Mohnish Pabrai on The Power of Compounding (TIP550)

So the key in investing is to recognize two things. One, we're going to make a lot of mistakes. Two, this is a very forgiving business. You can be wrong even 98% of the time. Still come out smelling really nice. And three, that is only going to happen if you are able to buy businesses with great economics at reasonable valuations and then hang on to them forever.

在投资中的关键是要认识到两个重要的事情。一、我们会犯很多错误。二、这是一个非常宽容的行业。你甚至可以在98%的时间里都错了，但依然能取得很好的回报。而且，只有在你能以合理估值购买具有良好经济基础的企业，并且长期持有它们时，才有可能实现这一点。

So when they get fully priced, they don't get sold. When they get overpriced, they don't get sold.

当商品价格合理时，它们不会被出售。当商品价格过高时，它们也不会被出售。

Welcome to the Investors Podcast. I'm your host, Dick Broderson, and it's perks a weekend. At least it's perks a weekend whenever you're listening to this. And I'm thrilled to invite it no other than Moniz Popurai to join us today.

欢迎来到投资者播客。我是您的主持人迪克·布罗德森，不管您什么时候收听这个节目，都会有点小激动。今天我非常高兴邀请到了莫尼斯·波普莱来与我们一起参与。

Moniz, thank you so much for taking the time to speak with us today. It's always a pleasure at this time of the year just before the Woodstock for Capitalist gets underway. So it's like our tradition, right? This is the kind of pregame tailgate party.

莫尼兹，非常感谢您抽出时间与我们交谈。在资本主义的伍德斯托克即将开始之际，这总是一个愉快的时刻。因此这就像我们的传统，对吧？就像一场赛前聚会。

Well said. I don't think I can beat that money. So I'm going right into the first question here. So which is also a tradition, I guess. I've been reading Mungers. Well, yes, this is just wonderful book, Paul Charles Almanac. But especially the psychology of human Smith's Jasmine. It's just amazing. And I've heard you say that you always learn something new whenever you read the book and I feel I do the same thing, but specifically for that speech, it really makes me humble. Because I feel I'm susceptible to so many biases. And I thought of you as I was reading it.

说得很好。我觉得我无法比得上那笔钱。所以我直接进入第一个问题。这也是一个传统，我想是的。我一直在读蒙格尔的书。嗯，对，这本《保罗·查尔斯年历》真是太棒了。尤其是人类心理学部分的《贾斯敏》。简直太神奇了。我听过你说每次读这本书时都会学到新东西，我也有同样的感觉，但尤其是对于那篇演讲，它让我感到谦卑。因为我觉得自己容易受到许多偏见的影响。在我读它时我就想到了你。

Full disclosure, I'm an investor in Popurai funds. And I can say that since I joined it, I've been very, very happy about it. I hope I don't. I don't make you sad by saying so much, but it's been a wonderful experience. And I've started to wonder and worry if I like you a bit too much, Anish. And it's not only because you're a good looking guy, which you are. That's not why I'm saying this. But I am a bit worried in its own way because I kind of have all these associations with you in terms of compounding and that worth and all these warm, fussy feelings. So I kind of feel whenever I read something from you, whenever I watch a video with you or whatnot, I kind of feel I find myself filtering the information differently. And that worries me. And I guess I could say the same thing about Charlie and Warren, in the sense that if they do something wonderful, they're like, oh, you think you're so smart. And if they talk about a mistake, you're like, oh, they're also smart. Look how much they learn from their mistake. So my first question to you is sort of like with that as a backdrop. Is how do you make sure to stay objective whenever you process information from people that you really like, perhaps you even admire them? And you have this lot of hallucinics of different biases that can make you susceptible to not seeing the world the way it really is?

我要完全坦白，我是Popurai基金的投资者。我可以说，自从加入之后，我一直非常非常开心。我希望我不会因为说得太多而让你不开心，但这真是一次美妙的经历。我开始想知道和担心自己是否对你有点太喜欢了，Anish。这不仅仅是因为你是一个帅哥，虽然你是的。这不是我说这些的原因。但以某种方式，我有些担心，因为我在与你之间有各种关联，涉及到复利、价值等这些暖暖的感觉。所以当我阅读你的东西、观看你的视频或其他任何事情时，我会发现自己对信息的过滤方式不同。这让我感到担心。我想我也可以用同样的方式来形容查理和沃伦，如果他们做了什么了不起的事情，你会觉得他们自以为聪明。而当他们谈论一个错误时，你会觉得他们也很聪明，看看他们从错误中学到了多少。所以，我第一个问题是以此为背景的。在处理来自你非常喜欢、甚至崇拜的人的信息时，你是如何确保保持客观的？你有很多不同偏见的幻觉，可能会使你易受影响，看不到真实的世界？

Yeah, that's a great question, Stig. And it's really difficult to do. And I think most of us are definitely myself, we fail at it. So, yeah, I mean, our brains, you know, they've evolved over the millennia and they are not optimized for being great investors. They were really a brain with optimized to help us survive. And surviving on the African savannah needed a certain type of wiring. And we needed a different kind of wiring to be great investors. So our brains have a lot of quirks and a lot of biases. And I would say reading Munger's essay and reading Cialdini's book is going to be helpful in at least being aware of the pitfalls. But we are susceptible to it, you know, the commitment and consistency biases, a number of the biases that come in and that are very much part and parcel of who we are. It's just part of who we are. The best that we can do is try to be aware of it and try to sidestep as many of the pitfalls as you can. But I don't think anyone has succeeded in sidestepping all the pitfalls.

是的，这是一个很好的问题，Stig。但是这确实很难做到。我认为大多数人，包括我自己，都无法做到。所以，我们的大脑，并不是为成为优秀的投资者而优化的。它们在数千年的进化过程中主要为了帮助我们生存。在非洲大草原上生存需要某种特定类型的神经连接。而要成为出色的投资者，我们需要不同类型的神经连接。因此，我们的大脑存在许多瑕疵和偏见。阅读芒格的文章和查尔迪尼的书籍将有助于我们至少意识到这些陷阱。但我们容易受到这些影响，比如承诺和一致性偏见等等，这些偏见在我们身上非常常见。这只是我们的一部分。我们所能做的就是尽量意识到这一点，并尽量避开尽可能多的陷阱。但我认为没有人成功地避开所有陷阱。

So, yeah, I mean, I think that's a great essay and it is helpful. It's helpful to reread it. And it's helpful to be aware that we are quirky living creatures with quirky brains, which don't necessarily follow a, you know, rational path all the time. They are the very top of the show. You sort of like said that, you know, it's a tradition. And it's sort of like is a tradition that we speak here before the Woodstock of capitalism. And so one of the things that I do in preparation is I always go into the YouTube channel, which is just wonderful and do all these videos. So I sort of like do it once a year. I think probably like, I don't know, 30 hours of content, whatnot, a year that goes up. And so I sort of like been overdosed on my news. It's good. Here all the past week or so. And it's always interesting sort of like to have that kind of compact experience. I always like after an easy video, I type up my notes and sort of like what you, you know, three to five points that's most important from that video. It's also interesting to hear about how you, you know, you play Brits. I know you talked about that for a long time. But also it seems like you speak with what there's more content that used to. And you talk about how, you know, speaking with students also helps you to perhaps be a this active the market. I kind of felt it was kind of interesting take. But anyways, whenever I listen to you, there seems to be some themes. And I don't know if you're aware of this or I don't know, I might be all analyzing this. But you know, it's sort of like whenever you see your nephew, you haven't seen for, you know, two months, like he's grown, but whenever it's your own kid, you don't really see it because you see him every day. And so whenever I compared my notes from the previous year and you talked a lot about the spawner framework, sort of like one of the things that came after COVID, you talk a lot about the sleep. And then you also made this reference to the Walton family quite a few times. Now all the past 12 months, and I could, again, I, with all my biases, I could be completely wrong. You do mention the sleeps framework from time to time, perhaps even more with the Walton family, perhaps just because, you know, not so much the spawner framework. Perhaps it's just because you completely adapted that you don't really talk about anymore. Who knows?

所以，嗯，我的意思是，我认为那是一篇很好的文章，很有帮助。重读它很有帮助。而且，我们应该意识到我们是有怪癖的生物，我们的大脑也是有怪癖的，它们并不总是按照理性的路径行动。它们是节目的亮点。你似乎表达了这一点，你知道，这是一种传统。这似乎是在我们进入资本主义的“伍德斯托克”之前的一种传统。所以，我在准备时会经常进入YouTube频道，那里有很多精彩的视频。我大概一年看30个小时的内容之类的。所以，我对新闻的了解已经超标了。在过去的一周左右，我一直都在这里。有时候，有一种紧凑的体验总是很有趣。我喜欢在观看完一个视频后，写下我的笔记，总结出来三到五个最重要的要点。你也谈到了你如何玩英国人的角色。我知道你谈了很久。同时，你似乎说起来比以前更多。你谈到了如何与学生交流也有助于你更积极地参与市场。我觉得这是一个有趣的观点。不管怎样，每当我听你讲话时，似乎总有一些主题。我不知道你是否意识到这一点，或者我可能是在过度分析。但是你知道，当你见到你两个月没见的侄子，你会觉得他长大了，但是当你看你自己的孩子时，你不会真的察觉到他变化，因为你每天都看到他。所以每当我比较我去年的笔记和你对“孵化器”框架的讨论时，我也谈了很多关于睡眠的事情。你还多次提到了沃尔顿家族在过去的12个月中。我可能完全错误，受到了我的偏见的影响。你确实不时提到了“睡眠”框架，也许是因为沃尔顿家族的原因，或许只是因为你完全适应了它，所以不再讨论而已。谁知道呢？

And also seems like you've been perhaps a bit more open about some of your investments, especially in Turkey, racist, you talked about TAV airports. And my question is not so much your specific holdings. I don't want to make you susceptible to confirmation bias. That's not the point of saying this, but more about the Turkey stock market.

而且似乎你可能更加公开一些投资，尤其是在土耳其，提到了TAV机场，听起来有点偏见，你谈到了一些针对种族的事情。我的问题不太关注你具体的持股情况，我不想让你陷入确认偏见的境地。这不是说这些的目的，更多是关于土耳其股市的问题。

And I heard you reference that 80% of the stocks are held by insiders and foreigners. They don't generally don't trade a lot. And then you have 20% are traded by real estate traders. And they have a quite significant turnover. And whenever I heard the first time, I sort of like had to rewinds like, did money just say nine days? Did you really say that every, it's only period of nine days? And you also talked about how whenever you translate the Turkish word, it's into you don't invest. It's like play the stock market. So that's sort of like making you think about what that dynamic due to the efficiency of a market.

我听到你提到股票的80%是由内部人员和外国人持有，他们一般不怎么交易。然后还有20%是由房地产交易商交易，他们的交易频率相当高。当我第一次听到这个时，我有一种回放的感觉，好像你刚刚说了九天？你真的说每九天一次吗？你还谈到了将土耳其语翻译成“不进行投资”，就像是在玩股票市场一样。这让人思考这种动态对市场效率的影响。

Graham said, you know, decades ago, it took like 18 months to revert back to intrinsic value. Lindsay talked about two to three years again with a wide variance, but that's sort of like whenever they were asked to put on the spot, that's what they said. Again, this was eight kids ago. How do you think about the whole inverting to intrinsic value? How's that different than say the data series we have about the states, if at all?

格雷厄姆说，你知道，几十年前，回归内在价值大约需要18个月的时间。林赛提到再过两到三年会有巨大的变化，但那只是每次他们被问到的时候说的。再次强调，这是在八个孩子之前的情况。你如何看待回归内在价值作为整体的问题？与我们所拥有的关于各个州的数据系列相比，这有何不同（如果有的话）？

Well, I mean, I think Graham's bedrock that we all believe in is that in the long run, the stock market is a weighing machine. And in the short run, it's a voting machine. So I think that applies universally. I think in the end, all companies get correctly valued. If they're undervalued, they're going to go up with their value. They're going to come down. And so I think that is part of the bedrock that applies globally.

嗯，我的意思是，我认为格雷厄姆坚信的基石是，在长期来看，股票市场是一个称重机。而在短期内，它则是一个投票机。所以我认为这个观点是普遍适用的。最终，我认为所有公司最终都会被正确地估值。如果它们被低估了，它们的价值将会上涨，它们可能会下跌。所以我认为这是适用于全球的基石之一。

But I think that in a place like Turkey, and actually, when I mentioned to local Turks about the nine days, they are actually surprised. They expected it to be a lot shorter because all the people they know basically, you know, invest at 10 o'clock and want to wrap it up by two o'clock. And so they actually expected that the holding period would be like, you know, two or three days on average. So they were actually surprised that it's long as long as nine days because they just said, like I said, that they're the way they look at the stock market is they're playing the market, not really investing. That's really the only explanation. One can come up with, you know, for the wide mispricing we've seen businesses like race us, for example, is that no one is weighing the companies. They're just, you know, dancing in and out of them. And Buffett has a great quote. He says that the stock market is a mechanism to transfer wealth from the active to the inactive. And it could not be more true than a place like Turkey.

但我认为在像土耳其这样的地方，实际上，当我提到关于九天的事情时，当地的土耳其人实际上感到惊讶。他们原本预计时间会更短，因为他们所认识的所有人基本上都是早上10点投资，然后希望在下午两点之前结束。因此，他们实际上预计持有期平均为两到三天。所以他们实际上感到惊讶的是，持有期竟然长达九天，因为他们只是说，就像我所说的，他们看待股市的方式是在市场中玩耍，而不是真正投资。这实际上是我们看到企业如race us这样的广泛错价的唯一解释。没有人在权衡这些公司，他们只是进进出出。巴菲特有一句很好的名言。他说，股市是一个将财富从主动者转移到非主动者的机制。在像土耳其这样的地方，这句话再合适不过了。

So yeah, actually I enjoy it's kind of like, I would say it's almost a little bit of a time warp. It's like going back to the 60s and 70s in the US. I think that's all it feels like the early 90s in India, where you had a lot of very high quality businesses at single digit multiples. So that existed in Western markets, in a existed in India, and it doesn't exist anymore. You know, so these places have, we will always have fear and greed and we will always have mispricing. But the degree of mispricing that I can find in a place like the US is much, much less than many other places.

所以，实际上我很喜欢这种感觉，可以说它几乎像是时光隧道。就像回到美国的60年代和70年代一样。我觉得这就像是印度的90年代初期，那时你可以找到很多高质量企业，市值只有个位数倍数。在西方市场和印度都有这种情况，但现在已经不存在了。知道吗，这些地方会一直存在恐惧和贪婪，也会一直有错定价格。但在美国这样的地方，我能找到的错定价格要远远少于其他很多地方。

I wanted to refer back to one of the wonderful videos I've been watching over the past week. Back in September, you had this wonderful Q&A and we'll make sure to link to that in the show notes and the gentleman interviewing asked you how you read annual reports. And please correct me if I'm wrong. I'm just, I'm just referencing what sort of like what I think I heard. But I just, I just wanted to like mention because it was really interesting.

我想回顾一下我在过去一个星期里看过的一个精彩视频。去年九月份，你参与了一个很棒的问答环节，我们将确保在节目注释中链接到那个视频。那位先生在采访中问到你如何阅读年度报告，如果我说错了，请纠正我。我只是引用我所听到的东西。但我只是想提一下，因为那真的很有趣。

Then perhaps at the end of it, there might be a question there, but you talked about how you're looking for reasons to say no. It could be seconds, it could be minutes. But then if it's sort of like, you know, past that test, like a very, very quick test, you sort of like went through four steps.

也许最后会有一个问题，但你说你在寻找拒绝的理由。可能只需要几秒钟，可能需要几分钟。但如果通过了这个像是一个非常非常快速的测试，你就会顺利地经历了四个步骤。

The first one looking at the Bell investors club for a write up because it saves you so much time. You can overview the company, there are some qualitative and sort of like it saves you a bunch of time. And it also gives you a bit of filter because the quality in there is relatively high.

第一个是关注Bell投资者俱乐部的好处是它能省下很多时间。你可以对公司进行概述，其中包括一些定性分析，这样能节省很多时间。而且它还能提供一定程度的过滤，因为其中的质量相对较高。

Then if it passes that filter, you ask your assistant to print out the management letters. But only if it's written by the management or the CEO, not if it's like a PR company that like types it up. And so you get to see whether or not they or promise or under the liver or the other way around, you get to see how they react before, during and after the great financial crisis, the pandemic. And then it goes to step three.

然后，如果通过了这个过滤器，你会要求助理打印出管理层信函。但只有当它是由管理层或首席执行官撰写的，而不是由公关公司撰写的时候。因此，你可以看到他们在全球金融危机、以及大流行病之前、期间和之后的反应是如何的。然后进入第三步。

And you would look through the transcripts for the Q&A about the business, not all the curated stuff, but like where there's sort of like put on the spot to understand the business better. Of course, disregarding those analysts who just want the management to fill out their excel sheet, whether they are like estimate the next quarterly earnings. And then it goes to the finals, like step four, which is you actually reading the reports and your reports.

而你会浏览关于企业的问答转录，而不是所有精心策划的内容，而是那些需要对企业更好理解的关键时刻。当然，可以忽略那些只是希望管理层填写他们的Excel表格的分析师们，无论他们是在估计下个季度的盈利还是其他方面。然后进入下一步，就是你实际阅读报告和你的报告了。

And so with all of that said, I also heard you say in another video that here in the 2020, 23, you wanted to study 50 businesses if they passed those first few hours of tests. So I'm curious what you learned. And again, not to put your own spot in the kind of specific stocks, but whether you found, I don't know, perhaps a new mental model you want to share or a new perspective on things. Yeah.

所以，有了所有这些说法，我还在另一个视频中听你说，在2020年的时候，你希望研究50个企业，如果它们通过了前几个小时的测试。所以我很想知道你学到了什么。再次强调，不是让你提供具体的股票，而是想知道你是否发现了一种新的思维模式或者对事物有了新的观点。是的。

And I've made some good progress on the 50 businesses. I think it's up to close to 20. So far, and I have to pull it up maybe like 70, no 18 or something like that, which is I'm on track because basically I'm behind if I'm not at least one per week. You know, so I'm very pleased with that. And of course, you know, when I make a trip, like I made a trip to Turkey, I see all these new companies. So I get a lot done during a week like that.

我在50家企业的工作上取得了一些很好的进展。我想大概已经接近20家了。迄今为止，我必须提高速度，大概还需要70家，不对，18家或者什么样的数字，这样我才能保持进度，因为如果每周没有至少完成一家，我就会落后。你知道的，所以我对此感到非常满意。当然，你知道，当我去了土耳其这样的地方，我会看到很多新的公司。所以在这样的一周里，我能做很多事情。

But yeah, I mean, I think that one of the things I am excited about is kind of a new way of me looking at things is what I call the circle of the wagon's approach to investing.

是的，我的意思是，我认为我感到兴奋的一件事是我对事物的看法有了一种新的方式，我称之为"围车圈投资理念"。

And you know, this year, for example, Buffett in his letter mentioned that Berkshire has a few truly extraordinary businesses, many pretty good businesses and a very large number of mediocre or below average businesses. And he also mentioned that in 58 years, it's really been 12 decisions that have created most of the great outcome for Berkshire. And most of the other decisions have just been at best so so. So if you look at something like Berkshire Hathaway over 58 years, Warren has bought more than 80 companies in that period. He's probably made at least 10 key hires and probably bought at least 210 stocks over that period. So collectively well over 300 decisions. And when he says that 12 stand out, it's like one in 25. It's like a 4% hit rate for someone as great as Warren Buffett.

你知道的，比如说今年，巴菲特在他的信中提到伯克希尔拥有一些非常出色的企业，还有很多相当不错的企业，但也有很多平庸甚至不及格的企业。他还提到，在58年的时间里，真正具有重大意义的决策其实只有12个，这些决策创造了伯克希尔的大部分巨大成功。其他大部分决策最多也就是一般般而已。所以如果你看看伯克希尔哈撒韦这58年来的情况，沃伦在这段时间内购买了80多家公司，至少做出了10个关键性的招聘决策，还可能在期间购买了至少210只股票。总的来说，他做出了超过300个决策。而他说出这12个突出的决策时，相当于每25个决策中只有一个突出的，即成功率约为4%。对于像沃伦•巴菲特这样伟大的人来说，这个成功率仍然相当可观。

And you know, Charlie Munger said many times if you took a top 15 decisions and took them out, our record would be useless. We actually see this particular phenomena of, you know, this 4% play out over and over. So for example, if you look at the Nifty 50, you know, in the early 70s, which is very popular by the 50 blue strip stocks and don't worry about the valuation, can I said it and forget it.

而且你知道，查理·芒格多次表示，如果把前15个决策拿出来，我们的记录就毫无价值了。我们实际上一再看到这种特殊现象，也就是说这个4%的情况一再上演。举个例子，如果你看看上世纪70年代初的Nifty 50指数，它是由50只蓝筹股组成的，不用担心估值，可以买了就忘了。

There is some controversy whether Walmart was part of the Nifty 50 or not. If you assume that Walmart is part of the Nifty 50, we'll take two cases here, but let's say you assume Walmart is part of the Nifty 50. And you assume that it has a 2% weight in the Nifty 50 because they're 50 stocks. Each one has a 2% weight. And you assume that the other 49 stocks go to zero. They just get wiped out. And you assume that you bought Walmart at the IPO in 1970 and you held it till today.

有关Walmart是否是Nifty 50成分股的问题存在一些争议。如果我们假设Walmart是Nifty 50的成分股，我们将提出两种情况，假设Walmart是Nifty 50的一部分，并且假设它在Nifty 50中的权重为2%，因为Nifty 50有50只股票，每只股票的权重为2%。并且假设其他49只股票全部变为零，彻底失去价值。假设您在1970年的IPO时购买了Walmart股票，并一直持有至今。

The Nifty 50 with 49 out of 50 gone to zero would have ended up with something like a 13.3% annualized return. And the S&P is 10 and change, you know, 10.3% or something. So with just 2% of the portfolio surviving and being there for the entire 50 two year period, you still significantly outperformed the S&P.

Nifty 50股票组合中，有49只股票变为零，最终预计年化回报率大约为13.3%。而标普500指数的回报率约为10.3%左右。所以，即使只有2%的投资组合在整个50年期间幸存下来，仍然显著超过了标普500指数的表现。

And of course, 49 of the other names didn't go to zero. They were like McDonald's and Coke and Procter and Gamble. They were a lot of good companies. There were some bad companies like, you know, Polaroid and Xerox and Kodak and Burrows and a lot of these companies basically went to zero. But you can just see that the one decision whether Walmart is part of the group and whether you keep it or not has such a outsized impact.

当然，其他49个名字中有很多没有降至零。它们像麦当劳、可口可乐和宝洁公司一样，都是很好的公司。当然也存在一些糟糕的公司，比如极光、施乐、柯达和博洛斯，它们中的很多公司基本上都破产了。但你可以看到，决定沃尔玛是否属于这个集团，并且是否保留它，对整个集团产生了巨大的影响。

Now, if you take the other case, which is that let's assume that Walmart is not part of the Nifty 50 and you assume that you invest in the Nifty 50 at the all-time high in 1972, just before the big crash of 73 74. And you run it till today. What you find is that the annualized return is 10.2% annualized and the S&P is 10.3%. So even with buying at ridiculous valuations, but just holding them, of course, what happened in 73 74 is the Nifty 50 went down 50%. Nobody was in the Nifty 50 by 1975. You know, that everyone exited. But if they had held on and if they held on till today, they would pretty much be total to with the S&P. It's not that much of a difference. And you know, this lesson again plays out where we had this great investor in India who passed away last year, Rakesh Jhindranwala. And Rakesh Jhindranwala never managed money professionally. He was an individual investor. Maybe close to the end of his life, he was starting a business.

现在，如果我们考虑另外一种情况，即假设沃尔玛不是Nifty 50的一部分，并假设您在1972年的最高点，也就是在73年74年大崩盘之前投资于Nifty 50。然后一直持有至今。您会发现年化回报率为10.2%，而标准普尔500指数（S&P）为10.3%。因此，即使以荒谬的估值购买，但只要持有，当然，73年74年发生的事情是Nifty 50下跌了50%。到1975年，没有任何人留在Nifty 50中。但如果他们坚持持有直到今天，他们的回报几乎与标普500指数相当。两者之间并没有太大的差异。您知道，这个教训再次得到验证，我们在印度也有一位伟大的投资者，去年去世了，拉凯什·金德兰瓦拉。拉凯什·金德兰瓦拉从未专业管理过资金，他是个人投资者。也许在他生命的最后阶段，他开始创办了一家企业。

Basically, he was all passive investing. And he started at $400 when he was 25 years old. And at 62 when he passed away, it was 5.8 billion. In 2003, Rakesh put 4% of his portfolio into a company in India called Titan Industries. And it was a $3.4 million bet on Titan. He had about $85 million in total assets at that time. So he invested $3.4 million. If you again, like the Nifty take everything to zero that he had in 2003, except for Titan, and he owned like, you know, a little over 5% of Titan. You run it till when he passed away. Now his widow has kept Titan. So it's still compounding. It became 1.4 billion excluding dividends. If you reinvest the dividends, it's even higher. So 3.4 million was a 400X return. And so even if you took everything else to zero, he'd still have 1.4 billion.

基本上，他完全进行被动投资。当他25岁时，他的资金为400美元。到他去世时，62岁时，它已经增长到58亿美元。在2003年，拉克什（Rakesh）将他资产组合的4%投资到了一家名为Titan Industries的印度公司。这就是对Titan的一次340万美元的赌注。当时他的总资产约为8500万美元，所以他投资了340万美元。如果你重新计算他在2003年拥有的一切，除了Titan，他拥有Titan约5%的股份。然后一直持有到他去世。现在他的遗孀保留了Titan股份，所以它仍在复利增长。这个数字除去股息后是14亿美元，如果再将股息再投资，它会更高。340万美元增长了400倍。即使你将其他所有资产降为零，他仍将拥有14亿美元。

And these are not venture investments. Right? I mean, when Buffett buys Coke or Cs candy, these aren't like, you know, early stage like Sequoia making a bet on Amazon when it's early stage business. These are mature businesses with a lot of history. And we see the same thing with Nick sleep with Amazon. I mean, if you pull Amazon out of the equation, Nick sleep's record isn't that great. And when you put it in, it's an exceptional record. And then of course, the most extreme case of all of this is NASPER's in South Africa. So you know, NASPER's in 2001, you know, it's almost a hundred year old newspaper company. That's how it started about 100 hundred years ago in 2001. They have a market cap of about $500 million. They put $32 million into 10 cent and they get a 46% stake in 10 cent. And the most surprising thing about the NASPER's 10 cent adventure is they basically never sell this whole little bit of the IPO, but they still own 36% of the company in 2018. And in 2018, their stake was worth 170 million, billion, 170 billion. And in 2021, at the peak of 10 cent, their stake was worth 270 billion. So here's a sleepy old media company in South Africa. They suddenly start seeing some Chinese company become 99% or even more than 99% of their total assets. And they don't trim it and they don't hedge it. They just keep it. And they end up with an astronomical analyzer turn over the last 20 years. And so if you look at the 10 cent bet, it was 6%, approximately 6% of the value of NASPER's at that time. And NASPER's made hundreds of bets. Everything else really didn't matter. There were only two things that mattered, buying 10 cent and more importantly, not selling 10 cent.

这些都不是风险投资，对吧？我的意思是，当巴菲特购买可口可乐或者Cs糖果时，这些都不是像Sequoia那样的早期阶段投资，比如Sequoia在亚马逊刚开始业务时的一次赌注。这些都是具有悠久历史的成熟企业。我们在尼克•斯利普和亚马逊的情况中也看到了同样的现象。我的意思是，如果将亚马逊从方程式中剔除，尼克•斯利普的业绩并不出色。但一旦将亚马逊考虑进去，他的业绩就非常出色了。当然，南非NASPER's公司是这个现象中最极端的例子。那么，NASPER's公司在2001年是一个近百年历史的报纸公司。在2001年，他们的市值大约为5亿美元。他们投入3200万美元购买了腾讯的46%股权。而关于NASPER's和腾讯的最令人惊讶的事情是，他们基本上从未在腾讯IPO时出售任何份额，但到2018年，他们仍然持有腾讯公司36%的股份。2018年，他们持有的股份价值1700亿美元，而在2021年，腾讯股价最高时，他们持有的股份价值2700亿美元。所以，这是一个位于南非的沉睡的老传媒公司，突然开始看到中国公司成为他们总资产的99%甚至更多。他们没有削减持股，也没有对冲，只是持有股份。这样，在过去的20年里，他们的投资回报率激增。所以，如果看一下当时NASPER's公司的市值，腾讯股票只占了大约6%左右。NASPER's公司进行过很多投资，但其他的都无关紧要。只有两件事情很重要，一是购买腾讯，更重要的是不出售腾讯。

So the circle, the Wagon's concept comes from the 19th century on the American frontier. So when the pioneers and the settlers were moving west to, you know, stake out and take over land and start farming it and so on, these wagons used to get attacked by the American Indians. The defensive posture they took to defend against the Indians was to circle the wagons, which means you put everything, your crown jewels in the center of the circle and then you fight and you try to protect the center. It's a similar concept in investing with the Nifty 50 with Walmart. You really need to not touch it. It only works if you don't touch it. Similarly with Sea Scandy and American Express and Coke for Berkshire, you know, all of these, you know, hiring a G-Jane and so on, you need the long runway and NASPER's needs the very long runway with 10 cent.

所以，Wagon（手推车）的概念源于19世纪美国的边疆地区。当拓荒者和定居者向西方迁徙，占领土地并开始耕种时，这些马车经常遭到美洲印第安人的袭击。他们采取的防御姿态是用手推车成圆圈的形状，意思是将所有宝贵的东西都放在圆圈中央，然后进行战斗并试图保护中心。投资中的"Nifty 50"，以及沃尔玛、Sea Scandy、美国运通和可口可乐对于伯克希尔公司来说都是类似的概念。你真的不能碰它，只有不触碰它才有用。同样，对于NASPER公司来说，要与腾讯保持非常长期的合作关系。

And so the key in investing is to recognize two things. One, we're going to make a lot of mistakes. Two, this is a very forgiving business. You can be wrong, even 98% of the time still come out smelling really nice. And three, that is only going to happen if you are able to buy businesses with great economics at reasonable valuations and then hang on to them forever.

因此，在投资中，关键是要认识到两件事。一、我们会犯很多错误。二、这是一个非常宽容的行业。即使你错了，甚至在98%的时间里都错了，你还是可以取得很好的结果。三、而这只有在你能够以合理的估值购买具有良好经济基础的企业，并长期持有它们时才会发生。

So when they get fully priced, they don't get sold. When they get overpriced, they don't get sold. It's only possibly when they get completely ridiculously, egregiously overpriced that you can consider selling. And so this framework of Circle the Wagons is very fundamental. I think it's very hard to beat the market if you don't have this framework because you're going to be cutting the flowers and watering the weeds. And what we need to do is make sure we don't cut the flowers. And it really doesn't matter whether you water the weeds or not. But the important thing is you just don't cut the flowers. It's okay if you want to water the weeds.

所以当它们定价合理时，它们无法销售。当它们被高估时，它们也无法销售。只有当它们被严重、过分高估时，你才会考虑卖出。所以这个“围住篷车”的框架非常基本。我认为如果你没有这个框架，很难击败市场，因为你会剪去花朵，浇水给杂草。我们需要做的是确保不剪去花朵。至于浇水给杂草与否并不重要。但重要的是你不能剪去花朵。如果你想浇水给杂草也没关系。

It's so well said, Manis. I think you brought up this stat of the index is like 5% that generates all their turns because the index is too dumb to sell Amazon and alphabet. So they're not cutting the flowers. And then you'll have this joke where you're like, yeah, and you don't want to pay off for it. Good luck. Good luck finding them. And of course there are exceptions where you can get a wonderful, wonderful company for small, most of all, but you know, it is a stick. That's why we hang out in Istanbul. That's yeah. You know, so you have to see how the jigsaw puzzle fits. So we have to find the great businesses and we have to go fishing with a fish are. Thank you for that.

真说得好，Manis。我认为你提到了指数的这个统计数据，大约只有5%的收益来自它们所持有的亚马逊和字母表股份，因为指数太愚笨了，不会卖出这些股票。所以它们没有砍掉那些鲜花。然后你还开玩笑说，是的，你不想为此付出代价。祝你好运，好运去找到它们。当然也有例外，你可以以极小的代价获得一家非常好的公司，但这很罕见。这就是为什么我们喜欢待在伊斯坦布尔的原因。我们必须看看拼图是如何拼合的。所以我们必须找到伟大的企业，然后和鱼共舞。感谢你的分享。

Hand off. I'm going to talk a bit about Turkey and then see if I can zoom in and zoom out to Turkey here. So it's about the purchase of she has. And I heard a lot of fantastic questions asked you over the videos I just mentioned before. And there was this really brilliant student who said, why is it that hard for CEOs to buy back. She has below the intrinsic value. And you've made the really good point that, you know, CEOs, they didn't rise to the top because they were great capital allocators. Precious of good sales people. You also talked about how the optimist, you need to be an optimist leader company and to have people lead you. So, so you're like, yeah, that's why it's difficult for CEOs to buy back shares, below the intrinsic value, not destroy shareholder value unless you're the single tons of the world. But there are very few of those. So all of that made a lot of sense.

转向土耳其。我将先稍微谈一下关于她的购买，然后看看能否在这里放大和缩小土耳其。通过我之前提到的视频，我听到了许多出色的问题。其中有一个非常聪明的学生问，为什么对于首席执行官来说，以低于内在价值的价格回购公司股份如此困难。你提出了一个很好的观点，即首席执行官之所以能够达到高层，并不是因为他们擅长优化资本配置，而是因为他们是出色的销售人员。你还谈到了作为一个乐观主义者，你需要成为一家领导公司的乐观主义者，并且需要有能够领导你的人。所以，你说说这就是为什么首席执行官很难以低于内在价值购买股份，除非你是世界上独一无二的那种人，但这样的人非常少。所以，这一切都很有道理。

And then I also heard you talk about the father, son team at races. And again, I'm not trying to give you any kind of confirmation bias. I'm usually more as an example than perhaps we can talk more generally about it. So whenever you're talking about the father and son team, I'm like, they're just such smart people. You know, you talk about the hurdle rates and the payback period, of course, three years. You come up with this example about their solar panels, whenever they got installed, where the payback period perhaps was a bit longer. But then they talked about how, you know, the assets, how long the longevity of that and the prices going up and say that the 50 million is worth 200 million to whatever. It's not so much that. It's sort of like tying those two stories together. I would say, I understand why your conventional CEO would not understand capital location. Well, but if you founded races or perhaps we can talk about one of your previous holdings, Shinokan, I know there are also some cultural differences in terms of Japan and how they do capital location. But could you paint some color around why a founders were clear to very good at capital allocation, not necessarily good at buying back their own stock, whenever it's clearly below their liquidation value, which they would know better than anyone, but their liquidation value is of their assets. So why is that the case?

然后我还听到你谈论比赛时的父子团队。我并不是试图给你任何确认偏见。我通常更多是作为一个例子，也许我们可以更一般地谈谈这个问题。所以每当你谈到父子团队时，我会觉得他们真是聪明的人。你谈到了 hurdle rates 和回本期，当然是三年。你举了个例子，关于他们的太阳能板，安装后回本期可能会比较长。但是他们谈到了资产的寿命有多长，价格上涨了多少，说这 5000 万变成了 2 亿。但这不是最重要的。关键是把这两个故事联系在一起。我可以理解为什么传统的 CEO 不会理解资本配置。但是如果你是创立比赛的人，或者我们可以谈谈你之前的一些投资，比如 Shinokan，我知道日本在资本配置方面也存在一些文化差异。但你能详细解释一下为什么创始人在资本配置方面很出色，而不一定擅长回购自己的股票，即使明显低于清算价值，而他们自己更清楚自己资产的清算价值是多少吗？为什么会有这种情况？

Yeah. So just to give you an update on Shinokan, there was a take under and they did a tender offer offering a small premium and they took the company private. And so the founder with some investors basically in effect did what you're suggesting they should do. It took them some time to understand we had a number of conversations, I had a number of conversations with Shinokan, including I actually sent them a PowerPoint in Japanese on the benefits of buybacks explaining because I realized that a builder may not understand that entrepreneur or a builder.

是的。关于Shinokan的最新情况，发生了一次收购，他们进行了一项要约收购，给出了一小笔溢价并将公司私有化。所以，创始人与一些投资者基本上做了你建议他们做的事情。他们花了一些时间来理解，我们进行了多次对话，我还给Shinokan发了一份用日语编写的关于回购优势的幻灯片，因为我意识到一个建筑商可能不了解企业家或建设者的优势。

And what ended up happening is actually they took my advice in very large doses. So instead of nibbling and a buyback like I was suggesting, I mean, we had already sold the stock because we were a little bit frustrated that they were not really acting the way they should because they had significant amounts of cash flow and they could retire significant number of shares, but they were nibbling. It was a very small amount that they were buying back. And then we exited and I think a year or two later, they basically took one big gut and bought it all at a actually a spectacular discount to what the business was worth. Shinokan was a exceptional business because it has very strong recurring revenues from all the properties they're managing. I mean, the visibility into cash flows go out, you know, many, many years. So it's actually an exceptional business.

最终发生的情况是他们实际上大量采纳了我的建议。所以，与我之前建议的一点点回购不同，我们已经出售了股票，因为他们并没有按照他们应该做的方式行事，尽管他们有可观的现金流和可以回购大量股票的能力，但他们只是一点点地回购。然后我们退出了，一两年后，他们实际上以一个令人惊人的折扣买下了所有股票，远低于企业实际价值。Shinokan是一家非常优秀的企业，因为他们从管理的所有物业中获得非常稳定的经常性收入。也就是说，他们可以看到未来很多年的现金流的可见性非常高。因此，这实际上是一个非常出色的企业。

And one of the things that attracted me to Shinokan in the first place was that it was founder run and that he did not fit the template of most Japanese management. Most Japanese management and boards run the business for the benefits of the employees. They do not run the business for the benefit of the shareholders. So their number one concern is to make sure that the business is very stable and can survive downturns without layoffs. And the shareholders pay a very big price for a business that takes that approach. And so I generally find Japan difficult to invest in for two reasons. That's one reason. The second is the demographics of the declining population. So last year, 1.6 million, a Japanese citizens died and 800,000 new ones were born. So we're looking at almost a net 1 million reduction in the population in a single year. South Korea is even more extreme than that.

首先吸引我来到Shinokan的一件事情是，它是由创始人经营，并且他并不符合大多数日本管理者的模板。大部分日本的管理者和董事会是以员工的利益来经营企业的，而不是股东的利益。所以他们首要关注的是确保企业非常稳定，能够在经济下滑时不进行裁员。而以这种方式经营的企业要付出很大的代价，股东们需要为此买单。因此，由于这个原因，我普遍认为日本的投资是困难的。第二个原因是日本人口的下降趋势。去年，日本有160万名国民去世，而新生儿只有80万名。所以我们面临的人口净减少量在一年内接近100万。韩国的情况甚至更加严重。

So we did see the founder act very rationally, eventually, for his own self interest. In the case of RASAS, I think that again, they were very focused on building and they have very much woken up to the fact that they blew it. I think that if they look back, they wish they had given a 50% premium and bought the whole company, taken the whole company private. For example, they've been trying to fix that mistake by increasing their holdings. They've been buying back shares in the last couple of years or so. They did wake up to the fact that, oh, we should have kind of approached this differently. But it's not easy for CEOs, even founder let CEOs to look at things like buybacks. Basically what ends up happening is you see cash leave your treasury. And you don't immediately see a pop in the stock price. So you see something go away and you don't see anything on the other side. So it's really you have to have a kind of faith the way Henry Singleton had faith that when you retire away, large number of shares, and of course, you're going to see the stock react to that.

所以，最终我们确实看到创始人为了自身利益采取了非常理性的行动。在RASAS的情况下，我认为他们非常专注于建设，而且他们非常清醒地意识到他们犯了错误。我认为他们如果回头看，希望他们当时能支付一个50%的溢价，将整个公司收购，将其私有化。例如，他们一直在尝试通过增加持股来弥补这个错误。在过去几年里，他们一直在回购股票。他们确实意识到，哦，我们应该以不同的方式来处理这个问题。但对于CEO来说，甚至是创始人兼任CEO，要考虑股票回购之类的事情并不容易。基本上，最终发生的情况是你看到现金流失，但你看不到股价的立即上涨。所以你看到某个东西消失了，但在另一边你看不到任何东西。所以你真的必须像亨利·辛格尔顿那样有信心，当你大量销售股票时，当然会看到股价对此做出反应。

Thank you for elaborate on that. And thank you for opinions and color running because I did notice that you're saying there are actually buying back shares themselves, but not for the company. I was like, huh, but how one without the other? But it makes sense now that you're out like that. So so thank you, Manus, for that.

谢谢你详细解释。还要感谢你对观点和色彩奔跑的分享，因为我确实注意到你说的是公司自己回购股票，而不是为了公司。我当时疑惑了一下，没有其中一个怎么可能有另一个呢？但现在你这样说就很有道理了。所以非常感谢你，Manus。

In one of our previous conversations, you talked about your best investment that I don't refer. And I just want to say all the modesty to you that you don't refer to one of your 200 baggers that you made in the past. But the the owner's manual that you got from Jack Skeen and the business partner of him, they came to go. I want to say 1999 or so. And they told you that you like to play games where you felt you had an edge and you like the single play games, which also led into the whole thing about selling TransTech started by Rifons, which was the perfect game for you.

在我们以前的交谈中，你谈到了你最好的投资，我不太了解。我只是想向你表示谦逊，你没有提到过你过去所做的200倍投资之一。但是你从Jack Skeen和他的商业伙伴那里得到了业主手册，他们大约在1999年左右离开了。他们告诉你，你喜欢参与你觉得有优势的游戏，你喜欢单局游戏，这也导致了关于出售Rifons创办的TransTech的整个事情，对你来说，这是一个完美的游戏。

So if you look at the stock market or if you look at the game of investing, well, as a game, has that changed since you started 1999? And if it has, how have you adapted to the new rules of the game? Well, I very much enjoy the game. And one of the things with this particular game, it's actually very similar to bridge is that, you know, bridge of the game that would take you 15 minutes to learn and you cannot master it in a lifetime. So you can keep learning forever. There's really no plateau that shows up in bridge. Even if you were playing 30, 40 hours a week for your whole life, you would still be learning.

所以，如果你看看股市，或者你看看投资这个游戏，嗯，作为一个游戏，自从你1999年开始了以后有没有发生变化？如果有的话，你是如何适应游戏的新规则的呢？嗯，我非常喜欢这个游戏。而这个特定的游戏，它和桥牌非常相似，你知道，桥牌是一个你学会需要15分钟的游戏，但你却无法终生掌握它。所以你可以一直不断地学习。在桥牌中真的没有什么能够显示出学习进展的高峰。即使你每周玩30、40个小时，一辈子都在玩，你仍然能够不断学习。

And I think investing is very similar in the sense that this is a game with a lot of twists and turns. And any time you look at a business, the my rate of factors that affect where it might be in the long run are so diverse. And some of them you may be able to understand, some of them may be within your circular competence. A lot of them may not be. So, you know, lifelong learning is going to serve you very well. So I think I am as excited about the investing game as I was nearly 30 years ago. But I think what has happened in the previous almost three decades is that more competency has been built up. Momental models have been refined and incorporated. And so the pattern recognition is probably faster now than it used to be and it's broader now than it used to be.

我认为投资在某种程度上非常类似于一场充满曲折的游戏。任何时候当你看待一个企业时，影响其长期发展的因素是如此之多样。其中一些你可能能够理解，有一些可能在你的专业范围之内。而许多因素可能不是。所以，你知道，终身学习对你来说非常重要。所以我觉得我对投资这个游戏的兴奋程度几乎和30年前一样高。但是，我认为在过去的几十年中所发生的是，我们建立了更多的能力。模型已经得到精细改进和应用。因此，模式识别可能比以前更快，范围也更广。

Interesting. So I wanted to talk a bit about jazz and dilution and buying back. It's just such a fascinating thing. And you heard her talk about NDR over the past few years and how they have been doing a wonderful job buying back jazz. They've also been delivering some of their shares, giving to the shares to management and whatnot. And I spoke with Chris Brumster in here last week. He said that he ran some numbers on the S&P 500 and he said it was 2% that they've been issuing shares to the management. And so we're not talking about the racing caboose, she asked me talking about giving away in a stock based compensation. Do you have a threshold for how much shareholder dilution you will tolerate in companies you invest in?

有趣。所以我想稍微谈谈爵士乐、稀释和回购。这太有趣了。你听她说过去几年NDR在回购爵士乐方面做得很出色。他们还交付了一些股份，交给了管理层等等。上周我与克里斯·布鲁姆斯特在这里交谈。他说他对标普500指数进行了一些计算，他说公司向管理层发行股份的比例为2%。所以我们不是在谈论股权通胀，她问我关于以股票为基础的薪酬方面的问题。你对你投资的公司能够容忍多少股东稀释有一个门槛吗？

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大家好，我是Clay Fink。你是否在寻找一个价值2万亿美元的市场中的投资机会？别再找了，AutoCama是网络安全行业的最新创新者。AutoCama向美国认可的投资者和国际投资者敞开了大门，已经吸引了超过5,000位投资者和650万美元的资金。AutoCama的循环收入模式仅在2022年就实现了10倍的收入增长。他们拥有专利技术和大型合同，其中包括与美国国防部的合同。这是一个有限时间内的机会，可以参与到一个快速增长的网络安全初创企业的起步阶段。要了解更多信息，只需访问invest.auto-cama.com。全面披露，我个人在AutoCama的众筹股权轮中以2,900万美元的估值进行了投资。请记住，早期阶段的公司投资存在风险，就像任何投资一样。众筹投资确实具有有吸引力的潜在上升空间，但不能保证未来的回报。

Well, you know, we would ideally like compensation. I think you can set compensation and incentives quite well without giving out equity. And you could encourage management to buy equity. And I think, for example, Constellation Software does that, and they do an excellent job. Berkshire does that in the sense that a lot of the Berkshire managers have significant ownership of Berkshire, but they basically taken after-tax earnings and bought it with those earnings. And that's worked out well for them and everyone.

嗯，你知道的，理想情况下，我们希望能获得补偿。我认为你可以很好地设定补偿和激励措施而不需要分配股权。而且你可以鼓励管理层购买股权。例如，Constellation Software 就这么做，并且做得非常出色。Berkshire（伯克希尔）也是以类似方式做的，很多伯克希尔的管理者都拥有重要的伯克希尔所有权，但他们基本上使用税后收益购买了这些股权。这对他们和每个人都取得了良好的效果。

So I think Silicon Valley and the tech world is overdosed on a certain model, which is that you give away equity to everyone and their brother. And boards don't understand the value of this equity. Many times CEOs don't understand it. And because it is non-cash, it becomes attractive because you're not really using the company's cash.

所以我认为硅谷和科技界过度依赖一种模式，就是把股权分配给每个人和他们的兄弟。董事会并不理解这种股权的价值，很多时候连首席执行官也不理解。而且由于它不是现金，所以它变得有吸引力，因为你实际上并没有使用公司的现金。

So one good thing that happened in accounting is that the gap accounting rules changed a while back to force them to treat stock-based compensation as an expense and to show it as an expense on the income statement. And so the companies have gone to metrics like adjusted EBITDA or adjusted net income and adjusted whatever.

在会计领域发生的一件好事是，一段时间之前，会计准则发生了改变，迫使公司将以股票为基础的薪酬视为费用，在损益表上以费用的形式呈现出来。因此，公司开始采用调整后的指标，如调整后的调整后的息税前利润、调整后的净收入和其他调整后的指标等。

Yeah, so it's an unfortunate state of affairs. It is sub-optimal. We can still do well in some businesses, even with that drag. We can still work out, okay, but it's far from ideal. I'm happy to say that because it sounds like such a plausible thing that you give out options. Now an owner, so now everyone's going to work a lot harder. And what you basically, mainly sees just the existence, shareholders are being deluded. It's heads, they win and tails, they don't lose.

是的，这真是一个不幸的局面。它不是最优的。尽管有这种阻碍，我们仍然可以在某些业务上获得成功。我们仍然可以解决问题，但离理想状态还有很远。我很高兴能说出这样的话，因为这听起来像是一种合理的选择。现在作为所有者，每个人都会更加努力工作。而你所看到的主要是存款存在的事实，股东们被欺骗了。他们一方面赢了，但另一方面又并非真正输了。

You know, and so there's no real skin in the game there. And I really liked the plan that Mark Leonard put in place at Constellation. I think that if you don't believe that, you know, just cash comp alone is going to do it for you, you could go with a plan like that. And the results at Constellation speak for themselves. I'm happy to do mention this consolation. We have talked about it a bit here on the show and about how they set up this kind of unique structure.

你知道的，所以那里没有真正的风险。我真的很喜欢马克·伦纳德在康斯特雷令人满意的计划。我认为，如果你不相信单纯的现金报酬就能解决问题，你可以选择类似的计划。而康斯特雷的结果证明了这一点。我很高兴提到康斯特雷。我们在节目中已经谈论过这个话题，以及他们是如何建立这种独特的结构的。

I want to say it's between 25 and 75% of the compensation of bonuses. I should say there has to be a put back in the open market. And Mark Leonard is just amazing. You know, now he's traveling a bit more comfortable than he used to, but he's also paying it out of pocket, which is, you know, is an example to follow. Yeah, and he takes no salary. Yeah. He has no salary and no bonus. Because he's an owner and he's thinking like an owner.

我想表达的是，奖金的补偿应该在25%到75%之间。我还应该说必须要在公开市场上回购。而马克·伦纳德真是太了不起了。你知道，现在他的旅行比以前更加舒适，但他的旅费都是自掏腰包，这是一个值得学习的榜样。是的，而且他没有薪水。他既没有薪水，也没有奖金。因为他是一个业主，他思考问题的角度就像一个业主一样。

Yeah. But you can contrast that, for example, with someone like Larry Ellison at Oracle. So one can argue Larry is a founder. He has a significant ownership stake. Why would he need a stock based compensation plan to be aligned with other shareholders? But if you study Oracle and you look at the historical amount of compensation that's gone to Ellison, it's been quite spectacular. Now he would argue that he's worth it. And I would say probably absolutely he's probably worth it. But he would have worked just as hard because he had the incentive with the ownership. So it was a add on that was a tax to the shareholders that never happened with Bill Gates at Microsoft. So Gates basically always had a very modest salary.

是的。但是你可以将其与甲骨文公司的拉里·埃里森这样的人进行对比。所以可以说拉里是一位创始人。他拥有很大的股权。为什么他需要一个基于股票的补偿计划来与其他股东保持一致呢？但是如果你研究一下甲骨文公司，并看一下埃里森获得的历史补偿金额，那是相当惊人的。现在他可能会辩称他值得。我会说他很可能确实值得。但是他会同样努力工作，因为他有股权激励。所以这是对股东来说是一项额外的负担，在微软公司的比尔·盖茨身上从未发生过。所以盖茨基本上一直拿着非常低的薪水。

I'm trying to ask you a question here without being too specific with the kind of feel I've already failed. And you know, because the cancellation software is so interesting for so many reasons, it's not too derated a conversation too much. Whenever you have a return on invest capsule for 30% for decades, it's almost like whenever you look at an asset manager, you're like, you want a long runway, but you also want a long track record. So it's sort of like you want to have your cake and need it too, right? So you're like, yeah, the installation software that makes a lot of sense to have a track record. But now they're like 50 billion plus what mark cap. So it's probably going to be hard to do for the next two decades. But I would also not bet against Mark.

我试图在这里向你提一个问题，而不过于具体地描述我已经失败了。而且你知道，由于取消软件有很多有趣的原因，这样的对话也不会太过于无聊。每当你在几十年内获得30%的投资回报率时，这就像是每当你看着一个资产管理人时，你是说，你想要一个长期的发展机会，但你也想要一个较长的历史记录。所以这有点像是你想要同时拥有蛋糕并享受它的滋味，对吧？所以你会说，是的，安装软件具有很多道理来拥有一段历史记录。但现在它们市值已经超过500亿美元了。所以在未来的二十年里，可能会很难做到。但我也不会押注马克失利。

Mark has an uncanny ability to put little rabbits out of the hat. So I don't have an investment in constellation. And many times I think it's a mistake, even at the size and the multiple that they're at, because the quality of the manager is so exceptional. And the business model is so exceptional. In many ways, constellation is embryonic. So I would not be surprised at all if constellation continues to do very well in the years ahead. I would also not be surprised at all if Leonard takes the company in some different direction where he might allocate, you know, he's not really a software guy. He's a capital allocator. And he found a mouse trap that worked really well and that mouse trap had a deep vein and they're continuing to mine that vein of great opportunities. I know that they're looking at other sectors and areas that could hold promise to deploy capital. Interesting.

马克有一种神奇的能力，能够从帽子里变出小兔子。所以我不对星座公司投资。有很多时候我认为这是一个错误，即使他们的规模和倍数都很大，因为经理的素质是如此出色。而且业务模式也是如此出色。在很多方面，星座公司还处于初级阶段。所以如果在未来几年中星座继续取得很好的成绩，我一点也不会感到惊讶。同样，如果莱昂纳德将公司引入一些不同的方向，可能会进行资本配置，我也一点都不会感到惊讶。他不是一个软件人员，而是一个资本配置者。他发现了一个非常有效的老鼠夹，而这个老鼠夹有一个深厚的资源脉络，他们继续开发这个脉络上的巨大机会。我知道他们正在寻找其他可能有望投资资金的领域和行业。很有意思。

On that note, I've heard you say it. And again, I'm probably paraphrasing, but like don't look too much about what the management is saying. Like look at the track record. Like that's what's important. If you look at a serial acquire, what is there to look out for other than the track record, assuming that the management do not change. Would you have anything where you're like, this is interesting?

在这个观点上，我听你说过这句话。虽然我可能有点改述，但是不要过多关注管理层所说的话。关注他们的历史记录才是最重要的。如果你看一个一贯进行收购的企业，除了历史记录外，还有什么其他值得注意的地方呢？假设管理层没有改变的话。你是否有任何感兴趣的方面呢？

Well, usually I'm not a big fan of rollups and I'm not a big fan of serial acquirers. I think that companies like Constellation and Berkshire are cut from a different cloth. So if you look at Constellation, they have an internal list of about 40,000 vertical market software companies, small companies, 40,000 of them. They nudge them probably two or three times a year. And basically, and they have a whole Biz Dev team, M&A team. So basically kind of like what Buffett would do with his letters to different companies like Ikea, he'd say, hey, if you ever decide to do something, please think of us. That sort of thing.

嗯，通常我不是卷起和连续收购者的忠实支持者。我认为像康斯特拉和伯克希尔这样的公司是不同风格的。所以如果你看康斯特拉，他们有一个内部名单上有大约40,000个垂直市场软件公司，都是小公司，总共有40,000个。他们可能每年会提醒他们两三次。他们有一个完整的商业发展团队和并购团队。所以基本上就像巴菲特会给不同公司写信，比如宜家，他会说，嗨，如果你们决定做些什么，请考虑我们。就是这种情况。

Amongst these 40,000 companies, there are founders who are getting old, may want to retire. They could be divorces. They could be other reasons why somebody wants to sell and move on. And for most of them, Constellation might be the only buyer. These are usually not rapidly growing companies. They may have stable revenues and cash flows or might have just very small, very slow growth. And so private equity is not interested. Venture capital is not interested. Even to venture capitalists actually Constellation is a great exit. So they make 20 bets in a portfolio and one outlier is going to generate most of the returns. They hope. And 15 or 17 end up being either they're going to disappear or just be on flat line, or just kind of limping along. And the partners of these venture funds don't want to sit on those boards anymore and waste their time. So they want those companies off their ownership. And so a place like Constellation is perfect for them. You know, they can stop doing the babysitting. They get rid of these things that they thought might have a great moon shot. Now they know there's no moon shot and they can focus on their one or two outliers and take it from there. And in effect, Constellation is in the funeral business. And the funeral business like I wrote about in my first book, Mosaic, is a really good business. So somebody has to take care of these businesses at some point and Constellation is the caretaker. And they are really good at it. So when they acquire a business, they have a lot of ways in which they can help the business, not by being overbearing, but by telling them, listen, we've got seven others like this. And these are what we've learned could be helpful and so on.

在这40,000家公司中，有些创始人年纪大了，可能想退休了。他们可能离婚了。他们可能还有其他原因想要出售公司并继续前进。对于大多数公司来说，Constellation可能是唯一的买家。这些通常不是增长迅速的公司。它们可能有稳定的收入和现金流，或者可能只有非常小的、很慢的增长。因此，私募股权对它们不感兴趣。风险投资也不感兴趣。甚至对于风险投资者来说，Constellation实际上是一个很好的退出方式。他们在一个投资组合中进行20次押注，其中一个离群值将产生大部分回报。他们希望如此。而其中15或17个要么将消失，要么将保持停滞状态，要么勉强维持。这些风投基金的合作伙伴不想再呆在这些公司的董事会上浪费时间了。所以他们希望将这些公司从他们的所有权中清除出去。对于像Constellation这样的地方来说，这是完美的。你知道，他们可以停止照顾这些公司。他们摆脱了自己原本认为可能有很大机会的东西。现在他们知道没有机会了，他们可以专注于那一个或两个离群值并从那里展开。实际上，Constellation从事的是殡仪业。而我在我的第一本书Mosaic中写过，殡仪业是一个非常好的生意。所以在某个时候必须有人照顾这些企业，而Constellation就是这个照顾者。他们在这方面做得非常好。因此，当他们收购一家企业时，他们有很多帮助企业的方法，不是通过专横霸道，而是告诉他们，我们还有其他七个类似的公司。这些是我们学到的可以帮助的事情等等。

So yeah, I think that Maostrap is exceptional. And they're the only ones with that Maostrap. So I wanted to talk to you a bit about investing mistakes and sort of like how to bridge that with wonderful companies such as Constellation Software. And you know, show me an investor who tells you that he hasn't made a investing mistake. And I'll show you a liar or at least someone who hasn't started investing. So this is a personal anecdote. It's about Alibaba, but it's not about Alibaba. I'm just sort of like using it as a point of reference. Because again, I don't want to give any kind of confirmation bias and all of that. And we also talked about it by in previous episode and text harvesting and all that stuff. So it's not so much that, but I made an investment in Alibaba, which I know a lot of investors in our circles did together with Charlie and Kai and you and so many others. And whenever I look at it now and a lot of things just happen again, this is about Alibaba, but not about Alibaba. So I'll see if I can get to a question at the end.

嗯，我认为Maostrap的表现非常出色。而且他们是唯一拥有那种Maostrap的人。所以我想和你聊一下投资错误以及如何与像Constellation Software这样的优秀公司相结合。要是有人告诉你自己还没有犯过投资错误的话，那我可以告诉你，他要么是个撒谎者，要么是个还没有开始投资的人。这是一个个人小故事，它与阿里巴巴有关，但又与阿里巴巴无关。我只是将其作为一个参考点。因为我不想引发任何肯定性偏见之类的东西。我们在之前的一集中也谈到了这个，并讨论了文本收集等等。所以不是那个方面的讨论，而是我在阿里巴巴进行了投资，我知道在我们的圈子里有很多投资者和Charlie、Kai以及你还有很多其他人一起投资了阿里巴巴。每当我现在看它的时候，许多事情又发生了。这是关于阿里巴巴的，但又不仅仅是关于阿里巴巴的。所以我看看能不能在最后提出一个问题。

But I think that I made a mistake in my assessment of the intrinsic value. And also that the company was perhaps still a compound, but not the type of compound I thought it was. And so I think at the time of recording, I think it just looked up here before we started recording, it's like $84 or whatnot. It was a bit painful to look at, but it's still undervalued with this new price.

但我认为我在对内在价值的评估上犯了一个错误。而且公司也许仍然是一个复合公司，但并不是我所认为的那种复合公司。所以我想在录制时，我查了一下，就在我们开始录制之前，它是84美元左右。看起来有点痛苦，但以这个新价格来说仍然被低估。

And so I guess, assuming that this is a mistake and again, it could be any other stock, like you have this kind of interesting paradox where you realize it's a mistake. But whenever you realize it's a mistake, the market more often than I'd also realize it's a mistake. Because the market told you that it was a mistake. And so you might think you bought it at 50 cents on the dollar or whatever kind of uptrend number, but it still trades at 50 cents on the dollar just like from a very low level.

所以我想，假设这是一个错误，而且它可能是其他任何股票，你会发现一个有趣的悖论，你意识到它是一个错误。但是每当你意识到这是一个错误时，市场更经常地也会意识到它是一个错误。因为市场告诉你它是一个错误。所以你可能认为你以50美分的价格买入它，或者任何其他的升势数字，但它仍然以50美分的价格交易，就像从一个非常低的水平开始。

And so, and I'm like, what do you do? Because you have this weird situation where there might be some tax loss harvesting you can think about, opportunity costs, whatever are biases with loss aversion, anchoring, you name it. And so there was like fireworks in the brain whenever you see that happening.

所以，我就想，你该怎么办呢？因为你会面临一种奇怪的情况，可能可以考虑一些税务亏损的利用，机会成本，以及所有与损失规避、锚定等有关的偏见。当你看到这种情况发生时，大脑里就像放烟花一样激动不已。

And so do we as investors, whenever we make a mistake, wait for the stock to revert back to the intrinsic value, again, knowing that it can take a long time before it happens. And perhaps we even roll in our new assessment of the intrinsic value as much as we cut it. Or do we cut our losses and say, well, you know, minus have told us invest in wonderful business and pay up and be patient. Let's go to the constellation software of the world. I don't know if there's a question there, but do you have challenge the premises of the question? Please do if you want. How do you think about this realizing you made a mistake and the opportunity cost? I guess that's my long way to asking the question. Yeah.

作为投资者，每当我们犯错时，都会等待股票回归到内在价值，同时知道可能需要很长时间才能实现。也许我们会根据新的内在价值评估来进行操作，既可能增加仓位，也可能减少仓位。或者我们会割肉止损，并且说：“唉，你知道，我们被告知要投资于出色的企业，并付出代价并耐心等待。让我们去寻找像Constellation软件这样的公司。” 我不知道这里是否有个问题，但是如果你想这样做，你可以挑战问题的前提。你如何考虑到你犯错的事实以及机会成本呢？我想这是我长篇大论式的问问题的方式。是的。

So, you know, we have to separate the signal from the noise as we saw with these examples of the nifty 50 and NASPers and Buffett and so on is this is a business with a high error rate. And the best investors will be wrong, at least half of that. And so one of the backdrops we have to keep in mind is that if you have a portfolio of 10 stocks, more than likely have our mistakes. Now you may not lose money on them. They may not just compound at a high rate. They may be 4% compounding instead of 15% that you're expecting, for example. So knowing that there's a high error rate and separating the signal from the noise, when you have a good amount of data telling you that the signal is saying that you were probably wrong, then yeah, you cut your losses and you move on.

所以，你知道的，我们必须将信号与噪音区分开来，就像我们在“聪明50”、“纳斯帕斯”和巴菲特等例子中看到的那样，这是一个错误率很高的业务。最好的投资者也会犯错，至少一半的时间是错误的。因此，我们必须牢记的一个背景是，如果你有一个包含10只股票的投资组合，很可能会有一些错误。你可能不会在它们身上赔钱，它们可能只以4%的复合增长率而不是你预期的15%，例如。所以知道错误率很高并将信号与噪音分离，当你有大量数据告诉你信号表明你很可能是错误的时候，是的，你会减少损失并继续前进。

And I think in the case of Alibaba, we saw actions by the Chinese government that quite frankly become very hard to handicap in the future. So we've seen a bunch of actions in the past which we didn't see when the investment was made and those actions destroyed value for the investor. And we don't know what the end game is. So I would say that, you know, what the Chinese government does and the impact it has on Alibaba goes into the too hard pile. We just don't know.

我认为对于阿里巴巴来说，中国政府采取的行动实际上变得非常难以预测未来。因此，我们在过去看到了许多行动，这些行动在投资时并未出现，而这些行动却损害了投资者的价值。而且我们不知道最终目标是什么。所以我会说，中国政府所做的事情以及对阿里巴巴产生的影响都属于难以预测的范畴。我们只是不知道。

And the second is, you know, which is one of the things that I've always, I've tried to avoid the mega caps. And you know, I made an exception to Alibaba, which didn't help me. And I moved that investment to process, which I think with 10 cent is a is a better bet. But I think the fact remains that if you're buying a business with a hundred or two hundred or three hundred billion dollar market value, what is the runway? That remains a question now. You could buy Apple at two hundred billion and it could go to two trillion or two and half trillion. And that's fine. But those are few and far between. So my bias has been to try to look for businesses that were much smaller. The runway was not in question. You know, there was room for them to grow. It doesn't mean that, you know, they're always going to work out, but that's that's the goal is that they have, they're not sitting at these massive mega cap numbers. They are saying, okay, even a double from him, it might be that easy.

第二个问题是，你知道的，这是我一直尽量避免购买市值庞大的巨头公司的其中之一的原因。虽然我对阿里巴巴做出了例外，但并没有对我产生帮助。我将这笔投资转移到了腾讯，我认为这是一个更好的选择。但是事实仍然存在，如果你购买的是市值为一千亿、两千亿或三千亿美元的企业，未来发展空间是多少？这仍然是个问题。你可以以两千亿美元的价格购买苹果公司的股票，然后股价上涨到两万亿或两万五千亿，这是可以的。但这种情况是少数情况。所以我的倾向是寻找规模较小的企业。他们的未来发展空间不会受到质疑。这并不意味着它们一定会成功，但这是目标，即它们的市值并不庞大。即使翻一番也可能不那么简单。

Very interesting. Thank you for sharing that, Manish. Well, hey, that's why we go to Turkey. So I wanted to shift gear here a bit and talk a bit about life for like a better words. And you know, my wife, wife is generally not too interested in what a deal. But she asked me before I jump on this call with you, what are you most excited about speaking with Manish about? And I said, you know, I have two questions here at the end. And it's about it's about living a life according to Manish. I'm pretty excited about that. So that that's going to be my my my build up. Just know this has been filtered by my wife.

非常有趣。谢谢你分享，Manish。嘿，这就是我们去土耳其的原因。所以我想稍微换个话题，谈一谈更好的生活。你知道的，我的妻子通常对这些不太感兴趣。但在跟你通话之前，她问我，你最期待与Manish谈论什么？我说，你知道的，在结束时我有两个问题。关于按照Manish的方式生活的问题，我对此非常兴奋。所以这就是我的底气。请知道这经过我妻子的筛选。

And so I wanted to talk to you about power versus force, which is this book by David Hawkins. And one of the lessons you took away from the book is that we subconsciously can know if a person is lying, pattern recognition, whatnot. There's just something there we don't really like to be around that person. We can't tell you why they're lying because it is subconscious, but there's just something there.

所以我想和你谈谈《力量与力》这本由大卫·霍金斯写的书。这本书教给我们的一个重要教训是，我们潜意识中能够意识到一个人是否在撒谎，通过模式识别等方式。在那个人身边，我们会感觉到一种不舒服，但无法准确说出他们为何在撒谎，因为这是潜意识的作用。

And one of the things I really admire about the way that you live your life is about how transparent and truthful you'll live your life and have caught out the big lies and the small lies. And I heard you mention this story where you're supposed to take out your wife and now ex-wife to the movies and she asked you how she looked in a dress. And you're very honest about what you said and you didn't go to that movie. But you also said that it was for the same reason why you could split nine figures in less than 30 minutes without lawyers and why your wife is your biggest investor in your funds because there's this trust like you can be trusted. You are trustworthy with a person because you sort of like you live that fully.

我非常欣赏你生活的方式中最令我钦佩的一点就是你以坦诚与真实的态度度过一生，你能识破大小谎言。我听你提到过一个故事，说你应该带你的妻子（现在是前妻）去看电影，她问你她穿的裙子怎么样。你对她的问题非常诚实，并且没有陪她去看那部电影。但你也提到了，之所以不需要律师就能在不到30分钟内分割九位数的财产，以及为什么你的妻子是你基金中最大的投资者，是因为存在信任。你是一个值得信赖的人，因为你用行动充分展现出了这一点。

And I guess I was just so fascinated about that and I spoke to my wife about this exact situation this morning and not because I wanted a divorce or to say something about how she dresses. But my wife and I had talked a long about how to practice a life more similar to that and we have also put it into practice. I heard you talk about this years ago and I think it's very fascinating. But it also gives you a lot of bruises. At least it does for us. So perhaps if you could share your journey in how you started cutting out the small and the big lies and what that has meant for you and the way you live your life today.

我猜我对此非常着迷，今天早上我就和妻子谈到了这个确切的情况，不是因为我想要离婚或对她的着装有所评论。但我和妻子长时间地讨论了如何过更接近那种生活，并且我们也付诸实践。多年前我听你谈起过这个，我觉得非常有意思。但它也会给你带来很多伤痕，至少对我们来说是这样。所以，也许你可以分享一下你如何开始消除小谎言和大谎言的旅程，以及这对你和你今天生活的方式意味着什么。

Yeah, well, I think that's a great question. It is going to feel uncomfortable. I think that it is the small white lies are just very comfortable. You don't hurt anyone and why would anyone care and how is anyone ever going to know that you really thought it didn't look great. So you move on, but it's not authentic. And I think that many times when we meet people, we don't know why, but we sometimes just don't want to be around certain people. We can't put our finger on it. And it may be that there's too much implicit and explicit lies around what that person is saying or doing.

是的，我觉得这是个很好的问题。这会让人感到不舒服。我认为那些小小的善意谎言让人感到很自在。你不会伤害任何人，为什么会有人在乎呢？还有，有谁会知道你真正觉得它看起来不好呢？所以你选择了忽略，但这并不真实。我认为很多时候，当我们遇到某些人，虽然不知道原因，但我们可能并不想靠近他们。我们无法抓住其中的原因。这可能是因为在那个人的言行中有太多隐性和显性的谎言存在。

So I think that the inversion of that is that if you want to build trust, you have to make a commitment to the truth. And the truth is going to not be easy many times. But I think that once you can cross that group economy, you know, on the other side, what you're going to find is that trust goes up a lot. And basically this world functions on trust. It doesn't function on contracts. The best contracts are ones that you never look at after you sign them.

所以我认为，相反的是，如果你想建立信任，你必须对真相作出承诺。而真相往往并不容易。但我认为，一旦你能够跨越那个群体经济，你将会发现信任大大增加。基本上，这个世界是以信任为基础运作的，而非合同。最好的合同是你签字后再也不需要查看的合同。

I think that if you if you want to have a lot of success in business, you have to have a very high standard for candor and integrity. And if you want to have, you know, great deep relationships, great friendships, then again, that same thing is really important. I think your friends need to know that you've got their back and that when they come to you, they're going to get very authentic answers, even if those answers are not what they want And so those are I think these are these are very powerful principles where once you kind of get comfortable with it and start to apply it in your life, the paybacks are so enormous that it just becomes a no brainer. I think any other way of living is kind of dumb. And it's going to make your life a lot more pleasant. It's very easy when you don't lie because you don't have to remember your lies. You know, this makes it really simple.

我认为，如果你想在商业上取得很大的成功，你必须对坦白和诚信有非常高的要求。而如果你想建立伟大而深厚的关系、友谊，那么同样，这一点就非常重要。我认为你的朋友需要知道你会全力支持他们，当他们向你求助时，会得到非常真实的回答，即使这些回答不是他们想要的。因此，我认为这些原则非常强大，一旦你对其感到舒服并开始应用于生活中，回报是如此巨大，以至于根本不需要考虑其他方式的生活。我认为其他方式的生活有点愚蠢，并且会让你的生活更加愉快。不撒谎很容易，因为你不需要记住你的谎言，这让生活变得非常简单。

Anytime you're saying something or talking about something, you don't have to remember, oh, I said this and I said that and I got to keep consistent with that or any of that. Just say the truth, you know, and that's the end. Like they say, it's simple, but not easy. But it's a it's a great journey to go on and it's a journey which is going to lead to a lot of growth. So it will feel unnatural and uncomfortable at times, but you will yourself start noticing very quickly that you feel so much better.

无论何时你说话或谈论某事，你都不需要记住“我说过这个，那个，我必须保持一致”之类的东西。只说真相，而那就是结局。就像他们说的那样，这很简单，但并不容易。但这是一次伟大的旅程，它将带来很多成长。因此，有时候会感到不自然和不舒服，但你会迅速注意到自己感觉好多了。

That's so true. And just as a personal anecdote, I in my early twenties, I told all my my friends and families that didn't want to go to their birthdays or go to weddings or anything like that because it just I felt uncomfortable. And it's hard. It's hard whenever you say that and the trick is to say, but I'm going to I'm going to bring a six pack or whatever you want. And this is your next Tuesday. It's not because I don't like you. It's because I don't want to sit next to your uncle and six hours whenever I could be reading a book or doing something else I really want. And I can say that's been one of the best decisions that I've made. But it's hard. And especially in the beginning, now I'm in the lucky situation that people don't ask me anymore. But it's hard to be that true to other people.

太对了。这只是我的个人经历，当我二十多岁的时候，我告诉所有的朋友和家人，我不想参加他们的生日派对、婚礼或类似的任何活动，因为我感到不自在。这很难。当你说出这样的话时很难，关键是要说出，“但是我会带上六瓶装啤酒（或者其他你喜欢的）。” 这是你的下一个星期二，不是因为我不喜欢你。而是因为我不想坐在你叔叔旁边六个小时，而我本可以读一本书或做其他我真正想做的事情。我可以说，这是我做过的最好的决定之一。但是这很难。特别是在开始的时候，现在我很幸运，别人不再问我了。但是对别人这样坦诚是很难的。

But you're right, mine is you don't have to say because I had to go to another event. You don't have to remember what an event was whenever you speak to a friend. I think candor, candor in that situation, you'll be surprised. And you've probably already seen that that your friends and relatives really appreciate you for the candor. And they'll understand, you know, my take on weddings are painfully boring. You know, yes. And I would say the only redeeming grace of weddings is if you get to meet a bunch of long lost, you know, friends and relatives that you've been longing to hang out with, that can be a great upside. But you are also going to meet a lot of dysfunction relatives and hang out with them as well. And that may not be so much fun. Yeah, so I think the candor is will be welcome by everyone.

但是你说得对，我的意思是你不必说出来，因为我必须去参加另一个活动。每次跟朋友交谈时，你不必记得过去的活动是什么。我觉得真诚，特别是在那种情况下，会让你惊讶。而且你可能已经注意到，你的朋友和亲戚真的很欣赏你的坦白。他们会理解，你知道，我对婚礼的看法是无聊得让人痛苦的。是的。我会说，婚礼唯一可取之处就是如果你能遇到一群久未见面的朋友和亲戚，那可以是一个巨大的优势。但你也会遇到很多有问题的亲戚和他们一起出席。这可能并不那么有趣。所以，我认为大家都会欢迎坦率的态度。

So on that note, I wanted to ask the last question I have here for today. And because another of the challenges sort of like related to this, this idea about living truthfully, living with the candor, my wife and I have a we have a hard time talking about money in some settings with with other people because like what we talked about before, you don't want to hurt anyone's feelings, right? You invite people, you don't want to see not to hurt their feelings and they come not to hurt your feelings. It's sort of like there's this there's this irony in it. But but anyways, well, I've not come from this middle class background and we just don't talk about money. And I think and I think most most people don't talk about money. It might be a little different from some of the circles that we run in minus where it's sort of like the center, but but in most social situations, we don't talk too much about money, especially if you have significantly less or significantly more money than your peers.

在这个问题上，我想问今天我所拥有的最后一个问题。由于另一个挑战与之相关，即真实生活，坦诚相对，我和妻子在某些场合与别人谈论金钱时有困难，就像我们之前讨论的那样，你不想伤害任何人的感情，对吧？你邀请别人来，不是为了伤害他们的感情，他们来也不是为了伤害你的感情。这有点具有讽刺意味。但无论如何，我并不来自中产阶级背景，我们不谈论金钱。而且我认为大多数人都不谈论金钱。这可能与我们所处的一些圈子有所不同，那里是核心，但在大多数社交场合中，我们不会过多地谈论金钱，尤其是如果你的财富显著少于或显著多于你的同龄人。

Now you've been very open about your background having a father that was a Syrian entrepreneur, many failed businesses behind him. And I think you you referenced this as a lot of fees to famine over the years. How has your journey to becoming financial and independent and the success you have today? How has that changed that your relationships with the people you knew before and after you got financial independent? Yeah, so actually what what I have found is that, you know, your remarks about people don't like to talk about money. I think that is universal across cultures. You know, guy always gets a chuckle because many times he and I will be in a conversation with someone who's having has some important issues, folk in the road, trying to figure out what to do.

现在您非常坦率地谈到自己的背景，您的父亲是叙利亚企业家，他曾经经营过许多失败的生意。我认为您提到这些年来经历的许多困苦和饥荒。您追求财务独立和今天的成功这段旅程对您与之前和之后认识的人的关系有何改变？是的，实际上我发现，您对于人们不喜欢谈论金钱的言论，我认为这种情况在各个文化中都普遍存在。在我们进行重要问题讨论时，我经常与一些人交谈，他们正面临一些重要的抉择，试图弄清楚该怎么办，这经常引发一阵笑声。

You know, I'll be asking a bunch of questions to try to get the data to try to help the person. And one of the first questions will go to really understand in detail the financial situation, you know, what's the net worth? What's the income? What's the expense and all that? And guy always kind of goes into a cubby hole. He says, oh, there we go again, Monish asking all these uncomfortable questions. You know, and what he's he's he's now learned that Monish is going to ask those questions. OK, and and what I find surprising is the people who hear those questions, who have never answered those questions to anyone, openly give the answer. And then they say, I want to let you know, I have never discussed this with anyone. No one knows this. Please don't. I said it's all confidential. I'm not going to be able to talk about it to anybody. But people actually get relieved to be able to share the data.

你知道，我将会提出一系列问题，试图获取数据来帮助这个人。而其中的第一个问题将会是详细了解财务状况，你知道，净资产是多少？收入是多少？开支是多少？等等。然后那个人总是会陷入一种困扰的状态。他会说，“噢，莫尼什又开始问这些让人不舒服的问题了。”你知道，他已经了解到莫尼什会问这些问题。好吧，我发现令人惊讶的是，那些从未向任何人回答过这些问题的人，会毫不保留地回答。然后他们会说，“我想告诉你，我从未与任何人讨论过这个。没有人知道这些。请不要说出去。我保证这是机密的，我无法和任何人谈论它。”但事实上，人们会因为能够分享这些数据而感到宽慰。

I recently had a call with a friend who wanted advice, career advice, you know, he's at an age where he could retire or he could take job A or job B or whatever. And one of the first things I asked him is I needed to know his financial situation before I could tell him what made sense for him. You know, and so he shared his information that he's never shared with anyone, you know, rather than his wife had never talked about it. I don't think his kids are aware of it. But that gave me the information to be able to be most helpful to him. And also, I think he felt relieved that he was not having a conversation around eggshells, you know, where I'm in a vacuum trying to say, well, if this is your situation, then do this. I actually knew exactly what a situation was and I could tell him what I would do in that situation. So yeah, I mean, I think I think people don't like to talk about money, but many times when they're confronting different issues, those conversations can be very enlightened a load for them. And I think it's important that in a safe and confidential environment with the people near you when you're trying to help them with some things where that information will be relevant, that go there, you go to the land you're not supposed to go to. That's OK.

最近我和一位朋友进行了一次电话，他想要一些建议，关于职业规划的建议，你知道的，他处于一个可以退休或选择A工作或B工作等选项的年龄阶段。而我最先问他的一件事是，我需要了解他的财务状况，然后才能给他提出有意义的建议。你知道的，他向我透露了他从未与任何人分享过的信息，他的妻子也从未谈论过，我想他的孩子们也不知道。但这让我能够为他提供最有帮助的信息。而且，我认为他感到了一种解脱，因为他不需要在一个充满压力的环境中进行对话，我在一个孤立的状态下试图告诉他，如果是这种情况，你应该做什么。我实际上知道他的具体情况，可以告诉他如果是我，在那种情况下会怎么做。所以，是的，我认为人们不喜欢谈论金钱，但有时当他们面对不同问题时，这些对话对他们来说是非常启发性的，也是一种减轻负担的方式。我认为在一个安全和保密的环境中，与身边的人一起处理一些关于相关信息的帮助时，去接触那些应该去的领域是非常重要的。这是可以接受的。

Wonderful. And perhaps you should end on that note. Thank you so much for your time. It's always a pleasure having this annual call here in April, just before the fall, Brooks. Yeah. So I just want to say, say, thank you on behalf of all our listeners. Stig, I always enjoy hanging out with you. And it was a wonderful leisure for me to have you join as an investor. So that added another dimension to our relationship. That's wonderful. Though I still feel you've kept the objectivity, which is great. Yeah, so I do enjoy hanging out with you. And I also want to say that you and Preston are doing God's work. I enjoy your podcast a lot. I listen to many of your guests. And I think you've done a tremendous service to the community with the podcast. So thank you for that. Wow. I don't think we can end on any better note. So I just want to humbly say, thank you.

太棒了，也许你应该以此结束。非常感谢你抽出时间。每年四月份，秋季即将来临之前，能与你进行这次年度通话真是一种愉悦，布鲁克斯。是的，所以我只想代表我们所有的听众说声谢谢。斯蒂格，我总是喜欢与你们相处。对我来说，能有你作为一名投资者加入，真是一种愉悦，这为我们的关系增添了另一层面。太棒了。虽然我仍然觉得你保持了客观性，这真是太好了。是的，所以我喜欢与你一起相处。我还想说，你和普雷斯顿是在做上帝的工作。我很喜欢你们的播客。我听过你们很多嘉宾的节目，我认为你们通过播客为社区做出了巨大的贡献。所以感谢你们。哇。我觉得我们不可能有更好的结尾了。所以我只想虚心地说声谢谢。

I managed that it means a lot. Berkshire, in my work, grew their economic earning power by about $7 billion last year. Now the stock was up 4%, book value and book value per share were down. They bought back 1.2% of the stock, but it was a year of capital allocation. The 92 year old that sits there in Omaha is still at the top of his game. Widely criticized for maybe overstaying is welcome. He's got cukes that think that we ought to separate the chairman role from the CEO role, which they're going to do when he's gone. But you know, the voting control rests with Mr. Buffett.

我成功地做到了，这有很重要的意义。伯克希尔（Berkshire）在我的工作中，去年他们经济收益能力增加了约70亿美元。现在股票上涨了4%，账面价值和每股账面价值下降了。他们回购了1.2%的股票，但这是一个资本配置的年份。那位92岁的坐在奥马哈那里的人仍然处于巅峰状态。他被广泛批评可能过度留任。有人认为我们应该分离董事长和首席执行官的职位，当他离开的时候他们会这样做。但是你知道，选举控制权在巴菲特先生手中。