Energy, Inflation, and the FED w/ Lyn Alden (TIP491)
发布时间 2022-11-05 23:45:01 来源
When they did that financial oppression playbook of, you know, hold rates, you know, basically let inflation run hot compared to interest rates. You know, eventually people want out. There's that IMF paper by Reinhardt, Carmen Reinhardt, I think she phrased it like you need a captive audience, right? If you're going to inflate the data way, you got to keep people in the debt. And if your money is going to lose value, how do you keep people in the money?
当他们执行那个金融压迫战略时，你知道，保持利率不变，同时任由通胀在利率之上泛滥。你知道的，最终人们会想要逃离。有一个来自国际货币基金组织的Carmen Reinhardt的论文，她大概是这样表述的，你需要一个被迫为之的观众，对吧？如果你要操纵数据提高通胀，你就需要让人们陷入债务。而如果货币失去价值，你又如何让人们继续信任货币呢？
Welcome to the Amestus Podcast. I'm your host, Nick Broderson and your listener. We are in good company. With us, we have the one and only, Lynn Alden. Welcome back to the show, Lynn. Thanks for having me back. Happy to be here.
欢迎来到Amestus播客。我是您的主持人，尼克·布罗德森，也是您的听众。我们有很好的陪伴。和我们一起的是唯一的林恩·奥尔登。欢迎回到节目，林恩。谢谢您再次邀请我。很高兴能够在这里。
So, Lynn, it's always great having you here on the show. And I want to start this interview by discussing the energy market. And I'll be referencing your wonderful blog post. I have you to write here, Energy, the Area Under the Curve, for the first part of the episode. So in here, you're claiming that the industry is acting more rational than before. And you also refer to the USL producers, which, unlike in the past, are more disciplined now and they only produce profitable oil and gas. And I found this very interesting, this statement, because we think and perhaps understand that a tech company, think about Facebook or Google, like, they might be horrible to utilize networking effects and achieve super normal profits. And they can be okay with being unprofitable for some time as they're getting there. I wrote the situation seems perhaps not to be applicable to all the gas producers. So could you please paint some color around why top line growth was more important than profits in the prior decade for USL producers?
所以，Lynn，很高兴你能来参加节目。我想在这次采访中从能源市场开始谈起。我会引用你的博客文章。这里，你声称行业比以前更加理性。你还提到了美国上市公司，与过去不同的是，它们现在更加谨慎，并且只生产有利可图的石油和天然气。我对这个说法非常感兴趣，因为我们认为，科技公司，比如Facebook或Google，可能会利用网络效应实现超额利润。而且，在达到目标之前，它们可以接受一段时间的亏损。然而，对于所有天然气生产商来说，这种情况似乎不适用。那么，你能否详细解释一下为什么在过去的十年里，对于美国上市公司来说，销售收入增长比利润更重要？
Yeah, it's a good comparison. I would say even in the tech space, that can get over its keys, right? So the idea of tech is that, you know, you can start out on profitable, but because you can scale exponentially, ideally, your revenues will scale faster than your expenses because, you know, it doesn't, you know, if more people are using your server, right, that's pretty cost effective. And your increase of need for staff and servers is slower than your increase of revenue can generate with those servers.
是的，这是一个很好的比较。我会说即使是在科技领域，也能克服关键的问题，对吧？科技的理念就是，你可以从盈利出发开始，但由于可以呈指数级增长，理想情况下，你的收入会比支出增长更快，这是因为，你知道，如果更多的人使用你的服务器，那是非常划算的。而且你对员工和服务器的需求的增长速度要比你通过这些服务器产生的收入增长速度慢。
And so that's the general idea of one of those, like, you know, big type of like scaling tech startups. And so, you know, they can manage five, 10 years of unprofitability as long as there's a future vision towards profitability. That's realistic.
所以，这就是其中一个那种大规模技术创业公司的基本概念了，就像你知道的那样。因此，你知道的，只要有朝向盈利的现实未来愿景，他们可以承受五年或十年的无利润状态。
I think actually what we've seen with a lot of these recent growth stocks is they pushed that too far. I mean, they went into an environment where, you know, you're basically selling $20 bills for $10, which of course, anybody can grow when they're doing that. If you're being so generous with your pricing and just kind of using your stock to pay employees. And so you're, you know, you're kind of saving on costs there. You're kind of just really pushing it far. It shows even tech companies, it can be irrational in terms of not having a vision towards profitability that's realistic.
我认为实际上，我们在最近看到的许多这些成长股中，它们推动得太远了。我的意思是，它们进入了一个环境，你基本上是以10美元的价格卖出20美元的钞票，当然，任何人在这样做的时候都可以实现增长。如果你的定价如此慷慨，并且只使用股票来支付员工，这样你就可以节省成本。你实际上是在极限地推动。这表明即使是科技公司，在盈利前景方面也可能是非理性的，缺乏现实可行的盈利愿景。
And you know, with oil companies, just, you know, there was new technology, right? So there was, you know, we're not in it was combination of new technology and specifically new implementation of those technologies. So it's not like, you know, there was advancements in how to get that oil out combined with, you know, just new visualizing tools and all sorts of those newer finements that marginal difference that helps make it more profitable or at least doable combined with an era of record low interest rates.
你知道的，对于石油公司来说，有新的技术对吧？所以，你知道的，我们不是在使用新技术，特别是对这些技术的新的实施方法。所以不像是只有在如何开采石油方面有进步，还有各种新的可视化工具和那些最新改进，这些微小的差别有助于使其更具盈利性或至少可行，并且结合了历史上最低的利率时代。
You know, they brought interest till near zero. There's rounds of QA. And then you had a number of pension funds and other entities like that being, you want to buy up all the debt and equity that they're willing to issue. And then a lot of CO compensation is tied to how big your company is not necessarily how, you know, what your net margin is, or even what your total return is, or over say, a five year period. And so there's a lot of just problematic incentives in the sector.
你知道，他们将利率降至接近零。有很多轮次的质量保证。还有一些养老基金和其他类似机构，他们想要买下所有愿意发行的债务和股权。而且很多高管的报酬与公司的规模有关，而不仅仅是净利润或总回报，或者是说，在一个五年的期间内。因此，在这个行业里存在很多问题性的激励机制。
And you know, the idea is it's always, it's going to keep growing. It's always going to be demand. We'll get profitable eventually. And of course, the apps that happened that a lot of these companies just had no clear vision towards profitability. They were over investing in that period of pricing. And like any, you know, commodity markets that get overextended, they got crushed pretty hard both in the aftermath of 2014. And then, you know, a second time, kind of not their fault in 2020. They kind of washed out any of the ones that kind of staggered, you know, to, you know, pass that earlier washout.
你知道，这个想法是它将永远不断增长。需求始终存在。我们终将盈利。当然，发生了许多这些公司没有明确盈利愿景的应用。它们在定价期间过度投资。就像任何商品市场过度扩张一样，它们在2014年的后续中受到了严重打击。然后，2020年，第二次，不是它们的错。它们把任何蹒跚前行的公司都排除了。
And so I think we're in a very different environment now where, you know, one is that due to ESG concerns and just bad returns, a lot of investors just don't want to, you know, just keep pouring money into that space anymore. And so those companies are forcing you more self-contained. They're saying, okay, instead of just issuing tons of shares in debt, we're going to actually focus on free cash flow generation. And then we're going to use that free cash flow to pay down debt, buyback shares, fun new growth and due dividends, right? So it's a more self-contained type of model, which is slower growing, but it's more profitable, less risky. And it generally results in less oil and gas growth. And so that's, I mean, that's a more rational price. And until the price gets high enough that more long duration projects come online or other energy solutions materialize that are, you know, taking that share.
所以我认为现在的环境非常不同，你知道，一方面是由于ESG（环境、社会、治理）的担忧和低回报，很多投资者不再愿意继续往这个行业投钱。所以这些公司逼迫自己更加自给自足。他们说，好吧，我们不再大量发行股票和债务，而是真正专注于产生自由现金流。然后我们会用这个自由现金流来偿还债务、回购股票、资助新的增长并支付股息，对吧？所以这是一种更为自给自足的模式，增长更慢，但更有利可图，风险更低。并且一般会导致石油和天然气的增长减少。这是一个更加合理的价格。除非价格高到足以支撑更多长期项目问世，或者其他能源解决方案得到实现并占据市场份额，否则情况将保持不变。
Yeah. And I think you bring up a good point that we see so many weird things happening in the financial markets. You also mentioned comms for CEOs. Like we all react to incentives and it doesn't mean that they're aligned with shareholders or they're aligned with ESG or, you know, but we react to our own incentives one way or the other. And the old market is notoriously known for being volatile.
是的。我认为你提到了一个很重要的观点，就是我们在金融市场上看到了很多奇怪的事情发生。你还提到了CEO的沟通。就像我们都会受到激励的影响，但这并不意味着他们与股东或者与环境、社会和公司治理（ESG）保持一致，或者说他们会按照这些方面采取行动。而过去的市场以其波动性而闻名。
And it's important to understand that the boom and bust cycle, for example, you know, the oil price is partly due to the time lag that it takes to add or it could also be removing capacity to the market. You know, an oil project can be unprofitable in total costs, but can still be rational to continue due to the differences in fixed and variable cost. And I don't know, Lynn, if you could give an example of such a project and then how that impacts the cycles or the price of oil.
同时，要了解繁荣和衰退的周期是很重要的，比如说，石油价格的波动部分原因是由于向市场添加或移除产能所需的时间滞后。你知道，一个石油项目的总成本可能是无利可图的，但由于固定成本和可变成本的差异，仍然可以继续进行。我不知道，琳恩是否能举一个这样的项目的例子，以及它是如何影响石油的周期或价格的。
So I mean, shale oil, the reason people went to it in addition to new technology and new access, basically making life out of older wells is that it's fast market, right? So less upfront capital cost, but then you have quicker decline rates. And so it's, you know, you're just getting out oil and gas quicker.
所以我的意思是，页岩油，除了利用新技术和新开发途径外，人们能够利用老井生产石油的原因就是它市场反应迅速，对吧？前期资本成本较低，但衰减速度较快。所以，你能够更快地取得石油和天然气。
Whereas if you do a gigantic offshore platform or, you know, some of those gigantic like OPEC, you know, wells, these are things that are very capital intensive upfront, but then they have these long lifetimes. Kind of the same thing for like oil sands, right? So super capital intensive upfront, but then once they're in place, they're very like low decline rates.
而如果你建造一个巨大的离岸平台，或者说像OPEC那样巨大的油井，这些项目需要非常多的初始投入，但它们的使用寿命很长。就像油砂一样，这些项目也需要巨额的初始资本投入，但一旦建成，它们的衰减速度非常慢。
And so they during that environment, you know, that kind of like easy money, new tech environment, it was all about that, that rapid oil to market. And the problem is that's like the red queen syndrome. So running in place and you have to run twice as fast just to stay where you're going. They have to run twice as fast again, just to stay where you're going.
所以在那个环境下，你知道，那种容易赚钱、新技术蓬勃发展的环境，就一直是那样，追求快速进入市场。问题是，这就像是红后的综合征，你只是原地奔跑，而为了保持现状，你必须用两倍的速度奔跑。他们又必须以两倍的速度奔跑，才能保持与前进方向一致。
And so that's the problem with shale. And that's why you can't just go from say 5 million barrels a day to 50 million barrels a day. You know, at once you get up to 10, 13, 15, you know, whatever the number they get to right now, it's something like, you know, 12 or 13. The higher you get is just like your, your existing base is kind of dissolving under you as you're also trying to expand it. And so there's limits for how much you can push it.
这就是页岩的问题所在。这也就是为什么你不能一下子从每天500万桶生产量增长到每天5000万桶的原因。你知道，一旦达到10、13、15，无论是现在达到的那个数字是多少，大约是12或者13之类的，你的基础就会像溶解一样消失，而你又在试图扩大它。所以，你对于它的推动有一定的限制。
And in this uncertain environment, you know, there's not a lot of incentive to go for these longer duration projects because, you know, they're being told by governments and investors, Hey, you know, we're going to phase you out in, you know, five years. And, you know, I think a lot of those targets are unrealistic, but they're being told that and they're also being told, you know, we're not going to give you tons of like financing. In fact, we're going to give a premium to these like green bonds over here instead of yours to make their costs to capital lower.
在这个不确定的环境中，你知道，去进行这些较长时间的项目并没有太多的动力，因为，你知道，他们被政府和投资者告知说，嘿，你知道，五年内我们要逐步淘汰你们。我认为很多这些目标是不切实际的，但他们被告知了这些，并且他们还被告知，你知道，我们不会给你们大量的融资。事实上，我们会提供给这些绿色债券较低的利率而不是你们的，以降低其资金成本。
And also like, you know, we might do windfall tax. Maybe we'll see. And then so you have like the long term spreadsheet of, okay, do I don't want to put a couple of billion dollars into this like, you know, 15 year payback period project, probably not. And so right now we're kind of geared towards these quicker barrels of oil.
而且，你知道的，我们可能会实施意外税。也许我们会看看。然后你可以有一个长期的电子表格，来评估是否愿意投入几十亿美元到需要15年才能回本的项目，很可能不愿意。所以现在我们比较偏向于这些能够更快得到原油的项目。
But I think in order to solve some of these structural energy problems, we're going to need some of these longer term projects. Right now the incentive structure doesn't incentivize that until maybe prices get crazy or there's more kind of a future clarity around, you know, maybe average pricing or that the fact that they know it'll be in demand, you know, 10 years from now.
我认为为了解决一些结构性能源问题，我们需要一些长期的项目。目前的激励机制并没有促使这种项目的实施，除非价格飙升或者对未来价格有更加明确的预测，或者他们知道未来10年将有需求。
Yeah, like the old market is just so fascinating. And you know, we might have a few decades back if we did the same interview back whenever no one knew what podcasting was, you know, we might have talked about peak oil or who knows, like, like the narrative just changes so fast whenever it comes to oil.
是的，就像古老的市场一样令人着迷。而且你知道，如果我们在几十年前进行同样的采访，那时候没人知道什么是播客，你知道的，我们可能会谈论到石油峰值或者谁知道会是什么情况，就像是，就像当涉及到石油时，叙述方式就变化得如此迅速。
And I also think it's important for people to understand that right now the focus is on we shouldn't have oil and I don't want to go into the whole climate discussion necessarily. But there are plenty of oil, but it's also important to understand that the marginal cost of that oil is just very different depending on the world. And so you can put a lot online. It just takes a lot of time and it also requires different levels of price of oil before it makes sense.
我也认为让人们理解当前的关键是我们不应该使用石油，我不一定想要深入讨论整个气候问题。但是要明白在世界各地，石油的边际成本可能会有很大差异。因此你可以在线上发布很多内容，但这需要大量时间，同时也需要石油价格达到一定水平才有意义。
And then you have the other effect, which is whenever the oil price is expensive enough, you have this other incentive that now renewables, it makes even more sense to do R&D in that field because now the opportunity cost is different than whenever, say, like a barrel oil was a 40 bucks, if it goes to $200, like we have different incentives.
然后，还有另一种影响，即当油价足够昂贵时，就会产生另一种动力，即现在可再生能源在该领域进行研发甚至更有意义，因为现在机会成本与以前完全不同，例如，每桶油价格在40美元时，如果涨到200美元，我们就会有不同的动力。
So you have this volatile environment for those reasons and so many others, as you'd say. Yeah, I mean, in a prior era, if you saw oil say double, you big, okay, drill, baby, drill, let's get some more out of the ground. And now they're like, no, no, like we don't know if it's going to stay here and we don't know what the future clarity is. And so it's basically a different environment. It's a more bearish, cautious, defensive type of sentiment.
所以出于这些原因以及许多其他原因，你认为环境不稳定。是的，我的意思是，在以前的时代，如果看到石油价格翻倍了，就会大干一场，开采更多的油资源。而现在他们会说，不，我们不知道价格是否会保持在这个水平，也不知道未来会是怎样的情况。所以现在的环境基本上是不同的，是更为悲观、谨慎、防守型的情绪。
And that's long term good for price. And that's part of why commodity cycles are so boom bust is because of that delay between the price signal that tells you, bring the oil online, and then especially outside of shale, the number of years it takes you to actually bring that oil.
这对价格长期来说是有利的。这也是商品周期如此波动的一部分原因，因为价格信号告诉你上线石油后会有延迟，特别是在页岩气外部，实际上需要多年的时间来生产石油。
And so usually those bear markets are characterized by oversupply that was financed during that prior boom.
因此，通常情况下，这些熊市的特点是由先前的繁荣时期融资支持的供应过剩。
And then bull markets are characterized by the fact that that spare capacity is eventually being worked out, either due to ongoing demand growth or just gradual decline rates and lack of sufficient new investment because of bad pricing.
然后牛市的特点是剩余产能最终得到利用，这要么是由于持续的需求增长，要么是因为渐进性的产量下降率以及由于价格不佳而缺乏足够的新投资。
And when that price starts to go up, if you don't respond to it right away, even if you do, it takes years for that new supply to come online.
当价格开始上涨时，即使你立即采取行动，这新的供应也需要数年时间才能投入使用。
And in the meantime, just demand is really pressuring the existing supply.
同时，仅仅需求就对现有供应造成了巨大压力。
And that's the story of commodities in general. And that's why they tend to have these roughly 15 year cycles. I mean, it varies a little bit, but in some ways it's like clockwork because it's just the overall investment cycle of what plays out. That you could do an overlay of fiscal monetary stimulus that kind of serves as some of the transition points of economic acceleration or deceleration on top of that commodity overlay. And you get a pretty repeated cycle over the past century or so.
这就是商品的一般情况。这也是为什么它们倾向于有大约15年的周期。我意思是，虽然有一些变化，但从某种程度上来说，它就像是一台时钟，因为它是整个投资周期的总体表现。你可以将财政货币刺激的层层叠加视为经济加速或减速的一些转折点，再加上商品的叠加效应。这样，在过去的一个世纪左右，就会出现一个相当重复的周期。
Yeah, and going back to the point about reacting to incentives.
是的，回到关于对激励做出反应的观点。
And to your point, you know, so sitting in Europe, I mean, don't even get mistaken all the problems we have in Europe with energy.
关于你所说的，你知道的，就坐在欧洲，我的意思是，别以为欧洲在能源方面没有问题。
And we have all the incentives that we don't want nuclear, we don't want oil, we don't want gas. We only want renewables.
我们有各种激励措施，我们不想要核能，不想要石油，也不想要天然气。我们只希望使用可再生能源。
And we previously talked here on the show why we can't just use renewables, not short term and not even medium term. There are so many things that we can always go into later that would require for that to happen. New technologies haven't been invented yet.
在这个节目中，我们之前已经讨论过为什么我们不能只依赖可再生能源，无论是短期还是中期都不行。有太多事情我们可以稍后再谈，这需要一些条件。新技术尚未发明出来。
So we have these different quotas we need to fail. And we can say that if we import gas for another country, that we can still fill out those quotas because that quote unquote pollution happens in another place. Because even though it's natural gas, it's still fossil fuel.
所以，我们有一些需要未能达到的不同配额。我们可以说，如果我们从另一个国家进口燃气，我们仍然可以达到这些配额，因为所谓的污染事件发生在另一个地方。因为即使是天然气，它仍然属于化石燃料。
So far, that project or, you know, here in Europe, like the backup has always been Russia.
到目前为止，在欧洲这个项目中，或者说备胎一直是俄罗斯。
And here we are. So this is not my plot for doing a lot of coal. That's not what I'm saying. It's just like, you have to choose and there are choices and consequences regardless of what path you're going to take.
我们就是在这里。所以这并不是我的计划为了获得大量煤炭而做的。我并不是这个意思。只是你必须做出选择，而无论你选择哪条道路都会有选择和后果。
But then it seems like the trend line of the price of oil is going higher and higher.
但是现在看起来油价的趋势线似乎不断上升。
And you point out that the US broad minus supply increased 40% since the start of 2020.
你指出，自2020年初以来，美国的广播供应减少了40%。
So you have in your research used gold as a measuring stick to normalize the price level. What do you find and what are the implications for businesses and households that has energy as an expense?
在你的研究中，你使用黄金作为衡量标尺来规范价格水平。你发现了什么，并且对于将能源作为费用负担的企业和家庭有什么影响呢？
在你的研究中，你使用黄金作为衡量标尺来规范价格水平。你发现了什么，并且对于将能源作为费用负担的企业和家庭有什么影响呢？
在你的研究中，你使用黄金作为衡量标尺来规范价格水平。你发现了什么，并且对于将能源作为费用负担的企业和家庭有什么影响呢？
你在研究中使用黄金作为价格水平的衡量标准。你得出了什么结论，以及对于企业和家庭将能源作为费用支出的影响是什么？
在你的研究中，你采用黄金作为价格水平的衡量标准。你发现了什么，并且对于将能源视为费用的企业和家庭有什么影响？
你使用黄金作为衡量标尺来规范价格水平的研究中，你得出了什么发现？对于企业和家庭将能源作为费用负担有什么影响？
在你的研究中，你使用黄金作为衡量标尺来规范价格水平。你得出了什么结论，对于将能源作为费用负担的企业和家庭有什么影响？
Yeah, so if you compare oil to gold historically, it's not that expensive in the grand scheme of things. It's roughly around average.
是的，历史上将石油与黄金相比较，从整体来看，它并不算太贵。大致上可以说处于平均水平。
Basically, at that point, you're ignoring the fiat denominator that everybody's seen those doom charts of like the dollar losing 99% of its value over XYZ time period, you know, things like that. So you ignore that gradually debasing denominator and you just compare two commodities.
基本上，在那一点上，你忽略了广为人知的像美元在某个时间段内贬值了99%那样的末日图表，你知道，类似的情况。所以你忽略了逐渐贬值的基准货币，只是比较了两种商品。
And so oil is roughly fairly priced in terms of gold.
所以从黄金的角度来看，石油的定价大致公平。
And even in terms of dollars, you know, oil was spiked up to like 140, you know, a decade and a half ago. And even from till seven all the way to 2014, it was like an average price that was equal or higher than it is now.
就算以美元计算，你知道，十五年前石油价格曾经飙升到140美元。甚至从2007年到2014年期间，石油的平均价格也比现在要高或者相等。
It had values during the global financial crisis. It had crazy peaks over 100. And, you know, it eventually fell off a cliff after it got a supply glut from that shale we talked about.
在全球金融危机期间，它价值连城。它曾一度疯狂飙升至100以上。而且，你知道的，之后由于我们谈论过的页岩供应过剩，它最终一落千丈。
But really, at the current time, it's not that expensive. Now, European gas is, you know, that's horrifyingly expensive. And so there are and coal had a huge gigantic spike in price. So there are types of energy that are expensive. The oil market has not yet reached that point.
但实际上，就目前而言，石油并不贵。现在，欧洲的天然气价格真的是令人害怕的昂贵。而且煤炭的价格也大幅上涨了。所以确实有些能源是昂贵的。但是石油市场还没有达到那个程度。
I think it's, you know, the years ahead, it's probably going higher. And, you know, to your prior point, it's I think there's a lot of issues around managing to expectations rather than managing to outcomes, which is, you know, trying to obfuscate, get anything dirty off the balance sheet rather than making it not exist.
我认为，在未来的几年里，股价可能会继续上涨。而且，针对你之前提到的观点，我认为在管理预期方面存在许多问题，而不是专注于实际结果。也就是说，有些人会试图掩盖问题，将任何不良资产从资产负债表中清除，而不是真正解决这些问题。
You just say, it's not our you don't want it on our balance sheet because we have a bureaucratic quota to meet.
你只是说，不是因为我们不希望它出现在我们的资产负债表上，而是因为我们有一个官僚配额要满足。
And so there's there was an example of, you know, European like they were chopping down old growth forests in Canada and then shipping those wood pellets. And that's like a irreplaceable deep carbon sink, you know, biodiversity naturally occurring. It's not one of those like, you know, human planted forests that we just keep turning ground. It's like old growth.
所以，有一个例子，你知道的，欧洲人砍伐了加拿大的原始森林，然后将木质颗粒出口。那是一种不可替代的深层固碳库，拥有自然形成的生物多样性。它不是那种我们不断翻耕的人工种植森林，而是老生长森林。
And we're shipping those wood pellets to burn over in Europe. And that's counted as green. And that's about that's one of the least green things I can think of. And that's an example of managing to optics.
我们正在将这些木屑颗粒燃烧物运送到欧洲。然后这被认为是环保的。但这是我能想到的最不环保的事情之一。这是管理视觉效果的一个例子。
Whereas managing to outcomes is like, you know, more of an engineering mindset. How can we make this grid stable? How can we make the air clean? How can we, you know, balance these different optimization goals and not just push it on to some other balance sheet or put out of mind?
与之相比，管理结果更像是一种工程思维方式。我们如何使这个网络稳定？我们如何让空气变得清洁？我们又如何平衡这些不同的优化目标，而不仅仅将其推给其他平衡表或忽视掉呢？
The problem is that if a place does not have affordable energy, it becomes uncompetitive very quickly. And so if you're we've had, you know, in Europe, you guys have had like some facilities shutting down, you know, fertilizer plants, aluminum plants and things like that, because they're just no longer competitive at those electricity prices. And so that can help put a cap on electricity prices, but also puts a cap on economic growth and likely triggers recessionary conditions.
问题在于，如果一个地方没有经济实惠的能源，它会很快失去竞争力。因此，在欧洲，你们已经出现像肥料厂、铝制品厂等一些设施因为电力价格过高而关闭的情况。这种情况可能有助于限制电力价格，但也限制了经济增长，并很可能触发衰退条件。
And so an environment that can't get those cheap energy prices quickly becomes uncompetitive in the global market. And Europe has been a strong manufacturer. So that's important to manage properly. You know, some countries that are more service oriented can get away with higher energy prices. But if you're manufacturing base, it's a little bit more cute. And then of course, any consumer, if they have to spend more money on their energy bill, especially they're spending more on energy.
因此，无法获得廉价能源价格的环境很快在全球市场上失去竞争力。而欧洲一直是一个强大的制造业国家，所以管理好这个问题非常重要。你知道，一些以服务为导向的国家可以接受较高的能源价格。但如果你的制造基地却有点吃力。当然，任何消费者如果他们在能源账单上花更多的钱，尤其是在能源方面花更多的钱，那就更糟糕了。
And then that's revenue for another country, because you're not producing it locally. That's less money you can spend on local goods and services. And so that's bad for the economy. And so that's the environment that many countries are in. So right now the dollar is pretty strong relative to other currencies. So actual oil is pretty highly priced in euro terms pound or yen and a lot of frontier markets, you know, not necessarily some of the major emerging markets, they've actually held up better. But compared to a lot of currencies, oil is very highly priced. And it is putting a lot of pressure. And then it's like I said, especially the natural gas, especially electricity prices, the coal. And so it's a matter of competitors and displacement of more discretionary purchases.
然后这就是另一个国家的收入，因为你没有在本地生产。这意味着你可以在当地购买的商品和服务的金额减少了。所以对经济不利。这就是许多国家所面临的环境。所以现在，美元相对于其他货币来说相当强势。所以根据欧元、英镑或日元来计算，实际上石油的价格很高，这在许多边疆市场中尤为明显，不一定是一些主要新兴市场，它们实际上表现得更好。但与许多货币相比，石油价格很高。这给很大压力。而且，正如我说过的，尤其是天然气、电力价格尤为明显，还有煤炭。所以这就涉及到竞争对手和对更多自主购买的替代。
Yeah, that's so true. And you know, a country like Germany speaking about manufacturing, it's just in the world of pain. And even whenever you look at the gas storage, like what they can hold, it's just it looks tricky at what's going to happen throughout the winter. So you already have all these contingency plan, what's going to happen if equity happens. And the last place you're going to cut is households. I'm not saying it's not reasonable. Obviously, it's also insensitive in terms of, you know, voters, like voters tend to vote more than say companies. And so like that's also another place where you have to consider it. But it seems like it's going to be, well, I think Europe has been lying for at least two decades. And here we are, it seems more grim than ever. But anyways, then we follow Warren Buffett and his investments quite closely here on the show. And Buffett recently built a 25 billion position in Chevron equivalent to an 8% ish ownership, and almost a 30% stake in accidental 30%. I don't know if anyone's take up these numbers, but Buffett also had a lot of warrants there. So that's why I came up with that number 30. If you only look at common stock, it's 20 ish plus what are your thoughts on the two stocks at the current market price?
是的，那是很正确的。而你知道，像德国这样一个制造业的国家，它正处于困境之中。即使你看看他们的天然气储备量，看起来在冬季期间会发生一些棘手的事情。所以你已经有了所有这些应急计划，以防发生股权问题。而最后一个被削减的地方将会是家庭。我并不是说这不合理。显然，在选民方面，这也是不敏感的，因为选民往往比公司更容易投票。所以这也是你必须考虑到的另一个地方。但似乎情况将会不妙，至少欧洲已经撒了谎至少两十年了。现在看起来比以往更加严峻。不管怎样，我们在节目中一直密切关注沃伦·巴菲特及其投资。巴菲特最近在雪佛龙公司建立了一个价值250亿美元的头寸，相当于约8%的所有权，并且在意外中拥有差不多30%的股份。我不知道是否有人研究过这些数字，但巴菲特还持有很多认股权证，所以我才得出那个30%的数字。如果你只看普通股票，大约是20%加上。你对目前市价下的这两只股票有什么看法？
So long term, I'm bullish on them. Chevron is one of the more expensive ones, but it's also one of the higher quality, safe liquid ones. And so, you know, my approach has been more kind of geographic diversification and more different oil types. So I have, you know, I have some of that kind of company. I also have some of the Canadian companies, you know, I think that there are other ones around the world. I've also been like some of the pipelines. He also bought, you know, they bought a pipeline from a company, right?
长期而言，我对它们持乐观态度。雪佛龙是其中更昂贵的公司之一，但也是更高质量、安全流动性较强的公司之一。因此，我的做法更倾向于地理多元化和不同类型的石油。所以我持有一些这样的公司股份。我还持有一些加拿大公司的股份，我认为世界上还有其他一些公司也很不错。我还有一些管道股份。而且，他们还购买了一条管道，是从另一家公司购买的，对吧？
So it's about energy producers and infrastructure. I think like any good value investor, and he's of course, you know, legendary for it. He knows what's cheap and he knows what's under invested in, and it's kind of an anti-bubble in many ways. And so I think he's been smart to get into the energy space. And, you know, obviously with his size of his book, he's going to go for the big liquid, you know, longer duration type of projects.
这是关于能源生产商和基础设施的问题。我认为像任何优秀的价值投资者一样，他当然是一个传奇人物，他知道什么是便宜的，知道什么是被低估的，并且在很多方面，这是一种反泡沫。所以我认为他聪明地进入了能源领域。显然，由于他庞大的资产规模，他会选择大型流动性更高、持续时间更长的项目。
And then also, I mean, he, you know, a couple years ago, he did those Japanese trading companies. So you put a few billion dollars into those. And those are many ways, they're commodity oriented, hard asset, you know, and some of them have energy exposure. So, and if you kind of tally up his overall kind of commodity energy, you know, even the infrastructure from moving it, like pipeline, he's made a pretty big bet on energy. And I think that's smart because, you know, he's obviously he's got that Apple position. It's very tech oriented. He's got the banks. And so, you know, I think he wanted to add to the real asset side of his book and specifically in areas that are underinvested in.
然后还有，我的意思是，他，你知道的，几年前他投资了那些日本贸易公司。所以他投入了几十亿美元。这些公司在很多方面都是以商品为导向的，有着硬资产，而且其中一些涉及能源。如果将他在商品能源领域的整体投资算起来，还包括了运输基础设施，比如管道，他对能源产业进行了相当大的押注。我认为这是明智的，因为他显然已经持有了苹果公司的股票，这是一个非常科技导向的投资。他还拥有银行业股权。因此，我认为他想要进一步增加他的投资组合中的实物资产，并专门投资那些被低估的领域。
So it's kind of, especially when he started doing them, it was less, you know, it's a little bit more contrarian than it was now. And a lot of, you know, sometimes he has criticized for not being super early. Like when he bought Apple, people were like, Apple, really, it's one of the biggest companies. It's already done great. And of course, it did amazing after that. So, you know, when he started getting into those oil companies, they already did pretty well. He didn't like buy them at the bottom in like March 2020. They were like, you know, I was in that kind of over. And I think we're in the beginning of like, five, 10 year story here for some of these companies, just the sector in general. And I think he sees that and that he's setting a Berkshire to, you know, be well positioned for that.
所以在他刚开始投资时，这种情况有点不同，你知道的，它比现在更具对立性。有时候他也会因为没有非常早地投资而受到批评，比如当他购买苹果公司的时候，人们会说，苹果公司，真的吗？它已经是最大的公司之一了，已经取得了巨大的成功。当然，在那之后，它的表现非常出色。所以，你知道的，当他开始投资这些石油公司时，它们已经有了很不错的表现。他并没有在2020年3月的低点买入它们。它们已经有了一定的涨幅。我认为我们现在正处于这些公司以及整个行业的五到十年的故事的开端阶段。我认为他看到了这一点，并且正在让伯克希尔为此做好准备。
Yeah, I think you absolutely right, Lynn. And Chevron isn't priced cheaply, as you said. There's also a limited number of even for Buffett, you know, or especially for Buffett, of companies you can invest in. You know, if you're sitting $140 billion of cash, which most of us don't, you can't, you know, because there are more exciting energy companies out there for sure. But you know, if the market is a billion dollars, it's just not going to move the needle. But I wanted to talk about Opig Plus. It's been making headlines here recently.
是的，琳恩，我想你绝对是对的。正如你所说的，雪佛龙的价格并不便宜。而且，对于巴菲特来说，即使是他，可以投资的公司数量也是有限的，你知道的，或者特别是对于巴菲特来说。你知道的，如果你手头有1,400亿美元的现金，这是我们大多数人所没有的，你就不能只因为市场上有更令人兴奋的能源公司而投资。但我想谈谈Opig Plus，最近它一直在成为头条新闻。
Opig Plus is a castle of all producing the countries, including Russia, Saudi Arabia, two of the biggest. And they recently cut productions by two million barrels per day. For comparison, they produce 40 million barrels daily. And I just wanted to give you some approximate numbers for everyone to follow. So the total oil market is around 100 million barrels. US has just showed up 20 million barrels per day. Just so like whenever we are like throwing out these numbers, there's something to compare it to. Anyways, why is explicitly not said, it seems like the members want a floor under the price of all between called 100 to like 80 to 100 compared to say 70 to 80 per barrel before COVID. What can the Western world do to lower the price of oil? And do we even buy the premise of my question?
Opig Plus是一个涵盖俄罗斯、沙特阿拉伯等几个最大的产油国的联盟。最近，他们削减了每日200万桶的产量。相比之下，他们每天生产4000万桶。我只是想给大家一些近似的数字来跟进。因此，全球石油市场约为1亿桶。美国每天产油量只有2000万桶。所以，当我们提到这些数字时，有一个参考依据。无论如何，为什么没有明确说明这一点，似乎是因为成员国希望石油价格维持在每桶100到80至100美元之间，而不是像COVID前那样在70到80美元之间。西方世界能做些什么来降低石油价格？我们是否接受了我提出的问题的前提？
So I would have reframed the question a little bit. So when Opig cut, when they did that two million cut, it's actually technically not a production cut. It's a cut for the ceiling for how much they can produce.
所以我会稍微改变问题的表述。所以当 Opig 进行削减时，当他们削减了两百万，从技术上讲它不是生产削减，而是对他们能够生产的上限的削减。
And what's interesting is they were already deeply under, they're already missing it underperforming that ceiling. And if you go back to Opig historically, it's actually been the problem of the other way around. Like they said a ceiling and then their, you know, countries are kind of going over it, trying to sell a little extra around the margins, you know, kind of cheating a little bit. And so it's actually a matter of enforcing not going above it.
而有趣的是，他们已经深陷其中，他们已经在未能达到这个上限的情况下错过了。如果你回顾历史上的Opig，事实上是相反的问题。他们设定了一个上限，然后他们的国家有点超过它，试图在周边多卖一点，有点作弊。因此，实际上是要执行不超过这个上限的规定。
Whereas in this environment, there's been the opposite where, you know, the majority of Opig countries or a bunch of Opig countries are failing to even meet their ceiling. And there's been good research by a number of firms that, you know, specialize in energy, you know, kind of all out more than I do. And they've done like the detailed work on analyzing some of these countries. And they've argued that there, a lot of these are near capacity, that, you know, that with the current level of CAPEX and some, sometimes, in some cases, just the amount of reserves they have and just overall kind of maximum output they can do, that they're kind of tapped out, you know, and there's a little bit around the margins, maybe, but they don't have the gigantic swing production that many people think they do, which is different than history.
在这种环境中，正相反的情况出现了，你知道的，大多数油气出口国家，或者说一些油气出口国家，甚至无法达到他们的峰值产量。针对这些国家，一些专门从事能源研究的公司进行了良好的研究，他们在这方面比我更有深入的了解。他们详细分析了这些国家的情况，并指出有很多国家已经接近产能上限，也就是说，考虑到当前的资本支出水平、有时也包括它们的储量和整体的最大产量，它们已经达到了极限，你知道的，在某种情况下，它们可能还有一些边际增长的空间，但并没有像许多人认为的那样具备巨大的摇摆生产能力，这一点与历史上不同。
And then some, you know, they might have to trim the production ceiling, you know, if you keep feeling to meet your production targets, eventually, countries realize you don't have what you say you have. And so this is, you know, I think one way of managing the optics is also the question, because we're talking about Opig Plus, which is, which includes Russia, you know, due to the war, the Western oil companies have had to pull out, they had capital and equipment and expertise that was part of Russia's production. And so the question is, we talked about oil declines, you know, what happens in a year to years, three years, if they can't recoup that level of investment to keep that production as high or higher than it is now, you could see a mild fall off in Russian production, for example.
然后还有更多的问题，你知道的，如果你无法达到生产目标，他们可能不得不削减产量上限，最终，国家会认识到你没有你所声称的东西。所以我认为，管理视觉效果的一种方式是提出的问题，因为我们谈论的是欧佩克+，其中包括俄罗斯。由于战争原因，西方石油公司不得不撤出，他们的资金、设备和专业知识是俄罗斯生产的一部分。所以问题是，我们谈到了石油减少，如果他们无法收回投资来维持目前的高产量或更高，一两年后会发生什么，甚至可能看到俄罗斯产量的轻微下降。
And so I think it's actually more matter of Opig not fully having the ability to keep amping it up. Then there's also matter of geopolitical alliances, deteriorating conditions between US and Saudi relations. And so essentially what that is saying though, is that there is a floor there, they're willing to defend that floor, but also that they might, you know, they might not just have a lot of spare capacity.
所以我认为，实际上问题更多地在于Opig没有完全具备加大力度的能力。还有一个问题是地缘政治联盟以及美国和沙特关系恶化的状况。而实际上，这也意味着他们有一个底线，他们愿意保护这个底线，但同时也可能没有太多的备用产能。
And you know, there are ways, you know, North America and Europe do have oil and gas reserves that you can tap into. I know in Europe, they've run into some earthquakes. So you know, somebody's saying that sometimes there's environmental groups that say we don't want to tap into this. In the United States, Biden has issued an order of magnitude fewer drilling permits for federal lands within the first 19 months of his administration compared to any post World War II administration. And that's part of his campaign program. He didn't want drilling on federal lands as prior to an acute energy crisis.
你知道的，有办法可以开发北美和欧洲的石油和天然气储备。我知道在欧洲，他们遇到了一些地震问题。所以有人说有时候环保组织会说我们不想开发这些资源。在美国，拜登在他的任期的头19个月内对联邦土地签发了数量相当少的钻井许可证，与任何二战后的政府相比都更少。这是他竞选计划的一部分。他不希望在出现严重能源危机之前在联邦土地上进行钻探。
And so now you have that dichotomy between, you know, you made a promise, but then you want to get inflation under control, then there's that. There's also a matter of, there's only so much refining and transportation capacity, right? So in the United States, you're pretty cheap natural gas. The question is, why can't we just send that all over to Europe? And of course, the problem is you need LNG infrastructure, which is expensive and time consuming to build.
现在你面临这种两难境地，你做出了承诺，但又希望控制通胀，这就是一个问题。另外，还有一个问题，就是炼油和运输能力的限制，对吧？所以在美国，天然气价格相对便宜。问题是，为什么我们不能将这些天然气全部运到欧洲呢？当然，问题在于你需要昂贵且耗时的液化天然气基础设施来实现这一目标。
And then even if we get it there, then you need import LNG infrastructure and you need to like have then the transportation to get that from the coast to the points where you need it. And so it's a matter of that type of infrastructure. It's a matter of refining. So you can have all the oil you want. But if you only have so much diesel production capacity, you can have a diesel shortage, even if oil's cheap, right? So there's multiple parts, there's multiple bottlenecks along the path to get right.
然后，即使我们能将天然气运送到那里，你还需要引进液化天然气基础设施，并提供运输手段将其从海岸运送到需要的地方。所以这涉及到基础设施建设的问题。同时也涉及到炼油的问题。你可以拥有任意多的石油，但如果你只有有限的柴油生产能力，即使石油价格低廉，你也可能遭遇柴油短缺，对吗？所以，在完成整个过程中，存在着多个环节和多个阻碍。
So one thing that that North American or Europe, like Western countries can do, one is they could expand their exploration and production around the margins. They also can invest in more infrastructure, transportation, refining, things like that.
北美和欧洲等西方国家可以做的一件事是在边缘地区扩大勘探和生产。此外，他们还可以投资于基础设施、交通运输、精炼等方面。
In the United States, we've not added a new refinery in like 50 years. We've expanded existing refineries. And that's because they're not the most environmentally friendly sites. And there's always opposition, not in my backyard, no more refineries. And it's like, well, there is a trade-off for that. Either you have to import more of that product, or you're going to have shortages and high prices of that product if demand does not fall off with your capped or slow growing supply. And so there are investments that can be done. And I think it's one of those things where when the price signals emerge immediately, maybe there's the idea that it's transitory or you can blame the blame someone. But if it goes on month after month, quarter after quarter year of year, eventually that starts to change how people vote. It changes how politicians draw the numbers. They want to stay in power. That changes how companies will choose to invest longer-term capital. And they say, okay, this shortage is here to stay. Let me be a little bit more aggressive here now. And so price eventually can solve a lot of things. And it just takes time. And it takes working through some of the headwinds that are present at the current time.
在美国，我们已经有大约50年没有增加新的炼油厂了。我们扩建了现有的炼油厂。这是因为它们并不是最环保的场所。而且总是有人反对，他们不希望在自己家附近再建炼油厂。但这意味着有一个权衡。要么你不得不进口更多的产品，要么如果需求没有随着供应的稳定或缓慢增长而减少，你将面临产品短缺和高价。因此有一些可以进行的投资。我认为在价格信号立即出现时，也许会认为问题是暂时的，或者可以归咎于某个人。但如果问题持续了数月、数季、数年，最终会改变人们投票的方式。这将改变政治家们制定政策的方式。他们想要保持权力。这也会改变企业选择长期投资的方式。他们会说，好吧，这种短缺是长期存在的。我现在要更加积极地行动起来。因此，价格最终可以解决很多问题。只需要时间。需要解决当前存在的一些障碍。
Yeah. And I don't want this into you too much to come across as a lot of complaining about the India, Maggis and Europe, even though it's probably too late. But it just seems like there were no plan B. Like you mentioned before, we can't just, one of the first things you must suggest is, oh, the US should just like ship us like a lot in G and we just didn't have the infrastructure to like receive it. So there's so much of that infrastructure that isn't, it just isn't built out. And something that's just always under invested is the power grid. It doesn't sell well to voters. And if you say, oh, let's just have a better power grid. Because what does that mean? Like I can still charge my iPhone and I can still like have lights in my home and like, but that's just not how it works. And so, so what happens is like the power grid is just a mess. And they're a mess for so many reasons. Like we like to think, I don't know if I can come up with the best example of, you know, whenever we cook too much food and kind of feel like, Oh my God, it would be so great if someone could like take the spoons or don't have to throw it out. So like almost the same analogy I want to say, but in India, because we have so much energy that's being produced, and we have so much to go to waste. And one of the reasons, there are many reasons why a lot of it goes to waste is that the power grid just can't handle it. And it takes a lot of time to build out. So it's not like, Oh, there's a war now in Ukraine and like, let's just build out the power grid. No, it takes a lot of time and to for power grids to be very efficient.
是的。而且我不想让这听起来像是对印度、Maggis和欧洲的抱怨，尽管现在可能为时已晚。但是似乎没有备选方案。就像之前你提到过的，我们不能只是提出一个建议，比如说美国应该给我们运输大量的G，而我们没有接收的基础设施。因此还有很多基础设施的建设尚未完成。而且电网一直都是投资不足的一个问题。它并不受选民的欢迎。如果你说：“噢，我们应该有一个更好的电网。”那意味着什么呢？我仍然可以给我的iPhone充电，我仍然可以在家里有灯光，但事实并非如此。所以电网变得一团糟。电网之所以一团糟，原因很多。我不知道能不能找到一个最好的例子来解释，你知道，每当我们做太多的食物时，会感到，哦，要是有人能帮我们取走一些餐具或者不用浪费就好了。差不多是同样的比喻，但在印度，因为我们产生了那么多能源，却浪费了很多。而造成这部分能源浪费的原因很多，其中一个原因是电网无法承受。而建设电网需要很长时间。所以这并不像是，“哦，乌克兰现在发生战争了，让我们建设电网吧。”不，建设一个高效的电网需要很长时间。
Well, it's slightly different in the States, even though I also know you also have issues with your power grid. But like, that's one country. It's really difficult in Europe because something like a power grid is just so crucial to infrastructure. So whenever you're building things together, there's just so many different conflicts you need to hash out. And also to your point before, not a lot of people want to have upgraded the power grid in their backyard. Like, no, no, we want we want better power grid. So we're not depending on Russia, just not where I live. But I still want the benefits. And that's just the nature of how we are as people, I guess.
嗯，在美国情况稍有不同，虽然我也知道你们在电力系统方面也有问题。但是，那只是一个国家而已。在欧洲，这就很困难了，因为像电力系统这样的基础设施非常重要。所以，每当你们一起建设某些东西时，就会涉及很多不同的冲突需要解决。而且就像你之前说的，很少有人愿意在自家后院升级电力系统。就好像，不，不，我们想要更好的电力系统，这样我们就不会依赖俄罗斯，只是不在我居住的地方而已。但是我仍然想要享受这些好处。我猜这就是我们作为人的本性吧。
Yeah, there's been both in the United States and in Europe, there's a problem with construction in general. It's just there's a lot of headwinds for doing it. And like you point out, there's not a lot of incentive to run on a campaign of stronger grids unless you're experiencing like rolling blackouts.
是的，在美国和欧洲都存在建筑业普遍存在的问题。只不过在这方面存在很多阻碍。正如你所指出的，除非遭遇间断停电，否则没有太多的动力去提出加强电网的竞选承诺。
So once the problem has to get severe before it becomes a voter issue, and at that point, it takes years to fix. So that's just how that works. And the funny stat that we have is the United States, it took like a year to build the Empire State Building in the 30s. We can't build a skyscraper any year now. We can barely build one in five years. If you try to build like high speed rail, good luck, give it a decade and you'll still have like the permitting being done. It's just a lot of these a lot of countries are now it's very challenging to build these infrastructure projects. And that includes modernizing the grid.
因此，问题必须严重到影响选民之前，它才会成为一个选民问题，而在那个时候，修复问题需要数年的时间。这就是它的工作原理。有一个有趣的统计数据是，在上世纪30年代，美国花了一年时间建造帝国大厦。现在我们几乎无法在一年内建造一座摩天大楼。我们几乎需要五年才能建造一座。如果你试图建造高速铁路，祝你好运吧，十年后你可能仍然在办理许可。对于很多国家来说，现在建设这些基础设施项目非常具有挑战性，这包括现代化电网。
So a lot of these goals, they want to electrify things more. Right now, you can call it almost decentralized energy. So you have, let's say, you know, my house has electrical power. It also has a natural gas line. And then also my car goes to a gas lane, which is a whole another distribution point. Right. So all those there's three different energy distribution points that are basically going to my home and my consumption.
因此，许多目标都希望更多地推动电气化。现在，你可以说它几乎是去中心化的能源。比如说，我的房子有电力供应，还有一条天然气管道。另外，我的汽车还需要去加油站加油，这是另一个能源分配点。对的，这些都是三个不同的能源分配点，基本上是为了满足我家的需求和消耗而存在。
And the idea is we want to fold that all into just electricity. Right. So instead of using natural gas for my heating or my stove, a lot of communities are saying only electric now. So that's that gets forward into the electric power. And then they say, okay, now we want to do EVs only electric vehicles. And so that that whole like gasoline, you know, transport infrastructure that gets forward into the grid. Right. And so then suddenly, instead of three different channels of energy, I'm relying on one channel of energy. That better be a super robust type of energy or trans energy transportation electricity, because if it's not, if it's not ready for that, or if it goes down, you know, all off everything goes down instead of having three different types of energy. And so that that's I think the challenge with this long term plan of electrification and also the just the ability even outside of energies, the ability for kind of wealthy developed countries that already have a lot of infrastructure to build it or place that existing infrastructure. It's just a very costly, very bureaucratic, very, very challenging thing to do for a variety of reasons.
然后，我们的想法是将所有能源都转化为电力。对的，所以不再使用天然气来供暖或烹饪，许多社区现在都要求仅使用电力。因此，这就转化为了电力需求。然后他们说，现在我们只要使用电动汽车。因此，整个汽油运输基础设施就转化为了电网。所以突然间，我不再依赖于三种不同的能源通道，而是依赖于一种超级强大的能源或输电能力，因为如果这个能源还没有准备好，或者出现故障，所有事情都会瘫痪，而不是拥有三种不同的能源。这就是我认为电气化的长期计划面临的挑战，以及即使在能源之外，对于那些已经拥有大量基础设施的富裕发达国家来说，修建或更换现有基础设施是一项非常昂贵、非常繁琐、非常具有挑战性的任务，出于各种原因。
Yeah. And just one last comment on that. You know, we can build that grid above the ground, but people just don't want that. It doesn't look nice. It's a cheaper option because if you dig into the ground, which you can also do is just so expensive because you have this radius, a lot of heat. So it's like, it's just a very expensive thing to do. And then you have the incentive, like with a different country. So let give you like one example, like France, they've been providing us all this wonderful electricity and they're run on nuclear. And so we have this thing where a lot of countries, so for example, Germany, like the green party do not want nuclear. And I not want to go in like pro-akon. I'm just saying that if you don't want that, it's completely fine. Then you just need to use a fossil fuel because right now the renewables can't just, they're just not stable enough to do it. And even in Germany, they have three different grids.
是的。再对此发表一点评论。你知道，我们可以在地面上建造那个电网，但人们不喜欢这样做。它看起来不美观。这是一种更便宜的选择，因为如果你挖进地下，这也是非常昂贵的，因为会产生大量的热量。所以这只是一件非常昂贵的事情。然后你还有这样一种动机，就像另一个国家一样。我们来举一个例子，就像法国，他们一直为我们提供这些美好的电力，而且他们主要使用核能。所以我们有这样一种情况，很多国家，比如德国，像绿党这样的政党不希望使用核能。我不是要支持核能，我只是说如果你不想用核能的话，完全没问题。那么你只需要使用化石燃料，因为目前可再生能源还不够稳定。即使在德国，他们也有三个不同的电网。
I know it's, I probably make this way too nerdy, but I had different grids and they're not connected. If that's enough room on the cable, you just can't get that electricity. So you have so much electricity that go to waste for so many reasons.
我知道这可能有点过于专业化，但是我的不同电网之间没有连接。如果电缆上足够的空间，你就无法获得电力。所以有很多电力因为各种原因被浪费掉。
Anyways, at least we do another question here, then can we fix inflation before we fix the engine markets? I think not persistently. Now, if you cause a deep enough recession and suppress demand enough, you know, if enough business is shut down due to high energy costs, if you create enough unemployment to suppress wage increases, then you can cure inflation, but it's like cutting off your leg to fix the infection. That's not what the patient asked for. What people really kind of think mean when they say that or like, I think that what they should mean is how can you get back to a period of dis-explationary growth? And I think that's only possible once you fix the energy situation. And even then there's some pressures. There's, you know, we had a multi-decade trend of globalization towards places like China, and that's stalling out or in some cases reversing, just due to one is demographics. And, you know, we've already filled that bucket now. And also, there's, of course, geopolitical tensions and reasons and things like that.
不管怎样，至少我们在这里提出了另一个问题，我们在解决引擎市场之前能够解决通货膨胀问题吗？我认为不可能持久地解决。如果你引起足够深的经济衰退并抑制需求，你知道，如果足够多的企业因高能源成本而关闭，如果你创造足够多的失业来抑制工资增长，那么你可以治疗通货膨胀，但这就像切断腿来解决感染一样。这不是病人要求的。当人们在说这种话或者像我认为的那样，他们应该是在问如何恢复到一个非通胀性增长时期？我认为只有在解决能源问题之后才可能实现。即使在那之后还会存在一些压力。我们在过去几十年一直趋向全球化，将产业转移到像中国这样的地方，但现在这种趋势正在停滞甚至有些地方出现逆转，其中一个原因是人口结构。而且，当然还存在地缘政治紧张局势等原因。
So I think the short interest is, you know, I've been describing like holding a beach pole underwater. You can, you know, you can temporarily hold it down. You can drain the strategic petroleum reserve. You can, you know, China's doing recurring lockdowns, which is actually suppressing quite a bit of fuel demand. You can do, you know, you can tighten monetary policy so much that no one's building homes and electricity prices can get a control and shut down fertilizer and in metals companies. And you can, you can kind of press that down by having demand kind of fall to meet, meet supply.
所以我认为做空利益，你知道的，我一直在形容它就像把沙滩杆在水下压着。你可以，你知道的，暂时把它压下去。你可以抽取战略石油储备。你可以，你知道的，中国一直在实行重复封锁，这实际上抑制了相当多的燃料需求。你可以，你知道的，加紧货币政策，以至于没有人建房子，电力价格可以得到控制，并关闭化肥和金属公司。通过让需求下降以适应供应，你可以把它压制下去。
The problem is then you, you start to get recession. You start to get unrest. And if you then try to stimulate you out of that, well, that, those shortages are still there, structurally. If you have not taken that time to increase supply. And another challenging thing is that all these rate hike increases, admirables, they are, they increase the cost of capital for energy companies. And so the hurdle rate for them choosing to do a new project is even higher now. And so it's actually, it's suppressing demand, but it's also pressing in some cases supply arguably. And so we're in an environment where until they, you know, until we grind through this, until we actually fix the energy situation, I don't think you're going to get disinflation or growth kind of bouncing between either you're going to get inflation or you're going to get recessionary like conditions with, you know, maybe lower inflation, but nobody wants that either.
问题在于，当你开始陷入经济衰退时，你开始感到不安。如果你试图刺激经济走出困境，那么那些短缺问题仍然存在，从结构上看如此。如果你没有利用这段时间增加供应的话，这将是一个挑战。另一个具有挑战性的问题是，所有这些利率上调，虽然令人钦佩，但它们会增加能源公司的资金成本。因此，对于他们选择做一个新项目的门槛现在更高了。实际上，这不仅抑制了需求，还在某些情况下抑制了供应。所以在这种环境下，除非他们，你知道的，我们通过这些过程，直到我们真正解决能源问题，我认为你不会得到通缩或增长，而是会在通货膨胀和经济衰退之间反复蹦跶，也许通货膨胀会更低一些，但也没有人希望出现这种情况。
Then the period we're in, it's, it's often in the financial media compared with the 1970s, early 1980s, giving how central banks are raising rates and fighting inflation. Now the fight wasn't equally distributed if we were looking across the globe. From 1978 to 1984, Britain, Germany, and Japan cut their budget deficits while hiking rates in Canada and France did the same thing, though, not to the same extent. The US was the exception of the major economies because they were hiking rates, but they were cutting taxes during the Reagan administration. And many economists today argue that while Paul Vogler got the credit, the inflation environment didn't structurally change before the monetary and fiscal policy worked in tandem.
然后我们现在处于的时期，常常被金融媒体与1970年代和80年代初期相提并论，因为中央银行正在提高利率并对抗通胀。然而，这种对抗并没有在全球范围内均匀分布。从1978年到1984年，英国、德国和日本削减了预算赤字，同时加息，而加拿大和法国也采取了类似的做法，尽管程度不同。美国是主要经济体中的例外，因为在里根政府时期他们提高了利率，但同时减税。今天许多经济学家认为，虽然保罗·沃格勒得到了功劳，但在货币和财政政策协同作用之前，通胀环境并没有发生结构性变化。
Do you agree with that assessment? And I guess depending on your answer, how does that translate into today's environment in Western Europe and the US, where we are hiking rates, but we're also running huge deficits?
你同意这个评估吗？我猜根据你的答案，这会如何在如今西欧和美国的环境中体现，在那里我们正在加息，但同时也存在巨额赤字。
请注意，以上的表达方式仅供参考，实际表达中还有可能有所调整。
Yeah, I mostly agree. Also, the inflation in earlier, resolved itself in the 70s until they fixed the energy situation, going back to the prior question. Right. So you had multiple energy shocks in the 70s, and by the 80s, those were largely sorted out. And so the combination of tight monetary policy, and then the energy situation resolved, that helped that went a long way. It wasn't just Volcker. And then you have the fiscal situation is interesting because so Reagan did boost the deficits a lot, but it's like the deficit as a percentage of GDP we have now in the US are bigger than most periods back then. Right. So even that it's not just direction that matters, it's also magnitude.
是的，我基本上同意。另外，通胀在70年代早期已经得到解决，直到他们解决了能源问题，回到之前的问题上。对，所以在70年代有多次能源冲击，到了80年代，这些问题基本上都解决了。因此紧缩的货币政策加上能源问题的解决，起到了很大的作用。这不仅仅是由Volcker一个人所致。而且财政状况也很有趣，因为里根确实大幅增加了赤字，但是与现今美国GDP相比，我们的赤字所占的比例更大。对，因此不仅方向重要，规模也很重要。
And so that's actually why I've used the 1940s comparison where, you know, in the 70s, if you look at so broad money supply was growing pretty quickly. And money supply mostly is created from either bank lending or monetized fiscal deficits. And in the 70s, the majority of the money supply growth was coming from bank lending. That was a kind of a peak demographic situation. You know, baby boomers were entering early adulthood, consuming buying houses, getting jobs. And so that was a, you know, demand driven bank lending driven type of inflation environment. And then we added fuel onto the fire with like, you know, wars, guns and butter programs, right? So that we did add some deficits to that. But that actually was the minority monetary creation direction. Whereas like in the 1940s, you also had insane money supply growth, but it wasn't because of bank lending. It was because of massive fiscal deficits to fight the war. And most of fighting the war means building facilities, hiring people, trying to make like gun chips, right, or like supply chains and things like that. So it's actually, it's a type of fiscal stimulus, even though the outcome is in many cases wasted. But when they come back, a lot of that could be repurposed domestically to make cars and to make other industrial things.
因此，这就是为什么我使用了1940年代的比较。如果你看看70年代，广义货币供应增长得很快。货币供应主要来自银行贷款或货币化的财政赤字。在70年代，货币供应的大部分增长来自银行贷款。那是一种顶峰人口状况。你知道，婴儿潮一代开始进入早期成年期，购买房屋，找工作，消费增加。这是一种需求驱动的银行贷款驱动的通货膨胀环境。然后，我们还通过战争、军火和经济恢复计划等手段加剧了这一情况。所以我们确实增加了一些赤字。但实际上，这只是少数货币创造的方向。而在1940年代，货币供应也呈现了疯狂的增长，但并不是因为银行贷款，而是因为大规模的财政赤字用于战争。大部分战争意味着建设设施、招聘人员，努力制造军舰等，或者是建立供应链。所以，实际上这是一种财政刺激，尽管结果在很多情况下是浪费的。但当它们回来时，其中很多可以在国内重新利用，生产汽车和其他工业产品。
And so in that environment, that was a very inflation environment regards to what the central banks wanted to do. And so I think the issue now is that we're in more of a 1940s environment where, you know, the past two, three years, most of the money supply growth has come from monetized fiscal deficits to deal with some of these shocks that are happening and to deal with the fact that the system so levered that they'd rather print and let kind of defaults happen in a, you know, kind of a fragile economy.
因此，在那种环境中，这是一个非常通胀的环境，与中央银行希望实现的目标相矛盾。所以我认为现在的问题是，我们正在经历更像是1940年代的环境，你知道，过去两三年，大部分货币供应的增长来自于货币化的财政赤字，以应对一些发生的冲击和系统过度杠杆化的事实，他们宁愿印钞来让一些违约发生在一个相对脆弱的经济体中。
Now, if you zoom in on the current time, because of the monetary tightening, you know, money supply growth is not growing very quickly. In the US anymore, it's been rather flat. And so that gets part of why we're getting this kind of contraction in a number of sectors and things like that. But the longer term story, I think for this decade is that the money supply growth is coming from the fiscal side. And so as long as that's unaddressed, and as long as the energy situation is unaddressed, money tightening can only do so much. It can hold the beach ball under the water for periods of time, but all that upward pressure on the beach ball is from those other two forces.
现在，如果你放大目前的时间，由于货币紧缩，你知道，货币供应增长不再很快。在美国，它基本停滞不前。这就是为什么我们在许多行业和其他方面都出现了收缩的部分原因。但从长期来看，我认为本十年的故事是货币供应增长来自财政方面。只要这一问题没有得到解决，而且能源问题也没有得到解决，货币紧缩只能起到有限的作用。它可以在一段时间内将沙滩球压在水下，但所有对沙滩球的上升压力来自其他两个力量。
And I'd even go further say even the fiscal budget, it's very hard for them to solve at this point because a lot of it is demographics entitlement driven type of spending, a lot of it's locked in. And then if they cut, you know, many cases like the GDP growth figures we look at, that includes those deficits. So when you trim the deficits, in many cases, you trim the GDP growth. So if you're trying to optimize for like debt to GDP, basically austerity works in terms of preventing you from accumulating debt. But once you're over, you know, 100% sovereign debt to GDP, austerity usually is unable to push it back down. You're kind of already past that event horizon.
我甚至更进一步说，就连财政预算，目前很难解决，因为其中很大一部分是基于人口统计和权益驱动的支出，大部分都是固定的。而且如果他们削减开支，就像我们查看的国内生产总值增长数据一样，那些赤字也会包括在内。所以当你削减赤字的时候，在很多情况下，也会削减国内生产总值的增长。所以如果你试图优化债务与国内生产总值的比例，基本上紧缩政策能够防止你累积债务。但一旦你的主权债务超过了国内生产总值的100%，紧缩政策通常不能够将其降下来。你已经超过了那个事件视界。
And so I think that's kind of the environment where in the 2020s where this is going to be a persistently inflationary force, but you know, perhaps with periods of disinflationary, fight back, hold the beach ball under the water type of environment that I think we're now. And there seems to be some rumors that we don't need to perhaps hold the beach ball too long under the water. At least there've been some rumors around that the inflation target might be abandoned of 2%. There seems to be at least some that suggest a 3% or 4% target rate. This is not like an official announcement from the Fed or ECB, anything like that. It's just some economists that had some fun about exploring that. But some people have to have noticed and it would be different implications if that inflation target would be changed. Of course, it would inflate some of the, it weighed some of the long-term public debt. It would also lead to a redistribution from greater to a debtor. And it would probably also lower trust in central banks.
因此我认为，在2020年代，这将是一种持续通胀的力量所在的环境。但是，也许会有一些时期的紧缩力量的反击，类似于把沙滩球按在水下的环境。似乎有一些传言，我们可能不需要太长时间地把沙滩球按在水下。至少有一些传言表明，通胀目标可能会放弃2%。至少有一些人认为，通胀目标可能会设定为3%或4%。这不是来自美联储或欧洲央行官方的声明，只是一些经济学家为之着迷的探索。但是，一些人必然已经注意到了，如果通胀目标被改变，将会产生不同的影响。当然，这会增加一些长期公共债务的负担。这也将导致从债务人那里向债权人的再分配。并且可能会降低对央行的信任。
Now, if we just, if we just threw me at Lynn here and say this plays out that we're going to change this inflation target for central banks in the western world. What are the implications for us as investors and citizens if inflation structurally moves higher or the target moves higher? Yes, it's a good question. I mean, briefly going back to why they would go that. So Volcker, for example, under his watch when he did his big tightening, federal debt to GP was 30%. And so Powell's dealing with 130%. So he's trying to do the Volcker playbook, but he's up against forces that even Volcker didn't have to deal with.
现在，如果我们只是将我扔给琳恩，并且说这场游戏将导致西方世界的央行改变通胀目标，那对于我们作为投资者和公民，通胀结构性上升或目标上升会有什么影响呢？是的，这是一个好问题。我是指，简单地回顾一下他们为什么会这样做。例如，沃尔克在他进行大规模紧缩时，联邦债务占GDP的比例为30%。所以鲍威尔正在处理130%的债务。因此，他试图执行沃尔克的策略，但他面临的挑战甚至连沃尔克都没有经历过。
（表述意思，尽量易读）
And so let's say we fast forward and they're unable to tighten, at least in such a way that they get back to disinflation or growth. They keep choosing between either recession or inflation. They can't manage to get disinflation or growth because of the structural force we talked about. If they then resort to higher average inflation targeting, I think that causes a number of issues. One, that's kind of like partially letting go to the beach ball a little bit. So I think some of those more value-oriented, hard assets type of things do well. So that could be cash flow producing things like energy producers and pipelines and chemical companies and refined. These harder asset under-invested areas, it can also mean hard monies like gold or Bitcoin, catch a bid as you have a recurrence of currency debasement and perceptions around forward strength of the fiat currency, people that want alternatives.
所以，假设我们时间快进，他们无法以能够恢复至通货紧缩或增长的方式进行紧缩。他们在衰退和通胀之间不断选择。由于我们谈到的结构性力量，他们无法实现通货紧缩或增长。如果他们采取更高的平均通胀目标，我认为这会引发一系列问题。首先，这有点像部分放松对沙滩球的掌控。因此，我认为一些更价值导向的硬资产类型的投资会有好表现。这可能包括产生现金流的能源生产商、管道公司和化工公司以及金属矿产品。在这些较少投资的硬资产领域，也可能意味着像黄金或比特币这样的有回报的硬货币会受到追捧，因为人们会重新产生对货币贬值和对法定货币未来强度的看法，并寻求替代选择。
One thing that's challenging is going back to the 40s and thereafter, when they did that financial repression playbook of hold rates, basically let inflation run hot compared to interest rates, eventually people won out. So there's that IMF paper by Reinehart, Carmen Reinehart, and it was like, I think she phrased it, you need a captive audience. If you're going to inflate the data way, you've got to keep people in the debt. If your money is going to lose value, how do you keep people in the money? To a lesser extent, this happens in emerging markets all the time. How do you keep people in the local currency? They all want dollars. They all want gold or dollars or other assets or stable coins or Bitcoin, whatever the case may be. They want whatever it is, they don't want the Argentine paste though, that's for sure. So the problem is generally you turn to capital controls.
有一件较具挑战性的事情是回到40年代以后，当时采用了金融压抑的策略，即将利率保持在较低水平，与通胀率相比放任。最终，人们胜出了。所以有一篇由雷因哈特（Carmen Reinehart）撰写的国际货币基金组织（IMF）文件，我想她的措辞是需要一个被困的观众。如果你要通胀数据飙升，你必须让人们负债累累。如果你的货币要贬值，你如何让人们继续使用该货币呢？在新兴市场，这种情况经常发生。你如何让人们坚持使用本地货币？他们都想要美元。他们都想要黄金、美元或其他稳定币、比特币，无论是什么情况。他们想要任何东西，但肯定不想要阿根廷比索。所以，问题通常是你转向了资本管制措施。
So the United States, for example, they banned gold for 40 years. You could go to jail for 10 years for owning a benign yellow medal. That's what they turned to. You also had just, back then, there was just obviously worse technology. So you had less information traveling around. You had it was harder to move money around. The question is, what happens when you run a financial or a pression playbook in the modern environment of social media? Easier ways to move money. I think that's a new experiment we're going to encounter. I don't think anyone can fully tell you how it's going to work out. I think generally money tries to move towards what is not being debased, which I think would again be a variety of scarce assets, some cashflow producing some more monetary, but it's whatever is perceived as outside of that capital audience, the basic situation.
例如，美国曾经禁止黄金40年。拥有一枚无害的黄金奖章可能会被判入狱10年。这就是他们的做法。那时的技术显然更差，信息传播不及现在频繁。移动资金也更加困难。问题是，当你在现代社交媒体环境下运营一个金融或压榨策略时会发生什么呢？有更简单的方式来转移资金。我认为这是一个我们将会遇到的新实验。我不认为有人能完全告诉你它会如何发展。我认为通常资金会倾向于流向不受贬值影响的资产，这可能包括稀缺的资产，一些产生现金流的，一些更具货币属性的，但是它关注的是被认为是超出基本情况的资本受众之外的东西。
I think that, Lynn, if you read about capital controls, it looks good on paper, but in fact, it's really difficult to enforce. You just almost seem to have this shadow economy going on. If you go back to the whole thing about leading up to Nixon taking at the US as well, and the world of the gold standard, the price of gold went from $35 to $800. I want to say in January of 1980, it was fast that moved. You saw whenever capital control was applied in Southeast Asia, whenever they tried to restrict capital, taking out of the country in the late 90s, how they just crashed the economy. It's just very difficult to do in practice. Like you mentioned before, in today's world, it's probably even more difficult than it's ever been before. Transitioning into the next topic.
我认为，琳恩，如果你读到了有关资本管制的内容，从理论上看，它是有好处的，但实际上，执行起来真的非常困难。你似乎可以看到有一种影子经济的存在。如果你回顾一下尼克松掌权时的整个情况，以及黄金标准的世界，黄金价格从35美元涨到了800美元。我想说的是，在1980年1月份那段时间，变化非常快。你可以看到，当东南亚地区实施资本管制、试图限制资本在90年代后期流出国家时，他们的经济就会崩溃。这在实践中非常困难。正如之前提到的，在今天的世界中，执行资本管制可能比以往任何时候都更加困难。转入下一个话题。
Also recently, you would think that when the Fed were buying treasuries, it pushes down the yield. But that's actually not the case. Could you please elaborate on this? What seems to be a very counterintuitive relationship? So the prior decade, QE was intended in part to suppress yields. It was one of the tools that they were using. But when actually people crunched the numbers, they found that at the time of purchases, that was not the case. You'd actually have an environment of yields going up.
最近的情况下，你可能会认为当美联储购买国债时，会导致收益率下降。但实际情况并非如此。您能详细解释一下吗？这似乎是一个非常反直觉的关系吗？十年前，量化宽松政策（QE）在一定程度上旨在抑制收益率。这是他们使用的工具之一。但实际计算结果显示，在购买时，并非如此。事实上，市场收益率出现上升的环境。
The way I like to structure it, the way I frame it at least, is it's a different between long-term and short-term. The short-term is that when they're not buying, financial conditions are tighter, economies slowing, financial markets are tighter, and a lot of risk assets are not doing great, and people buy bonds. When the central bank starts buying, it really liquefies the market. It eases financial conditions. You see, you get an uptick in risk assets. People buy those and they sell the bonds. So even though the Fed's buying, the central banks are buying the private sector selling. They're saying, okay, sold to you. And so in the near-term, it actually has the counterintuitive opposite effect. People wouldn't expect that the biggest buyer buys a product, the price goes down, you'll go up. You would not expect that, but that's how it works. But if you zoom out, the question is, let's say the Fed wanted to sell $2 trillion in treasuries that decade. Could they have done it without destroying the price? I would argue, many would argue no. That even though the moment they buy it, it's actually not the price you actually expect that the cumulative effect of taking that excess supply off the market was important for holding down yields. Now that we're seeing more inflationary pressures, and we have debt at higher levels relative to GDP, and there's just supply of those bond issuances, a lot of people were insisting that once the central bank's tried to tighten, that's not bad for yields. But if you're actually doing supply-demand analysis of who's in a buy that is so much of who's in a buy it, right now we're in an environment where yields are going up as the central bank has in many cases pulled back their purchases. That's more in line with intuition. I think that's more in line with the fact that we have an inflation environment and we have more acute oversupply.
我喜欢的结构化方式，至少我构思的方式是长期和短期之间的不同。短期来看，当他们不购买时，金融状况更为紧缩，经济增长放缓，金融市场更加紧张，很多风险资产表现不佳，人们购买债券。当中央银行开始购买时，会使市场更加流动。它缓解金融条件。你会看到风险资产上升。人们购买这些资产，然后卖掉债券。所以即使联邦储备系统购买了，央行购买了，私人部门还在卖出。他们会说，“好的，卖给你。”所以在短期内，实际上会产生逆向效果。人们不会预料到最大的买家购买产品后，价格会下跌，你会涨起来。你不会预料到这一点，但这就是实际情况。但如果你放大来看，问题是，假设联邦储备系统想要在那十年内出售2万亿美元的国债。他们是否能够在不破坏价格的情况下完成？我会争辩，很多人也会争辩说不行。即使他们购买国债的那一刻，实际上它不是你预期的价格，但将这个过剩供应从市场上清除的累积效应对于维持低收益率非常重要。现在我们正在看到更多的通胀压力，我们的债务相对于国内生产总值水平更高，而且债券发行供应量相对较大，很多人坚称，一旦央行试图紧缩，收益率就不会下降。但如果你真的进行供需分析，看看谁会购买，目前我们正处于一个央行在许多情况下削减购买量的环境。这与直觉更加一致。我认为这与我们当前的通胀环境和更严重的过剩供应更加符合。
Actually, that relationship started breaking down in March 2020, because during the COVID crash, first, it went how you'd expect, which is people's soul stocks, right? They're like, okay, we don't know what's going to happen. Let's get to Treasuries, and then it got so bad, and the dollar spiked because all these cash flows were on the world were drying up, but they still have dollar-dominated debt to service. So this is scrambled for dollars and safe haven to that.
实际上，这种关系在2020年3月开始瓦解，因为在COVID疫情爆发期间，首先发生了大家所预料的事情，即大家纷纷向国债转投，因为他们都不知道会发生什么。随后情况变得更糟，美元因为全球现金流枯竭导致了剧烈波动，但他们仍然需要偿还以美元计价的债务。因此，这就引发了对美元的争夺和避险。
So every screen link for dollars, and then the problem is that countries with dollar-dominated debt, they have to sell assets to get dollars to service the debt. So where they sell, they sell Treasuries. And so basically people bought Treasuries as old stocks until it crashed so hard and got so illiquid, and the dollar spiked so much that they forced soul Treasuries and it broke the Treasury market.
所以每个屏幕上都是以美元计价的链接，问题是那些有以美元计价债务的国家必须出售资产以获取美元来偿还债务。所以他们在哪里出售，他们出售国债。因此，人们基本上将国债视为旧股票，直到它崩溃得如此严重、流动性变得如此低下，美元升值如此之高，以至于他们被迫出售国债，破坏了国债市场。
The off-the-run Treasury market went totally liquid. There's no bid. And you actually started to get yield spiking from a very low level at the worst point in that sell-off, which is when you think there'd be maximum demand for Treasuries. And that's, again, it's just a mechanical supply demand problem at that point. And so that's when the Federal Reserve had to come in and buy a trillion dollars of Treasuries in three weeks, and they hammered down that little spike and they fixed the liquidity situation.
次要美国国债市场完全没有流动性。没有买盘。在最糟糕的时候，你实际上开始看到收益率从极低水平上升，而这个时候应该是国债最大需求的时候。这仅仅是一个机械供需问题。因此，美联储不得不在三周内购买一万亿美元的国债，并降低了那个小幅度上升，解决了流动性问题。
That was kind of the first sign of a trend change that this is not the 2010s situation. This is more a sovereign debt crisis situation. It's different. And that's really materialized here in 2022, which is we've gotten past, I think, that disinflationary commodity over supply cycle that was, I've used the analog of the 1930s compared to the 2010s just without the dust bull and the better technology. So it's more fun, but it's still kind of the static inflationary deleveraging period.
这是首次出现趋势变化的迹象，表明现在的情况不同于2010年代。这更像是一个主权债务危机的情况。这是不同的。这在2022年真正显现出来，我认为我们已经度过了那个通货紧缩和商品供应过剩周期，可以将其类比为上世纪30年代与2010年代的情况，只是没有灰尘和更好的技术。所以这更有趣，但仍然是一种静态的通胀去杠杆化时期。
And now we're in the 2020s, which is, unfortunately, more like the 1940s, which is massive fiscal spending, rising geopolitical tensions, outright war, in some cases, unfortunately. The analogy got more literal than when I originally made that analogy. And that's more inflation environment and that's an environment where stocks and bonds can go down together if the central banks are not monetizing that debt because they have trouble placing that debt.
现在我们已经进入了2020年代，可惜的是，它更像是20世纪40年代，大规模财政支出、地缘政治紧张局势升级，甚至在某些情况下出现直接战争。这个类比现在比我最初做出的时候更为真实。这也就意味着更高的通货膨胀环境，如果中央银行不对这些债务进行货币化，他们可能会难以找到债务的投资渠道，从而导致股票和债券同时下跌。
So right now you have, as long as the dollar is strong, four sectors not buying treasuries, in fact, they're trimming their treasuries to defend their own currency. It's not that their opinion is that treasuries are overvalued. It's just a mechanical outcome. It's like, hey, we want to defend the yen. We're going to not buy treasuries. We're going to trim some treasuries. That's how it is. Then you have feds not, they're letting them treasure them to show up the balance sheet. And you have SLR regulations being that commercial banks can only buy so many treasuries.
当前，只要美元保持强势，有四个部门将不购买国债，实际上他们正在减持国债以保护自己的货币。这并不意味着他们认为国债被高估了，这只是一种机械性结果。就像他们说的，我们希望捍卫日元，所以我们不购买国债，会减持一些国债。就是这样。然后联邦储备系统不再收购国债，而是让它们出现在资产负债表中。此外，商业银行还受到SLR监管的限制，只能购买有限数量的国债。
So the three biggest balance sheets are net flat to down and there's still issuance that all these smaller balance sheets have to absorb them somehow. And that's how you get disorderly liquid conditions with higher yields and lower prices. And so I think that 2020 is marked by sovereign debt problems and currency problems. Not necessarily, the prior one it blew up in the banking sector and the private leverage sector. Whereas now I think it's more sovereign debt currencies and then that underlying energy because you can't print energy.
所以，三个最大的资产负债表净平稳下降，还有发行量，所有这些较小的资产负债表仍然需要吸收一些。这就是你如何得到混乱的流动性状况，高收益率和低价格。因此，我认为2020年会面临主权债务问题和货币问题。不一定是像之前那样在银行业和私人杠杆部门爆炸。而现在我认为更多的是主权债务货币问题，以及能源的基础问题，因为能源是无法印刷的。
Yeah, it is so interesting that you make this comparison to the 1940s. And not like everyone else would say, well, high inflation, well, we had that in the 70s and early 80s. And so I really like that you're such a student of history.
是的，你将这与1940年代相比较，真的很有趣。不像其他人可能会说的那样，高通胀，我们在70年代和80年代初就经历过。所以我真的很喜欢你是如此重视历史的学生。
Then the world is no short of pundits who want to give power advice. And I'm definitely guilty as charged. Generally, whenever we talk about the call optimal monetary policy, I kind of like want to use the analogy that is it's as wrong as whenever a person would ask you, perhaps, what should I invest in? Because the answer is really it depends on what's your goal.
那么，世界上毫不缺少想要提供权力建议的专家。而我肯定违法，有罪。通常，每当我们谈论最佳的货币政策时，我想用一个类比来解释，就好像每当一个人问你，也许，我应该投资什么？因为答案其实取决于你的目标。
So if I'm turning the table here, and of course also parting out the irony that I'm now asking you to give to give Paul a friendly advice, I would change that question by asking, depending on what Paul wants to optimize for, what should he do with monetary policy? It's a good set of questions. And I like, I have different answers depending on timeframes or how fundamental I am in my thinking, which is my kind of bedrock answer is that I'm not a fan of price controls, and that includes the price of money.
所以，如果我在这里改变局势，并且当然也揭示了讽刺之处，我现在要求你给Paul提供友好的建议，我会改变那个问题，询问Paul想要优化什么，他应该怎么处理货币政策？这是一组很好的问题。根据时间框架或者我思考的基本原则，我有不同的答案。我的基本观点是，我不赞成物价管制，包括货币的价格。
So I actually kind of contest the whole notion of the modern central banking works. United States is a country of 330 million people. Do I think that there's one interest rate that is suitable for the entire country? Is the interest rate for rural Alabama the same rate as New York? Should this be set by a small committee of elders?
所以实际上，我有点质疑现代中央银行的整体运作概念。美国是一个拥有3.3亿人口的国家。我认为是否存在一种适用于整个国家的利率？阿拉巴马州乡村地区的利率是否与纽约相同？这个利率应该由一个小委员会来确定吗？
So I would say no. I kind of just throw the model, but that is the model we live in. That's the model that we operate in. So then the question becomes, what do you do with that model? So I think if if Paul's trying to optimize for inflation, which he's actually kind of legally mandated to do, he's got really three mandates. One is low unemployment, which he's got officially the way they measure it, then it's stable pricing, which they define as 2% average inflation. They're currently way above target, the way they measure it. So he's got to get that down in terms of mandates. And then they have kind of the third shadow mandate of financial stability. So the treasury market blows up. They have no choice but to go in and fix that before it melts down.
所以我要说不。我只是想要说明这个模型，但这是我们生活的模型，也是我们运作的模型。所以问题变成了，你要怎么处理这个模型呢？所以如果保罗试图优化通胀，这实际上是他的法定责任，他有三个责任。首先是低失业率，在他们正式测量的方式下，他已经做到了；其次是稳定的价格，他们将其定义为2%的平均通胀率，但目前远超过目标；第三，他们还有一项隐含的金融稳定责任。如果国债市场崩溃，他们别无选择，只能去修复，以免造成更大的破坏。
So he's got a clear mandate, which is increase unemployment and decrease inflation. So I think using the limited tools he has, he's kind of forced to do what he's supposed to do. So I'm not really sure what I would do different if I was Powell, because I think it's almost an insolvable problem. It's like, how do you advise to solve an insolvable problem or kind of a bad algorithm for what you're supposed to do?
所以他拥有明确的任务，就是增加失业率并降低通货膨胀。所以我认为，他只能利用有限的工具，被迫做他应该做的事情。所以如果我是鲍威尔，我真的不确定我会做什么不同的事情，因为我认为这几乎是一个无法解决的问题。这就像，你如何建议解决一个无法解决的问题，或者解决一个对于你应该做的事情而言不太好的算法？
So in general, I think in this environment, only solving for inflation is the wrong problem. And instead, it's how to get disinflationary growth, which is mostly not a central bank question. It's mostly a private sector and fiscal policy question. It's mostly, how do you get more energy supply? How do you get more infrastructure? That kind of thing. And that's not something Powell has any control over. He's even said we have no control over food and energy prices. So that might be even a hint at average inflation targeting. If they just can't get the energy situation under control, and they're like, well, we killed rents at least. So that's best we could do.
总的来说，在这种情况下，我认为仅仅解决通货膨胀问题是错误的。解决的应该是如何实现负通胀增长，这主要不是中央银行的问题，而是私营部门和财政政策的问题。主要是如何增加能源供应？如何增加基础设施建设？这种事情。这些都不是鲍威尔能够控制的。他甚至说过我们无法控制食品和能源价格。所以这可能是对平均通胀目标的一种暗示。如果他们无法控制能源局势，他们可能会说，好吧，至少我们已经控制了租金。这是我们能做到的最好的。
So I think there's only so much any central banker can do. It's the Kobyashim Roo for people that know Star Trek, the insolvable situation. And so I think that's kind of what they're in. And the only way around that is probably eventually to change some of the mandates or to redefine how you interpret the mandates, which can include things like different levels of inflation targeting.
所以我认为任何央行行长都只能做出有限的努力。这就像《星际迷航》中的“科比亚什姆流”（Kobyashim Roo）一样，是一个无法解决的局面。所以我觉得这就是他们面临的情况。唯一的解决办法可能是最终改变一些法令或重新定义对法令的解读方式，其中可能包括不同层次的通胀目标。
And I think the longer term story is I would like to see better technology so that there's not a committee of a handful of elders setting an interest rate for 330 million people in a manual process. I mean, you see things like they do interviews and they're like, well, we're going to pencil some interest rate hikes in and we're going to say, that's how we're running. We're in the 21st century and we're penciling interest rates. We're penciling and basically price controls for the price that sets all other prices.
我认为从长远来看，我希望看到更好的技术，这样就不会有几位长者手动设定3300万人的利率委员会了。我的意思是，你会看到他们进行采访时说，我们打算将一些利率上调计入，并且我们会说，这是我们的运作方式。我们生活在21世纪，竟然还在用铅笔来调整利率。我们用铅笔来控制价格，而这个价格决定了其他所有价格。
And so different answers for different timeframes, I guess. But I feel bad for Powell. I don't know what I would do differently. No, there are choices and consequences. And he's just trapped between a rug and a half place. Someone will get mad at him regardless of what he do. Exactly. Yeah, sure. And before the line, you said 330 million people. I am almost inclined to say eight billion. Because you're actually, yeah.
对于不同的时间框架，可能会得出不同的答案。但我为鲍威尔感到不好。我不知道我该怎么做才好。不，我们都有选择和后果。他只是陷入了两难境地。无论他做什么，总有人会对他不满。确实是这样。是的，没错。在刚才你说了3.3亿人口，我几乎要说80亿。因为你说的是实情。
I mean, yeah, because we hear that the US is exporting inflation. Given the continuous interest rate hikes, could you please help us understand what does mean whenever we hear the US is exporting inflation? And what is the implication of the US monetary policy to the world?
我是说，是的，因为我们听说美国正在出口通胀。鉴于不断上调的利率，你能帮我们理解一下每当听到美国出口通胀时是什么意思吗？美国货币政策对世界有什么影响呢？
So most commodities are priced in dollars.
So the dollars strength compared to most currencies, that's making them harder to afford in their local currencies.
In addition, most global financing happens in dollars.
So if an entity in Europe wants to finance some Latin American debt, either government debt or corporate debt, there's a good chance it'll be in dollars.
There's some in euros, but it's a distant second compared to dollars.
所以大多数商品的价格都以美元计价。
因此，相对于大多数货币，美元的实力使得这些商品在其本地货币中更难负担得起。
此外，大部分全球融资都以美元进行。
因此，如果欧洲的一家机构想要为一些拉丁美洲的债务提供融资，无论是政府债务还是企业债务，很有可能会是以美元计价。
虽然也有一些以欧元计价的，但相比之下，美元是遥不可及的第二选择。
And so when Powell or anyone at the Fed, when they tighten monetary policy, they're basically hardening the dollar and then they're hardening everyone's liabilities.
So in addition, as you point out correctly, in addition to affecting 330 million Americans, you have an entity over in Turkey or Sri Lanka or Brazil or China, a country XYZ, they're getting squeezed due to a decision by a council in another country.
Because they've, for network effects, for global hegemony reasons, for all sorts of historical reasons, and also just the fact that they haven't found a better alternative, they're using another country's money and assets as their money or their reserve asset or their debt financing.
And they get squeezed by that.
They're basically subject to that foreign power.
And so when the dollar strength ends, it can help us get inflation under control, but it's actually making it worse for the periphery.
所以当鲍威尔或美联储的任何人收紧货币政策时，他们实际上是在加强美元，而且还加大了所有人的负债。因此，正如你正确指出的那样，除了影响3.3亿美国人之外，我们还有土耳其、斯里兰卡、巴西、中国等国家的某个实体，他们因为另一个国家的决策而受到挤压。由于网络效应、全球霸权原因、各种历史原因以及他们没有找到更好的替代品，他们使用另一个国家的货币和资产作为其货币、储备资产或债务融资工具。而他们因此受到外国权力的影响。因此，当美元的强势结束时，它可以帮助我们控制通货膨胀，但对于周边国家来说，情况实际上变得更糟。
That's kind of how this whole system's been designed, which is to push volatility to the periphery.
So the core is the US, the secondary ring is like all the other leading developed countries.
And then the periphery is especially the emerging market in frontier countries.
We just push volatility to them, which many would say unjust, but that's how the system's designed.
And that can work as long as the treasure market is functioning, because the feedback loop, one thing that has happened over time, for example, in 1980s, when Volcker tightened, it broke Latin America, which basically calls all these debt and currency crisis down there.
There's big contributing factor to that.
Whereas now, a lot of those countries have more reserves than they had back then.
And then another example, actually a stronger example is late 90s, strong dollar broke Southeast Asia.
It broke their situation.
Now, especially Southeast Asia has very strong reserves.
They've learned their lesson, and they've accumulated a lot of reserves during good times.
And so when the dollar strengthens, they have a lot of reserves that they can use to defend their currency and sell.
And then the question becomes, who breaks first?
Is it the whole world or is it the treasure market?
And the answer is a little, I think a little bit both, because the periphery unfortunately still breaks first.
The poorest countries, the frontier markets, they just don't have the reserve, they have the debts, they have just weak pricing for the input commodities they need.
So they unfortunately break first.
这就是整个系统设计的方式，将波动性推向外围地区。美国是核心，其他发达国家是次要环，而新兴市场和边境国家则是外围地区。我们只是将波动性推给它们，这被很多人认为是不公平的，但这就是系统的设计。只要国库市场运作正常，这是可行的，因为随着时间的推移，存在一种反馈循环。例如，在20世纪80年代，当沃尔克收紧政策时，拉丁美洲陷入破产，引发了债务和货币危机。这是一个重要因素。然而，现在，许多这些国家的储备比那时还多。另一个例子，实际上是一个更好的例子，是在90年代晚期，强势美元导致东南亚陷入困境。然而，现在，尤其是东南亚拥有非常强大的储备。他们吸取了教训，在好时候积累了很多储备。因此，当美元走强时，他们有很多储备可用来捍卫自己的货币和出售。然后问题就变成了，是整个世界破裂还是国库市场破裂？答案有点两者都有，因为不幸的是，外围地区总是先破裂。最贫穷的国家，边境市场，他们只是没有储备，有债务，他们需要的投入商品价格低廉。因此，不幸的是，他们首先崩溃。
But then it becomes a question of major emerging markets versus the US.
So the question is, can Japan and China sell more treasuries than the US private sector can buy?
And so they each have a trillion dollars of treasuries, give or take.
And then you add Switzerland, it's another developed country.
But then you go into emerging markets and you have Taiwan, they have a ton of US assets, Brazil has decent amount of US assets, and they also have commodity exports.
And so it becomes that it is a global kind of that type of knot.
I forget the name of it, it's like all tied up together.
And how do you unfold that knot?
And I think the thing to watch is the treasure market, because there are feedback loops here.
That goes back to the impossible question.
Paul doesn't have complete control over what he does, because he's got limitations like the treasure market and things like that that he's got to deal with.
And so it becomes, how far can you push it?
How many twists or tools can he do it in his shop?
Keep the treasure market functioning while he's trying to tighten elsewhere.
然后问题变成了主要新兴市场与美国之间的问题。
所以问题是，日本和中国能否销售更多的国债，超过美国私营部门可以购买的数量？
所以他们各自持有大约一万亿美元的国债。
然后再加上瑞士，又是一个发达国家。
但是当你进入新兴市场时，台湾拥有大量的美国资产，巴西也拥有相当数量的美国资产，并且他们还有大宗商品出口。
这就变成了一个全球性的纠结。
我忘记了它的名字，就像所有都被紧密地绑在一起。
那么你如何解开这个纠结呢？
而我认为要关注的是国债市场，因为这里存在着反馈循环。
这又回到了无法解答的问题。
保罗并不能完全控制他所做的事情，因为他有像国债市场等限制性因素要处理。
所以问题就变成了，你可以推动到多远？
在其他地方加紧的同时，他能在他的领域展开多少转折或工具？
在他试图在其他地方加紧的同时，保持国债市场的运转。
And so yeah, basically we live in a system where we do our best to push volatility to the poorest of the world, the periphery.
Yeah, and if we look at emerging markets, they're definitely in a world of pain in so many ways.
But to your point before, it is interesting that they have stronger reserves, they learn a lot from what happened in the 90s.
And one of the things that they also learned was to have less debt and dominated in dollars, which just gets so much more expensive whenever the dollar gets expensive and because of high grades.
Because I was still surprised knowing that to learn that many emerging currencies, including the currencies of Brazil, Mexico, Peru, have performed better than the US dollar over the past 12 months or at least this year.
And much better than the traditional seen strong occurrences like Euro pound at the yen.
Of course, we could also like point to currencies like the Turkish lira and say, well, it doesn't go for all emerging markets.
But I still want to point out the irony that many emerging markets are forced to be more hawkers when times get tough than the more developed economies. Why is that? Because historically, they have the weaker currencies. They're the ones that are more prone to currency crisis.
所以，基本上我们生活在一个系统中，我们尽力将波动性推给世界上最贫穷的地区，即边缘地区。
是的，如果我们看看新兴市场，它们在很多方面确实处于痛苦之中。
但是根据你之前说的，有趣的是它们有更强的外汇储备，从90年代的经历中学到了很多东西。
它们也学到了减少债务，减少对美元的依赖，这样每当美元升值时，成本就会增加很多，因为高息债务。
因为我还是很惊讶地了解到，许多新兴市场货币，包括巴西、墨西哥、秘鲁的货币，在过去12个月或者至少今年表现得比美元好很多。
比起欧元、英镑和日元等传统的强势货币要好得多。
当然，我们也可以指出像土耳其里拉这样的货币，并不适用于所有新兴市场。
但我仍然想指出一种讽刺，即在困难时期，许多新兴市场被迫比发达经济体更加强硬。为什么呢？因为从历史上看，它们的货币较弱，更容易发生货币危机。
And so they have to be hawkish. And that means the US gets the luxury, usually, of easing into a recession and tightening into a stronger economy. But there's a lot of emerging markets have to tighten into a weak economy just to defend from a currency crisis because the defense tightening. Right? So they have to defend against the fact that the rich people of the world are trying to push volatility to them. And they have to use their reserves and also tightness to try their best to defend against that. And over time, some emerging markets have matured. They've entered the higher level of emerging markets. And so they build up more reserves and they have more resilience. So when people just say, quote, emerging markets, as though it's one group, it's actually very different groups. And so, ironically, why a lot of the bigger emerging markets are holding a better than the developed country currencies this year is because right now, it's, a lot of them have decent reserves and they've been pretty hawkish.
因此，他们必须保持鹰派立场。这意味着美国通常可以在经济衰退中缓慢进入，并在经济较强时加紧。但是很多新兴市场不得不在经济疲软的情况下加紧政策，以防止货币危机，因为他们需要加紧政策来保护自己。所以他们必须抵御世界富人试图将波动性推向他们的事实。他们必须利用储备和紧缩政策尽力抵御这种压力。随着时间的推移，一些新兴市场发展成熟了。他们进入了新兴市场的更高级别。所以他们积累了更多的储备，并且更具抵御能力。所以当人们仅仅说"新兴市场"，好像他们是一组，实际上他们是非常不同的群体。具有讽刺意味的是，为什么很多较大的新兴市场今年的货币表现好于发达国家，是因为现在很多新兴市场拥有相当可观的储备，并且他们一直保持相当鹰派的政策。
And so the areas of weakness are countries that have either a combination of energy inputs. They're now higher priced. So they've they worst in their current account bounce. And they have so much debt that they can't raise interest rates properly. So that includes like Japan, that includes parts of Europe. And so those are the ones you're seeing a lot of of crisis in.
因此，弱势地区是那些能源输入组合不佳的国家。这些国家的能源价格上涨，导致其经常账户出现恶化。同时，它们背负着沉重的债务，无法适当提高利率。这包括日本和欧洲的一些地区。因此，我们能看到这些地区发生了许多危机。
Whereas Brazil, they front ran the Fed, they jacked up interest rates super high. They also have a decent commodity situation, obviously. And so they're not being as punished as some of these Western sovereigns or these developed XUS sovereigns. But you still have Turkey, they have a lot of dollar-damaged debt. They don't have a lot of reserves. And then they have unusual beliefs about interest rates. So they're super high inflation and they don't want to tighten the interest rates. And so until you kind of fix the energy situation, the fiscal situation, and you know, positive rates, it's hard for that currency to fully stabilize. And so it comes in very country by country specific issue rather than develop markets versus emerging markets. Because even among developed countries, there are some that are, they have a ton of reserves, maybe their energy sufficient, right? And so they're doing okay. And so it becomes more about the energy and the debt.
然而，巴西则提前前瞻美联储政策，大幅提高利率。显然，他们的大宗商品情况还不错。因此，他们没有像一些西方主权国家或发达XUS主权国家一样受到惩罚。但是，土耳其拥有大量美元债务，却没有足够的储备金。他们对利率有不寻常的信念，因此通脱持续高通胀，却不愿提高利率。所以，在能源情况、财政情况和正利率问题没有解决之前，该国货币很难完全稳定下来。因此，这主要是一个国家与国家的具体问题，而不是发达市场与新兴市场之间的问题。因为即使在发达国家中，有些国家拥有大量储备，可能是自给自足的能源，所以他们的情况还可以。因此，这更多地关乎能源和债务的问题。
Yeah, and just one quick comment to what Argan is doing in Turkey, he has this weird relationship about, he feels that a lower interest rate gives you the win inflation. So that's the way he wants to go about it. He keeps on firing central banker after central banker until he can find someone who agrees with him. And two quick points on that. One is that Warren Moser, who is credit is kind of like founded in the MMT school, his advice to Turkey is to cut interest to zero. Right? So, so Argan is not alone in that belief. Number two, it's basically the fiat system does not work well with that. There's different ways to interpret that obviously. So there's different, different sub-interpretations of that. But that's, there is kind of that cultural context there. And most, a lot of countries have to just ignore that to function within the modern banking system. And so, you know, I hesitate to kind of make fun of it too much. But it's just a challenging environment when someone has these, has beliefs like that around interest rates and it's being tested in the world about, you know, laws that, for example, were written while gold was money is different than when Turkish lira is money. Right? And so, it's just a challenging situation for some of these countries to navigate.
是的，关于阿尔干在土耳其所做的事情，我有一个小评论。他对此有一种奇怪的看法，他认为降低利率能够抑制通货膨胀。所以这是他想要采取的方式。他一直在解雇中央银行家，直到找到一个同意他观点的人为止。对此有两点评论。第一点是，沃伦·莫瑟，他的信贷观点可以说是源自MMT学派，他建议土耳其将利率降至零。所以，阿尔干并不是唯一一个持有这种观点的人。第二点，这基本上与法定货币系统不兼容。当然，对此可以有不同的解释。所以有不同的子解释。但是，这种文化背景存在。而很多国家为了适应现代银行系统，不得不忽视这一点。所以，我不太愿意嘲笑它。但对那些持有这种关于利率观点的人来说，这是一种具有挑战性的环境。对于一些国家来说，面对这种情况是很具有挑战的，因为他们的法律是在黄金还是货币的时代制定的，而现在土耳其里拉是货币。所以，这对于这些国家来说是一个具有挑战性的情况。
Well, S Linn, is there, before we end this, this interview and, and, and I definitely want to give you a handoff too, is there anything you feel that we haven't covered in this, in this interview?
那么，S Linn，在我们结束这个采访之前，我想确保我们没漏掉任何事情，我也想给你一个机会，有没有任何你觉得在这个采访中我们还没有涉及到的内容？
I think, I think we covered quite a bit. I think it's just, it's, it's about, you know, going forward, it's obviously going to be volatile in a lot of ways. And, you know, I think it's just a support of folks in the fundamentals, you know, disinflationary growth generally comes when your necessary input costs are cheap and abundant, which is things like commodities and basic labor. And there's, you know, there's freedom to innovate and grow and, and, and increase productivity, right? So when people had to farm by hand, then they got tools, and they got tractors, and then maybe get self driving tractors, right? You keep it, you, you've, you've, you keep increasing the, the productivity of a per farmer basis to feed the rest of the world. And that, that applies industry after industry after industry. And when you go through, you know, the long arc of history is, especially once we discovered like, you know, hydrocarbons and these denture energy sources, there's been this upward trend of more and more productivity. And, but there are, there are periods of setback, you know, there are, there are, you know, wars, for example, are, are very malinvestment. They, they're inflationary. Same thing with like, you know, if there's, if there's things that prevent productivity from increasing, things that prevent business from, from functioning that can, that can suppress productivity. Then if you have under investment in those input costs, those like, raw commodities, that's, that's inflationary. That's, it's bad for productivity. It's, it's more expensive to afford basic things that we were affording cheaply before. And so I, I think investors would do well to think of it like that, which is just, it's very simple. So what are the input costs? What is the particular productivity like? Are we more or less productive and efficient than we were, you know, four years ago?
我觉得，我认为我们谈到了很多内容。我认为，就是，就是关于，你知道的，朝前看，显然在很多方面会很不稳定。而且，你知道的，我认为它只是支持着人们从根本上。当你必要的投入成本便宜且充足时，通常会出现通货紧缩性增长，这些投入成本包括商品和基本劳动力。而且有机会进行创新、成长和提高生产率，对吧？所以当人们不得不用手耕种时，他们得到了工具，他们得到了拖拉机，然后可能会有自动驾驶拖拉机，对吧？你不断提高每个农民的生产力，以供养世界其他地方。这种情况适用于一个行业又一个行业。当你回顾整个历史过程时，尤其是在我们发现像是烃类和其他可再生能源这样的能源之后，生产力越来越多。但也有一些挫折期，你知道的，有时会发生战争，例如，它们是非常的错误投资，通胀的。同样，如果有一些事情阻碍了生产力的提高，同时也阻碍了企业的运作，这会使生产力下降。如果对这些投入成本，例如原材料，进行了投资不足，这是会导致通货膨胀的，对生产力不利。以前我们以低廉的价格负担得起的基本物品变得更加昂贵。所以我认为投资者会很好地把它看作这样，就很简单。那么投入成本是什么？特定的生产力如何？与四年前相比，我们的生产力和效率是否更高还是更低？
And so it's, it's no wonder that we're having this type of inflation. And then you overlay that, of course, with the, the money supply growth and, and the flexible letters that we use to try to, to deal with this.
因此，难怪我们会出现这种通胀现象。然后当然，还要加上货币供应增长以及我们用来应对这一问题的灵活政策措施。
And so I think that's, that's the environment that we're navigating, which is, we know we're dealing with currency debasement, but then we're also dealing with real world physical limits on productivity and, and input CAPX that a lot of those are solvable, but they take time.
所以我认为，这就是我们正在应对的环境，我们知道我们正在处理的是货币贬值问题，但同时我们也将面临实际世界生产力和投入资本的物理限制，其中很多问题是可以解决的，但需要时间。
That's, that's so well said. It's not, it's not too long ago. Probably was, it was just a few days ago, I said to my wife before we're going to bed, not to put it to sleep. But I, I did tell her that, you know, in 10 years, people would be reading about now, like with all the things that's going to happen. The, the financial history books are being being rewritten right now.
真是太好了，真是说得太好了。这并不是很久以前的事情。可能只是几天前，我对我妻子说，在睡觉前不要束之高阁。但是我确实告诉过她，你知道的，在10年后，人们会在读到现在这个时刻的故事，所有即将发生的事情。金融史正此刻被重新书写着。
But anyway, Lynn, thank you as, as always, it's, it's always so much fun having you on, on the show. I'm sure the audience would like to connect with you.
不管怎样，琳恩，非常感谢你，一如既往地，每次你参加节目都非常有趣。我相信观众会很喜欢与你联系。
Where can I learn more about you and please also give a plug for your wonderful blog.
我在哪里可以了解更多关于你的信息，请也为你的精彩博客做个推荐。
I appreciate that. See, I've been making fun of my work at lindaldon.com. I'm also on Twitter at lindaldoncontact. And so I've read a free material and content that people can explore.
我很感激。你看，我一直在lindaldon.com上取笑我的工作。我也在Twitter上有lindaldoncontact账号。所以，我阅读了一些人们可以探索的免费材料和内容。
Fantastic. Lynn, thank you so much for taking time out of your busy schedule to speak with us here today.
太棒了！Lynn，非常感谢您抽出宝贵时间与我们今天在这里交谈。
Yep. Thanks for having me.
是的，谢谢你邀请我来。
But you can make an impact and the impact that you make will change your life. People will appreciate you to extend that you will not understand. When you save a life and you look that person interface, the amount of emotion that will go through you will amaze you.
但是你可以产生影响，而这个影响将改变你的生活。人们将会欣赏你，超出你的理解范围。当你拯救了一个生命并面对那个人的表情时，你所经历的情感将会让你惊讶不已。