Taiwan quite timely, we'll get to that in a moment. But set the stage. We're coming off some pretty high profile visits, high level visits. Secretary Yellen was in Beijing. The identity blink in there as well. Is this relationship, while complex, as stable as one can reasonably hope? I think it is. I would call it uncomfortable coexistence. I think we're going to have strategic competition for a great length of time over things like technology, values, global south, economic, political.
We are in a long-term strategic competition with the Chinese, and it's inevitable. The two greatest economic powers in the world, now really the two great military powers in the world, we inevitably are in this position. But that doesn't mean war. And I think Americans are very clear, American military leaders, and American political leaders. We're not looking for war with China. But we do compete, and our values are different. And we do have different ideologies, and that is just a reality that we're all going to have to live with.
That takes us into the Taiwan conversation. You mentioned war. The US has said it's not interested in war. The Chinese have also said it's not something they want. Why do we keep talking about it then? Because there is a danger here. And the danger is that if Beijing were to ever feel that peaceful unification is impossible, then the political leadership in Beijing would be under pressure to do something about this situation. I do worry that William Ly and his inaugural address went too far. I think he provoked Beijing a little bit. The fact that he did not say that negotiations would be under the principle of the Republic of China Constitution was a dangerous thing to say.
Because it gets away from the one China concept. So I worry that we are in a little more tense period that Beijing and Washington are going to have to care to fully manage William Ly. Washington can't love Taiwan too much. There is a danger with all of these congressmen and senators loving China and Taiwan that the leadership in Taiwan might get the sense that they can move further. And I think that's very dangerous. The status quo is wonderful. My president, when I served him George Bush, established the principle of unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. I think that's the perfect position. Taiwan gets a certain degree of independence. Beijing is assured that the United States isn't going to support independence. I think that's where we want to be.
If I remember correctly, it takes me into Donald Trump, possibly a 2.0. One of the first calls he took during his first few days in office was from the time, was then Taiwan president, Taiwan. What does that look like for this relation? For this status quo as you laid it out. I think there's some danger. I noticed that former Secretary Pompeo is in Taiwan a lot. I wonder what he is saying to the government on Taiwan about what would happen in a Trump administration. I think personally, Trump actually is not that engaged on the Taiwan question. I see Trump trying to make a deal with the Chinese over trade, actually. I think he's got this whole plan of 60% tariffs is really a way to stimulate the Chinese into talks.
And I think we would actually find that Trump and Xi Jinping end up with a fairly good relationship. Is there room for an improvement in relations going into elections, six, let's call it five, six months away. No, in fact, it goes the other direction. If you look, what Biden right now is focused on is Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. And all the anti-China steps that have been taken recently on tariffs, on EVs, it's all about those states. If Biden is gonna win, he has to take those three states. My friend, Charlie Cook, who's here as well, makes that case.
The only way Biden wins is through those three swing states. So he is doing everything possible to galvanize and get out the union vote. And that's an anti-China vote. And so that's why you're seeing these steps, and I would anticipate more of them before the election. What do you expect from the Chinese side? They probably know, they likely know, this is all political noise to us, to the US. I absolutely understand what's going on. They're not gonna overreact because it's politics. They'll wanna make a point, though. They will wanna make a point, and we're gonna see them do some things. We've already seen them threaten a few things. I think they'll have to, in part, to keep the Europeans from doing some of these things.
Remember, on the EVs, there's the whole issue of Europe now, and what steps Europe might take. So I think the Chinese to scare the Europeans off a little bit, we're going to see them take some retaliatory steps. What does this mean for businesses? Certainly the cost of doing business has gone up. China plus one, reforring with de-risking. Companies are sometimes willing to make that investment if there is certainty ahead, if they can make that investment back.
Does the level of uncertainty even get worse from here, or do you see things as bad as they can possibly get? I think a little more uncertainty, one of the problems is that on emerging technologies, the administration's going to keep looking at these, and keep ratcheting up. We're not at the end, because the thing about emerging technologies is they continue to move. And the administration's going to have to make decisions on new technologies and how much to restrict those.
And so the small yard, high fence, is going to get bigger. The yard's going to get bigger, the fence is going to get higher. That is an inevitability just because of the nature of technology. For those companies that rely on China, whether as an end market, as a part of their supply chain, China's maintained and said it's open for business, it says come in, we welcome foreign investments. But foreign investment has trickled through it.
It's not pre-pandemic level, it's just yet. What do you make up the messaging coming out of Beijing? What do you think they need to do to get that message across? Because there seems to be also this information, this asymmetry, this gap in between. The difficulty in Beijing right now is that there is this emphasis on national security. They have this problem with Xinjiang. I believe Xinjiang was an espionage case.
I think that's scared Beijing. And you can see that the MSS has been allowed to do much more publicly than it had before. So there's this tension between national security and wanting the West to come in. And it's going to be interesting to see how Beijing navigates that. I'm very interested, obviously, in the third plenum coming up. What that tells us about Chinese economic policies and about the opening to the West.