A Sea Change Is Happening: What Worked Then, Won’t Work Now w/ Howard Marks (TIP545)
发布时间 2023-04-13 23:45:02 来源
I think that this decline in interest rates was the biggest single event of the last 45 years in the financial world. Most people wouldn't say that. Why? Because it was very gradual over a long period of time.
我认为，在金融界过去45年中，利率的下降是最重大的一个事件。大多数人可能不会这么说。为什么呢？因为它在漫长的时间内非常逐渐。
Welcome to the Investors Podcast. I'm your host, Trey Lockerbie and man, oh man, do we have a special episode for you today? I am here with the legend, Howard Marks. I'm so thankful to have you back on the show. Thank you for coming back on. There's a lot to talk about. How are you doing?
欢迎来到《投资者播客》。我是您的主持人Trey Lockerbie，嗯，天哪，我们今天真是有一期特别的节目！我很荣幸能够与传奇人物Howard Marks在一起。再次欢迎您回来参加节目。我们有很多话要说。你好吗？
I'm very good. Thank you. It was great to be back on the show.
我很好。谢谢你。能够再次上节目真是太棒了。
Well, we are going to try and maximize our time together here and dig right in because there's a lot. So bear with me, but I've got a lot to throw you right off the top.
嗯，我们要尽量充分利用我们在这里的时间，并开始深入讨论，因为有很多事情要说。所以请耐心听我说，我要在一开始就向你们提供很多信息。
Good. I know that you're not one to make market forecasts. And in your 54 years of investing, you've only made five real market calls, which have all come to pass. And in your latest memo, sea change, you list two major sea changes that you've experienced along the way and make a prediction that a third is currently underway. You are a master of market cycles and Ray Dalio has recently been out there saying we're in the 12th major market cycle.
很好。我知道你不是一个做市场预测的人。在你54年的投资中，你只做了五个真正的市场判断，而且都事实证明准确。在你最新的备忘录"转折点"中，你列举了你经历过的两个重大转折，并预测第三个正在进行中。你是市场周期的大师，而雷·达利奥最近表达了他对我们正在经历第12个主要市场周期的观点。
I'd love it if you could outline for us how a sea change differs from normal market cyclicality, which two prior events qualified in the past as a sea change? And what you're seeing today that's giving us level of conviction.
如果你能为我们勾勒出一个“巨变”与普通市场周期性的区别，我会非常高兴。过去发生的两个事件中有哪些被视为“巨变”？以及你今天所看到的什么使我们有相同的信心水平。
Sure. You know, back in 2017, I was writing a book called the Mestering the Market Cycle, which I'm happy to see on your shelf. And, you know, I've been a student of cycles, observer and user of cycles, you know, for a long time as you cite. And yet when I got two thirds of the way through writing that book, I said to myself, I wonder why we have cycles. Why don't things just go in a straight line? The economy grows 2% every year on average. Why does it just grow 2% every year? Why sometimes three and sometimes one and sometimes four and sometimes negative? The stock market, the S&P 500 has risen at about 10% a year on average for the last 100 years. Why does it just go 10% every year? And in fact, Trey, why does it almost never return between 8 and 12? If the average is 10, why don't we see some 8s, 9s and 11s and 12s? And the answer is that cycles, in my opinion, occur because people take things too far. When things are going well, they turn optimistic. And then they become too optimistic. And then they do things which are unsustainable. And so then eventually the events become less optimistic. The people become less optimistic. And they kind of reverse their prior actions, whether it be the decision to build a factory or a decision to buy a stock, whatever it might be. And when the overly optimistic or actions are reversed, very often the actions are too pessimistic.
没问题。你知道，早在2017年，我就在写一本叫做《驾驭市场周期》的书，很高兴看到它在你的书架上。而且，你知道，我一直以来都是周期的学生、观察者和使用者，就像你引用过的那样。然而，当我写这本书写到三分之二的时候，我就想，为什么我们会有周期呢？为什么事情不能沿着一条直线发展呢？经济平均每年增长2%。为什么它不只是每年增长2%呢？为什么有时是3%，有时是1%，有时是4%甚至有时是负增长呢？标普500指数过去100年的平均年增长率约为10%。它为什么不只是每年增长10%呢？实际上，Trey，为什么它几乎从不在8%至12%之间波动呢？如果平均增长率是10%，为什么我们看不到一些8%、9%、11%和12%呢？答案是，我认为周期的出现是因为人们过度推动事物。当事情顺利时，他们变得乐观。然后他们变得过度乐观。然后他们做出了不可持续的举动。所以最终，事件变得不太乐观了。人们变得不太乐观了。他们会反转先前的行动，无论是决定建厂还是购买股票，无论是什么行动。当过度乐观或行动逆转时，很多时候行动会变得过度悲观。
So I concluded that we have a trend line, let's say it's the 2% of the economy. But then optimism takes over and we do above trend. But then people say, no, that's unsustainable. And it corrects back toward the trend. But through the trend, because psychology goes too far, toward an excess on the negative side. And that corrects back toward the trend, but goes through it toward an excess on the positive side. So I think that cycles are very useful in thinking about excesses and corrections. They are, for the most part, the operation of the traditional machine, the economy of the market, with some novel events thrown in from the exogenous territory. But just going too far and then correcting in both directions.
所以，我的结论是我们有一个趋势线，假设是经济的2%。但是随后乐观情绪占据主导地位，我们的表现超过了趋势线。但是人们却说，那是不可持续的。于是，它会向趋势回归。但由于心理过度，会朝着消极方向有所过度。这将会朝着积极方向过度，然后回归到趋势线之上。所以，我认为周期在思考过度和修正方面非常有用。它们大部分是传统机器即市场经济的运作，其中还添加了来自外部领域的一些新事件。但总的来说，就是过度并在两个方向上进行修正。
Normal operation with normal excesses and normal corrections. A sea change, in my way of thinking, is a change in the machine, in the fundamentals of the machine. People are going to do things differently post the sea change than how they did it before. So in the memo, I talk about the two important sea change that I feel I've lived through and worked through. The first occurred in the late 70s. I started in this business in the late 60s. And at that time, a fiduciary was somebody who would buy high quality assets for the beneficiaries. Trust, whatever it is. And you could not be criticized for buying quality that was too high. You could be criticized for buying quality that was too low. And in fact, under the right circumstances, the fiduciary bought 10 risky assets. If nine of them were up 10x and the 10th one lost 5%, the fiduciary could be surcharge for having bought a risky asset and made to pay. So the job of the fiduciary was to avoid low quality.
正常运作需要正常的超额和正常的修正。在我看来，一个巨大的变革是指机器本身以及机器的基本原理发生了改变。人们在变革之后会以不同的方式做事，与之前不同。所以在这份备忘录中，我谈到了我经历和参与的两个重要的巨大变革。第一个变革发生在70年代末。我在60年代末开始从事这个行业。那时，受托人是为受益人购买高质量资产的人。不管是信托还是其他形式。你购买的高质量资产太多是不会受到批评的，但购买的低质量资产太多就会受到批评。事实上，在适当的情况下，受托人购买了10个风险资产。如果其中九个涨了10倍，而第十个亏了5%，那么受托人可能会因为购买了风险资产而被处以额外费用。所以受托人的工作就是避免低质量资产。
Then around 7778, Michael Milken and others had the idea that the prohibition on issuing below investment grade debt was excessive. And rather than consist of a blanket prohibition, there should be an understanding that they're risky because they're risky. They have to appear to offer a higher return as an inducement. But if the promised return seems adequate to the risk, then that's it. That's a reasonable thing for a fiduciary to do. So this was a big change. But this was a C change. You go from there are good assets and bad assets and you can't buy bad assets to you can buy any asset. No matter how risky it is, as long as as a as a prudent professional would say that the perspective return compensates to the risk. Big change, risk return thinking. And I dare say that it's risk return thinking that governs everything we do today. And nobody declines to buy anything just because it's low quality, but because it's too risky for the return that seems to be offered. Big change, big change. And we wouldn't have hedge funds, venture capital, private equity, and all the derivatives at the institutional level if the old fiduciary rules were still in enforce. So the shifting to thinking about risk and return together really has made the investment universe of today unrecognizable from 50 years ago.
然后在大约7778年左右，迈克尔·米尔肯和其他人提出了一个想法，即对于发行低于投资等级债务的禁令过于严厉。与其采取一种一刀切的禁令，不如认识到它们之所以有风险是因为它们本身就有风险。它们必须提供一个更高的回报作为诱因。但如果承诺的回报似乎足以弥补风险，那就是这样。对于一个受托人来说，这是一个合理的行为。所以这是一个重大的变化。但这是一个重大的变化。你从有好资产和坏资产，不能买坏资产，到可以购买任何资产。无论它有多大的风险，只要一位审慎的专业人士表示其潜在的回报可以弥补风险，那就可以购买。这是一个重大的变化，风险回报思维。我敢说，正是风险回报思维统领着我们今天所做的一切。没有人拒绝购买任何东西，仅仅因为它的质量低，而是因为它的回报风险似乎太大。这是一个重大的变化，重大的变化。如果旧的受托人规则仍然有效，我们就不会有对冲基金、风险投资、私募股权以及机构层面的所有衍生品。所以转向同时思考风险和回报真的使得今天的投资领域与50年前完全不可比拟。
The other C change I lived through came right around the same time, not connected. I don't think by anything underlying, but in 1980, I had a loan outstanding from a bank in Chicago and they sent me a slip of paper as they did when rates changed. And they said the rate on your loan is now 22 and a quarter percent, 1980, December. 40 years later, I was able to borrow at two and a quarter percent fixed for 15 years. Well, this is a major change. And first of all, declining interest rates have a number of very strong impacts. They stimulate the economy. They make it easier for companies to make money. They make assets worth more and of course, they reduce the cost of borrowing.
我经历过的另一种C变化发生在差不多同时期，但与之前的C变化没有联系。我认为这并非由于任何潜在因素，但在1980年，我从芝加哥的一家银行贷款，他们向我发送了一张纸条，告知利率的变化。他们说你的贷款利率现在是22.25%，时间是1980年12月。四十年后，我能够以2.25%的固定利率贷款15年。这是一个重大的变化。首先，利率的下降对经济产生了多个非常强大的影响。它们刺激了经济增长，使公司更容易盈利。它们提高了资产的价值，当然也降低了借款成本。
So these events of those 40 years made it very, very attractive for asset owners and for borrowers and people who borrowed money to buy assets got a double bonus. And so this was the overwhelming condition over this period. And it's not a coincidence that this is when private equity in particular, that had its great success because that's what it does. You borrow money to buy assets. The assets as it happened turned out to be worth more than you thought they would. And the cost of borrowing to buy them turned out to be less than you thought it would be. What a great combination. And I believe there's a couple of things worth noting. Number one, I think that this decline in interest rates was the biggest single event of the last 45 years in the financial world. Most people wouldn't say that. Why? Because it was very gradual over a long period of time. Kind of like the frog in the pot of water. You know, you put a frog in a pot of boiling water, he'll jump right out. But if you put him in a cool water and you turn on the heat, he'll just sit there while it gets hot and eventually he'll succumb. Because he doesn't notice that it's taking place so gradually. And I think that's what happened with rates. They changed so, so gradually that people, I mean, if you send out a questionnaire, what was the most important event it was 45 years in the world of finance, I don't think anybody would say they would take derivatives, high yield bonds, private equity. Very few, I think, would say the decline in interest rates. But, and then, so a couple of other things were noting.
在这40年的这些事件中，这对资产所有者、借款人以及借钱购买资产的人非常有吸引力，因为借钱购买资产的人有了双重好处。所以在这段时间里，这是压倒性的情况。而且这并不是巧合，这就是私募股权取得巨大成功的原因，因为这就是它的所作所为：你借钱买资产。而事实证明，这些资产的价值比你预想的要高，而购买它们的成本也比你预想的要低。这是多么完美的组合啊。同时，我认为有几件事值得注意。首先，我认为利率下降是金融界过去45年中最重要的单一事件。大多数人可能不会这样说。为什么？因为它在漫长的时间内变化得非常渐进，就像锅里的青蛙。你把青蛙放在开水中，它会立刻跳出来。但如果你把它放在凉水里，然后加热，它会一直坐在那里，直到水变热最后才不堪承受。因为它没有注意到变化是如此渐进。我认为利率就是这样发生的，它们变化得如此之渐进，以至于人们，如果你发问卷问最近45年金融界最重要的事件是什么，我不认为有人会说是衍生品、高收益债券、私募股权。很少有人会说是利率下降。而且还有其他几件值得注意的事情。
Number one, that means that in order to have seen a more normal period, you had to be working in the 70s or maybe in the 60s? In the 70s. Of course, we had the battle against inflation, so that wasn't a typical period. The 60s may have been something we would call normal. And, but that was obviously the 60s ended 53 years ago. So, not too many people who worked in the 60s are still working today. And I believe that the declining interest rates were responsible for the majority of all the money that's been made in the last 45 years. So, that's pretty important. Those are my candidates for sea changes. Obviously, not just a normal cyclical up and down, not just a correction and an excess and a graduate, but in a replumbing of the whole environment. So, the environment of borrowing money and buying assets at low interest rate period seems to be reversing.
第一，这意味着为了经历一个更加正常的时期，你必须在70年代或者60年代工作？在70年代。当然，我们曾经对抗通货膨胀，所以那并不是一个典型的时期。60年代可能被认为是我们所说的正常时期。但是，显然60年代已经过去了53年。所以，现在还在工作的在60年代工作过的人并不多。我相信，利率下降是过去45年来创造的大部分财富的原因。所以，这是非常重要的。这些是我认为的重大变革的例子。显然，这不仅仅是一个正常的周期性波动，也不仅仅是一个调整和过度，而是对整个环境进行重新调整。因此，以低利率借钱和购买资产的环境似乎正在逆转。
So what is the opposite of that? What is the sea change we are entering into that you're foreseeing? Trey, I'd rather not say reverse because that implies that we're saying rates went down and now they're going to go up. I think I would say they went down and now they're going to kind of hang around at this well, I'm not predicting that they're going to go back up. And in fact, you know, you look at the Fed funds rate, which is a four and three quarters today, I'll bet you in a year and a half it'll be lower. The rates are high today to high inflation. I don't think they're going to stay this high or get high.
那么相对的是什么？你预见到我们正在进入的巨变是什么？特雷，我宁愿不用说反向，因为那意味着我们在说利率下降，现在它们将会上升。我认为我应该说它们下降了，现在将会在这个水平上徘徊，我并不预测它们会回升。实际上，你知道，看看现在的联邦基金利率，今天是四分之三，我敢打赌一年半后它会更低。目前的高利率是由于高通胀，我不认为它们会保持这么高或者继续上升。
But if rates are through coming down, well, two things. Number one, they're through coming down and number two, they're in any major way. And number two, they're through being ultra low. You know, the Fed reduced the Fed funds rate to zero at the beginning of online to rescue us from the global financial crisis. And it worked. It was a strong move and we should thank our stars. But interestingly, do you know how long they kept it at zero? 13 years. No, I'm not figgled, don't know. Oh, and the answer is seven years. Seven. Now, zero rates are an emergency measure. And an emergency measure was called for in late, oh, eight or early on nine. But clearly, we didn't have an emergency for seven years. Clearly by 12 or 13 or 14, the emergency was over.
但是如果利率一直下降，那么有两个问题。第一，它们已经停止下降；第二，它们不再处于任何重要程度。第二，它们不再处于超低水平。你知道吗，美联储在经济危机开始时将联邦基金利率降至零，以拯救我们。它起到了强大的作用，我们应该感谢上天。但有趣的是，你知道他们将其保持在零利率多长时间吗？13年。不，我不是在开玩笑，我不知道。哦，答案是7年。现在，零利率是一种紧急措施。在2008年或2009年初，确实需要采取紧急措施。但显然，我们七年来并没有出现紧急情况。很明显，到2012年、2013年或2014年，这场紧急情况已经结束了。
So why were rates left at zero? And the answer is, you know, I'd rather think it was a mistake. But anyway, so if rates aren't going to be ultra low and aren't going to decline in the future, then the things that worked in recent years should not be the things that work best in that no one of our, that's the essence of the memo sea change.
那么为什么利率保持在零利率？答案是，你知道的，我更倾向于认为这是一个错误。但无论如何，如果利率不会保持极低水平，并且未来也不会下降，那么在最近几年起作用的事物就不应该是最有效的，这是备忘录中心思想的重大转变。
So I'm tempted to ask, you know, where if you think there's a Volcker like, you know, hammer needed here with this current inflationary environment, because you said they're not going to stay low for long. They're not going to go high for long, but inflation seems to be sticking around. And I'm, yeah, that playbook exists. I'm just curious if you're, if you're agreeing that maybe that's not needed in this new environment.
所以我很想问一下，你知道，你是否认为在当前的通胀环境中需要像沃尔克那样的重拳解决措施，因为你说它们不会保持低位很久。它们也不会保持高位很久，但通胀似乎一直存在。我知道那个方案存在，只是想知道你是否认为在这种新环境下不需要采取这种措施。
Well, I think it's not needed to the same extent. First of all, inflation today is probably roughly half of what it was in the 70s. So by definition, we don't need strong countermeasures. And secondly, some of the inflation that we have is kind of a one-off response to the, to the post pandemic measures that were enacted, distributing so much money to taxpayers and so forth. And also the little crimping of the supply chain, and those two things should work themselves out over time. So I think that the level of inflation today is not so high, and it will abate naturally, which was not necessarily the case in the 70s.
我认为没有必要采取同样程度的强力对策。首先，今天的通胀率可能大致是70年代的一半。因此，根据定义，我们不需要强有力的反制措施。其次，我们目前所面临的通膨一部分是对后疫情时期采取的措施的一次性反应，例如向纳税人分发大量资金等。另外，供应链也出现了一些瓶颈，但这两个问题随着时间的推移应该会自行解决。所以我认为今天的通胀水平并不高，它会自然减退，而这在70年代并不一定会发生。
So, but we still need to wipe out inflation and inflationary psychology, which tends to get embedded and sticky. And I think that you asked whether we're going to have a, a, a Volcker type treatment. And I think we are getting it from Jay Powell. I think he's being very reasoned, but he's being resolute. And, you know, all the, all the optimists who run the stock market would love him to say, you know, we're probably going to think about bringing rates back down, starting in December or something. But he hasn't said it. And I don't think he's going to say it. And all he has said so far is we're going to keep raising rates. We may go slower than we were going. We may end up higher than we thought we were going to go, but we're going to keep vigilant. And he hasn't said a word. Well, he has, he has mostly said, and we're not going to be cutting rates any time soon, which I think is very appropriate. So I'm optimistic that he'll, that he'll do the right thing here. Then they've been coming up with all kinds of tools that I think will kind of abate the needing to lower rates as well, which is kind of fascinating.
因此，我们仍然需要消除通货膨胀和通胀心态，这种心态往往会变得根深蒂固。我认为你问的是我们是否会采取沃尔克式的处理方法。我认为鲍威尔正在采取这种方式。我认为他非常理性，但也坚定。所有管理股市的乐观家都希望他说，我们可能会考虑从12月开始降低利率。但他没有说。我认为他不会说。到目前为止，他唯一表示的是我们要继续加息。我们可能比原先慢一些，可能会提高我们原本计划的幅度，但我们将继续保持警惕。他没有说一句话。好吧，他基本上说的是，我们在短期内不会降息，我认为这很合适。因此，我对他能做出正确决策感到乐观。他们还在制定各种工具，我认为这也可以减少降息的必要性，这很有趣。
When, when interest rates are low, corporate defaults are also low. And as rates rise, defaults also rise, or they tend to rise, right? So that you've written about investing with caution in the past while we've had this pandemic-infused uncertainty and this low return on cash environment. I'm curious how your opinion on investing with caution has changed in recent months. Is it the new definition of caution to a degree or a different type of caution that you're, you're now investing with?
当利率低时，公司违约也很低。而随着利率上升，违约情况也会上升，或者倾向于上升，对吧？因此，在我们面临这种受疫情影响的不确定性和低回报的现金环境时，你过去曾就谨慎投资写过文章。我很好奇你最近几个月对谨慎投资的观点是否有所改变。现在谨慎投资的定义在某种程度上已经有所变化，还是你现在采取的是一种不同类型的谨慎投资策略？
Well, there are lots of kinds of caution. And for me, caution means insisting on a margin of safety. You know, not many of us are so dumb that we will not, we'll make investments that would, would suffer if things stay the way they are. But if a cautious investor insists on margin of safety or margin or better or whatever you want to call it, what he's saying is, I want to make sure that if things get worse, then I think they will, I'll still be okay. And so I think that that's a very important part of being a cautious investor because, you know, from time to time, things will be worse than you, I thought, how will you do? That's, that's a key question.
嗯，谨慎的种类很多。对我来说，谨慎意味着坚持一定的安全保障。你知道，并非我们中的许多人都那么愚蠢，会进行一些如果事态保持现状就会受损的投资。但是，如果一个谨慎的投资者坚持要有安全保障，或者称之为保障边际，或者其他任何你想用的名词，他所表达的意思就是，我想要确保如果事态变得比我预期的更糟糕，我仍会处于安全状态。所以，我认为这是作为谨慎的投资者非常重要的一部分，因为你知道，有时候事态会比你预期的更糟糕，你将如何应对？这是一个关键问题。
Now, when the market's flying high and valuations are stretched and all opinions are loaded down with optimism, clearly you need a lot of question because there's so much potential for things to come in worse than expected. When the market's really low in its cycle, there's not much risk of that. There's no optimism in prices. Nobody thinks anything good is going to happen. And so you're not at risk of overestimating the situation and being disappointed to the same extent. So the thesis of mastering the market cycle is that your actions should be determined by where the market stands in its cycle. To the extent you could figure that out. And when it's high, you should be cautious. And when it's low, you should be aggressive. And, you know, I still feel the same about that. At Oaktree, we have, I would say, a cautious bias.
现在，当市场飞速上涨，估值过高，所有观点都充斥着乐观情绪时，显然你需要更多的疑问，因为事情很有可能比预期更糟。当市场处于周期低点时，这个风险就不大了。价格中没有任何乐观情绪，没有人认为会发生好事。因此，你不会冒着高估情况并同等程度地失望的风险。因此，精通市场周期的论点是，你的行动应该根据市场处于其周期的位置确定。在你能够判断的范围内。当市场处于高位时，你应该持谨慎态度。而当市场处于低位时，你应该采取积极行动。你知道的，我对此仍然持有同样的看法。在橡树资本，我们有一种谨慎的倾向。
Every investor and every investment portfolio embodies a mix of aggressiveness well, you say, I want to be a defensive so that if things go badly, I won't suffer too much. But on the other hand, I don't want to miss all the opportunities. So I'm going to have some aggressiveness. And the question of how you strike the balance between aggressiveness and defensiveness for me is question number one in the short or intermediate term. And when the market is, I think the market's in moderate territory.
每一个投资者和每一个投资组合都体现了一种积极性和保守性的混合。你说，我希望能够保守一些，这样如果情况不好，我不会受太大的损失。但另一方面，我也不想错过所有的机会。所以我会保持一定的积极性。对我来说，如何在积极性和保守性之间取得平衡是短期或中期的首要问题。而当市场处于中等水平时，我认为市场是温和的。
So I'd like to keep the same in their normal balance, which for Oaktree means a cautious balance. And, you know, we we we we sharded our course many years ago as saying that we're what we're going to deliver is lots of good years, maybe an occasional great year, but hopefully never a terrible one. And if you can just do that combination, which I think we've done, and you can do it for 40 or 50 years, then I think you've really accomplished something.
所以我希望保持他们的正常平衡，对于橡树来说，这意味着保持谨慎的平衡。你知道，我们多年前就明确了我们的目标，即我们将提供许多良好的年份，也许会有偶尔的辉煌年份，但是希望不会有可怕的年份。如果你能够实现这种组合，而我认为我们已经做到了，并且能够坚持40或50年，那么我认为你真的取得了一些成就。
So I want to talk about the current debt environment a little bit and just get your thoughts. Global debt is around nearly 350% of global GDP. And similar to how high rates can negatively affect corporate debt and how zombie companies who spend more than they earn have sustained through this low interest rate environment. And they may be facing a reckoning. Our country along with the rest of the world has continued to accumulate debt. And there's now a non zero chance that our country could default on its debt. What are your general thoughts on how this new moderate interest rate environment will impact our country and its overall place in the world?
因此，我想稍微谈谈当前的债务环境，并听听您的想法。全球债务约占全球GDP的近350%。就像高利率会对企业债务产生负面影响一样，那些花费超过收入的僵尸公司在低利率环境中得以维持下去，但它们可能面临着惩罚。我们国家与世界其他国家一样，继续累积债务。我们国家违约的可能性已不再为零。您对这种新的适度利率环境对我们国家及其在世界上的整体地位会产生何种影响，有何一般想法？
You know, late 2020, not so long ago, when it looked like we were getting out of the pandemic and the related economic malaise unscathed, stock market was high interest rates were low inflation was quite essence. People started talking about something called the modern monetary theory. And the belief that you could run as big an deficit as you like and take on as much debt as you like with no negative consequences as long as quote, you're in control of your currency. And that seemed to me what I said at the time was it seems too good to be true. I'm not smart enough to know why it's still good to be true, but I think it's still good to be true.
你知道的，就在不久前的2020年末，当我们看起来能够毫发无损地摆脱疫情和相关的经济困境时，股市飙升，利率走低，通胀相当低。人们开始谈论一种被称为现代货币理论的东西。他们相信，只要掌控货币，你可以无限制地进行赤字支出，负债增加，而不会有任何负面后果。当时我觉得这似乎太美好而不可信。我并不聪明到足以知道为什么它仍然是美好而真实的，但我认为它仍然是美好而真实的。
And you know, it's like, you'd be like if somebody said, well, I'll give you a credit card. And it has no maximum balance. And it has no requirement to ever repay principal. Oh, God, if you have one of those, you can buy anything you want. And you don't never have to go out of pocket. Although maybe you do for the interest, but maybe you can put the interest on the credit card. It's the same thing. It's the way our country's being run. Now, if somebody offered me that credit card or you, Trey, the first thing you would say is, well, what's the catch? And when they say it about our country, I say, what's the catch? I think it must be catch, but I just don't know what it is.
你知道，就像是，如果有人说，我会给你一张信用卡。它没有最大限额，也没有偿还本金的要求。哦，天啊，如果你有这样一张卡，你可以买任何你想要的东西。而且你永远不必花费自己的钱。虽然可能要支付利息，但也可以将利息放在信用卡上。就像我们国家的运行方式一样。现在，如果有人给我或者你Trey这张信用卡，你首先会问的是，有什么陷阱吗？而当他们说这个关于我们国家时，我会问，有什么陷阱？我认为肯定有陷阱，但我不知道是什么。
So let's say we're at 350% of GDP. Is that too much? No one can say, you know, I mean, we were very high at the end of 20, debt to GDP, but nothing bad seemed to be happening. At the end of or mid 22, we concluded that the inflation was too high and was not going to be transitory. So now we conclude that the debt is too high. So what's the line in the sand where it becomes excessive? No one can say. Japan's had heavy debt for a long time. It's conservative thought of as a conservative country, but they may do. Other countries that we think are less stellar than we are have higher debt ratios, and they seem to do OK. It's really very hard to come up, I think, with the statement of this is OK, and that's too much. I think we just have to avoid having that thinking. I mean, one of the great, helpful things in life is if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. And I just think it's too good to be true to think we can have a credit card. We never have to pay the balance on.
那么假设我们国内生产总值（GDP）的债务达到国内生产总值的350%。这算是太多吗？没有人能够确定，你知道吗，我的意思是，虽然在20年末我们的债务占GDP比例很高，但似乎并没有出现什么糟糕的情况。在22年底或22年中期，我们得出结论，通货膨胀过高且不会是暂时的。所以现在我们得出结论说债务过高。那么有种程度的债务被认为是过度吗？没有人能够确定。日本长期以来都有巨额债务。它被认为是一个保守的国家，但他们似乎做得不错。其他我们认为不如我们出色的国家债务比例更高，它们似乎也过得去。很难去确定这是可接受的，那是太多了的界限。我认为我们必须避免这种思维方式。我的意思是，生活中一个很有用的原则是，如果某事听起来过于美好，那么它可能并非如此。我只是认为以为我们可以持有信用卡而永远不需要还清余额，这太美好但却不现实。
Well, speaking of sea changes, Bill Gates wrote this new article. It says, the age of artificial intelligence has begun. And during his lifetime, he has seen two revolutionary technologies, the graphical user interfaces that created Windows and now AI. In his article, he writes that AI is as fundamental as a microprocessor, the personal computer, the internet, and the mobile phone. And OK, so why am I asking you, Howard Marks, about AI? It's because of human psychology, prices tend to fluctuate more than company profits, right? And as a result of human psychology, markets are prone to be reflexive and have these reflexive swings as you kind of outlined earlier between hope and fear. And there's been funds driven by AI to date, but they're kind of more akin to quant or algo trading, which you've written about in the past as well. And they've had these inconsistent or unimpressive returns, but that might be changing.
说到巨大变革，比尔·盖茨写了一篇新文章。文章称，人工智能时代已经开始。在他的一生中，他见证了两个革命性技术发展，一个是创造了Windows的图形用户界面，现在是人工智能。在他的文章中，他写道，人工智能和微处理器、个人电脑、互联网以及移动电话一样基础。好了，那么为什么我要问你，霍华德·马克斯，关于人工智能呢？这是因为人类心理学的原因，价格往往比公司利润更容易波动，对吗？由于人类心理学的原因，市场容易出现反射性波动，正如你之前所概述的那样，介于希望和恐惧之间。到目前为止，已经有一些由人工智能驱动的基金存在，但它们更类似于量化或算法交易，这也是你之前写过的内容。它们的回报不稳定或不令人印象深刻，但这种情况可能会发生改变。
I'm wondering if you've ever envisioned a world where either you use artificial intelligence in your decision-making and AI investment funds eliminate the need for human investment managers altogether. Well, it's a great story. It goes back to my days in grad school at University of Chicago, when the professor in the investment course told us that the vast majority of equity mutual funds do worse than the S&P. Many do worse before the imposition of fees, the vast majority do worse after the imposition of fees.
我想知道你是否曾经设想过一个世界，在那里你使用人工智能进行决策，并且AI投资基金完全消除了人类投资经理的需要。嗯，这是一个很棒的故事。这一切可以追溯到我在芝加哥大学攻读研究生时的日子，当时投资课上的教授告诉我们，绝大部分股票型共同基金的表现都不如标准普尔指数。许多在收费前就表现更差，绝大多数在收费后表现更差。
So he said, why don't they just buy one share of every stock in the S&P? There was no such thing as an index fund at the time or of indexation. It started off as kind of curiosity in this Jack Bowell introduced the first commercial index fund that Vanguard in 74. And through the 70s and the 80s, maybe even into the 90s, he was like, yeah, yeah, and I put 3% in an index fund. That's what I call dabbling. It would put in a little bit to be able to say, yeah, we're doing that. But it wasn't important.
所以他说，他们为什么不只购买标普500指数中的每只股票的一股呢？当时并没有指数基金或指数化的概念。最早是由杰克·鲍威尔在1974年引入了第一个商业化指数基金--先锋指数基金。然后在70年代、80年代，甚至可能延续到90年代，他会说，是的，我把3%的资金投入了指数基金。这就是我所谓的涉猎。他会投入一点点资金，只是为了能够说，是的，我们在做这个。但它并不重要。
Then, over the next 10, 15 years, it came to be true that the majority of mutual fund equity capital was managed passively or by indexation. Why? Is it because it indexation was so good? No, because active magic was so bad. People buying things that would go down or that would go up less than the things they didn't buy and charging high fees for the privilege.
随后的10到15年里，事实证明，大部分共同基金股本是以被动管理或指数化管理的方式进行的。为什么会这样呢？难道是因为指数化管理非常好吗？不是的，而是因为主动管理的效果实在太差了。人们购买的投资品种要么下跌，要么涨幅低于他们没有购买的那些品种，并为此支付了很高的费用。
And basically, what happened in mutual fund equity is to a large extent, the machine took over, machine not AI yet, but the machine of indexation or passive management, that is, you establish a role and you let the computer enact the rules.
基本上，互惠基金股权方面发生的事情在很大程度上是机器接管了，这里指的机器并非人工智能，而是指指数化或被动管理的机器，也就是你设定一种规则，然后让计算机执行这些规则。
So what is the computer dough? When I was in school, and I hope they haven't changed the risk this ever since, but when I was in school, what we said, what we learned that a computer can add, subtract, compare two numbers to see which is the bigger. Remember, those are the big things that computers can do. But what it means is that they can process a lot of data, they can do it fast, they can do it without making arithmetic mistakes or emotional mistakes, since they don't have emotions.
那么，计算机到底是什么呢？当我时在学校时，我希望他们从那时起就没有改变这个风险，但当我在学校的时候，我们所知道的，我们所学到的是，计算机可以做加法、减法，比较两个数字大小。记住，这些是计算机可以做的大事。但这意味着它们能够处理大量的数据，他们可以快速地做到，而且不会犯算术错误或情感错误，因为它们没有情感。
That sounds like a modest list. Processed data, a lot of it fast, no arithmetic mistakes, no emotional mistakes, modest list, but better apparently than most people can do, because investing passively, most of the people who were saying, well, what's the market going to do? What's the economy going to do? What rates going to do? What's the money price going to do? What's this company going to do? What's that company going to do? But who's going to win the battle between this company and that kind of turns out that most people didn't do a very good job of that. And so a lot of the work was turned over to indexation or passive investment. And so it seems that those things can do better indexation and passive can do better than most active. And I think that's also true, going to be true of AI and machine learning when it gets fully implemented, because obviously AI and machine learning should be able to do those same things even better and faster.
听起来像是一个谦虚的清单。有处理过的数据，大部分都很快速，没有算术错误，没有感情上的错误，这个清单虽然谦逊，但显然比大多数人做得更好。因为大多数人都选择了被动地投资，他们会说：“市场会怎样？经济会怎样？利率会怎样？货币价格会怎样？这家公司会怎样？那家公司会怎样？”但最终谁会赢得这场公司之间的竞争，事实证明大部分人并没有做得很好。所以很多工作都交给了指数化或被动投资。因此，似乎那些事情可以比大多数主动投资做得更好，指数化和被动投资能够做得更好。我认为当人工智能和机器学习得到充分实施时，这也将成为事实。因为显然，人工智能和机器学习应该能够更好、更快地做到这些事情。
So I do believe that there's a role. If you look at the last 45 years or 55, the real upshot is that it became impossible for people to charge high fees for inferior results. That makes a lot of sense. And I think that'll continue to be true. So the point is that the machine can do better than most people. And we're moving in that direction, and AI will be the next step in that direction.
所以我确实相信这是有一种作用的。如果你回顾过去的45年或55年，真正的结果是，人们再也无法为低劣的结果收取高额费用。这很有道理。而且我认为这种情况将继续存在。所以关键是机器比大多数人做得更好。而我们正在朝着这个方向进发，人工智能将成为这个方向的下一步。
Now, I wrote a memo six, seven, eight years ago called investing without people. And I talked about first about passive and indexation, secondly about systematic and algorithmic, and thirdly about AI and machine learning. And remember, this is from somebody who's not an expert in any of those subjects. But what I said was that AI, just like passive AI and machine learning even maybe to a greater extent, will knock out everybody who doesn't add value. It should be harder and harder and harder to run money and be paid highly for producing it to your results. But hopefully, there will still be a small group of people who can do something that the machine can't do. And that is understanding subjective matters, qualitative matters, and the future. Hopefully, there will still be room for the best at that. And hopefully, O3 will be among them.
现在，我写了一份六、七、八年前的备忘录，名为《无人投资》。我首先谈到了被动投资和指数化，其次是系统性和算法化，最后是人工智能和机器学习。请记住，这是一个对这些主题都不是专家的人所说的。但是我的观点是，人工智能，尤其是机器学习，将会淘汰那些没有增加价值的人。赚钱并因此而高薪的门槛将会越来越高。但希望还是会有一个小团体的人能做到机器所不能做的事情。那就是理解主观事物、定性事物和未来。希望仍然有最优秀的人才在这方面有发展的空间。希望O3能够成为其中之一。
But, you know, can a computer, an AI computer, enabled, sit down with five CEOs and figure out which one is D drops. Can it sit down with five business plans and figure out which one is Amazon? I just don't think so. You know, this is an art form. We have thousands of people with high intelligence try to do these things, and nobody does it consistently. So that tells me that it's not a matter of intelligence, whether artificial or not. Some people have insight. Some people can make these qualitative subjective distinctions. Most people can't. So I believe there will still be room left for the few people who can do these things demonstrably better. I hope so as well.
但是，你知道，一台计算机，一个AI计算机，能够坐下来与五个首席执行官交谈，并确定哪一个是D掉队者吗？它能够坐下来与五个商业计划交谈，并确定哪一个是亚马逊吗？我不认为会这样。你知道，这是一门艺术。我们有数千名高度智能的人试图做这些事情，但没有人能够始终如一地做到。所以这告诉我，这不是智能的问题，无论是人造的还是天然的。有些人有洞察力。有些人能够做出这些定性的主观区分。大多数人不能。所以我相信还会有少数几个人能够显著地做得更好。我也希望如此。
In our last discussion, why should we have to worry about interviewing me? It'll just be two robots interviewing each other, right?
在我们上次的讨论中，为什么我们要为面试我而担心呢？毕竟那只是两个机器人互相面试，对吗？
In our last discussion, we were talking about the adoption of Bitcoin, and you were actually even considering it to be a viable investment asset, although I think you were less convinced than your son.
在我们上次的讨论中，我们谈到了比特币的采用，并且你甚至认为它是一个可行的投资资产，尽管我觉得你对此并不像你的儿子那样确信。
While the world of crypto has collapsed around Bitcoin, meaning altcoins, FTX, Silvergate Bank, even etc. While those have been collapsing, Bitcoin has continued to climb. It's up roughly 70% year to date at the time of this recording.
在加密货币世界中，比特币周围的其他代币、FTX交易所、Silvergate银行等纷纷崩盘。然而，在这一切崩溃的背后，比特币却继续攀升。截至本录音时，比特币的涨幅大约达到今年的70%。
Have current events helped highlight the inherent differences of Bitcoin compared to other assets claiming a crypto title in your eyes?
在您看来，当前事件有助于彰显比特币与其他声称拥有加密资产称号的资产之间的固有差异吗？
I'm not necessarily close enough to the action tray to be able to answer your question empirically. But clearly, as you say, Bitcoin has done less poorly, and in 2023 has done much better. It's up 70% of it from below. I guess it got down into the 15,000 level, and now it's at the 27 level, I think. Of course, it was at the 75,000 level for a moment. So it's down almost two thirds from the old time, right?
我并不一定能够亲身接触到这个动作托盘，以便能够以实证方式回答你的问题。但显然，正如你所说，比特币的表现并不糟糕，在2023年表现强劲。它比之前低点上涨了70%。我猜它跌到了15,000的水平，现在应该是27的水平。当然，曾经它的价格一度上涨到75,000的水平。所以它与之前的最高价相比下跌了将近三分之二，对吗？
But we're noting that I wrote a memo in January of 21 called something of value about my time in captivity with my son, Andrew, during the pandemic. Our families lived together for three months, and we had some great discussions that you can imagine.
但我们要提到的是，我在2021年1月写了一份备忘录，标题是《关于我和儿子安德鲁在疫情期间的囚禁经历的一些宝贵东西》。我们的家庭在一起生活了三个月，期间有许多令人难以想象的美好讨论。
It was around April, I think it was April of 20, that Andrew told me he had bought Bitcoin, and I think he paid five or six thousand. So clearly, it went up 15, 12, 15 times. Then it went down to thirds, but it still shows the 5X gain from his purchase. I guess the only thing I could say is that it hasn't been disproved. And there are people who believe that when you have a bank crisis like we did with SBB and some of the others, that the weakness of the. I mean, it's really in many ways, it's an anti-bank play, and the weakness of the bank shows up the strength of Bitcoin. And it's done very, very well this year.
大约是在四月份，我想是2020年的四月份，安德鲁告诉我他买了比特币，我记得他可能花了五六千美元。显然，它的价格涨了15、12、15倍。然后它下跌三分之二，但仍然显示出与他购买时相比5倍的收益。我想我唯一能说的就是还没有被证伪。还有一些人相信，当像我们与SBB等银行一样出现银行危机时，比特币这样的虚拟货币起到了反银行的作用，银行的薄弱性凸显了比特币的力量。而且今年它表现得非常好。
For one thing, we can extrapolate from what we see in the United States. There are a lot of people who live in places where they don't trust the financial system or have access to it, and they don't exactly want everybody in authority to know how much money they have. It does seem that there are good uses for some coins, and Bitcoin seems to be so far the one in the lead.
首先，我们可以从美国的情况推测出一些结论。许多人生活在无法信任金融系统或无法接触金融系统的地方，而且他们并不希望让所有权威机构知道他们有多少财产。看起来，使用一些加密货币确实有好处，而比特币似乎是目前领先的一种。
Well, I know that you've minored in Japanese studies at Worden, and I'd love it if you could share how that has influenced your investment philosophy. First, I want to question about confirmation bias. So it may have made me something that I wasn't, and otherwise wouldn't have been, or it may have played to something about me. You know what I'm getting at? But whatever the reason, it kind of meshed with a kind of, I would say, I like to use the word patience that I have. You know, I'm patient about expecting things to happen.
嗯，我知道你在沃登大学辅修了日本研究，如果你能分享一下这是如何影响你的投资理念，我会很高兴的。首先，我想问一下确认偏误的问题。这可能让我成为了一个我本来不是的人，或者说可能暴露了我某方面的特点。你明白我的意思吗？但无论原因如何，它与我的某种耐心，我想用耐心这个词来形容，有点契合。你知道的，我对事情发生持有耐心的态度。
I think I sometimes know what's going to happen, but I'm pruned enough to know it's not going to happen on my timetable. And I would say mature enough to know that things are always going to change. I may not know how, but you know, when people say, well, we've reached a plateau, and it's a permanent plateau, and we're never going to have a reversal, you know, I think I'm mature enough to know that that's not true. So in Japanese aesthetic terminology, for example, there's a word called mojo and yojo literally translated the turning of the wheel of the law. In other words, it's about impermanence.
我认为有时候我知道接下来会发生什么，但我足够成熟，知道事情不会按照我的时间表发生。我也足够成熟，知道事物总是会改变。我或许不知道具体如何改变，但是当别人说我们已经达到了一个台阶，它是一个永久的台阶，永远不会倒退的时候，我知道这不是真的。比如在日本美学术语中，有一个词叫做"母常"和"六常"，直译为"法轮转动"。换句话说，它是关于无常的。
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And about the things that that change is inescapable, change is uncontrollable, change is often unpredictable. We have to accommodate ourselves to a world in which those things are true. The world is not going to accommodate to us. The great Peter Bernstein once wrote me a letter. He said the market is not an accommodative machine. It won't give you high returns because you're new. The market and the environment will not accommodate to you. You have to make adjustments.
关于变化是不可避免的、变化无法掌控、变化往往是不可预测的这些事情，我们必须适应这个世界，因为这些情况是真实存在的。这个世界不会迎合我们。伟大的彼得·伯恩斯坦曾经给我写过一封信。他说市场不是一台能迁就人的机器。它不会因为你是新来者而给你高回报。市场和环境不会迎合你。你必须做出调整。
I'm perfectly happy saying what I think will happen and then waiting for it to happen. I don't get frustrated. I don't say, well, it hasn't happened in six months. So I guess it's not going to happen. I review my thesis but if I still think it's going to happen, then I'm perfectly happy waiting. And patience, discipline, humility. I think humility is a really important thing, especially in the market, which humbles us all the time. But to think that you know everything that's going on and everything that's going to happen and you know when and you know what the impact is going to be, if you can carry that belief for 20 or 30 years, then you must be really good at deluding yourself because we all run into surprises that we didn't expect. And I think that humility, knowing how much we don't know, knowing the importance of that is a great way to stay out of trouble. You know, I believe that in our field, there is no room for certainty or for strong confidence in your views. You have to have confidence or else you won't be able to act boldly and resolutely. But if you have too much confidence, that's hubris and you'll stick with a losing position even when all the reasons to stick with it are gone. So you have to strike a balance. But I think that it intellectually or humility is tremendously important. What is intellectual humility? It's the admission to yourself that the other person could be right. And I think that anybody in a non-scientific field in a field where there's randomness and uncertainty and qualitative and subjective things are important. Anybody who doesn't allow for humility is writing for a fall. The reason I ask is, well, there's a potential sea change of sorts appearing to be happening in Japan where a new guard is coming in and potentially living what seemed to be a permanent yield curve control policy. And to your point about impermanence, I mean, nothing seems to last forever. What are your thoughts, if any, on Japan and the yield curve management today and how that might affect their US treasury holdings, the markets worldwide, just any impact you might see from that change?
我完全愿意说出我认为会发生的事情，然后等待它发生。我不会感到沮丧。我不会说：“嗯，已经过了六个月了，所以我猜这事情不会发生了。”我会回顾我的论点，但如果我仍然相信它会发生，那我就愿意等待。这需要耐心、纪律和谦卑。谦卑在市场中尤其重要，因为市场总能让我们感到自惭形秽。但要认为自己了解一切、能预测一切，你知道何时何地会发生什么影响，如果你能坚持这个信念20或30年，那你肯定是真的很擅长自欺欺人，因为我们都会碰到意料之外的情况。而我认为谦卑，知道自己了解之少有多重要，是避免麻烦的好方法。在我们的领域里，没有确定性或对观点极度自信的空间。你必须有信心，否则你就无法果断行动。但如果你过于自信，那就是傲慢，即使所有坚持原因已经消失，你还会坚持一个失败的立场。所以你必须保持平衡。但我认为在思想上或谦卑是非常重要的。什么是思想上的谦卑？就是承认对方可能是对的。我认为在非科学领域，在有随机性和不确定性、重视定性和主观因素的领域，任何不允许谦卑的人都会自食其果。我之所以问这个问题是因为在日本似乎正在发生一种潜在的变局，新的守卫队会接手，并可能采取一种看似永久的收益曲线控制政策。对于你所提到的不持久性，我想知道您对日本的意见以及当下的收益曲线管理政策对其美国国债持有、全球市场的影响可能如何。
First of all, I'm not an expert on Japan. You know, the Japanese market and economy. And secondly, I'm not an expert on yield curve control. I am basically skeptical of the power of governments to make things happen in the economy. I mean, you can do it in the short run. And you know, we've seen the Fed, for example, rescue us from the global financial crisis. And then again, from the pandemic through quantitative easing and other means. But I think the way I think of it, Trey, is it's kind of like a water spout in the ocean. I have, I think it's our pictures. So, a water spout, a cauliflower, a big ball at the top. And the strength of the column, water keeps the ball up in the air, 100 feet above the sea level. It only works as long as you're pumping water. And you can't, you can't, the government, the Fed cannot take us to a permanently higher level if they stop taking their actions. So, you know, I'm not crazy about highly activist feds and treasury and so forth.
首先，我不是日本的专家，也不是对日本市场和经济很了解。其次，我也不是对收益曲线控制很专业的人。我基本上对政府在经济中推动事情发生的能力持怀疑态度。我是说，在短期内，你可以做到这一点。就像我们看到的，美联储在全球金融危机和疫情中通过量化宽松和其他手段拯救了我们一样。但是我认为，特雷，就像大海中的水龙卷一样。我有个形象的比喻。就像一个大白菜，在顶部有一个球状物。只有在你不断注水时，水才能使球保持在海平面上方100英尺的高度。如果停止采取行动，政府和美联储就无法将我们带到一个永久的更高水平。所以，你知道，我对高度积极主义的美联储、财政部等等并不热衷。
And I think that, you know, look, we're, we're all, I'll bet you the, I'm a card carrying capitalist. I imagine you are. And imagine people only listen to your podcast because they are. And what capitalists believe is that the free market is the best allocator of resources. And when we look around that governments, whether it be, you know, a Cuba or Russia or Vietnam, we say the government can't run an economy as well as an economy can run itself if left alone. Okay. So, but that means for me that I would rather see the regulators keep their hands off the economy. Now, once in a while, if the economy gets going too hot, we have to cool it off with interest rate increases among other things to slow down the economy because the overeating economy is producing undesirable inflation. And when it, when the economy goes too slow and it's not creating jobs for Americans anymore, we have to give it sub-stimulus to, to get it back into job creation mode when it's too cold. In between, I'd like to leave it alone. You know, I don't think that there's anything smart for me to do in the market every day or every week or maybe even every month. And I don't think there's something smart for the Fed to do every day week or month. So I'd rather keep my hands to myself.
我认为，你知道的，看，我们都是，我敢打赌，我是一个坚定的资本主义者。我想你也是。而且我想人们只会听你的播客，因为他们也是这样。资本主义者相信自由市场是资源最佳配置者。当我们看到各国政府，无论是古巴、俄罗斯还是越南，我们说政府不能像自由市场一样自主运作经济。好吧。但这对我意味着，我宁愿看到监管机构不要干预经济。现在，如果经济发展过热，我们必须通过提高利率等手段来降温，以减缓经济，因为过度发展的经济会产生不良通胀。当经济发展过慢时，不再为美国人创造就业机会，我们必须提供次级刺激措施，让经济重新进入创造就业的模式，当经济太冷时。在此之间，我宁愿不干预。你知道的，我认为每天或每星期或甚至每个月都要在市场上找点聪明的事情做是没有意义的。我也认为联邦储备系统每天、每周或每月都做某些聪明的事情也没意义。所以我宁愿自己保持克制。
And, you know, the back when automation was big to the, to the picture in the States maybe 20 years ago in big ways, people used to talk about the factory of the future, which would have one man and one dog. And it was the, the dog's job to keep the man from touching the equipment. And it was the man's job to feed the dog. And I think that's, that's kind of the, the Fed that I would like to have, where the Fed keeps its hands off the machinery most of the time.
当自动化在美国成为一个重要话题的时候，人们过去常常谈论未来的工厂，它将只需要一个人和一只狗。狗的工作是防止人触摸设备，而人的工作则是喂养狗。我认为这是我想要的，即联邦保持大部分时间都不介入机构的运作。
And so back to Japan, you know, can they really make the economy or the interest, the yield curve, what they wanted to be on a permanent basis? I don't know. But I like the old fashioned kind of free markets better. I'm with you there.
然后回到日本，你知道吗，他们是否能够永久地实现他们想要的经济、利率以及收益曲线呢？我不知道。但我更喜欢那种古老的自由市场。我和你一样。
Let's go to China. You've been investing in non-performing loans in China with amazing results. With its leadership, structure changing and other recent events, we've some have called China uninvestable. So as a contrarian, I imagine that might signal bullish to you, but have recent events changed your views on investing in China in any way? Obviously, with the events of the last year or so, and we have to be cautious, but, but I'm naturally cautious. And the, the irony is that I've done some terrified things in my life, investment-wise, cautiously, and they worked, maybe because of the inclusion of caution.
让我们去中国吧。你在中国的不良贷款投资取得了惊人的成果。随着中国的领导层和体制的变革以及其他最近发生的事件，一些人认为中国不值得投资。所以作为一名反向投资者，我想这可能对你来说可能是一个买入的信号，但最近的事件是否以任何方式改变了你对在中国投资的看法？显然，由于过去一年左右的事件，我们必须谨慎，但是我本来就是谨慎的。而讽刺的是，我在投资生涯中做过一些让人害怕的事情，不过都是谨慎行事，而它们成功了，也许正因为谨慎的因素的加入。
But here's how I look at China. And by the way, I, when I go to China and they ask me, what do you think about China? I always say, well, why are you asking me you live here? But, and I don't, I don't claim to be expert on China. But what I think is this, China is nothing short of an economic miracle. From 1979, over the next 40, 40, I think it was 40, maybe 41, 42 years, they increased the GDP 100 X. It went from 177 billion to 17.8 trillion. And 100 X on GDP in a short period of time, it's a miracle. They moved tens of millions of people from the farms to the cities and from subsistence agriculture to manufacturing.
但是这是我对中国的看法。顺便说一句，当我去中国的时候，他们问我对中国有什么看法，我总是回答，你为什么问我，你们住在这里啊？但是，我并不是自称对中国很专业。但是我认为，中国是一个经济奇迹。从1979年开始，在接下来的40年里，他们的GDP增长了100倍。从1770亿增加到17.8万亿。在短时间内将GDP增长100倍，这真是个奇迹。他们迁移了数千万人从农村到城市，从自给自足的农业到制造业。
And I think they want to keep doing that. I don't think they want to go back to eating grass like they did in the 70s when millions of people were dying of starvation every year. And in fact, I think that for Chairman Xi, he has to keep producing economic miracles to stay in power. And I haven't figured out yet how China can perpetuate its economic progress and become the world's largest economy, which most people think it will sometime in the 2030s or so, without selling a lot of goods to the rest of the world. There's just not enough consumption in China for enough goods to be produced and consumed to produce the growth we're talking about. They have to keep selling to the rest of the world. And obviously, they can't do that if they have a hot war with the rest of the world. So I think they're in a tough situation. They have ideological differences from us. They view us as the enemy, which is the symmetrical because we view them as the enemy. There seems to be nothing that the two political parties in this country agree on more than that China is the enemy. And there seems to be no limit in badmouthing them.
我认为他们想要继续这样做。我认为他们不想回到70年代那样吃草的日子，那时每年都有数百万人因饥饿而死亡。实际上，我认为习近平主席必须继续实现经济奇迹才能保住权力。而且我还没有弄清楚中国如何能够延续其经济进步并在2030年左右成为世界最大经济体，大多数人都认为如此，而不用向世界其他国家大量出售商品。中国内部消费不足，无法产生足够的商品生产和消费以实现我们所谈论的增长。他们必须继续向世界其他国家出售商品。显然，如果他们与世界其他国家爆发热战，他们就无法做到这一点。所以我认为他们处境困难。他们与我们在意识形态上存在差异。他们把我们视为敌人，而我们也把他们视为敌人，这是相互的。在这个国家，似乎没有什么比认为中国是敌人更让两个政党一致认同。并且似乎没有贬低他们的限制。
But the interesting thing, if you think about the last 100 years, until China came along, the US did not really have a serious economic rivalry in a century. Now we do. And that rivalry is going to be played out. And we don't like some of the ways they undertake it. And everybody tells me the same thing. So they must be right. They must be misbehaving in some ways. But I think they're going to want to stay part of the world community, which means that they're, I don't think we're going to have their worst instincts confirmed.
然而有一个有趣的事情，如果你思考一下过去的100年，直到中国崛起，美国在一个世纪里并没有真正遇到过严重的经济竞争对手。现在我们有了。这场竞争将会展开。我们不喜欢他们采取的某些方式。而每个人都告诉我同样的事情。所以他们一定是对的。他们一定在某些方面表现不当。但我认为他们会希望继续成为世界共同体的一部分，这意味着他们不会展现出最糟糕的本性。
You mentioned that people describe China as uninvestable. I've done several things in my life that were uninvestable. Hayobans 78, the stressed out 88, even emerging market equities 98, were all considered uninvestable. And you make the most money when you do something that other people refuse to do, or everybody refuses to do. And it turns out to be the right thing. So calling China uninvestable doesn't give me a problem. Doesn't make me unwilling to invest in China. But guess what? We're going to continue to do it. We're going to do it cautiously. I think there's still a role for that in our portfolios.
你提到人们将中国描述为不值得投资的地方。在我的生活中，我做过多件被认为不值得投资的事情。比如Hayobans 78，压力山大的88，甚至是新兴市场股票98都被认为不值得投资。而当你做一些别人拒绝或者所有人都拒绝做的事情时，你赚到的钱最多，并且事后证明你的选择是正确的。所以说中国不值得投资对我来说不是问题，也不会让我不愿意在中国投资。但你知道吗？我们将继续在中国投资，虽然会谨慎对待。我认为在我们的投资组合中，这仍然有一定的作用。
In your book, the most important thing you highlight risk management, being a contrarian, when appropriate, and other investment tenants. Some people believe risk is controlled by position size, not only margin of safety, but actual position size itself. How do you think through position size with your investments, especially as they kind of in the context of an overall portfolio?
在你的书中，你强调了风险管理、持反对意见的能力（只有在适当的时候），以及其他投资原则。有些人认为风险是由仓位大小控制的，而不仅仅是安全边际，而是实际仓位大小本身。你如何考虑投资中的仓位大小，尤其是在整个投资组合的背景下？
Position sizing is one way. Insistio, I'm always interested in safety as another. Have these certain minimal standards for interest rate coverage, if it's a bond, you know, they're a lot's way. Having a better foresight with regard to the future is something being more predictable by its nature, is a way to control its risk. When you do things which are by nature, unpredictable, obviously, you're taking on more risk. So there are lots of ways to do it. Position sizing is important. Was it Potter Stewart who said, I can't define it for you, but I know it when I see it. I think that superior investors just have this feeling for investments and for knowing how great the uncertainty is and how great the potential reward and how the potential reward compares with the uncertainty and the possibility of loss. I don't think it can necessarily be quantified. I don't think quantification is an important criteria. And in fact, if you think about, back to my answer about AI, if it could be quantified, then the machine could do it. So I'm talking about the fact that hopefully there are some things that people can do that machines can't do, subjective, qualitative, future-oriented. So it doesn't bother me to be unable to quantify the relationship between potential reward and potential risk. But I think you should ramp up your investments in things where you believe the potential reward is more than commensurate with the risk. It's as simple as that. You know, friend of mine in England wrote a book called Simple but Not Easy and Richard Oldfield, this is his name. And I think it's a great description of what we do. We try to buy things that go up. It's not so quite hard to describe. The only thing is I can't explain to you how you do it. And I can't make you able to do it. But some people have the ability. And one of my books, I forget which one, I say that the superior investor has a superior, it is superior for the simple reason that he or she has a superior understanding of probability distribution that will govern the future events. And thus, for whether the potential return is more than enough to compensate for the uncertainty that lurks in the negative left-hand tail. That's what we do. I use the word inference. I use the word insight, sensitivity. That's all it is. But that's why I think that there's a lot of art that is to say creativity and the ability to deal with the unquantifiable in our job.
头寸大小是其中一种方法。Insistio，我对安全性也很感兴趣。如果是债券的话，确保有一定的利率覆盖标准是非常重要的。对未来有更好的预见是通过其本质更易预测的方式来控制风险的一种方式。当你做一些本质上是不可预测的事情时，显然会承担更多的风险。因此有很多方法可以做到这一点。头寸大小很重要。是波特·斯图尔特（Potter Stewart）说过：“我不能为你定义，但是当我看到它的时候我就会知道。”我认为优秀的投资者对于投资有一种直觉，知道不确定性有多大，潜在回报有多大，以及潜在回报与不确定性和损失的可能性相比之下如何。我认为它并不一定可以量化。我认为量化不是一个重要的标准。事实上，如果你回想一下我对AI的回答，如果它可以量化，那么机器就可以做到。所以我是在说，希望人们能够做到一些机器无法做到的事情，主观的，定性的，面向未来的事情。所以不能量化潜在回报和潜在风险之间的关系并不困扰我。但是我认为你应该加大对你认为潜在回报超过风险的投资的投入。就是这么简单。你知道，在英国有位朋友写了一本书叫做简单而不易，他的名字是理查德·奥尔德菲尔德（Richard Oldfield）。我认为这是对我们所做的事情的一个很好的描述。我们试图购买能够上涨的东西。很难描述得太具体。唯一的问题是，我无法向你解释如何做到这一点。我也无法让你能够做到这一点。但是有些人具备这种能力。在我的一本书中，我不记得是哪一本，我说优秀的投资者之所以优秀，是因为他或她对将来事件的概率分布有着更好的理解，并且因此能够判断潜在回报是否足够弥补负面的不确定性。这就是我们所做的事情。我使用推理、洞察力和敏感性这些词语来形容。但这就是为什么我认为在我们的工作中有很多艺术性，也就是创造力和处理不可量化因素的能力。
That last point or point you threw in there was reminding me of that Peter Lynch quote that I had no buffets borrowed and it's selling your winners and holding your losers is like cutting the flowers and watering the weeds. For what you said, I imagine that's kind of the same philosophy you were describing there to a degree, right? Going in on the things that you know are strong and not necessarily dollar cost averaging down. Do you have a viewpoint on that?
你最后提到的那一点，让我想起了彼得·林奇的一句话，他说过“不借巴菲特，卖掉你的赢家，持有你的失败者就好像剪掉花朵，浇灌杂草”。根据你的描述，我想这个哲学在某种程度上是相同的，对吧？就是专注于那些你知道会强势的事物，而不一定要进行均匀投资。你对此有何看法？
Well, first of all, trade. Nothing in our business can be turned into rules. People come up with rules all the time. You buy something, you can go down 10% shallow. Well, West Magic about 10%. You might have a lot of things that are going to go down 10 and then up 200. Maybe it should be 20. Well, maybe you'll have a lot of things that will go down 20 and then up 400. So I don't believe in rules. And what you really have to do is you take your position. It'll do what it'll do. The market will do to you what it'll do. And then you have to reassess. You have to reassess. And the decision to sell I think is better thought of as the decision to unbuy. So there's a certain process that you apply deciding whether you should buy something. You should just reverse that process to decide whether you should unbuy something. And that should be divorced from whether it shows a profit or a loss. You should not be any more willing, in my opinion, to sell your winners than your losers or your losers and your winners. You should sell things.
首先，谈谈交易。我们的生意里没有什么可以变成规则的东西。人们总是会制定规则。你买了东西，它可以下跌10%。西部魔法可能会下跌10%。你可能有很多东西会下跌10%，然后上涨200%。也许应该是20%。也许你会有很多东西会下跌20%，然后上涨400%。所以我不相信规则。你真正要做的是确定你的位置。市场会按照自己的意愿发展。然后你必须重新评估。你必须重新评估。我认为卖出的决定更好地被认为是取消购买的决定。因此，有一定的过程来决定是否应该购买某样东西。你应该反过来使用这个过程来决定是否应该取消购买某样东西。这与是否盈利或亏损无关。在我看来，你卖掉赢家和输家的意愿应该是一样的。你应该出售东西。
Let's go back to the last definition. You should sell things if the prospective return does not seem more than adequate to compensate for the risk of loss. You should hold things if it dies. I wrote a memo not too long ago. I think it was in 2020 called Selling Out. And I had never written a memo on selling. You see almost nothing in our business about selling. Everybody talked about when to buy, when to not buy it. But I think I said, half tongue and cheek, that there are two reasons why people sell things because they go up or because they go down. If they go up, they sell them because they're afraid that if they don't sell them, they'll go but down and they'll kick themselves. And if they go down, they sell them because they're afraid that if they don't sell them, they'll go down more and they'll kick themselves. So an amazing amount of energy is expended by investors trying to avoid having to kick yourself, which is to say, try to avoid regret. And a tremendous amount of investing is about avoiding regret. But you shouldn't sell things because they're up and you shouldn't sell things because they're down. There's only one good, well, there's a couple of good reasons. One is that you think the risks are increased. Another is you think that the return prospects are not as good as they had been. Another is that you think the gains today have borrowed from the gains that remain in the future. But you shouldn't sell anything for a numerical reason or because it's up or because it's down.
让我们回到上一个定义。如果潜在回报似乎不足以弥补损失风险，你应该出售商品。如果它失效了，你应该持有商品。我不久前写了一个备忘录，我想它是在2020年叫做《售出》。我以前从未写过关于销售的备忘录。在我们的行业几乎没有关于销售的内容。每个人都在谈论何时买入，何时不买入。但是我想我说过，开玩笑地说，人们卖东西有两个原因，一是东西涨了，一是东西跌了。如果它们涨了，他们会卖掉，因为他们担心如果不卖掉，价格会下跌，他们会后悔。如果它们跌了，他们会卖掉，因为他们担心如果不卖掉，价格会进一步下跌，他们会后悔。所以，投资者花费了大量精力来避免后悔，也就是说，试图避免后悔是非常耗费精力的。很大一部分的投资就是为了避免后悔。但你不应该因为东西涨了就卖掉它们，也不应该因为它们跌了就卖掉它们。只有一个好的，嗯，有几个好的理由。一是你认为风险增加了。另一个是你认为回报前景不如以前好。另一个是你认为今天的收益已经借用了未来的收益。但你不应该出于数字原因或因为它涨了或跌了而卖掉任何东西。
What is the least important thing when it comes to investing? I'm glad you asked that. Very few people asked that and I happened to have written a memo November, I believe entitled What Really Matters. And first I talk about a bunch of things that in my opinion don't matter. Short-term events, short-term trading, short-term performance, volatility, hyperactivity. These are things that don't matter, that don't add to your long-term success and that you shouldn't emphasize. But of course, these are the things that most people spend all their time on.
在投资方面，最不重要的是什么呢？很高兴你问到了这个问题。很少有人提出这个问题，而我碰巧在去年11月写过一份备忘录，名为《真正重要的事情》。首先，我讨论的是一些在我看来不重要的事情。短期事件、短期交易、短期表现、波动性、过分活跃。这些事情并不重要，它们不能为你的长期成功做出贡献，你不应该过多强调它们。但当然，这些正是大多数人花费大量时间关注的事情。
You go into a committee, you know, I've been on a lot of investment committees for nonprofits and you go into the meeting and they spend the first 45 minutes discussing the performance in the last quarter. Why? It's over. There's nothing you could do about it. Well, you might say, there's stuff you can figure out to do in the future. Yeah, but you almost never see anybody taking any strong action based on what happened last quarter, changing the portfolio. Most people never changed their portfolio wholesale. They spend 45 minutes because they think it's their job. Well, why is it your job? Well, I'm a fiduciary. You got to care. Well, yeah, but it's over. There was a great quote from a guy named Ian Wilson who was head of GE. One of my favorites nowadays, he said, something like, there is no degree of sophistication that you will get around the fact that all your knowledge is with regard to the past and all your decisions over with regard to the future. So studying the past as a way of figuring out what she could do in the future has severe limitations. And I would rather go with fundamentals. I'd rather say, which companies can I buy a piece of that will become most valuable over the years and decades? And which companies can I lend money to to have the highest probability of paying me back? And those things have nothing to do with GDP forecasts, interest rates, recession and inflation.
你进入一个委员会，你知道，我参加了很多非营利组织的投资委员会，在会议开始的前45分钟，他们都在讨论上个季度的表现。为什么呢？那已经过去了，你对此束手无策。嗯，你可能会说，可以找到未来的解决方案。是的，但你很少见到有人根据上个季度的情况采取任何强有力的行动，改变投资组合。大多数人从未完全改变过他们的投资组合。他们花费45分钟是因为他们认为这是他们的工作。那为什么是你的工作呢？嗯，因为我是一个受托人。你必须关心。是的，但那已经过去了。有一个来自通用电气公司前任负责人伊恩·威尔逊的伟大引言，我现在很喜欢，他说过类似这样的话，没有任何程度的复杂性可以抵挡住这样一个事实，你的所有知识都是关于过去，而你的所有决策都是关于未来。所以，通过研究过去来找出未来的对策是有严重局限性的。而我宁愿坚持基本原则。我宁愿问，哪些公司的一小部分在未来几年或几十年内将具有最大价值？我可以借钱给哪些公司，以最高的概率得到偿还？这些事情与国内生产总值预测、利率、衰退和通货膨胀无关。
So, you know, I wrote that memo. Almost nobody said a word about it. I think it's one of the most important things ones I've written. And I hope the readers will take a look.
所以，你知道的，我写了那封备忘录。几乎没有人对此发表意见。我认为这是我写过的最重要的事情之一。我希望读者能够仔细阅读。
By the way, all the memos are available on the Oak Tree website, Oak Tree Capital website, under the heading of something called Insights. Hopefully they have Insights. But the great thing is that the price is right because they're all free. And I hope people will take a look. There are also in this video format as well, which I've also been digesting.
顺便说一句，所有备忘录都可以在橡树网站上找到，即橡树资本的官方网站，位于一个叫做洞察力（Insights）的栏目下面。希望他们的洞察力十分有见地。但最棒的是价格很合适，因为它们全部是免费的。而且我希望大家能够去看一下。这些备忘录也以视频格式提供，我也在接收这些信息。
So, that last point reminds me of one of my favorite quotes from you that I've read from you, which was, don't judge a decision by its outcome. Can you elaborate on what you mean by that? Well, this is, you know, I talked about what we do. It's not scientific. It's not empirical. It's not governed by rules. It can't be quantified. We're in a way, we work in an area where there's a lot of vagueness. And it's only appropriate, as I said, to view the future with trepidation and uncertainty.
那么，你上面提到的最后一点让我想起了你的一句我很喜欢的话，就是不要以结果来评判一个决定。你能详细解释一下你的意思吗？嗯，这个嘛，你知道，我谈论的是我们的工作。它不是科学的，也不是经验主义的。它不能被规则所控制，也不能被量化。我们在一个充满模糊不清的领域工作。正如我所说的，以关切和不确定的心态看待未来是合适的。
And when I got to the Wharton in September of 63, I remember the first book I read. And it was called Decision Making Under Uncertainty. And it was about how oil and gas operators decide to drill wells. And it had a great impact on me. And especially the aspect that you cite, Trey, because what I most strongly remember is reading where it said you can't tell the quality of a decision from the outcome.
当我在1963年9月到达沃顿学院时，我记得读的第一本书。它叫做《不确定环境下的决策》。它讲的是石油和天然气运营商如何决定钻探井口。它对我产生了很大的影响，特别是你提到的那个方面，Trey。因为我最深刻记得的是书中说，你无法通过结果来判断一个决策的质量。
And, you know, in our lifetimes, hopefully, we get these things in Zen, Buddhism, in Japan, they have things called co-ends, riddles. And if you think about the brittle and you meditate on it, it can unlock a situation for you, unlock and understand it. And I think that that line is similar. You can't tell the quality of a decision from the outcome.
在我们的有生之年，希望我们能够在日本的禅宗和佛教中获得这些东西，它们被称为双合谜题。如果您思考这个谜题并进行冥想，它可以帮助您解开一种情况，理解它。我认为这个观点类似。从结果上无法判断决策的质量。
We all know people who we say they've been successful, despite their chills, or they were right for the wrong reason. We also know people who were wrong for the wrong reason. They did something. It made sense. It just didn't work out. And lots of deserving people have not been successful because the ball bounced in the wrong direction for that.
我们都认识那些我们说他们取得了成功的人，尽管他们有时会冷淡，或者他们的成功是出于错误的原因。我们也都知道一些人出于错误的原因而失败了。他们做了一些事情，逻辑看起来是正确的，只是最终没有成功。还有很多值得成功的人之所以没有成功，是因为运气不好，事情没有朝着他们期望的方向发展。
But I think that if you think about decisions, we put into our decisions everything we know about the past and everything we know about how we believe the machine works. I said the machine, I mean the market or the economy. But there's obviously a lot we don't know, which is what events will transpire in the future. Will tomorrow be sunny or cloudy? Will it rain or not? Who will be elected president? Or, you know, there are so many things that are some combination of unpredictable and random. That obviously it's possible to work very hard and make a very well-reasoned decision that doesn't work for perfectly good reasons. Or make a poorly thought-out decision that is phenomenally successful.
我认为，如果你思考决策，我们会在决策中考虑到我们对过去的了解以及我们对机器运作方式的认知。我说的机器指的是市场或经济。但显然有很多我们不知道的事情，比如未来会发生什么事件。明天是晴天还是阴天？会下雨吗？谁会当选总统？或者说，有很多事情是无法预测和随机的组合。很明显，即使我们很努力地做出了一个非常有理由的决策，也有可能因为很好的原因而失败。或者做出一个考虑不周的决策，却获得了惊人的成功。
So what that tells me is we shouldn't have sown that because we're making a well what we think is a well-reasoned decision that's going to work. You got to leave plenty of room for air. All these things come back and tie into each other. These are not random separate elements in one's philosophy.
那么，这告诉我我们不应该播种这些东西，因为我们正在做一个据我们认为是明智的、将会成功的决定。你必须给予足够的空间。所有这些事情都相互联系。它们不是哲学中的随机独立要素。
So you just, like I said, there's no room for certainty. You have to assume that hopefully your better decisions will work more often than your worst decision. Or the better decision-makers decision will work more often than the worst decision-makers decisions. But it's certainly not true that every correct decision or every well-thought-out decision is going to work or is going to work on your time schedule.
所以就像我说的，没有绝对的确定性。你必须假设，希望你的更好决策比最糟糕的决策更多次地成功。或者说，更好的决策者的决策会比最差的决策者的决策更多次地成功。但并不是每个正确的决策或每个经过深思熟虑的决策都会成功，或者按照你的时间表得以实现。
A lot of these ideas come from a book called Fooled by Ramhammas by at NASA and Nicholas to Web. And I found that book extremely thought-provoking like a Zen Cohen or like decision-making under uncertainty. You have to get at the truth of the environment that you work in.
很多这些想法来自一本名为《被罗曼尼拉与尼科拉斯愚弄》的书，这本书是NASA和尼古拉斯给网站撰写的。我发现这本书非常发人深省，就像禅宗公案或在不确定情况下做决策一样。你必须探求你所从事的环境的真相。
We've talked a little bit about the books you've written and the memos which have become required reading. I mean, even for Warren Buffet and some of the greatest investors, every time you write a memo, they drop what they're doing to read it. And if you haven't done so and you're listening to this, of course everyone needs to go read those things.
我们稍微谈了一下你写过的书以及那些成为必读的备忘录。我的意思是，即使对于沃伦·巴菲特和一些最伟大的投资者来说，每当你写一封备忘录，他们都会放下手头的工作去阅读。如果你还没有读过，并且正听着这个的话，当然每个人都需要去读一下那些东西。
What I am curious about is what you're reading. And I'd be curious to know either the book you've most enjoyed, say in the last year or so, or what you're reading now. I try not to read too many investment books because there's so much more in life. And if you read, if you read on other topics, hopefully you can generalize to investing.
我好奇的是你正在读什么。我也好奇了解你最近一年里最喜欢的书籍，或者你现在正在读的书。我尽量不读太多的投资类书籍，因为生活中还有很多其他方面。如果你阅读其他话题的书籍，希望你能将其推广到投资领域中。
But I did get a lot of a book I read this summer called The Mistakes Were Made but Not by Me by Carol Taffres. And it's basically a book about how people practice self-deception, self-delusion, how cognitive dissonance can keep us from admitting valuable information that doesn't square with our preconceptions. And I think it's really important for us to understand our cognitive biases and try to overcome that.
但这个夏天我读了一本书叫《错误不是我犯的》（The Mistakes Were Made but Not by Me）作者是卡罗尔·塔弗雷。这本书主要讲述了人们如何自欺欺人，如何自我欺骗，以及认知失调如何使我们无法承认与我们先入为主的观念不符的有价值信息。我认为理解我们的认知偏见并试图克服它们非常重要。
Because, you know, a common sense isn't that common. And if you want to have common sense, you have to obviously get past the barriers that hold others back. And, you know, for example, and I touched on this. I wrote a memo I think it was October called The Illusion of Knowledge. I borrowed the quote from the historian, who said that the enemy of knowledge is not ignorance. It's the illusion of knowledge. When people believe that they or somebody else has knowledge, it stops the quest.
因为你知道，常识并不那么常见。如果你想要拥有常识，显然要克服阻碍别人的障碍。例如，我曾经谈及过这个话题。我在十月份写了一份备忘录，名为《知识的幻觉》。我引用了一位历史学家的名言，他说敌人不是无知，而是知识的幻觉。当人们相信自己或别人拥有知识时，就停止了探索的追求。
Everybody makes forecasts all the time. I think GDP is going to do this. I think IBM is going to do that. I think the interest rate will be this at the end of the year. They never write them down. They never compare their forecasts with what turned out to be true. In fact, when I was a kid, somebody once told me that an economist is a portfolio manager who never works to market. In other words, they don't keep a record. They don't rigorously say, gee, are my forecasts any good? And most people forecasts are terrible. And they keep making forecasts. And how could they possibly be able to keep making forecasts if their record is so bad? And the answer is that they have these mechanisms which permit them to practice self-tolution. And that was the, that's the upshot of that book. I recommended it highly.
每个人都时常进行预测。我认为国内生产总值会这样做。我认为IBM会那样做。我认为年底利率会是这个。他们从不把它们写下来。他们从不将他们的预测与真实情况进行比对。事实上，当我还是个孩子的时候，有人曾告诉我，经济学家就是一个从不挣钱的投资组合经理。换句话说，他们不做记录。他们不严格地说：“哎呀，我的预测准确吗？”而大多数人的预测都很糟糕。然而，他们仍然继续预测。如果他们的记录如此糟糕，他们怎么可能继续做出预测呢？答案是他们有这些机制，使他们能够实践自我演进。这就是那本书的主要观点。我衷心推荐它。
And then at the present time, I'm reading an out, the unlikely spy by Daniel Silver, because I sometimes I like to read for enjoyment, Joe. I just have to ask, you said you think in pictures, and I'm just curious if that has always been the case, or from what you've read and where your mind takes you. That's, I define that as sort of like the distillation of knowledge and simplifying things down to its essence. And the way that you do that, was that something you practice and have worked on? Or is that something that's important?
现在，我正在阅读丹尼尔·席尔弗的《不太可能的间谍》，因为我有时候喜欢读书以娱乐自己。乔，我想问一下，你说你思考时是通过图像的方式，我很好奇这一点是一直存在，还是来源于你阅读的内容以及你的思维方式。对我来说，这就像是将知识提炼和简化到其本质的过程。你以这种方式思考，是通过练习和努力形成的吗？还是这一点很重要？
No, it was not a conscious effort. Look, if I made a contribution to the body of investing, I hope it is my view of risk and my chart on which I super oppose some little bell-shaped curves on the capital-larked line. You know, we all see this line and it looks like that. You have, you have return on the vertical axis and risk on the horizontal axis. The line slopes up and to the right. And, and we think that, that explains the fact that riskier assets are higher returns. And I think that's a terrible way to render that subject.
不，这并不是有意而为之的努力。你看，如果我对投资领域有所贡献的话，我希望是关于风险观点和我所反对的某些小小钟形曲线在资本投入线上的图表。你知道，我们都看到这条线，它看起来是这样的。垂直轴表示回报，水平轴表示风险。这条线向右上倾斜。而且，我们认为这解释了高风险资产有更高回报的事实。我认为这是一种糟糕的方式来阐述这个主题。
It can't possibly true that, that risky assets have higher returns because if, if risky assets could be counted out to have higher returns, then they would be risky. So what is it, what does it really, what does that relationship really mean? And I think it means that assets that are risky have to appear to offer higher returns, or nobody will make those investments. That makes perfect sense. So, but I, I had trouble just figuring out how to communicate that until I did my thing with the little bell-shaped curves. And, and when you look at the curve and it looks like this, you say, as the risk increases, the return increases. That's a terrible, the distillation, they're very dangerous to think that riskier assets are safe.
这个表达不够流畅，我来帮您修改一下：
这几乎不可能是真的，即冒险资产拥有更高回报率，因为假如冒险资产能够被证明拥有更高回报率，那它们本身就不算冒险了。所以，这意味着什么呢？这个关系真正代表了什么？我认为，它指的是冒险的资产必须表现出似乎具有更高回报率，否则就没有人会进行这些投资。这是完全合理的。但是，我在沟通这一点上遇到了困难，直到我用了那些呈钟状曲线的小东西做了些研究。当你看着这个曲线，它看起来就是这个样子，你就会说，随着风险增加，回报也增加。这是一个糟糕的错误理解，非常危险，认为更冒险的资产是安全的。
But when you, when you put on these little bell-shaped curves and they press and slides, as you move from left to right, then you say, aha, as the, as the perceived risk increases, the expected return increases. But so does the range of possible outcomes. And so, and, and the, the bad outcomes in the range become worse. That's a pretty good description of, of, of risk. But it was my insistence on doing it through a picture, through a graphic, that, that led me to be able to communicate it.
但当你穿上这些小钟形曲线，并且它们被压缩和滑动，随着你从左到右移动，你会说，啊哈，随着感知风险的增加，预期回报也增加。但是可能结果的范围也增加了。所以，坏结果在范围内变得更糟。这是一个相当好的对风险的描述。但是，要通过图片、图形来表达它，是我坚持的结果。
So, I, I, you know, I have so much fun, because I sit in my client's offices and they ask me a question, I draw them a picture, and I do it over and over and over again. And, and, and me, and I get a lot out of it. You know, if, if you just say the words, you can, you can gloss over the weaknesses in your art, but if you have to either write them down or create a graph which shows how things work, then I think you, you, you're, you're called to Irish dance. I would probably frame one of those drawings.
所以，我，你知道的，我玩得很开心，因为我坐在客户办公室里，他们问我一个问题，我给他们画一个图，然后再一次又一次地做同样的事情。而且，我从中收获了很多。你知道的，如果你只是说出来，你可以掩盖你艺术中的弱点，但如果你必须将它们写下来或者创建一个展示事物如何工作的图表，我认为你会被召唤去跳爱尔兰舞。我可能会把其中一幅画装裱起来。
So that's really great. Howard, this is, always such a pleasure. It's, it's one of the biggest privileges for me to get to speak with you. And I really admire you and what you've done. And I just, and, and how, you know, you go back to humility. You've always been so warm and welcoming and giving with your knowledge. And I know that our audience gets so much out of it. So, and I do as well, of course. I would just like to thank you really for coming back on the show and doing this and getting the word out there about so many different resources that we'll have listed there at the, on the links below.
所以这真的太棒了。霍华德，与你交谈总是一种乐趣，对我来说是最大的荣幸之一。我非常钦佩你和你所做的一切。而且，你一直都非常温暖、热情、乐于分享你的知识。我知道我们的听众从中获益匪浅。当然，我也是如此。我真的非常感谢你再次出现在节目中，并通过我们在下方列出的链接来广泛推广这么多不同的资源。
So, Howard, I think, and let's do it again. I just want to thank you, Trey, you know, you, the stuff that we discussed today, this isn't glamorous stuff. This is not how I picked a stock that went up 10x, you know, or, or, you know, how I, how I was able to afford my last yacht. This is interesting, provocative, and worth struggling over it. And I'm very glad to come on the show and do it with you. I appreciate that so much.
嗯，霍华德，我想我们要再来一次。我只是想感谢你，特雷，你知道，你，我们今天讨论的这些东西，并不是什么华丽的东西。这不是我如何选股票涨了10倍，或者我如何负担得起我最后一艘游艇的方式。这是有趣的、引人思考的，并值得为之努力。我非常高兴能上节目和你一起做这件事。我非常感激。
And so, as things unravel, of course, the pressure, the combination of declining confidence and peak debt is a very bad one. My question really is, does it take the Fed or would it find the weak spot anyway sooner or later?.
所以，随着事态的逐渐变坏，压力必然增加，信心下降和债务达到顶峰的结合是非常糟糕的。我的问题是，是否需要联邦储备系统来发现或最终找到经济的薄弱环节？