Should the Fed stick with the 2 percent inflation target or rethink it? – Part 1
发布时间 2023-01-14 16:12:51 来源
I'm David Wessel, Director of the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy. Here are Brookings. I want to thank you all to coming today and for people who are joining us online.
大家好，我是David Wessel，负责管理财政和货币政策的哈钦斯中心的主任。在布鲁金斯学会，我想感谢大家今天的光临，以及在线加入我们的人。
I bring greetings from Glenn Hutchins, who's the benefactor of the Hutchins Center who's chartered plane from somewhere was canceled. So he can't be here with us today, but he's probably watching on his phone and will undoubtedly be weighing in on everything I did wrong in the first opening segment of this thing. But that's the fun.
我代表哈钦斯中心的资助者格伦·哈钦斯带来问候。他原本从某个地方包机前来参加会议，但因为取消，今天不能和我们在一起。但他很可能正在通过手机观看，毫无疑问会对我在一开始开场环节中犯的错提出意见。但那也是好玩的一部分。
We think that the question of rethinking the 2% inflation target is one of the most important questions facing monetary policy makers at the moment. You might say that the backward looking question that we need to think about, which we at Hutchins Center are thinking about is how did unconventional policy really work and should unconventional policy really be considered conventional policy.
我们认为，重新思考2%通货膨胀目标的问题是当前货币政策制定者面临的最重要的问题之一。你可能会说，我们需要思考的是一个回顾过去的问题，即在哈钦斯中心，我们正在思考非常规政策究竟是如何运作的，非常规政策是否应被视为常规政策。
But when you look forward, I think one of the, you'd have to argue that one of the biggest questions now is whether given everything we know, whether a 2% inflation target framework is the right one for monetary policy. After all, when it was conceived, nobody anticipated we'd have so many years of trying to get inflation up to 2%.
但是当你展望未来时，我认为最重要的问题之一是，考虑到我们所知道的一切，一个2%通货膨胀目标框架是否是货币政策的正确选择。毕竟，当这个框架被构想时，没有人预料到我们花费如此多年时间才能将通货膨胀率提高到2%。
In order, we think that the long run equilibrium interest rate would be so low that in the last Federal Open Market Committee survey of economic projections, the members said that they expect a long run rate to be a nominal 2.8% to 3%, which means that there's not a lot of room to lower rates, real rates below zero as we usually do in a recession.
我们认为，长期均衡利率会非常低，以至于在最近的美联储公开市场委员会的经济预测调查中，成员们预计长期利率为名义2.8%到3%。这意味着我们在经济衰退时通常会将实际利率降至零以下的空间非常有限。
Now when we first conceived this event, one of the reasons we did it is we felt that this was a discussion that was really important, but hard for the members of the FOMC to have, because if you start talking about this, you frighten the markets and bad things would happen so you just don't talk about it in public. I think we were right that this is an important issue.
现在，当我们第一次构思这个活动时，其中一个原因是我们认为这是一次非常重要的讨论，但对FOMC成员来说很难进行，因为如果你开始谈论这个问题，你会让市场感到恐慌，产生不良影响，因此你不会在公开场合谈论。我认为我们是正确的，这是一个重要的问题。
We were wrong that FOMC members are afraid to talk about it. The minutes in the meeting suggest that it's been discussed in a number of regional Fed bank presidents and Chair Yellen herself have raised it, but I think that this is not a decision that can be left to Federal Reserve policy makers or the economists who spend time thinking about monetary policy. This is too important a decision to be left to the Fed and the economics profession itself. It has to involve a broader array of people, a broader discussion in our society.
我们之前的想法是FOMC成员害怕谈论这个问题，但会议纪要表明这个问题已在多个地区联邦储备银行行长的讨论中得到了重视，并且耶伦主席也提到了它。但我认为这不是一个可以让联邦储备银行决策者或花时间思考货币政策的经济学家来决定的事情。这是一个太重要的决定，不应该只由储备银行或经济学行业来决定。这必须涉及更广泛的人群，社会上更广泛的讨论。
So this is our attempt to try and explain what the issues are, what the choices are, what the pros and cons are for that broader audience. I'm hoping that we can do that. We'll try and synthesize this at the end.
这是我们尝试解释问题、选择、利弊的努力，为更广泛的受众进行阐述。我希望我们能够做到这一点。我们会在最后进行综合概述。
We have a very crowded schedule, which we're extremely pleased about. It's hard to imagine. You could have assembled a better group of people to discuss these issues than the ones we have. So I'm just making a public plea to our speakers that I made in private, which is trying to stick to our time schedule so we can get everybody can get a fair shot.
我们的日程安排非常紧凑，但我们非常高兴。很难想象，我们能够召集到比这些人更好的人来讨论这些问题。所以我想公开向我们的演讲者提出一个请求，就是尽量遵守我们的时间表，这样每个人都有机会发表自己的看法。
We're going to start with a conversation with Larry Summers, the former Treasury Secretary who has raised this issue in public and is going to set the scene for us. Then my colleague, Louis Schaener, will come up here and introduce a panel that we're going to have to discuss the alternatives.
我们首先将与前财政部长拉里·萨默斯进行一次对话，他已经在公开场合提出了这个问题，并将为我们创造背景。接下来，我的同事路易斯·谢纳将上台介绍一个小组讨论备选方案。
So with Larry Summers. My job at a conference like this at a moment when I am not in government is to surely be provocative and hopefully be sound. My propositions are at root 2.
所以，与拉里•萨默斯一样，我在像这样的会议上的工作时，既要引起人的思考，又要确保我的观点合理可靠。我的两个基本观点是：
1. First proposition, our current framework is likely to involve unnecessary costs in lost output on the order of a trillion dollars a decade or a hundred billion dollars a year relative to what otherwise would be possible.
第一个观点是，我们目前的框架可能会导致无谓的成本损失，每十年可能达到一万亿美元的产出损失，或每年一千亿美元的产出损失，相对于可能实现的其他情况而言。
Second two, a proper better framework which we shouldn't necessarily move to immediately but we should ultimately aspire to would involve normal nominal interest rates in the 4 to 5 percent range.
第二个概念是，一个更恰当更好的框架。虽然我们不一定立即转向这个框架，但我们最终应该力争将正常实名利率维持在4%到5%的范围内。
意思是说，虽然目前不一定需要立即转向更好的框架，但最终我们应该争取维持正常的利率在4%到5%之间。
Let me develop these arguments in several stages. First proposition, within the current policy framework we are likely to have by historical standards very low rates for a very large fraction of the time going forward even in good economic times.
让我分几个阶段来阐述这些论点。首先提出，按照目前的政策框架，即使在经济好的时候，根据历史标准，未来很长一段时间内利率也很低。
David just shared the Fed's view which is that the neutral real rate is in the neighborhood of 1 percent. We're at more risk at least currently of falling short of the 2 percent inflation target than we are of exceeding the 2 percent inflation target.
David 刚刚分享了美联储的观点，即中性实际利率大约为1%。我们目前面临的风险更多地是未达到2%的通胀目标，而不是超过2%的通胀目标。
It's a good rule with official projections think about the weather bureau that when they keep being revised in one direction there's positive serial correlation in the revisions. So it would be my judgment that further reductions in the real predictions of the neutral real rate are more likely than further increases. The market essentially shares this view. The long run libor forecast is 2.3 percent. 2.3 is less than 2.8 but the market is projecting the expected value. The Fed is projecting the mode that is a reason for some discrepancy. On the other hand the market's forecast builds in a term premium whereas the Fed's forecast doesn't build in a term premium. Reasonable judgment then if we continue to operate in our current framework it's a reasonable expectation that in good times rates will be in the 2 to 3 percent range typically. And it seems to me hard obviously that's a projection made with substantial error but I cannot see good reasons for thinking that the Fed and the market's estimates are massive under estimates.
这是一个好规则，当官方预测不断修订一个方向时，应该考虑气象局，因为修订的正向相关性是积极的。因此，我认为，中性实际利率预测的进一步降低比进一步增加更有可能。市场基本上持有这种观点，远期LIBOR预测为2.3％，虽然2.3％低于2.8％，但市场正在预测预期价值，而美联储则是众数预测，这是一些差异的原因。另一方面，市场的预测建立在一个期限溢价的基础上，而美联储的预测没有建立期限溢价。因此，如果我们继续操作我们当前的框架，一个合理的判断是，在好时期，利率通常会在2到3％的范围内。显然，这个预测带有较大误差，但我认为没有充分的理由认为美联储和市场的估计是大幅低估的。
Second proposition. Recessions will come. What is the likelihood of recession? My reading suggests that the best thinking is that recoveries unlike people do not die of old age. That the probability of recession once one is significantly advanced into a recovery is essentially independent of the length of the recovery. And that probability depending upon just how far back one looks is something in the neighborhood of 15 to 20 percent on an annual basis. That's a historical reading looking back through 50 odd years of US business cycle history. Is it the right view going forward? You can make a case that it's an understatement of the risks going forward. That case would emphasize that normal growth is now 2 percent rather than 3.5 percent. And so you have to slip less far to fall into recession. It would emphasize a higher degree of geopolitical risk now than in the past. It would emphasize that we have a more financialized, more levered economy with higher ratios of wealth to income that's therefore more at risk of financial disturbance.
第二命题。经济衰退将会到来。衰退的概率是多少？我的阅读表明，最好的想法是，恢复不像人一样会因年老而死去。一旦经济进入恢复期，衰退的概率基本上与恢复期的长度无关。这个概率取决于从多长时间前开始观察，大约在年度水平上是15%到20%左右。这是一个历史性的观察，回顾了美国50多年的商业周期历史。那这是正确的未来预测吗？您可以认为这是低估了未来的风险。这种情况会强调，正常增长现在是2%而不是3.5%。因此，您需要跌得更少才能陷入衰退。它会强调现在比过去更具有地缘政治风险。它会强调我们现在拥有更加财务化、更具杠杆力的经济，财富与收入比率更高，因此更容易受到金融干扰的风险。
A case for more optimism would that the past probability is an overestimate would emphasize lower inflation as less risk of inflation getting out of control, forcing the Fed to hit the brakes hard. It would emphasize smaller inventory cycles in a less tangible and physical economy. I'm not compelled that one of those sets of considerations is far more important than the other. So I think 15 percent annually is a reasonable estimate of the probability of a downturn. The average of monetary policy of the standard form will lack room to do what it usually does.
更乐观的理由在于，过去的概率被高估了，会强调通货膨胀降低风险，因为通货膨胀失控的风险较小，不会迫使美联储采取紧急措施。它还会强调在经济变得较不可见和实质化的情况下，库存周期变小。我认为，这两种考虑都很重要，没有哪一种更为重要。因此，我认为每年15％的经济衰退的概率是合理的。标准货币政策的平均水平将没有足够的空间来实施通常做的事情。
On average, the rates are reduced nominally by 5 percentage points in order to combat recessions. The low numbers are at the beginning of the period when there were very substantial credit rationing effects that were important in understanding how the economy functioned. So that 5 percent strikes me as if anything slightly on the low side. If you look at nominal rates, you conclude a 5 percent reduction is necessary. If you look at real rates, you similarly conclude that about a 5 percent reduction in rates is necessary. You can see where this is going, 5 is substantially more than 2 to 3. So the likelihood, I would argue the overwhelming likelihood, is that when recession comes, policy will not have sufficient room to cut rates as much as it would like to within the current framework. If one believes that neutral real rates will decline further or that there is a risk that they will decline further, this effect is, of course, magnified. These conclusions are not very far from those reached in a much more elaborate way by Kylie and Roberts.
为了对抗经济衰退，通常平均而言，利率会略微降低5个百分点。在该时期初期，由于信贷限制的相当大作用，低利率非常重要。因此，在我看来，5％似乎稍稍偏低。如果您看名义利率，您会得出必须降低5％的结论。如果您看实际利率，您同样会得出必须降低大约5％的结论。您可以看出情况，5大大超过了2至3的数字。因此，我认为极有可能在经济衰退时，政策在当前框架内无法削减利率的幅度到其希望的范围内。如果认为中性实际利率将进一步下降或存在该风险，这种效应当然就会被放大。这些结论与Kylie和Roberts更为复杂的结论不相上下。
At the zero lower bound, if you assume that once every 7 years will be in recession and you assume that once we get into recession, rates will be constrained by the zero lower bound for 3 years, one gets that will be at the zero lower bound, about 30 percent of the time given our current framework. Observation 4, if within this framework, the expected output losses are large. Kylie and Roberts estimate an output loss above 1 percent of GDP on average. That would be at current magnitudes over the next decade, about $200 billion a year. I think it's plausible to suppose that their estimates are too high.
在零利率下限处，如果你假设每7年会有一次经济衰退，而且一旦陷入衰退，利率将会受到零利率下限的限制，那么根据我们目前的框架，大约有30%的时间处于零利率下限。观察4表明，在这个框架内，预期产出损失很大。Kylie和Roberts估计每年平均GDP损失超过1％，对于当前情况来说，这将会是约2000亿美元。我认为他们的估计可能过高。
I have a much more of a back of the envelope approach. I said suppose when we get into one of these episodes and we are constrained for 3 years, about 40 percent as long as we were constrained after the 2008 crisis that will lose 1 percent of GDP, the first year relative to where we would have been 2 percent of GDP the next year and 1 percent of GDP in the last year. If you take that number you get a loss of about 4 percent of GDP once a decade that works out to about a trillion dollars over the next decade or $100 billion a year.
我更倾向于简单粗略的方法。我说，假设在我们遇到这种情况时，我们被限制了3年，约为2008年危机后的限制时间的40％，那么第一年会失去1％的GDP，并相对于本来的发展预期，第二年会损失2％的GDP，最后一年会损失1％的GDP。如果你用这个数字计算，每十年会有约4％的GDP损失，这相当于未来十年约1万亿美元或每年1000亿美元的损失。
One could obviously be wrong if recessions were more frequent or they were long lasting or a negative spiral developed or there were hysteresis effects. You can imagine reasons why the calculation would be an overstatement. It seems to me hard to argue that what I have said is way off as an estimate of the cost of the insufficient ability to adjust monetary policy. How could this calculation be way off?
如果经济衰退频繁或持续时间较长，或产生负面循环或存在滞后影响，那么自然会出现错误的情况。你可以想象一些原因，导致计算结果过高。在我看来，我所说的不足之处对于调整货币政策能力的成本的估计是难以争论的。这个计算结果怎么可能出现重大错误呢？
I might address the question of whether I am way off on the frequency of recessions or way off on the amount of interest rate cut that is necessary when you have a recession. The main challenge to this type of calculation it seems to me as a suggestion that alternative forms of stimulus can be provided and so the zero lower bound is not an important constraint because monetary stimulus can be provided nonetheless. That's what Janet Yellen tried to argue in her Jackson whole speech in 2016.
我可能会回答一个问题，即我是否太偏离了经济衰退的频率或在经济衰退时需要降息的数量方面。对这种计算的主要挑战在于替代形式的刺激可以提供，因此零利率下限并不是重要的限制，因为货币刺激仍然可以提供。这就是珍妮特·耶伦在她2016年的杰克逊霍尔演讲中试图争辩的。
I am far from convinced and I would make these points. First starting at 2.5 percent 10 year rates. If you simply imagine that the economy goes into recession and then you imagine that the Fed cuts rates four or five times to a 25 basis point Fed funds rate and nobody does anything else.
我并不完全相信，并且我在这里提出以下几点。首先，从10年期收益率2.5%开始。如果你简单地想象经济陷入衰退，然后想象联邦储备委员会将利率削减4到5次，使联邦基金利率达到25个基点，而其他人则不采取任何行动。
The 10 year rate will find its way down to 1.5 or in that range. It seems to me quite questionable how much extra stimulus would be developed by any further reduction below 1.5 percentage points that is possible and that applies with respect to any monetary device that might be developed.
10年期限利率将会下降到1.5%或者类似的范围内。在我看来，如果再降低1.5个百分点以下将有多少额外的刺激措施是非常值得怀疑的，而这适用于任何可能采用的货币工具。
With respect to quantitative easing I would note that there is less room now than there was previously that it is far from clear and retrospect that it is as effective once periods of major illiquidity are removed as is often supposed. As Ben has acknowledged it doesn't really work in theory and I think the evidence now is much less clear that it once appeared that it works in practice.
关于量化宽松，我得注意到现在的空间比以前更少了，很难确定，回顾起来，它被认为在大量流动性不足的时期被排除在外并不像人们通常所想象的那样有效。正如本所承认的，从理论上讲，它并不真正起作用，我认为现在的证据更不清楚，它曾经出现的那样在实践中起作用。
Especially in light of the awkward fact which most discussions of QE pass over that the quantity of US public debt that markets have to absorb has increased rather than decreased during the QE period given the activities of the treasury and given the further observation that the swap spread is negative somewhat inconsistent with the suggestion that there is an induced short supply of treasury debt.
尤其要考虑到一件被许多量化宽松讨论零散忽视的尴尬事实，即在此期间，美国公共债务的数量实际上是在增加而不是减少的，这是由于财政部门采取的行动导致的；同时，我们还注意到，利差为负数，这与有关特别缺乏国债的推论有些不一致。
So I am completely unconvinced that QE can be our salvation next time round. What about forward guidance? The fact that the Fed is moving with some vigor towards tightening while inflation is at this moment well short of 2%. The fact that the Fed is not willing to predict inflation above 2% at any moment even a hypothetical moment of the 10th year of recovery with an unemployment rate of 4% must be undercutting whatever credibility might previously have attached to the idea that a Federal Reserve would be willing to live with substantially super 2% inflation rates.
因此，我完全不相信在下一次经济危机中，量化宽松政策能够拯救我们。那么向前指引呢？现在通货膨胀还远未达到2%的水平，美联储却在积极推进加息。此外，美联储不愿意预测通胀率在任何时候都会超过2％，即使是在复苏的第十个年头，失业率仅为4％。这一点肯定会削弱之前曾经认为美联储愿意接受超过2％的通胀率的想法的可信度。
Finally there is the possibility of fiscal policy. I would only note that growing levels of the debt to GDP ratio coupled with readings of the political process and the way the political process responded to the aftermath of the Recovery Act suggests a little basis for serenity that substantial fiscal policy will be quickly entered into the next time the economy goes into recession.
最后还有财政政策的可能性。我只想指出，债务对GDP比率的不断增长，加上对政治进程与政治进程对复苏法案后果的反应的读数，暗示了很少有安宁的基础，即下一次经济陷入衰退时会迅速进入实质性的财政政策。
My conclusion therefore is that we are living in our current framework in a singularly brittle context in which we do not have a basis for assuming that monetary policy will be able as rapidly as possible to lift us out of the next recession. And therefore that a criterion for choosing a monetary framework when we next choose a framework should be that it is a framework that contemplates enough room to respond to a recession meaning nominal interest rates in the range of 5% in normal times.
因此，我的结论是，我们目前处于一个非常脆弱的环境中，我们没有依据认为货币政策将能够尽可能快地让我们摆脱下一次经济衰退的影响。因此，当我们下次选择货币制度框架时，一个选择标准应该是该框架应该考虑足够的空间以响应经济衰退，即在正常时期，名义利率范围应在5%左右。
Whether that is achieved through changing conventions on how one permits above target inflation, providing for adjustment to changes based on the price level rather than the rate of inflation, or whether that is done in the context of relying on nominal GDP seems to me to be a question of second order importance. What is of primary importance is that we establish a framework in which our best guess is that we will have room rather than that we won't have room to respond to the next recession.
无论通过改变允许通货膨胀目标的约定方式，提供基于价格水平而非通货膨胀率的调整，还是在依赖名义国内生产总值的背景下进行，似乎都是次要问题。最重要的是，我们建立一个框架，我们最好的猜测是我们将有足够空间来应对下一次经济衰退，而不是没有足够的空间。
And so I would suggest as a design criterion that an appropriate framework allows for a 5% nominal interest rate in normal times.
因此，作为设计标准，我建议适当的框架应允许在正常时期下进行5%的名义利率。此意思是指，设计某物时应考虑到在经济运作正常的情况下，需要有5%的利率来进行考虑。
I would just conclude by observing that if I am wrong and we assume I am right, we will live with marginally, perhaps slightly more than marginally, higher inflation. But if I am right or if the trend towards a declining neutral real rate continues and we ignore it, we will put ourselves at risk of very substantially exacerbating the next recession and that the consequences for welfare, not to mention political economy, I would suggest dwarf those of marginally higher inflation.
我想总结一下，如果我错了但我们假定我是正确的，我们将会面对稍稍或者略微高一些的通货膨胀。但如果我是正确的，或者趋势走向一个下降的中性实际利率并被忽视，我们会冒着极大地加剧下一次经济衰退的风险，这些后果对福利和政治经济而言，我认为远远超过了略微增加的通货膨胀。
So I would hope that all consideration of monetary frameworks emphasize centrally the need to provide for adequate response to the next recession.
我希望所有货币框架的考虑都能够集中强调为下一次经济衰退提供充分的回应所需的必要性。
Thank you very much. Thank you Larry. I want to ask you one question and we will take a few questions from the audience and then Larry will be around and might be able to respond in the next session as well.
非常感谢。谢谢你，Larry。我想问你一个问题，之后我们会从观众那里收取几个问题，然后Larry可能也会在下一节会议中回答。
So if you had to decide today what the new framework should be without regard to the difficulties of changing it, do you have a horse in this race? Which one would you choose?
如果你必须在不考虑更改困难的情况下今天决定新框架应该是什么，你在这场竞赛中有自己的看法吗？你会选择哪一个？
I really wanted to emphasize that something that would have a normal nominal interest rate of 5% is much more important to me than the tactical choices. If I had to choose one, I would choose a nominal GDP target of 5% to 6% and I would make that choice because it would attenuate the issues around explicitly announcing a higher inflation target, which I think are a little bit problematic on politically economy grounds and because it would build in the property which I think is desirable that the slower the underlying growth rate and therefore the less likely to mean lower neutral real rate and is likely to mean less normal productivity growth which is relevant for the zero floor on wages and so a nominal GDP target has that as an advantage.
我想强调一点，那就是对我来说，一个常规名义利率5%的东西比战术选择更重要。如果我必须选择一个，我会选择名义GDP目标为5%至6%，我会做出这个选择，因为它会减轻明确宣布更高的通货膨胀目标所带来的政治经济问题，而我认为这些问题有点棘手，因为它会将我认为是可取的属性纳入其中，即基础增长率越慢，中性实际利率越低，正常生产率增长越少，这与工资零底线有关，因此，名义GDP目标具有这样的优势。
That would be my bold big step. My smaller, I think more practical step would be an explicit acknowledgement by the central bank of an objective of super 2% inflation in the late stage of an expansion based on the confidence that a recession would come at some point and would provide for some further disinflation and by doing that one could preserve the 2% inflation target, justify a more expansionary policy today and it seems to me be entirely responsible.
这将是我的大胆的重大举步。我认为更实际的小步骤是中央银行明确承认，在经济扩张的后期，通胀超过2%的目标，因为他们相信经济衰退会在某一时刻到来，这可以带来一些进一步的紧缩，通过执行这种政策，可以保持2%的通货膨胀目标，在今天证明更具有扩张性，我认为这是完全负责任的做法。
I don't think it is possible to reconcile the forecasts of 2% inflation with not a single dot above 2% inflation on forecasts that assume continued expansion with the claim of being symmetric about the 2% inflation mandate.
我认为将2%的通胀预测与假设持续扩张的预测中没有一个点超过2%的通胀率调和是不可能的。这与宣称符合2%通胀目标的对称性要求不符。
Thank you. I should have noted, people are welcome to stand in the back if you like but in the room just across the hallway we have a big screen and you can sit down if you like so anybody who wants to see you do it.
谢谢。我应该注意到，如果你愿意，人们可以站在后面，但是在走廊对面的房间里，我们有一块大屏幕，你可以坐下来，如果你想看的话，任何人都可以这样做。
I want to take a couple of questions and then we'll let Larry respond and we'll move on if anybody has one. Roberto, does it make coming? And if you would tell us who you are and please make it a question which has a question mark at the end? So all this discussion assumes that neutral race is going to stay low. Is there anything in your view that can any realistic policy that can be implemented that changes that?
我想提出几个问题，然后我们让拉里回答，如果有人有问题，我们就继续下去。罗伯托，你是否能来说一说？请告诉我们你是谁，并提出一个以问号结尾的问题。 所有这些讨论都假设中性种族将保持低水平。在你看来，是否存在任何现实政策可以改变这一点？
Okay, thank you. Take another one. Jen, please Steve. Larry, do you envision any fiscal response to this next recession? As in would you then I know the horses left the barn with this particular year but envision creating fiscal capacity right now in order to let fiscal play a part and not put all of the recession response on the monetary side?
好的，谢谢。再来一个。珍，麻烦你。拉里，你是否预计会对下一次经济衰退进行财政回应？也就是说，你是否想现在创造财政能力，以便财政在经济衰退应对中发挥作用，而不是把所有的经济衰退反应都放在货币方面？我知道这个年份已经错过了，但你是否会考虑这种可能性？
Okay, one more. Yes, gentlemen here. Wait for the mic and please tell us who you are. I suggest that was Roberto Parley, Steve Leesman and you are Patrick Lawler.
好的，还有一个问题。是的，请这位绅士发言。请等待麦克风并告诉我们你是谁。我认为那位是罗伯托·帕利，史蒂夫·利斯曼和你是帕特里克·劳勒。
Our experience with inflation in the, I'm guessing 3 to 4% range which might be consistent with your target nominal rates. Our history doesn't show any ability to keep a rate in any kind of narrow band at that point. If are you at all concerned that raising inflation that much might engender much wild their swings in what kinds of things monetary policy is expected to respond to?
我们的经验是通货膨胀率在3%到4%的范围内，这可能与您的目标名义利率一致。然而，我们的历史并没有显示出在该点上能够维持一个狭窄的利率范围的能力。如果您担心提高通货膨胀率可能会引起货币政策所应对的各种情况波动，那么这是否会令人担忧？
Okay, Larry, three good questions. Answer them and they're already elected. All questions of the form am I at all concerned? The answer is yes.
好的，Larry，三个好问题。回答它们就可以当选了。问题都是关于我是否有关注的。答案是肯定的。
I do not share your reading of the 1980s for example when inflation was in the 3 to 4% range and seemed to me to remain in control. Furthermore I think that there is a natural corrective in the form of intermittent recessions which would tend to bring inflation down. I could conceive that this would become a problem but I guess as more and more time passes I come to see the 1970s more as the world's first experiment with pure fiat money from which it learned painful lessons and less as a prototypical event that characterizes what's going to take place going forward.
我不认同您对20世纪80年代的理解，例如当时通胀率在3至4%范围内，我认为通胀还是受到控制的。此外，我认为周期性的经济衰退是一种自然的纠正方式，可以使通胀率下降。我承认这可能成为一个问题，但是随着时间的推移，我越来越认为1970年代更像是全球第一个试验纯法定货币的事件，从中得到了痛苦的教训，而不是未来可能发生的典型事件。
I don't have that as a concern at the level of the trillion dollars a decade at least that I think we're putting at risk from this bread illness problem.
我并不担心这个面包疾病问题会造成的十年内至少数万亿美元的经济风险。
Steve, if we really could work countercyclical stabilization policy well in our political system that would attenuate somewhat these arguments, but it's actually a pretty complicated business even if you leave aside the infirmities of our political system. What's the instrument of the countercyclical stabilization going to be? It just turns out to have it be I live this designing the helping to design the economic recovery act. It just turns out to be very difficult to turn spending on and off on the spending side. If you insist on developing backlogs of infrastructure projects you'll get projects delayed to wait for your stimulus program just at the moment that you want them. It turns out just to be very hard.
如果我们在我们的政治体系中真正能够很好地实施反周期稳定政策，那将会在某种程度上减轻这些争论，但即使不考虑我们政治制度的不足，这实际上是一个非常复杂的问题。反周期稳定的工具将是什么？事实证明，设计经济复苏法案时就有这样的设想，但是在支出方面，将支出开关打开和关闭非常困难。如果坚持发展基础设施项目的积压，您将会得到项目的延迟，等待您的刺激计划，就在您期望的那一刻。事实证明，这非常困难。
I spent the better part of an afternoon trying to figure out how to give money to the NIH in a useful way which they could only spend in the next two to three years, and it turned out to be very, very hard to do. If you rely on the tax side, there's a question as to just how high the marginal propensity to spend out of anything you do temporarily on the tax side is. So even before you get to the political problems, I think fiscal policy is somewhat problematic. Is it somewhat problematic instrument?
我花了一个下午的时间，试图想出一个有用的方法，将钱捐赠给NIH，并确保他们必须在未来两到三年内使用这笔资金，结果证明这非常非常难做到。如果你只依靠税收这一方面，那么问题就出现了，就是临时做出的任何税收调整对消费的临时影响有多大。因此，即使在处理政治问题之前，我认为财政政策也有些棘手。财政政策是一种有些棘手的工具吗？
The question of the neutral real rate, look my view is that the neutral real rate is being shaped by some very profound structural things that I would call the demassification of the economy. Law firms used to need 1,200 square feet of space per lawyer, now they need 600 square feet of space per lawyer. No one wants malls anymore because there's e-shopping. Startups used to require $5 million of capital. Now they require $500,000 of capital. Our canonical technology companies, Apple and Google have as their central business problem what to do with all of their cash and how to disperse all their cash.
中性实际利率的问题，我的观点是，中性实际利率正在受到一些非常深刻的结构性因素的影响，我称之为经济去集中化。律师事务所过去需要每个律师1200平方英尺的空间，现在只需要每个律师600平方英尺的空间。由于有了电子商务，人们不再喜欢购物中心。创业公司过去需要500万美元的资本，现在只需要50万美元的资本。我们的技术巨头苹果和谷歌面临的核心业务问题是如何处理所有的现金和如何分散他们的现金。
An environment of that kind it seems to me as an environment that's going to have structurally low real interest rates, and look it's a basic problem. How do you extrapolate the time series 321? Like one answer is you extrapolate it to zero. Another answer is you extrapolate it to one because stuff is a random walk. Another answer is you extrapolate it to two because stuff mean reverts and another answer is you extrapolate it to three because stuff mean reverts sort of fast, and it's very hard to know what the answer is.
在我看来，这种环境似乎就是一个结构性实际利率较低的环境，这是一个基本问题。那么，如何推断时间序列 321 呢？有不同的答案：一个答案是将其推断到零；另一个答案是将其推断到一，因为有些东西是随机游走；还有一个答案是将其推断到二，因为有些东西平均回归；最后一个答案是将其推断到三，因为有些东西平均回归得比较快。很难知道答案是什么。
But I look at the downward trend in almost any proxy for the real interest rate in almost any country over 25 years and I'm at least as worried that the neutral real rate is going to fall as I am of the belief that it is going to rise. And I think you have to take the fact that if you look at the index bond market, it is telling you that in neither the United States nor Europe nor Japan is there an expectation that the 2% inflation target will be attained over a decade as suggesting that there is substantial doubt about the capacity of policy to generate adequate stimulus.
但是，当我看到近25年来几乎任何国家实际利率的代理人下降趋势时，我至少同样担心中性实际利率会下降，同时也相信它会上升。我认为，你必须考虑到指数债券市场的情况，它告诉你，在美国、欧洲和日本，都没有预期会在十年内实现2%的通货膨胀目标，这意味着对政策刺激能力的质疑非常大。
And so it seems to me that if anything the Kylie Roberts assumption of a 1% neutral real rate is way too high as a certainty equivalent estimate of A what the real rate actually is and B how you should calculate it recognizing that if you are too high that's a really serious problem and if you are too low that's a much less serious problem. Thank you very much, Larry, and thank all of you.
在我看来， Kylie Roberts 对于1%的中性实际利率的假设是高估了，因为它假设了两个方面：一方面是对实际利率的确定性的等价估计，另一方面是你应该如何计算实际利率。应该认识到，如果您的估计过高，这将是一个非常严重的问题，如果您的估计过低，那么这将是一个较轻的问题。非常感谢您，Larry，也感谢大家。