Behind The Memo: Sea Change
发布时间 2023-01-05 05:00:00 来源
This is the memo by Howard Marx. Today, another episode of Behind the Memo, in which Howard shed some light on themes from his most recent memo. Here he is discussing sea change with Oak Tree Senior Financial Writer Anna Shamanski.
这是Howard Marx写的备忘录。今天的“扒一扒备忘录”节目中，Howard向橡树高级财经作家Anna Shamanski讲解了他最新备忘录中的主题。他正在讨论“巨变”。
Howard, in this memo you describe the third sea change you've seen in the investment world during your career. I want to begin by having you describe what exactly you mean by a sea change. How does such a change differ from the normal ups and downs of a cycle?
霍华德，在这份备忘录中，您描述了您职业生涯中看到的第三次投资界的重大变革。我想先让您描述一下您所谓的“重大变革”是什么意思。这样的变革与周期性的普通波动有什么不同呢？如果需要的话，请改写。
I think a sea change is characterized by its scale. It's big. It's substantial. It's not your typical month-to-month or year-to-year fluctuation. But it's something that, well, the definition I chose to publish, use the word transformation. That's a hell of a lot different from a cyclical fluctuation. It's a change. It has aspects of long-term.
我觉得一次海变的特点在于它的规模。它很大，很实质。它不像那些典型的月度或年度波动。但它是一种改变，就像我选择发表的定义所说的，使用了“转化”一词。这与周期性波动截然不同。这是一次变化，它具有长期的方面。
Can you explain how this memo came about?
你能解释一下这个备忘录是如何产生的吗？
Well, Anna, if you go back a few memos to I begged to differ, which I think came out in the summer, you'll recall that I talked about our conference in London, which was June 21. I did my normal kickoff session and all the questions I got surrounded how bad will inflation get, how long will it last, how much will the fed raise rates to fight the inflation, and will that produce a recession, and if so, how bad and for how long?
嗯，安娜，如果你回到几个备忘录之前的“我持不同意见”一篇，我想是去年夏天发布的，你会想起我们在伦敦召开的会议，那是6月21日。我进行了正常的启动会议，所有的问题都围绕着通胀会有多糟糕，会持续多久，美联储将提高利率抵抗通胀会产生多大的影响，是否会导致经济衰退，如果有，会有多糟糕，持续多久等等。
I answered those questions and then I sat down and then I had lunch and then I got back up after lunch and I said, you know what, those aren't the important questions. That's all short-term stuff. We can't know much about it. We can't attach much probability being right to our judgments and we're not going to do much about it.
我回答了那些问题，然后坐下来吃了午饭，午饭后我重新起身说，你知道吗，那些问题并不重要。那些只是短期的东西。我们不能够了解得太多，也不能给我们的判断附加太大的正确概率，而且我们也做不了太多有关那些问题的事情。
We're not going to convolut our portfolios to accommodate it and it doesn't matter in the long run. I talked about that and I begged to differ. When I said, if you want to be different from other investors in an important way, how about carrying about it the long run and not the short? Then in the illusion of knowledge, I said that so much of the energy in the investment business is expended trying to guess short-term events, which A can't be done and really don't matter.
我们不打算把我们的投资组合搞得复杂来适应它，而且从长远来看也没什么关系。我谈到了这个问题，并提出了不同的观点。当我说，如果你想在重要的方面与其他投资者不同，那么关注长期而不是短期如何？然后，在知识的幻觉中，我说，投资业务中的许多精力都被消耗在试图猜测短期事件上，这是做不到的，真的也没什么关系。
Then in what really matters, I singled out short-term events and short-term trading and short-term performance as what doesn't matter. I think was leading up to this and kind of a steady drum beat, not intentional or conscious, but it was a theme that I got on. Then Bruce Karshani made a trip in mid-October. He and I were bouncing ideas back and forth and most of the ideas for the sea change came out of that trip, which started off just talking by the end of the trip.
在真正重要的事情上，我将短期事件、短期交易和短期绩效视为不重要。我认为这是一个逐渐形成的主旋律，虽然并不是有意识的，但我意识到了这个主题。然后布鲁斯·卡尔什尼在10月中旬前往了一次旅行。他和我互相交换了一些想法，大部分改变方向的想法都是从那次旅行中产生的，一开始只是聊天，到旅行结束时已经成型了。
I had the list of attributes that's in the memo and he encouraged me, as he always does, to think about this and I concluded that the clients who we didn't get to visit should also, I'm tempted to say, have the benefit or thinking if it's beneficial, but at least be exposed to our thinking on this subject.
我有一个备忘录里的属性清单，他一如既往地鼓励我思考。我得出结论，不能看到我们的客户也应该得到好处，或者我应该说至少要接触到我们在这个问题上的想法。
So let's go to the first sea change, which you describe as the development of a new investor mentality. You write and this is in reference to the 1970s. Now risk wasn't necessarily avoided, but rather considered relative to return and hopefully born intelligently. So I'd like you to discuss this shift and why it was so foundational to the development of the modern investment world.
让我们来谈一下你所描述的第一个重大变革，即新的投资者心态的发展。你在书中谈到，这与20世纪70年代有关。当时，人们并没有完全回避风险，而是将风险相对于回报进行考虑，并希望能够有智慧地承担风险。因此，我希望您能够讨论这种转变，以及为什么它对现代投资界的发展至关重要。
I think when I came into the business, people thought it was the job of the professional investor to buy good things. And what I learned from my first 10 years of experience is that good investing doesn't come from buying good things, but from buying things well. The difference is more than grammatical. We talked about investment grade bonds, guilt-edge stocks, if a fiduciary bought a low quality asset and lost money on it, he or she could be surcharge, that is, taken to court and made to pay the loss even if the overall portfolio made money.
我觉得，当我刚开始从事这个行业时，人们认为职业投资者的工作就是买好的东西。而我从前10年的经验中学到的是，好的投资并不是来自于购买好的东西，而是来自于购买得当的东西。这种差别不仅仅是语法上的，我们谈论过投资级债券，优质股票，如果受托人购买了低质量的资产，并在其上亏钱，他或她可能会被追加税款，也就是说即使整个资产组合赚了钱，他们也必须承担损失并被带到法院。
So if you included 10 risky assets and lost money on one, you could be required to make up the loss on the one. So that was obviously is an extreme attention to the quality of what you're buying quality defined in a very traditional sense. And you know, I was struck when I started working in high yield bonds in 1978 that moody's defined a b-rated bond as follows, fails to possess the characteristics of a desirable investment.
所以，如果你包含了10种高风险资产，而其中有一个亏损，你可能需要弥补这个损失。这显然是对你买什么的质量非常关注，按照非常传统的定义来定义质量。当我1978年开始从事高收益债券时，我注意到穆迪将一种B评级的债券定义为“没有拥有理想投资的特征”。
In other words, it's a bad investment because the company was of low credit worthiness. Doesn't say anything about the price. Doesn't say anything about the adequacy of the yield to compensate for the low quality, just low quality. And the innovation by Mike Milken and a few others in 77-778 period was that you should be able to issue high yield bonds, that is to say bonds of below investment grade rating, if the prospect of return was sufficient to compensate for the risk. As I say in the memo, that's all we do now is we think in that dimension. And people who think that way today, which should be everybody, would be shocked to learn that that's not what people thought of 50 years ago.
换句话说，这是个不好的投资，因为这个公司的信用价值很低。这并没有说明价格，也没有说明收益是否足够来弥补低质量，只是说质量很差。而迈克·米尔肯和其他几个人在77-778年期间的创新就是，如果回报的前景足以弥补风险，你应该能够发行高收益债券，也就是评级低于投资级的债券。正如我在备忘录中所说的那样，我们现在所做的一切就是在这个维度上思考。而今天像这样思考的人，也就是所有人，会惊讶地发现，50年前人们并不是这样想的。
Yeah, it was interesting when I was reading that section. It just made me think that so much of the growth that we've seen in the economy in the last 40 years is really based on that shift in thinking. People had not been able to engage in risky investments.
嗯，当我读那部分时，感觉很有趣。这让我想到过去四十年里我们在经济上看到的很多增长其实都是基于这种思维变化的。人们以前无法进行高风险投资。
How would all of the tech companies that contribute so much to our lives today have gotten the money to start?
那些如今给我们生活带来如此多贡献的技术公司，最初是从哪里获得启动资金的呢？
So let's shift now to the next sea change, which happened a little bit after, which was the beginning of the four decades of declining interest rates that began in the 1980s.
那么，让我们现在转向下一个重大变革，它比前一个发生得晚一点，即20世纪80年代开始的四十年利率下降期。
You speak about this at length in the memo. So first, I would just like you to discuss why you say that this trend is really one of the key drivers of investment performance during that period.
你在备忘录中详细谈到了这件事。因此，我首先希望你讨论一下为什么你认为这种趋势真的是那段时期投资表现的关键推动因素。
Whether everyone knows it or not, interest rates have been enormous, multifaceted, impact in the financial and investment world. They make companies more profitable by reducing their costs. They lower interest rates, drive people to make, so we say, riskier or more aggressive investments in order to get the returns they want or need, which makes capital available for riskier activities. They increased the value of bonds, an 8% bond is worth a certain amount in a climate where 8% interest rates are prevalent, but it's worth a lot more in a climate where 4% interest rates are prevalent.
不管是否被人们广泛认知，利率在金融和投资界带来了巨大而复杂的影响。通过降低成本，它们使企业更具盈利性；降低利率会推动人们进行更冒险或更进攻性的投资，以获得他们想要或需要的回报，这使得更多的资金可用于风险更高的活动。它们提高了债券的价值，在8%利率普遍的环境中，8%债券的价值一定数额。而在4%利率普遍的环境中，它的价值会更高。
So yields in the environment down value of a bond up. This is automatic. Now, what not everybody appreciates to the same extent is that the same is true of every other asset, a stock in a company with a certain growth potential and that pays a certain dividend is worth more in a low interest rate environment than a high one.
在低利率环境下，债券的价值会上升。这是因为这种情况自动发生。但是，并不是每个人都能充分理解，同样的情况也适用于其他资产，如某个具有一定增长潜力和支付一定股息的公司股票，在低利率环境下价值更高。而在高利率环境下则价值更低。
A building that throws off $100,000 a year in net operating income is worth a lot more when prevailing interest rates are less. The value of a company, the value of any asset classically, is defined as the discounted present value of the future cash flows. The lower the rate at which you discount the future cash flows, the more it's worth today.
一栋每年净营业收入为100,000美元的建筑，在当前利率较低的情况下价值更高。任何资产的价值，包括公司的价值都被定义为未来现金流的贴现现值。减少未来现金流贴现的利率，这个资产今天的价值就会更高。
So, as I say, there are multiple ways in which interest rates have a salutary effect for everybody other than the lender or the saver. And I think that those multiple ways in which low interest rates are helpful really had a very important effect on those four decades that you describe.
所以，就像我说的，利率对除了借款人或储蓄者之外的每个人都有多种有益的影响。我认为这些低利率有益的多种方式对你所描述的那四十年真的有很重要的影响。
As I say in the memo, I borrowed a 22 and a quarter in 1980 and two and a quarter 40 years later. By the way, I think that not everybody understands the magnitude of this impact and the way I've been describing it to people in the last few days, which means to say it's not in the memo, is using the example of the frog in the hot water.
就像我在备忘录中所说的那样，1980年我借了22.25美元，40年后我又借了2.25美元。顺便说一下，我认为并不是每个人都理解这种影响的重要性。我在过去几天里向人们描述这种影响的方式是，就像青蛙被放在热水中一样，他们可能不会察觉到它的存在。这句话不在备忘录中。
If you put up frog in a pan of hot water, it'll jump out. But if you put it in the pan of cool water and turn on the burner, it'll get gradually hotter and the frog won't know to jump out. So the point is this is something that happened gradually over decades. I think that not everybody is fully conscious of the magnitude of the impact.
如果你把青蛙放在一个热水锅里，它会跳出来。但如果你把它放进凉水锅里再打开炉火，水慢慢变热，青蛙不会意识到要跳出来。所以问题在于这是一个逐渐发生了几十年的过程。我认为不是每个人都完全意识到这种影响的巨大程度。
What do you think is the relationship between those two sea changes that shift in mentality and the declining interest rates? I don't think there's a direct connection, but I think that the fact that they both occur at similar points in time allowed each to amplify the other.
你认为思维方式的改变和利率下降之间存在什么关系？我认为两者之间没有直接的联系，但它们发生在相似的时间点上，使它们互相加强。
And the greatest example of the two in action is probably private equity. The appetite for risk allowed high yield bonds to be issued, which enabled private equity to borrow a lot of money. At the same time, the decline in interest rates made private equity investments very profitable, which led to an amplified the growth of the sector. So more coincidence than causal, but together, a very dramatic impact.
"两者合作最好的例子可能是私募股权。冒险的欲望让高收益债券能够发行，让私募股权可以借到很多钱。同时，利率下降让私募投资变得非常有利可图，这导致了这个领域的增长加剧。所以说，这并不是因果关系，而是巧合促成了非常戏剧性的影响。"
So now let's move on to the third change that you describe. To begin with, can you just discuss what is this third sea change and why you think it merits being referred to as a sea change?
现在让我们继续转向你所描述的第三个变化。首先，你能否讨论一下这个第三个海洋变革是什么，为什么你认为它值得被称为海洋变革？
I think that we had a very consistent environment ever since the end of the global financial crisis, which ended in late 2009. So now it's more than 13 years. With the exception of an unusual period for the pandemic and immediate aftermath, which was affected by exogenous, non-cicocal, non-economic forces, first the pandemic and then the rescue.
我认为自全球金融危机于2009年末结束以来，我们一直拥有一个非常稳定的环境。现在已经过去了13年多了。除了受到来自外部、非周期性、非经济力量影响的疫情及其直接后果这段不寻常的时期，包括疫情和救援。
So they kind of break up the narrative, but you can look at 21 as a continuation of 19. It's really 20 that was anomalous.
这些故事有点打乱了情节，但你可以把21看作是19的延续。实际上是20比较异常。
If you look at that period, so 12 years out of the last 13, you see a very active and stimulative Fed, which could be stimulative and flood the world with money and at low interest rates because inflation was quite essence. We had a consistently positive economic outlook. We had the longest economic recovery in history, albeit a slow one. We had a positive mood, so low level of risk aversion, perhaps due to the fact that the Fed actions really prevented there from being many defaults and bankruptcies, both in the global financial crisis and in the pandemic period.
如果你观察那个时期，也就是过去的13年里，有12年都可以看到联邦储备委员会非常积极和刺激性的政策，其中包括刺激经济并向全球提供低利率的货币，因为通货膨胀处于非常重要的状态。我们始终保持着积极的经济前景，并创下了历史上最长的经济复苏时间，尽管速度缓慢。我们的情绪也很积极，所以风险规避程度较低，可能是因为联邦储备委员会的政策措施有效地预防了在全球金融危机和疫情期间的许多违约和破产。
I'll just note that in the crises of 1991 and a 102, there were two years of double digit defaults in the Hyal Bond universe in the global financial crisis, which in many ways was much worse, there was only one and in the pandemic crisis, there were none.
我想提醒大家，在1991年的危机和102年的危机期间，在Hyal Bond宇宙中出现了两年双位数的违约率。在全球金融危机中，情况更糟糕，只有一年。而在疫情危机中，没有出现任何违约。
In the pandemic, we were projected to have 15% defaults among Hyal Bonson was only five. So you can see how strong the impact of the Fed rescue was.
在疫情期间，我们预计贷款违约率将达到15％，但Hyal Bonson只有5％。因此，您可以看出联邦储备救援的影响是多么强大。
As result of all this, we had eager buyers, happy holders, no urgent sellers and the greatest fear, I believe, was foam O of the fear of missing out. Not too many people were afraid of losing money.
因此，我们拥有热心的买家，快乐的持有者，没有紧急出售者，我认为最大的担忧是错过机会带来的焦虑。并没有太多人害怕赔钱。
The credit market was wide open. It was easy for companies to get the money they wanted or investors to get money for leveraged investment programs.
信贷市场敞开大门。公司想要筹到资金或投资者想要进行杠杆投资计划都十分容易。
So I would say this period was uniformly optimistic, positive, easy, untroubled, depending, of course, on who you were. It was a great period for people who owned assets, people who had assets they wanted to sell or people who wanted to borrow money. That's such a great period for bargain hunters or providers of credit.
所以我会说这个时期普遍是乐观、积极、轻松、无忧的，当然这也要看你是谁。对于那些拥有资产的人、想要出售资产的人或想要借款的人来说，这是一个伟大的时期。对于寻找廉价物品或提供信贷的人来说，也是一个很好的时期。
I gave a speech from October of 2012 until February of 2020. That is until the doorstep of the pandemic entitled investing in a low return world. For us, it was a low return world.
从2012年10月到2020年2月，我做了一场演讲。那是在疫情降临之前，题目是“在低回报的世界中投资”。对我们来说，这是一个低回报的世界。
That fixed income bonds credit, however you wanted to describe it, was offering the lowest returns in its history. There was cash at zero, treasuries at one, high grade bonds at two, or three, high yield bonds at four or five. These were not very helpful for most institutional investors. For example, defined benefit pension plans need roughly seven. So you can't use one, two, three, four, five percent returning assets very much in a portfolio that needs seven and a slow period.
那些固定收益债券的信用，无论你如何描述，其提供的回报率都是历史最低的。现金回报率为零，国债回报率为一，高等级债券为二或三，高收益债券为四或五。对于大多数机构投资者来说，这些并没有太多帮助。例如，确定的养老金计划大约需要七个回报率。因此，你不能在需要七个回报率和缓慢时期的组合中太多使用回报率为一、二、三、四、五百分之的资产。
Now I believe most of what I describe is reversed. The Fed is obviously restrictive. It has to be because inflation is now at a 40-year high or reached a 40-year high.
现在我相信我所描述的大部分情况是相反的。美联储显然是保守的。这是必须的，因为通胀现在达到了40年的高点。
The economic outlook probably includes a recession. They everybody tells me, not a forecaster. Everybody believes that raising interest rates to kill off inflation will produce a recession. It's not easy to get money anymore for a corporation. It's not cheap. The credit mechanism is somewhat in a jam because of the hung bridge loans. The buyers are not that eager. The holders are not that complacent.
从经济前景来看，可能会出现经济衰退。这是别人告诉我的，我不是个预测家。大家都认为提高利率来解决通货膨胀问题会引发经济衰退。现在对于公司来说，获得资金变得不容易了，而且也不便宜。由于悬而未决的桥梁贷款，信贷机制遇到了一些困难。买家也不是那么热心了，持有者也不那么安心了。
Well, certainly at 9.30, this was one of the worst years in history for both stocks and bonds and probably the worst for the combination of stocks and bonds. Of course, there's been a rally in the stock market since 9.30.
嗯，当然，在九点半时，这是历史上股票和债券表现最糟糕的一年，对于股票和债券的组合可能是最糟糕的。当然，自九点半以来，股市有所反弹。
But now there's real fear, not just FOMO. Now there's risk aversion. Now the outlook is not so rosy and the going is not so easy. But now credit instruments, treasury returns are now forish, not oneish. Yield spreads are additive to that and they're not skinny, they're normal. So prospective yields on credit instruments are pretty good. I describe them as more than ample.
现在有了真正的恐惧，不只是FOMO（害怕错过）。现在有了风险规避。现在的前景不那么乐观，走路也不那么轻松了。但是现在信用工具和国债回报率不仅仅是稍微有点令人欣喜，而是非常令人欣喜。收益率差额也增加了，它们不是很小，而是正常的。因此，信用工具的预期收益率非常好。我形容它们为非常足够。
The 7% investor can make use of credit instruments today, whereas it was tough to use public, unlevered credit instruments a year or two ago. So if it's true that the description of the 19 through 21 period is now changed, is it 180 degrees or is it 143 degrees or is it 90 degrees, I think it's substantially different. I think that some of these changes may be permanent.
那些7%的投资者今天可以利用信用工具，而在一两年前使用公共的、没有杠杆的信用工具是很困难的。因此，如果19到21年这段时间的描述现在改变了，是180度还是143度还是90度呢？我认为它是根本不同的。我认为其中一些变化可能是永久性的。
I'm pretty confident that interest rates are not going to go down another 2,000 basis points. I think that a lot of what went on in those 12 years was a function of the low rates and thus the sanguine environment. Maybe we're in a period where being an asset owner or a borrower is not an unmitigated bone where a bargain hunter or a lender can find better opportunities. If so, and if it lasts a while, I think that is a sea change.
我非常有信心，利率不会再降低2,000基点了。我认为在那12年里发生的很多事情都是由于低利率和乐观的环境所导致的。也许我们正处于一个时期，成为资产所有者或借款人并不是一项没有附加条件的好事，而找便宜货或放贷人可能会找到更好的机会。如果是这样，并且持续一段时间，我认为这是一个巨大的变革。
And you described the declining interest rates of the frog and the boiling water and this is kind of long term. What we're seeing now seems to be a pretty rapid shift. So I'm curious how you think it might be different in that it is so sudden.
你说了蛤蟆和沸水的利率下降，这是一种长期趋势。但我们现在看到的似乎是一个相当迅速的转变。我很好奇你认为这种变化会有何不同，因为它是如此突然。
Well, I think first of all, Anna, that this was behind the very bad performance of stocks and bonds in the first 9 months of 2022. All of a sudden, remember that in 20, when the Fed cut rates to zero and pumped out money through quantitative easing, the buying up bonds, and when the Treasury engaged in so much in relief payments, COVID relief payments and deficit spending, people said, well, we think it's going to be inflationary. Yet it didn't rear its head. And you'll recall a lot of discussion of something called modern monetary theory, which said that these things don't matter. And by the way, we don't hear anything about that anymore.
嗯，我认为首先，安娜，这是导致2022年前9个月股票和债券表现非常糟糕的原因。突然之间，我们记得在20年的时候，当美联储把利率降到零并通过量化宽松购买债券，当财政部进行了许多救济付款、COVID救济付款和赤字支出时，人们说，嗯，我们认为它会导致通货膨胀。但是却没有出现。你会记得大量讨论的现代货币理论，这种理论认为这些事情并不重要。顺便说一句，我们再也没有听到关于这个的任何消息了。
Then in 21, we started to see the inflation. As I recall, it was in the region of 4% in April of 21. And then the Fed came out strongly that they thought it was transitory. In late 21, they allowed, well, maybe not transitory, maybe structural for a while. And so they embarked on a dramatic program of interest rate increases.
21年时，我们开始看到通货膨胀。据我记得，当时4月份的通货膨胀率大约在4%左右。然后美联储公开表示他们认为这是暂时的。到了21年末，他们认为通货膨胀不一定是暂时的，可能是结构性的。所以他们开始了一项大规模的加息计划。
Probably the strongest I've ever seen. The Fed used to move interest rates in increments of 25 basis points. And 50 was considered strong medicine and a fairly dramatic signal. Oh my God, they increased 50 well this time around. The Fed did some 75s consecutively. So this was a very, very dramatic period of interest rate increases, which produced very dramatic declines in the stock and bond markets. I think the shock of all that was very substantial.
这可能是我见过的最强烈的表现了。美联储曾经以每次25个基点的幅度调整利率，而50个基点被认为是强烈的药物和相当戏剧性的信号。哦天啊，这次他们增加了50个基点。美联储连续做了一些75个基点的调整。因此，这是一个非常，非常戏剧性的利率上升期间，导致股票和债券市场的急剧下跌。我认为所有这些的冲击是非常重大的。
And as you indicate much more sudden than a slowly heating up the water in the pan. So how would you have any final thoughts? Well, Anna, I do believe that the period ahead will be markedly different from the period behind. I don't know if it's going to last one year, two years, or be a real sea change with some aspects of permanence. Do you know I'm not a forecaster?
你说得没错，它比慢慢加热平底锅中的水更加突然。那么你有什么最终想法吗？嗯，安娜，我相信未来的时期会与过去的时期显著不同。我不知道它会持续一年、两年，还是一些方面会有永久性的真正的变化。你知道我不是预测家。
And I emphasize in the memo that we're not going to bet on my forecast. But I do think that the Fed now realizes it can't be in a similar mode on a permanent basis. And the other thing is, of course, some people might argue we're going back to zero or one on the Fed funds rate. But back in 17 or 18, there was considerably unhappiness with the low level of interest rates because people said, but if we have a recession and the Fed has to cut rates to cure the recession, there's no room from zero or one.
我在备忘录中强调我们不会以我的预测为赌注。但我认为美联储现在已经意识到长期处于类似模式是不可行的。当然，有些人可能会争辩说我们回到了美联储基金利率的零点或一点。但在17 或18年期间，人们对低利率水平感到相当不满，因为他们说如果我们遭遇经济衰退，美联储必须降息以治愈萧条，但从零点或一点开始的空间很有限。
And I would imagine that the Fed is not going to go back there and get back into that pickle. So I think that we'll see higher rates for a while. I think that roughly the current level will be close to the norm for the next several years. And we're only substantially less if there's a serious recession that needs fighting, which, of course, some people think we're going to see in the next year or two.
我认为联邦储备委员会不会再回到那个困境里去。因此，我认为我们将在未来一段时间内看到更高的利率。我认为目前的利率水平大致上将是未来几年的常态。除非出现需要应对的严重经济衰退，否则我们只会略微降低利率，当然，一些人认为我们会在未来一两年内看到这种情况。
But if people say, as I always imagine them in my head saying, let's go back to normal like 2010 to 2019. That was an unusual, easy period, which I think we're not going back to. Howard, thanks so much. Thank you, Anna. It's always a pleasure to get behind the memo.
但如果人们像我在脑海中一直想象他们会说的那样，让我们回到以前正常的时光，仿佛是2010年至2019年那样。那是一个不寻常的、轻松的时期，我认为我们不会回到那个时期。霍华德，非常感谢。谢谢你，安娜。总是很高兴能够理解备忘录。
Thank you for listening to the memo by Howard Marx. To hear more episodes, be sure to subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts. This podcast expresses the views of the author as of the date indicated and such views are subject to change without notice.
谢谢大家收听 Howard Marx 的备忘录。如果您想听更多的剧集，请务必在您通常收听播客的平台上订阅。这个播客反映了作者截至指定日期的观点，这些观点可能会随时更改，恕不另行通知。
Oak tree has no duty or obligation to update the information contained herein. Further, Oak tree makes no representation and it should not be assumed that past investment performance is an indication of future results.
橡树没有更新此处所含信息的责任或义务。此外，橡树不作任何陈述，也不应该认为过去的投资绩效是未来结果的指示。
Moreover, wherever there is a potential for profit, there is also the possibility of loss. This podcast is being made available for educational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. The information contained herein does not constitute and should not be construed as an offering of advisory services or an offer to sell or solicitation to buy any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction.
此外，无论在哪里存在利润的潜力，也存在亏损的可能性。本播客仅供教育目的，不应用于任何其他目的。此处所含信息不构成，也不应被解释为提供咨询服务的建议或任何辖区内有关证券或相关金融工具的买卖或邀约要约。
Certain information contained herein concerning economic trends and performances based on or derived from information provided by independent third party sources. Oak tree capital management LP Oak tree believes that the sources from which such information has been obtained are reliable.
这里包含的有关经济趋势和表现的某些信息是基于或从独立第三方来源提供的信息推导而来。橡树资本管理有限合伙企业橡树认为，这些信息的来源是可靠的。
However, it cannot guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based. This podcast, including the information contained herein may not be copied, reproduced, republished or posted in whole or in part in any form without the prior written consent of Oak tree.
然而，它不能保证该信息的准确性，并且尚未独立验证该信息或该信息基于的假设的准确性或完整性。这个播客，包括所包含的信息，未经橡树的事先书面同意，不得全部或部分复制、再版、重新出版或张贴。