How to Make Life-Changing Returns in Commodities, Cyclicals, & Spinoffs | Gautam Baid (TIP544)
发布时间 2023-04-10 23:45:01 来源
Work hard today to let good luck find you tomorrow. Opportunities in the stock market can spring to life on short notice. Take advantage of them. You must be prepared and ready to act. Make sure you properly allocate your time playing offense as well as defense.
今天努力工作，让好运明天来找你。股市中的机会可能突然出现，要善加利用。你必须做好准备并随时行动。确保合理分配时间，既要进攻也要防守。
Hey everyone, welcome to the Investors Podcast. I'm your host, Clay Fink. For those of you who have been tuning into my recent episodes, you'd know that I'm currently covering God and Bades book, The Joys of Compounding. Today's episode is part three of our series covering the book. And as I've mentioned before, most of the chapters in the book are somewhat standalone, so you're able to listen to each episode separately. But the episode you're listening to is part three of my series covering his book.
大家好，欢迎来到《投资者播客》。我是您的主持人克雷·芬克。对于那些一直在收听我最近几集的听众们，你们就会知道我目前正在解读戈德和巴德斯的书《复利的乐趣》。今天的这一期是我们系列节目的第三部分，涵盖了这本书的内容。正如我之前提到的，这本书中的大多数章节都是相对独立的，所以您可以单独收听每一期节目。但是您现在正在收听的这一期是我系列节目中解读他的书的第三部分。
In part one, episode 534, I touched on more of the personal development side of the book, such as why it's really important we invest in ourselves and embrace lifelong learning, as well as the biggest edge we can have as individual investors. In part two, episode 536, I covered the virtues of philanthropy and good karma, the importance of achieving financial independence, why the key to success is delayed gratification, how to properly assess a management team, and much more.
在第一部分的第534集中，我提到了书中更多的个人发展方面，比如为什么我们要投资自己并拥抱终身学习的重要性，以及作为个人投资者我们可以拥有的最大优势。在第二部分的第536集中，我讨论了慈善和好的因果报应的优点，实现财务独立的重要性，成功的关键是延迟满足的方法，如何正确评估管理团队等等。
On today's episode, I'll be covering chapters 15 through 21. I'll touch on how journaling can make us better investors, why it's so important to understand the power of incentives, how some investors fall for value traps, the three most important words of investing, why you should consider investing in commodity sectors and spin-offs, which these chapters I found really, really interesting, and we also cover a bunch more during this episode.
在今天的节目中，我将涵盖第15到21章。我将谈论如何通过写日志来让我们成为更好的投资者，为什么理解激励力量如此重要，一些投资者为什么会陷入价值陷阱，投资的三个最重要的词，为什么你应该考虑投资商品行业和分拆公司，我在这些章节中发现非常有趣，我们在本期节目中还会讨论更多内容。
For those of you who don't know God Unbaid, he is the managing partner and fund manager of Stellar Wealth Partners India Fund. The fund is a Delaware-based investment partnership, which is available to accredited investors in the US. The fund is modeled after the Buffett Partnership fee structure, and it invests enlisted Indian equities with a long-term, fundamental, and value-oriented approach. With that, let's dive right into today's episode, continuing our discussion of the joys of compounding.
对于那些不了解God Unbaid的人来说，他是Stellar Wealth Partners India Fund的执行合伙人和基金经理。该基金是位于特拉华州的投资合伙企业，只面向美国的合格投资者开放。该基金的费用结构模仿了巴菲特合伙公司，并采用长期、基本面和价值导向的方式投资在列的印度股票。那么，让我们直接进入今天的节目，继续讨论复利的乐趣。
All right, jumping right back into the book, we're starting with chapter 15, covering journaling as a powerful tool for self-reflecting. One thing I love about this book is that God doesn't just pull quotes and ideas from people like Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. At the start of this book, he has one quote from Benjamin Franklin, observe all men, thyself most, and one from Lao Zu, who's an ancient Chinese philosopher, it is wisdom to know others, it is enlightenment to know oneself.
好的，现在我们重新回到这本书，开始阅读第15章，讲述日记写作作为一种强大的自我反思工具。这本书让我喜欢的一点是，上帝不仅仅从沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格等人身上挑选名言和想法。在这本书开始的地方，他引用了本杰明·富兰克林的一句话：“观察所有人，尤其是自己”，还有一句来自老子的话：“了解他人是智慧，了解自己是启蒙”。
He then dives in to talk about the brain and how a significant part of our memories are mostly fiction. Because our brain is continually optimizing and conserving energy, when we recall information, this gets simplified, and it's likely leaving out and possibly oversimplifying key information. This reconstruction of our memories happens every time we access it, so it's something that's continually happening, and it's continually simplifying this information that we're recalling.
然后他展开谈论大脑，以及我们的记忆大部分都是虚构的这一事实。由于我们的大脑持续地优化和节约能量，当我们回忆信息时，这些信息会被简化，很有可能会省略或过度简化关键信息。我们每次访问记忆时都会重新构建它，所以这是一个持续发生的过程，而且会持续地简化我们回忆的信息。
And this is why journaling is so, so important. To be a great investor, you need to make quality decisions. And journaling allows us to record why we made a certain decision, and then in hindsight, analyze what we got wrong. Godum recommends having a notebook that tracks all of your important decisions. This allows us to compare what we originally expected to happen, with what actually happened, to identify the flaws in our thinking. Even if the outcome is good, you may come to realize that the reasons an investment played out well aren't the reasons that you originally anticipated. In hindsight, everything seems so obvious. Of course, stocks would soar in 2020 after the Fed printed so much money, but how many of us actually believed that as stocks were going down in March of 2020?
这就是为什么写日记如此重要。要成为一名优秀的投资者，你需要做出高质量的决策。而写日记可以帮助我们记录为什么做出某个决策，然后回过头来分析我们犯了哪些错误。Godum建议我们拥有一本笔记本来记录所有重要的决策。这使我们能够比较我们最初预期会发生的事情和实际发生的事情，以便发现我们思考中的缺陷。即使结果是好的，你可能会意识到投资成功的原因并不是你最初预期的原因。回顾过去，一切都显得如此明显。当然，在2020年股票在美联储大量印钞后会飙升，但在2020年3月当股票下跌时，有多少人真的相信这一点呢？
A journal helps us avoid having hindsight bias, and allows you to continuously learn from your own mistakes. The significant intrinsic value of learning from one's personal mistakes, and even more important, learning vicariously from others' mistakes over an investing lifetime, is grossly underestimated. One behavioral issue with investors is the planning fallacy, which leads us to making forecasts that are overly optimistic. One reason we tend to do this is because of availability bias, which is us forecasting into the future based on the information available to us, such as what has happened in the past. Availability bias leads us to ignoring the unknown unknowns.
一本日志帮助我们避免事后诸葛亮的偏见，并让我们不断从自己的错误中学习。从自己的个人错误中学习具有重要的内在价值，更重要的是，在投资的一生中，通过借鉴他人的错误进行学习，其价值被严重低估。投资者面临的一个行为问题就是规划偏见，这使得我们产生过于乐观的预测。我们之所以倾向于这样做的原因之一，是因为可得性偏见，即我们基于我们所拥有的信息，比如过去发生的事情，来预测未来。可得性偏见使我们忽视了未知的未知因素。
One way to work through this is to conduct a premordum, which is to investigate a bad outcome before it even happens. This can help us combat our tendency to overestimate the likelihood of a bright future for a company. He writes, before you buy his stock, visualize that a year has passed from the date of your purchase, and that you have lost money on your investment, even in a steady market. Now write down on a piece of paper what went wrong in the future.
解决这个问题的一种方法是进行"预先失误分析"，即在坏事发生之前调查其结果。这可以有助于我们克服对公司未来成功可能性高估的倾向。他写道，在您购买他的股票之前，设想从您购买之日起已经过了一年，即使在稳定的市场中，您的投资也亏了钱。然后，在一张纸上写下未来出现的问题。
This perspective hindsight technique forces you to open up your mind, to think in terms of a broad range of outcomes. To consider the outside view and to focus your attention on those potential sources of downside risk that did not intuitively come to your mind the first time you thought about buying, value investors always think about the potential downside risks when first evaluating a potential investment. When making an investment, always ask what can go wrong? What will my reaction be if those things go wrong? What are the risks? How likely are the risks? How big are the risks? And can I bear them if they come true?
这种透视后见之技术强迫你打开心扉，思考一系列广泛的结果。要考虑外部视角，并将注意力集中在那些在你第一次考虑购买时未能直观想到的潜在下行风险来源上，价值投资者在评估潜在投资时总是会考虑潜在下行风险。在进行投资时，始终要问自己有什么可能出错？如果出现这些问题，我的反应会是什么？风险有哪些？这些风险有多大的可能性？有多大风险？如果这些风险变为现实，我能承担得起吗？
Godim considers the journal he purchased for $10 to be one of the best value investments he has ever made. He uses it to keep track of his investing decisions and then how his investment philosophies develop over time. He would also take note of media commentary and investor behavior during various market panics and gyrations. He says, writing apart from being a communication tool is a thinking tool too. It is almost impossible to write one thing and simultaneously think something else. When you force yourself to handwrite something, it channels your thoughts in the same direction.
Godim认为他以10美元购买的日记是他所做过的最有价值的投资之一。他使用它来追踪自己的投资决策，并记录自己的投资理念如何随时间发展。他还会注意各种市场恐慌和波动期间媒体评论和投资者行为。他说，写作除了是一种沟通工具，也是一种思考工具。几乎不可能在写一件事情的同时思考另一件事情。当你强迫自己手写东西时，它会让你的思维朝着同一个方向发展。
Journaling turns out to not just be a tool for thinking, but also a highly effective medium for focusing our thoughts. The more you write, the more precision of thought you build. Writing is a thinking exercise and it acts as the shield against the resting of our mind. It is also a useful tool for retaining what we read and it deepens our understanding. An added benefit of journaling is that it deepens commitment. The very act of writing things down deepens our resolve to make good things happen in our lives. It is like a personal declaration that acts as a constant motivator. Journaling has therapeutic benefits too. Writing aids self-reflection which is a great way to ease any unhappiness in our lives. It also improves our memory because we remember more when we write down our thoughts and learnings.
写日记不仅是一种思考工具，而且还是一种高效的专注思维的媒介。你写得越多，你的思维越精确。写作是一种思考的锻炼，它能抵挡我们思维的休憩。它也是一个有用的工具，用于保留我们阅读的内容，并加深我们对其的理解。日记写作的另一个好处是加深承诺。书写的行为本身加深了我们在生活中实现美好事物的决心。它就像是一份个人宣言，作为一种不断激励我们的动力。写日记还具有治疗的好处。写作有助于自我反思，这是缓解生活中不快乐的好方法。它还提高了我们的记忆力，因为当我们将思维和学习记录下来时，我们记得更多。
This brings us to chapter 16 which I really enjoyed. It is titled Never Underestimate the Power of Incentives. God, let me tell you, he really delivered in this chapter. Benjamin Franklin stated, if you want to persuade, appeal to interest and not to reason. Jesse Livermore said that, my main life lesson from investing is that self-interest is the most powerful force on earth and can get people to embrace and defend almost anything. When you understand incentives, it really changes the way you view the world.
这让我们来到第16章，我非常喜欢这一章。它的标题是“永远不要低估激励的力量”。天啊，让我告诉你，作者在这一章中真的很棒。本杰明·富兰克林说过，如果你想说服别人，就要迎合他们的利益而不是理性。杰西·利弗莫尔曾说，我从投资中学到的最重要的人生教训就是，自利是地球上最强大的力量，能够让人们接受和捍卫几乎任何事情。当你理解了激励因素，它真的会改变你对世界的看法。
A lot of times when someone is selling me something, my mind almost immediately goes to the incentives. I ask myself questions like, what benefit does this person get if I buy this product? Or consider the difference in outcomes when I buy or don't buy something or I buy the higher ticket item versus the lower ticket item. The seem to lead tied incentives to investing, stating, never ask anyone for their opinion, forecast or recommendation. Just ask them what they have or don't have in their portfolio.
很多时候，当有人向我推销某个东西时，我的大脑几乎会立刻着眼于动机。我会问自己诸如：如果我购买了这个产品，这个人会得到什么好处？或者考虑一下，我购买或者不购买某样东西、或者购买较高价位的商品和购买较低价位的商品之间的结果的差异。这似乎将动机与投资联系在一起，他们提出，在投资方面永远不要向任何人询问他们的意见、预测或建议。只需问他们在投资组合中有什么或者没有什么。
Godams opens up this chapter by stating, we do that for which we are rewarded and avoid that for which we are punished. In incentives are at the root of most of the situations we face and yet we often fail to account for them. The iron rule of life is that you get what you reward for. People follow incentives the way ants follow sugar. Then a bit later, it is imperative that we think deeply about the incentive systems we create because ignoring the second or third order effects of an incentive system often leads to unintended consequences also known as the pelts' effect. An example is monetary rewards that were offered to help exterminate unwanted animals such as rats and snakes. What authorities failed to foresee was that people would start to breed the rats and the snakes.
Godams在本章中开篇便指出，我们做那些会带来奖励的事情，避免那些会带来惩罚的事情。激励措施是我们所面对的大多数情况的根源，然而我们经常忽视这一点。生活的铁则是，你得到了什么样的奖励，你就会追随什么样的激励措施。人们像蚂蚁一样追随激励措施。稍后，我们迫切需要深思熟虑我们所创建的激励系统，因为忽视激励系统的二次或三次效应往往会导致意想不到的后果，也就是所谓的皮尔兹效应。一个例子是提供金钱奖励来消灭不受欢迎的动物，比如老鼠和蛇。当局没有预料到的是，人们会开始养殖老鼠和蛇。
It not only is important to have symmetrical incentives, but also it is crucial to not allow the gaming of the system. Human beings have the tendency to game systems for their benefit. Regarding incentives, Muncker has stated that almost everyone thinks he fully recognizes how important incentives and disincentives are in changing cognition and behavior, but this is not often so. For instance, I think I've been in the top 5% of my age cohort almost all my adult life in understanding the power of incentives. And yet I've always underestimated that power. Never a year passes that I get some surprise that pushes a little further my appreciation of incentive superpower.
拥有对称的激励机制非常重要，同时防止操纵系统也至关重要。人类往往会为了自身利益而玩弄系统。关于激励，蒙克尔表示，几乎每个人都认为自己充分理解激励和惩罚在改变认知和行为方面的重要性，但事实往往并非如此。举个例子，我一直以为自己在理解激励的力量方面，在同龄人中处于前5%的位置，而事实上我一直低估了这种力量。每年总会有一些意外让我更加意识到激励的超能力。
What comes to mind for me here as an investor is how a company's management team is compensated. If a management team is incentivized with stock options, well, if you understand how stock options work, you know that anyone who holds these options, they want to maximize the value of the shares in the short run, because there's an expiration date at which those options are exercised. It creates this sort of asymmetric upside opportunity where there's a big payout, say one year from now, or potentially no payout at all. So there's really no downside risk. So this incentivizes them to maximize short-term earnings. And that's really critical to understand because if they want to maximize the short-term earnings, that may be taking long-term sacrifices.
对我作为一个投资者来说，我在这里想到的是一个公司的管理团队是如何获得报酬的。如果一个管理团队通过股票期权来激励，如果你了解股票期权的工作原理，你就会知道持有这些期权的人都希望在短期内最大化股票价值，因为这些期权有一个行使日期的限制。这就创造了一种非对称的上行机会，即在一年后可能有巨额回报，或者可能根本没有回报。因此，实际上没有下行风险。这激励了他们最大化短期收益。这一点非常关键，因为如果他们想最大化短期收益，可能会做出长期的牺牲。
And then you can think about the management team that owns a bunch of shares in the company. This aligns the interests of the management team with the long-term shareholder base. The management now has the downside risk, assuming that they hold those shares for a really long time. They have skin in the game. For me personally, I would want a CEO to be similar to Buffett and have 99% of their net worth invested in the company. So they are deeply incentivized to give it their all and give their full attention to the company.
然后你可以考虑一下那些拥有公司大量股份的管理团队。这样可以使管理团队的利益与长期股东基础保持一致。假设他们长期持有这些股份，现在管理团队承担了下行风险。他们参与其中。对我个人来说，我希望首席执行官（CEO）能像巴菲特一样，将自己净值的99%投资于该公司。这样他们就会深受激励，全身心地投入并全神贯注于公司。
Munger believes that the most important rule of management is to get the incentives right. And Buffett has long been opposed to stock options, because he believes that this creates broken incentives for managers, and it's really against the interest of the long-term shareholders. Not only does Buffett want the management team to own shares in the company, but he also wants to tie their compensation to the key value drivers of the business. If they do their job well and they allocate capital effectively, then they should receive bonuses to recognize that job well done. In the case of GEICO, executives were compensated based on two key variables. First was the growth in their auto policies, and second was the underwriting profitability on their auto business.
芒格认为管理的最重要规则是正确引导激励机制。巴菲特长期以来一直反对员工股票期权，因为他认为这会导致管理者的激励机制出现问题，不符合长期股东的利益。巴菲特不仅希望管理团队拥有公司股份，而且希望将他们的薪酬与企业的关键价值驱动因素挂钩。如果他们工作出色并有效配置资本，那么他们应该获得奖金以表彰好的工作。在GEICO的案例中，高管的薪酬是基于两个关键变量来确定的。第一是其汽车保单的增长，第二是其汽车业务的核保盈利能力。
Whether you're a parent, a manager, an employee, a teacher, a salesman, or you take on many other roles, thinking about incentives between you and others is necessary to create win-win relationships. Incentives encourage desirable behavior and disincentives prevent them. Gotem explains, incentive-caused bias is so pervasive that it occurs in almost every profession. Outsider CEOs avoid long-term value creating investments in research and development because their compensation is based on them meeting or beating their quarterly Wall Street estimates. Lawyers make clients litigate more than necessary. Doctors prescribe expensive branded drugs instead of generics. Contractors engage in the gaming of cost plus arrangements. Auditors overlook accounting irregularities. Investment makers price IPOs to extract maximum value for their clients because that is the basis of which they get paid.
无论你是一个父母、经理、员工、教师、销售员，还是扮演其他多种角色，思考你和他人之间的激励是创造双赢关系所必需的。激励鼓励可取行为，而惩罚则防止它们。尤其是在几乎每一个职业中都存在激励导致的偏见。外部CEO会避免进行研发长期创造价值的投资，因为他们的报酬是基于达到或超过每个季度的华尔街预期。律师让客户进行比必要更多的诉讼。医生开处昂贵的品牌药品而不是仿制药。承包商会利用成本加利润安排做些手脚。审计师会忽视会计违规行为。投资人价格为其客户提取最大价值的IPO，因为这是他们获得报酬的基础。
The real power of incentives is the ability to manipulate the cognitive process. An otherwise decent individual may act immorally because he or she is driven by the perverse incentives prevailing in the system. Because incentive-caused bias operates automatically, at a subconscious level, you may be fooled into believing that what is good for you is also good for the client. And so you may find yourself selling addictive and harmful products like tobacco and alcohol or overpriced insurance just for the money.
激励措施的真正力量在于操纵认知过程。一个本来正直的个体可能会因为违背常理的激励机制而行事不道德。由于激励造成的偏见是在自动、潜意识的层面上运作的，你可能会被欺骗以为对你有利的事情也对客户有利。因此，你可能会为了金钱而销售诸如烟草和酒精等成瘾性产品，或者高价的保险。
So as investors, we can use the power of incentives and recognize the role they play through these subtle clues. When I did my initial research on a specific company, I mentioned the company to Stig and he didn't ask about any of the things I mentioned about the company and one of the very first things Stig mentioned to me was he asked what the insider ownership was within the company. Right away, I had noticed that during my initial research, I had forgotten about how important that was. Stig also thinks very hard about the incentives within our own company and how we're all compensated at TIP. He wants to set a compensation structure that rewards that which benefits the company and then disincentivize behaviors that hurt the company.
作为投资者，我们可以利用激励的力量，并通过这些微妙的线索认识到它们所扮演的角色。当我对一家特定公司进行初步调研时，我提到了这家公司，但Stig并没有询问我关于该公司提到的任何事情，而他向我提起的第一件事就是询问内部所有权。我立刻意识到，在我进行初步研究时，我忘记了这个问题有多么重要。Stig也非常关注我们公司内部的激励机制，以及我们在TIP公司的报酬方式。他希望建立一种奖励有利于公司发展的结构，并对损害公司利益的行为进行逆向激励。
Gotem talks a little bit about investment firms and how people in the financial industry act as commissioned salesmen. They want to make the sale rather than provide the best product for their clients. Fees are killer for investors as many in the audience know and those selling the fund will likely do whatever they legally can to understate the fees. Be wary of firms that advertise their hot funds, create new sector funds to try and sell you more or they don't do a good job of educating their clients.
Gotem谈到了一些关于投资公司的话题，以及金融行业中人们如何像佣金销售员一样行事。他们更想进行销售，而不是为客户提供最佳产品。对于投资者来说，费用是致命的，正如观众中的许多人所知道的那样，而销售基金的人很可能会尽其合法所能来低估费用。对那些宣传炙手可热基金的公司要保持警惕，对那些试图销售更多产品的新兴行业基金也要小心，另外，那些没有很好地教育客户的公司也要谨慎。
Gotem states that ultimately, the best way to overcome incentive-caused bias is to achieve financial independence because this independence empowers you to see things as they really are. Only free people can be honest. Only honest people can be free.
Gotem认为，最终克服因激励而产生的偏见最好的方法是实现财务独立，因为独立使你能够真实地看待事物。只有自由的人才能诚实，只有诚实的人才能自由。
Chapter 17 covers the importance of being directionally right with our investments rather than running a complex model with all these different inputs. When you purchase a company, you want it to be really obvious to you and your investment thesis should really be pretty straightforward. Buffett simply wants to buy a business that he believes is trading well below his assessment of the company's intrinsic value.
第17章讲述了在投资中与方向正确比运用复杂的模型和各种不同的输入更为重要。当你购买一家公司时，你希望这对你来说是非常明显的，你的投资论点应该非常简单明了。巴菲特只是想购买一家他认为其交易价格远远低于他对公司内在价值的评估的公司。
We shouldn't obsess over whether a business will earn $2 or $2.05 in the next quarter. Focus instead on finding a big gap between the current price and the value you have placed on the long-term earning power using conservative estimates to create a margin of safety just in case your initial assessment is wrong. A spreadsheet can only do so much for us. It's not very useful in modeling things like trust, integrity, goodwill, reputation, or execution capabilities. Investing is part art and part science in nuanced judgment is required.
我们不应过于关注一家企业在下一个季度能否获得2美元或2.05美元的利润。相反，我们应该专注于找到当前价格与您对长期盈利能力的价值之间的巨大差距，并使用保守的估计创建一个安全边际，以防您最初的评估错误。电子表格只能为我们提供有限的帮助。它在建模信任、诚信、商誉、声誉或执行能力等方面并不十分有用。投资既需要艺术，也需要科学，需要细腻的判断能力。
Godam even admits in his book that he's never opened a spreadsheet to help him make an investment decision which I personally find quite surprising. Munger is the same way as he stated, we never sit down, run the numbers out, and discount them back to the net present value. The decision should be obvious to us. Maybe I'm too much of an amateur but I personally always run the numbers on a company to put my expectations on paper and then see what my potential downside risk might be. I think that's the way that you know, TIP taught me from listening to so many of the previous mastermind episodes with Preston and Stig and others. They're explaining their TIB finance tool and they're coming up with their IRR.
上帝，甚至在他的书中承认，他从来没有打开过电子表格来帮助他做出投资决策，我个人觉得这相当令人惊讶。蒙格也是一样，他说，我们从不坐下来运算数字，然后将其贴现回到净现值。决策对我们来说应该是显而易见的。也许我太过业余，但我个人总是会计算一个公司的数字，把我的预期写在纸上，然后看看我可能面临的下行风险是什么。我认为这就是你了解的方式，TIP从听了很多之前的大师级节目，与普雷斯顿、斯蒂格和其他人的交流中教给我的。他们在解释他们的TIB财务工具，并且计算出他们的内部收益率。
Anyways, everyone is going to have their own approach that they are comfortable with and that's going to likely change over time. I guess this is my way of saying to just recognize your own limitations, capabilities, and your own skill set.
总之，每个人都会有自己舒适的方法，而且这种方法可能会随时间而改变。我猜这就是我想要表达的方式，即要认识到自己的局限性、能力和技能。
Buffett cautions investors from using precise numbers when calculating the value of a business. Rather, he's more focused on the range of potential outcomes and the probabilities he would assign to those outcomes. The more uncertain the businesses the higher the possibility there is that your calculation of business value is far off the mark.
巴菲特警告投资者在计算企业价值时不要使用精确的数字。相反，他更关注潜在结果的范围以及对这些结果的概率赋值。企业越不确定，你计算企业价值偏离真实价值的可能性就越大。
Tying this into human behavior, got him right, over the years, I have come to appreciate the fact that investing is a field of simplifications and approximations rather than extreme precision and quantitative wizardry. I also have realized that investing is less a field of finance and more a field of human behavior. The key to investing success is not how much you know, but how you behave. Your behavior will matter far more than your fees, your asset allocation, or your analytical abilities.
把这与人类行为联系在一起，了解到他是对的，多年来，我逐渐认识到，投资是一个简化和近似的领域，而不是极端精确和数量化的魔法。我也意识到，投资更多地是关于人类行为而不是金融领域。成功投资的关键不在于你拥有多少知识，而在于你的行为。你的行为比你的费用、资产配置或分析能力更为重要。
Then he covers a bit about calculating intrinsic value here. One example he gives is calculating a company's intrinsic value by projecting out the free cash flows for 10 years and then applying a terminal multiple to the business at the end of your 10. You can then calculate the internal rate of return off of those cash flows and then compare that to your other investment opportunities such as other stocks or high-grade bonds. I actually did a similar calculation for this on Constellation Software on YouTube. You can find that on the We Study Billionaires YouTube channel if you're interested in seeing what that looks like and what all of the assumptions are in calculating the intrinsic value there.
然后他在这里解释了一些有关计算内在价值的内容。他举了一个例子，通过预测未来10年的自由现金流量，然后在10年结束时对企业应用终端倍数来计算其内在价值。然后你可以根据这些现金流量计算出内部收益率，然后将其与其他投资机会（如其他股票或高等级债券）进行比较。我实际上就在YouTube上为Constellation Software做了类似的计算。如果你对看看那个计算过程和计算内在价值所涉及的所有假设有兴趣，你可以在"We Study Billionaires"的YouTube频道上找到。
Gotem explains that if your expected return for stock is less than a top rated bond, then it would be irrational to own the stock at the current price. So this is why interest rates are so important when valuing stocks. All else equal if interest rates rise, then one would generally expect stock prices to decline. If the stock has an expected rate of return of say 5% and interest rates go from 2% up to 5%, those that would be holding the stock may consider selling it because they can get the same expected return in bonds but with much less downside risk.
Gotem解释说，如果你对股票的预期回报低于最高评级债券，那么以当前价格拥有该股票将是不理性的。这就是为什么利率在估值股票时如此重要的原因。其他条件相等，如果利率上升，人们通常预计股票价格会下降。例如，如果股票的预期回报率为5%，而利率从2%上升到5%，那些持有该股票的人可能会考虑卖出，因为他们可以以更小的下行风险获得相同的预期回报。
Socks generally are much more uncertain. This brings us to his chapter which is all about intrinsic value titled intelligent investing is all about understanding the intrinsic value.
袜子通常更加不确定。这就引出了他所介绍的一个关于内在价值的章节，题为“聪明的投资就是要理解内在价值”。
He states the process of determining the intrinsic value of a business is an art form. You cannot follow rigid rules to plug data into a spreadsheet and hope that it spits out the value for you. Stocks are worth what people are willing to pay for them and no shortcuts will give you an exact equilibrium value.
他说，确定企业内在价值的过程是一种艺术形式。你不能按照严格的规则将数据输入电子表格，并希望它为你输出价值。股票的价值取决于人们愿意支付多少，没有捷径能给你一个确切的均衡价值。
Intrinsic value is a moving target that is constantly changing as fundamental data comes out and investors update their expectations based on knowledge and past experience.
内在价值是一个不断变化的动态目标，随着基本数据的出现以及投资者根据知识和过往经验更新他们的预期，而不断变化。
In the past I believe Buffett has described the intrinsic value as what an informed buyer would pay to purchase the entire business. As we've talked about many times on the podcast, the intrinsic value of an asset or a business is that some of the cash flows expected to be received over its remaining useful life discounted for the time value of money and the uncertainty of receiving those cash flows.
过去，我相信巴菲特曾经描述过内在价值是一个知情的买家愿意支付的购买整个业务的金额。正如我们在播客中多次讨论的那样，资产或业务的内在价值是指预计在其剩余使用寿命内将收到的现金流折现的金额，考虑到货币的时间价值和收到这些现金流的不确定性。
When determining your earnings figures, Gautam encourages value investors to use owners or earnings which is Buffett's definition of the earnings attributable to shareholders rather than your GAP EPS figures that are reported by the company. Many times there's a big difference between the GAP earnings and the cash that is actually produced by the business.
当确定你的收益数字时，高塔姆鼓励价值投资者使用股东可归属利润（也称为巴菲特定义的股东盈利）而不是公司报告的普通会计准则（GAP）每股收益（EPS）数字。很多时候，GAP收益和实际由企业生产的现金之间存在很大差异。
Another issue with GAP earnings is that for companies heavily reinvesting in the business, sometimes these investments are treated as expenses in the P&L statement and this ends up understating the earnings figures used to calculate Buffett's owner's earnings amount.
GAP收入报告的另一个问题是，对于大量将资金重新投资于业务的公司来说，有时这些投资会被视为损益表中的费用，这导致了低估了用于计算巴菲特所有者盈利额的收益数字。
This is why for a company like Amazon, you would have to normalize the earnings to determine if Amazon were not investing so much in the future, what would their earnings potentially look like today? Amazon in 2022 actually reported a net loss largely because of all these investments they're making to maximize that long-term shareholder value. Understanding this is critical and it's missed by many value investors.
这就是为什么像亚马逊这样的公司，你需要对其收益进行归一化处理，以确定如果亚马逊不在未来投资那么多，它们的收益可能看起来会如何？实际上，由于亚马逊对于最大化长期股东价值进行的投资，2022年它报告了净亏损。了解这一点至关重要，但很多价值投资者忽视了这一点。
A lot of times old school value investors have been attracted to low PE, low price-to-book companies because the high PE companies look expensive at face value. Investors like Bill Miller were able to look many layers deeper and understand that a company like Amazon was actually pretty profitable and they're continually reinvesting to produce potentially enormous growth in the future.
很多时候，老派价值投资者会被低市盈率、低市净率的公司所吸引，因为高市盈率的公司表面上看起来很贵。像比尔·米勒这样的投资者能够深入挖掘，并理解亚马逊这样的公司实际上非常盈利，并且不断地进行再投资，以实现未来潜在的巨大增长。
Bill Miller saw that as Amazon stock dropped by 90% after the tech bubble, the metrics of the business actually continued to improve. Then he mentions this idea I talked about during my episode covering Terry Smith's investment approach who's what I would call a quality investor, someone who wants to purchase high-quality companies.
比尔·米勒（Bill Miller）发现，在科技泡沫破裂后，亚马逊股价下跌了90%，但其业务指标实际上持续改善。然后，他提到了我在涵盖特里·史密斯（Terry Smith）投资方法的一集中讨论过的这个想法，特里·史密斯可以被称为一个质量投资者，他希望购买高质量的公司。
Got him writes, the key point is that for businesses that will grow their earnings, even at a moderate pace, but for a very long time, the optically high PE multiples that deter many value investors in reality are actually pretty low. This means that if you buy a strong-moded business at what appears to be a high price based on the current year earnings, you will end up compounding your money at a higher rate than the discount rate you use to arrive at your fair price. The longer the competitive advantage period, the more likely a business is worth a lot more than what the market thinks. Durability of the mo is the key factor.
这段话的关键点是，对于那些将增长盈利能力的企业来说，即使增速适度，但时间跨度很大，表面上高的市盈率倍数实际上相当低。这意味着，如果你以当前年度收益为基础购买一家有竞争优势的企业，其价格可能看起来很高，但最终你将以高于你用来确定公平价格的折现率复利增长。竞争优势期越长，企业的价值很可能远高于市场预估。竞争优势持久性是关键因素。
The market tends to underappreciate companies that have really strong modes because the durability often allows for the company's runway to last longer than many expect. For long-term investing, the focus should be shifted from entry PE multiples to duration of the competitive advantage period.
市场往往低估拥有强大护城河的公司，因为这种持久性通常使得公司的发展时间比许多人所预期的更长。对于长期投资来说，焦点应该从进入价格盈利率倍数转移到竞争优势期的持续时间上。
Godam discusses a few other interesting ideas in this chapter. He discussed the importance of understanding the maintenance capex that a company has and how businesses with high maintenance capex should have lower valuation multiples. Because of the lower multiple, this might trick investors into thinking these businesses are actually cheap companies.
Godam在本章中讨论了一些其他有趣的想法。他讨论了理解公司维护资本支出的重要性，以及高维护资本支出的企业应该具有较低的估值倍数。由于较低的倍数，这可能会让投资者误以为这些企业实际上是便宜的公司。
He mentions another Buffett quote about how not all earnings are created equal as well. Companies with high capital expenditures might have a tougher time if there's high inflation because their capital expenditures expenses continue to rise. Compare this to a company like Adobe, which is very asset light. They would have a much better time weathering through periods of higher inflation.
他还提到了巴菲特关于不同收益并非一视同仁的另一句话。如果存在高通胀问题，资本支出较高的公司可能会面临更大困难，因为他们的资本支出费用将持续上升。相比之下，像Adobe这样资产负债比较轻的公司将更容易度过高通胀时期。
When we value a business, it's easiest to do so if we have a good understanding of the capital expenditures required within the business. It helps a lot of the business has stable operations and the cash flows are stable rather than super volatile as it's much easier to predict and project out into the future.
当我们对一个企业进行估值时，如果我们对企业内部所需的资本支出有良好的了解，那么这将是最容易的。如果企业运营稳定，现金流量也相对稳定而不是非常波动，将更容易预测并预测未来的情况，这对于估值也非常有帮助。
He also has some great points here around discount rates and calculating the value of a business. Business school teaches people to use the weighted average cost of capital which is a weighted average of the cost of equity and the cost of debt. This never really made sense to me personally to use and Buffett and Munger are in the same boat. They just look at it from an opportunity cost perspective. The long term average for the S&P 500s is around 9-10%. You can use that as a good alternative proxy as anyone can go out and buy the S&P 500. Bruce Greenwald instructs students in his classroom to use a 10% discount rate in their calculations and just not even think about it too much. This can be used as a baseline to revise up or down based on a company's risk profile and other things related to the company.
他在这里也提到了一些关于折现率和计算企业价值的重要观点。商学院教导人们使用加权平均资本成本，这是股权成本和债务成本的加权平均。对我个人来说，这种做法从来就没有什么意义，巴菲特和芒格也持相同观点。他们只从机会成本的角度出发来看待这个问题。标准普尔500指数的长期平均值大约在9-10%左右。你可以把它作为一个很好的替代指标，因为任何人都可以购买标普500指数。布鲁斯·格林沃尔德在教室里教导学生在计算中使用10%的折现率，而且不要对此过于纠结。这可以作为一个基准，根据公司的风险状况和其他与公司相关的因素进行上下修正。
Companies that have a much more uncertain future should have a higher discount rate than a company that is much more stable and predictable and much more certain. I personally almost always use a 10% discount rate when I calculate the intrinsic value of a business. Ideally, we want to be able to put a range on a company's intrinsic value and only purchase businesses that are trading at the lower end of our estimates. This will ensure a margin of safety in case you're wrong or if your thesis plays out differently than what you originally expected.
对于未来更加不确定的公司来说，其折现率应比更加稳定和可预测以及更加确定的公司要高。在计算商业内在价值时，我个人几乎总是使用10%的折现率。理想情况下，我们希望能够确定公司内在价值的范围，并只购买以我们估计的较低端价值交易的企业。这样可以确保在您的判断失误或者您所预期的情况与实际情况不符时，有一定的安全边际。
The way Godum thinks about it is he's taking a weighted average of the future potential outcomes and he cautions against businesses that have a wide range of possible outcomes and he wants to make sure he's highly certain that he's making a favorable bet and doesn't want to risk the loss of capital. He says in businesses like Oil for example or any business that involves extracting stuff from below the Earth's surface, the range of potential outcomes can be pretty big. He also cautions against what are called value traps and having the mentality of only purchasing low PE companies. Constantly buying and selling cheap securities and waiting for them to increase to their intrinsic value not only leads you to continually incurring capital gains taxes but it also prevents you from owning high quality businesses with long runways. He states most of the time switching from a high PE stock to one with a low PE proves to be a mistake. Value traps are abundant and all pervasive. I have learned to respect the market's wisdom. Everything trades at a level it does for a reason. High quality tends to trade at expensive valuations and junk or poor quality is frequently available at cheaper valuations who took me many years to learn this big market lesson. Expensive is expensive for a reason and cheap is cheap for a reason. In the stock market prices usually move first in the reported fundamentals follow. A plummeting stock price often turns out to be an accurate harbinger of deteriorating fundamentals for a company. Think about this before you jump into it. Avoid investing in the melting ice cubes. What appears to be cheap or relatively inexpensive can continue becoming cheaper if industry headwinds intensify. An irrational fall in price makes the stock cheaper a rational fall in price makes a stock more expensive. Many of the high dividend yield stocks in expensive markets eventually turn out to be value traps and destroy wealth. Value traps are businesses that look cheap but are actually expensive.
上帝谷特（Godum）对此的看法是，他正在对未来潜在结果进行加权平均，并且他对可能结果范围较大的企业提出警告。他希望确保自己能做出有利的赌注，并且不想冒失去资本的风险。他说，像石油等涉及从地下提取物质的企业，潜在结果的范围可能相当大。他还警告说，不要陷入所谓的价值陷阱，并且不要只购买低市盈率的公司。不断购买和卖出廉价证券，并等待它们增值到其内在价值，不仅会导致不断产生资本增值税，还会阻止您拥有具有长期发展潜力的高质量企业。他说，大多数时候，从高市盈率股票转向低市盈率股票往往是一个错误。价值陷阱无处不在。我已经学会尊重市场智慧。每样东西的交易价格都有其原因。高质量的东西往往以昂贵的估值交易，垃圾或劣质产品常常以更便宜的估值出售，这是我多年来学到的一大市场教训。贵是因为有原因，便宜也是有原因的。在股票市场上，价格通常先动，基本面随后。股票价格的暴跌往往是对公司基本面恶化的准确预示。在你决定加入之前，请考虑一下这一点。避免投资正在融化的冰块。如果行业逆风加剧，看似廉价或相对便宜的东西可能会继续变得更便宜。价格的非理性下跌使股票更便宜，合理的价格下跌使股票更贵。许多高股息率的股票在昂贵的市场最终被证明是价值陷阱，并消减财富。价值陷阱指的是外表看起来便宜但实际上很昂贵的企业。
Then to round out the chapter he lists four common sources of value traps. The first being cyclicality of earnings. For example an oil business might have a low PE but their earnings are about to fall off a cliff. Leading to the stock price collapsing with those earnings. If one normalizes the earnings it might not appear to be as cheap on a PE basis. The second one he lists here is at-risk. He uses the example of a taxi business that appears really cheap based on the past earnings until Uber or Lyft comes along and totally disrupts them. Third is poor capital allocators on the management team. Sometimes a business might have a low multiple because the management team invests internally in projects that don't give a high return to investors. Maybe sometimes they even produce negative returns which is destroying value for the shareholders. And finally fourth is governance issues you obviously don't want to partner with a manager that is a crook. Unethical managers have a way of siphoning cash from the business so be wary of businesses of run for social purposes or they're owned by shady promoters. Thomas Phelps stated that remember that a man who can steal from you will steal from you.
然后，在总结这一章节时，他列举了四种常见的价值陷阱来源。第一种是收益的周期性。例如，一个石油公司可能有很低的市盈率，但它们的收益即将暴跌。这导致股价随着收益的下降而崩盘。如果我们对收益进行归一化处理，它可能在市盈率上看起来并不便宜。第二个来源是风险。他以出租车行业为例，该行业在过去的收益表现上看起来非常便宜，直到Uber或Lyft出现并完全颠覆了他们的市场。第三个来源是管理团队的资本配置不当。有时候，一个企业的市盈率可能很低，是因为管理团队在内部投资的项目对投资者没有高回报。有时候甚至产生负回报，这会损害股东的价值。最后一个来源是治理问题，显然你不想和一个是骗子的经理合作。不道德的经理有一种从企业中挪用资金的方式，所以要谨慎对待为社会目的而运营的企业，或者那些由可疑的推销商拥有的企业。汤姆斯·费尔普斯曾说过，记住，一个能偷你东西的人就会偷你的东西。
Chapter 19 covers the three most important words in investing. Those three words being margin of safety. Howard Marks immediately comes to mind when I say those three words as he's been on our show multiple times you know preaching this margin of safety concept.
第19章涵盖了投资中最重要的三个词。那三个词就是 “保证金安全边际”。当我提到这三个词时，霍华德·马克思立刻在我脑海中浮现，因为他曾多次出现在我们的节目中，并传授这个保证金安全边际的概念。
Seth Klarman stated that a margin of safety is achieved when securities are purchased at prices sufficiently below underlying value to allow for human error bad luck or extreme volatility in a complex unpredictable and rapidly changing world.
塞思·克拉曼表示，当证券以足够低于底层价值的价格购买时，就实现了安全边际，这种边际可以防范人为错误、不幸事件或复杂、不可预测和快速变化的世界中的极端波动。
Now one of the classic examples of investing without a margin of safety were those who believed that the nifty 50 could never go down in the early 1970s. Jeremy Siegel writes the nifty 50 were a group of premier gross stocks such as Xerox, IBM, Polaroid, and Coca-Cola that became institutional darlings in the early 1970s. All of these stocks had proven growth records, continual increases in dividends, and high market caps.
现在，投资中没有安全余地的经典案例之一是那些相信20世纪70年代初的nifty 50永远不会下跌的人。杰里米·西格尔写道，nifty 50是一组在20世纪70年代初成为机构宠儿的优质股票，如施乐、IBM、宝丽来和可口可乐。所有这些股票都有可靠的增长记录、持续增加的股息和高市值。
This last characteristic enabled institutions to load up on these stocks while significantly influencing the price of their shares. The nifty 50 were often called one decision stocks by and never sell because their prospects were so bright many analysts claim that the only direction they would go is up. Since they had made so many people rich few if any investors could fault a money manager for buying them. At the time many investors did not seem to find 50, 80, or even a hundred times earnings at all an unreasonable price to pay for the world's preeminent growth companies.
这个最后的特点使得机构可以大量购买这些股票，同时对其股价产生重大影响。这些50只值得关注的股票通常被称为“一次决策股票”，因为它们的前景如此光明，许多分析师声称它们的唯一发展方向就是增长。因为它们使得许多人致富，所以几乎没有投资者会责怪一位基金经理购买它们。当时许多投资者对于为全球最优秀的成长型公司支付50倍、80倍甚至100倍的盈利无所谓。
Then got them shows a chart of the nifty 50 stocks in their returns starting from June of 1972. McDonald had a PE of 85 and they had a return of 1% over the following 10 years. Disney had a PE of 75 and had a return of minus 3% over the next 10 years. And remember that during the 1970s this was a period of higher inflation. So the real returns on these is far negative had you bought during the hype phase in 1972.
然后他们向他们展示了从1972年6月开始的50只优质股票的收益率图表。麦当劳的市盈率为85，随后的10年内收益率为1%。迪斯尼的市盈率为75，随后的10年内收益率为负3%。此外，要记住在70年代，这是一个高通胀时期。因此，如果你在1972年的繁荣期购买，实际收益率将远远为负。
Lawrence Hamptel reflected on the nifty 50 bubble stating, the lesson from this exercise I believe is that investors should always be conscious of starting valuations when placing their bets. With few exceptions eventually valuations that are simply too high will drift back down to more reasonable levels often at the expense of poor intermediate term performance. This appears to be true no matter how revolutionary the business appears to be and no matter how much potential you believe it has.
劳伦斯·汉普特尔对于“精明50”泡沫进行了反思，他表示，我认为从这次经历中得出的教训是，投资者在下注时应始终意识到起始估值的重要性。除非有极少数例外，过高的估值最终将回落到更为合理的水平，这往往以中期表现糟糕为代价。不论企业看起来多么革命性，也不论你对其潜力有多大信心，这一点似乎都是真实的。
Of course if your conviction is such that you plan on holding the shares for multiple decades, valuation may indeed matter less to long term returns. But that is assuming you follow through on your commitment. Over several years of sub-part performance that is much easier said than done. The easier said than done piece here he mentions I think is so critical. It's easy to buy into the hype of a gross stock but it's incredibly difficult to sit on it for 5 years or more if the stock is going nowhere while the rest of the market is going up and gross stocks are correcting.
当然，如果你坚信股票长期持有数十年的话，估值可能对长期回报就没那么重要了。但这是在假设你能够坚守承诺的前提下。在几年的表现不佳中，这比说起来要容易做起来要困难得多。在这里，他提到的“说得比做得容易”我认为非常关键。买入一只热门股票很容易，但如果这只股票一直没有增长，而市场其他股票却在上涨，热门股票却在调整，那么坚守五年或更长时间将会非常困难。
There was a quote I've read one time that said that everyone's a long term investor until they get punched in the mouth. All fast growing companies eventually have that gross slow and it can really lead to a painful transition for investors and potentially even result in something like a lost decade for that stock or that type of industry or sector. Remember that a company can do exceptionally well with their growth but the stock can still go nowhere if you're buying at a really high price.
我曾经读过一句话，说每个人在被揍的时候都是长期投资者。所有快速增长的公司最终都会经历一个减速期，这对投资者来说可能会导致痛苦的转变，甚至可能导致该股票、行业或部门的十年失利。请记住，一家公司的增长可能非常出色，但如果你以非常高的价格购买股票，股价仍然可能一事无成。
Our goal is value investors should be to compound at a moderate but steady rate of return over a long period of time. This is vastly superior to generating a sharp outperformance for a year or two but these outlier high returns just aren't sustainable and they aren't really reliable. Over Buffett's career he had an average annual rate of return of nearly 20% per year since he took ownership of Berkshire Hathaway in 1965.
我们的目标是价值投资者应该在长期内以适度而稳定的回报率进行复利。这要比仅仅在一两年内取得突出的回报更为优越，因为这些异常高的回报并不可持续，也不是真正可靠的。自1965年沃伦·巴菲特接管伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司以来，他的平均年回报率几乎达到20%。
Achieving any more than 20% per year over a long time horizon is simply not sustainable. Most of us aren't like Buffett unless you happen to be one of those handful of people that happen to be as brilliant as him. Gotta mince is that only 5% of Indian listed companies above some sort of size threshold. Only 5% were able to grow their earnings by more than 20% annualized. Over the previous 10 years from 2018 55% of companies had earnings decline.
在一个长期的时间跨度内，实现超过每年20%的收益是不可持续的。除非你碰巧是像巴菲特一样聪明的那几个人之一，我们大多数人都不可能像他那样。需要明确的是，只有5%的印度上市公司超过一定规模的门槛。只有5%的公司能够实现年化收益超过20%。在2018年之前的10年中，55%的公司的收益出现下降。
Investing success over a long period of time is really extraordinarily difficult and when a bull market comes it tricks investors into thinking that investing is really easy. Consider a thought experiment where one investor earns 20% for two consecutive years and another investor earns 100% in the first year and a negative 30% in the second year. I find this so interesting because intuitively you'd think that the second investor does better than the first but the overall returns for the first person who compounded at 20% annually actually has the better return.
长期投资成功实际上是非常困难的，当牛市来临时，会让投资者误以为投资很简单。假设有两个投资者，第一个连续两年收益率为20%，而第二个投资者第一年收益率为100%，第二年收益率为负30%。我觉得这很有趣，因为直觉上你可能会认为第二个投资者的表现比第一个好，但实际上，以20%年复合收益率的第一个人的整体回报率更高。
Unfortunately a lot of inexperienced investors realize this the hard way. Myself included in some cases earlier on in my investing journey. I love following the stock market and learning about investing concepts but sometimes I fall victim to information overload. That happens to you too right? Hundreds of news headlines from CNBC, Forbes and Twitter all pulling for my attention every hour. How are we supposed to know what's important when everything is made to seem important?
不幸的是，很多经验不足的投资者都经历过这样的痛苦。我自己在投资旅程的早期某些情况下也是如此。我喜欢关注股市并学习投资概念，但有时我会陷入信息过载的困境。你有没有遇到类似的情况呢？每个小时都有来自CNBC、福布斯和推特的数百条新闻标题争相吸引我的注意力。当一切似乎都很重要时，我们应该如何知道什么是重要的呢？
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I think this is a good example of highlighting the importance of not losing money. One single year of a big loss can undo many years of good decisions in the past. This is why Buffett's number one rule of investing is to not lose money. In his second rule is not to forget rule number one.
我认为这是一个很好的例子，强调了不要亏损的重要性。一个大的亏损年份可以抵消过去多年的良好决策。这就是为什么巴菲特在投资中的第一条规则是不要亏损。他的第二条规则是不要忘记第一条规则。
This is why Buffett pays so close attention to price when he's buying a business. He won't buy unless he's certain that there's a large margin of safety in his purchase to make sure he's not going to lose any money.
这就是为什么巴菲特在购买企业时非常注意价格。除非他确信购买的东西有很大的安全边际，以确保自己不会损失任何钱财，否则他不会购买。
Many traditional value investors opt for finding value in stocks that are statistically cheap otherwise referred to as deep value. While other investors have chosen to opt for growth at a reasonable price and paying up a bit for quality. The investment styles are different but the objective is actually the same. They're both trying to buy something for less than it's worth.
许多传统的价值投资者选择在统计上廉价的股票中找到价值，也被称为深度价值。而其他投资者则选择以合理的价格寻求成长并愿意为优质品多付一些钱。投资风格有所不同，但目标实际上是相同的。他们都试图以低于其价值的价格购买某种资产。
As I discussed during my episode covering Terry Smith who focuses on quality businesses, it is worth paying up a bit for a high quality business. A business that's growing their intrinsic value at 18% per year should be trading at a much higher multiple than a business that's growing at just 6% per year. This is why Buffett eventually came around to the Charlie Munger School of Thought that it's much better to pay a fair price for a wonderful business than a wonderful price for a fair business.
正如我在讨论特里·史密斯（Terry Smith）专注于高品质企业的一集中提到的，为了拥有一个高品质的企业，稍微支付更多的费用是值得的。一个每年内在价值增长18%的企业应该以比一个每年只增长6%的企业更高的倍数进行交易。这就是为什么巴菲特最终接受了查理·芒格思想学派，即为了一个美妙的企业支付一个公平的价格要比为一个普通的企业支付一个美妙的价格更好。
Gotta acknowledge is that high quality businesses can help increase your margin of safety given that you have a long enough time horizon with your purchase. Owning quality businesses is the best form of long-term investing in my opinion. I'm still early on in my investing journey and I have many years ahead to let my investments grow. I know that chasing after cigar buds, training for cheap might outperform in the near term but over the long term I think that quality businesses that compound their capital at high rates of return and they have that long runway for growth ahead. I think these businesses are best positioned to outperform over the long run.
必须承认的是，优质企业可以在您进行长期购买时增加安全边际。在我看来，拥有优质企业是最好的长期投资形式。我在投资之旅中还处于早期阶段，未来还有很多年可以让我的投资增长。我知道追逐廉价的"雪茄烟蒂"可能在短期内表现出色，但从长期来看，我认为那些以高回报率复合其资本并拥有长期增长空间的优质企业才是表现最好的。
Gautam says that when we invest in short-term opportunities such as a commodity, a cyclical, or a special situation type play, we want to pay really close attention to the price. And when we invest in long-term opportunities, we want to pay really close attention to the quality of the business and the quality of the management team. Then Gautam discusses Buffett's transition from Graham's to Garbud approach to Phil Fisher's approach of finding high quality businesses.
高塔姆表示，当我们投资于短期机会（如商品、周期性或特殊情况）时，我们希望非常关注价格。而当我们投资于长期机会时，我们希望非常关注企业的质量和管理团队的素质。然后高塔姆讨论了巴菲特从格雷厄姆的投资方法向加布德方法再转向费希尔方法寻找高质量企业的转变。
The Graham and Dott investor believed in the concept of mean reversion. They believe that bad things will eventually happen to good businesses and good things will eventually happen to bad businesses.
格雷厄姆和多特投资者坚信均值回归的概念。他们认为好的企业最终会遇到困难，坏的企业最终会迎来好的时机。
Phil Fisher recognized that there were actually some cases where mean reversion really didn't apply. Ironically, Benjamin Graham's profits from Geico, which was a really high quality company, it exceeded his profits from all of his other investments combined. In 1948, Graham's investment partnership purchased 50% of Geico for $712,000. By 1972, the position was worth $400 million. That's a 560-fold increase or a 30% annualizer return from 1948 through 1972.
菲尔·费舍尔意识到实际上有一些情况，回归均值并不适用。具有讽刺意味的是，本杰明·格雷厄姆在浙江民营经济研究中心赚取的利润超过了他所有其他投资的利润。1948年，格雷厄姆的投资合作伙伴以71.2万美元购买了Geico的50%股份。到1972年时，该头寸价值4亿美元。这是一个560倍的增长，或者说从1948年到1972年的年化回报率为30%。
He also references a study here done by Credit Suisse in 2013 that provided strong evidence of outperformance by quality companies with high return on investing capital. It found that great businesses tend to remain great, or some of them become good businesses. Only 9% of the companies in their study went from being a great business to being in the quartile of the poorest quality businesses. Similarly, poor companies also tended to remain poor companies. It's rare to see a turnaround situation as Buffett says. Only 6% of companies in the study went from the lowest quartile to the highest quartile of performance. So great businesses tend to remain great and poor businesses tend to remain poor.
他还提到了瑞士信贷于2013年进行的一项研究，该研究提供了高资本回报率的优质公司在表现上超过其他公司的强有力证据。该研究发现，伟大的企业往往保持伟大，或者其中一些会变成好公司。在他们的研究中，只有9%的公司从伟大的企业转为质量最差的企业四分位。同样，贫困的公司也倾向于保持贫困的状态。正如巴菲特所说的，见到企业的转机情况很少。在该研究中，只有6%的公司从最低的四分位转为最高的绩效四分位。因此，伟大的企业往往保持伟大，贫困的企业往往保持贫困。
Got him right, the key finding of this study was that despite being recognized as successful businesses, the fourth quartile of businesses continued to deliver outstanding investment results over the long term. But if markets were efficient, this should not have happened. The prices of such stocks should have been bid up to such a point that the buyers could not earn exceptional returns. But they did. Markets systematically underpriced quality over long periods of time. I hadn't heard about this study, but it only confirms my own personal bias towards favoring a high quality company versus a company that is simply cheap based on the numbers.
他们说到了重点，这项研究的关键发现是，尽管被认为是成功的企业，但在长期内，业绩位于第四个四分位数的企业仍然能够提供出色的投资回报。然而，如果市场是高效的，这种情况本不应该发生。这些股票的价格应该被推高到买家无法获得异常回报的程度。但实际上他们做到了。市场系统性地长时间低估了高质量的股票。我之前没有听说过这项研究，但它只是证实了我个人对更看重高质量公司而非仅仅依靠数据选择便宜公司的偏见。
This brings us to chapter 20 titled Investing in Commodity in Cyclical Stocks is all about the capital cycle. Commodities are definitely not in my domain of expertise, so it was interesting to read a traditional value investors take on investing in commodities. In order to understand commodity investing, you need to understand the capital cycle. The capital cycle is similar to the concept of the meaner version. Dot-em-rights, a capital cycle is based on the premise that the prospect of high returns will attract capital, which results in increased competition just as low returns repel it. The resulting ebbs and flow of capital affects long term returns of stockholders in what often are predictable ways termed the capital cycle.
这让我们进入第20章，标题为投资周期性股票中的大宗商品，重点是资本循环。大宗商品绝对不是我擅长的领域，因此阅读一位传统价值投资者对大宗商品投资的看法很有趣。为了理解大宗商品投资，你需要了解资本循环。资本循环类似于波动版本的概念。基于一个前提，即高回报的前景将吸引资本，从而导致竞争加剧，而低回报则会抵制资本。所以引起的资本的涨落，以一种通常可预测的方式影响股东的长期回报，被称为资本循环。
When investing in commodities and cyclicals, look for industries that are in major down cycles and they're starved for capital. Dot-em- likes to find individual companies that are selling at a huge discount to intrinsic value. They have manageable debt levels and they're capable of surviving another couple of years in this downturn. He wants to buy when pessimism levels are high and the more inefficient companies are going bankrupt or shutting down their operations. As he sees the capital cycle start to turn, he starts adding to his position. Investors who are able to time the capital cycle well are able to achieve really high risk adjusted returns. I just think that timing these cycles right involves a ton of research and a little bit of luck to be honest. So for me personally, I like to focus on the quality investing approach and leave the commodity investing to people a lot smarter than me.
在投资商品和周期股时，应寻找处于主要下行周期并急需资金的行业。dot-em-喜欢寻找个别公司，这些公司的股价远低于内在价值。它们的债务水平可控，并且能够在这次衰退中再次存活几年。他希望在悲观情绪达到高潮、效率更低的公司破产或停业之际买入。当他看到资本周期开始转向时，他开始增加头寸。能够掌握资本周期的投资者能够获得真正高风险调整回报。我只是认为，正确把握这些周期需要大量的研究和一点运气，说实话。所以对我个人而言，我更喜欢专注于质量投资的方法，并将大宗商品投资留给比我聪明得多的人。
One major red flag to keep an eye out for in a cyclical industry is high levels of capital investment. The levels of capital investment are the most direct sign of a capital cycle that is about to harm investors. Edward Chancellor states that you don't just need supply to increase to destroy returns. Capital expenditures will do it. These types of industries are all about supply and demand. Demand is simply unknowable, but Gotem explains that supply can be forecasted accurately. Where investors sometimes get tripped up is forecasting demand based on recent trends.
在一个周期性行业中，一个重要的警告信号是高水平的资本投资。资本投资水平是即将伤害投资者的资本循环最直接的迹象。爱德华·乔恩斯勒指出，要破坏回报率，不仅需要增加供应，资本支出也会起到作用。这些行业都与供求有关。需求是无法预知的，但Gotem解释道，供应可以准确预测。投资者有时会在根据最近趋势预测需求方面出现错误。
Then he includes a section that talks about capitalizing on opportunities in the market as well, because profiting from cyclicals is all about seizing the opportunities when you see them. Quote, the importance of insatiable intellectual curiosity along with a deep passion for continuous learning cannot be overstated in the investing profession. And investing all knowledge is cumulative. In the insights we acquire by putting in the effort today, often help us in a serendipitous way at some point in the future. Work hard today to let good luck find you tomorrow.
然后他还包括了一个关于如何在市场中抓住机会的部分，因为从周期性行业中获利就在于在看到机会时及时抓住它们。引用：“在投资行业中，对无止境的求知欲和持续学习的强烈热情的重要性无法过分强调。而且，所有的知识都是累积的。通过今天的努力所获得的见解，往往会在将来的某个时刻以一种意外的方式帮助我们。今天努力工作，让好运明天找到你。”
Opportunities in the stock market can spring to life on short notice. Take advantage of them. You must be prepared and ready to act. Make sure you properly allocate your time playing offense as well as defense. Playing defense means monitoring the companies you already own. And playing offense means scanning the other thousands of listed companies for new and superior ideas. There's a lot of truth to the expression the harder I work, the luckier I get. Buffett was reading Bank of America and IBM reports for decades before he ever bought a share. Similarly, the work I am doing today may not pay off immediately, but I am confident that it is going to pay off at some crucial time in the future, as has happened many times before in the past. When a unique insight seemingly fired up in my mind out of nowhere, driven by cumulated experiences, it helps me connect the dots in a rapid manner. End quote.
在股市中，机会可能突然出现。抓住机会，你必须做好准备并准备行动。确保你适当地分配时间来进攻和防守。防守意味着监控你已经拥有的公司。而进攻则意味着浏览其他上市公司的数千个名单，寻找新的、更优秀的想法。表达“我越努力，运气就越好”这句话是很有道理的。巴菲特在购买美国银行和IBM的股票之前，已经阅读了几十年的报告。同样地，我今天所做的工作可能不会立即产生回报，但我有信心它将在未来的某个关键时刻产生回报，就像过去发生过的很多次一样。当我的头脑中突然涌现出一个独特的洞察，由积累的经验驱动，它帮助我迅速地将各个点连接起来。
He also shared his personal experience with investing in a commodity sector, which I found really interesting. He ventured into the graphite electrodes industry in India, which he described as a game-changing investment and it catapulted him within touching distance of financial independence. He purchased a company that ticked all of the boxes for him of what to look for in an investment. It was a company called graphite India, which he purchased in August of 2017. It was the highest quality company with the strongest balance sheet in the sector, and he believed this company positioned him to make a killing during the next cyclical upturn. The first two weeks he owned it, the stock actually declined, while a lower quality company he had analyzed had shot up by 50%. Rather than feeling bad for himself, he fully embraced learning everything he could to make sure he was making the right decision. He read and reread multiple books on commodity investing and did all of this research on the graphite electrode industry. He realized critical insights, such as the fact that high-cost producers counter intuitively tend to go up far more in the up cycles than the low-cost producers. And most of the time, the sector leaders move up first and become expensive. Then the attention typically turns to the secondary players in the industry, bidding up those prices as well. There are many more lessons that I won't be diving into here, but another one I wanted to highlight is that commodity stocks are not long-term investments. They generate alpha in portfolios over short time periods, and timing is really critical, and you really need to do extensive research if you're wanting to play this game.
他还分享了他在大宗商品领域投资的个人经验，我觉得非常有趣。他在印度涉足了石墨电极行业，他将其描述为一个具有颠覆性投资，它使他接近财务独立。他购买了一家完全符合他对投资标准的公司，这家公司叫做Graphite India，他在2017年8月购买。它是该行业质量最高、资产负债表最强大的公司，他相信这家公司会让他在下一个周期性上涨时大赚一笔。他开始拥有这支股票的头两个星期，股价实际上下跌了，而他分析过的一家质量较差的公司股价却上涨了50%。他没有对自己感到沮丧，而是全身心地学习一切，确保自己作出了正确的决策。他阅读和重读了许多有关大宗商品投资的书籍，并进行了对石墨电极行业的深入研究。他意识到一些关键的见解，比如高成本生产商在上升周期中的涨幅往往远远超过低成本生产商。在大多数情况下，行业领导者会率先上涨并变得昂贵。然后，通常会关注行业中的次要参与者，推高他们的股价。我在这里不会详细介绍更多的教训，但我想强调的另一个是，大宗商品股票不是长期投资。它们在短期内可以为投资组合带来超额回报，而时间选择非常关键，如果你想参与这个游戏，你真的需要进行广泛的研究。
Gautam was also inspired by Charlie Munger's belief that when you find a rare opportunity that you're nearly absolutely certain as a bargain, you should allocate in size towards that opportunity. So Gautam, after his extensive research, moved his money into what he previously saw as the lower quality opportunity in the graphite electrode space to a company called HEG in late 2017. He ended up making 270% on his investment in less than five months, and what was a really sizable bet for him at that time. He later re-entered that position to achieve another 64% gain through August of 2018 after he had realized that the stock still had more room to run. This resulted in a profit of more than 350% on his initial investment in the company. Gautam said that he had never achieved what Peter Lynch calls a 10-bagger where a holding win increased by 10x. Over his investment career, he had smaller wins that compounded many times over to help him realize his dream of achieving financial freedom. For a successful investing career, what matters is the long-term compounded annual growth rate and the overall portfolio value with the least possible risk, not the number of investments you took to achieve it. So if you were skeptical or maybe biased towards avoiding the commodity sector, maybe this could be a little bit of a wake-up call to not dismiss the opportunities too early. If you'd like to learn more, I'd encourage you to check out this chapter in Gautam's book in the joys of compounding. It's a really great chapter.
Gautam也受到了查理·芒格的鼓舞，芒格相信当你发现一个非常罕见的机会，几乎可以肯定是个便宜货时，你应该大量投资于这个机会。因此，经过 extensive research后，Gautam在2017年末将他的资金转向了他之前认为质量较低的石墨电极领域的一家名为HEG的公司。在不到五个月的时间里，他的投资获得了270%的回报，当时对他来说是一个相当大的赌注。之后，他再次进入这个职位，在2018年8月之前取得了另外64%的收益，因为他意识到这只股票还有更多上涨空间。这导致他在这家公司的初始投资上获得了超过350%的利润。Gautam表示，他从未像彼得·林奇所说的那样实现过一笔10倍回报的投资。在他的投资生涯中，他有很多次小的胜利，这些小胜利不断累积，帮助他实现了实现财务自由的梦想。对于一个成功的投资生涯来说，重要的是长期复利增长率和最小可能风险下的整体投资组合价值，而不是您采取的投资数量。因此，如果您对避免商品部门持怀疑态度或者有偏见，也许这可能会是一个让人警醒的时刻，不要过早地忽视机会。如果您想了解更多信息，我鼓励您阅读Gautam在《复利的乐趣》一书中的这一章节。这是一章非常出色的章节。
This brings us to chapter 21 discussing spin-offs. Again, this is an area I've personally never ventured into, but Gautam makes a pretty compelling case to at least consider them and study them.
这一点让我们进入第21章，讨论分拆公司。再次强调，对于我个人来说，我从未涉足过这个领域，但是Gautam提出了一个非常有说服力的理由，至少要考虑和研究一下它们。
During one of Monish-Pabirise meetings with Charlie Munger, Munger explained that investors would do well focusing on three things. First is watching what other great investors are doing using the 13F filings. Second would be to analyze cannibals which are companies that are buying huge amounts of their own stock. And third is to carefully study spin-offs.
在莫尼什-帕比里塞与查理·芒格的一次会晤期间，芒格解释道，投资者将获益于关注三件事情。第一是通过13F文件观察其他杰出投资者的行动。第二是分析“自我吞噬者”，即购买大量自家股票的公司。第三是仔细研究分拆公司。简而言之，投资者应该关注其他有成就的投资者的操作、自家股回购以及公司分拆。
What Gautam discovered about spin-offs is their high base rates of success. There was a study done by a consulting firm The Edge and accounting firm Deloitte that studied spin-offs from 2000 through 2014 with the parent companies having a market cap of at least $250 million. The study found that the worldwide asset class of spin-offs generated more than 10 times the average gains of the MSCI world index during the first 12 months that the spin-off company was independent from the parent company. In India, which is the market that Gautam focuses on, spin-offs generated an average excess return over the market index of around 36%.
高塔姆发现有关分拆公司的一个重要发现是它们高成功率的基础。一家咨询公司The Edge和会计公司德勤进行了一项研究，研究了2000年至2014年间具有至少2.5亿美元市值的母公司的分拆公司。研究发现，全球范围内的分拆资产类别在分拆公司独立于母公司后的首12个月中，产生的平均收益超过了MSCI全球指数的10倍以上。而在高塔姆关注的印度市场，分拆公司产生的超过市场指数平均回报约为36%。
He explains quote, a profitable opportunity often arises when a promising but small-sized company demurged from a large-sized parent is listed and has residual institutional holding. During its initial weeks and months of trading, you often observe forced selling by institutions that cannot hold the new stock in their portfolios because of certain rigid institutional mandates, such as being allowed to only invest in certain sectors or restrictions on market cap. Whenever someone sells in desperation, they tend to sell cheap. As a buyer, I love to be on the opposite side of such trades in which the other party is being forced to liquidate holdings at any price, regardless of the underlying value. The time to buy is when those investors are in a hurry to dump shares at any price.
他解释道，当一家有前景但规模较小的公司从一家大型母公司中剥离出来上市，并且拥有剩余的机构持股时，通常会出现有利可图的机会。在其初始的几周和几个月的交易中，通常会观察到机构的强制性卖出，因为它们无法在其投资组合中持有新股票，这是由于某些严格的机构规定，例如只被允许投资于特定行业或对市值有限制。每当有人绝望地卖出时，他们往往会以低廉的价格出售。作为买家，我喜欢处于另一方被迫以任何价格清算持股的交易的对立面，而不管其基本价值如何。购买的时机是当那些投资者急于以任意价格抛售股票的时候。
Then later, spin-offs represent live case studies on time arbitrage, in which the patient investor is paid for merely waiting and letting the procedural formalities take their due course.
随后，分拆公司成为了关于时间套利的活生生案例研究，其中耐心的投资者仅需等待并让程序性手续按照正常流程进行，就能获得回报。
Now, much of the time spin-offs occur because the sum of the parts is more than the whole. So a larger business may want to spin off unprofitable businesses, or they might recognize that there's more value to be discovered by spinning off a company that deserves a higher multiple than the parent company.
现在，许多分拆发生的原因是部分的总和超过了整体。因此，一个更大的企业可能希望将无利可图的业务分拆出去，或者他们可能意识到通过将一个应该被给予更高倍数的公司分拆出去，可以发现更多的价值。
He says that sometimes you'll find profitable opportunities when the parent company trades at a lower valuation and then the spin-off company should trade at a higher multiple, but the market doesn't fully appreciate or realize how much this business is really worth.
他说，有时候当母公司的市值较低时，你会发现有利可图的机会，而分拆的子公司则应该以更高的倍数进行交易，但市场并没有完全意识到或认识到这个业务的真正价值有多大。
Seth Klarman, Joel Greenblatt, and Peter Lynch have all expressed the huge opportunities available in spin-offs. Klarman has written about how spin-off companies often don't publicize the attractiveness of their business and the undervaluation because they prefer to initially fly under the radar. This is because management receives stock options based on the initial trading prices. Until the options are actually granted to the management team, they prefer to have the stock trading at a lower price. Klarman is quoted as saying, spin-offs are an interesting place to look because there's a natural constituency of sellers and there's not a natural constituency of buyers.
Seth Klarman、Joel Greenblatt和Peter Lynch都表示，分拆是一个巨大的机会。Klarman写到，分拆公司通常不会宣传他们的业务吸引力和低估值，因为他们更喜欢一开始保持低调。这是因为管理层根据初始交易价格获得股票期权。在期权实际授予管理团队之前，他们更愿意股票以较低的价格交易。Klarman说过："分拆是一个有趣的地方，因为有一群自然的卖方，而没有一个自然的买方。"
Joel Greenblatt is widely known for investing in spin-offs as he wrote about them in his book You Can Be a Stock Market Genius. He explained five different reasons why spin-offs may occur. First is that conglomerates tend to trade at what is known as a conglomerate discount. By separating the unrelated businesses, management can unlock value. In other words, the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. We've done plenty of episodes talking about the intrinsic value of Berkshire Hathaway. As value investors, we tend to be conservative in our estimates of intrinsic value and typically, Berkshire is trading at a pretty decent discount to their intrinsic value, which is partially due to that conglomerate discount that is applied to the company by the market. Buffett probably enjoys this at times as they're able to repurchase their shares at pretty favorable prices.
乔尔·格林布拉特因在他的书《你可以成为股市天才》中写到拆分公司而广为人知。他解释了拆分公司可能发生的五个不同原因。首先，大型企业往往以所谓的集团折扣交易。通过分离不相关的业务，管理层可以释放价值。换句话说，零部件的总和大于整体。我们已经做了很多集的剧集，谈论伯克希尔·哈撒韦的内在价值。作为价值投资者，我们在估计内在价值时倾向于保守，并且通常情况下，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股价相对于其内在价值交易还是相当合理的，部分原因是市场对该公司应用了集团折扣。巴菲特可能有时会对此感到满意，因为他们可以以相当优惠的价格回购自己的股票。
The second reason spin-offs occur is to separate a bad business from a good business. Third is to realize value for a subsidiary that can't be easily sold. Fourth is a way to recognize value by avoiding selling the business and then incurring a tax bill. And fifth, to resolve a regulatory hurdle where they need to split up the company in order to be acquired by another business.
分拆公司的第二个原因是将不好的业务与良好的业务分开。第三个原因是为那些不容易出售的子公司实现价值。第四个原因是通过避免出售业务并遭受税收损失来实现价值的一种方式。第五个原因是解决监管障碍，例如需要将公司分拆以便被另一家企业收购。
Greenblatt and Gotham also highlight the brilliance of capitalism. Gotham writes, Once a spin-off is complete, its management is freed from the bureaucracy of the parent and is empowered to make changes that will create shareholder value because if management owns a significant portion of the spin-off stock, they will benefit directly. Greenblatt tends to look for spin-offs that institutions aren't interested in. They have high levels of insider ownership and he looks for spin-offs where value is unlocked in either the parent company or the spin-off.
格林布拉特和戈汉姆也强调了资本主义的光辉。戈汉姆写道，一旦分拆完成，分拆的管理团队将摆脱母公司的官僚机构束缚，有权进行改革以创造股东价值，因为如果管理人员拥有大量分拆股票，他们将直接受益。格林布拉特倾向于寻找机构不感兴趣的分拆股票。这些股票拥有很高的内部所有权，并且他会寻找在母公司或分拆公司中能够释放价值的分拆股票。
Gotham also recommends studying the relevant SEC filings to check whether spin-offs management will have a substantial options package. Gotham understands the power of incentives and he recommends looking up the spin-offs form 10-12b filing. For those companies in the US, in search for the term executive compensation to see how many shares the new management team will have in the transaction.
高谭还建议研究相关的美国证券交易委员会（SEC）的文件，以查看拆分公司管理层是否有大量的期权计划。高谭理解激励的力量，并推荐查阅拆分公司的10-12b文件。对于在美国的那些寻找“高级管理薪酬”这一词汇的企业，他建议查看新管理团队在交易中将拥有多少股份。
Peter Lynch wrote him one up on Wall Street that spin-offs often result in astoundingly lucrative investments and quote, Once these companies are granted independence, the new management, free to run its own show, can cut costs and take creative measures that improve the near-term and long-term earnings. Lynch especially likes spin-offs of those with insider buying. Insiders have a ton of reasons they want to sell a company but there's really only one reason they want to buy and it's because they believe the price of the shares will go up. Even better is when you see a cluster buy, which is when three or more managers make open market purchases in a short period of time.
彼得·林奇在《华尔街独门秘籍》一书中写道，拆分公司往往能带来惊人的利润性投资，并且引用了这样一句话：“一旦这些公司获得独立性，新管理层在自由运营的同时可以削减成本并采取创造性措施，进而改善短期和长期收益。”林奇尤其喜欢那些内部买家参与的公司拆分。内部买家有许多想要卖掉公司的原因，但只有一个原因是他们想要购买的，那就是他们相信股价会上涨。更好的情况是，当你看到三个或更多的经理在短时间内进行公开市场购买时，这被称为“集群购买”。
Old-school value investor Jay Jeon studied the first year performance of spin-offs in the US from 2001 through 2011 which had insider buying within a week of being spun off. 11 out of the 12 spin-offs in the study beat the S&P 500 by a large margin. Live nation entertainment for example increased by 87% in the first year and January's financial increased by 46%.
老派价值投资者杰伊·全（Jay Jeon）研究了2001年至2011年间在美国进行股权剥离的公司的首年表现，这些公司在剥离后的一周内有内部人士买入。研究中的12个股权剥离中，有11个大幅度击败了标普500指数。举个例子，Live Nation Entertainment在第一年涨了87%，而January's Financial则增长了46%。
Trowned out this portion on spin-offs, I'll leave you with one more piece here from got him. Spin-offs received little attention from Wall Street are usually misunderstood and thus mispriced by investors. All this bodes well for future returns and then at the end the key takeaway from this chapter apart from strongly incentivized management the initial forced selling in spin-offs often leads to some attractive opportunities.
忽略了关于衍生产品的这一部分，我将在这里给你留下来自《得到他》一篇文章。衍生产品往往受到华尔街的较少关注，通常被投资者误解，从而定价不准确。所有这些都对未来的回报预示着良好的前景，而除了提供强烈激励的管理之外，从这一章节中可以得出的主要观点是，衍生产品最初的强制卖出往往带来一些有吸引力的机会。
That wraps up today's episode. This episode was part three of covering got him spoke the joys of compounding. If you happen to miss part one and two covering the book be sure to check those out as well. Those are episodes 534 and 536.
今天的节目就到这里。这一集是关于乔奇对复利产生的快乐进行讨论的第三部分。如果你错过了关于这本书的第一集和第二集，一定要去看一下。它们是第534和第536集。
If you're enjoying this series consider sharing it with your friends. We really appreciate you supporting the show and wouldn't be able to provide it for free without loyal listeners like yourself who help us continue to spread the word. With that thank you so much for tuning in and I hope to see you again next week for part four.
如果您喜欢这个系列，请考虑与您的朋友分享。我们非常感谢您对节目的支持，没有像您这样忠实的听众帮助我们继续传播，我们将无法免费提供节目。再次感谢您的收听，希望下周能再次见到您，一起迎来第四部分。
It is why Munger has said it takes character to sit there with all that cash and do nothing. I didn't get to where I am today by going after mediocre opportunities.
这就是为什么芒格说，要有勇气坐在那里，手里拿着这么多现金却什么也不做。我之所以能取得今天的成就，是因为我不追求平庸的机会。