What the Collapse of SVB Means For Deposits and Interest Rate Increases
发布时间 2023-03-22 09:00:02 来源
You're listening to leaders in lending from Upstart, a podcast dedicated to helping consumer lenders grow their programs and improve their product offerings.
你正在聆听 Upstart 的贷款领袖们，这是一档致力于帮助消费者贷款公司发展计划并提升产品提供的播客。
Each week, hear decision makers in the finance industry offer insights into the future of the lending industry. Best practices around digital transformation. And more, let's get into the show.
每周，听金融业决策者对贷款业的未来提供见解。最佳数字化转型实践。还有更多内容，让我们进入节目吧。
Welcome to leaders in lending. This week's episode features my conversation with Nick Timmeros, the chief economics correspondent for the Wall Street Journal.
欢迎来到借贷领域的领袖。这周的节目将与华尔街日报的首席经济通讯员尼克·蒂默洛斯进行对话。
Nick and I had originally planned to talk mostly about the Fed, but given that we recorded this podcast on Thursday, March 16, less than a week after the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, we decided to delve a little bit into what happened with those institutions, what the response from the federal government has been and how effective it's been. And how that might impact stimulus, monetary policy, other government policy moving for, what we think the after effects of those collapses might be.
Nick和我原本打算大多聊一聊美联储，但由于我们在3月16日星期四录制了这个播客，而在洛杉矶，硅谷银行和Signature Bank不到一周就倒闭了，所以我们决定深入了解这些机构发生了什么事，联邦政府的响应以及它的有效性。以及这可能如何影响刺激，货币政策和其他政府政策。我们认为这些倒闭行带来的后果会是什么。
It was a very timely conversation. We are glad that we could have Nick on to talk about this very important topic with us. So it was a really interesting conversation. I know I learned a lot about something that doesn't happen all that often and kind of what the causes and possible after effects are. And I hope you will as well.
这次聊天的时机非常适合。我们很高兴能邀请Nick和我们谈论这个非常重要的话题。所以这是一个非常有趣的交谈。我知道我学到了很多罕见事件的原因和可能的后果。我希望你们也会这样。
So please enjoy this conversation with Nick Timmeros.
所以，请享受与Nick Timmeros的这次交谈。
Nick, welcome to the podcast. Thanks for making the time to join us today. Thanks for having me.
尼克，欢迎来到播客节目。感谢您今天抽出时间加入我们。谢谢邀请我。
You know, we're recording this here on what is it Thursday, the 16th of March. And we talked last week about things we might talk about. And I feel like over the weekend, the world changed. There's maybe timely topics that we don't want to ignore that have occurred.
你知道，我们正在这里录制，是三月十六号星期四。上周我们谈论了一些我们可能要谈论的事情。但是我感觉在周末，世界发生了变化。有些可能是即时的话题，我们不想忽略。
So I thought I might just start off with, you know, roughly the takeaways you have from what happened. Obviously, I'm talking about Silicon Valley Bank and the kind of failure of that bank is stepping in of the federal government, the FDIC and kind of where we're at. Like what's your takeaway as we as we talk about this a couple days after the, you know, the ultimate takeover by the FDIC of what happened and how we responded.
所以，我想我可能会从大致上谈谈您对发生的事情的结论开始。显然，我正在谈论硅谷银行以及该银行的失败和联邦政府FDIC介入的情况，以及我们现在的处境。就像我们在经历了FDIC最终接管发生的事情并逐渐适应后，您对此的看法是什么。
Well, I think there are a couple things. One question has been, of course, what was going to break in this Fed interest rate cycle, right? The Fed is saying is the Fed always raises rates until something breaks or someone always goes through the windshield. And so now we're beginning to see. I mean, we knew last year, obviously, crypto and some of the other digital assets that had, you know, gotten parabolic in 2021 came back down.
嗯，我认为有几个问题。当然，一个问题是在这个联邦利率周期中会发生什么，不是吗？联邦储备委员会正在说联邦储备委员会总是提高利率，直到某些事情崩溃或者总有人撞到挡风玻璃。所以现在我们开始看到了。我的意思是，去年我们知道，显然，加密货币和其他一些数字资产在2021年达到了高峰，然后回落了。
But this is, you know, now you're getting into things that obviously policymakers are more concerned about because if you damage credit creation, you know, credits the lifeblood of the economy. Now we're beginning to see some of the casualties of the Fed's rate increases. And I think it's raising questions about how the Fed will respond because the Fed wants the economy to slow down. They want demand. They want to restrict demand to bring inflation down, get supply demand and a balance. But they don't want to do it by causing a banking crisis.
嗯，现在你已经开始涉及到那些显然是政策制定者更为关注的事情了，因为如果你损害了信贷的创造，那么信贷就是经济的命脉。现在我们开始看到联邦储备委员会加息所造成的损失，这引起了对联储会如何回应的问题，因为联储想要经济放缓，他们想要的是需求，他们想要限制需求来抑制通胀、将供需达到平衡，但他们不想引发银行危机来实现这一目标。
And so the analogy I use, Jeff, is sometimes, you know, the Fed doesn't know how its moves are going to affect the economy. They call those the lags of monetary policy. And it's like hitting that glass ketchup bottle. You keep hitting it. Nothing comes out. Nothing comes out. And then you smack it in another time and everything comes out. They want more of a squeezable bottle where they can kind of control it carefully. But that is not how the economy and industry policy works.
所以，我用一个比喻来解释，有时候联邦储备委员会不知道它的政策会对经济产生什么影响。他们称这叫货币政策的滞后效应。这就像打玻璃酱瓶一样。你不停地打，什么都不出来，什么都不出来。然后你再狠狠地一击，所有的东西都出来了。他们想要更易控制的挤压式瓶子。但经济和工业政策并不是这样运作的。
Is there anything you think gets them close? I love the squeeze bottle analogy. And I've got the ones out that you store upside down. So they're not really squeezable. But the ketchup right there. Yeah. And now it's right there for you. Is there anything that is equating to that? I mean, obviously not to the upside down squeeze bottle. But to the more real-time understanding of the impact of changes to the economy that they can respond to.
你认为有什么方法能让他们更接近目标吗？我喜欢这个挤压瓶的比喻。我拿出了存放倒置的那种，所以它们并不能真正被挤压。但就在那边的那瓶番茄酱，是的，现在就在那边等着你了。有什么方法能够与那个类比呢？我是说，显然不是倒置挤压瓶的那种，而是更实时地理解经济变化对他们的影响，并能够做出响应的方法。
Because that's an interesting analogy. And I'm curious if you see anything that moves them closer to a squeeze bottle from banging on the 57 on the glass one.
因为那是一个有趣的比喻，我很好奇你是否看到了任何东西将它们从敲打在玻璃瓶上的57挤压到挤压瓶中的。
Well, you know, so I think the challenge here for the Fed is they have a mandate to bring inflation down, but it is harder to do that if you have an unstable financial system.
嗯，你知道的，我认为Fed面临的挑战在于他们有责任将通货膨胀降低，但如果你有一个不稳定的金融体系，这就变得更难了。
So what we saw, you know, this past Sunday was they came out, they made two big moves. The first one was they said they would, they said also, by the way, signature bank has been closed in New York. And we're going to, we're going to stand behind the uninsured depositors of Silicon Valley bank and signature bank.
我们上个星期天看到的是，他们采取了两个重大举措。第一个是他们说，顺便说一下，Signature银行已经在纽约关闭了。我们将支持无保险存款人的硅谷银行和Signature银行。
And they did that by invoking what's called the systemic risk exception. The FDIC has to resolve failed banks in the least cost manner for their deposit insurance fund unless they deem they and the Fed and the Treasury deem there to be a systemic risk which allows them to not focus on the least cost to the deposit insurance fund.
他们通过引用所谓的系统性风险例外来实现这一点。美国联邦存款保险公司必须以最低成本的方式为其存款保险基金解决失败的银行，除非他们认为联邦储备委员会和财政部认为存在系统性风险，这使他们不必专注于最低成本来保护存款保险基金。
So that was the first step. The second step was because there was some concern. There was a lot of concern that you would have a bank run on Monday morning if uninsured depositors of a bank that was seen as, you know, fairly stable.
那是第一步。第二步是因为有些担忧。很多人担心，如果一个被认为相当稳定的银行的未受保险存款人在周一早上开始银行恐慌，那就糟糕了。
I read that signature bank had by rating from more than half of the Wall Street analysts that cover it. So if, you know, people wake up on Monday and they say, well, the equity analysts who cover this bank couldn't do the credit risk analysis. What prospect do uninsured depositors have? You would have had runs on other banks that we're seeing is not large enough to have the government in there.
我读到签名银行得到了半数以上覆盖它的华尔街分析师的评级。因此，如果有人在星期一醒来并说，那些覆盖这家银行的股票分析师无法进行信用风险分析，那么未保险存款人的前景会怎样呢？其他看到的银行已经出现了挤兑，但签名银行规模并不大，政府不需要介入。
So they created this facility at the Fed called the bank term funding facility. I'm missing one of the acronyms there, but essentially it said, if people want to get their money out of the bank, we will provide a way for banks to borrow from us in order to meet demands for withdrawals. And the hope was that that would sort of cauterize this problem.
所以他们在美联储设立了一项名为银行期限融资设施的机构。我不记得其中一个首字母缩略词了，但基本上是说，如果人们想要把钱从银行里取出来，我们将提供一种借钱给银行以满足提款需求的方式。希望这样能够解决这个问题。
And you know, you don't actually have to use it, right? Like Hank Paulson said about backing the GSCs in 2008. If you have a bazooka, people know you have it. Maybe you won't have to use it. So this was really an insurance policy to say, all right, if there is, if there are deposit outflows on Monday, banks are going to be able to meet them. So maybe there won't need to be deposit outflows on Monday.
你知道，你其实不需要使用它，对吧？就像Hank Paulson在2008年支持GSCs时说的一样。如果你有个火箭筒，别人知道你有它。也许你不必使用它。所以这实际上是一项保险政策，以表示，好的，如果周一有存款流出，银行将能够满足需求。所以也许周一不需要出现存款流出。
Do you sense that there is movement of foot to evaluate? I mean, this kind of feels like an admission that on some level, for any reason, one statistician, we're going to step in and ensure all deposits not feels like.
你感觉到有脚步运动来进行评估吗？我的意思是，这种感觉像是在暗示，无论出于何种原因，如果一个统计学家出现问题，我们会介入并确保所有存款都不像有问题。
I think a lot of people, I mean, I think many consumers and even businesses don't understand the idea that they're in the deposits are not actually at the bank, that they're at some risk. They're kind of lending the bank the money to make loans and that there's risk in doing that.
我觉得很多人，也就是说很多消费者甚至企业并不理解他们的存款其实并不在银行，而是有一定风险的。他们实际是将钱借给银行用于贷款，这是有风险的。
I mean, most of us just as when you put your money in the bank, and if you leave it in the bank account, that should be the safest place it could be that can't go anywhere. And I don't know if there's going to be a movement to actually make that more formal and official and more holistic way where it's kind of implicit for the systemically important financial institutions where it's kind of an implicit guarantee from the government beyond the standard insurance limits. And now a questionable one for at least two institutions that make you assume that in the future, some similar measures might be taken.
我是说，我们大多数人放钱到银行里时，如果将钱保留在银行账户里，这应该是最安全的地方，而且不可能出现任何问题。不知道是否会有一个运动来使这更加正式、官方化并更加全面，甚至成为一个系统重要金融机构的隐含保证，除了标准保险限制之外，还有可能由政府提供。目前，至少有两家机构存在问题，迫使你认为在未来可能会采取类似的措施。
I'm curious if you think there's some movement to make that a more official stance to make like an unlimited deposit guarantee. We've got to remove the limits on the deposit. It really raises questions about what's the future for deposit insurance, right? Because regulators said after 2008 that they had tried to address too big to fail.
我好奇你是否认为有一些运动来使那成为更正式的立场，像无限存款保障。我们必须移除存款的限制。这真的引发了对于存款保险未来的问题，对吧？因为监管者在2008年之后说他们试图解决太大而无法失败的问题。
And Silicon Valley Bank wasn't considered by anybody to be too big to fail. The 16th largest bank in the country. But I think a couple things to note here. One is the speed of the run on that bank was just shocking, right? A quarter of the deposits out the door in one day, $42 billion out of deposits being withdrawn.
而且在任何人眼里，硅谷银行都不被认为太大而不能倒闭。虽然是全国第16大银行。但有几个要点需要注意。首先是银行出现流失的速度令人震惊，一天内有四分之一的存款被取出，420亿美元的存款被取出。
And when you look at the customers of the bank, I mean, this was a very concentrated customer base, not insured deposits. These were not stable deposits, right? There was a risk that if people thought the bank wasn't safe, they would run. So I think now you probably are hoping bank supervisors are going through them looking at other banks that are in the same situation where they might not have such stable deposits. So that's one point.
当你看看这个银行的客户群，我的意思是，这是一个非常集中的客户群，他们的存款没有保证。这些存款不是稳定的，对吧？如果人们认为银行不安全，就会出现挤兑风险。所以我认为现在你可能希望银行监管机构正在审查其他情况类似但存款不太稳定的银行。这是一个要点。
I think, you know, this is not new, though, this problem for regulators. And I wrote a book last year about the Fed's response to the COVID crisis called trillion-dollar triage. I think this was a lot on the Fed, Jerry Powell, he worked at the Treasury Department in 1991 in January of 1991. So this is in the thick of resolving the bank failures that came out of interest rate increases in the 1980s.
我想说，你知道，对于监管机构来说，这个问题并不新鲜。去年，我写了一本关于美联储对COVID危机的应对的书，名为Trillion-Dollar Triage。我认为这对美联储和杰里·鲍威尔产生了很大的压力，他在1991年1月在财政部工作。因此，这是在解决20世纪80年代利率上涨所产生的银行倒闭问题的高峰期。
And then there was a Sunday in the, I think the first weekend of the year, 91, the Bank of New England was failing. And they were talking about what to do with the uninsured depositors. This was the 33rd largest bank in the country at the time. It was going to be the third largest bank failure in the country at the time. And then, I want to say $19 billion in deposits, only 10% uninsured. So really the inverse, it was more than 90% of those deposits, the Silicon Valley bank were not insured.
然后有一天星期天，我认为是91年的第一个周末，新英格兰银行出了问题。他们在讨论怎么处理没有保险的存款人。当时，这是全国第33大银行，也是当时排名第三的银行之一。据说有190亿美元的存款，只有10%没有保险。实际上，逆转率更高，超过90%的那些存款来自硅谷银行，没有受到保险的保护。
So what did they do? Powell's boss was a Harvard academic, his name was Bob Glover. And he kind of got up on his soapbox and he said, this is moral hazard. If we step in and bail out these uninsured depositors, then there won't be any risk, no plan risk taking by bank management or the wealthy people or customers that put their money in the bank. They should know what that bank is up to.
那么，他们做了什么呢？Powell的老板是哈佛大学的学者，名叫Bob Glover。他有点站在讲台上，说这是道德风险。如果我们介入并拯救这些没有保险的存款人，那么银行管理层或富人或客户进行的计划风险承担就没有任何风险了。他们应该知道银行在做什么。
And the Fed, then there was a Fed governor, the name John Lawyer, and he said, okay, well, if you do that, here's what we think is going to happen. Every money sent, there will be a run on every bank in the country, as they're uninsured depositors try to get their money out on Monday morning. They will come to us, and then we will be dealing with that problem. So you're the government, you can do whatever you want, but that's what we think is going to happen.
然后有一个联邦储备委员会的委员，名叫约翰·罗伊尔，他说：“好的，如果你这样做，这就是我们认为会发生的事情。每笔钱都会导致全国所有银行遭遇挤兑，因为没有被保险的存款人会在星期一早上取出他们的钱。他们会来找我们，然后我们就得处理这个问题。所以你们是政府，可以做任何想做的事，但这就是我们认为会发生的事情。”
And Powell later explained, you know, we chose the backstop of the depositors without dissent. So people, you know, are surprised this happened, but it's not surprising really if you look at the history of this, this is how policy makers have responded on this topic.
鲍威尔后来解释说，你知道，我们选择了储户作为后备措施，而没有异议。所以人们会惊讶这种情况发生了，但如果你看一看历史，这其实并不令人意外，这就是政策制定者对这个问题的应对方式。
Yeah, and I think the comment, I think the president made the same comment. They've kind of like the equity holders, the bond holders, those guys are taking risk and they deserve to be wiped out. But I do think there's at least in the common man's perspective, a pretty big difference between the depositors who had their money in a checking account and the person who had equity or bond.
嗯，我认为评论，我认为总统也发表了同样的评论。他们有点像股权持有人，债券持有人，这些人正在冒险，他们应该被摧毁。但我认为至少从普通人的角度来看，存款人与持有股权或债券的人之间存在相当大的区别，存款人将钱存入支票账户中。
And I don't know what you're taking, but my sense is that like, small businesses were supposed to be looking at the financials of a bank to understand if they had their money at a safe bank that was making responsible lending or not, that that was supposed to be a backstop.
我不知道你拿了什么，但我的感觉是小企业应该通过查看银行的财务状况来确定他们的钱是否安全地存放在一个负责任的、负责任的借贷银行，这应该是一种保障。
And at the other point, you know, the buy side analysts, the sales and all, and the equity markets were telling me these were good banks, you know, both of them having been through their audits relatively recently and coming out with clean bills of health from auditors, like it seems to me a bit unrealistic to think that the depositor is the one who's supposed to impose some sort of financial discipline by being unrelenting deposit with banks, making risky moves with money.
在另一方面，你知道，买方分析师、销售以及股票市场告诉我这些都是好银行。这两家银行最近完成了审计，从审计师处得到了健康的账单。那么，认为存款人应该通过毫不妥协地向银行存款、进行风险投资来施加某种财务纪律，我觉得有些不切实际。
That's the idea that that's a backstop. That seems a bit misguided to me. It does though raise questions about, all right, well, if every time this happens, then the government's going to step in and, you know, ensure the uninsured depositors, what are we doing with deposit insurance going forward? Should that be priced differently?
那个想法是这样的，那相当于是一个安全保障。在我看来，这似乎有点误导。不过，这确实引发了一些问题，如：如果每次出现这种情况，政府都会介入，保障那些没有保险的存款人，那么我们在未来应该如何处理存款保险？应该对其定价不同吗？
I think the other thing that we saw, you know, this week again, it's March 16th or so. But what we saw at the beginning of the week was it didn't actually provide maybe the measure of confidence that you might have hoped that these actions, obviously we don't know the counterfactual.
我认为我们看到的另一件事情，你知道的，就在这周，大约是3月16日左右。但是我们在这周初看到的事情，并没有给人带来足够的信心，显然我们无法知道实际情况的反面。
A lot of people think it would have been a lot worse if the government hadn't done what they did. But I think a couple of people I've talked to have said what spooked folks about this is one, Silicon Valley bank, you know, the beginning of March, even though they had had some people knew generally what the problems were there. They had some interest rate risk that was causing problems for them.
很多人认为，如果政府没有采取行动，情况会更糟。但我认识的几个人说，他们对这件事感到害怕的原因之一是硅谷银行，在三月初，尽管一些人已经知道他们那里的问题，但他们还是有一些利率风险给他们造成了困扰。
They had bought a lot of lower yielding, long duration mortgages and treasury securities when they had all these deposits coming in in 2020 and 2021. You think of the kind of the pandemic tech boom or bubble that we had. And so this bank benefited from that. They put that money to work. They didn't manage the interest rate risk, perhaps as prudently as other banks have. And that caught up to them.
他们在2020年和2021年有很多存款进账时，购买了许多回报率较低、持续期较长的抵押贷款和国库证券。你可以想象一下我们曾经经历的大流行病科技繁荣或泡沫。所以这家银行从中受益。他们将那笔钱投入了工作。他们可能没有像其他银行那样谨慎地管理利率风险。而这最终追上了他们。
But the concern was that was seen as a fairly strong, healthy franchise. I talked to somebody who said, you know, two weeks ago, if you had said you want to own this franchise, they would have said, of course I do. Then people see how quickly the money can leave the bank.
但是担心的是，这被看作是一个相当强大和健康的特许经营权。我与某人谈话时，他说，你知道，两周前，如果你说你想拥有这个特许经营权，他们会说，当然我想要。然后人们看到钱有多快地离开银行。
Now it's March 16th. No one has bought the bank. I think the FDIC is doing a second auction for the assets on Friday the 17th. But then people begin to say, well, wait a minute. This thing that I thought had great value, the value's gone. The depositors fled. That leads to questions now around other similarly situated mid-size regional banks. And that's a concern because if the deposits are seen, deposits are usually seen as sticky. And if they're now seen as flighty, at least for these regional players, then you have a unstable equilibrium potentially, especially as deposit rates have stayed fairly low.
现在是3月16日。没有人购买这家银行。我认为FDIC将在17日星期五进行第二次资产拍卖。但接着人们开始说，等等，我以为这个东西很有价值，但价值已经消失了。存款人逃离了。这引发了关于其他类似的中型地区银行的问题。这是一个问题，因为存款通常被视为粘性资产。如果它们现在被视为不稳定，至少对于这些地区银行，那么您可能会出现不稳定的平衡状况，特别是由于存款利率一直保持相对较低。
And the Fed has raised interest rates a lot. And so there's a gap you can close there by raising deposit rates. But that could create a negative funding spread for banks or certainly, you know, lower margins. And so I think those are the concerns that haven't been fully addressed or resolved yet.
美联储已经大幅提高了利率。因此，通过提高存款利率，您可以缩小差距。但这可能会为银行带来负资金成本差，或者至少会降低银行的利润率。因此，我认为这些问题尚未得到充分解决或解决。
Yeah. And the other thing is when I talk to banks that I definitely hear is the stickiness of deposits and the question of if that, the historical stickiness can be maintained in the future. Particularly, I mean, you know, the banks have this idea of beta, like how much they have to raise interest rates on deposits and keep deposits as interest rates in the markets rise.
嗯，另一件事是当我与银行交谈时，我听到的确实是存款的粘性和历史上的粘性是否能在未来保持。特别是，银行有这种beta的想法，即他们需要提高存款利率并保持存款利率随着市场的利率上升。
You really have to match that. And the answer has typically been not that much. But we've also, for quite a period of time, haven't had interest rates go so far so quickly that people are going, wait a minute, I can go get three and a half points on a checking account at one of these new FinTechy banks. Like, that's a pretty big delta from the 0.5 or whatever I might be getting.
你真的要匹配它。而答案通常是不怎么匹配。但是我们也有相当长的一段时间，利率没有迅速上涨到让人们想，“等一下，我可以在其中一个新的金融科技银行得到 3.5 点的支票账户利率。”那是从我可能得到的 0.5 点的差距相当大。
And so I do think there's more concern that those deposits are becoming less sticky, both because there's a big beta, a big delta in terms of yield available from a traditional, you know, most banks today and the most aggressive banks on the forefront. And to your point, just how rapidly and easy it is for people to move money. I mean, that $42 billion in a day was just, I think, terrifying people that it couldn't just, I mean, it's just a click on the bank. Click on the cell phone away from moving for A to B.
所以我认为人们更加担心这些存款不够稳定，这是因为传统银行与最前沿的最积极银行之间的收益率差距很大。另外，正如你所说，人们转移资金的速度和方便程度也很快。我的意思是，那420亿美元的转移速度只需要一个简单的银行或手机点击就可以从A到B。这使人们感到恐慌。
And I think that's a new reality that people are not quite sure what to deal with, what to do about and how to think about how much stickiness of deposits really has been more less permanently shed, particularly if there's a big, big gap in return rates.
我认为这是一个新的现实，人们还不太确定如何处理，该怎么做以及如何思考存款的粘性到底有多少被永久性减少了，特别是如果回报率有大大的差距。
Yeah, it's, I mean, people have called it the first, you know, bank run of the digital age or the 21st century, right? This kind of social media. And, you know, it's a cliche to say perfect storm, but you did kind of have a perfect storm here.
是的，我是说，有人把它称为数字时代或21世纪的第一次银行运行，对吧？这种社交媒体。你知道，说“完美风暴”已经成为陈词滥调，但在这里确实发生了一场完美的风暴。
And I think that's a very, you know, these startups that need a stable source of funding, they're on tech, they're talking to each other, they're all being financed by some of the same, you know, they're portfolio companies of the same venture capital firms. So once word went out, get your money out of this bank, you know, there wasn't a whole lot to do at that point.
我觉得那对于那些需要稳定资金来源的初创公司来说是一个非常棒的机会。他们都在从事科技行业，并且彼此之间交流着。他们的资金大多都来自于同样的风险投资公司。因此，一旦流言蜚语传开，让大家把钱从这家银行中取出来，那时候也没有什么可做的了。
It really, and it took, I think it took the regulators just by surprise because we're not used to seeing deposits flee that quickly. I'm sure they thought they had more time to try to do what normally happens, which is, well, if this bank isn't going to make it, we're going to find a buyer, we'll go in, take it over on the weekend, announce it after, you know, close the business Friday, but here you had the state regulator in California going in at 8.50 in the morning. And I think that also spooked people that, gee, that this could just happen that fast.
这真的很让人吃惊，我认为监管机构也感到意外，因为我们不习惯看到存款如此快地离开。我相信他们认为自己还有更多时间来做通常发生的事情，也就是，如果这个银行无法生存下去，我们会找到一个买家，在周末接管它，然后在周一公布它，但是这次加州州监管机构在早上8点50分就进去了。我认为这也让人们感到惊恐，哇，这竟然可以这么快地发生。
Yeah. Yeah, I think there's probably, if you looked at the depositor to Twitter user ratio at Silicon Valley Bay, quite a bit higher than most institutions, and that kind of like the meme stocks that kind of went crazy on Reddit, I mean, it was, it was an environment where those customers were highly concentrated in a small number of information channels, which could cause, you know, at least within that depositor based on high degree of contagion really rapidly, which is probably a bit unique to some of these, you know, to Silicon Valley bank and others, but in the general concept of how much more quickly this thing can spread in the age of social media is probably a very real phenomenon for every institution.
嗯，我认为在硅谷湾，如果你观察存款人和推特用户的比例，会比大多数机构高出很多。这有点像在Reddit上热门的那些股票迷因，意味着这样的客户高度集中在少数信息渠道上，这可能会导致至少在存款人中非常迅速地传播，这对于硅谷银行和其他机构可能是有点独特的现象，但在社交媒体时代，这种快速传播的现象对于每个机构来说可能是一个非常真实的现象。
Yeah, definitely. And, you know, I think it's something where people are only going to now have to figure out how to deal with it. I mean, I saw something from a communications, a PR shop this week, sort of tying their clients like, you got to get on top of this when it happens now, you got to have a plan and tell people what it is you're actually doing so that they, if they're feeling sick, you can make them feel well.
是的，绝对没错。我认为这是一个人们现在必须得学会应对的问题。本周我看到一家传播和公共关系公司的一篇文章，提醒他们的客户，必须在发生时立即应对这个问题，制定一个计划并告诉人们你所做的事情，如果他们感到不舒服，就可以帮助他们感觉更好。
Yeah, yeah. I do think the other piece of that, if you think of this as being a Silicon Valley bank's experience, particularly being kind of a combination of some mismanaged interest rate and duration risk, along with the kind of very rapid bank run, the communications seems to have been one of the places where people wanted to not do the best job of kind of calming their customers and their crisis communications PR firms, I think, are using this as an example of, did not really effectively manage the communications and the risk through that as they could have is probably a good, a good note for others.
是的，我确实认为在这种情况下，如果你将其视为硅谷银行的经验，特别是一些管理不善的利率和期限风险，再加上非常快速的银行挤兑，传播似乎是人们不想要做的最好的工作之一，冷静他们的客户和他们的危机传播公关公司，我认为，将这作为一个例子，没有真正有效地管理沟通和 风险，他们可以的，这可能是其他人的一个好的提示。
Yeah, it was, I mean, but what the catalyst for all this was on Wednesday night, they announced they were going to raise capital, I think, to $2.25 billion. They were going to have to sell. They were going to have to take losses on some of these hold from maturity securities. And so they were going to record a loss and that just made people ask questions. And so you want to try to answer those questions before people can say, well, wait a minute, what else might we not know? What's going on here? Right.
是的，那时候的情况确实是这样，但导致这一切的催化剂是周三晚宣布他们将筹集资金，我想是到22.5亿美元。他们将不得不出售一些持有到到期的证券，从而产生损失。因此，他们将录得一项亏损，这激起了人们的质疑。所以在人们质疑之前，您需要尝试回答这些问题。不然，人们可能会问，嘿，我们还不知道什么？这里发生了什么事？对吧。
So I'd like to shift a little bit from the story to, you know, we were actually talking about the Fed and I think a lot of people are debating what will the Fed do now. Are they going to stop interest rate rises or like, you know, how are they going to respond?
我想稍微转换一下话题，因为我们实际上在谈论联邦储备系统，很多人在讨论联邦储备系统如何作出反应。他们会停止加息吗？或者，你知道的，他们会采取哪种策略？
And the thing you and I talked about that I think is fascinating is getting beyond this kind of simplistic view of the Fed as kind of things happen in the world. And then just the Fed responds as if it's a monolithic institution that just isn't input output kind of, you know, we just keep raising rates until inflation hits the nerve.
你和我之前聊过一件我觉得很有意思的事情，就是超越这种对联邦储备委员会的简单看法，认为它只是对全球事件做出反应的单一机构，而不是像输入输出一样的单一机构，我们会一直加息直到通货膨胀触动神经。
Remember, we want, and then we decrease rates until we're even, but it's really, it's really ultimately run by individuals, and particularly Chairman Powell. And so, tell me a little bit about how you think his perspective, like where's he coming from when he thinks about, I mean, obviously, I'm going to say, I'm going to say, I'm going to say that it was an unusual world pre this particular incident in terms of the interest rate rises we'd seen in the economy we've been experiencing.
记住，我们想要这样做，然后降低利率直到我们达到平衡，但实际上，这是由个人来决定的，尤其是鲍威尔主席。那么，请告诉我一些关于他的角度的想法，当他考虑这个问题时，他是从哪里来的呢？显然，我要说，在这次特定事件之前，我们所看到的经济利率上升是一个不寻常的世界。
Where do you think he's coming from and the motivations that are driving him? And then I guess after that we'll talk about what you think we might see from the Fed moving forward.
你认为他来自哪里？是什么动力推动了他？然后，我猜我们会讨论一下你认为联邦储备委员会未来的动向可能会有什么。
So Powell just to give some background, he's spent his career mostly in the private sector as I said before. He worked in the Bush administration, the first Bush administration in the early 90s. And then private sector, private equity, you know, came back to, he's from Washington. So he was living in Washington, not really working in 2011 and worked on the debt limit problem.
那么，关于鲍威尔，先给大家介绍一些背景。他的职业生涯大部分时间都在私营领域，正如我之前所说的。他曾在90年代初的布什政府任职。之后，他回到私营股权领域工作，他来自华盛顿。2011年的时候，他住在华盛顿，不是很忙碌，在解决债务限制问题方面工作了一下。
He really helped the Geithner, Tim Greithner, the Treasury Secretary, convince Republicans, here was a Republican private equity guy saying, you guys got to raise a debt limit, even though you don't want to because you'll just really screw everything up if you don't. And so they sort of thanked him for it and they put him on the Fed board. They were also having trouble getting Republicans to agree to one of their nominees for the Fed.
他真的帮助了财政部长蒂姆·盖特纳说服共和党人，因为这位共和党人私募股权人说：“你们必须提高债务上限，尽管你们不想这样做，因为如果不这样做，一切都会很糟糕。” 所以他们对他表示感谢，并将他任命为联邦储备委员会成员。他们还在努力说服共和党人同意他们提名的联邦储备委员会成员之一。
So he's on the Fed for five years under Bernanke and Yellen and he sort of became a centrist. Republicans were quite unhappy with the policies that been Bernanke and Janet Yellen and Powell supported them. Donald Trump becomes president. And he sort of likes Janet Yellen's policies, even though he wants to have his own person in the job. So Powell becomes the Fed chair.
那么他在伯南克和耶伦时期加入了联邦储备委员会，任职五年，并且他有点成为了中间派。共和党人对伯南克和珍妮特·耶伦的政策非常不满，鲍威尔支持了这些政策。唐纳德·特朗普成为总统。他有些喜欢珍妮特·耶伦的政策，尽管他想把自己的人安置在那个位置上。于是鲍威尔成为了联邦储备委员会主席。
And Powell had taken sort of in that same tradition of Bernanke and Yellen of you that, you know, the economy needed more support after the COVID shock. The Fed went all in. And the concern before the COVID shock had been that actually growth is too weak across the world. And the inflation and interest rates are going to be low, that's going to leave central banks with less room to stimulate.
保罗在这方面采取了伯南克和耶伦的传统，他们认为，经济在疫情冲击之后需要更多的支持。美联储全力以赴。在疫情冲击之前，人们担心全球经济增长实际上太弱了。通货膨胀和利率将会很低，这将使央行刺激经济的空间变得更少。
Then of course you get hit with this inflation in 2021. And now, you know, I think Powell is focused on making sure that he isn't remembered as the central banker who undoes 40 years of relatively successful inflation control or what was seen as inflation control by the central bank, by the Fed, you know, Volker, Greenspan, Bernanke and Yellen.
当然啦，你现在还得面对2021年的通货膨胀问题。我认为鲍威尔的关注点现在是要确保他不会被人们记作中央银行家中的一位，因为他是在40年来相对成功的通货膨胀控制或者说是联邦储备银行、Volker、Greenspan、Bernanke和Yellen所认为的通货膨胀控制的基础上破坏了它们。
And obviously there were other forces at play that helped inflation to stay low as it came down. But I think that's the concern now is you can't, you know, if you're the Fed and your job is to maintain price stability and maximum employment, but the Fed has already sort of said, you can't have great employment if you don't have price stability, if you don't have real wages going up, well, good as a job. So, that's, you know, that's, I think where he's coming from, where he's been coming from as he raises rates quite aggressively is there is no reason for this place to exist if we fail on inflation.
显然，还有其他的力量帮助保持了通货膨胀率下降时的低位。但我认为现在的担忧是，如果你是联邦储备局，你的工作是维持价格稳定和最大就业，但联储已经说过了，如果你没有价格稳定，如果你没有实际工资增长，你就不可能有良好的就业。所以，我认为他的担忧，他在加息时表现得非常积极主动，是因为如果我们在通货膨胀方面失败，那这个职位就没有存在的理由了。
Now one thing he has that Paul Volker didn't have for better or worse is the Fed has said they've set this new American inflation target of 2%. Volker didn't have to worry about that. New inflation was too high, he knew he needed to get a lower in 1982 as inflation came down from, you know, double digits down to four or five percent. He said, okay, I think I've done enough and he backed off. But the Fed now, and we can talk about this if you want, he has made 2% sort of the, the what they need to have. They've set that as their target. And so there's a, you know, the credibility is at stake for the institution, but also for Powell, and I think that is important in thinking about how this institution is approaching what they're dealing with here.
现在他所拥有的一个与保罗·沃尔克不同的东西，无论是好是坏，就是美联储已经宣布了新的美国通胀目标为2%。沃尔克并没有必要担心这个。当时通胀太高，他知道需要在1982年将其降低，因为通胀从两位数降至四或五个百分点以下。他说:“好的，我认为我已经做足了犹豫不决，于是他退缩了。但是现在，美联储已经将2%作为他们的目标，如果你想的话，我们可以谈论这个问题。因此，这种机构的可信度受到了威胁，但对于鲍威尔个人来说也非常重要，我们需要考虑这个机构如何处理它们正在面对的问题。
So let's dive into a little bit. Where did the 2% come from? What's the nature of the target for 2% that the rationale for a specific, specific target on that?
那么，我们来深入了解一下。2%是从哪里来的？2%的目标本质是什么，这个目标的理由是什么，为何需要一个具体而明确的目标呢？
So 2% wasn't something that, you know, economists did finely tuned empirical analysis to get to arrive at. It actually came from New Zealand. New Zealand had, like many countries, a bad inflation problem in the 1980s. And so in 1990, they said, all right, we're going to set a target of 0 to 2 percent. And actually we could fire you, central bank governor if you don't hit the target.
所以2％的数字不是经济学家通过精细调整的经验分析得出的，它实际上来自新西兰。像许多国家一样，新西兰在1980年代面临通货膨胀问题。因此，在1990年，他们说，好吧，我们将设定0到2％的目标。实际上，如果你没能达到这个目标，我们可以解雇你，央行行长。
The idea though was, if you tell people what it is you're trying to do, you know, monetary policy, interest rate policy operates through the financial sector. And so before the 1990s, the Fed didn't tell anybody what they were doing with interest rates. So they were just trying to make a big mystery. And you just kind of figured it out from what was happening in the overnight borrowing market.
这个想法是，如果你告诉人们你正在努力实现什么目标，比如货币政策、利率政策是通过金融部门来实施的。在1990年代之前，美联储没有告诉任何人他们对利率做了什么。他们只是试图制造一个大谜团，你只能从隔夜借贷市场的情况中推断出结果。
But there began to be this, you know, revolution, a glass nost in, in, in monetary policy where if you actually tell people what it is you're trying to do and how you will react to incoming data, the Fed's reaction function. If you tell people what your reaction function is, then as the economy unfolds, people in the markets, they're guessing, but they're really educated. They're really, well, better educated guesses about how you're going to respond.
但是开始出现了一种革命，你知道，一种关于货币政策的透明化，如果你真的告诉人们你想做什么，以及你将如何对接收到的数据做出反应，这就是美联储的反应函数。如果你告诉人们你的反应函数是什么，那么随着经济的发展，市场上的人们猜测，但他们确实很有教育程度。他们会做出更好的猜测，猜测你会如何做出反应。
And so interest rates begin to move as people begin to understand, well, actually, here's how the Fed's going to reaction this because we know the Fed is seeking, in this case, 2 percent inflation. So the Fed also up until that point in 1996, inflation hadn't, you know, inflation had been too high. And so they always knew the direction of travel was we want to bring inflation down.
那么，随着人们开始理解，利率开始动态调整。实际上，美联储将会采取下列措施，因为我们知道它寻求2%的通货膨胀率。以1996年为例，那时美联储一直知道通货膨胀率过高，因此方向一直是要将通货膨胀率降下来。
But by, by the early 2000s and you, you begin to worry maybe about, you know, interest rates went to 1 percent in 2003. There were concerns that, that maybe the problem could be too low as opposed to too high on inflation. Japan was dealing with deflation and it was a very difficult problem for that central bank to get out of it. It has been up until very recently.
到了21世纪初，在利率降到1%的时候，你开始担心可能会出现问题。有人担心通货膨胀的问题是太低而不是太高，这类似于日本正在处理的通货紧缩问题。对于央行来说，这是一个非常棘手的问题。一直到最近，他们还没有解决这个问题。
So Bernanke, Ben Bernanke goes and says, we should set an inflation target and they had sort of already informally been conducting policy with the eye of, you know, one, maybe it was one and a half, maybe it was 2 percent. But finally, the financial crisis hits in 2008 and they say, okay, this is, you know, this is it. We could have deflation here. Let's set a target. Let's announce what it's going to be.
所以，伯南克（Ben Bernanke）说，我们应该设定通货膨胀目标，他们已经以一定的方式进行政策制定，关注的是1%、1.5%或2%之类的数字。但最终，2008年的金融危机爆发，他们说，“好吧，这就是了，我们可能面临通货紧缩。”让我们设定一个目标。让我们公布它将是什么。
And there's a great quote from Bernanke before he became chair, he was a governor of the Fed and in 2003 at an FOMC meeting. He said to his colleagues, you know, ambiguity has its uses in games like poker, but monetary policy is a cooperative endeavor. And so if we tell people what it is that we're trying to do, we actually improve our odds of achieving it.
有一个很棒的引用来自伯南克在成为主席之前，他是美联储的一位理事，在2003年的FOMC会议上。他对他的同事们说，你们知道，在像扑克这样的游戏中，模糊性有其用处，但货币政策是一项合作努力。因此，如果我们告诉人们我们试图做什么，我们实际上可以提高实现它的可能性。
And so that's really where this 2 percent inflation targeting came from and it's something that's become a global standard really. Most central banks around the world have inflation targets with maybe some, you know, differences, but generally 2 percent has sort of become the standard.
所以这就是2%通胀目标的来源，这已经成为全球标准了。世界上的大多数中央银行都有通胀目标，可能有一些差异，但一般来说2%已经成为标准了。
The goal thing, what do you think happens if impacts like, like what we saw this weekend, like, are in conflict with 2 percent because inflation is obviously not there yet. And yet there's some sense that maybe they will stop raising rates for a little while based on the reaction to the failures of the banks, the concerns about contagion.
目标是什么，你认为如果像这个周末所见的那样的影响与通胀率相矛盾会发生什么呢？然而，很明显通胀还没有到达2%。尽管如此，由于银行的失败和关于蔓延的担忧，人们有一些感觉，也许他们会在一段时间内停止加息。
How do you think they weigh different factors in the economy against that inflation target? Is that becomes, once you've got to explicit target and you're not there, you kind of ties your hands and yet at the same time there are other things that you might want to take into consideration that might change your point of view. I'm curious how you think the Fed is trying to palen up weighing their things.
你认为他们如何权衡经济中的不同因素和通胀目标？一旦你已经明确设定了目标，但你没达到，你就像被绑住了手脚一样，但与此同时，你可能还想考虑其他事情，这可能会改变你的观点。我很好奇你认为美联储如何努力平衡这些事情。
So before the banking issues, the Fed had been able to say, well, this is pretty easy. Inflations, we have two mandates and kind of a silent third mandate. The two mandates are inflation, employment, maximum employment. The silent third mandate, I think, is financial stability. But financial stability was fine and employment was 3.6 percent unemployment in February. What's not to like about that?
所以在银行问题出现之前，美联储一直能够说，这还是比较容易的。通货膨胀是我们的两项职责之一，还有一个不太明显的第三项职责。两项职责分别是控制通货膨胀和实现最大就业。我认为，不太明显的第三项职责是确保金融稳定。但在金融稳定方面情况良好，而2月份失业率为3.6％，那还有什么不满意的呢？
So they were saying, well, we can just go all in on fighting inflation. Now, if unemployment rises or if you have financial instability, now you have to actually say, what are the trade-offs? How do we manage these trade-offs?
他们说，嗯，我们可以全力以赴地对抗通货膨胀。但是，如果失业率上升或者出现财务不稳定，现在你必须要考虑，这些权衡是什么？我们如何管理这些权衡？
One way they can manage it and you hear some people talking about this is, well, we never said we have to get to 2 percent tomorrow, right? You can get to 2 percent over time. So right now, a lot of their forecasts and projections are consistent with getting there by 2025.
有一种方式他们可以管理它，一些人这么讲：我们从来没有说过我们必须在明天达到2%的目标吧？你可以逐步地达到2%。所以目前，许多预测和投资计划是为了在2025年达到2%的目标。
So they're giving themselves two or three years to get to 2 percent. You don't need to get 10 percent of the workforce unemployed tomorrow to try to get 2 percent by December. This is referred to sometimes as optimal control, where you're trying, you want to balance these two things or these three things.
所以他们给自己两到三年的时间来达到2%的目标。你并不需要明天就让10%的工人失业，只为了在12月达成2%的目标。这有时被称为最优控制，你想要平衡这两个或三个因素。
The banking problems, though, I think are a wild card, certainly for the Fed right now, if they can deal with these with other tools, like the things that they came out with on Sunday, that would be their first choice. It's not to have to use monetary policy to deal with the right tool for the right job.
银行问题我认为是一张“王牌”，对于美联储来说现在确实是这样，如果他们可以通过其他工具来解决这些问题，比如他们周日提出的那些东西，那将是他们的首选。使用货币政策本身并不是处理正确工具的最佳选择。
So if monetary policy is the tool you're using to deal with macroeconomic management and inflation, then you come up with other tools. Sometimes they're called macro-prudential regulatory tools. You can intervene in the markets, but continue to focus interest rates on bringing inflation down. But if the banking crisis gets really bad, then you're going to have a much tougher conversations I think and decisions around that.
所以，如果你正在使用货币政策来处理宏观经济管理和通货膨胀，那么你需要找到其他工具。有时候这些工具被称为宏观审慎监管工具。你可以干预市场，但仍要专注于通过利率来控制通货膨胀。但如果银行危机变得非常严重，那么我认为你将不得不进行更加艰难的谈判和决定。
And I would just point to 2008, the day after Lehman went down, there was a Fed meeting and the transcript is public. So anybody can go look up what they were talking about at the FOMC meeting on September 16, 2008. And it makes for fascinating reading because there was an inflation problem actually that summer, oil prices went to 140 a barrel. CPI, the consumer price index went above 5%. Now core, which is what the Fed is more focused on, wasn't so high.
我想提一下2008年，雷曼兄弟倒闭后的第二天，有一次联邦储备委员会会议，其记录是公开的。所以任何人都可以查看2008年9月16日FOMC会议上他们讨论的内容。这是非常有趣的阅读材料，因为那个夏天实际上有通胀问题，油价涨到了每桶140美元，CPI（消费者物价指数）超过了5%。现在，核心CPI，这是联储更关注的指标，并没有那么高。
But they were worried about inflation. And you read what people were saying that day. And this isn't a gotcha exercise. There were a lot of people around the table who were worried about inflation as they were about financial sector instability. And in hindsight, you say, oh my gosh, how could you inflation? Wasn't going to be a problem anymore. And we had the financial crisis.
但他们担心通货膨胀。您可以看到当天人们都在说些什么。这不是挑刺的演习。桌子周围很多人都担心通货膨胀问题，就像他们担心金融部门的不稳定一样。回头看，你会说，哦，我的天，通货膨胀怎么可能不再是问题了？我们还遭遇了金融危机。
But at that point in time, so I've been wondering for months, wow, what happens if we get into a situation like that? And I'm not saying we're in a situation like that. But if we were in a place where you're worried about inflation, you feel like your hands are taught, there's a financial stability issue, but you feel like your hands are tied because you really got to focus on inflation. You know, it creates much more difficult decisions. Yeah.
在那个时候，我已经想了几个月了，哇，如果我们陷入了那样的情况会发生什么呢？我并不是说我们现在正处于那样的情况。但如果我们处于一个你担心通货膨胀、感觉手足无措、存在财务稳定问题，但你又感觉手脚被束缚因为你必须关注通货膨胀的地方。你知道，这会带来更加困难的决策。是的。
And I do think the concept of financial instability at large scale feels more real in recent, I think, the idea that that is a thing that can happen, I think, after 2008 probably doesn't feel as abstract to policymakers as it does, is it might have at that time in some ways, you could maybe a little recency bias in having seen some of those.
我认为近年来大规模的金融不稳定感觉更为真实，我觉得这是一个可能会发生的事情的概念，我认为在2008年之后，对于政策制定者来说，这个想法可能不再是那么抽象了。某些方面，你可能会因为看到了其中一些情况而受到一些最近的偏见。
All right, last topic, Eric, I know we're running up on the time I told you we'd take, but you mentioned the kind of data and responsiveness of the Fed. And I wanted to ask what you see in terms of obviously the kinds of data that Fed uses.
好的，最后一个话题，Eric，我知道我们快到达我告诉你的时间限制了，但你提到了联邦储备委员会使用的数据种类和反应能力。我想问问你在这方面看到了什么，显然是关于联邦储备委员会使用的数据种类。
I know there's a lot of survey data that goes into this and at least in my world and a lot of consumer spaces, the validity and kind of usefulness of survey data is coming into question. Is that becomes less people are less responsive to various ways that we've taken surveys, we're trying to find new ways? Are there interesting trends you see in the kinds of types of data that are available to policymakers at the Fed and other places and shifts maybe in how they think about those data sources as they try and respond to pretty rapidly changing conditions, me and even right now like waiting for a survey or response feels out of date compared to how quickly you might have to make choices in some of these situations.
我知道有很多调查数据涉及其中，至少在我的世界和许多消费者领域中，调查数据的有效性和实用性正受到质疑。由于人们对我们采取的各种调查方式的反应越来越少，我们正在尝试寻找新的方法。您是否看到了各种类型的数据对联邦储备委员会和其他地方的政策制定者的可用性方面的有趣趋势，并且在他们尝试应对相当快速变化的情况时，他们对这些数据来源的思考方式的转变，比如现在，等待调查结果或反应感觉已过时，与您可能不得不在某些情况下迅速做出选择时的快速性相比。
So I'm curious if you see any trends on the data side of how they look at what they look at. I think big data or these new data sources do offer opportunities. I think one of the drawbacks is maybe that there isn't a long time history with some of them.
所以我很好奇，你是否看到任何趋势在数据方面，他们如何看待他们看到的信息。我认为大数据或这些新的数据来源提供了机会。其中一个缺点可能是，有些数据还没有长时间的历史记录。
So the great thing about the payroll report is it goes back to 1948. There have been changes over time but you do have a long time series on it where you've seen some of these newer data sources being really helpful. I think during the pandemic, the open table and some of the small business payment processors Wompley, there was a home base which was way to track kind of small business payroll.
所以，工资单报告的好处是它可以回溯到1948年。这些年来进行了一些更改，但您可以在长时间序列上观察到一些新数据来源确实很有帮助。我认为在大流行期间，开放餐桌以及一些小型企业支付处理器Wompley、Homebase等等，为跟踪小型企业的工资单提供了很好的方式。
Those real time sources when something really crazy was happening, we were shutting down the economy or people were staying home out of their own choice because they were afraid of getting sick. So you're trying to figure out what's happening out there. What's mobility like? What's foot traffic like? You could use some of these data sources to try to figure out if we were actually getting out of the worst of it.
当真的发生疯狂的事情时，我们关闭了经济或人们出于自我保护的原因待在家中。因此，你要试图弄清楚外面正在发生什么。移动性如何？人流量如何？你可以使用一些数据来源来判断我们是否真正走出了最困难的时刻。
The Fed did use those inside of some of those, just in their kind of analysis of the U.S. economy. And so it will be interesting to see if more of those data sources, the Fed gets some I think credit card data real time credit card data. If you have companies that have fairly good market share then and the market share is stable, you're not having to worry about mixed shifts polluting the data, there is more data that might be you can bring the bearer to try to figure out where those turning points are in the economy.
美联储确实使用了其中的一些数据，在其对美国经济的分析中。因此，有趣的是看看更多这些数据来源是否会被美联储获取，例如即时信用卡数据。如果您有一些市场份额相当大且市场份额稳定的公司，那么您就不必担心数据被混合转移所污染，会有更多的数据可供您使用，以尝试找出经济中的拐点在哪里。
Yeah, well certainly I'll add that to my list of interesting things to watch. Nick, I appreciate you taking the time today. I know it's a very timely conversation. I guess we'll all be watching what actually happens over the next couple of weeks because I said this is a pretty fast moving environment and I'll be curious to see how things play out compared to some of the things we talked about today. So I appreciate you coming and sharing your perspective.
嗯，这绝对会被我加入到我必须看的有趣事物清单中。Nick，我很感激你今天抽出时间来和我交谈。我知道这个话题很时尚。我猜我们都会关注接下来几周内会发生的事情，因为我觉得这是一个快速变化的环境，我很好奇事情的发展会和我们今天谈论的一些事情相比如何。所以我很感谢你的到来，分享你的想法。
Thank you Jeff, pleasure to be with you.
谢谢Jeff，很高兴能和你在一起。
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Thanks for listening. Until next time.
谢谢傾聽。下次再见。