So first off, please join me in welcoming Ray Dalio to the stage. Wow! Yeah! Ray Dalio! Thank you. Oh my god, real legit. Thank you, guys. You got Ray Dalio! Thank you. You got Ray Dalio! You let your winner ride. Brainman David Satt. And it said we open-source it to the fans and they've just got crazy. I don't know how we got you to the stage. It must have been the fact that I just said your name 400 times last year.
This guy's written the book. But I will say you were by far my top choice as a guest to have at the all-in-sum of 2023, which I took advantage of because I got to produce it this year. You guys have heard me talk about Ray's book, Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order, Why Nations Succeed and Fail on the Pod a lot. And I think it really encapsulates so well why we are observing a lot of the social, economic, and political shifts that are underway in the US and around the world today. Increasing civil unrest, divisive politics, our desire for external conflict, inflation, budget, and debt problems, etc. they've all played out before as nations have risen and fallen. Jason likes to make fun of the term declineists but I think it's more broader than that which is what is the cycle that happens with social systems that we call nation states over time.
Ray's book was my content pick of the year in 2021 and I first learned about Ray when he published Principles as a PDF in 2011. You put that out for free on the internet. Thank you. I'm a document you use at Bridgewater and I don't know if anyone else downloaded it and read it but I was a young CEO in 2011. I read that PDF and it made a big impact on me and how I thought about management, prioritization, decision making, and myself.
As a kid growing up in Nassau, New York, Nassau County, New York, Ray earned money, mowing lawns, shoveling snow, delivering newspapers and caddying for Wall Street tycoons. He later got a summer job with a Wall Street trader that he caddied for and ended up starting at Bridgewater two years after he got his MBA at Harvard in 1973. Make sure I get that right. By 2013, Bridgewater was the largest hedge fund in the world today managing well over a hundred billion dollars in assets. Ray spends much of his time sharing his analyses and thoughts today and his viewpoints openly and freely and for that we appreciate him and thank him and excited for welcoming here today.
So Ray, maybe you could just very briefly kind of summarize the cycle that you highlight in your book that I mentioned and the five great kind of drivers that you've observed and tell us a little bit about the simple kind of macro picture. I know you've got something you could share on it as well. Yeah, sure. First, I should explain that experience I had of learning that many of the things that surprised me, surprised me because they didn't happen in my lifetime before but they happened many times in history. The first time I was clerking on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange in 1971 and the United States mix and defaulted on the promise to deliver gold for money because they didn't have enough money, real money gold and it went down. I went on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange expecting a big down. It went up a lot. That's because I never had a devaluation at the half of that. I found that in March 1933, the exact same thing happened with Roosevelt on the radio. Same thing. So then I studied the 30s. What happened in 1938 in terms of the depression leading to the wars and so on and the interest rates hitting zero is the exact same thing that happened in 2008 and was because I studied that that we were able to make a lot of money in the 2008 financial crisis.
So three things started to happen in my lifetime, our lifetimes that never happened before and I needed therefore to study them in history. The first is the amount of debt and money creation. Huge amounts of debt and money creation. Does that matter? What does the rise and decline of reserve currency? How does that all work? I needed to see the cycles for that.
The second was the amount of internal political conflict in particular, populism of the left and populism of the right and a populist is a person who will not accept losing. They fought with their contingency and that dysfunction and that lack of willingness to lose then had January 6th came out after the book and there's a dynamic that we're going on for that.
And the third of course is the great power conflict. In other words, the rise of a comparable economic and military power in the form of China rising and competing with the United States which is also changing that world order. Those three things never happened in my lifetime but are big things that are affecting things. When I went back in history, I said I needed to study how these things work. Sometimes we overlooked the really big things. So I went back and I studied that and I saw that there were two others that had enormous impact. The two others were acts of nature in particular drought, floods and pandemics and they killed more people and they toppled more empires and changed more world orders than anything. And certainly big issue now.
And then number five is technological changes and how they evolve. So I needed to study those five forces. I saw that there's the cycle that repeats over for good cause effect relationships. I don't believe in a cycle just because it repeats. I started to understand the cause effect relationships. I have a clip here if I can show you just four minutes, just a brief summary of the cycle.
Can you hit it with the clip? I studied the ten most powerful empires over the last 500 years and the last three reserve currencies, it took me through the rise and decline of the Dutch Empire and the Gilder, the British Empire and the Pound, the rise and early decline in the United States Empire and the dollar and the decline and rise of the Chinese Empire and its currencies, as well as the rise and decline of the Spanish, German, French, Indian, Japanese, Russian and Ottoman empires, along with their significant conflicts as measured in this chart.
To understand China's patterns better, I also studied the rise and fall of Chinese dynasties and their monies back to the year 600. Because looking at all these measures at once can be confusing, I'll focus on the four most important ones, the Dutch, British, US and Chinese. I'll quickly notice the pattern. Now let's simplify the form of it.
As you can see, they transpired in overlapping cycles that lasted about 250 years, with 10 to 20 year transition periods between them. Typically these transitions have been periods of great conflict because leading powers don't decline without a fight. So how am I measuring an empire's power? In this study, I used eight metrics. Each country's measure of total power is derived by averaging them together. They are education, inventiveness and technology development, competitiveness in global markets, economic output, share of world trade, military strength, the power of their financial center for capital markets and the strength of their currency as a reserve currency.
Because these powers are measurable, we can see how strong each country is now, was in the past and whether they're rising or declining. By examining the sequences from many countries, we can see how a typical cycle transpires. And because the Wiggles can be confusing, we can simplify it a bit to focus on the pattern of cause-effect relationships that drive the rise and decline of a typical empire. As you can see, better education typically leads to increased innovation and technology development and with a lag the establishment of the currency as a reserve currency. You can also see that these forces then declined in a similar order reinforcing each other's decline.
Let's now look at the typical sequence of events going on inside a country that produces these rises and declines. In a nutshell, the big cycle typically begins after a major conflict, often a war, establishes the new leading power and the new world order. Just no one wants to challenge this power, a period of peace and prosperity typically follows. As people get used to this peace and prosperity, they increasingly bet on it continuing. They borrow money to do that, which eventually leads to a financial bubble. The empire's share of trade grows and when most transactions are conducted in its currency, it becomes a reserve currency, which leads to even more money.
At the same time, this increased prosperity distributes wealth unevenly, so the wealth gap typically grows between the rich haves and the poor have nots. Eventually, the financial bubble bursts, which leads to the printing of money, an increased internal conflict between the rich and the poor, which leads to some form of revolution to redistribute wealth. This can happen peacefully or as a civil war.
While the empire struggles with this internal conflict, its power diminishes relative to external rival powers on the rise. When a new rising power gets strong enough to compete with the dominant power that is having domestic breakdowns, external conflicts, most typically wars take place. For these internal and external wars come new winners and losers. Then, the winners get together to create the new world order. And the cycle begins again.
The book is amazing and the amount of work you put into this is extraordinary and it's just really great intellectually.
这本书太棒了,你付出的努力令人惊叹,它在智力上真的非常出色。
I'm curious when we look at those four groups. Since you wrote the book, China, I think we all agree, has changed significantly. Perhaps I think best described maybe being in decline in many ways, disconnecting from the West. It's also, I believe, when you look at the countries you studied, perhaps one of the only modern authoritarian countries to perhaps have an ability to take the crown if they were to continue.
So, two-part question, how does everything you've learned and studied impact your thinking when one person, an authoritarian Xi Jinping is running China and disconnecting it from the rest of the world in terms of their ability? Then do you consider this, if they did succeed in becoming the dominant power in the world, what do you think that does for humanity? There are a bunch of questions in there. I'll try to remember them and take them once at a time.
I think China is going to be a big power for the foreseeable future. I think the basic picture in China, the United States, the emergence of India and so on, is when the world order is going to change in a very profound way. We can't say who's going to be the winner and the loser of this game, but I think we do know that this conflict is going to be with us and it's totally changing the world order.
When you're asking who's going to be the winner of this game, I'll tell you history. In the history of democracy, as Plato described in the Republic, there's a cycle and one of the great vulnerabilities of democracies is the disorderliness, the anarchy that comes from the conflict. You're asking me to compare democracy and also what I'll call capitalism with authoritarianism. Let's call it communism, that version of it. Or quasi-capitalism maybe. We know what we mean. Okay.
So, the risk of capitalism is when you have the wealth gap clash and the opportunity gap clash. That produces a risk for democracy. The 30s, four major democracies because of that dynamic, chose to be their parliament, chose to be autocracies. That happened in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Japan. So the risk, both have risks. I came from, and I've been, we've all been blessed with this amazing environment, that unequal opportunity, the ability to be creative, rule of law, civility. But if we risk those things in both of those, then we have a great risk.
So on this war, I think it depends more on how we are with our circumstances to be strong and capable and relative to them. It's certainly going to be a test of the systems. Yeah. So in a way, us focusing inward on what we do here in America with our democracy and making it high function is as important as managing our relationship with China.
And if you were to look at China and India, and those two countries specifically, and you were to handicap them as you are uniquely qualified to do, maybe you could just broadly handicap India versus China for us. Because this is a topic we've been talking about, Chamath and I, and the other besties on the show a whole bunch. And it's now the largest population in the world, I guess people don't realize that, that they've, and they're continuing to grow and the birth rate is in decline in China. So maybe a little bit on India and how you look at it. Yeah.
And I should emphasize that every conclusion that I have is a function of measuring statistics and having them as leading indicators. And we have 10-year growth rate estimates for China. Excuse me, India. I'm all the countries, top 22 countries. And you could see it online if you want country by country. And the reasons for it. India has the highest potential growth rate. I think India is where China was when I started to go, I started to go in 1984. So if you look at the complexion, the per capita income, and I think Modi is a Deng Xiaoping. So that you have a massive reform development, creativity, all those elements. There are, of course, issues, risk issues. But India is very, very important. Now, of course, there's a religious internal issue having to do with the population. Has 240 million Muslims. And I don't think that any of these issues is going to stop India. I also, in history, the countries that were the neutral countries did the best. So in other words, better than the winners in wars. So as we have this conflict between the United States and China and its allies, Russia and so on, as we see that line up, countries that are in the middle, like India, are going to be net beneficiaries of that. So at least, again, there's, so there are two big epicenters where things are happening fast and quick and getting better. One of them is, well, let's say three. There's the ASEAN countries, and we can say that Singapore, essentially, is a hub, but the ASEAN countries, which is Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, and all of that, that's going to be a great area. The Middle East, in terms of particularly the Gulf countries. The amount of money and they're making talent magnets, they're attracting people, that's you look at how the change in wealth is taking place. That's certainly it. And India.
Ray, can I just ask back on China, you know Chinese leadership, you've spoken and had relations there for many years. Can you share with us your point of view on how they think about their position in the world and how you understand their intentions? Yes. I'll give you my thoughts. I'm not making judgments, I'm just passing along. They think there are two different systems, two different approaches. They would think that an autocratic system, they used to have a committee that would make it, but they would say it would be very much like a company. If you had a company, you have a board, you have the executive committee, and so on and so forth, and make sure you get the leadership. And then they would say that the world should have a competition and that throughout history, there are these competitions in all the various ways we talk about, and there's an emergence of that, and that there's an inevitability, and I think we say that there's an inevitability for a conflict, because there's a containment, and then there's a desire to expand, and it's like almost keeping a lid on a boiling pot, that's the type of situation. I can go on at length about the particulars of their thing. They have a very good historical perspective because their history has been literally 5,000 years, like we think of ours. They remember the particulars and all the leaders study that, and there is a cycle that they're very conscious about. So for example, the big risk that they believe is instability. So she says that the big storm on the horizon, he keeps referring to the big storm on the horizon, and that relates to the conflict with in the world that we're talking about, but it also relates to the fact that they've got a debt problem, they have a debt restructuring problem, and their instinct through history, the learning of history, is that during such periods of time, internal conflict is a big threat, and therefore autocracy, strong controls are the things to have.
Okay, now we can explore the relative merits of that internal conflict and so on, but that's basically their perspective. One of the things that I'm struck by is if you look in the past, a lot of these conflicts were started because it's about commerce or some form of capital or some critical resource, and then it just kind of like escalates and then you have these like large retransformations and reallocations of power. But in a world where we are now sort of almost on the precipice closer than we've ever been to this sort of form of abundance, whether it's quasi-costless energy, whether it's food that's available to be printed or made or what have you, what do we fight over in this next great conflict? What is worth fighting over?
Okay, so let me first deal with the productivity thing. Throughout history, productivity's been the greatest, and so if you take the 20s, we had the productivity, most engines, most patents and so on, in the 20s. You also had a debt problem, and you also had a wealth gap problem. So I believe that in terms of the new technology, we're going to really see new technologies. Now, they can be used for weapons or they can be used for productivity, but we're going to have to have a reorganization of how are we going to redistribute the wealth and opportunities and so on.
So if we come back, I think we just have to look at what are we fighting for now? What's going on? And I think that of course there's a fight over money. If you have a downturn, if you have a debt problem, and I think there's good reason to believe we will, we can get into that in a minute, but they fight over money and they fight over differences in values. In other words, the differences in values like how do you educate your children? What is transgender issues and education issues and those types of things? And so I think you're seeing those things to fight over. You're seeing plenty to fight over.
And let's say we don't fight. Let's pray we don't fight. We need this to come together. But let's say we don't fight. You're still going to have to deal with how do you redistribute not only money, but how do you redistribute opportunities? And that's going to take figuring it out, right? And there's going to be an argument over how they do that.
No, I think this is really interesting because I think you're saying if you don't fight over the historic area of battlefields, right, if we're not fighting over resources, we are going to fight over social issues or social constructs or social beliefs. So I can say- But I'm also saying you're going to fight over resources. We have debt and we're operating as though it doesn't matter and we'll continue to have the pile. If you look at history, and we can get into why it is, it is not that that goes on a while. And you can't continue to increase your living standards by borrowing more than you're spending. You can't keep accumulating your debt because it has to matter.
So these types of things as they build up, as the debt builds up, as the wealth gaps builds up, and the values gaps build up, and then there's difference in reaction to controls. Some people- so you see the movement. We will have things to fight over at the same time as we hopefully will have a productivity miracle.
I think that in the next five years, I think year by year, we're going to go through a time warp. You're going to see radical disorder in the next five years as each one of those things comes to path. First with the elections as we have, then we have the conflict with the geopolitical conflict. Then we have the climate issue, which by the way is a very expensive issue. We should talk about how costly that issue is. And then we're going to have this issue of technology which can provide the greatest miracle, but also is a weapon.
Just frame for us your thoughts on debt for a second. How do you think about debt as an absolute construct or a relative construct, especially sovereign debt? There is a US debt, but then there are also every other 182 countries who have a ton of debt. So how do you think about debt to GDP relatively and in absolute terms? For any country, and quite often, many countries, because they go through the cycle together as they did in the 30s, what happens is debt rides as relative to incomes. And what that means mechanistically is that debt service payments rise relative to incomes. And so it squeezes out consumption as this compounds. And what happens is there's a realization that they have to print money. So I think you're going to see in the next downturn another move to print money.
There are certain things that are going on now that means that the big risk comes when they don't want to hold those bonds anymore. Because the supply demand, think about that supply demand, it has a deficit, it has to borrow. And so it sells its bonds. Who were the buyers of the bonds? Why did they buy? The buyers of the bonds buy because there's an attractive return. Not only do you have to sell those amounts of bonds, but when they start to realize that I'm not getting good returns on those bonds, they can sell those bonds.
There are 31 trillion dollars of bonds. They always own tangible things. And those things can also be, it could be equities. It could be other many other things. It could be gold. Gold has always been accepted as a money because nobody else is saying gold is the only asset you can have that. Not somebody else's liability. In other words, you're dependent on getting paid. You can have that intrinsic value and for a long period of time it's been valued and you can move it between countries.
But also, different countries prosper. So you'll see the countries, some of the countries that we mentioned, they will prosper through that. And the United States made most of its money because it didn't end to the war. It was before, on World War II and World War I, the United States became the richest country because of the money it made before it entered the war. So those countries will prosper and in those countries, then certain real estate will prompt hard assets. But where you have that is very, very important.
There's something about wealth inequality that they just wanted to get your thoughts on as well. I saw a chart in The Economist recently that showed on a purchasing price parity basis, normalized across all the Western countries that US median income, so median. So not thinking about means is now $45, almost $47,000 doing much better than Britain, most of continental Europe, et cetera, et cetera. So on a functional purchasing power parity basis, a lot of Americans are doing much, much better. There was a UPS renegotiation for their labor contracts. Drivers can now make 180 grand a year. I mean, there's a lot of money to be made, but then there's this real but also hyper perceived imbalance.
And I just want to get your sense of how much of this is the social media phenomenon of just never having enough? And how much of it is true when you look at data like that? There's a huge wealth gap. And the nature of our economy is producing this so I can rattle up a bunch of statistics. What happens as happens in these cycles is that when you have the type of situation we have, the government will take on the debt and it'll send out the money. So the mechanics of that were that there was more checks and more money sent than there was loss of income by a lot. So a lot of money went out. And as a result of that, the financial conditions of the household sector improved, generally speaking, while the financial conditions of the government sector, the government got into a lot more debt. That's very classic at the end of the cycle.
Because there's an imbalance between demand and purchases of bonds, there is the central bank buying those bonds, that monetization. Okay, so now that's what the wealth gap looks like. And also that also creates more of the inflation because the household sector buying large benefits. But when you look at the differences, I'll tell you a personal case so that I can understand. I live in Connecticut and Connecticut's usually one, two, or three in the richest states in the country. Twenty-two percent of the high school students in Connecticut either have dropped out of high school or are failing classes with absentee rates of greater than 25%. The $600 million a year goes to incarcerations. There is a level below which no human beings should be allowed to let alone raising kids and families.
I live in Greenwich, Connecticut, a wealthy place. My number won't be up to date, maybe five years old. Per capita students in high school, costs would be 24,000 a person. In Bridgeport, Connecticut, up the road, $14,000 a person. There were 60,000 kids in Connecticut that didn't have computers. How were they going to get education? The state wasn't going to pay for it. We philanthropically bought them. So now we don't create a bottom, an acceptable bottom. The idea of equal opportunity, I mean I was blessed with it. I think we probably won't. We're blessed with equal opportunity. All you need is parents will take care of you. Go to a public school, come out to a world of equal opportunity and learn civility. If you have those things. So if you take all those measures and so on, the gaps in those things are greater than they have ever been. Right.
So Ray, I think I'd funnily agree with your critique that America is looking more and more like a late stage empire. Like a late stage Roman Empire, we have this massive debt and we're debasing our currency. Like the Roman Empire, we have all these far flung military wars which we lose all over the world. We're racked by internal division. So I think I agree with that part of it. At the same time, we do seem to be really good still at technological innovation. In the last year we've had this breakthrough with AI with large language models. I'm wondering, is that a mirage or do you agree with that? And then if you do agree that we're still really good at technology, is there anything in the historical pattern that's like that where you have an empire that's declining in every visible way except for the one that really undergirds our power which is technology?
Well, the late 20s in the United States was such a classic example. We had more innovations, more technology, all of these cycles. If I was to go back to the industrial revolution, late 1800s, and then you turn, men, you create it when there's a lot of debt and a big wealth gap. You have the 1907, you have the panic of 1907. Boom, you have this internal conflict and you had the First World War.
In the 20s you had the same kind of late 20s. It was an era of great inventiveness. The other things matter. So just because we're really great innovation isn't going to save us if all these other things are broken. It's a wonderful thing. But ultimately we as a society and an aggregate are spending a lot more money than we're earning. So if we're doing such a good job on that technology, whatever it is, why is that happening?
We're still, so now when you look at the debt, do you want to own the debt? Do you want to own that? When those who don't want to own it, then you have a financial problem. When you have a financial problem at the same time as you have a wealth gap and populism, that's a dangerous combination. At the same time as you have an external. So it's a very risky, you know, with you.
Let me just follow up there. So you mentioned populism. I mean, I think I have a slightly different definition. I don't want to debate semantics with you. I think populism is a reaction to the failure of elite. So all the people managing our fiscal situation and our foreign policy who've gotten us into all these industry conflicts who've debased our currency, I see populism as people rising up to reject their leadership. Now it's a bad thing that they're not willing to accept the results of elections. I agree with your definition. Okay. I agree with your definition.
But then also at the same time that that's happening, they'll win it or cost. They won't compromise. They will win. They will fight for that so I didn't win. Okay, fair enough. And that's not good. But I mean, I guess my question is why don't you have more criticism for our elites who are running all these institutions who are making these decisions?
I do. I mean, it depends what you're. I wrote a piece about four years ago which says why and how capitalism needs to be reformed. And I believe that on these issues of equal opportunity and that we've got a big structural problem and that everything needs to be reformed. I'm not against capitalism but it needs to be reformed. And part of the big problem just analytically, mechanically is that the profit system alone does not direct resources adequately. Let's say if we take climate, for example. There are costs, terrible costs that come from climate.
It's not built into the system education. Look at the gaps in education. The structural system means that the central government, the state government controls education. Then you get to the town and at the town level, it's the town that controls the education, how much they pay. And so then you create wealth gaps with rich people being able to take care of their kids in a way that other people can't take care of their kids. And that creates an opportunity gap. That's a structural problem. It has to be taken on full, looked at, reformed, and in order to pull this thing off, we have to do it together. We cannot do it with one side fighting the other side where there are reconcilable differences.
Right. Before we run out of time, I'm wondering what an amazing conversation. If we were to get prescriptive here in the last couple of minutes we have, if America wants to continue to be the leader or at least in the lead position here in the free world, what should we focus on? What would you say are the top three biggest?
Let me add one question to that. Yeah. It connects these two. Is there a political solution in the US to avoid the end of empire? Or is it a function of physics? And I think this is a big part of like Sax's point of view that there's a solution we need to change these people, or are there too many conflating forces, social forces, economic forces that all kind of rise and fall together that progress? It's inevitable. And it becomes an inevitability that there's a cycling.
There are pre-existing conditions that represent challenges. So for example, the amount of debt that we're in represents a, you can't pretend it exists. So it represents a challenge. There are a lot of these challenges, but it is not inevitable.
What is needed is first of all, a strong middle, okay, to bring the country together in terms of rather than to have this fighting. Because if we continue the way we will, we're going to have a conflict. And then there needs to be a good engineering exercise that's going to produce, but has to be bipartisan. It has to be bipartisan with that strong middle, taking control of the extremes, because neither side is going to win.
A great reformation. So and that reformation has, I think should take the form of like if I was president of the United States, what I would do is I'd have to- It's on the table by the- By-partisan cabinet. I'm not, I'm not going to present it. But a bipartisan cabinet, bipartisan cabinet. And then have an engineering exercise, much like the Manhattan Project, in which those bipartisan people get together and properly engineer important changes that need to be made. They have to be structural.
We will not agree with each other ever. We're going to kill each other, fighting over these things. So structural changes have to be made, and you need to have the countries a whole do those things. Do you guys think that's naive or is it feasible?
I think that the way politics works is that you don't somehow come together in the middle. I think one side has to win in the eyes of voters. Voters have to choose a path. And that's- I'm with you. That's what's going to happen. We've had- We're going to have an interesting two years. We're going to have a different path between where we are now and, let's say, almost a few years. And let's say early 2025. Okay.
And not just interesting because we're going to have unbelievable elections and we'll see whether- how power- how we can come together. We're going to have an interesting on how China-US relations are. We're going to have an interesting financial conflict. And we're going to have radical technology changes. Plus climate's going to be an issue. So- Right. You've- Mr. Dahlio.
Right. You've accomplished more than anybody could ever expect in life financially with your company. And intellectually, obviously, you've given this tremendous amount of thought. And you said you're not running for president. I wonder, there's not much time left. You should maybe consider running for president. And why not do it? Why not? Why- what's the argument to be so successful, so rich, so intellectually curious, and not do what the country needs you to do? Just get in the arena. We need you, Mr. Dahlio. Get in the arena. Who wants him in the arena? Let's go. Right. Thank you, Alme.
This is the same speech- Very complicated. Very complicated. Very nice and generous compliment. Thank you very much. Seriously, I have a personal level. Take me through it. Well, okay. Mario, drop up. I would give up my life for the country. Okay. But Mario Draghi in Italy, if you know the story, he knows the system and how it works. And that if you don't have unitedness and operating in that way, everybody's going to be torn apart. And so I think whatever thoughts I have, if these are helpful thoughts, I think my best role is to pass along whatever helpful thoughts I have. And then the population as a whole deals with those thoughts. So I'm making my best contribution that I can, I feel. That's my best capacity. And then let's up to the people.
You're so vibrant. People, please join me in thanking Rondolio for its contributions. Amazing. Give it up. That was incredible. Thank you for following our questions. Incredible. Wow. Look at that. Standing out. First standing on the page of all these designs. I'm going on a year. Let your winner ride. Brainman David Sattice.
And it's said we open source it to the fans and they've just gone for easy. I'm going on a year. What, what, everyone are trying. Besties are all comfort. Let's play a dog. Take it in. Wish you a drive. Wait a minute. Oh man. My half a day has your old media voice. We should all just get a room and just have one thank you George because they're all like this like sexual tension that we just need to release and out. What, you're the beat. What, you're the beat. What, you're the beat. What, you're the beat. What, we need to get merges. Besties are back. I'm going on a year. I'm going on a year. I'm going on a year.