Chinese Economy Braces for a Crash as US Recession Risk Rises - YouTube
发布时间 2023-09-03 16:00:00 来源
Hey everyone, welcome to On the Market. I'm your host Dave Meyer. Today we have an incredible guest for you. We have Anna Wong joining us. Anna is the chief US economist for Bloomberg, which if you're unfamiliar, is an enormous media company that covers investing and economics throughout the world. Prior to that, Anna was the principal economist at the Federal Reserve Board. She was the chief international economist at the White House Council of Economic Advisors, and she's done incredible things all over the world of economics. If you are one of those people who listen to the show because you are nerdy and wonky and really like understanding what is going on, not just in the US economy, but in the global economy, you are definitely going to want to listen to this episode.
大家好，欢迎来到《On the Market》。我是你们的主持人戴夫·迈耶。今天我们有一个令人难以置信的嘉宾。安娜·王将加入我们。安娜是彭博社的首席美国经济学家，如果你不熟悉的话，这是一家覆盖全球投资和经济领域的大型媒体公司。在此之前，安娜是美联储委员会的首席经济学家，她曾是白宫经济顾问委员会的首席国际经济学家，并在经济领域做了非凡的工作。如果你是那种因为对美国经济和全球经济的了解而收听这个节目的人，你一定会想要听这一集。
I will say that Anna is extremely intelligent and she gets into some complicated, well, not complicated, just more advanced economic topic. So just a caveat there, but she does a very good job explaining everything that she's thinking about and talking about. So if you want to learn and get better and better understand the global economy, I think you're going to really, really appreciate this show.
我要说安娜非常聪明，她涉及一些复杂的，嗯，并不复杂，只是更高级的经济话题。所以提前告诫一下，但她非常擅长解释她所思考和谈论的一切。所以如果你想学习、进步和更好地理解全球经济，我想你会非常非常喜欢这个节目。
Just as a preview of what we talk about, we start basically just talking about the differences between a soft and hard landing. If you haven't heard those terms, basically when the Fed is going out there and talking about risk of recession, they think that there's going to be a quote, soft landing, which means that will either avoid a recession or perhaps there'll be a very, very mild recession. On the other hand, a hard landing would be a more severe, more sort of average type of recession where there's significant job losses, declines in GDP, that kind of thing.
作为我们所讨论的一个预览，我们首先要谈论的基本上是软着陆和硬着陆之间的区别。如果你没听说过这些术语，基本上是指当联邦储备系统（Fed）在讨论衰退风险时，他们认为可能会出现软着陆，这意味着要么避免衰退，要么可能会有一个非常非常轻微的衰退。另一方面，硬着陆将会是一个更严重、更平均类型的衰退，其中会出现显著的失业和GDP下降等情况。
So we started the conversation there, Anna, who has worked at the Fed and at the White House, has some really interesting thoughts and some very specific ideas about what's going to tilt the economy one way or another. And then after our discussion of the US economy, I couldn't resist. I did have to ask her about the Chinese economy because we've been hearing for years about how real estate in China is dragging down their economy and just in the middle of August, over the last couple of days, we've heard some increasingly concerning news about the Chinese economy.
所以我们在那里开始了谈话，安娜曾在美联储和白宫工作，她对经济的倾向有一些非常有趣的思考和一些非常具体的想法。然后在我们讨论了美国经济之后，我忍不住问她关于中国经济的情况，因为多年来我们一直听说中国的房地产市场拖累了他们的经济。而在八月中旬的最近几天，我们听到了一些越来越令人担忧的关于中国经济的新闻。
What's going on there? Actually, just yesterday, the Chinese government announced they were no longer going to release certain data sets because it really just wasn't looking very good. And Anna has studied the Chinese economy for decades. And so she has a lot of really interesting thoughts on what's going on in China and how it could potentially spill over into the US economy. And specifically, honestly, a little bit into the real estate industry.
那边发生了什么？实际上，就在昨天，中国政府宣布他们将不再发布某些数据集，因为情况看起来并不太好。而安娜已经研究中国经济几十年了，所以她对中国正在发生的事情以及对美国经济可能产生的影响有很多有趣的见解。特别是对于房地产行业，她也有一些真实的想法。
So that's what we got for you today. I hope you guys enjoy it. We're going to take a quick break and then we'll bring on Anna Wong, the chief economist for Bloomberg LP.
所以，这就是我们今天为您准备的内容。希望大家喜欢。我们将稍作休息，然后请来Anna Wong，即彭博有限合伙人的首席经济学家。
Anna Wong, welcome to On the Market. Thank you for being here. Happy to be here, Dave. Can you start by telling our audience a little bit about yourself and how you got into economics?
安娜·王，欢迎来到《市场观察》。非常感谢您的到来。很高兴能在这里。德夫，请您先向我们的听众简要介绍一下您自己以及是如何走上经济学这条道路的呢？
Right. So I started being very interested in economics because of financial crisis back in early 2000s in college. And after that, I started working in DC for some former senior officials in the IMF and at the Federal Reserve. And in early 2000s, it was a pretty exciting time to study global economics, partly because there was some very interesting phenomenon that was happening, such as the global saving glut and the dollar depreciation and China accumulating in international reserves by purchasing US treasuries. And also predictions that maybe the US housing market was in a bubble and there will be a correction.
没错。所以我在大学时因为早在2000年代的金融危机而对经济学非常感兴趣。在那之后，我开始在华盛顿特区为一些前国际货币基金组织的高级官员和联邦储备系统工作。在2000年代初，是一个非常令人兴奋的时刻去研究全球经济，部分原因是因为发生了一些非常有趣的现象，比如全球储蓄过剩、美元贬值以及中国通过购买美国国债积累国际储备。同时，还有人预测美国房地产市场可能处于泡沫中，将会发生修正。
So when 2008 happened, I was in graduate schools getting my PhD in economics from University of Chicago. After I got my graduate degree, I worked at the US Treasury on the international side of things. And there I had covered G7 countries. I had been through the fiscal cliff in 2013 in the US. And I also covered China in 2015 and 2016. And after treasury, I went to work as a economist in the Federal Reserve Board, where I also covered the Chinese economy. And I did that for a couple of years. And during the trade war, I went to work for a year at the White House Council of Economic Advisors.
所以，当2008年发生时，我正读研究生，在芝加哥大学攻读经济学博士学位。拿到研究生学位后，我在美国财政部工作，负责国际事务。在那里，我涉及了G7国家的经济状况。我经历了2013年美国的财政悬崖，并在2015年和2016年负责中国的经济。财政部之后，我成为一名美国联邦储备委员会的经济学家，继续关注中国经济。我从事了几年的工作。在贸易战期间，我在白宫经济顾问委员会工作了一年。
So every year, the Federal Reserve would send an economist to the White House CEA. That's historically been the case. So I was that economist from 2019 and 2020.
每年，美联储都会派一位经济学家前往白宫的经济顾问委员会（CEA）。历史上一直如此。因此，我就是2019年和2020年的那位经济学家。
And while I was really there to work on trade war, supply chain, resiliency, which actually started before the pandemic began because of the trade war, there was already a lot of concerns about vulnerability of US supply chains. So when the pandemic happened, I was also there to study, to forecast what would happen to the US economy if there were no fiscal stimulus? And what is the appropriate size of the fiscal stimulus? And forecasting the collapse of the US economy in April 2020. And I will never forget that moment. It was very formative. That second part of my tenure at the White House during the pandemic.
当我真正到那里处理贸易战、供应链和韧性等问题时，实际上这些问题在疫情爆发之前就已经开始了，这是由于贸易战的原因，对美国供应链的脆弱性已经引起了很多关注。因此，当疫情发生时，我也在那里研究、预测如果没有财政刺激，美国经济会发生什么？财政刺激的适当规模是多少？我还预测了2020年4月美国经济的崩溃。那一刻我永远不会忘记，对我来说具有很大的意义。这是我在白宫任职期间经历的疫情的第二阶段。
And so that was why I became the chief US economist at Bloomberg, because I thought this is the time to forecast, to study the US economy. Because it is it's a time where if you have a view about where inflation is heading, where GDP growth is heading, this is a very exciting time. Whereas, you know, in the previous 10 years, inflation just fluctuate around 1% to 2.7% just not as not as exciting as on an international side of things. So now as a Bloomberg chief economist, chief US economist, I mainly focus on forecasting where inflation is going, where growth is going, whether there will be a recession and what the Fed funds rate, where it would go. So that's that's my job now.
所以这就是为什么我成为了彭博的首席美国经济学家，因为我认为现在是预测、研究美国经济的时候了。因为现在正是一个令人兴奋的时刻，如果你对通胀和国内生产总值增长的走向有自己的看法的话。相比之下，在之前的10年中，通胀只是在1%到2.7%之间波动，并没有像国际层面那样令人兴奋。所以现在作为彭博的首席美国经济学家，我主要关注通胀走势、经济增长走势，是否会出现经济衰退以及联邦基金利率的走向。这就是我的工作内容。
All right. Well, it sounds like we have someone extremely qualified to answer all of our questions that we have for you. So we're we feel lucky to have you here, Anna.
好的。听起来我们有一个非常有资格回答我们所有问题的人。所以我们感到很幸运能有你在这里，安娜。
And I do I want to talk about the Chinese economy in just a little bit, because there's been a lot of news coming out about it. And given that our show so much about real estate and some of the trouble they're having with real estate, we're particularly interested. But I'd love to just start sort of at the sort of at the highest level here, given your experience at the Fed to we're hearing a lot about from from the Federal Reserve, Andrew and Powell, a lot about a soft landing. And if that's possible, could you just tell us a little bit about the concept of the soft landing? First of all, and what your views on the feasibility of it is?
我接下来想谈谈中国经济，因为近来有很多关于它的新闻。考虑到我们节目中有很多关于房地产以及他们在房地产方面遇到的一些困难，我们对此特别感兴趣。但我想首先从最高层面开始，根据您在联邦储备系统的经验，我们听到了来自联邦储备系统、安德鲁和鲍威尔的许多关于软着陆的说法。如果可能的话，您能否简要解释一下软着陆的概念，并分享一下您对其可行性的看法？
Yeah, I think the the concept of soft landing is not very well defined. It's a nebulous concept, because some people would interpret it as saying that there would be a recession, but it will be very mild where unemployment rate will still increase to, you know, from today's 3.5% to 4ish percent. But I think right now, most investors who are talking about soft landing are really of the mind that there won't be a recession at all. And that inflation would come down painlessly, where the labor market will continue to be tight. I think that's basically what people have in implicitly in their mind.
是的，我认为“软着陆”概念定义不够明确。这是一个模糊的概念，因为有些人解读它为经济衰退，但衰退将非常轻微，失业率仍将略有增加，从目前的3.5%上升至约4%左右。但我认为目前大多数谈论软着陆的投资者的观点实际上是认为根本不会发生经济衰退。他们认为通胀将无痛地下降，劳动力市场将继续紧张。我认为这基本上是人们心中的含义。
And in terms of the possibility of this, so Bloomberg economics, our my group is still off the of the mind that there will be a recession that getting inflation back to 2%, which is the Fed's target, will be painful. And that a rise in unemployment rate to at least 4.5% is necessary to bring inflation back to 2%. We are skeptical of the soft landing optimism for a couple of reasons.
就这个可能性而言，彭博经济学家以及我们的团队仍然认为，经济会出现衰退，将通胀率提高到2%（即美联储的目标）将是痛苦的。为了使通胀率恢复到2%，失业率至少需要上升到4.5%。出于几个原因，我们对经济软着陆的乐观态度持怀疑态度。
Number one, so many people today cited resilient consumption. You saw the strong retail spending yesterday, right? I mean, many people cite that as one reason of soft landing. Well, when we looked at the pattern of consumption over the past recessions in the last 50 years, well, it turns out that consumption always is resilient before a recession. And even in a recession, in an average recession, consumption does not even drop off. Like consumption just maybe even tails off services consumption. In fact, on average, grow a trend even during a recession. So it's just not the kind of indicator you want to derive comfort in because it has no forecast ability of a recession.
第一，现在有很多人提到强劲的消费。你昨天见到了强劲的零售支出，对吧？我的意思是，很多人把这看作是软着陆的原因之一。然而，当我们回顾过去50年来的衰退期间的消费模式时，事实证明在衰退之前消费总是有弹性的。即使在衰退期间，平均而言，消费也不会下降。消费可能只是逐渐减少服务类消费。事实上，平均而言，消费甚至在衰退期间保持增长趋势。所以它并不是你希望从中获得安慰的指标，因为它对衰退的预测能力很低。
Second reason that people cite it as why they're optimistic. It's just broad, broadly speaking, economic indicators lately have been surprising on the upside. It turns out that two months before the Great Recession in 2007, so December 2007 is the beginning of that recession, two months before that economic data were all surprising on the high side as well. PMI was doing well and auto purchases was also solid. Nonfarm payroll, just two months before that recession was going at 166,000 jobs added just two months before it became very, you know, start to be negative.
人们引用的第二个原因是他们乐观的原因。广义上说，最近的经济指标一直在积极的方向上出人意外。事实证明，在2007年的大衰退前两个月，也就是2007年12月，经济数据也都出人意料地高位。采购经理人指数（PMI）表现良好，汽车购买也很稳固。在大衰退爆发前的两个月，非农就业增加了16.6万个职位，但两个月后开始出现了负面增长。
So currently we have nonfarm in the most recent jobs report. We saw that the economy added 187,000 jobs. And that number is likely to be smaller in the next month because we have seen in the past couple weeks bankruptcy of the trucking company yellow. And that will, you know, already shaved off at least 20,000 from the headline.
目前，根据最新的就业报告，我们看到非农岗位出现增长，经济新增了18.7万个工作岗位。由于最近几周卡车公司Yellow的破产，这个数字可能会在下个月减少，至少已经从总数中减去了2万个岗位。
And also we have been seeing a trend of downward revisions in these jobs number. And by looking at various benchmark series are, our view is that the nonfarm payroll number is overstating the strength of the economy and the disinflation trend, the low core inflation reading that we have been saying, seeing lately, is not due to painless reasons. It is because the underlying job market and labor market is weakening more than these headline figures are suggesting.
最近我们还注意到这些职位数据的下调趋势。通过观察各种基准数据，我们认为非农就业人数高估了经济和通胀下降趋势的强劲程度。我们最近看到的较低核心通胀率并非源于无痛苦原因，而是由于基础的就业市场和劳动力市场的疲弱程度超过了这些主要数据所表明的程度。
We are expecting consumer delinquencies to search after October. And we are already seeing small firms bankruptcy going up sharply. We are expecting by the end of the year small firms bankruptcy would reach the level that you would last year in 2010. So what consumer delinquencies.
我们预计消费者拖欠情况在十月之后会增加。而且我们已经看到小型企业破产数量急剧上升。我们预计到年底，小型企业破产数量将会达到去年2010年的水平。那么消费者拖欠情况呢？
And in fact, I think the best economic indicators with proven forecasting ability for recession is the Federal Reserve survey of senior loan officers. And in that survey, the Fed asked senior loan officers in banks, what are the plans for credit tightening in the second half of the year? What did they do in the past six month? And this is actually a causal channel of economic activity, right? Whereas consumption, and resilient consumption PMI, those are like coincident indicators.
实际上，我认为对于衡量经济衰退并具备预测能力的最佳经济指标是联邦储备系统对高级贷款官员的调查。在这项调查中，联储系统询问银行的高级贷款官员，他们在下半年有哪些信贷紧缩计划？过去六个月他们做了什么？这实际上是经济活动的因果关系通道，对吗？而消费以及经济活动PMI等指标则属于同时性指标。
But whereas, you know, lending is the people can only spend if they can borrow. And lately, this is what you're seeing. Consumption is propped up by borrowing. So the moment that it becomes harder for them to borrow or the cost of financing, these borrow becomes exorbitant, they will have to downshift the activity.
然而，你知道，借贷是人们只有在可以借钱的情况下才能消费的方式。最近，这就是你所见到的情况。消费是通过借贷来支撑的。因此，一旦他们发现借钱变得更加困难，或者融资成本变得过高，他们将不得不减少活动。
Similarly, on the corporate side, the mysterious things that that has been, you know, why the on the corporate side we see activity being very resilient is still very narrow corporate spread. And usually, in a downturn, you will see wide and corporate spread. That's because bankruptcies are happening and credit risk are worsened. And there will be credit downgrades, you know, things like that.
类似地，在企业方面，我们所遇到的神秘事物是，你知道的，为什么在企业方面，我们看到的活动非常有韧性，这是因为企业利差非常窄。通常，在经济衰退时，你会看到企业利差较大。这是因为破产事件正在发生，信用风险加剧。还会有信用评级下调等等。
And we're seeing the very, very beginning of that. And usually, when that happens, it's a very non-linear process. One of the reasons that people have been citing as why we won't have a problem like we did in previous recession this time on the corporate side is that credit quality is very good. And looking at mortgage origination, you see the credit scores of consumers are very good, right? Nowhere near what it was in 2006.
我们正在见证这一切的非常非常初期阶段。而当这种情况发生时，通常是一个非线性的过程。人们认为这一次在企业方面，我们不会像以前的经济衰退那样遇到问题的一个原因是信用质量非常好。看看抵押贷款的起源，你会发现消费者的信用评分非常好，对吧？远远不及2006年的水平。
But what happens is that some of the pandemic policies, such as the student loan forbearance policies, have distorted credit scores. In fact, you know, by some estimation, credit scores might be artificially inflated by 50 basis point. So if you kind of look at the, you know, tranches of mortgage originations by credit scores, and you discount the lower 10 percentile, 20 percentile of mortgages by, you know, 50 basis point of credit score. In fact, credit quality is not that much better than 2006.
但事实是，一些疫情政策，例如学生贷款停还政策，导致信用评分出现了扭曲。事实上，据估计，信用评分可能被人为地提高了50个基点。因此，如果你看一下按信用评分排列的抵押贷款发起情况，并将信用评分降低10个百分点或20个百分点，事实上，信贷质量并不比2006年好多少。
So I think that a lot of these things that are underneath the service will only bubble up to the service as you start seeing this snowball, you know, financial accelerator kind of effects. And that's why I just don't think that the things that people have been citing for being optimistic about soft lending today do not stand the test of history.
我认为很多这些隐藏在表面之下的事情，只有当你开始看到这种雪球效应、金融加速器的作用时，它们才会冒出来。这就是为什么我不认为人们对于今天的软贷款持乐观态度的依据经得住历史的考验。
Yeah, you know, so this is why we are still thinking that a recession will happen later this year. Great. Thank you. And you just answered one of my other questions, but just to summarize forever, and it sounds like what a lot of prominent media outlets or other forecasters are relying on are variables that don't necessarily have the right predictive qualities for a recession. And some of the data points that you just pointed to are in fact better examples of what we should be looking at if we're trying to forecast a recession.
是的，你知道的，这就是为什么我们仍然认为今年晚些时候会发生经济衰退的原因。太好了，谢谢你。你刚刚回答了我另一个问题，但是为了总结一下，听起来很多知名媒体机构或其他预测者所依赖的变量并不一定具备预测经济衰退的正确特征。而你刚刚提到的一些数据点实际上是我们在试图预测经济衰退时应该关注的更好的例子。
I you said at the end of this year, and I want to just follow up on on this conversation because it does seem from the other forecasts I read, people are sort of split. The people who do believe there's a recession, some say end of this year, some say the, you know, in the beginning or middle of 2024, the Fed started raising interest rates. What is it now 15, 18 months ago, something like that, we know that it takes some time for these interest rates effects rate hikes to ripple through the economy.
您说过今年年底可能会出现经济衰退，我想跟进一下这次谈话，因为我读到的其他预测似乎存在分歧。相信有经济衰退可能发生的人中，有些人说在今年年底，有些人说2024年初或中期，美联储开始加息。大约15到18个月前，我们知道加息需要一定时间才能在经济中产生影响。
But what do you expect to happen between now and the end of the year that's going to go from the sort of like gray area that we're in now to a bona fide recession? Yeah, a very good question Dave. So resilience in the economy in the last two years, to be able to accurately forecast a recession, I think one needs to also have a good understanding of what is boosting the resilience in the last two years, right?
但是你期望在现在和年底之间会发生什么，以至于我们现在所处的灰色区域会变成一个真正的经济衰退？是的，这是一个很好的问题，戴夫。所以在过去两年里，经济的弹性，以能够准确预测经济衰退，我认为还需要对过去两年中提升了经济弹性的因素有一个很好的理解，对吗？
And for us, we actually have been pushing against recession calls last year, Dave. If you remember last year, a lot there was a lot of people who was who were talking about recession at the end of last year, or in the middle last year. But we were never in that camp, we have been consistently saying that the recession will be in Q3 of this year, Q4 or Q1 2024. And the reason why is precisely because of the lags that you just described of monetary policy.
对于我们而言，实际上去年我们一直反对衰退的预测，Dave。如果你记得去年，很多人在去年年底或中期谈论衰退。但我们从未持有这种观点，我们一直坚称衰退将在今年第三季度、第四季度或2024年第一季度出现。原因就是你刚才描述的货币政策滞后效应。
So we estimated some models and all those models would suggest that the peak impact of monetary policy would occur around the end of this year, around the end of this year. So I think those are the tools that central bankers typically use like cop-down, Vazee PhD models, right?
我们估计了一些模型，所有这些模型都表明，货币政策的顶峰影响将在今年年底左右发生，就是在今年年底左右。所以我认为这些通常是中央银行家们使用的工具，如卡普-下降（cop-down）、Vazee博士（Vazee PhD）模型，对吧？
But we also look at this from a bottom-up kind of perspective, because there are some unique things propping up the economy these two years, right? One of which is that household to have built up this cash buffer from the fiscal stimulus and also from savings during the last two years, because in the early part of the pandemic, they couldn't spend if they have all this money, right? And also from the stock market, wealth effect, all that.
但是我们也从一种自下而上的视角来看待这个问题，因为近两年来，有一些独特的因素支撑了经济，对吧？其中之一就是家庭通过财政刺激和在过去两年中的储蓄积累了大量现金储备，因为在疫情早期，他们无法花费这些钱，对吧？还有来自股市的财富效应，等等。
And so we look at the by also income buckets, how much household have in excess savings. And what we see is that in terms of the runway, how many months that these cash buffers could support somebody's normal spending habit without them eating a job or something like that. It shows that by the end of this year, towards the end of this year is when probably the lower half of the population will be out of these buffers. So either they come back to the job market, and this is why labor supply has been increasing this year so far. It's because of these people who were on the sidelines suddenly feel that desperation that they need this job, right? Because the cushion is gone, right?
因此，我们还要看不同收入档次的家庭拥有多少过剩储蓄。从我们看到的情况来看，就支持某人正常消费习惯的时间来看，这些现金缓冲区可以支持几个月，而不会让他们失业或出现其他问题。它显示到今年年底，可能是人口下半部分将会用尽这些缓冲区。所以要么他们重新回到就业市场，这就是为什么今年迄今为止劳动力供应在增加的原因。因为这些人突然感到绝望，他们需要这份工作，对吧？因为这个保护层已经消失了，对吧？
And so that's one reason why from a bottom-up analysis, we think that the second half of this year around the end of this year is the time. And second, I think from a kind of natural experiment point of view, you also see the impact of these pandemic policy, one of which is that during the pandemic, the administration boosted the emergency allotment for people's food step money and for a poor household.
因此，这就是为什么从自下而上的分析角度来看，我们认为今年下半年就在年底左右是时机的一个原因。其次，我认为从一种自然实验的角度来看，您还可以看到这些疫情政策的影响之一，其中之一是在疫情期间，政府提高了人们的食品券和贫困家庭的紧急额外发放。
And this, we were talking about household in the perhaps lower 20 percentile by income bucket. And those people saw their food-stamped allotment going from less than $100 to as much as $300. That's like a lot every month they got more. And there's more pandemic policy such as childcare, credit, and of course the three rounds of fiscal stimulus.
而且我们正在讨论的是收入桶可能位于最低20%的家庭。这些人看到他们的食品券津贴从不到100美元增加到多达300美元。每个月都会得到更多，非常多。此外，还有更多的流行病政策，如儿童保育、信用消费以及当然还有三轮财政刺激。
But this snap program, this food stamp emergency allotment, it expired earlier this year at March, March of this year. And immediately, you saw this a plunge in demand for food, not just trading down to cheaper food, but just plunge in demand and food. And you see evidence of that in the earnings call and that is finishing up just around now from food company like General Mills, Tyson's, they're talking about decrease in volumes of food demand.
但是这个为期一段时间的食品券紧急额度计划在今年三月就到期了。而且立即就看到了食品需求的下降，不仅仅是因为购买更便宜的食品，而是出现了食品需求的急剧下降。你可以从各大食品公司的收益电话中看到这一证据，像通用磨坊、泰森食品等，他们都在谈论食品需求量的减少。
Because we saw early signs of that tremendous impact from this, you know, this expiration of food stamp emergency allotment in plunging card box shipments. That is actually one of former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan's favorite barometer of the US economy, cardboard shipments and freight rail car loadings. Both of them plunge at the same time and it turns out that 30% of the demand for cardboard shipments came from food industry.
因为我们早就看到了这种巨大影响的早期迹象，你知道的，食品券紧急津贴到期导致纸板盒装货物的减少。实际上，这是前美联储主席艾伦·格林斯潘最喜欢用来衡量美国经济的指标之一，纸板运输和货物铁路装载量。两者同时下降，结果发现纸板运输的30%需求来自食品行业。
And it turns out that the reason why that one of the primary reason I think for that plunge is because of food demand plunge from this emergency allotment expiration. And now we are seeing, we are expecting to see the expiration of people, a household, resuming student debt payment in October. And the average amount that of a student loan borrower is about $300 per month in payments. So that basically subtracted $300 per month in spending power they could have in buying other stuff. And so that's a tremendous amount that could shave off about $9 billion per month in spending power for the US economy. It's a tremendous shock.
结果表明，我认为导致股市暴跌的主要原因之一是因为紧急配给的到期导致食品需求下降。而现在我们预计在十月份将会看到人们的家庭、学生债务还款到期。每月平均学生贷款借款人大约需要支付300美元。所以基本上他们每个月可用于购买其他物品的消费能力减少了300美元。这意味着每月约90亿美元的美国经济消费能力受到了巨大冲击。这是一个巨大的震动。
Similar to the food stamp allotment program that also took away about $200 in spending power of a household. And this is what I meant by a natural experiment. You see these pandemic policies expire and bam. And then that's where you get that plunge somewhere. And that's when we, so this is why we think that in October, once those payments resume, you're going to definitely see consumers pulling back on consumption.
这与粮票分配计划类似，该计划也会减少家庭大约200美元的购买力。这就是我所说的自然实验。你看这些疫情政策到期了，突然就出现了一种下跌。这就是我们认为在十月份，一旦这些付款恢复，消费者肯定会在消费上收紧的原因。
I mentioned earlier in this podcast that consumption is a poor predictor of recession. So if consumption is resilient, it doesn't tell you about the chances of recession tomorrow. However, if consumption is not doing well, it definitely will tell you something about the recession probability tomorrow because consumption accounts for two thirds of the US economy.
在这个播客中，我之前提到过，消费并不是衡量经济衰退的好指标。因此，如果消费有弹性，它并不能告诉你明天是否会发生经济衰退。然而，如果消费不好，那肯定会对明天经济衰退的概率产生影响，因为消费占美国经济的三分之二。
And so that's one non-linear shock that I'm expecting to see. And I think it will have ripple effects because I mentioned earlier that student loan for bears policy inflated people's credit scores. So the Biden administration extended the period of when credit agencies can dock people's credit score if they are delinquent on their student loan by another year. So after October, we won't see credit scores deterioration yet from people who cannot pay on the student loans.
因此，这是我预料到的一个非线性冲击。我认为它将产生连锁效应，因为我之前提到的贝尔斯政策充实了人们的信用分数。所以拜登政府将延长信用机构在学生贷款逾期的情况下扣减人们信用分数的期限，再延长一年。因此，在十月之后，我们将不会看到因无法按时偿还学生贷款而导致的信用分数恶化。
But I do think that on the margin, some people would be paying and then you will see auto loans or other consumer loans, a credit card loans, delinquency deteriorate because so while credit companies cannot dock a person for being delinquent on student loans, they could dock somebody for being delinquent on auto loans and credit card loans. And all that means that we are going to see credit score deteriorate. And the pullback on consumption will also affect firms profitability, which will also lead to more bankruptcies over time. And so I think we are going to see credit risk measures of various credit risk worsen starting in the fall and going into next year.
但我确实认为在边际上，有些人将要支付，并且你会看到汽车贷款或其他消费者贷款、信用卡贷款的违约情况恶化，因此虽然信贷公司不能因为某人对学生贷款拖欠而罚款，但他们可以因为某人对汽车贷款和信用卡贷款拖欠而罚款。所有这些意味着我们将会看到信用分数恶化。消费的减少也将影响公司的盈利能力，这也将导致更多的破产。因此我认为我们将会看到从秋季开始到明年的各种信用风险度量恶化。
Wow. Thank you for explaining that because I've just been wondering about timing because it does sort of feel like we're for the last year and a half or so we're hearing a lot there's going to be recession and it's it's curious when the tipping point is going to be. But I appreciate that explanation on your thinking about timing.
哇，谢谢你解释这个问题，因为我一直在纳闷，因为在过去的一年半左右，我们听到很多关于经济衰退的消息，很好奇什么时候会出现转折点。但我很欣赏你对于时机的解释。
You mentioned the unemployment rate of 4.5% just for context for everyone. I think we're at about 3.6ish percent right now. And this is in August of 2023. How bad do you think it's going to get at it? Like is this going to be a long drawn out thing, a short recession, you know, they come in all sorts of flavors. What are you expecting?
你提到了4.5%的失业率，只是为了给大家提供背景信息。我认为我们现在的失业率大约是3.6%左右。而且这是2023年8月的数据。你认为情况会变得多糟糕？这会是个长期拖延的问题吗？还是一个短期的经济衰退呢？你知道，经济衰退有各种不同的形式。你对未来的预期是什么？
Yeah, as Anna Karenana, the novel begins, all unhappy families are unhappy and they're away just like recessions. So, you know, the average recession would be in the unemployment rate have to go near 5%, at least almost 5%. But because the pandemic era has improved the balance sheet of you know, you have investment grades firms which are able to refinance some of their debt with the lower interest rate during the low interest rate period in the early part of the pandemic. There are a lot of heterogeneity across credit risk.
是的，就像小说《安娜·卡列尼娜》开头所说的，所有不幸的家庭都是不幸的，并且它们的不幸就像经济衰退一样难以避免。所以，你知道，平均经济衰退会使失业率接近5%，至少接近5%。但是，由于疫情时期改善了你知道的资产负债表，投资评级的公司能够在疫情初期的低利率时期重新融资一部分债务，因此信用风险之间存在着很大的差异。
When I said that this recession would be prompted because of the worsening credit risk, I'm talking about on the consumption side the poor half of the country on a corporate side, the less credit worthy half of the corporate world. But there are still pockets of resilience. And I think that's why overall this recession will be a mild one just because it's not it's not the kind of situation of 2008 to have something of the magnitude of 2008. Not only do you need vulnerability in the economy, and we do have vulnerability in the economy, you also need some amplifier, some propagation of those weak points, right?
当我说这次经济衰退将是因为恶化的信用风险而引发时，我指的是在消费方面，这个国家的一半穷人，在企业方面，一半不值得信任的企业世界。但仍然存在一些有韧性的地方。我认为这就是为什么整体上这次经济衰退将是一个温和的原因，因为它不是2008年那种规模的情况。你不仅需要经济上的脆弱性，而且我们的经济确实存在脆弱性，你还需要一些放大器，一些对这些薄弱点的传播，对吗？
And in 2008 that that propagation mechanism is the surprise mortgage and the packaging and tranches stripping the credit at each each of the prime into various tranches. And you know, that leads to this in transparency of the credit quality of this assets you're holding it. And when the prime started getting into trouble, it is that fear of not knowing what you have in your hand is it toxic is it not toxic and that everybody just pulls back. And you know, you need that kind of propagation mechanism. And oftentimes it's unclear beforehand what it is because it is so hidden, right? It's it's usually you don't know ahead of time. But as I said, just now if suppose that if in fact that people's credit scores were so inflated and their behavior, in fact, mimics somebody with much lower credit scores today, maybe the credit quality of a lot of assets on the consumer side today are mispriced.
在2008年，这种传播机制是通过意料之外的抵押贷款以及将信用拆分成各种券的方式产生的。你知道，这导致了你所持有的资产信用质量的不透明。当抵押贷款开始陷入困境时，人们因为不知道自己手中的资产是有毒还是无害而感到担心，于是大家纷纷撤出。你知道，你需要这种传播机制。而且往往事先不清楚它是什么，因为它是如此隐藏起来，对吧？通常情况下你事先是不知道的。但正如我刚才所说，假设实际上人们的信用评分被夸大了，他们的行为事实上像是信用评分较低的人，那么今天消费者方面许多资产的信用质量可能被错误定价了。
Another potential shock today is of course, the commercial real state. Everybody has been talking about how it's just a ticking time bomb related to the fact that a lot of commercial properties are fakened right now given the remote work trends that was started during the pandemic. So I cannot tell you exactly what would be the source of a potential amplifier of of a downturn, but that this is why we are at the view that the baseline is still a mild recession. But with the caveat that I think X anti is hard to say where that shock that propagation mechanism is coming from.
今天可能存在的另一个潜在冲击当然是商业地产。大家一直在谈论它是一个定时炸弹，这与疫情期间远程办公趋势导致许多商业物业空置有关。所以我不能确定潜在衰退的具体来源是什么，但这就是为什么我们认为基准线仍然是轻度的经济衰退。但请注意，我认为很难确定这种冲击和传播机制的确切来源。
Yeah, it's like one of those things where it's almost certainly not going to be the thing that you think it's going to. Yeah. Yeah. It's so much that whenever it's in the media enough that people may be mitigate against it or yeah, exactly.
是的，就像那些事情之一，几乎肯定不会是你认为的那样。是的。是的。这样的情况太多了，以至于当它在媒体上足够出现时，人们可能会采取措施来缓解它，或者是的，确切地说。
Exactly. Exactly. They focus on it when there's a bigger creeping risk that no one's really seeing.
没错，就是这样。他们只注重这个问题，而没人真正看到一个更大的潜在风险正在悄然逼近。
Exactly. You did and I mentioned the commercial real estate market, but earlier mentioned something about mortgage quality and loan quality. And I'm curious if you have concerns or thoughts about the residential real estate market in any risk of foreclosures or defaults going up there.
没错。你确实提到了商业房地产市场，但先前也提到了抵押品质量和贷款质量的问题。我很好奇你是否对住宅房地产市场是否存在房产被判定拍卖或违约风险的问题有担忧或想法。
Well, you know, Dave, I was looking at the mortgage origination in the residential market by different percentile of the credit scores. And my observation there was that on the lower 10 percentile, if you just take those numbers as given, you see that the average credit scores of the bottom 10 percentile by credit scores in mortgage origination was about 60 or 70 points higher than before of the 2008 crisis. And a second observation is that that average credit scores of the bottom 10% and 20% has been deteriorating in the last three years in terms of mortgage origination. And those two things are pretty alarming to me because why is mortgage origination deteriorating at a time where credit scores was inflated and even like, and in those two years where credit quality was deteriorating in the mortgage origination, that was when credit scores was actually increasingly inflated, not just like, not just inflated earlier, but increasingly inflated. So that tells me that in the last two or three years, the people who are buying the higher the interest rate they're getting on their mortgage, the likely that the average credit quality behind that mortgage is not as good as the one two years ago. And furthermore, if I adjust that credit score inflation by the amount that I think is feasible 50 basis point, the fact the average credit quality is not clearly better than 2006.
嗯，你知道的，戴夫，我在研究按不同信用分数百分位数进行的住房贷款发放情况。我观察到，在信用分数最低的前10%中，如果你只看这些数字，你会发现，在住房贷款发放中，最低10%的信用分数的平均值比2008年危机前高了60或70分。第二个观察是，在过去三年中，最低10%和20%的信用分数平均值在住房贷款发放方面有所恶化。这两个事实对我来说相当令人担忧，因为在信用分数被夸大的时候，为什么住房贷款发放会恶化呢？这两年中，信用质量都在恶化，而信用分数却不断上升，不仅是之前夸大，而且是逐渐夸大。所以这告诉我，在过去两三年里，购买抵押贷款的人，他们获取的利率越高，该抵押贷款背后的平均信用质量就越差，不如两年前。而且，如果我按照我认为可行的50个基点来调整信用分数通胀，事实上平均信用质量并没有明显好于2006年。
And in terms of foreclosure, now that's a curious aspect of this housing market. What's different today than back in 2006 is that we have significantly lower housing supply. And that has capped housing prices from falling too much. And there are many reasons why housing supply is not as high as before. But I think one reason is also that there's been less foreclosure. And this, I think one of the reasons is also related to the administration policies from Freddie Mac Freddie made that, that I think there has been some remediation policies that has delayed and make it harder for for closures to happen. So there, it and also related to the pandemic also that there has been policies that when I reduced the risk of homelessness on the part of people who are suffering. So from a humane perspective, I can see exactly why that would be the case for it. But from a housing supply perspective, that is, that is a one curious case. So I think underneath the surface, a lot of this resilience is perhaps just deferred and delayed because of actual policies, pandemic related policies.
就抵押赎回而言，这是房地产市场上一个引人注目的方面。与2006年相比，今天的一个不同之处在于，我们的住房供应明显减少。这限制了房价下跌过多。住房供应不如以前之多有很多原因，而我认为其中一个原因也是由于较少的房屋赎回。我认为其中一个原因也与Freddie Mac的管理政策相关，Freddie制定了一些补救政策，延迟了和加大了房屋赎回的难度。另外，与疫情也有关系，政府也制定了政策，减少了受苦人群无家可归的风险。从人道主义的角度来看，我可以理解为什么会出现这种情况。但从住房供应的角度来看，这是一个有趣的案例。因此，我认为在表面之下，这种韧性很可能只是因为实际政策，与疫情相关的政策而被推迟和延迟了。
Yeah, it's interesting to see about the credit quality. I had never previously heard about the potentially elevated credit scores. That's really interesting because I've definitely been reassured about the housing market based on some of those credit quality and the fact that even, you know, a lot of these forbearance programs and foreclosure moratoriums did lapse more than a year ago, I think. And we're still seeing pretty low foreclosures. They are ticking up, but they've still been pretty low on a historic scale. And so I think that's to me, one of the more interesting things in the market to watch for in the next year or so is will a potential recession or any, you know, really anything else for more foreclosures in the housing market over the next couple of years.
是的，了解信用质量真的很有趣。我之前从未听说过潜在的高信用分数，这真的很有趣，因为我确实基于一些信用质量来放心房地产市场，事实上，知道许多偿付暂缓计划和停止执行抵押品担保权令已经超过一年的时间了。而我们仍然可以看到非常低的抵押品拍卖数量。虽然有所增加，但从历史尺度来看，它们仍然相对较低。因此，在未来一年左右，对我来说，市场上更为有趣的事情之一就是，在接下来的几年里，潜在的衰退或其他任何因素是否会导致房地产市场出现更多抵押品拍卖。
And I wanted to shift a little bit out of the US, actually. We rarely talk about this on the show, but since we have an expert with your background, I would love to just talk a little bit about the Chinese economy. For the last year or so, we've heard a lot about how Chinese real estate has been sort of a drag on their economy. It is, from my understanding, a lot of asset values have gone down and that's depleted a lot of savings or net worth of a lot of citizens. We also heard yesterday something pretty unique that the Chinese government will no longer be releasing unemployment data, youth unemployment data, because it was growing so high. So it does seem like there's a lot of economic turmoil coming out of China. So would love just your perspective on that. But I think for our audience, we'd love to know what impact will the Chinese economy, second biggest economy in the world have on perhaps the American economy?
我实际上想要转移一下视角，远离美国谈一谈。我们很少在节目中讨论这个问题，但是既然我们有一位背景专业的专家在场，我很想简单地谈谈中国经济。在过去的一年左右，我们听说了很多有关中国房地产对其经济造成拖累的消息。据我了解，很多资产价值已经下跌，这削弱了很多公民的储蓄或净资产。昨天我们还听说了一件非常独特的事情，即中国政府将不再发布失业数据和青年失业数据，因为这些数字都在急剧增长。因此，似乎中国正面临着许多经济动荡。因此，希望能够听听您对此的看法。但是我想对我们的观众来说，我们想知道世界第二大经济体中国经济将对美国经济产生什么影响？
Yeah. Okay. On the Chinese economy, I think one of the driver of China's growth has been real estate and that's related to multi-decade policies in China that suppressed investment options of Chinese household. So from Chinese households perspective, there were not many instruments that you could invest in. And that's why it's very typical for household to overweight on real estate.
是的。好的。关于中国经济，我认为中国增长的一个驱动因素是房地产，这与中国几十年来抑制了中国家庭投资选择有关。因此从中国家庭的角度来看，你可以投资的选择不多。这就是为什么家庭在房地产上过度投资非常常见的原因。
And this is why in terms of a housing bubble, China does have a continuous problem there. And every time the real estate market slows in China, you see significant impact on the economy. And economists have used more granular input output tables to get at the direct and indirect impact of real estate sector on Chinese growth. And that number is actually massive. And it's a big number. And it's much bigger than in US.
这也是为什么在房地产泡沫方面，中国确实存在持续的问题。每当中国的房地产市场放缓，你都会看到对经济产生重大影响。经济学家使用了更精细的投入产出表，以获取房地产行业对中国经济增长的直接和间接影响情况。而这个数字实际上是巨大的，远超过美国。
If you think that in US, a housing market downturn would push the US into recession. And China, that's like several factor or larger. And in the past 20 years, every time you see that there's a housing and price cycle in China, and it's very clear because you see to look at the first tier Chinese cities prices, every time that happens, there's hard landing fears in China and there's capital flight away from China, the renminbi weekends.
如果你认为在美国，住房市场的下行会推动美国陷入衰退的话，那在中国，这种情况会更加复杂或更为严重。在过去的20年里，每当你看到中国出现了房地产和价格周期，很明显因为你只需要看一下一线城市的房价，每当发生这种情况时，人们会对中国的硬着陆感到担忧，资本会流出中国，人民币也会贬值。
And what makes the recent cycles so this this current cycle pretty severe is that it seems to be related to some scarring on the household side from the long pandemic policies of shutting down the economy. And so it seems like this, this time this China shock, this is a serious China shock. So I would say it could be even worse than the 2015, 2016 hard landing shock. Some of the indicators that had in the past been indicative of the Chinese economy is, of course, as I mentioned, first tier Chinese city housing prices.
而使得最近的经济周期如此严重的原因是，似乎与长期封锁经济的疫情政策对家庭方面产生了一些伤害。因此，这次中国冲击似乎是一次严重的中国冲击。所以我认为，这可能比2015年至2016年的硬着陆冲击还要严重。在过去一直被认为是中国经济指标的一些指标，当然，就像我提到的，中国一线城市的房价。
And in the past, whenever that has fallen, the government could stop publishing it. And in fact, whenever the government stop publishing something, that's when you know something's not doing well. Yeah, it's not. No news is good news. It's no news is bad news. Yes. So number one, number two is a thing called total social financing TSF. And basically captures the credit impulse of the economy and it's just falling through the roof. It is worse than 2006.
过去，每当该统计数据下降时，政府都会停止公布它。实际上，每当政府停止发布某些数据时，那就表示有些事情不太妙了。是的，没有消息就是好消息，但在这种情况下，没有消息就是坏消息。是的。所以，第一、第二是一种叫作"总量社会融资"（TSF）的指标。它基本上反映了经济的信贷冲动，而这个指标正在直线下降，比2006年还要糟糕。
That's like in terms of level. That's really bad. That's, and I would say as an economist, just as an economist focus on measurement issue, from a statistical agency's perspective, it's actually easier, often time to collect price data than quantities data. So at times where all these economic indicators are sending mixed signals, I would focus on prices.
就水平而言，那太糟糕了。作为一个经济学家，仅就衡量问题而言，从统计机构的角度来看，收集价格数据通常比数量数据更容易。因此，在经济指标出现混乱信号的时候，我会专注于价格。
And some of the prices that you can observe here is, for example, Chinese PPI and US import prices from China, because we also collect those data. It's right. You don't necessarily need to rely on China's data. You can see some of these data on the US side. And those are weakening very much. And deflationary spiral don't come from nowhere.
在这里您可以观察到一些价格数据，比如中国的生产者价格指数和美国从中国进口的价格，因为我们也收集这些数据。没错，您不一定需要依赖中国的数据。您可以在美国这边看到一些相关的数据。而且这些数据正在大幅下降。通缩螺旋并非毫无原因。
Similar, you can extend even the same analysis to the US economy in terms of our labor market. A lot of people talk about labor market strength in the US, but you look at wages and you look at the jobs opening data. Is it possible that just a decrease of 34,000 jobs opening could lead to more than 1 percentage point decrease in wage growth? Like, that sort of stuff where if you believe more in the price data, because it's very easy to collect prices data on China's case, prices of consumer discretionary.
同样的，你也可以把同样的分析方法应用到我们的劳动力市场上，来看看美国经济。很多人都谈论美国劳动力市场的实力，但是如果你看看工资和招聘数据，是否有可能仅仅34,000个工作岗位的减少就能导致工资增长率下降超过1个百分点？就像这样的情况，如果你更相信价格数据，因为收集中国的价格数据非常容易，像消费者自由支配的价格。
In the US case, it's very easy to collect prices on wages. But it's harder to count the number of jobs, the number of jobs opening, the housing starts in the US. And first is in China, it's hard to count the exact unit of quantity. Whereas prices data, we have it everywhere. And you're seeing deflationary data? Yes. So I think that the key indicators in China, the housing prices, PPI, and also using corresponding US data on counterparty data, and also the total social financing data in China, those are pointing to some series trouble on par or worse than 2015.
在美国的情况下，很容易收集到工资的价格数据。但是很难统计岗位数量、岗位开放数量以及美国的房屋开工情况。而在中国，很难准确统计数量单位。而价格数据则比较容易获得。你现在看到的是通货紧缩数据吗？是的。所以我认为中国的关键指标是房价、生产者物价指数以及使用相应美国数据的交叉数据，还有中国的社会融资总量数据，这些都指向了一些与2015年持平或更糟的严重问题。
In terms of spillovers to the US, though, when I was at the Federal Reserve, I wrote a paper on the spillovers from a China heart landing on US and global economy. And so you can think of it as having the shock has three propagation channel. Number one is through its impact on commodities. So we China will lead to a disinflation or deflation on various commodity prices, such as ironers and oil and zinc, copper, aluminum, China's demand historically account for at least 40% of those commodities.
就美国的溢出效应而言，当我在美联储时，我曾写过一篇关于中国硬着陆对美国和全球经济的溢出影响的论文。因此，你可以将其视为冲击传播渠道有三个。第一个是通过对商品的影响。因此，中国将导致各种商品价格（如铁矿石、石油、锌、铜、铝）的通胀或通缩，中国历史上占这些商品需求的至少40%。
So number two, the second channel is through trade. So if we export less to China than from a GDP accounting perspective, we have less growth. So these two channels are not so important for the US because in terms of our direct trade exposure to China, very small. Finally, the third channel, which is where it gets dicey. And this is the main channel of how a China heart landing could slow us down. It is through the risk asset channel.
因此，第二个渠道是通过贸易实现的。如果我们从国内生产总值的角度来看，对中国的出口减少，那么我们的增长就会减少。因此，就美国而言，这两个渠道并不是很重要，因为我们与中国的直接贸易曝险程度很小。最后，第三个渠道是关键所在。这是一个中国经济下滑可能对我们造成影响的主要渠道，即通过风险资产渠道。
So in terms of direct bank exposure to Chinese assets or even, you know, indirect US bank exposure to to China related. So suppose we are highly exposed to UK bank HSBC, which is very exposed to Hong Kong or, you know, China, that channel is not that important in terms of finance. It's really the global risk asset channel.
就直接银行对中国资产的曝露，或者间接美国银行对与中国相关的曝露来说，从金融角度来看，它并不是一个非常重要的渠道。假设我们对英国汇丰银行的曝露非常高，而该银行与香港或中国有很强的关联，但从金融角度来看，这个渠道并不是非常重要。真正重要的是全球风险资产渠道。
What happens if there's a sudden heart landing in China is that it would lead to global risk off. So you would see credit spread widen, sovereign spread widen. The dollar would appreciate. So my paper's estimate is that if China falls 4 percentage point below expectations, then the dollar could appreciate by 6%.
如果在中国出现突然的经济危机，全球会面临风险不安局面。因此，我们会看到信贷利差扩大、主权利差扩大。美元会升值。所以，我的报告估计如果中国的经济增速比预期低4个百分点，美元可能会升值6%。
And that usually when the dollar appreciates, it tightens global financial conditions. It makes it harder for companies and higher, higher. And so and also VIX would also increase if China's GDP growth is 4% below expectations. Our model expects to see about 6% point increase in VIX. So that's close to one standard deviation oil price would decrease by 40%.
通常情况下，当美元升值时，全球金融条件会收紧。这会使得企业运营更加困难，并导致成本上升。另外，如果中国的 GDP 增长低于预期，波动率指数（VIX）也会增加。我们的模型预计 VIX 会增加约 6 个百分点，相当于一个标准偏差。在这种情况下，油价可能下降 40%。
So, you know, it's actually through that channel that pulls back people's appetite to lend. That could lead to problems in slowing US US. You know, you gave us an idea about the US economy and timing.
所以，你知道的，实际上是通过那个渠道来抑制人们的借贷欲望。这可能会导致美国经济放缓的问题。你知道的，你给了我们一个关于美国经济和时间的想法。
Do you think we'll know anything about the extent of the Chinese economic situation and its potential impacts anytime soon?
你认为我们会很快了解中国经济状况的程度及其可能的影响吗？
Well, you know, Dave, as I was saying, when we encounter measurement problem, if the data is not available to you, what is available to you is actually what is happening to prices and the real world, right?
嗯，你知道的，戴夫，就像我之前说的那样，当我们遇到测量问题时，如果数据对你不可获得，实际上你能得到的是价格和真实世界的变化情况，对吗？
And China does not have a monopoly to its own data. In fact, the US also measures a lot of counterparty data. We can say how much China is importing from. So if Germany's export to China dropped, because Germany experts a lot of capital equipments to China, there's a usual pattern of how China's slowdown could affect the rest of the world. And you just need to tally up those signs to have a good gauge of how bad is the trouble with China. So right now, we are also seeing a, you know, people are debating on whether there's a recession in Germany. And certainly, the mood is very gloomy in Germany, which is another manufacturing powerhouse. That economy is very much tied to the Chinese economy. If they're not doing well, I think it's highly suggestive, but China is not doing well either.
中国不拥有其自己的数据垄断。事实上，美国也收集了大量的交易对手数据。我们可以得知中国从哪里进口了多少商品。所以如果德国向中国的出口下降，因为德国向中国出口了很多资本设备，那么中国经济放缓如何影响其他国家就有一个通常的模式。你只需要整合这些迹象，就能很好地判断中国的情况有多糟糕。所以现在，我们也可以看到，人们正在争论德国是否陷入衰退。德国的情绪确实非常低落，这也是一个制造业强国。德国经济与中国经济密切相关。如果德国经济不景气，我认为可以高度暗示中国经济也不景气。
So also, I would look at commodity prices where traditionally Chinese demand account for the bulk of it. As I was saying, iron ore, zinc, aluminum, if those prices are falling dramatically, it does tell you that demand is lumping China. So it's pretty obvious. You can tell it medium.
因此，我也会关注商品价格，特别是那些传统上中国需求占据大部分份额的商品。正如我所说的，铁矿石、锌和铝等的价格如果大幅下跌，这就表明中国的需求正在衰减。所以这一点非常明显。你可以从中得出一定的结论。
All right. Well, thank you so much, Anna. This has been extremely helpful. We appreciate you lending your expertise to us today here on on the market. If people want to learn more about what you and your team are doing at Bloomberg and follow your analysis and writing, where can they do that?
好的，非常感谢你，安娜。这真的非常有帮助。我们非常感激你今天在这里向我们提供专业知识。如果人们想了解更多关于你和你们在彭博社所做的工作，并想关注你的分析和文章，他们可以在哪里找到呢？
Right. You will need a Bloomberg terminal. And once you have a Bloomberg terminal, you type in BECO, B-E-C-O, go. And there you can see all our insights and thematic pieces and reactions to data.
好的。你将需要一个彭博终端。一旦你拥有了彭博终端，你输入BECO，B-E-C-O，然后开始检索。然后你就能看到我们的所有观点、主题作品和对数据的反应。
All right. Great. Well, Anna, thank you so much for joining us. All right. Big thanks to Anna. I hope you all enjoyed that interview. Anna, clearly a very knowledgeable and smart person knows a ton about the real estate market, knows a ton about the economy. And I really appreciated what she was saying. I think there's a lot of different conflicting data out there. But what I really liked about Anna's analysis is that she acknowledged that there's a lot of conflicting data and said, you know, there are certain data sets. There are certain data series that just aren't that good predictors of recession. Maybe they're good at predicting something else that are important for some other reason, like consumption. She was talking about US consumption. It's not a good predictor of recessions. And so she and her team are able to distill what data points are important and which ones are not.
好的。很好。安娜，非常感谢你加入我们。好的。特别感谢安娜。我希望大家都喜欢这次采访。安娜显然是非常有知识和智慧的人，对房地产市场和经济了解非常多。我真的很欣赏她的观点。我觉得现在存在很多相互矛盾的数据。但我真正喜欢安娜的分析是，她承认存在很多相互矛盾的数据，并说到，你知道，有些数据集合或者数据系列并不是预测经济衰退的好指标。也许它们在预测其他与消费有关的因素时更重要，比如消费。她谈到了美国的消费，它并不是一个很好的经济衰退预测指标。因此，她和她的团队能够筛选出哪些数据点是重要的，哪些不重要。
I love that because I think as real estate investors, that's something we also have to do, not just, you know, broad macroeconomic terms, but also when you're looking for property, you need to decide which data sets are important to you, which indicators, which numbers are really going to determine the performance of your deal. And so I think learning from people like Anna about how to pick the right indicators, the right data sets is something that we could all learn and benefit from.
我喜欢这个观点，因为我认为作为房地产投资者，我们不仅仅需要关注宏观经济数据，而且在寻找房产时，我们还需要决定哪些数据集、指标和数字才能真正决定交易的表现。所以我认为向Anna这样的人学习如何选择正确的指标和数据集是我们都能受益的事情。
All right, that's what we got for you guys. Thank you all so much for listening and we'll see you for the next episode of On the Market.
好的，这就是我们为你们准备的内容。非常感谢大家的收听，我们下一集《在市场上》再见！
On the Market is created by me, Dave Meyer and Kaitlyn Bennett, produced by Kaitlyn Bennett, editing by Joel Asparza and Onyx Media, research by Pooja Jindal, copywriting by Nate Weintraub, and a very special thanks to the entire Bigger Pockets team.
"On the Market" 是由我、戴夫·迈耶和凯特琳·贝内特共同创作的，由凯特琳·贝内特制作，由乔尔·阿斯帕尔萨和Onyx Media负责编辑，普贾·金德尔进行研究，纳特·韦恩特劳布进行文案撰写，并特别感谢整个Bigger Pockets团队。
The content on the show on the market are opinions only. All listeners should independently verify data points, opinions, and investment strategies.
节目中的内容仅为意见。所有听众都应该独立验证数据、观点和投资策略。