The Rewind: Calling The Market
发布时间 2023-03-07 07:01:00 来源
This is the memo by Howard Marx. Today, we're featuring another episode of The Rewind, in which Howard looks back on some of his memos over the years, discusses their origins, and considers their relevance to today's financial environment. In this episode, Howard discusses a few memos related to calling the market. He's interviewed by Oak Tree Senior Financial Writer Anna Shamanski.
这是霍华德·马克斯留下的备忘录。今天我们将推出重温节目的另一集，霍华德将回顾他在过去几年中写过的一些备忘录，并讨论它们的起源，考虑它们在今天的金融环境中的相关性。在这一集中，霍华德讨论了一些与市场预测相关的备忘录。他接受了橡树资深金融作家安娜·沙曼斯基的采访。
Howard, let's begin by talking about how this discussion came about. Sure. I think this is a particularly significant discussion today, and I've been looking forward to it. About four months ago, the Financial Times asked me to participate in their column, Lunch with the FT, which comes out every Saturday, and they interview somebody of interest, somehow I got on that list.
霍华德，我们开始谈论这次讨论是如何发生的吧。好的。我认为今天这次讨论特别重要，我一直在期待着。大约四个月前，金融时报请我参加他们的专栏《与金融时报共进午餐》，每个星期六出版，采访某个有趣的人，不知怎么我被列入了那个名单里。
They were going to come over here and meet me at my favorite Italian restaurant, and block from the office, and that took place in late September. To prepare, they asked for some memos that might be exemplary. I went back and I read a few from the last 23 years that were written at what turned out to be turning points for the market. I noticed some common threads running through them, and it's really those threads that I look forward to discussing with you today.
他们原本打算来这里，和我在距离办公室一个街区的我最喜欢的意大利餐厅见面，时间是在九月下旬。为了做好准备，他们要求我提供一些可能具有典型意义的备忘录。我回去阅读了过去23年里写于市场转折点的一些备忘录，发现了它们之间有一些共同的主题。今天我非常期待和大家讨论这些主题。
Let's start with bubble.com from January of 2000. I know you've long said this was the first memo that really elicited a response. What do you think it was about this memo? What were you saying that really made people sit up and take notice? As you say, Anna, I started writing the memos in 1990, so it was 10 years down. Literally, not only had nobody ever said they were good, nobody even said they got them.
我们从2000年1月的bubble.com开始吧。我知道你一直说这是第一个引起反应的备忘录。你认为这个备忘录有什么特别之处吗？你说了些什么让人们真正关注起来？就像你所说的，Anna，我从1990年开始写备忘录，到了这个备忘录已经是10年后了。实际上，没有人曾经说过这些备忘录很好，甚至没有人说他们理解了其中的内容。
But this one had two virtues. It was right, and it was right fast. If you're right slow, it doesn't do you any good. One of the first addages I ever learned is that being too far ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong. The people who might have said something about the tech bubble in 96 or 7 or 8 had to sit there and watch their clientele disappear because they were missing what looked like a phenomenon.
不过这个产品有两大优点。第一，正确性，第二，速度快。如果你的正确性速度慢，那对你就没有什么好处了。我记得我最早学到的一句名言就是，“领先于时代太多就等于错误”。在96年或97年或98年，有可能会发出有关科技泡沫的警告的人，必须坐在那里看着他们的客户消失，因为他们没有意识到这是一件看起来像是一种现象。
I'd been writing throughout the fall of 1999, and I put out the memo on the first day of 2000, and the tech media telecom bubble imploded in about six months. So promptly enough for people to say, I guess that was right.
我在1999年的整个秋季一直在写作，而在2000年的第一天发布了备忘录，科技传媒电信泡沫在大约六个月内破裂了。所以很及时，让人们可以说，“我猜那是对的。”
Can you speak a little bit about what was in that memo? Sure. It might have been the first memo in which I talked about the broad markets. The previous memos had mostly been about investment philosophy, not about assets. But in the latter part of 1999, I was struck by the extremeness of the TMT bubble.
能否稍微谈谈那份备忘录里都有些什么内容？当然可以。那份备忘录可能是我第一次谈到广泛市场的备忘录。之前的备忘录大多是关于投资哲学，而不是关于资产。但在1999年后期，我被 TMT 泡沫的极端程度震惊了。
In particular, the illogicalities and the similarities to previous episodes which had turned out to be bubbles which had imploded. So I thought it was really stark, the comparison. The clearest memory I have from the fall of 1999 is reading a book called A Devil Take the Hindmost by Edward Chancellor, and he talked about past excesses, past bubbles. It's so resonated for me with the present.
特别是，它的不合逻辑和类似于以前出现过的泡沫已经破灭的情况，这使我觉得这个比较非常鲜明。我对1999年秋天最清晰的记忆就是读了一个叫做《梭哈手中的恶魔》的书，作者是爱德华·钱西勒，他谈到了过去的过度和泡沫。它与现在非常相关，让我感觉深刻。
People leaving their day jobs to trade. They did that in the South Sea bubble. People who resisted this idea that didn't make any sense until it did so well and made so many other people money that they couldn't resist anymore. People who bought into schemes or companies without thinking about devaluation, or in many cases without even knowing what they did.
有人离开白天的工作去做交易。这在南海泡沫时期就已经发生了。一些人一开始对这个想法很抵触，认为它毫无意义，直到这个想法非常成功，赚了很多钱，让其他人也随之跟风。还有一些人在考虑不够充分的情况下买入大涨的计划或者公司，甚至很多时候他们甚至都不知道那些东西是干什么用的。
That was true in the TMT bubble and also in the South Sea bubble. I tell the story about somebody who spent his whole existence day trading one stock for a year and he didn't know the name of the CEO of that company. So the point is when these manias catch on, either positive or negative, people get carried away based on their view of the future, the prospect for making or losing a lot of money, and they don't care that much about the facts or what we call basic due diligence.
那在TMT泡沫时期和南海泡沫时期也是这样。我讲了这样一个故事，一个人花了一整年时间日交易一支股票，却不知道那家公司的CEO叫什么。所以，重点在于当这些狂热情绪扩散时，无论是积极还是消极的，人们会根据他们对未来的看法、赚或赔很多钱的前景而被带走，他们并不太关心事实或我们所称的基本尽职调查。
Yeah, it sounds so similar to also what we recently saw with crypto. Exactly. Exactly. And the TMT bubble, especially the internet bubble or the e-commerce bubble, was built on people who were not skeptical. One of the hallmarks of the bubble is the lack of skepticism. So in the TMT bubble, there were all these companies that didn't have any profits, didn't have any revenues, didn't have any facilities. They were just an idea. And yet people were buying their stocks and bidding them up a company without any profits or maybe without any revenues would come public at $20 a share on a given Tuesday and close the day at 100 and go on to 200 the next day.
对，这听起来很像我们最近看到的加密货币。确切地说，TMT泡沫，特别是互联网泡沫或电子商务泡沫，是建立在不怀疑的人群之上的。泡沫的标志之一就是缺乏怀疑精神。因此，在TMT泡沫中，有许多公司没有任何盈利、没有任何收入、没有任何设施，它们只是一个想法。然而，人们仍然购买他们的股票，并提高公司的价格。有时一家没有任何利润或者可能没有任何收入的公司会在一个星期二以每股20美元的价格公开上市，当天收盘价为100美元，随后在第二天上涨到200美元。
And in my recent memo, what really matters, I talked about investing sardines versus trading sardines. In the bubbles, people think of these things as just ways to make money. It's not a company. It's not a product. It's not a balance sheet. It's just something I can buy and make money on regardless of its inherent merits.
在我最近的备忘录《真正重要的是什么》，我谈论了投资沙丁鱼和交易沙丁鱼。在市场泡沫中，人们会认为这些只是赚钱的方法。这不是一家公司。这不是一个产品。这不是一份资产负债表。只是一些我可以购买并赚钱的东西，无论它是否具有内在的价值。
One of the things that you wrote in bubble.com that I thought was really important is you noted that changing the world is not enough. That stock can be overvalued even if the company's underlying technology does turn out to be revolutionary. So I was hoping you could speak more about that.
在bubble.com上你写的一件事情我认为非常重要，就是你指出改变世界并不一定足够。即使公司的基础技术确实具有革命性，股票也可能被高估。所以我希望你可以再多谈谈这个问题。
Let me go back another 30 years to the 60s when I joined the industry. The day I started work in September of 69 at Citibank. The bank was an adherent to the nifty 50 school of investing, which I have spoken about a lot. It identified the 50 best and fastest growing companies in America, companies for which nothing could ever happen that was on toward and thus companies for whose stocks there could be no price to high.
让我回到60年代再过30年，那时我加入了这个行业。我在1969年9月份在花旗银行开始工作的那一天。这家银行奉行投资精选50大品牌的理念，我已经谈论过很多次了。这些品牌是美国最好和增长最快的公司，对它们来说，不会发生任何可能拖累它们的事情，因此，对它们的股票来说，价格可以无限高。
If you held those stocks for the five years following the day I started, you lost almost all your money in the best companies in America. One of the earliest lessons I learned was that successful investing is not a matter of buying good things but buying things well. It's not what you buy, it's what you pay. You can buy into something great, but if you pay a price which is too high, you can lose money.
如果你在我开始那天持有那些股票五年，你会在美国最好的公司中几乎失去所有投资。我最早学到的一课是成功投资并不是购买好东西的问题，而是购买得当的问题。重要的不是你购买了什么，而是你支付的价格。你可以投资于一个很棒的项目，但如果你付出的代价过高，你可能会亏损。
That's basically what all bubbles are about. There's always a seed of truth, but it gets taken too far. Usually because people say, ah, no price too high. So in the nifty 50, we had IBM, Xerox, Kodak, Polaroid, Merck, Lilley, Texas, Instruments, Hewlett-Packard. Great companies, no price too high.
这基本就是所有泡沫的本质。通常都有一些真相的种子，但是被夸大了。一般是因为人们说：“啊，没有价格太高的问题。”因此在Nifty 50中，我们有IBM、Xerox、Kodak、Polaroid、Merck、Lilley、Texas、Instruments、Hewlett-Packard这些伟大的公司，没有价格太高的问题。
When a stock is selling at a PE ratio of 90 times earnings, that is too high in most cases when earnings are real. And when the PE ratio goes from 90 to 9, that's the easiest way to lose 90% of your money. And that's what happened to the nifty 50. Likewise, the TMT bubble was built on the belief, for example, that the internet would change the world.
当一支股票的市盈率达到90倍时，在大多数情况下，这太高了，特别是当盈利是真实的时候。而当市盈率从90倍降至9倍时，这是最容易亏损90%的方式。这正是“聪明50”的遭遇。同样地，TMT泡沫建立在这样一种信念之上，例如，互联网将改变世界。
And people made the leap from that statement to the belief that for a company that deals with the internet or e-commerce or something like that, there's no price too high. That's the logical leap where the failure resides. The internet has changed the world. The world is unrecognizable from the world of 25 years ago, of the years leading up to the tech bubble.
人们从这个说法中想到了这样一个信念，那就是对于一家从事互联网、电子商务或类似行业的公司来说，没有价格是过高的。这是逻辑上的跳跃，也是失败的根源所在。互联网改变了世界。现在的世界与25年前、科技泡沫之前的世界已经完全不同，几乎无法辨认。
But that didn't keep people from losing not 90% like they did with the nifty 50, but 99 or 100% of their investments in hundreds of companies that were created and came public in the late 90s. And what this makes me think of is the importance of history. You're going back and looking at what we've seen in the past.
但这并没有阻止人们像Nifty 50一样失去了90%的投资，而是在上世纪90年代末成立并上市的数以百计的公司中，他们失去了99或100%的投资。这让我想到历史的重要性。你要回顾过去我们所见过的东西。
Obviously, this idea of there being no price too high is something that quite recently we saw come up again. I know in bubble.com and also in your memo from 2012, Deja Vu all over again. You really focus on this importance of history. So I'd like you to speak about that.
显而易见，最近我们又看到了“价格再高也不嫌贵”的这个想法出现。我知道在bubble.com和你2012年的备忘录中，你真的强调了历史的重要性。所以我想请你谈谈这个问题。
Well, Santiana said that those who are ignorant of history are bound to repeat it. And Mark Twain said history doesn't repeat, but it does rhyme. As I read the six memos that you've raised at today's conversation, number one I talked about, for example, Twain's quote frequently.
好的，Santiana说过那些不了解历史的人注定会重蹈覆辙。马克·吐温说历史不会重复，但是会有押韵的地方。当我阅读你今天谈话提出的六个备忘录时，例如第一个备忘录中我经常提到吐温的这个引语。
But in many cases, what I was talking about were excesses that investors were guilty of at that time, which echoed excesses of the past which had led to tears. Well, why can't they understand that if it caused a problem 50 years ago and another one 25 years ago, that it's likely to cause a problem today?
在很多情况下，我谈论的是那些投资者曾犯下的过度行为，这些行为是过去曾经导致悲痛的过度行为的回声。为什么他们不能理解，如果它在50年前和25年前引起了问题，那么今天很可能会引起问题呢？
And the answer is that a lot of people are ignorant of history or if they know history, their prudence is negated by their desire to get rich. Charlie Munger always quotes the philosopher, Demosthenes, who said, for that which a man wishes that he will believe. And the power of wishful thinking is very strong and the desire to get rich is very strong.
答案就是很多人对历史无知，或者即使知道历史，他们的谨慎性也被致富的欲望所消减。查理·芒格总是引用哲学家德摩斯尼的话：一个人希望什么，他就会相信什么。愿望的力量非常强大，致富的欲望也很强烈。
And these things can overwhelm any knowledge of prudence or any history. And as you said, so many bubbles are based on a new technology because it's that sense of, oh, well, this is new. Great, this grain of truth that most bubbles are built around, usually surround something new. It's hard to do it with the old.
这些事情可能会压倒任何谨慎的知识或历史。就像你说的，许多泡沫都基于新技术，因为这是那种感觉，噢，这是新的。这是大多数泡沫建立在的真理粒子，通常是围绕着一些新事物展开的。用旧的很难做到。
It's hard to say, oh, everything that used to be true about the airline industry or airplanes is different now or the steel industry or the restaurant industry. It doesn't work that way. But it's easy to believe that something we've never seen before, which bursts on the scene to acclaim is unique in some way and not trampled by the things that restrained other industries and companies in the past.
说出航空业或飞机的所有过去真相都已经改变，或是钢铁业或餐饮业，这很困难。事情不是那样运行的。但容易相信，一个我们从未见过、突然现身且备受赞扬的事物在某些方面是独特的，并且没有被过去束缚其他产业和公司的压力所阻挡。
So let's stay on deja vu all over again. There's many good lines in this memo, but there's one that really jumped out at me.
所以我们还是继续把话题留在“历史再一次重演了”上吧。这份备忘录中有许多好的表述，但其中有一条让我印象深刻。
You write, if I was asked to name just one way to figure out whether something is a bargain or not, it would be through assessing how much optimism is incorporated in its price. Can you elaborate on this?
如果让我只选一种方法来判断某件东西是否划算，我会考虑它的价格是否蕴含了多少乐观情绪。你能详细说明一下吗？
A few minutes ago, I mentioned that it's not what you buy it, what you pay. No matter how good an asset is, it can be overpriced, an unsuccessful investment or underpriced at a successful one. What matters is not the quality of the asset, but the relationship between the price and the quality.
刚才我提到，重要的不是你买什么或者花多少钱买，无论资产有多好，它可能会被高估或者投资失败，也可能会被低估而获得成功。真正重要的是资产价格与质量之间的关系，而不是资产本身质量的好坏。
So you can get quality cheap, you can get low quality cheap, or you can get high quality but overpay for it. And I use the word optimism to sum up the factors that result in the relationship between price and value.
所以你可以买到质量好但价格便宜的商品，也可以买到质量差但价格低廉的商品，还可以买到高质量但可能要付出昂贵的代价。我使用“乐观主义”一词来总结价格和价值之间的关系所涉及的各种因素。
A company has in some sense an intrinsic value. That's what we value investors try to figure out. It can be elusive, it can be hard to figure out. But in theory, that intrinsic value exists. And the question is, where is that security selling in relationship to the intrinsic value? And what determines the relationship between price and value?
一家公司在某种程度上具有内在价值。这便是我们价值投资者尝试弄清的。它可能有些难以捉摸，也可能很难理解。但从理论上讲，内在价值是存在的。问题在于，证券在内在价值的关系中正在以何种价格出售？又是什么决定了价格和价值之间的关系呢？
I use the word optimism to sum it up. If people are excited about something, whether it's a high quality asset or a low quality asset, if people are excited about it, it will probably sell at a price of Bobbitt's intrinsic value. And if people are turned off to it and have lost interest, it will probably sell at a price below its intrinsic value. And we want to know that. And we love to buy assets below intrinsic value, we sometimes have to pay intrinsic value and then make our money from the increase in the intrinsic value. But we should be forewarned before we buy assets for more than their intrinsic value. It's really a very simple calculus. Once you think through it.
我用「乐观主义」这个词来总结。如果人们对某样东西感到兴奋，无论它是高质量的还是低质量的，只要人们感到兴奋，它就很可能以Bobbitt内在价值的价格出售。如果人们对此失去了兴趣，并不感兴趣，那么它很可能以低于内在价值的价格出售。我们想了解这一点。我们喜欢以低于内在价值的价格购买资产，有时我们不得不以内在价值购买，然后从内在价值的增长中赚钱。但我们在超过内在价值购买资产之前应该有预警。这实际上是一个非常简单的计算问题。一旦你思考清楚了，就很容易明白。
So let's move to another market call. In the years leading up to the global financial crisis, you wrote a number of memos where you talked about the risks building in markets. I'm thinking especially of there they go again in May 2005 and the race to the bottom published in February 2007.
那我们来看看另一个市场。在全球金融危机之前的那几年，您写了很多备忘录，讲了市场上正在累积的风险。我特别想提及的是2005年5月的"他们又来了"和2007年2月发表的"竞相比肩贬值"。
Now I know you don't base your market calls on macro predictions. So what were some of the key things you were seeing that made you make this call?
现在我知道你不基于宏观预测来进行市场预测。那么，是有什么关键的事情促使你做出这个判断呢？
You're right. I try not to rely on macro forecasts, but rather current observations. It's much easier to predict the present than it is to predict the future. In the environment of those years, I was seeing behavior amongst investors that I thought was reminiscent of the TMT bubble and other excesses that I'd seen.
你说得对。我试图不依赖宏观预测，而是依靠当前的观察。预测现在比预测未来容易得多。在那些年的环境中，我看到投资者的行为让我想起了TMT泡沫和其他过度的现象。
So for example, it's different this time. People always say that about something new. People were saying that our example residential market back securities and subprime mortgages. It's a sure thing. No matter what price I pay, I'm sure to make money. In other words, no price too high. If I pay too high a price, there's always somebody I can sell it to. It's great or fool theory.
所以，举个例子，这次就不同了。人们总是这样谈论新事物。人们曾经这样谈论我们的住宅抵押证券和次级房屋抵押贷款市场。这是肯定的。无论我付什么价格，我一定会赚钱。换句话说，价格再高也不怕。如果我付了太高的价格，总会有人买。这是一个好理论或傻瓜理论。
Even if I make a huge mistake and pay too much for something, somebody else will make a bigger mistake and buy it from me at a higher price. I can always get out. I know this isn't going to work forever. Maybe overdone already, but I want to ride that train as long as I can and before it turns out, I'll get out.
就算我犯了一个大错，花了太多钱买某些东西，也会有其他人犯更大的错，以更高的价格从我这里购买。我总是可以出手。我知道这种方式不会永远有效。也许已经太过沉重了，但我想尽可能长时间地乘坐这班火车，在它变坏之前，我会退出。
You always say these kinds of things and others, as Twain said, these are the themes that rhyme from cycle cycle. The details are always different, but these themes rhyme.
你总是说这些话，正如托马斯·托马斯所说的，这些主题在不断地循环和变化。细节总是不同，但这些主题却是相似的。
The interesting thing about all six of these memos at the turning points was that I don't talk in any depth about the assets themselves. I really didn't have expertise in tech stocks or the internet or residential mortgage back securities and so forth. It's all about just what I'm observing in the environment, which tells me to heat it or too cold.
所有六份备忘录在转折点上的有趣之处在于，我并没有深入谈论这些资产本身。我真的不太懂科技股、互联网或住房按揭证券等领域的专业知识。一切只关乎我观察到的环境，告诉我这里是否过热或过冷。
Historically, when those things are true to an extreme, I think that has been enough. I think it's particularly worth noting that the global financial crisis of 0708 was based on excessive optimism or too low standards, shall we say, applied to subprime mortgage back residential mortgage securities.
历史上，当这些事情被极端地证明为真时，我认为这已经足够了。值得特别注意的是，全球金融危机在0708年是基于对次级抵押贷款支持的住房抵押贷款证券的过于乐观或太低标准。
Not only did I not know much about them, I barely knew they existed. This was not the movie, the big short to the contrary. This was not a national mania. This was something that was happening in a distant obscure corner of the fixed income world. I didn't even know it existed.
我关于它们几乎一无所知，甚至几乎不知道它们的存在。这不是电影《大空头》所描述的情况。这也不是全国热潮。这只是固定收益世界一个遥远而不起眼的角落中正在发生的事情。我甚至不知道它的存在。
I was able to say the environment is nutty. Investors are acting nutty. The risk is probably too high. And that's what turned out to be the case. So that diagnostic works at the extremes.
我能够说环境很疯狂。投资者的行为也很疯狂。风险可能太高了。这就是实际情况。所以这种诊断方法适用于极端情况。
When I was working on my book, Basterying the Market Cycle, I said to my son Andrew, on reflection, I think my market calls have been about right. And he said, that's true, Dad, because you did it five times in 50 years and five times or six or four or seven or whatever the number was.
当我在写我那本名为《征服市场周期》的书时，我跟我儿子安德鲁说，反思后，我觉得我所做的市场预测大概是正确的。他说：“没错，爸爸，因为你已经成功预测了五次，在过去五十年里，以五次或六次或四次或七次或其他数字为例。”
The market was either so high or so low relative to intrinsic value that the logic was compelling for the call and the probability of being right was high. But if I had tried to do it 50 times in 50 years or 500 times or 5000 times, I would not have been correct.
这个市场相对于内在价值要么太高，要么太低，因此选择看涨期权非常有道理，而且做对的可能性很大。但如果我在50年内尝试这样做50次，或者500次，或者5000次，我也不会一直正确。
So the point is that each of these memos identified a point in time when the excesses were pronounced. Touching on one of the things you just mentioned about not having made 50 or 100 calls or saying that something was 10% overvalued.
所以重点是，每个备忘录都指出了某个时刻过度行为的存在。就你刚刚提到的一个问题，比如没有打50或100个电话，或者说某物被高估了10%。
Another thing you've mentioned is that it's impossible to pick the absolute bottom. This is something you actually in 2008 during the height of the financial crisis wrote in a memo to clients. So I want you to speak about that.
你提到的另一件事是，无法准确捕捉到市场的最低点。这是你在2008年金融危机爆发期间向客户发送的备忘录中明确指出的。所以我希望你能谈一谈这个问题。
One of my repeated themes that hopefully rhymes from cycle cycle is the belief that it is folly to think you can buy at the bottom. And a lot of people paralyzed in fear in my opinion, trying to sound intelligent, say, we're not going to try to catch a folly knife.
我的一个反复强调的主题，希望从一个周期到另一个周期都能同韵，就是认为认为你可以在市场最低点买入是愚蠢的。在我看来，很多人因为恐惧而瘫痪，试图表现得聪明，说我们不会试图抓住愚笨的刀子。
We're going to wait till it hits bottom. We're going to wait till the dust settles and the uncertainty is resolved. Maybe if stocks are going from 100 to 90 to 80 to 70 to 60, at 60, somebody says I'm not going to try to catch a folly knife out of fear that it's going to go to 50 and 40 and 30, which of course it could. But it begs the question of whether it's cheap at 60. And if it's cheap at 60, in my view, they should buy.
我们要等它跌到谷底。我们要等到尘埃落定，不确定性解决之后再做决定。如果股票从100跌到90、80、70、60，当它跌到60时，有人说：“我不会去试图接住摔下来的刀子，因为它可能会跌到50、40、30，当然这是可能的。” 但这就引出了一个问题，它在60的价格是否便宜。如果在60的价格便宜，在我看来，他们就应该买进。
And if it goes to 50, they should buy more. Having revalidated the thesis. But to say we're going to wait for the bottom strikes me as all wet. What is the bottom? The bottom is the day before the rally starts. So if it's the day before something, how can you know that it's the day?
如果股价上涨到50，他们应该买更多。已经证实了这个论点。但说我们要等待股价触底，我认为不够明智。什么是底部呢？底部是涨势开始前的那一天。因此，如果是某件事情之前的那一天，你怎么知道那一天就是底部呢？
The only time you know that Tuesday was the bottom is by looking back and saying, oh, yeah, they didn't go down anymore from there. They went up by definition and never know when you're at the bottom. And the other thing that's important is in some fancy full version of the truth, the bottom is the day that the last highly-moted seller sells.
唯一能确定周二是市场底部的方法是回过头看，然后说“哦，对了，它们从那里开始就没有再下跌了”。按照定义，它们开始上涨，并不知道何时是底部。另一件重要的事情是，在某些花哨的真相版本中，市场底部指的是最后一个高度推荐卖家卖出的那一天。
It doesn't take much selling to create the bottom. It doesn't take much buying to start the rally. Just optimism has to replace pessimism at the margin. But if the bottom is the day the last seller sells, then by definition, there's not much for sale on that day.
创建底部并不需要进行大量销售，而开始反弹也不需要进行大量购买。只要乐观情绪能够取代悲观情绪，就可以在局部市场中创造底部。但如果底部是最后一个卖家出售的那一天，那么根据定义，在那一天销售量并不大。
It's wrong to think about initiating your position at the bottom. And I believe that if you're like us and you have to buy a substantial amount to make an impact, then I think you should say we're willing to buy on the weight of the bottom and maybe the little bit we can pick up at the bottom. And we're willing to buy once the bottom has been passed and we're on the way up.
认为在基础位置开始投资是错误的。如果你和我们一样需要投入大量资金才能产生影响，那么我认为你应该说我们愿意在价位较低时购买，并且可能会尝试在底部拾取一些。在底部已过并且价格开始上涨时，我们愿意购买。
It's important to bear in mind that you might say, well, we'll buy on the way down and on the way up. On the way up, you can't get much. Why? Because optimism has replaced pessimism. On the way down, pessimism is still increasing. The urgency of getting out is growing and you can buy a lot.
重要的是要记住，你可能会说：“我们会在下跌和上涨时买入。”在上涨时，你买不到太多，因为乐观已经代替了悲观。在下跌时，悲观情绪还在不断增加，时间已经很紧迫，但你可以买到很多东西。
So I think that's extremely important. We didn't wait in the fall of our way until we got to something at the bottom. My memo of that time to investors in some of our funds called current developments, I think actually allowed for the fact that things would probably go down more. But we said this is the time to get going. Why? Because things were cheap. And they had gone down substantially already.
我觉得这非常重要。我们在秋天不等到跌到谷底再行动。当时我给我们某些基金的投资者写的备忘录称为当前的发展，实际上允许事情可能会更糟。但是我们说，现在是行动的时候了。为什么？因为东西很便宜。而且它们已经大幅度下跌了。
They were likely to go down further. Who knows how much or for how long. But the time to start buying is not at the point where they're not going to go down anymore or much more. That's when they get cheap. If you wait and you say it's cheap today, but it'll be cheaper tomorrow, I'm going to wait and you're wrong, then you miss it.
他们很可能会进一步下跌。谁知道下跌多少或持续多长时间。但是开始购买的时机不是在它们不会再下跌或下跌幅度不会更大的时候。那时它们才会变得便宜。如果你等待并说现在便宜，但明天会更便宜，我会等待而你却是错的，那么你就错过了购买时机。
Missing a bargain is much more significant than buying into something early. Because if you buy into something early, but it's cheap, there'll probably come a time when you can sell it out of profit. But if you miss and you hold it off and you miss it, then you'll never get a chance to participate in that bargain.
错过一笔便宜的交易比早期买入更为重要。因为如果你早期买入某物品，但价格划算，可能会有一个时机能够以利润卖出。但如果你错过了并且一直拖延，错过了那个时机，那么你将永远没有机会参与那笔交易。
Yeah, this just makes me think of what you were saying earlier and you said often about focusing on intrinsic value and thinking as an investor, not a trader. Right, that's really the key, isn't it? The trader doesn't want to buy today if it'll be lower tomorrow. The real investor doesn't care.
是的，这让我想到你之前说过的，强调内在价值并把自己当作投资者而非交易员。没错，这就是关键，不是吗？交易员不想在今天买入，如果明天跌了，真正的投资者并不在意这些。
And in fact, there's this terrible, shall I say, fear that something will be lower tomorrow. I was just making a series of visits to clients in the last few months, renewing my travel habits post the pandemic finally.
实际上，有一种可怕的恐惧，我应该说，担心明天会有什么下降。最近几个月我在拜访客户，重新恢复了疫情后的旅行习惯。
And what I said to them is something going down tomorrow is equivalent to something being put on sale in a department store. When something goes on sale into the department store, more people go and more people buy. It's only in the stock market or the bond market that when things get further marked down, people become less willing to buy.
我对他们说的是，明天会有不同的事情发生，就像百货商店里有商品特价促销一样。当商品在商店里促销时，就会有更多的人前来购买。只有在股票市场或债券市场上，当商品标价更低时，人们就会不太愿意购买了。
Buffett says, I believe, I like hamburgers. And when hamburgers go on sale, I eat more hamburgers and you can't argue with that. It makes a hell of a lot more sense than saying, I like this stock, but I hope the price doesn't go down.
巴菲特说，我相信，我喜欢汉堡包。当汉堡包打折时，我会多吃汉堡包，你也不能反驳这一点。这要比说我喜欢这支股票，但希望价格不会下跌更有意义。
If something has gone from 100 to 70, that's a markdown. If it then goes to 60 or 50, that's a further markdown. And isn't that a reason to buy rather than to not buy? And then I think in the opposite way, real people will buy simply because something has gone up. That's right.
如果某件东西从100降到70，那就是打折。如果它再降到60或50，那就是更大的打折。这不正是购买的理由吗？然而，我也有相反的想法，真正的人会因为某件东西升值而购买。没错。
In déjà vu all over again, I reviewed the 1979 Business Week article, The Death of Equities, it was actually issued on the doorstep of probably the greatest 20 year period in the history of the stock market.
在“似曾相识重演”中，我回顾了1979年商业周刊文章《股票之死》，但事实上，它发表在股市历史上最伟大的20年期间之一的门口。
But in 2012 or 13, when I wrote déjà vu all over again, people were again saying stocks have done so badly that nobody will ever buy them. In other words, they've been marked down from 100 to 80 to 60 to 40. And that's a reason why people won't buy them. And if you just apply common sense and you say, everything's on sale, that is actually a reason why people might buy them. And so that's a time to get going.
但是在2012或13年，当我写下“大象再次过眼云烟”时，人们再次说股票表现糟糕，没有人会买它们。换句话说，它们已经从100降至80、60、40。这就是人们不愿购买它们的原因。但是，如果你只是运用一些常识，你会发现，一切都降价了，这实际上是人们可能会购买它们的原因。所以，现在是开始行动的时候了。
I think there's never been a piece of journalism that was as wrong as the death of equities. Did you actually speak a little bit more about the death of equities and what that piece was about? Yeah.
我认为从来没有一篇新闻像 "股市的死亡" 那样错了。您能详细谈谈 "股市的死亡" 是怎么回事吗？是的。
Well, it just goes to show you how what people try to pass off as logic can be illogical and not introspective and superficial. So here the author was saying things like stocks are down so much nobody will ever buy them again.
嗯，这只是告诉你人们试图表现得逻辑却不合适自省和肤浅的本质。所以作者在这里说像股票已经下跌到一个极点，没人会再去购买它们。
Stocks have done so poorly that companies are taking public companies private. Well, if companies are willing to buy public stocks to obtain ownership of the underlying companies, why shouldn't investors buy public stocks for the same reason?
股票表现非常糟糕，以至于公司正在将上市公司转为非上市公司。如果公司愿意购买公共股票来获得基础公司的所有权，那么投资者为什么不为同样的原因购买公共股票呢？
But to say things like stocks have done so badly nobody will ever buy them is totally illogical in one of the memos that I reviewed for the FT and for you today.
但在我今天为《金融时报》和您审查的备忘录中，说像股票表现如此糟糕以至于任何人都不会购买它们这样的话是完全不合逻辑的。
It says that the extrapolator believes that he is respecting history. He has seen something go from two to four to six to eight to 10 to 12 to 14 and he says it's going to go to 16 18 20 because I respect history and I respect the path that it's on.
这段话的意思是，这位预测者相信自己在尊重历史。他发现某种趋势从2、4、6、8、10、12、14递增，因此他认为它将会到达16、18、20，因为他尊重历史，也尊重这个趋势前进的道路。
But the real understanding of history would say things are cyclical things regress to the domain if something has gone from two to four to six to eight to 10 to 12 to 14. It might be too high. The underlying intrinsic value may start to decline.
但真正理解历史的人会说，事物是循环的，如果从两个到四个到六个到八个到十个到十二个再到十四个，它们可能会太高了。潜在内在价值可能会开始下降。
The increase that we've seen so far may have borrowed from the increase that normally would be expected to occur in the future. But that's what the death of equities did and that was a huge mistake.
目前我们观察到的增长可能是借用了未来本应有的增长。但这正是股票死亡的原因，这是一个巨大的错误。
I think it says in the memo that in the two decades the S&P maybe I started with 82 which was the beginning of the uplift. But I think it says that for 20 years the S&P appreciated 18.6% a year which is about almost double the historic rate of return.
我觉得备忘录的意思是，在过去的二十年里，S&P指数可能从82点开始一路上涨。但是我认为备忘录里说的是，20年来，S&P指数每年升值18.6％，几乎是历史回报率的两倍。
So it was the greatest buying opportunity in my opinion in history. This writer was so distressed by the cheapening that had taken place that he thought it was a time to avoid.
在我看来，这是历史上最大的购买机会。这位作者对价格的便宜深感不安，认为此时是应该避免购买的时候。
Now what happened is that when we had the tech media telecom bubble of the late 90s collapse in 2000 the stock market the S&P 500 and the whole stock market was down in 2001 and two. That was the first three year decline since 1939.
现在发生的是，在晚上90年代的技术、媒体、电信泡沫破灭后，股市、S&P 500指数以及整个股票市场在2001年和2002年下跌。那是自1939年以来的第一个三年下降。
So we had gone 60 years without a three year decline. And that turned off people to stocks so they didn't buy them. They looked into hedge funds, private equity, other forms of so-called alternative investing.
所以，我们已经经过了60年没有三年的下跌。这让人们对股票不感兴趣，因此他们不买股票。他们研究了对冲基金、私募股权、其他所谓的替代性投资形式。
That's when I think the word alternative investment was coined and that's when private equity funds went from two billion to four billion to eight billion and so forth.
那时我觉得“另类投资”的词语被创造出来，那时候私人股本基金从20亿美元增加到40亿美元，再到80亿美元等等。
And stocks had a zero return from the high in 2000 until the law which was right around the time of Deju Vuol Organ.
从2000年高点到德朱沃尔机构的时候，股票零回报。
And here were new stories appearing saying stocks have done so badly nobody will ever buy them. And repeating that illogicality. Now that I think of it maybe you would say that a lot of what I'm pursuing in my observations is illogicalities that are being perpetuated that shouldn't.
这里出现了一些新的故事，说股票表现得如此糟糕，以至于永远没有人会购买它们。而且一再重复这个不合逻辑的说法。现在我想起来，也许你会说，我在观察中追求的许多东西是不应该继续存在的不合逻辑行为。
And what is the source of those illogicalities its emotion or psychology or you might say optimism and pessimism in excess.
那些不合逻辑的来源是情感、心理、或者你可以说是过度的乐观和悲观情绪。
Now let's turn to really 2020. This was another market call. You wrote a memo to clients. I believe it was March 19th which I actually think is four days before the market bottom.
现在我们来看看真正的2020年。这是另一个市场预测。您向客户写了一份备忘录。我相信那是3月19日，我认为那是市场触底前四天。
And you noted that obviously there's tremendous uncertainty but it may still be a good time to buy. Obviously the pandemic was very different than other crises. So I'm curious what you were thinking at that time.
你注意到显然存在巨大的不确定性，但仍然可能是一个不错的购买时机。显然，这次疫情与其他危机非常不同。我很想知道你那时候在想什么。
What most of the memo was about was the disease itself. This was March 19th as you say. When I wrote my first memo in the pandemic a couple of weeks earlier.
大部分备忘录是关于该疾病本身的。就像你说的那样，这是在三月十九日。但在疫情爆发之前的几周，我撰写了我的第一份备忘录。
I quoted from a epidemiologist at Harvard Michael Lipsich who said that in normally when we're studying things we have past history extrapolation from prior experience and supposition.
我引用了哈佛大学的流行病学家迈克尔·利普希奇的话，他说，通常情况下我们在研究某些事情时，都是基于过去的经验和假设来推断未来。
But in this case we had no history and we had no past experiences to extrapolate from. It was all supposition. But we all tried to figure out what was a reasonable supposition. The outlook was bleak. And we talked about the virus growing exponentially. It was believed capable of reaching some very bad numbers. And of course it did. We had a million Americans die.
但是在这种情况下，我们没有历史，也没有过去的经验可以推断。一切都是猜测。但我们都试图弄清一个合理的推测。前景看起来很暗淡。我们谈论病毒呈指数增长的情况。人们相信它有能力达到一些非常糟糕的数字。当然，它做到了。有一百万美国人死亡。
So I think the memo might have been sufficiently negative but maybe not. But let's go back to the beginning. For every truth, for every reality, for every actual set of circumstances, for every actual intrinsic value, there's the possibility that prices go so low that they understate the value. We didn't know where we were going. We didn't know how bad the epidemic would be, the pandemic. We only knew one thing.
所以我认为备忘录可能足够负面，但可能不够。但让我们回到开始。对于每一个真相，每一个现实，每一个实际的情况，每一个实际的内在价值，都有可能价格跌至低于其价值。我们不知道我们将去往何处。我们不知道瘟疫会有多糟糕，大流行病会有多糟糕。我们只知道一件事情。
But prices had come down a great deal. Prior to the pandemic, I would say that stock prices were full but not highly excessive. The PE ratio I'm doing this from memory might have been 22. In the TMT bubble, I think it was 32. That was crazy, 22 compared to enormous 16 is high but not crazy. And then from February 19th, which I think was the high to March 19th, which was the date of the memo, I think they had come down about a third. So if they were fairish to slightly high and came down to third, they were probably cheapish. I had no reason to say they weren't going lower, but I'm actually proud of that memo.
但是价格已经下降了很多。在疫情之前，我会说股票价格充实但不是过于过度。我从记忆中得知的PE比率可能是22。在TMT泡沫时期，我认为它是32。那真是太疯狂了，22与巨大的16相比高，但并不疯狂。然后从2月19日（我认为是高点）到3月19日（备忘录日期），我认为它们已下降约三分之一。所以，如果它们是公允的到稍微高，下降到三分之一，它们可能是便宜的。我没有理由说它们不会更低，但我真的为那份备忘录感到自豪。
And I'll read a bit if I may. Even though there's no way to say the bottom is at hand, the conditions that make bargains available certainly are materializing. Given the price drops and selling we've seen so far, I believe this is a good time to invest. Although of course it may prove not to have been the best time. There's no reason to say we're at the bottom. No one can argue that you should spend all your money today, but equally no one can argue that you shouldn't spend any.
如果可以的话，我想读一点书。尽管我们无法确定价格已经到了最低点，但现在我们可以看到，使投资变得具有优势的条件正在显现。鉴于我们目前所见的价格下跌和抛售情况，我认为现在是一个不错的投资时机，当然，可能事实证明这并不是最佳时机。我们不能说价格已经到了最底部，也不能说你应该消费所有的钱，但同样也没有人能够说你不能花任何钱。
I don't view things as black and white, right or wrong. This is the time to buy. This is not the time to buy. Sometimes you buy a little. Sometimes you buy a moderate amount. Sometimes you buy a lot. But not risk on risk off. So I conclude by saying the more you want to garner potential gains and don't mind market to market losses, the more you should invest here.
我不认为事情是非黑即白、对或错的。现在是买入的时候。现在不是买入的时候。有时你买一点儿，有时你买适量的，有时你买很多。但不要赌博，不要冒风险。所以我得出结论，如果你想获得潜在的收益并且不介意市场波动带来的损失，那么你应该在这里投资更多。
Why? Because we were getting bargains. On the other hand, the more you care about protecting against interim mark downs and are able to live with missing opportunities for profit, the less you should invest. But is there really an argument for not investing at all? In my opinion, the fact that we're not necessarily at the bottom is not such an argument.
为什么？因为我们正在获得优惠。另一方面，您越在乎防止暂时降价，而能够接受错过盈利机会，您就应该投资得越少。但是，真的有理由不投资吗？在我看来，我们不一定正处于最低点这个事实不是这样的理由。
And as you say, the market hit its low on March 23rd. So the 19th, I think, was a Thursday. It hit the low on Monday, the 23rd. The Fed came out and clarified and amplified its program. And from there, for the next 21 months, basically through the end of 2021, the market went straight up. As I recall, enough from the 23rd of March to the end of 2020, I think the S&P was up 62%. And then I think it was probably about 29% or something like that in 21. So this was an opportunity to double your money.
就像你所说的，市场在3月23日达到了低点。那么19日是星期四。它在23日星期一达到了低点。美联储出来澄清并扩大了它的计划。接下来的21个月，基本上到2021年底，市场一路上涨。据我记忆，从3月23日到2020年底，标普500指数上涨了62%。然后我认为它在21年上涨了大约29%左右。所以这是一个翻倍掏钱的机会。
Could you have lost money? Sure. Could you have had some mark downs? Sure. But you were buying on a substantial sale. And if you were willing to say the world is not going to end, the pandemic is not going to wipe out the population. And it's not going to decimate the economy and the business community. Then it was just a reasonable starting point.
你可能丢失了钱吗？是的。你可能有一些折扣吗？是的。但你当时是在大力促销的情况下购买。如果你愿意相信世界不会末日，大流行不会灭绝人口，也不会摧毁经济和商业界。那么，这只是一个合理的起点。
Anybody who said in late March, no way, the pandemic has a long way to go. I'm not going to touch it. Obviously, missed one of the great opportunities.
三月下旬时，任何人如果说“绝不会有大流行，我不会碰它”，显然错失了一个重要机会。现在看来，大流行情况还将持续，那些犹豫不决的人已经错过了良机。
It's interesting to me and that section you just read. You didn't say anything about the macro. You didn't say anything about interest rates. And as you said, obviously, the Fed's actions are part of what did cause this, but that's not what you were focused on.
对我来说那部分很有趣。你刚才读的那部分中没有提到宏观经济情况，也没有提到利率。并且，正如你所说的，联储行动是导致此事的一部分，但这不是你关注的重点。
Absolutely. And let's not forget that the appreciation that materialized really, most people questioned it. I would say that from March 23rd to the low point through the end of the year, probably the most often heard sentiment was the disease is so horrible. How can the market be going up? It can't be legitimate. It can't be reasonable.
当然。而且我们不要忘记，实际上，大多数人都对这种出现的赏识持怀疑态度。我认为从3月23日到低点一直到年底，最常听到的情绪可能是这种疾病太可怕了，市场怎么会上涨呢？它不能是合法的，不能是合理的。
And the answer is that the Fed was more powerful in the short run. There's an old saying, you can't fight the Fed. And this was really, I guess, probably the best example we've ever seen. Because in the face of terrible fundamentals and this horrible disease, the Fed engineered a rescue of the economy and the capital markets, which caused number one, 2020, this terrible pandemic year to be the best year in history for raising money for low grade credit instruments and a year of very substantial gains in the stock market on a full year basis.
答案是联邦储备系统在短期内更具有影响力。有一句古话叫做“你不能与联邦储备系统抗争”。我想这可能是我们曾经见过的最好的例子。因为在可怕的基本面和这种可怕的疾病面前，联邦储备系统实现了经济和资本市场的拯救，导致了低评级信贷工具的募资成为史上最好的一年，2020年成为证券市场全年获得非常可观收益的一年。
This idea of not trying to predict the macro and your earlier comments about the fallacy of believing it's different this time may make a listener think about one of your recent memos see change because it obviously is discussing potentially large macro changes.
这个想法是我们不试图预测宏观经济因素，而您之前提到相信这一次会有不同的观点可能让听者想起您最近的备忘录，因为该备忘录显然是讨论潜在的大规模宏观变化。
I think that my answer is that it's not like I'm predicting a change from one normal atmosphere or environment to another. I think we live through an abnormal environment from 09 through 21 in which interest rates were zero.
我认为我的答案是，这不是像我在预测从一个正常氛围或环境转变到另一个一样。我认为我们在09年到21年这段时间中经历了一个异常的环境，其中利率为零。
Most of the time, if you had a reasonable business, you couldn't default or go bankrupt. In fact, it was terribly easy to raise money and terribly cheap. The economy was really chugging along. We had the longest economic recovery in history and the longest bull market in history.
大多数时候，如果你有一个合理的生意，你就不会违约或破产。事实上，筹集资金非常容易，而且非常便宜。经济真的很快速增长。我们有历史上最长的经济复苏和最长的牛市。
It all stems from the fact that capital market conditions and money market conditions were not left alone to do their thing. They were bossed around by the Fed, which produced the kind of environment that it wanted to rescue the world first from the global financial crisis and then from the pandemic.
所有这一切的根源在于资本市场和货币市场的条件没有自主发展。它们都被联储局掌控，联储局创造了它希望的环境，首先是为了从全球金融危机中拯救世界，然后是为了从这场疫情中拯救世界。
But that kept interest rates, I would say, unnaturally low. First of all, the Fed took the Fed funds rate to zero. I think it was at the end of 2008 or beginning of the year and I think that was the first time that it was ever zero. That was pretty radical.
我觉得那导致利率非常不自然地低。首先，联邦储备委员会将联邦基金利率调到了零。我记得是在2008年底或者新年开始的时候，也是它第一次归零。这很激进。
In researching the memo, I was surprised to learn that it kept it at zero for seven years. Most people wouldn't guess that.
在研究备忘录时，我惊讶地发现它已保持为零七年之久。大多数人应该猜不到吧。
Clearly by 2012 or 2013 or 2014, the economic recovery was well established. Why would you keep the Fed funds rate at an emergency level? Interest rates of zero, it's kind of like adrenaline. Somebody has a heart attack. You give them adrenaline or nitroglycerin and it brings them back. But nobody starts their day with a daily injection of adrenaline for seven years. That's not very healthy.
到了2012年、2013年或2014年，经济复苏已经非常稳定了。为什么你要让美联储紧急利率保持在零水平呢？零利率就像肾上腺素，当有人心脏病发作时，你会给他注射肾上腺素或硝酸甘油，让他恢复过来。但是没有人会每天注射肾上腺素七年，那样对健康很不好。
Why would the Fed keep rates at an emergency level? I think the answer is they kind of got into a trap where people said, no, we like it at zero. And if you raise it above zero, we're going to throw a temper tantrum.
为什么联邦储备委员会会保持利率处于应急水平呢？我认为答案是他们陷入了一个圈套，人们说，我们喜欢利率为零。如果你把它提高到零以上，我们会发脾气。
You may recall October 2nd was the day mastering the market cycle was published. So I can remember that on October 4th, we're talking about 2018 now. I think the Fed funds rate hit three and a quarter because Powell was trying to raise interest rates so that, among other things, if there was a recession, he could lower it and pull off a rescue.
你可能还记得，Mastering the Market Cycle这本书是在10月2日出版的。因此我能记得是在10月4日，我们现在谈论的是2018年。我想美联储基金利率达到3.25%是因为鲍威尔试图提高利率，这样如果发生经济衰退，他可以降低利率并拯救经济。
You can't rescue the economy by cutting interest rates from 1% because there's just no room. So it got up to three and a quarter, the market threw a temper tantrum. I believe that the fourth quarter of 2018 was the worst fourth quarter in history. And they retreated from that at the beginning of 2019 with the economy strong.
你不能仅靠降低1%的利率来拯救经济，因为没有足够的空间。所以利率升到了3.25%，市场陷入了狂暴之中。我认为2018年第四季度是历史上最糟糕的一个季度。但在2019年初，随着经济的强劲复苏，他们开始从这个措施中退出了。
And in the ninth or tenth year of an economic recovery, the cutting interest rates. So I don't think they want to get into that again. I don't think they want to be perpetually at zero or close to it.
在经济复苏的第九或第十年，降息并不是他们想要做的事情。所以我不认为他们想再次陷入这种情况。我认为他们不想永远处于零利率或接近零利率的状态。
And the other thing is that the Fed pays lip service to wanting to have a neutral interest rate. And a neutral interest rate is one which is neither stimulative nor restrictive. It's just what it is. Naturally occurring, I think, is the fair description.
另一件事是美联储口头表态希望实现中性利率。中性利率既不刺激经济也不抑制经济，它只是它自己，我认为“自然而然”的描述很贴切。
When they last talked about it last summer, I think it was July, they said they think that the neutral interest rate is 2.5. So from that verbiage, and logically, I would expect to see 2.5 be kind of a norm. Not zero or a half or even one.
他们上次谈论这个问题是去年夏天，我想是在七月份，他们说他们认为中性利率是2.5。从这个说法和逻辑上看，我预计2.5应该是一种常态，而不是零、半个或者甚至是一个。
So that's my judgment. Now I'm playing common sense, which is always dangerous, but that's where I come out. And it's again that idea of when something is an extreme.
那就是我的判断。现在我正在运用常识，这是非常危险的，但这就是我的结论。而且这再次涉及到一种极度的概念。
Yes. I think you're right. Absolutely. That's a great observation. All these things are about extremeness. When the market investor behavior is extremely optimistic or extremely pessimistic, when the valuations numerically are extremely high or extremely low, then you have a chance of making an observation that will hold water.
是的，我认为你说得对。绝对没错，这是一个很好的观察。所有这些事情都与极端性有关。当市场投资者的行为极度乐观或极度悲观时，当估值数字极高或极低时，你就有机会做出一个持水的观察。
But in the meantime, in the middle where the psychology and the valuations are not extreme with their plus 10 minus 20, you just don't have a very high probability of being right. So do you have any final thoughts? Yes. I do.
但同时，在心理和估价不极端的中间地带，也就是加十减二十的范围内，你的正确概率就不会太高。那么，你有最后的想法吗？是的，我有。
So let's go ahead and look at the next step. Psychology swings to extreme highs and extreme lows. And it is from the extremeness of the swings that the opportunity or the danger comes. When we're at extreme highs, there's danger. When there's extreme lows, there's opportunity.
那么，让我们继续往下看下一步。心理学会出现极度高涨和极度低谷的情况。而正是从这些极端摇摆中带来了机遇或危险。当我们处于极其高涨的状态时，就有危险。当处于极度低谷时，就有机会。
The extreme swings of the market and Sue from extreme swings toward optimism or toward pessimism. The enabling mechanism is these beliefs that people hold, especially in extreme times, that permit them to make these mistakes. It's different this time. There's no price too high. It'll never go down. If it's about to go down, I'll sell it to somebody else. I can always get out.
市场的极端波动以及苏在极端波动中的乐观或悲观态度，都是由人们拥有的信念所驱使的。在特殊时期，人们容易因为这些信念而犯错。他们常常认为：这次不一样；没有价格太高；它永远不会下跌；如果它要下跌，我会把它卖给别人；我总是能赶上出场。
It helps to be my age and have lived through so much market history. But the great thing about humans is in theory they can learn other than from experience. You can read about these things. You can read the Chancellor's book, for example. But the key is as you are reading about the 18th century, you must say is this relevant to today? You don't read it just as a point of interest or for your amusement or the past of time. You say what are the proper inferences to draw? These are a lot of what I think about.
对我来说，年龄和曾经经历过如此多的市场历史是一项帮助。但人类的伟大之处在于理论上他们可以从经验之外而学习。你可以阅读关于这些事情的书籍。例如，你可以读读大臣的书。但关键是，在你阅读18世纪的内容时，你必须问自己这对今天是否有相应的意义？你不能仅仅将其视为一种兴趣或娱乐或历史时期。你要问自己有哪些合适的推断可以作出？这些是我经常思考的内容。
What does the book tell me about history that's relevant today? What does the behavior that I'm seeing today of stock prices maybe tell me about the underlying investor psychology and might it be erroneous and if so, in which direction and to what extent? So you just have to be curious and seeking and conscious of this role of history and role of psychology. And then I think you can understand what's going on around you.
这本书对今天的历史有什么启示？我今天看到的股票价格行为，也许可以告诉我关于投资者心理的一些东西，而且如果是错误的话，可能是在哪个方向上以及程度如何呢？你只需要充满好奇心，寻求和意识到历史和心理学的作用，我相信你就可以理解你周围正在发生的事情。
Thank you so much. This is a great conversation. Well, I enjoyed it too. Thank you Anna, as always.
非常感谢你。这是一次很棒的对话。我也很享受。安娜，一如既往地感谢你。
Thank you for listening to The Memo by Howard Marks. To hear more episodes, be sure to subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts. We'll hear from many of Oak Tree's leading experts, including Howard. They'll go beyond today's market chatter and focus on what we believe really matters for investors today.
谢谢你们收听 Howard Marks 的《备忘录》。如果你想听更多的集数，请务必在你听播客的地方订阅。我们将邀请许多橡树资本的领先专家，包括 Howard Marks。他们将超越当今市场的喧嚣，关注我们认为对投资者真正重要的事情。
This podcast expresses the views of the author as of the date indicated and such views are subject to change without notice. Oak Tree has no duty or obligation to update the information contained herein. Further, Oak Tree makes no representation and it should not be assumed that past investment performance is an indication of future results. However, wherever there is a potential for profit, there is also the possibility of loss.
该播客表达了作者在指定日期的观点，而这些观点可能会随时改变，但橡树公司没有更新此处所含信息的责任或义务。此外，橡树公司不表示过去的投资业绩是未来结果的指示，也不应该这样认为。然而，每当有赚钱的潜力时，也必然伴随着风险。
This podcast is being made available for educational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. The information contained herein does not constitute and should not be construed as an offering of advisory services or an offer to sell or solicitation to buy any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction. Certain information contained herein concerning economic trends and performances based on or derived from information provided by independent third party sources.
这个播客仅供教育目的而提供，不应用于其他任何目的。其中所含的信息并不构成或应被解释为提供咨询服务的提议或出售或购买任何证券或相关金融工具的邀请。此处所包含的关于经济趋势和表现的某些信息基于或源自独立第三方提供的信息。
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橡树资本管理有限合伙公司（简称为橡树）认为所获取的信息来源可靠。然而，橡树不能保证这些信息的准确性，并且未经过独立验证这些信息的准确性或完整性，或是这些信息所基于的假设。本播客包括所包含的信息，未经橡树事先书面同意，不得全部或部分复制、再生产、发布或发布。