Munk Dialogue with Graham Allison: the deteriorating relationship between the US and China
发布时间 2022-12-27 17:58:11 来源
These statues have to come back. It's always been a pandemic of the unvaccinated. The problem now is it's a pandemic of the willfully unvaccinated.
这些雕像必须回来。它一直是未接种疫苗人群的流行病。现在的问题是它已经成为故意不接种疫苗人群的流行病。
Falling birth rates are good. They're good for our planet. They're good for our societies.
出生率下降是一件好事。这对我们的地球有益，对我们的社会也有益。
We're not responsible for the escalation with Russia. We're not the ones who invaded Ukraine. I don't think it's fair to portray people of color as victims.
我们对与俄罗斯的升级不负责任。我们不是那些入侵乌克兰的人。我认为将有色人种描绘成受害者是不公平的。
It is a very dangerous time in American politics.
这是美国政治中非常危险的时刻。
Hello, Monk listeners. Rudyard Griffiths here, your host and moderator. Welcome to this, the latest in our continuing conversations called the Monk Dialogs. These are in-depth Q&As with some of the world's sharpest minds and brightest thinkers. We go deep into the big issues that are transforming our world and shaping our future on each and every Monk Dialog episode.
大家好，"接触喜马拉雅的听众"。我是主持人和主持人鲁德亚德·格里菲斯。欢迎来到我们正在进行的名为"喜马拉雅对话"系列的最新一期。这些是与世界上最聪明的思想家进行的深入问答。在每一期"喜马拉雅对话"节目中，我们会深入探讨正在改变我们世界并塑造我们未来的重大问题。
On today's program, we explore the worsening relationship between the United States and China. What happens when a rising power like China threatens to displace a dominant power like America? Perhaps no one is more qualified to answer this all-important question than Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University. Professor Allison is a world-renowned scholar and foreign policy expert who has advised multiple U.S. governments on defense policy for the last four decades. He is the author of numerous best-selling books, including, Destin from War, Can America and China Escape through CitiD's Trap.
在今天的节目中，我们探讨了美国和中国之间日益恶化的关系。当一个像中国这样的崛起之国威胁到像美国这样的主导国家时，会发生什么呢？或许没有人比哈佛大学政府学教授格雷厄姆·艾利森更有资格回答这个至关重要的问题了。艾利森教授是世界知名的学者和外交政策专家，过去四十年来曾多次为美国政府提供国防政策建议。他是许多畅销书的作者，包括《战争的命运：美国和中国能否摆脱修昔底德陷阱》。
Professor Allison joins us from Boston, Graham. Welcome to the Monk Dialogs. Thank you very much for having me.
艾莉森教授加入我们这里，格拉汉姆。欢迎来到《和尚对话》。非常感谢你邀请我。
Let's jump right in here and kind of set the scene for our listeners. What would you characterize as the state today of relations between the United States and China?
让我们直接开始，为我们的听众勾勒一个背景。你如何描述当前美中关系的状态？
Well, that's a timely question coming right after the Bali bilateral summit between Biden and she. But I think the consensus judgment has been that the relations between the U.S. and China are the worst that they've been in the 50 years since the opening to China. It was hard to remember, but that was back in 1972 with Kissinger and Nixon and Mao and so in lie. And I agree with the consensus judgment that they are about as bad as they have been, even though I think what happened in Bali in the bilateral summit was at least the beginning of what I hope will be an effort to build a bit of a floor under the continued deterioration.
嗯，这个问题来得正是时候，在拜登和习近平的巴厘岛双边峰会之后。但我认为普遍的判断是，美中关系是自1972年的中美交往以来最糟糕的。虽然很难记得，但那是与基辛格、尼克松和毛泽东等人举行的。我同意这种普遍判断，认为目前的局势几乎和过去一样糟糕，尽管我认为巴厘岛双边峰会上发生的事情至少是我希望能够努力在继续恶化的情况下建立一个基础的开始。
But I think that equally important point for your listeners and for all of us is to think about why this downward spiral.
但我认为对于您的听众和我们所有人来说同样重要的一点是要思考为什么会出现这种恶性循环。
And there I think there are two big factors. The first that most people neglect is the structural reality. And then the second are the policy choices that have been made by the governments.
在那里，我想有两个重要因素。第一个是大多数人忽视的结构现实。第二个是政府所做出的政策选择。
And the structural reality is captured by Thucydides in his brilliant analysis of the rise of Athens and its impact on Sparta back in classical Greece. But at this stage, I don't think anybody can deny that China is a meteoric rising power. That the U.S. is a colossal ruling power and that the clear threat by China to displace the U.S. from its traditional position of predominance at the top of every pecking order is creating a dynamic that Thucydides captured in what I've characterized as Thucydides trap. Namely, with a rapidly rising power seriously threatens to displace a major ruling power, all hellbusters, disruption and ahead, seat belts to be tightened, rocky, and typically, most often, a dynamic that ends up dragging the people into a war often a war that neither of them really wanted, but which nonetheless, they came from one choice to the next choice and felt that they had no alternative but to take a little bit greater chance and one thing led to the other. So that structural reality is the first, and I would say that accounts for more than half of the deterioration.
而这种结构性现实被修昔底德在他对古希腊的雅典崛起及其对斯巴达的影响的精彩分析中所捕捉到。但在当前阶段，我不认为有人可以否认中国正在迅速崛起。美国是一个庞大的主导国家，而中国对取代美国在传统上占主导地位的明确威胁正在创造一种修昔底德所提到的修昔底德陷阱。也就是说，当一个快速崛起的大国严重威胁到取代一个主导大国的地位时，破坏、紧张、摩擦都将随之而来，人们会为此做好准备，但通常情况下，这种动态最终导致人们卷入一场战争，这往往是两国都不想要的战争，但由于一步步限制选择，他们感到别无选择，不得不冒更大的风险，最终一发不可收拾。因此，这种结构性现实是第一个因素，我认为它占了恶化的超过一半原因。
In my destined for war book, published just as Trump became president, I said expect things to get worse before they get worse. So that's for the structural reason.
在我出版的目标是战争的书中，正值特朗普成为总统之际，我曾经说过，预计事情会变得更糟，然后再变得更糟。这是出于结构性的原因。
The second is the policy choices, and there I would say both policy choices in Beijing and in Washington and elsewhere, where finding it so difficult to deal with the reality of the policy and even the shock of a genuine rivalry, the typical reaction, again in Thucydides in terms, is to say, Sri Khara, who is this party and what does he think he's doing? Why is he challenging me? So Washington's reactions have been rather typical, and similarly, as people say, well, Xi Jinping seems more aggressive, more assertive, more determined to stand up for China. That's called normal for rising power. As again, Thucydides explained, power that's becoming stronger looks at the order that has been provided by the ruling power and says, well, you established this before I even got here. You didn't consult me, my interests weren't taken into account, things need to adapt and adjust.
第二个因素是政策选择，在这一点上，我要说无论是在北京还是在华盛顿和其他地方，都很难处理政策的现实和真正对抗的冲击。典型的反应，再次以修昔底德的观点来看，就是说：“马格里斯，这个人是谁？他到底在干什么？为什么他挑战我？”因此，华盛顿的反应是相当典型的，同样地，正如人们所说，习近平似乎更加积极、自信，更有决心为中国站出来。这被认为是崛起中的大国的正常表现。正如修昔底德所解释的那样，正在变得更强大的实力会看到已经被主导大国建立起来的秩序，并说：“你在我到来之前就确立了这个秩序，你没有征求我的意见，没有考虑我的利益，事情需要调整和适应。”
So I think so far the reactions both in Washington and Beijing and unfortunately elsewhere have been stumbling, trying to find some way to deal with the fact that while on the one hand, China will for the U.S. and for the West, pose the gravest chai, the gravest rivalry they've ever seen. So that's baked into the geopolitics. On the other hand, equally powerful is the fact that we both live on a very small globe and that in this enclosed biosphere we each emit greenhouse gases, and they have the same impact no matter whether they come from Canada or U.S. or Africa or China. And any parties, especially the U.S. and China, the number one and number two, can buy themselves on their current trajectory, create a biosphere that none of us can live in before the end of the century. So you say, well, yikes, we have to find some way to take account of that. And it's not enough just as regard to you as my rival. You also have to be my partner in trying to deal with that.
我认为到目前为止，华盛顿和北京以及其他地方的反应都显得有些笨拙，试图找到一种处理方法。一方面，中国对美国和西方构成了前所未有的最严重的威胁和竞争，这已经融入到地缘政治之中。另一方面，同样强大的是我们都生活在一个非常小的地球上，在这个封闭的生物圈中，无论温室气体是来自加拿大、美国、非洲还是中国，它们都会产生相同的影响。任何一方，特别是美国和中国，作为第一和第二大排放国，如果按照目前的轨迹继续发展，将在本世纪末创造出一个我们都无法生存的生态圈。所以你可以说，哎呀，我们必须设法考虑到这一点。对于你作为我的竞争对手而言，仅仅这样是不够的。你还必须成为我在应对这个问题上的合作伙伴。
Secondly, we both have nuclear arsenals that are robust enough so that if there should be a nuclear war between U.S. and China, both societies would end up being destroyed. So we can't have a war. That becomes a nuclear war. We therefore have a shared, powerful interest that comes just from the necessity for my survival. And what about pandemics? They don't have passports. And what about financial crises that start one place and end up creating a different. So there's a level of interdependence that's been created by a combination of nature for climate and technologies, nuclear weapons, and the development of modern integrated societies, that while the arrivals require us to be partners. Well, that's pretty stressful. So I would say that's the challenge that both Beijing and Washington are dealing with. It's not surprising that in the first instance they're having some difficulty getting their head around that.
其次，我们两国都拥有强大的核武库，以至于如果美国和中国之间发生核战争，两个社会都将毁于一旦。因此，我们不能开战。那将变成一场核战争。我们因此对自身生存的必要提出了共享的强烈利益。那么，流行病呢？它们没有护照。金融危机又如何？它们起源于一个地方，最终却在不同地方造成影响。因此，自然环境、气候、技术、核武器以及现代化社会的发展共同打造了一种相互依存关系，催生了我们成为合作伙伴的必要性。这确实带来了相当大的压力。因此，我可以说这是北京和华盛顿都面临的挑战。不足为奇的是，在首次尝试解决这个问题时，他们都遇到了一些困难。
Excellent. Summing up. Thank you so much. As we think about what could be the trigger for a conflict to this point that has been largely one of words, tens nonetheless, high stakes nonetheless. As you've mentioned, climate change, pandemics, we could think of the regulation of artificial intelligence. There's so many things that China and the United States arguably urgently need to cooperate on. But the proverbial fly in the ointment, you know it well, Graham. It is Taiwan. And I wonder how you might see China going about asserting its territorial rights over Taiwan in what people are now positing an increasingly near-term scenario for such an event to occur.
非常好。总结一下。非常感谢你。当我们考虑到什么可能成为冲突的导火索时，虽然目前这一冲突主要还是言语上的，但风险依然很高。正如你提到的，气候变化、流行病，我们还可以考虑到对人工智能的监管等问题。中国和美国有很多紧迫的合作需求。但是你对此很了解，阻碍合作的一个因素是台湾问题。我想知道在一个越来越近期的情况下，中国如何维护其对台湾的领土权益，以及人们如何预测这种情况可能发生。
Well, great question and a big one. So the fastest track, the war between US and China goes through Taiwan. We should just start with what the realities are. So the differences in views between Beijing, Washington, and Taiwan are essentially irreconcilable. But they were irreconcilable 50 years ago. So irreconcilable does not mean unmanageable, even though managing it could require a great deal of imagination. So that's the first place to start. This is not hopeless, or in any case it's not more hopeless than it was 50 years ago. And what was created 50 years ago was a framework in which in the past 50 years, people living on both sides of the straits have seen a greater increase in their well-being than in the five decades in their whole history. So that's for Taiwanese, that's for Chinese, that's for the whole area. So I would say, what a fantastic success. Don't screw it up. That's the first thing.
嗯，好问题，也是个大问题。所以，美国和中国之间最快的战线就是经过台湾。我们应该从现实出发。北京、华盛顿和台湾之间的观点分歧基本上是不可调和的。但五十年前它们就是不可调和的。因此，不可调和并不意味着不能管理，尽管管理可能需要很大的想象力。所以这是第一个要开始的地方。这并不是没有希望的，或者至少不比五十年前更没有希望。五十年前创造的是一个框架，在过去五十年里，海峡两岸的人民的福祉比他们整个历史上的五十年都有更大的增长。所以对于台湾人来说，对于中国人来说，对于整个地区来说，这是一个多么成功的成果啊。别破坏它，这是第一点。
So then secondly, well then why is this at risk of conflict? And I would say, well, China has an indelible commitment to Taiwan as an integral part of China. And any effort to separate Taiwan from China on some permanent basis as an independent country is something any Chinese leader would fight go to war to prevent. Because if he failed to do so, he wouldn't be the leader anymore. So that's on the one hand.
其次，那么为什么存在冲突的风险呢？我想说的是，中国对台湾作为中国不可分割一部分的坚定承诺是不可磨灭的。任何试图将台湾永久地分离出中国、作为独立国家的努力，都会引发中国领导人为防止而发动战争。因为如果他未能这样做，他就不再是领导人了。所以这就是一方面的情况。
On the other hand, Taiwanese have grown up, especially now the majority of the Taiwanese population have grown up in a free, self-governing country. So they're accustomed to living in a very successful market economy that has a very lively democracy, a very vibrant 23 million people. And more and more, they cannot imagine that they shouldn't, that that's not normal. If you ask them, well, how would you like to live in Hong Kong? They don't want to live in Hong Kong. They don't want to live in Taiwan. How would you like to live in Beijing? They don't want to live in Beijing. They like to live free. And I would say for Americans or Canadians or others in the world that live in free societies, one has to be greatly admiring of what they've created. And it seems quite plausible to say, well, why shouldn't they be able to live as a free country? And there's only one reason why is because China will not prevent that happening.
另一方面，台湾人已经长大了，特别是现在台湾大多数人口已经在一个自由、自治的国家中长大。所以他们习惯于生活在一个非常成功的市场经济体系下，拥有一个非常活跃的民主制度，拥有着2300万人口的充满活力的社会。越来越多的人无法想象他们不应该这样生活，这是不正常的。如果问他们想不想住在香港，他们不想住在香港。他们也不想住在北京。他们喜欢自由的生活。对于居住在自由社会的美国人、加拿大人或其他世界上的人来说，我们必须非常钦佩他们所创造的成就。我们有理由说，他们为什么不可以作为一个自由国家来生活呢？唯一的原因是中国不会容许这种情况发生。
So can somehow the U.S. and China and Taiwan manage to sustain under something called strategic ambiguity or some wrapper that basically manages contradictions for some substantial period of time? Well, people said 50 years ago, you can't do this. Excuse me, they did. And we have. So I would say that's the challenge going forward.
所以美国、中国和台湾是否可以以某种称为战略模糊或某种基本管理矛盾的方式维持一段相当长的时间呢？嗯，人们在50年前说过，你做不到这一点。不好意思，他们做到了。我们做到了。因此，我认为这是未来的挑战。
And I think the, why is it now, why is there more concern about it, more alarm about it? And I would say several reasons. There's no question Xi Jinping has made more, more, more spoken more about and talked more about the need not to keep passing on this problem from one generation to another, even suggesting that he needs to do it during his leadership to make sure Taiwan is reintegrated. And I think Chinese watching what's going on in Taiwan see that Taiwanese are getting less and less interested in becoming an integral part of a China that's ruled by an autocratic party led Xi. So that's on the one hand.
我认为，为什么现在会出现更多关注和警惕呢？我想有几个原因。毫无疑问，习近平更多地谈到了不将这个问题代代相传的必要性，甚至暗示他需要在他的领导期间确保台湾重新融入中国。而且我认为，中国人看到台湾的情况，他们看到台湾人对成为一个由习近平领导的独裁党统治的中国的一部分越来越不感兴趣。这是一方面。
On the other hand, in the U.S., as China has become identified first as a competitor and then as an adversary and then more and more increasingly as an enemy, the idea that, well, we should confront China wherever we can. And here's a good place to do so. So if they are behaving like they deserve to take over a self-governing, vibrant market-oriented democracy, we should be standing up for them and defending them the way that we're trying to help defend Ukraine against Russia. Why shouldn't we? I mean, if we believe in the values that we say we believe in, we have a stake in this.
然而，在美国，随着中国首先被视为竞争对手，然后是对手，然后越来越多地被视为敌人，有一种观点认为，我们应该在任何可以的地方与中国对抗。这里是一个很好的地方这样做。所以，如果他们表现得好像他们理应接管一个自治、充满活力、以市场为导向的民主国家，我们应该为他们站出来并像我们努力地帮助乌克兰抵抗俄罗斯那样来保护他们。我们为什么不应该这样做呢？我的意思是，如果我们相信我们所说的价值观，我们在其中有一定的利益。
And then beyond that, people are now making arguments about, well, there's also a military rationale. If Taiwan was part of the first island chain or something, I don't find much plausibility in that, but still that's an argument. And another is, well, Taiwan, and not just a free independent or self-governing entity, it's also got a very lively technology set of companies, including the most important semiconductor company in the world, the SMC. So you can see how on the U.S. side, increasingly there's an effort to sort of, quote, protect Taiwan. And I think the danger in this is that some unthinking, unwitting provocation creates conditions in which either of the parties feels obliged to respond in a way that takes them to another round of this, would be a basically vicious circle in the end that would lead to conflict.
然后除此之外，人们现在也在讨论军事方面的理由。比如说，如果台湾是第一岛链的一部分什么的，对此我并不觉得有太多的可信度，但这确实是一个观点。还有一个观点是，台湾不仅仅是一个自由独立或自治的实体，它还拥有一些非常活跃的科技公司，包括全球最重要的半导体公司，即SMC。所以你可以看到，在美国方面逐渐有一种努力去“保护台湾”的倾向。我认为这种做法的危险在于，一些无意识的挑衅会造成一方或两方都不得不以某种方式作出回应，进而产生又一轮冲突，最终变成一种恶性循环。
And the analogy that I think is most troubling is what happened in the period running up to 1914, which you're familiar with, and I'm sure some of your listeners are, but basically, I believe you cannot study 1914 too much. I have a pretty good chapter on it if one wants just a chapter version in my destined for war book, but the fact is that under the conditions that had been created, something as bizarre as a terrorist killing an archduke in Serievo, which was something that didn't even make the front pages in New York or Canada, you know, at the time, within five weeks had dragged all the nations of Europe into a war at the end of which they were all basically destroyed. So the fact that parties don't want a war doesn't mean that a war can't happen.
我认为最令人不安的类比是发生在1914年战争爆发之前的情况，你应该对此很熟悉，我相信你的听众中也有一些人了解这个故事。但基本上，我相信你无论怎么研究1914年都不为过。在我的《注定要打仗》一书中，我有一章专门讲述这段历史，如果有人只想看一章的话可以参考。但事实上，根据当时的情况，一件如同恐怖分子杀害塞尔维亚大公的荒谬事件，当时甚至没有登上纽约或加拿大的头条新闻，却在五周内卷入了所有欧洲国家的战争，最终导致他们全部遭受毁灭。因此，政党不想要战争并不意味着战争不会发生。
The fact that if they, if after the war, if in 1918, you would have given any of the leaders who were in power in 1914, that the defense for a do-over, nobody would have made the choices he made, now that they could see where they led, but in the circumstances they couldn't. So I can imagine, just to go to the heart of your question, I think the great danger arises not from she waking up one day saying this is a good day to do this. He has such a long agenda, such an ambitious agenda at home, since he knows that the cost of this would be huge, and that there would be great uncertainties about it that would disrupt the rest of his agenda.
事实是，如果他们，在战争之后，如果是在1918年，你把权力掌握在1914年的领导人面前，让他们重新选择防御策略，没有人会做出他当时所做的选择，因为他们现在能看到这些选择的后果，但在当时的情况下他们做不到。因此，我可以想象，直奔你的问题核心，我认为真正的危险不是她某一天突然说这是一个做这件事的好日子。他有如此庞大的议程，如此雄心勃勃的国内议程，因为他知道这样做的代价将是巨大的，并且对此会有很多不确定性，会干扰他其余议程的进行。
I'm not counting on him waking up out of the blue conducting a, what I can do, imagine, is that American politics now essentially caught up in the furious competition between Republicans and Democrats. Could in the course of the 24th campaign, presidential campaign, and then a new administration in, or second term of Biden in 2025, create a political dynamic in which Republicans call for recognition of an independent Taiwan. And if that seems crazy, Mike Pompeo, who's running for nomination, has already done that. And it's not, unfortunately, just Republicans making this. If you look at the Menendez, who's the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Lindsey Graham Bill that came out of there for a relations committee just a month ago, it's called the Taiwan Policy Act.
我不指望他会突然醒来，但我可以想象美国政治现在基本上陷入了共和党和民主党之间的激烈竞争。在2024年总统竞选和拜登2025年的新一届政府中，是否可能出现一个让共和党呼吁承认独立台湾的政治动态。如果这听起来很疯狂，追求提名的迈克·庞皮欧已经这样做了。而且不幸的是，这并不仅限于共和党。如果你看看民主党参议院军事委员会主席门德斯，以及刚刚一个月前公布的林赛·格雷厄姆法案，名为《台湾政策法案》。
That initially called for a quote, recognition of Taiwan as a non NATO ally, which is like about five steps up, you know, recognition as a country. Well, my best judgment, and I've asked all the China experts I get about this, is that if we should, if that should happen, if the US declared that it was recognizing Taiwan as an independent country, or even more as a ally. And even if the US seemed to be about to do that, now what will Beijing do? So I would say it's not unlikely, I would say quite likely, that Beijing will act, react violently, and then they have a menu of things that they could do. But I would say that's the fastest path I can find for getting from where we are to nuclear war.
最初的要求是要求报价，承认台湾作为一个非北约盟友，就像是走了五步，你知道的，承认它作为一个国家。嗯，根据我的最佳判断，并且我已经向所有的中国专家咨询过，如果我们应该，如果发生了那种情况，如果美国宣布承认台湾为独立国家，甚至更多地视为盟友。即使美国似乎即将这样做，那么北京会怎么做呢？所以我认为这不太可能，我会说相当可能，北京会采取激烈的反应，然后他们有一系列可以采取的行动。但我会说这是我找到的从目前的状态到核战争最快的路径。
So I think crucial for the parties to recognize why war would be catastrophic for both of them. Fortunately in Xi and Biden, you have two very sane people, and I'm confident that when they talked about this in Bali, they talked pretty candidly about the fact that neither of them wants a war. They both know that they wanted a war, they can either start it, you know, yesterday, tomorrow. They don't need a provocation, but that they're going to be trying to work to try to constrain what are otherwise the forces that would lead either Washington or Beijing to do something that would force the hand of the other party.
所以我认为，各方应该意识到战争对他们两国都将是灾难性的。幸运的是，在习近平和拜登身上，您有两位非常理智的人，我相信他们在巴厘岛讨论这个问题时，对于他们都不想要战争这一事实进行了坦诚的交流。他们都知道，如果他们想要战争，他们可以昨天、明天，甚至当下就开始。他们不需要任何挑衅，但他们将努力约束这些本应促使华盛顿或北京采取行动的因素，以避免一方被迫采取行动。
Hey, Monk Podcast listeners, I wanted to let you know about our other weekly audio program. It's called Friday Focus, and hey, guess what? It comes out each and every Friday. It's half an hour long, and it provides you with a masterclass on international events, all the big issues and ideas shaping our world. We've got that for you. Each and every Friday here at the Monk Debate, simply access via our website, www.munkdebates.com. Click on Friday Focus in the top right navigation. You'll get all the details, or check out a sample of the program in the same podcast feed as the main Monk Debates podcast. I hope you'll join us for the next edition of the Friday Focus podcast. Now back to our program.
嘿，僧侶播客的听众们，我想告诉你们我们的另一个每周音频节目。它叫做《周五聚焦》，猜猜怎么着？它每周五都会发布。它时长半小时，向你提供了一个关于国际事件的专题课程，涵盖了塑造我们世界的重大问题和思想。我们为你们准备了这个节目。每周五，在僧侣辩论会的网站上可以获取，网址是www.munkdebates.com。在右上角导航栏点击《周五聚焦》即可获取所有细节，或者在与主要僧侣辩论会播客相同的播客源中试听节目的一段样本。我希望你们能加入我们下一期《周五聚焦》播客的行列。现在回到我们的节目中。
So, Graham, I think one of the questions people are wondering about is, in addition to these kind of flashpoint scenarios that you've outlined, which I think are very compelling, there is under the Biden administration a commitment now to increasingly arm Taiwan, and not insignificantly. We're talking about billions of dollars now of arms pledges, sophisticated defensive systems, but also now increasingly offensive weapons such as surface to ship missiles that could conceivably allow Taiwan to project force off its coasts.
所以，格雷厄姆，我认为人们关心的一个问题是，在你所概述的这些闪点情景之外，拜登政府现在致力于越来越多地武装台湾，而且规模不小。我们谈论的是数十亿美元的武器承诺，先进的防御系统，但现在还包括越来越多的攻击性武器，例如可以使台湾有可能在其海岸线以外展示力量的舰对舰导弹。
How Graham have we gotten so far in some people's minds from the kind of one China policy, and which in a sense was had embedded in an assumption of non-interference to a moment now where there is a one might characterize, at least from the Chinese perspective review, a kind of aggressive arming of Taiwan into a beachhead, a bunker, and a hundred, 160 kilometers off its coast.
在一些人的心中，我们对于中国的一个中国政策已经走得如此远了，其中某种程度上是建立在非干涉的假设之上。但现在的情况是，从中国的视角来看，可以说台湾正在被武装得十分强大，就像是一个堡垒、一个据点，距离中国海岸仅有100到160公里。
Yeah. Well, Taiwan, I mean, I always try to explain to people in Washington, Taiwan is to China in distance about the Cuba from the US, so 90 or 100 miles. You know, you can't quite see that far, but that's not very far. You can get in a boat and be there quickly, and it's very close to China, and it's very far away from the US. So this tyranny of distance in potential military conflicts is a huge, huge, huge factor.
是的。台湾，我的意思是，我经常试图向华盛顿的人们解释，台湾与中国的距离大约相当于古巴与美国的距离，大约90到100英里。你知道，你并不能完全看到那么远，但那并不算很远。你可以乘船快速到达那里，而且它离中国非常近，离美国非常远。因此，在潜在的军事冲突中，距离造成的限制是一个巨大的、非常非常非常重要的因素。
But I think, to your question, the contradictions were built into the basic Taiwan relations, or the Shanghai Communique and its successors, in which Taiwan would be essentially self-governing. Taiwan would not declare itself to be an independent country. The US would not recognize it as an independent country, and we would let history decide, or let time decide, see what happens.
但是我认为，对于你的问题来说，这些矛盾是基于台湾关系的构建因素，或者说是与《上海公报》及其后续文件中的矛盾。根据这些文件，台湾基本上是自治的，不会宣布自己为独立国家。美国也不会承认台湾作为独立国家，我们会让历史或时间来决定，观察发展会如何。
So, in an early stage of this, and I still like the idea of describing Taiwan as kind of a Chinese experiment, or democracy with Chinese characteristics. So part of their broader experiment, and they should take credit for that. They're trying to understand how Chinese can govern themselves. And every society is trying to understand how to do that, certainly Americans.
所以，在这个早期阶段，我仍然喜欢将台湾描述为一种中国实验，或者说拥有中国特色的民主。因此，它是他们更广泛实验的一部分，他们应该为此获得认可。他们试图理解如何使中国人能够自我治理。每个社会都在努力实现这一点，当然包括美国人。
So, in that setting, the question of what's the relative military capabilities of the parties for preventing any one of the parties attempting to move from letting history decide to a unilateral military action that would change the conditions.
因此，在那种情况下，一个问题就是各方相对的军事能力，以防止任何一方试图从让历史决定转变为单方面的军事行动，从而改变现状。
The US and Taiwan, well, everybody's position has been no change in the status quo by a unilateral use of military force. So then the question is, well, what are the relative military capabilities of the parties? In 1995-96, when I was in the Pentagon, when China, when Taiwan was taking a few provocative steps, and China responded to it by an effort to coerce Taiwan by bracketing and get with missile tests, the US had overwhelming military superiority, brought two carries up into the area, and forced China to basically withdraw or submit in a way that for them they found even humiliating for the PLA.
美国和台湾的立场都是一贯的，反对任何一方单方面使用军事力量改变现状。因此，问题是，各方的军事能力如何相对比较？在1995-1996年期间，当我在五角大楼工作时，台湾采取了一些挑衅行动，中国则通过围堵和导弹试验来试图威胁和迫使台湾妥协。在当时，美国拥有压倒性的军事优势，派遣了两艘航母到该地区，并迫使中国基本上撤退或屈服，这对中国人民解放军来说甚至是一种耻辱。
But from that day to this day, every day they've gotten up and built up Chinese military capabilities against Taiwan to prevent that happening. So what they are arming of Taiwan or making it more like a porcupine, as people in the Pentagon like to say is about, is raising the price for China of a military action against Taiwan so that it would take them a week or two weeks or three weeks to dominate Taiwan as opposed to a few days.
从那天起到现在，他们每天都在提升中国对台军事实力，以防止这种情况发生。所以他们所做的装备台湾或让其像刺猬一样更强大，正如五角大楼的人所说的，就是为了提高中国对台军事行动的代价，使他们花费一周、两周或三周的时间来控制台湾，而不是几天的时间。
And similarly, the effort to build up US military forces in the area is again to raise the price of a conflict and the risk that it might also ultimately involve a war with the US.
同样地，努力在该地区建立美国军事力量的目的是为了提高冲突的代价，以及最终可能导致与美国卷入战争的风险。
So I still think we're in a struggle aimed at deterring conflict rather than preparing to take the initiative. And in the case of Taiwan, Taiwan would obviously easily be destroyed by China if it decided to destroy it. They have many ways to do that, or defeated by China if China made an all-out effort to defeat it. The question is how long that at what price, at what cost, at what risk, and the US position has been to try to keep the costs and price and risks so high that when people come to Xi Jinping and say, this is a good day for doing this, he says, I don't think this is a good day. We have nine other things to do, just keep working on it.
所以我依然认为我们处于一场旨在遏制冲突而非主动出击的斗争中。而对于台湾来说，如果中国决定摧毁它，显然台湾很容易被中国摧毁。他们有很多方法可以做到这一点，或者在中国全力以赴击败它的情况下被击败。问题是需要多长时间、以什么代价、冒多大的风险，而美国的立场一直是试图保持成本、代价和风险非常高，以至于当人们向习近平表示今天是个好日子来做这件事时，他会说，我觉得今天不是个好日子。我们还有其他九件事要做，继续努力吧。
And therefore, I think the challenge for both Beijing and Washington and Taiwan is to avoid some provocation that's so dramatic that any one of the parties has to depart from what they're otherwise doing.
因此，我认为北京、华盛顿和台湾的挑战是要避免引发某种戏剧性的挑衅，因为其中任何一方不得不离开他们原本正在进行的事情。
Graham, one of the scenarios, and I think you know well, is instead of an outright Chinese attack on Taiwan that the PLA would look to, in a sense, blockade the island. And we certainly got a taste for what that might look like after Speaker Pelosi's visit to the island in the Chinese reaction to that.
格雷厄姆，其中一个情景，我想你应该很清楚，是中国不会直接攻击台湾，而是解放军会试图封锁这个岛屿。我们对这种情况可能会是什么样子已经有了一点儿预感，尤其是在佩洛西议长访问台湾以及中国对此的反应后。
There's a lot to say about a blockade, but I wonder what you think specifically the American response to that, because it wouldn't be an outright invasion. It wouldn't involve the targeting of Taiwan in the same horrible way that Vladimir Putin's Russia is dismembering Ukraine. Instead, it in a sense puts the ball in the American court to break a blockade, to put its ships its men and women in harm's way conceivably to show that the Chinese blockade is ineffective.
对于封锁行动，有很多事情可以说，但我想知道你对美国对此的反应怎么看，因为这不会是一次直接的入侵。这也不会像弗拉基米尔·普京的俄罗斯对乌克兰进行的可怕方式一样，以台湾为目标进行解体。相反，从某种意义上说，这将把主动权交到美国方面，让他们冒险打破封锁，派遣舰船和军人可能面临危险，以示中国的封锁是无效的。
Does that scenario worry you? And what do you think the American response would be to a blockade?
你担心那种情况吗？你认为美国对封锁会做出怎样的反应呢？
Good for you. I would say I have been trying to help our team work through these scenarios, and that's certainly one. In fact, I can make it a little more mischievous for you. So I think we saw in Pelosi's absolutely unnecessary and dangerous visit that provided a pretext for China, basically practicing the next level of what the capability it's developing, a picture of what could happen.
很好。我可以说，我一直在努力帮助我们的团队解决这些情景，而这绝对是其中之一。事实上，我可以为你稍微增加一些调皮的东西。因此，我认为我们在佩洛西完全不必要且危险的拜访中看到了中国提供了一个借口，基本上在实践它正在发展的下一个水平，这给我们展示了可能发生的情况的一个画面。
So I think that what would happen would be, in the first instance, what they would call, as the U.S. did in the Cuban Missile Crisis, not a blockade, but a quarantine. And they would say the quarantine is only a quarantine of illegal shipments of either by sea or by air into Taiwan.
所以我认为会发生的情况将是，首先被称为像美国在古巴导弹危机中所做的那样，不是封锁，而是隔离。他们会说这个隔离只是对非法运往台湾的海运或空运进行限制。
So in order to, we certainly want the ships to keep flowing one way, and the food and oil could keep flowing the other way. We're not trying to interrupt normal commercial activity. We're just interrupting the rival of arms that could be destabilizing, or of drugs, or of weather, or whatever, whatever.
因此，为了确保船只以一定方式持续航行，食物和石油可以以另一种方式持续流动。我们并不打算中断正常的商业活动。我们只是打断可能造成不稳定的武器、毒品、天气等的到达。不管是什么情况，都是如此。
And in order for your ships to come, they just have to be approved, the shipment by us. Okay? This is our territory. We're just simply exercising our sovereign rights over the territory.
为了让你们的船只进入，只需经过我们的批准，货物就可以运送过来。好吗？这是我们的领土。我们只是在行使对这片领土的主权权利而已。
Now the question is, you put it as, well, what do the U.S. do? And I think testing the blockade line with military ships, escorting a shipment that would otherwise be, quote, illegal or had not been approved, was obviously at the top, you know, had to be on the list. And as the Soviets discovered when they were trying to test the blockade or quarantine line in Cuba in 1962, that means ship confronting ship, and then either the ships crashing into each other, or firing upon each other. And then if one ship was sunk, what about tit for tat retaliation? So you pretty quickly get on an escalation ladder. That's pretty dangerous. And the Soviets, when they looked at it carefully, thought, well, wait a minute. We're halfway around the world. These guys are right at their border. They have a lot of ships there, and we have a few. If that reminds you of anything in Taiwan, I would say it's not coming soon. So that's a very difficult case.
现在的问题是，您将其称为什么美国会怎么做？我认为用军舰检验封锁线、护航本来会被视为“非法”或未获批准的货物，显然是首要的，必须列在清单上。苏联人在1962年试图测试古巴的封锁线或隔离线时发现，这意味着船只对峙，然后要么相撞，要么互开炮。如果一艘船被击沉，什么时候触发报复？这样很快就会升级。这是非常危险的。苏联人仔细研究后发现，他们与美国有半个地球的距离，而对方就在他们的边境上。他们有很多船只，而我们只有几艘。如果这让您想起台湾的某件事，我可以说这不会很快发生。所以这是一个非常困难的情况。
And I think that when we try to think about, okay, well, if I can't militarily interfere, what else could I do? Well, could I create a quarantine on Chinese shipments at some other barrier, maybe like the Malacca Straits? And so Chinese are dependent on shipments of oil to come to China and also of their goods to go to fill Walmarts and targets. So could I have some counter quarantine? I don't know. It's complicated. And you don't want to get down to breaking up a freedom of the sea, which is an important principle, or other economic areas. So I think that's extremely dangerous. And I would hope that it would certainly become a crisis that would remind one of crises that we've seen in this street, that unless managed successfully could ultimately lead to conflict.
我认为，当我们试图思考一下，好吧，如果我不能通过军事干预，我还能做什么呢？那么，我是否可以在其他地方，比如马六甲海峡，对中国的船运进行隔离呢？中国依赖石油运输进口到中国，也依赖商品运输去填充沃尔玛和塔吉特。那么，我是否可以实施一些对抗性的隔离呢？我不知道。这很复杂。你不希望违背自由海洋的原则，或者其他经济领域的原则。所以我认为这非常危险。我希望这能成为一次 crisis (危机)，提醒人们我们曾经遇到过的危机，除非成功管理，否则最终可能导致冲突。
And Graham, when we think of a scenario like that, and we're in the world of hypotheticals here, but if we think of the issues that we're grappling with right now, let's say high inflation fractured supply chains, lack of coordination on all those issues we talked about at the top of the show, climate change, pandemics, artificial intelligence, I guess, is this worth it? I mean, is it worth the United States and China should China, let's say, implement this quarantine to permanently kind of fracture and tear up a relationship that is at the very heart, the very essence of the globalized world that we live in now.
当我们考虑这样的情景时，我们在猜想的世界中。但如果我们想到我们现在正在处理的问题，比如高通胀、断裂的供应链、我们在节目开头讨论过的所有那些问题的缺乏协调，气候变化、流行病、人工智能，那么这值得吗？我的意思是，是不是值得中美之间，假设中国实施这种永久性的隔离措施， 从根本上破坏和撕裂我们现在生活的全球化世界的核心关系？
I mean, China has been allowed to, if we're honest with ourselves, to basically repossess Hong Kong with little or no serious consequences. Taiwan is different than Hong Kong. I think we all acknowledge that, but it's also different than Ukraine. It's not acknowledged in the same way that the Ukraine is as an independent sovereign state, say, in the United Nations or in a variety of international laws and treaties and covenants. So, I guess Graham is discretion, the better part of valor here, is there potentially an acknowledgement at the end of the day that this is just not a conflict, a flashpoint over Taiwan that the United States is worth having with China? Extremely hard questions.
我的意思是，坦率地说，中国几乎没有遭受任何严重后果地重新接管了香港。台湾与香港不同，我认为我们都承认这一点，但与乌克兰也不同。它没有像乌克兰那样被承认为一个独立主权国家，比如在联合国或各种国际法律、条约和契约中。因此，我想格雷厄姆在这里的谨慎是明智的，最后可能会承认，美国与中国之间关于台湾的冲突并不值得发生。这是非常困难的问题。
So, if it turned out that, by standing up for Taiwan's, the U.S. ended in a general war with China, so not just your inflation and recession and pandemics and all the other horrible things, but actually nuclear bombs landing in Boston, after the fact, I would say, if I were still here, boy, that was a bad idea. Okay. But the more complicated question is, should the U.S. be prepared to run some risk of war with China in order to let this evolution continue? And is that feasible given the dynamics? And that's why I started with looking back 50 years.
那么，如果事实证明，为了捍卫台湾，美国最终卷入了一场与中国的全面战争，不仅仅是通货膨胀、经济衰退、疫情等其他可怕的事情，而是有核弹落在波士顿，事后，我会说，如果我还在这里的话，那真是个糟糕的决定。好吧。但更复杂的问题是，美国是否应该准备为了让这种演变继续而承担与中国发生战争的某种风险？考虑到局势的动态，这是否可行？这就是为什么我从回顾50年开始。
So 50 years ago, if one had listened initially, actually the transcripts of the Kissinger show in light conversations, the initial conversations have now been declassified, so you can read the conversation. And it's very clear they have irreconcilable differences about Taiwan, completely irreconcilable. So you could easily have concluded from that, well, this is helpless, you know? We're not going to be able, they're insisting that we give them Taiwan if we're going to have a relationship. And so either we're going to do it or we're not. And ultimately was decided some way to create this strategic ambiguity in which Taiwan has been a self-governing country for all this period. So this, I think, leads me to conclude, this is not hopeless, okay? It's quite possible. Now, it's risky, it's dangerous.
所以50年前，如果当初听取了基辛格在轻松谈话中的节目剧本，实际上这些初期对话现在已经解密，你可以读到对话。很明显，他们在台湾问题上有着无法调和的分歧，完全无法调和。因此，你可以很容易得出结论，这是无助的，你知道吗？如果我们想建立关系，他们坚持要我们交出台湾，那么要么我们去做，要么我们不做。最终决定采取某种方式创造这种战略模糊性，使得台湾在这段时间里一直是自治国家。所以，我认为，这让我得出结论，这并非无望，好吗？这是有可能的。现在，当然，这是有风险的，也很危险。
That's.1,.2, to your point, go back to the real politic. So in the period after the Communist after Mao's, Communist won the Civil War in China in 1949, the US looked at the question of Taiwan. And the question was, is the US have a dog in this fight? We had already been earlier supporting Shanghai's check against the Communists, but Truman and the Truman Administration concluded no. We're not going to defend Taiwan. So when they did their defense perimeter, Taiwan was outside it.
那就来说说实际政治吧。所以在中国共产党在1949年赢得内战后的时期，美国开始关注台湾的问题。这个问题是，美国在这场争斗中应该插手吗？之前，我们已经在支持上海奇克抗击共产党，但杜鲁门和杜鲁门政府最终决定不援助台湾。因此，当他们划定防御范围时，台湾被排除在外。
So it was only after North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 with at least a yellow light from Mao and Beijing. That Truman decided, well, okay, we're going to defend Taiwan as well. So earlier, the US was prepared in terms of big strategic interest, not worry about Taiwan.
因此，直到1950年朝鲜在毛泽东和北京的支持下袭击南韩，杜鲁门才决定，好吧，我们也会保护台湾。所以早早地，美国在战略利益方面准备好了，不担心台湾的问题。
In the period since then, it's become a feature of the relationship. So what about today? I think that I cannot imagine an American government declaring that the US has no strategic interest in Taiwan. Partly, that's because in a Thucydity and rivalry, ruling powers don't do that. Partly, people would argue, well, if you'll do that, then you're not going to defend, whatever, whatever. So there's many, many objections.
自那时以来，这已成为两国关系的一个特征。那么现在呢？我认为我无法想象美国政府宣布不对台湾具有战略利益。部分原因是在瑟西底德和竞争中，统治者不会这样做。另一部分人可能会争辩说，如果你这样做，你就不会保护，无论是什么。所以有很多很多反对意见。
So I think we're going to have to find a way to live with this and to manage it. And I think it's extremely dangerous, and I think will become increasingly dangerous, as I said, as Americans go into our political season where the detachment from reality can be quite substantial.
所以我认为我们必须找到一种方法来应对并管理这个问题。我认为这是极其危险的，而且随着我之前提到的美国人进入政治季节，与现实脱离的程度可能会变得相当严重，这将使问题变得越来越危险。
And I'll pull out where to put a final question, you know, here at the Monk dialects, we care a lot about the nuclear threat and specifically the threat of the existential threat of atomic weapons. You've mentioned them a few times in this discussion. They seem just so far outside of our ability to comprehend in terms of any future reality.
我会找出一个适合最后一个问题的地方，你知道，在僧侣方言中，我们非常关心核威胁，特别是原子武器的存在威胁。你在这次讨论中已经提到过几次。从任何未来现实的角度来看，它们似乎远超出我们理解的能力范围。
But when you look at what's happening here in this potential flashpoint, this Thucydity's trap that China and the United States is falling into. If you look at what's happening in Ukraine with this increasingly loose and irresponsible language around nuclear weapons by the Putin regime, you're somebody with direct experience of the Cuban Missile Crisis threw to today.
然而，当你看到这个潜在火药桶中正在发生的事情时，这是中国和美国正在陷入的修西底德陷阱。如果你观察乌克兰的情况，普京政权围绕核武器的言辞越来越不稳定和不负责任，你就会明白，你是有着直接经历从古巴导弹危机一直到今天的人。
How serious is this risk? How worried are you about breaking the nuclear taboo after 75 years? Well, I get a great question, and thank you. I think that obviously this is one that most people find so bizarre that it just seems like, as you say, this can't be real. They've worked to a nightmare or to rewatching a bad movie.
这个风险有多严重？你对于75年后违反核禁忌有多担心？嗯，这是一个非常好的问题，谢谢你。我认为显然大多数人都会觉得这太离奇了，以至于看起来像是，就像你说的，这不可能是真的。他们觉得自己在经历一场噩梦或重新观看一部糟糕的电影。
And that's something that maybe we think that somehow that's all 20. My students say, that's all 20th century. You know, that's in the rearview mirror that nuclear weapons must somehow have been, I don't know, banished with the end of the Cold War. So, you know, we're not supposed to worry about that any longer.
这是一件或许我们认为所有的二十世纪的事情。我的学生们说，那都是二十世纪的问题了。你知道，那已经成为过去了，核武器应该因为冷战结束而消失了吧，我也不知道。所以你知道，我们不再需要为此担心。
And I think, unfortunately, Putin in particular with his nuclear threats in Ukraine is giving people a painful wake up call to the fact that the Cold War did end, and the Soviet Union did disappear, but nuclear weapons remained. Nuclear weapons at the level of thousands of nuclear weapons under the command of Vladimir Putin.
我认为，不幸的是，普京尤其是通过在乌克兰发出核威胁，给人们敲响惊人的警钟，提醒他们冷战已经结束，苏联已经消失，但核武器仍然存在。数以千计的核武器掌握在弗拉基米尔·普京的手中。
So, as certainly as any leader of the evil empire had a superpower arsenal that could destroy Tawantau and Boston and New York and every other city in North America. Putin does. And certainly as the Soviet Union ever had tactical nuclear weapons that could be used against NATO troops, Putin has.
因此，就像邪恶帝国的任何领导者一样，普京拥有能够摧毁塔万陶、波士顿、纽约和北美其他城市的超强大军火库。而正如苏联曾经拥有可以对抗北约部队的战术核武器一样，普京也拥有。
And in the Chinese case, we have a similar, something similar, but I would say there at least several degrees removed. The Chinese have not been rattling their nuclear saber, or talking about nuclear war, even though they're having a buildup of their own, which's otherwise been a minimum nuclear deterrent.
在中国的情况下，我们有了类似的情况，但我要说至少有几个程度的区别。中国并没有威胁使用核武器，或者谈论核战争，尽管他们正在进行自己的核武器建设，这在本质上仅仅是为了最小的核威慑。
But the most, the greatest danger, as Biden has rightly said, that we've seen of a use of nuclear weapons that might put us on to an escalator to nuclear and regadden is what we're now seeing play out in Ukraine. And there I would say three things.
但是，正如拜登所说的，我们目前所见到的最大危险，可能将我们推上核武器和再度军备扩张的升级阶梯的，就是乌克兰所发生的局势。在此，我想指出三个事情。
First, is it possible that Putin would rationally choose to conduct a nuclear strike on Ukraine? And I believe the answer is yes. He frames it in the same terms as he calls it, you know, basically following the American precedent when Truman decided to drop nuclear bomb first on erosion.
首先，普京是否有可能理性地选择对乌克兰进行核打击？我相信答案是肯定的。他将其框定在与美国先前在广岛投下原子弹时相同的条件下。
And then secondly on Nagasaki, again now, you know, in ancient history. But it's a fact that in order to end World War II against Japan, Truman rationally, in his view rationally, and afterwards when he was asked about it, he said, if I had to do this, I would do it again, killed 140,000 people in the first strike on Hiroshima, because he didn't want to fight, you know, island, island, hand to hand to defeat Japan.
其次，关于长崎，现在再说，你知道，在古代历史上。但事实是，为了结束对日本的二战，杜鲁门理性地认为，在事后被问及时，他说，如果我再次面临这种选择，我还会这么做，他在对广岛发动的第一次打击中杀死了14万人，因为他不想进行岛屿间的肉搏，手到手的战斗来击败日本。
So Putin, I think, if, how could I imagine Putin would choose to use nuclear weapons in this case? I think fortunately only if he's forced to choose between humiliating defeat on the one hand and using nuclear weapons in the faint hope, not a great hope, I would say, but a faint hope of nonetheless achieving an outcome that he can live with. In the case he's defeated, in the case of Jovan Zelensky achieves his objectives, liberate all of Ukraine. If he were to succeed in doing that, this would be a humiliating defeat for Putin. Would it be an existential crisis for Russia? I don't think so. Russia will still survive. Would it be an existential crisis for Putin? You bet. People would say, what a colossal strategic error you made, and you've got nothing for it. And with all the impact, so I think he believes this is existential for him. I believe it's existential for him. So if between an existential defeat for himself and all he cares about and all his view of Russia and taking a chance with a nuclear strike, I believe there's four to one chance he will end up taking that action.
普京，我认为，如果，我怎么能想象普京会选择在这种情况下使用核武器呢？我认为，幸运的是，只有在他被迫在羞辱性失败和使用核武器之间做出选择时，他才会抱着微弱的希望（不是很大的希望，我必须说，但仍然是一种微弱的希望）去实现一个他可以接受的结果。在他被击败的情况下，如果乔万·泽连斯基实现了他的目标，解放了整个乌克兰，这将对普京来说是一个耻辱的失败。这将对俄罗斯造成存在危机吗？我不这么认为。俄罗斯仍将幸存。但对普京来说，这将是一个存在危机。人们会说，“你犯了多么巨大的战略错误，而又一无所获。” 随着所有的影响，我认为他相信这对他来说是存在危机。我相信对他来说这是至关重要的。所以，如果在面临他自己和他所在乎的一切以及他对俄罗斯的看法之间存在着存在危机的失败，并且冒险进行核打击之间有选择，我相信他最终会采取行动的可能性是四比一。
So that, you think, whoa, wait a minute. Now, if he were to do that, what the consequence is, we will be living in a new world. If you say a taboo that's now for more than seven decades, made the use of nuclear weapons, quote, unthinkable, will have been broken. And how will the West respond? Again, the answer is, I've worked through the agenda, or the menu, and it starts with horrible, and it goes to catastrophic. So there's no good response, no good response. So trying to prevent that happening is our current focus.
所以，你认为，哇，等一下。现在，如果他这样做，后果会是什么，我们将生活在一个新的世界中。如果你说的这个七十多年来的禁忌，使用核武器的念头，将会被打破。而西方会如何回应？答案还是，我已经研究过议程或菜单，它从可怕开始，到灾难结束。所以没有好的回应，没有好的回应。因此，我们当前的重点是努力防止这种情况发生。
And there, I would say, one piece of good news that came out first of the meeting between Xi and Chancellor Schulz back now 10 days ago, and then reiterated at the G20 meeting in Bali was the call by leaders, including Xi, on all states, quote, not to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Well, that's a pretty strong message, because there's only one guy out there doing this, and it happens to be Xi, his most important ally happened to be Xi. So if he's saying to Putin, which he certainly told him before he announced it with Schulz, they have a relationship where they wouldn't surprise each other, you know, I think this is a bad idea, bad idea for me. That's a pretty big message. So I'm, I'm, I'm for day looking for, I look for silver linings, but I would say that's a silver lining in this case.
在我看来，首先要说的是，在十天前习近平主席与舒尔茨总理会晤的会谈中，以及在巴厘岛G20会议上再度强调的一个好消息是，习近平等领导人呼吁所有国家不要威胁使用核武器。这是一个相当强烈的信息，因为只有一个人在做这件事，而他恰好是习近平，他最重要的盟友也是习近平。因此，如果他对普京说这个消息，在与舒尔茨宣布之前肯定已经告诉过他，他们之间的关系使他们不会相互惊讶，我认为这是一个坏主意，对我来说不好。这是一个相当重要的信息。因此，我在寻找一线希望，但我可以说这在这种情况下是一个积极的方面。
But I think it also reminds us that in the, in the war in Ukraine, horrible as it is, and remarkable as Zelensky and the Ukrainian people's response has been that we have a stake, we all have a stake in this coming to some stalemate, a short of a humiliating defeat for Putin, if the alternative is for him to conduct a nuclear strike that will put us all in a, you know, in a, in a world that we don't want to be in. So that's not something that Zelensky and Ukrainians like to hear. It's not something that we can force upon them. Ultimately, they have to decide, you know, about their own fate. But I think it's a reality that they have to take, take your count off. And I've been vocal about the, just sort of, I'm just describing the, you know, the reality. I'm not necessarily saying what people should do. I'm saying down this path of this risk and down this path or other risk.
但我认为这也提醒我们，在乌克兰战争中，尽管它是多么可怕，泽连斯基和乌克兰人民的反应是多么引人注目，我们都有利益，我们都对这个问题担心，如果另一种选择是普京进行一次核打击，将把我们都置于一个我们不想置身其中的世界中，我们就会遭受耻辱的失败。所以这不是泽连斯基和乌克兰人喜欢听到的东西。这不是我们可以强加于他们的东西。最终，他们必须决定自己的命运。但我认为这是一个他们必须考虑的现实。我一直对这个问题表达我的意见，只是在描述现实，我并不一定说人们应该怎么做。我只是在说明这种风险的路径和其他风险的路径。
But I think for Ukraine, having so successfully defeated Putin's effort to erase Ukraine from the map and having done so with such remarkable courage, they now have a claim on the world to build a successful society. And I think that's going to be an even bigger challenge than defeating Putin.
但我认为对于乌克兰来说，他们成功地击败了普京试图抹去乌克兰存在的努力，而且他们以非凡的勇气完成了这一壮举，现在他们有权利去构建一个成功的社会，并且我认为这将是一个比击败普京更艰巨的挑战。
And whether they're 100 kilometers, this direction or that direction, from ultimately liberating all of their territory, I don't think it's, you know, central to that undertaking. So I'm hopeful that maybe come winter and something like a stalemate along the current line of divide plus or minus a little bit this way or that way.
无论它们距最终解放他们全部领土的方向是100公里、这个方向还是那个方向，我认为这并不是这一努力的核心。因此，我希望也许到了冬天，会出现一种类似僵局的情况，就像目前的分界线上下稍微有些升降。
You might see some de facto, I don't think negotiated agreement, but some de facto stalemate in which Ukraine would turn to focusing primarily on nation building, which is going to be a big chat. And West would be generously supportive in every possible way, especially financially, but also technically to that effort. And Ukraine never giving up the claim to recover every square inch of its territory, but you know, this Germany didn't get back all of East Germany for a long time. And South Korea hasn't got back to North Korea yet, but they've demonstrated they can build very successful societies.
你可能会看到一些事实上的情况，我不认为是通过谈判达成的协议，而是一种事实上的僵局，乌克兰会将重点转向国家建设，这是一个重要的话题。西方国家会在各个可能的方面慷慨支持，尤其是在财政上，同时也会在技术上支持这一努力。乌克兰永远不会放弃恢复其领土的每一寸的要求，但你知道，德国很长一段时间内也没有收回整个东德。而韩国至今也没有收回北韩，但他们已经证明他们可以建设非常成功的社会。
And in over time, history, I think ultimately will go to the people that can build more successful societies.
随着时间的推移和历史的发展，我认为最终将会对那些能够建设更加成功社会的人们有利。
Well, you've been very generous with your time, your wisdom and your insights Graham. Thank you so much for coming on the Monk dialogues today. I've learned a ton and I was looking forward to this conversation and you've done with me in the last 45 minutes or so, everything that I wanted to accomplish with it. So thank you again for your insights and analysis. Greatly appreciate it. Thank you for such good questions and I enjoyed the conversation and I'll look forward to more. So look forward to seeing you sometime. Thank you. Thank you Graham. Bye bye.
嗯，Graham，你非常慷慨地分享了你的时间、智慧和观点。非常感谢你今天参加“和尚对话”。我学到了很多东西，而且我一直期待这次对话，你在过去的45分钟里与我所达到的一切都一模一样。所以再次感谢你的洞察力和分析。非常感激。感谢你提出这么好的问题，我享受这次对话，期待更多。再次见到你。谢谢。谢谢你，Graham。再见。
While that wraps up today's episode, I want to thank our guest, Professor Graham Allison. He certainly gave us a lot to think about.
在今天的节目中，感谢我们的嘉宾格雷厄姆·爱利森教授。他给我们提供了很多值得思考的内容，这就是今天节目的全部内容了。
If you have feedback or reflections on what you've just heard or any of our other podcasts, whether it be the Monk dialogues or our one on one debate series, please send us an email to podcast at monkdebates.com. That's M-U-N-K debates with an S dot com.
如果你对刚才听到的或者我们其他的播客有任何反馈或思考，不管是关于和尚对话还是我们的一对一辩论系列，请发送邮件到 podcast@monkdebates.com。这里的"monk debates"拼写成 M-U-N-K debates with an S dot com. 如果英文不懂可以来问我，我可以解释给你听。
Also a reminder that you can listen to our complimentary Friday focus podcast, each and every Friday, on current affairs and international events. Join Janis Grossstein, the founding director of the Monk School of Global Affairs. And me, Roger Griffiths, the chair of the Monk debates as we delve into the big issues and ideas shaping the week's news. You can access your copy right now of the Friday focus podcast on this podcast feed or by going to our website, www.munkdebates.com.
同样提醒大家，您可以在每个星期五收听我们免费赠送的《周五焦点播客》，内容涵盖时事和国际事件。我们会邀请蒙克全球事务学院的创始院长Janis Grossstein和蒙克辩论会的主席Roger Griffiths加入我们，一起深入探讨本周新闻所涉及的重大问题和理念。您现在可以通过播客源或访问我们的网站www.munkdebates.com获取《周五焦点播客》的最新内容。
Thank you for lending your time and attention to our efforts to bring back the art of public conversation, one dialogue at a time. I'm your host and moderator, Rudyard Griffiths.
感谢您抽出时间和关注我们的努力，逐个对话的方式来恢复公共对话的艺术。我是主持人兼调解人鲁迪亚德·格里菲斯。
The Monk debates are a project of the Aurya and Peter and Melanie Monk charitable foundations. Rudyard Griffiths and Ricky Gerwits are the producers. Be sure to download and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. And if you like us, feel free to give us a five star rating. Thank you again for listening.
摘自“和阿格里亚、彼得与梅兰妮·蒙克慈善基金会有关的道士辩论”是一个项目。鲁德亚德·格里菲斯和里基·吉尔维茨是这个项目的制片人。请务必在您获取播客的任何地方下载并订阅我们。如果您喜欢我们，请随意给我们五星评级。再次感谢您的收听。