Why Uber Fails to Disrupt Transportation
发布时间 2023-01-25 17:13:55 来源
There are a few companies that match the fame and notoriety of Uber. As a ride-hailing service, Uber is divisive.
有一些公司和Uber一样出名，也有一些公司和Uber一样有名声不好的。作为一家叫车服务公司，Uber很有争议性。
To riders, the cheap fairs, up-from-pricing, cashless payment, app experience, and on-demand pickups are substantial upgrades over taxis and their antiquated dial-in dispatch systems.
对于骑手而言，廉价车费、增加的定价方式、无现金支付、应用程序体验和即时拾取功能都是相当实质性的升级。相比之下，出租车和他们陈旧的电话调度系统已经过时了。
To others, Uber is a public nuisance that has caused greater traffic congestion, disruption, and pollution in cities. For some drivers, Uber is a useful gig where they can make money working flexible hours.
对于其他人来说，优步是一个公共麻烦，在城市中造成了更大的交通拥堵、混乱和污染。对于一些司机来说，优步是一个有用的兼职，他们可以在灵活的时间赚钱。
For others, Uber is an exploitative middleman who has continuously raised prices, lowered payouts, and provided inadequate benefits, support, and protections to drivers as independent contractors.
对于其他人来说，Uber是一个剥削性中间人，不断提高价格、降低支付、为独立承包商提供不充分的福利、支持和保护。
The controversy extends internally as Uber has been rocked with scandals, dodging regulation, intimidating journalists, and covering up employee harassment.
Uber公司因涉嫌丑闻、规避监管、恐吓记者和掩盖员工骚扰而备受争议。
The purpose of this episode is not to rehash Uber's checkered past, but instead to assess Uber's profitability. In a sea of other unprofitable cash-burning tech startups, whether or not Uber specifically is profitable seems like something that shouldn't matter to most of us.
本集的目的不是重温Uber的不光彩历史，而是评估Uber的盈利能力。在众多无利可图、烧钱的科技初创公司中，Uber是否赚钱似乎对大多数人来说并不重要。
But Uber is more than just an app to get a ride or food delivered. As the most prominent and well-funded startup in the past decade, Uber is the largest living embodiment of Silicon Valley.
但是Uber不仅仅是一个用于叫车或送餐的应用程序。作为过去十年中最引人瞩目和资金充沛的创业公司，Uber是硅谷最大的代表。
Uber is one of the few if not the only tech startup in history to raise over $25 billion and still not turn a profit after 13 years of operations. The only other company to share this privilege is WeWork, the infamous co-working space provider.
Uber是历史上少数甚至是唯一一家在经营13年后筹集超过250亿美元资金，却仍未盈利的科技初创企业。唯一与之分享此殊荣的公司是臭名昭著的共享办公空间提供商WeWork。
WeWork raised $20 billion under the guise of being a revolutionary tech company, but turned out to be nothing more than subsidized office sub-leasing.
WeWork在创立时打出了革命性科技公司的幌子，筹得了200亿美元的资金，但事实证明，它无非就是一家通过补贴出租办公室的公司罢了。
The exposure of WeWork has reduced the company to nothing more than a penny stock, and its failures have been conveniently blamed on Adam Newman, but not on the venture capitalist that propped up the Ego Maniac founder.
WeWork的暴露使得该公司不过是一个低价股，而其失败则方便地归咎于创始人Adam Newman，而不是支持这位自我狂热创始人的风险投资家。
When it became clear that manufacturing was never coming back to the West, Silicon Valley venture capitalists turned to software, talking up its ability to disrupt industries and create new businesses.
当制造业不可能再回到西方时，硅谷风投家们转向了软件，强调软件颠覆行业和创造新的商业机会的能力。
Inspired by Amazon and eBay, venture capitalists streamed of applying their successful platform business model to realms beyond just books and secondhand goods.
受亚马逊和eBay的启发，风险投资家们梦想着将他们成功的平台业务模式应用于除书籍和二手商品之外的其他领域。
The story goes like this, you build a software platform that connects supply and demand for an offline service. You take a cut of every transaction that occurs on your platform. With enough transactions at scale, your cut as a middleman will go from millions to billions.
这个故事是这样的，你建立了一个软件平台，连接离线服务的供应和需求。你从每个在你平台上发生的交易中都提取一定的手续费。随着足够大规模的交易，作为一个中间商的你的收益将从数百万增长到数十亿。
As an online platform without physical assets, you would enjoy high profit margins and radically like cost structures as there's no marginal cost and software to serve the next customer at scale. The only real cost is developing the software.
作为一个没有实体资产的在线平台，您将享受高利润率和低成本结构，因为没有边际成本和软件可为下一个客户提供服务。唯一的真正成本是开发软件。
The biggest B2C startups of the past decade, Airbnb, Instacart, DoorDash and Uber, are all services built on the same, fundamental, on-demand, online to offline platform business model.
在过去十年里最大的B2C创业公司，如Airbnb，Instacart，DoorDash和Uber，都是建立在同一基本的、按需的、线上到线下的平台业务模式上的服务。
But Uber and these companies take it a step further with a sharing economy and gig work, where everyday people use personal assets like their cars, homes, or bicycles to render services on-demand and make money flexibly. Everyone has heard this story before.
但Uber和这些公司进一步发展了共享经济和零工经济，让普通人使用个人资产如汽车、房屋或自行车，以现场需求提供服务并灵活赚钱。每个人都听过这个故事。
Airbnb disrupts hotels because it doesn't own buildings. DoorDash disrupts food delivery because it doesn't own restaurants or hire the couriers. Uber disrupts transportation because it doesn't own any cars.
Airbnb通过不拥有建筑物来打破酒店行业的格局。DoorDash通过不拥有餐厅或雇佣信使来打破食品配送行业的格局。Uber通过不拥有任何汽车来打破运输行业的格局。
Uber was considered to be the most revolutionary out of the bunch as its adoption was most visible. The company was even written into business textbooks as a formidable example of tech disruption.
Uber被认为是其中最具革命性的公司，因为它的采用最为明显。这家公司甚至被写入商业教科书中，作为技术颠覆的一个强有力的例子。
From 2013 to 2018, startups around the world emulated Uber, burning millions in an attempt to apply the same on-demand, online to offline gig worker platform business to as many markets as possible. Flowers, valet parking, laundry, medication, massages, alcohol, and even cookies were all on-demand services available at a tap and brought to you through gig workers.
从2013年到2018年，全球的初创企业效仿Uber的模式，试图将同样的在线下零工平台业务应用到尽可能多的市场上，为此烧掉了数百万美元。鲜花、代客泊车、洗衣、药品、按摩、酒精甚至曲奇饼干等各种服务都可通过轻点来享受，并由零工人员提供。
Many of these Uber for X startups have collapsed or quietly disappeared. And despite the hype and their IPOs, Airbnb, DoorDash, and Uber have never once achieved profitability at any point in their history.
许多Uber for X初创公司已经倒闭或悄悄地消失了。尽管有炒作和IPO（首次公开募股）的影响，但Airbnb、DoorDash和Uber在它们历史上从未一次实现过盈利。
If Uber becomes profitable, it will be crucial validation for venture capitalists that on-demand B2C platforms can indeed become sustainable businesses with time. Uber's profitability would also validate Silicon Valley's controversial winner-take-all approach of destroying fair competition through subsidies.
如果优步实现盈利，这将是风险投资家关键的验证，证明即时的B2C平台确实可以成为可持续的企业。优步的盈利也将证明硅谷的有争议的胜者通吃策略，即通过补贴摧毁公平竞争的做法。
When a playbook goes like this, you raise a multi-million or multi-billion dollar war chest. You buy adoption by offering your product or services at subsidized prices.
当策略是这样时，你需要筹集数百万或数十亿美元的资金，通过提供低价产品或服务来促进市场接受。
You lose money but gain market share on every transaction. Your competition has no chance because they can't offer the same low prices as you do without going out of business. They end up going out of business anyways as you steal their customers.
在每一笔交易中，你会失去一些钱，但会赢得市场份额。因为你的竞争对手没有办法像你一样提供如此低廉的价格，而不会破产。最终，你将偷走他们的客户，他们最终会破产。
Once you've amassed enough market share to become the monopoly, you raise prices, and by then there's no one left for customers to go to. Uber popularized this playbook, burning billions to create an artificial price advantage over taxis. It was a sole fact that Uber had billions to burn that drove its early adoption, where drivers earned thousands of dollars every week, and passengers paid $20 for 30-minute rides.
一旦你积累了足够的市场份额成为垄断者，你就会提高价格，到那时候消费者已经没有其他选择了。优步（Uber）推广了这种策略，投入数十亿美元来创造人工价格优势，从而与出租车竞争。正是优步有数十亿美元可以烧掉，才推动了它的早期采用，在那里司机每周可以赚数千美元，乘客支付二十美元的乘车费用。
These artificially achieved fairs and inflated driver payouts pulled in supply and demand. Uber, in short, would not have achieved the popularity, growth, and dominant market share that it enjoys today without these billion dollar subsidies. As fairs have increased and driver payouts have decreased, the subsidies are less lavish but still exist to this day.
这些通过人工手段实现的优惠和高额司机津贴吸引了供需双方。简而言之，如果没有这些十亿美元的补贴，Uber今天不会取得它所拥有的流行度、增长和市场份额。随着车费增加和司机津贴减少，这些补贴变得不那么慷慨，但它们仍然存在至今。
While this episode is centered on Uber, the greater story is about what the company represents. If the most well-funded start-up in history during the greatest bull market can't turn a profit, then no one can. And since Airbnb, DoorDash, and many other B2C tech companies are all based on the same on-demand, online to offline, sharing economy gig-worker platform business model, if Uber can't hack it, then neither can they.
虽然这一集集中讨论的是Uber，但更重要的是它所代表的意义。如果最大投资的公司在最大牛市时期仍无法盈利，那么其他以同样的即时、在线到离线、共享经济兼职工作平台业务模式为基础的B2C科技公司（如Airbnb和DoorDash）也不可能。如果Uber不行，那么他们也不可能。
If Uber becomes a penny stock, it would expose Silicon Valley's pump and dump schemes, and the tale of software eating the world has nothing more than a fallacy, which would be a scandal greater than Sandbankman-Freed and FTX. In this episode we'll cover Uber, the strategies it's using to keep up appearances, and how far away the company really is in its desperate march to profitability.
如果Uber变成一只便士股，它将揭露硅谷的炒作和抛售计划，而软件吞噬世界的故事不过是一个谬论，这将是一个比Sandbankman-Freed和FTX更大的丑闻。在这一集中，我们将介绍Uber，它正在使用的策略来维持外表以及公司在渴望盈利上的距离有多远。
Uber has made questionable decisions over the years, but the company was not prepared for the onslaught in the public markets in 2022 that very few people saw coming. JP Morgan reports that retail investors are down on average 44%, but the biggest firms in the world are saying that this doesn't have to be the new normal. Goldman Sachs recently published a report stating that the idea allocation for stocks has shrunk from 60% to around 45%.
Uber在过去的几年中做出了一些值得质疑的决定，但是这家公司没有为2022年公共市场上的猛烈攻击做好准备，这样的情况很少有人预料到。JP摩根报告称，普通零售投资者的投资平均下降了44%，但是全球最大的公司表示，这不必成为新的常态。高盛最近发表了一份报告，指出股票的适当配置从60%缩减到了约45%。
This is where Masterworks, a leading investment platform and the sponsor of this episode comes in. So what does Goldman Sachs recommend you do with that difference in order to salvage your stolen returns? It's surprising to hear that Goldman Sachs states that FineArt can protect your purchasing power even in the face of rising prices. It's so resilient that even in 2022, the average FineArt piece is selling for 26% more at auction. FineArt has even outpaced the S&P 500 for the past 26 years by 131%.
这就是领先的投资平台Masterworks和本期主办方的角色。那么，高盛建议你怎么处理这种收益损失的差异呢？出乎意料的是，高盛认为即使在价格上涨的情况下，艺术品也可以保护你的购买力。它是如此的弹性十足，即使在2022年，平均艺术品的拍卖价格也比更高了26％。艺术品在过去的26年中甚至超过了标普500指数，增长了131％。
Now if you're looking to diversify your portfolio with FineArt, business insiders said that one platform should be the go-to. Masterworks. We've talked about Masterworks in the past a few times because of how their securitizing art into legal, tangible investments is a form and innovation in itself. Masterworks qualifies paintings with the SEC, turning legendary art into an actual investment for a fraction of the full price.
现在如果你想通过投资艺术品来实现投资组合的多样化，业内人士建议使用Masterworks这个平台。我们曾经在过去几次谈到Masterworks，因为他们将艺术品转化为合法的有形投资形式，是一种创新形式。Masterworks通过SEC认证艺术品，将传奇的艺术品转化为实际投资，而仅需支付全价的一小部分。
You can view all offering circulars on their website or at the Edgar database linked in the description. Today, Masterworks has had a total of 8 exits with 5 of them in this year alone. Masterworks last three exits delivered 17, 21, and 33% net returns. One of those was as recent as a few weeks ago for a 17.8% net return. With nearly 600,000 members, Masterworks has been offering a new painting every week as shares have sold out in minutes in the past.
你可以在他们的网站或描述中链接的Edgar数据库上查看所有的发行说明书。目前，Masterworks总共有8次退出，其中有5次仅在这一年实现。Masterworks的最近三次退出分别带来了17%，21%和33%的净回报率。其中一次仅几周前实现了17.8%的净回报率。Masterworks拥有近60万会员，过去他们每周推出的股票往往在几分钟内售罄。
But you can get priority access to their new offerings just by going to masterworks.art slash modern MBA or by clicking the link in the description. Thank you to Masterworks for supporting modern MBA and making this episode possible. Assessing a company's profitability is usually as easy as looking at annual operating margin and net income.
只需访问masterworks.art/modernMBA或在说明中点击链接，你就可以优先了解他们的新品。感谢Masterworks对现代MBA的支持，让本集节目成为可能。评估一家公司的盈利通常只需要查看年度营业利润率和净利润。
If we map out Uber's revenue, operating income and net income, we see a continuous growth in overall earnings, enormous operating losses, and fluctuating net losses. Based on these conventional metrics, Uber appears to have been profitable at least once in its history, going from a loss of $4 billion in 2017 to a positive net income of $997 million in 2018. The company appears to be closing the gap once again, coming up just half a billion dollars shy of profitability in 2021.
如果我们对Uber的收入、运营利润和净利润作出图表，我们可以看到总收入持续增长，运营损失巨大，净亏损波动。根据这些常规指标，Uber至少曾经在其历史上盈利过一次，从2017年的40亿美元亏损到2018年的正净收入9.97亿美元。该公司似乎再一次缩小了差距，在2021年只差5亿美元即可实现盈利。
But the numbers don't add up, especially in 2016, 2018, and 2021, where Uber's multi-billion dollar operating losses magically improved to significantly smaller net losses. When we look closer, there are two items buried between operating income and net income. There's income from discontinued operations and gain from business divestitures. Both of these items inflate Uber's bottom line by buildings.
但是数字不成立，特别是在2016年、2018年和2021年，Uber的数十亿美元的营业亏损神奇地改善为显著较小的净亏损。当我们仔细观察时，在营业收入和净收入之间有两个项目被隐藏起来。这里有来自已停止营业的业务和出售业务的收益。这两项都通过构建将Uber的底线膨胀了起来。
In 2016, Uber exited China after a failed war of attrition with D.D. to see who could offer the biggest subsidies and win over the most drivers and riders. To get Uber to leave China even faster, D.D. gave 52 million shares of its stock to Uber. In return, Uber gave D.D. its Chinese operations and promised to stay out of China for the next seven years.
2016年，优步与滴滴打车进行了一场削弱对方的战争，以争取更多的司机和乘客，并在失败后退出了中国。为了使优步更快地离开中国，滴滴向优步赠送了5200万股股票。作为回报，优步把中国的业务交给了滴滴，并承诺将在未来7年内不再进入中国。
In 2016, venture capitalists were pumping up private valuations of ride hailing companies around the world to astronomical levels and D.D. was no different. D.D. had just raised a $7 billion series B that valued the fast growing Chinese startup at $28 billion with a share price of $115. With 52 million shares valued at $115 each, Uber was given $6 billion worth of D.D. stock to leave China.
2016年，风险投资家将世界范围内的顺风车公司的私人估值推高到了极高的水平，而滴滴也不例外。滴滴刚刚完成了一轮7亿美元的B轮融资，将这家快速增长的中国初创公司的估值定为280亿美元，股价为115美元。由于每股股价为115美元，52 million股的股份总价值为60亿美元，Uber换取了价值60亿美元的滴滴股票，退出了中国市场。
In reality, this value of D.D.'s equity was nothing more than funny money. D.D.'s shares were worthless, non-tradable securities that could only be liquidated upon IPO. There's no guarantee that a company can maintain its private valuation and equity value when it goes public. The $150 share price had been reached in private by venture capitalists who were eager to pump up D.D.'s valuations in hopes of a future blockbuster IPO.
实际上，D.D.的股权价值不过是无关紧要的虚假货币。D.D.的股票毫无价值，是不可交易的证券，只能在首次公开发行(IPO)时变现。公司刚公开上市时，无法保证其私有估值和股权价值的稳定。150美元的股价是由风险投资家在私下里刻意抬高D.D.的估值，以期望未来有一个重大IPO。
Yet after paying off its outstanding liabilities in China, Uber immediately recognized the remainder of D.D.'s shares that year's income, even though these shares were only worth that much in the private market and could not actually be liquidated. This accounting trick allowed Uber to inflate its bottom line. By recognizing $2.8 billion of D.D. stock as quote additional income, Uber reduced its $3.2 billion operating loss in 2016 to a much smaller net loss of $300 million.
然而，在偿还了中国的所有未偿债务后，优步立即将剩余的D.D.股份视为当年的收入，即使这些股份在私人市场上只值那么多，实际上无法变现。这种会计手法使优步的底线得以膨胀。通过将28亿美元的D.D.股票视为“额外收入”，优步将其2016年32亿美元的运营亏损降低为300万美元的净亏损。
Uber repeated the same trick in 2018. The company found itself at another race to zero in Russia and Southeast Asia. Billions of dollars were wasted fighting local competition in another long war of attrition to see which startup would last the longest operating at negative margins and offering the biggest subsidies to win over as many customers and drivers as possible.
Uber在2018年重复了同样的把戏。公司在俄罗斯和东南亚再次陷入了一场零和竞赛。数十亿美元被浪费在与本地竞争对手的长期消耗战中，以查看哪个创业公司可以以负利润运营最久并提供最大的补贴，赢得尽可能多的顾客和司机。
Once again, it was Uber who blinked first. Uber pulled out of Russia, but not before pocketing 38% of stock worth $954 million at the time in a merger with the Moscow-based Yandex taxi. In Southeast Asia, Uber exited with a 23% stake worth $2.2 billion at the time in the Singapore-based Grab. The combined value of these private shares allowed Uber to magically convert a $3 billion operating lost in 2018 to a positive net income of $997 million.
再一次，Uber率先放弃。在俄罗斯，Uber退出了市场，并在与莫斯科的Yandex出租车合并前，以价值9.54亿美元的股票的38％为代价。在东南亚，Uber退出了市场，但保留了在新加坡Grab公司的23％的股权，价值22亿美元。这些私人股份的综合价值使得Uber成功地将2018年的30亿美元亏损转化为净收益9.97亿美元。
When Uber ex-pulled out of India in 2021, Uber pocketed $154 million worth of equity from Zomato and recognized those shares as income. Uber then sold off its European freight business to a German startup in exchange for their shares that were worth $77 million at the time. When Uber sold off itself driving division that same year, the company took a 26% equity stake in the buyer Aurora worth $1.6 billion at the time. Uber once again recognized the net combined value of all these private shares as additional income to inflate the bottom line, turning a $3.8 billion operating loss in 2021 into a $496 million net loss.
在2021年，Uber退出印度市场时，从Zomato收购了价值1.54亿美元的股权，并将这些股份视为收入。随后，Uber出售其欧洲货运业务给一家德国创业公司，以换取价值7700万美元的股份。当Uber在同一年出售其自驾车部门时，该公司在买家Aurora手中持有了26%的股权，价值当时为16亿美元。Uber再次将这些私有股份的净合并价值视为额外收入，以扩大底线，将2021年的38亿美元运营亏损转化为4.96亿美元的净亏损。
Every single one of these companies, D.D., Aurora, Zomato, and Grab have since debuted on the public markets and have seen their once lofty private valuations and equity wiped out. Aurora IPO'd in 2021 with an opening price of $10 a share. The company today is in danger of being delisted with a current share price of $1. D.D., IPO'd in 2021, but when placed under investigation by regulators chose to de-list. The Chinese company lasted less than a year on the New York Stock Exchange and is currently an over-the-counter penny stock. Grab debuted on NASDAQ in 2021 and these days is worth just $3 a share. Zomato went public in 2021 and today is valued at a little over $0.50 a share.
这些公司中的每一个，D.D.、Aurora、Zomato和Grab，都在公开市场上首次亮相，并看到它们曾经崇高的私人估值和股权全部被抹去。Aurora于2021年首次公开募股，开盘价为每股10美元。该公司目前面临被摘牌的风险，目前的股价为1美元。D.D.于2021年首次公开募股，但当被监管机构调查后选择摘牌。这家中国公司在纽约证券交易所上只坚持了不到一年，目前是一个场外股票。Grab于2021年在纳斯达克首次亮相，现在价值仅为每股3美元。Zomato于2021年上市，目前估值仅略超过每股0.50美元。
With travel restrictions lifted, Uber is now spinning a narrative that based on recent all-time highs in adjusted EBITDA, the company is well on its way to being profitable. The disclaimer that Uber conveniently hides is that adjusted EBITDA is a non-conventional, non-gap metric that doesn't follow established accounting standards. It's a metric that Uber has created for itself.
随着旅行限制的解除，优步现在正在宣传一种叙述，即基于最近调整后税前利润的历史最高水平，该公司正在稳步走向盈利。优步方便地隐藏的免责声明是，调整后税前利润是一种非常规的、非公认会计原则的度量标准。这是一种优步为自己创造的度量标准。
Uber defines adjusted EBITDA as net income with special exclusions of 13 expenses. These special exclusions reduce Uber's losses by billions to make the business appear healthier to outsiders. To demonstrate, Uber posted a $5.2 billion quarterly net loss in 2019, but when adjusted EBITDA is applied, the numbers magically get better. That $5.2 billion net loss in 2019 turns into an adjusted EBITDA loss of $650 million. In 2020, a $1.8 billion quarterly loss turned into an adjusted EBITDA loss of just $837 million.
Uber将调整后的EBITDA定义为13个特定费用的净收入排除。这些特定费用可使Uber的损失减少数十亿美元，从而使业务对外部人士看起来更加健康。例如，2019年Uber发布了52亿美元的季度净亏损，但是应用调整后的EBITDA后，数字魔术般地变得更好了。那个2019年的52亿美元净亏损变成了6500万美元的调整后的EBITDA亏损。在2020年，18亿美元的季度亏损变为仅为8.37亿美元的调整后的EBITDA亏损。
Now in 2022, Uber is presenting a net loss of $9.7 billion as a positive adjusted EBITDA of $1.05 billion. Between conventional net income and the custom non-regulated adjusted EBITDA, it should be no surprise that it's adjusted EBITDA that Uber promotes heavily to investors and media. It's only in Uber's accounting fantasies and non-gap measures that the company is profitable. By all conventional principles and regulated financial reporting standards, Uber is still unprofitable.
到2022年，Uber的净亏损达97亿美元，但调整后的调整后EBITDA值高达10.5亿美元，公司大力推销这一非规定的调整后EBITDA值来吸引投资者和媒体的注意。只有在Uber的会计幻想和非规定措施中，公司才能实现盈利。但按照所有传统原则和监管的财务报告标准，Uber仍然没有盈利。
The apples don't fall far from the tree. The only other businesses that have devised their own metrics and promote adjusted EBITDA as a measure profitability are Airbnb and DoorDash, tech companies with the same platform business model as Uber. These accounting tricks of recognizing inflated non-public illiquid stock as income and adjusted earnings are not illegal but are still highly misleading.
“苹果不会跑远离苹果树。”除了Uber以外，只有与其平台商业模式相同的Airbnb和DoorDash这两家科技公司制定了自己的衡量盈利能力的指标，并将调整后的Ebitda视为其中一项。这种会计手法将过高的非公开流动性股票认定为收入和调整后的收益并不违法，但具有极高的误导性。
Uber today has two big businesses. It has its classic rides, where a gig driver takes you from 0.8 to 0.0 and Uber eats for food delivery. Today, Uber blends both deliveries and passenger rides into a single aggregate number of trips. Even the number of drivers on Uber are a mystery. It's difficult to understand why the number of deliveries, rides, and drivers on the platform should be kept as company's secrets, especially when the same company is arguing that it needs to scale to reach profitability. As a result, we have to dig into the strategy and calculate the unit economics ourselves to understand Uber's real endgame and hidden margins.
今天，Uber有两个业务大头。一是提供经典的乘车服务，即通过接驾司机，让您从0.8到0.0的目的地。二是提供食品外卖服务的Uber Eats。如今，Uber把这两项业务的出行量合并计算，但在Uber平台上司机数量却是一个谜。在同一家公司为了实现盈利而争论需要扩大规模的背景下，很难理解为什么平台上的配送、乘车和司机数量需要保密。因此，我们必须深入研究Uber的策略，自行计算单位经济数据，才能了解其真正的终极目标和隐藏利润。
Putting aside these accounting tricks, the software platform is a simple business to understand. You take a percentage of the gross value of every transaction as the middleman. As the platform, you're responsible for generating demand and providing supply to match that demand. Platforms like Uber, DoorDash, and Airbnb make money in two ways. The first is to scale demand so that you can have as many transactions occurring on your platform as possible. The second is to increase your commission so you take a bigger percentage of every transaction. The more transactions that take place, the higher your commission, and the more money you'll make as a platform.
抛开这些会计手段，软件平台是一个容易理解的简单业务。作为中间人，你从每笔交易的总价值中抽取一定比例的利润。作为平台，你负责创造需求，并提供供应以满足这种需求。像Uber、DoorDash和Airbnb这样的平台通过两种方式赚钱。第一种是扩大需求，以便在你的平台上尽可能多地进行交易。第二个是增加你的佣金，这样你可以从每笔交易中获取更大的比例。交易量越大，你的佣金就越高，作为平台，你就能赚更多的钱。
In Uber's case, their situation is a little more complex as they're the ones who determine the fair price of every ride from 0.8 to 0.0. In comparison, food prices on DoorDash are set by the restaurants and Airbnb hosts set the nightly rates themselves. If Uber raises the prices of rides to the point where Uber is more expensive than a taxi, then demand will decline. If Uber takes such a high commission that drivers feel like they're no longer fairly compensated, then those drivers will find jobs elsewhere and Uber will lose supply.
在优步的情况下，他们的情况相对更加复杂，因为他们是决定每一次车程的公平价格的人，从0.8到0.0。相比之下，DoorDash上的食品价格是由餐厅设置的，而Airbnb的房主则自行设置每晚的价格。如果优步将车费涨到比出租车更贵的程度，那么需求将会下降。如果优步收取如此之高的佣金以至于司机感到自己的报酬不公平，那么这些司机将会去别的地方找工作，优步的供给也会减少。
The playbook for the company since its founding has always been to scale first and worry about profitability later. In 2010-2016, under Travis Kalanick, Uber's only goal was to grow as fast as possible. The company seized every opportunity to evade regulation and to operate in as many cities and countries as possible, even if local authorities had deemed the service illegal. Backed by a multi-billion dollar war chest, Travis was a believer that the ends justify the means. His vision was to build Uber into an unregulated monopoly to amass as many drivers and riders around the world as possible in the shortest time, even if that meant operating at negative margins, and then trust that profits would come with scale.
自成立以来，该公司的策略一直是先扩大规模，再考虑盈利。在特拉维斯·卡兰尼克的领导下（2010-2016年），Uber唯一的目标是尽可能快地增长。公司趁机规避监管，尽可能在多个城市和国家运营，即使当地当局已将该服务列为非法。在多亿美元的资金支持下，特拉维斯认为目的的正当性大于手段的正当性。他的愿景是将Uber打造成一个不受监管的垄断企业，尽可能快地聚集世界各地的司机和乘客，即使这意味着运营在负利润水平上，然后相信利润会随着规模而来。
Dara Krozwasehi was appointed the new CEO in 2017 to repair the company's image after a series of high-profile scandals. In his six plus years at Uber, Dara has made many sweeping changes like embracing regulation, establishing passenger safety tools, and restoring trust with drivers, initiatives that have been completely shunned by his predecessor. But the one thing that Dara did in touch was Uber's path to profitability. At IPO, Dara more or less restated the same vision that Travis had pounded since the founding of Uber.
在一系列高调丑闻之后，Dara Krozwasehi被任命为2017年新任CEO，以修复公司形象。在担任Uber的六年多时间里，Dara进行了许多全面的改变，比如积极接受监管、建立乘客安全工具和恢复与司机的信任等，这些都是前任完全忽视的倡议。但唯一不同的是，Dara没有触及Uber的盈利路径。在IPO上，Dara基本上重申了自Travis成立Uber以来一直主张的愿景。
In 2019, Uber was already the largest and most recognized ride-hailing platform in the world, facilitating 14 million trips a day in 700 cities across six continents and customers only waited five minutes on average to be picked up. But this wasn't enough. Quote, our strategy is to create the largest network in each market, so we have the greatest liquidity network effect which we believe leads to a margin advantage. If we remove the buzzwords, Dara's point is that Uber needs to keep scaling to reach profitability.
2019年，优步已经是世界上最大、最知名的叫车平台了，在6个大洲的700个城市提供每天1400万车次的服务。平均每位顾客只需要等待5分钟就可以上车。但这还不够。引用达拉的话，“我们的战略是在每个市场上创建最大的网络，这样我们就拥有了最大的流动性网络效应，我们相信这会带来利润优势。”如果去掉行话，达拉的观点是优步需要不断扩张以实现盈利。
The company needs to keep subsidizing rides and deliveries on its platform to keep growth. In the future, once Uber reaches enough scale, then the platform, in theory, will no longer require subsidies. All discounts, promotions, and incentives will then be turned off for riders and drivers alike. And at that point, the spread between the historically subsidized below-cost price and the true above-cost price will become Uber's profit margin.
为了保持增长，该公司需要继续在其平台上补贴车程和配送。将来，一旦优步达到足够的规模，理论上平台将不再需要补贴。所有的折扣、促销和激励措施都将关闭，对乘客和司机一样。到了那个时候，历史上通过补贴低于成本价格的价格和真正高于成本价格的价格之间的差距将成为优步的利润率。
There's some weird logic here. This vision assumes that people are not price sensitive to Uber and that Uber as a service is inelastic. This is a bizarre assumption to make as one doesn't have to travel frequently to see crowds of people huddled over at airport terminals in the rain, at live events or bars, waiting for surge pricing to go down before calling an Uber. These same people are often flicking between Uber and Lyft and booking whichever app gives them the cheapest price first. On the supply side, veteran drivers do the same thing. They strategically wait for hot spots to appear before going online and they optimize their shifts for the most profitable times and areas.
这里有一些奇怪的逻辑。这种想法假定人们对Uber不敏感，并且Uber作为一项服务是不变的。这个假设是奇怪的，因为人们不必频繁出行就可以看到在机场、现场活动或酒吧等地，人们挤在一起等待高峰期定价下降后才叫Uber。这些人经常在Uber和Lyft之间选择，并预订价钱最便宜的应用程序。从供应方面来看，老司机也是这样做的。他们会策略性地等待热点出现，然后再上线，并优化他们的班次以获得最大收益的时间和区域。
The second aspect that's weird is the underlying assumption that once the platform grows to a certain scale, it won't need to rely on subsidies. But since subsidies are explicitly deemed as essential to help Uber grow and scale, then how could the same platform be viable in the future without subsidies if low prices and negative margins were needed to grow in the first place?
第二个奇怪的方面是基于一种假设，即一旦平台规模扩大到一定程度，它就不需要依赖补贴了。但由于补贴被明确视为帮助优步增长和扩展至关重要，那么如果低价格和负利润是首要条件来促进增长，那么同一平台在未来如何在没有补贴的情况下运营？
Annual gross bookings for Uber rides grew significantly from $18 billion in 2016 to $49 billion in 2019, but even this was not enough to achieve profitability. Gross bookings represent the total dollar value of all rides booked on Uber. The majority of every ride is paid to the driver and the remainder is retained by Uber for its commission. Gross bookings for Uber rides don't include tips, which are optional and pass through info from the customer to the driver.
优步乘车的年度总收入从2016年的180亿美元增长到2019年的490亿美元，但这仍不足以实现盈利。总预订金额代表所有在优步订车的乘坐的美元价值。每次行程的大部分费用支付给司机，其余部分作为佣金由优步保留。优步乘车的总预订金额不包括小费，小费是可选的，是顾客向司机提供的额外报酬。
In 2019, Uber kept $10 billion as revenue and paid out the remaining $39 billion to drivers with a take rate of 21.5%. Take rate is the official term for the cut that Uber takes off each ride as the middleman. In 2016, Travis's last year as CEO, take rate was below 20%. It was under Dara that Uber began increasing its take rate, paying less to drivers and keeping more of the fare for itself. In 2019, Uber's total expenses came to $21 billion.
2019年，Uber的收入为100亿美元，其中215%的收益被用作为中间商所扣除的成本，并支付了剩余的390亿美元给司机。"Take rate"（成本）是Uber从每一次乘车中的利润中所扣除的费用的官方术语。在Travis担任首席执行官的最后一年2016年，成本为不到20%。在Dara掌管下，Uber开始增加成本，向司机支付更少的费用并保留更多的车费。2019年，Uber的总开支为210亿美元。
If Uber's goal was to break even, the company would have needed a take rate of 43.5% just to offset costs. Uber drivers that year were publicly protesting for better pay and demanding lawmakers cap Uber's commission at 10%. Given that Uber's actual take rate that year was at 21%, increasing take rate to 43% would have been catastrophic in literally driving away supply.
如果Uber的目标是达到盈亏平衡，该公司将需要收取43.5%的费率才能平衡成本。当时，Uber的司机公开抗议要求更好的工资，并要求立法者将Uber的佣金限制在10%以内。考虑到Uber当年的实际费率为21%，将费率增加到43%将会在实质上驱赶供应商，这将是灾难性的。
The other lever that Uber could pull would be to raise prices. If riders pay higher prices, then Uber could keep the same take rate to break even provided sufficient gross bookings. But with the take rate of 21%, Uber would need to double its gross bookings from $49 billion to $100 billion. Such a feat would require Uber to either double its current customer based or double prices. For such a high profile company with billions to burn, doubling users is not necessarily impossible but would still be extremely expensive and take years.
Uber可以拉动的另一个杠杆是提高价格。如果乘客支付更高的价格，那么如果总预订量足够，Uber可以保持相同的佣金率来实现盈亏平衡。但是，以21%的佣金率计算，Uber需要将总预订量从490亿美元增加到1000亿美元才能实现这一目标。这需要Uber要么翻倍其当前客户基础，要么翻倍价格。对于这样一家备受关注的公司，有数十亿美元的投资，翻倍用户不一定是不可能的，但仍然非常昂贵，需要花费数年时间。
To Dara the answer was simple. Rides are Uber's core product but the subsidies were not enough to drive the volume needed to break even. The platform desperately needed more volume and higher gross bookings. To make money, Uber needed to keep scaling.
对达拉来说，答案很简单。乘车是优步的核心产品，但补贴不足以带动所需的数量和达到盈亏平衡。这个平台迫切需要更多的数量和更高的总订单量。为了赚钱，优步需要不断扩大规模。
Their strategy in 2019 was to expand into delivery and move beyond rides to bring more transactions to the platform. To appease drivers, Dara launched a driver's reward program for supply side retention. Uber Pro offered drivers discounts on gas and free access to online courses for higher education. The company partnered with her and rental agencies to provide vehicles to gate workers who wanted to earn money driving for Uber but didn't have a car of their own. On the demand side, Uber rewards was launched in order to boost order frequency and encourage brand loyalty amongst customers.
他们的 2019 年战略是扩展到外卖领域，并超越出行，将更多的交易引入平台。为了安抚司机，达拉推出了一项供应端留存的司机奖励计划。Uber Pro 为司机提供加油折扣和免费的在线高等教育课程。公司与合作伙伴和租赁机构合作，为想要在 Uber 上赚钱但没有车的门口工人提供车辆。在需求端，Uber 奖励计划推出，旨在提高订单频率，鼓励客户品牌忠诚度。
Users could now earn points through rides and Uber eats orders to unlock price protection, priority pickups, and free delivery. Uber rewards was a success in its first year, with 27% penetration into the customer base. The 25 million users across the United States, Latin America and Australia who enrolled in Uber rewards were twice as likely to use both Uber rides and Uber eats the non-enrolled customers. This data would give Dara the confidence in the cross-sell super-at-vision that would later become the backbone of Uber strategy.
现在用户可以通过乘坐Uber和使用Uber Eats订餐来获得积分，以解锁价格保护、优先接送和免费配送等奖励。Uber Rewards在第一年就取得了成功，覆盖客户基数达27%。在美国、拉丁美洲和澳大利亚共计2500万的注册用户中，加入Uber Rewards的用户更可能同时使用Uber乘车和Uber Eats订餐。这些数据证明了Dara跨销售超视野战略的可行性，成为Uber战略的支柱。
Dara continued to invest in rides despite signals that the product had reached maturity in the United States. Greater subsidies would not drive further engagement. Uber comfort was launched as a way to increase gross bookings as a higher priced option to the standard Uber X. Uber also invested in an enterprise sales team to push Uber for business and to capture corporate travelers who had the budget for high priced, high margin, Uber comfort, and Uber Black services. Meanwhile Germany, Argentina, Japan, South Korea, Spain and Italy were designated as the six must-win countries for Uber rides international business.
尽管信号表明该产品已在美国市场成熟，但达拉仍然继续投资于乘车行业。更高的补贴并不能带来更多的用户。为增加毛收益，Uber推出了更高价位的Uber Comfort服务，作为标准Uber X的替代品。Uber还投资建立了一个企业销售团队，旨在推广Uber for Business，并获取有预算的企业旅客，让他们选择高价高利的Uber Comfort和Uber Black服务。与此同时，德国、阿根廷、日本、韩国、西班牙和意大利被指定为Uber rides国际化业务的六个必胜国家。
The product that Dara was most bullish on in 2019 was Uber Eats. Food delivery in his mind would bring in the volume and transactions that the platform needed to reach profitability. He envisioned rides and Uber Eats as separate entry points to pull customers into the platform.
Dara在2019年最为看好的产品是Uber Eats。在他看来，食品配送将为该平台带来所需的交易量和利润。他设想乘车和Uber Eats是吸引客户进入平台的独立入口。
Once customers were engaged, the company could regularly cross-sell rides, eats, and any other service on its platform for free. Japan proved Dara's point as a population that had embraced Uber Eats but was resistant towards ride sharing as the largest taxi market in the world. Uber Eats popularity in Japan Dara believed would organically drive business for rides over time.
一旦客户开始使用平台，公司就可以定期免费向他们推销车辆、外卖或其他服务。日本是一个接受Uber Eats但对于搭乘服务持抵触态度的国家，因为它是世界上最大的出租车市场。达拉认为，Uber Eats在日本的受欢迎程度随着时间的推移将自然地推动搭乘服务的业务增长。
Uber Eats was young but growing quickly thanks to its aggressive subsidies. Gross bookings for Uber Eats grew nearly five times from $3 billion in 2017 to $14 billion in 2019. To maintain growth, the company lowered its take rate for Uber Eats in 2019, taking less commission than it had in years prior to pulling restaurants and couriers.
Uber Eats是一家年轻的公司，由于其激进的补贴政策，迅速发展壮大。从2017年的30亿美元到2019年的140亿美元，Uber Eats的总收入增长了近5倍。为了维持增长，该公司在2019年降低了Uber Eats的佣金比率，比之前几年从餐厅和送餐员收取了更少的佣金。
Quote, our strategy for Eats is simple. To invest aggressively in markets where we're confident we can establish or defend a number one or number two position over the 18 months. We think ultimately the mature business model for Uber Eats will have take rates significantly higher than the take rates that you see now. In India and South Korea, markets where food delivery competition was at its fiercest, Uber Eats take rate was negative. Dara was content not just losing money on every delivery but literally paying for orders just to claim market share. Months later, Dara would wave the white flag and pull Uber Eats out of India and South Korea.
我们在Uber Eats的策略很简单。我们会大力投资于那些我们有信心在未来18个月内确立或保卫排名第一或第二的市场。我们认为，最终Uber Eats成熟的商业模式将会有比现有的佣金率更高的佣金率。在印度和韩国这两个最为激烈竞争的食品配送市场，Uber Eats的佣金甚至是负数。达拉（Uber CEO）并不介意在每次配送中都亏损，甚至直接支付订单来获得市场份额。数个月后，达拉放弃了印度和韩国的市场，认输了。
But while food deliveries are high-frequency transactions, their order sizes are small. Dara kept its foot on the gas by acquiring corner shop, an online grocery delivery service based in Latin America. He saw not just synergy between restaurants and supermarkets but also an opportunity to drive gross bookings with the naturally high basket sizes of groceries.
尽管食品配送频繁，但订单规模较小。 Dara通过收购总部位于拉丁美洲的在线杂货送货服务Corner Shop来保持竞争优势。他认为餐厅和超市之间不仅存在协同效应，而且可以通过杂货的自然高购物篮规模推动总订单额。
If ride users could be turned into Eats users, Eats users could be turned into ride users and both ride and Eats users could then eventually turn into grocery users there might just be enough volume to reach profitability. There were other bets like Uber Freight which matched truck drivers to pick up cargo and jumps dockless electric scooters that could be rented out by the minute. Neither of these businesses lived up to expectations.
如果骑行用户能够转化为餐饮用户，餐饮用户能够转化为骑行用户，那么骑行用户和餐饮用户最终可能会转化为杂货用户，从而实现盈利。还有其他的赌注，像Uber货运，可以将货车司机与货物配对，以及可以按分钟租赁的无码电动滑板车。但这些业务都没有达到预期效果。
Uber Freight's European business was sold off in 2021 to a German startup. Gross bookings for a jump reached $75 million in 2019 but the business cost $160 million a year to operate. When electric scooters died out a year later, Uber quickly dumped jump to Lyme at a loss.
Uber Freight在2021年将其欧洲业务出售给了一家德国初创公司。2019年，该业务的毛收入达到了7500万美元，但每年的运营成本为1.6亿美元。当电动滑板车的热度消失之后，Uber很快将Jump业务以亏损的形式卖给了Lyme。
Yet there was no bet bigger than autonomous driving. Like its peers, crews and Waymo, Uber's self-driving division was a money burning pit with few results. Uber regularly sought outside investors to soften ATG's burn rate and treated the self-driving division like a startup with its own private valuation.
然而，没有一项比自动驾驶更重要的赌注。与其竞争对手Cruise和Waymo一样，Uber的自动驾驶部门是一个烧钱的坑，却收效甚微。Uber经常寻求外部投资者来减轻ATG的烧钱速度，并把自动驾驶部门视为一家创业公司，拥有自己的私人估值。
In 2019, Toyota and Softbank swooped in with a billion dollars to extend ATG's runway by a few more quarters. Uber would sell off ATG a year later in 2020 admitting that level 5 autonomous driving was many years and many more billions away from reality.
2019年，丰田和软银注资10亿美元以延长ATG公司的发展时间，争取更多几个季度时间。一年后的2020年，优步出售了ATG公司，并承认实现5级自动驾驶还需要很多年和更多的资金。
In 2020, the pandemic crushed rides but intensified demand for food delivery. Uber rides gross bookings dropped to $26 billion but as rides collapsed, the eats business took off growing to $30 billion in gross bookings in a single year. Dara saw an opportunity to claim market share from DoorDash and other food delivery only competitors who could not afford to cut their commissions.
在2020年，疫情冲击了出行市场，但食品外卖需求却急剧增加。Uber的出行业务总收入下降至260亿美元，但随着出行业务的下降，外卖业务却迅速增长至300亿美元的总收入。在这个过程中，戴拉看到了从DoorDash和其他只做外卖业务、无法降低佣金的竞争对手中夺取市场份额的机会。
Uber intentionally cut its take rate on Uber eats orders to a record low 13% to win over even more restaurants and customers. Dara used the downtime to push a new vision to investors. Uber would never achieve enough volume to reach profitability through rides alone.
为了赢得更多的餐厅和顾客，Uber故意将其在Uber Eats订单上的收取比率降至历史新低的13%。在这段时间里，Dara向投资者推出了一个新的愿景：Uber永远无法仅通过乘车达到盈利的足够规模。
The company needed to transform from a mobility app into a super app where people log on and see not just rides with 5 minute pickups but also restaurants, groceries, pharmacies, convenience stores, supermarkets, retailers and everyday essentials delivered on demand within 30 minutes.
公司需要从一个移动应用程序转变为一个超级应用程序，人们在登录后不仅可以看到5分钟内可接载的乘车服务，还包括餐馆、杂货店、药店、便利店、超市、零售店等日常必需品的即时配送服务，配送时间限定在30分钟之内。
Delivery Dara pitched was no longer a luxury but a utility. If Uber could get to a point where it was fulfilling daily needs, that would give them a chance at the frequency, scale and gross bookings needed to reach profitability. Uber required postmates to boost retailers on its platform and a year later picked up Drizly to add alcohol delivery to its suite of services.
送货服务已经不再是奢侈品，而是一种实用工具。如果Uber能够满足日常需求，那么他们就有机会达到频率、规模和毛收入的要求，从而实现盈利。为了增加平台上的零售商，Uber需要收购Postmates，并一年后推出Drizly以增加酒类送货服务。
Breath was the missing ingredient to scale. To capture every possible transportation transaction, users around the world could now request rides on Uber in not just standard four doors, stands and SUVs and minivans but also rickshaws, motorcycles, limousines and even local taxi cabs. Even though Uber had sold off its electric bicycle and scooter division, those products are still available on the app today. Any and all transactions were needed.
呼吸是成长缺失的因素。为了捕捉全球范围内的每一个可能的交通运输交易，用户现在可以在Uber上请求不仅标准的四门轿车、站台和SUVs以及面包车，还可以请求人力车、摩托车、豪华轿车甚至本地出租车。即使Uber已经售出其电动自行车和滑板车业务，这些产品今天仍然可以在应用程序上使用。所有的交易都是必要的。
Inspired by Amazon Prime, Uber launched Uber Pass, its first ever membership program where for a monthly fee of 2499, members could unlock savings and perks across rides and eats. Dara saw memberships as critical for driving subscription revenue and encouraging greater frequency and higher order sizes. The Super App story continued in 2021, quote, not only do we see our rides business driving delivery and eats, but we expect to see retail, delivery and eats then driving grocery, then driving Drizly and alcohol delivery, etc. Kind of a chain reaction between businesses.
受亚马逊Prime的启发，Uber推出了其首个会员计划Uber Pass。会员每月支付2499元的费用，即可享受骑行和餐饮领域的各种优惠和福利。达拉认为会员计划对于推动订阅收入和鼓励更高频率和更高订单金额至关重要。2021年，超级应用故事继续，引用达拉的话，“我们不仅看到我们的骑行业务带动了送货和外卖业务，而且我们希望看到零售、送货和外卖业务推动杂货业务、Drizly酒类配送等业务等的发展，形成一种业务之间的连锁反应。”
The rides app is acting like a free marketing engine for our delivery business. In many markets, especially suburbs and smaller towns, Uber eats is sometimes the first way these customers engage with Uber. This cross pollination applied not just to demand but also supply. Dara's endgame is for Uber to become the Super App for gate workers to earn as much as they want however they want. While other apps will only give them one type of job, Uber would be a unique platform in his mind where the high continuous volume and diversity of work, delivering takeout, picking up essentials, delivering groceries, driving passengers, would net gate workers more consistent earnings with significantly less idle time. At this point, 25% of drivers on Uber were giving both rides to passengers and delivering food to doorsteps.
这个出行应用程序像是为我们的送货业务提供了一个免费的营销引擎。在许多市场，特别是郊区和小城镇，Uber Eats 有时是这些客户与Uber互动的第一种方式。这种跨领域的共生不仅适用于需求，还适用于供应。达拉（Dara）的最终目标是让Uber成为门房能够按照自己的意愿赚取所需的工资的超级应用程序。虽然其他应用程序只提供了一种类型的工作，但在他的想象中，Uber将是一个独特的平台，高连续的工作量和多样性的工作，如送外卖，取必需品，送杂货，接载乘客，将使门房获得更稳定的收益，并显着减少空闲时间。此时，Uber上有25％的司机既会给乘客提供服务，也会把食物送到门口。
But despite how promising Dara's Super App vision might seem and how encouraging the results have been so far, a viable strategy doesn't change reality. Even if Uber covers the entire world, unit economics don't change. In 2021, Uber ride gross bookings recovered from $26 billion to $36 billion. But in order to attract drivers back to the platform, the company has had to cut its take rate down below 20%, the first time it has done so since 2016. Gross bookings for Uber eats grew from $30 billion to $52 billion a year over a year, but the company only marginally increased its take rate to 16%. Despite eclipsing rides, Uber did not up its take rate on food delivery to the expected and standard 20% plus.
然而，尽管Dara的超级应用愿景似乎很有前途，而且迄今为止的结果也令人鼓舞，但可行的策略并不能改变现实。即使优步覆盖了整个世界，单元经济学也不会改变。在2021年，优步的乘车总额从260亿美元恢复到360亿美元。但是，为了吸引司机回到平台，公司不得不将其收取比例降至20%以下，自2016年以来首次这样做。优步外卖的总额从300亿美元增长到每年的520亿美元，但公司只将其收取比例略微提高到16%。尽管优步外卖的总额超过了乘车总额，但却没有将其收取比例提高到期望的标准20%以上。
For a company that believes that its services are inelastic and that scale leads to margin, it seems weird that Uber would be so sensitive to restoring its take rate back to pre-pandemic levels on a surging business, especially when the company is under pressure to prove profitability. The Super App story is Dara's tale for Wall Street and a long-term volume plate that will take years to materialize. When we take total gross bookings, total trips on platform and revenue over the past seven years, we can see how the company is brute forcing its way to short-term profitability.
对于一个认为其服务不受弹性影响，规模能够带来利润的公司来说，Uber如此敏感地要求将利润率恢复至疫情前水平是很奇怪的，特别是在公司面临证明盈利能力的压力下。超级应用程序的故事是Dara为华尔街讲述的一段长期计划，需要数年时间才能实现。当我们看到过去七年的总毛收入、平台上的总订单和总收益时，可以看出公司正在采取强制措施来实现短期盈利。
Between 2016 and 2017, the price per trip magically dropped over 10% from $10.58 to $9.18. It's unlikely that customers around the world that year collectively decided to start taking shorter rides. The more likely explanation is subsidies. In order to ensure a successful IPO in 2019, Uber needed to show strong growth in the years leading up to its public debut. The best way to do that would be to artificially lower the price.
在2016年至2017年期间，每次出行的价格神奇地从10.58美元降到了9.18美元，但全球客户不大可能在那一年集体开始选择更短的出行方式。更可能的解释是补贴。为了确保2019年的成功IPO，Uber需要展示其公开首次交易前几年的强劲增长，最好的方法是人为地降低价格。
Unsurprisingly, this additional subsidy was effective. Uber was now cheaper than ever before and customers flocked to the service as gross bookings grew 78%, total trips on platform grew over 100%, and monthly active customers grew over 50% year over year. In the two years leading up to its IPO, Uber maintained the subsidy in the hopes of stimulating consistent growth. Price per trip in 2017, 2018 and 2019 hovered at around $9.50. But the platform, gross bookings, user base and trips did not grow in subsequent years at the same massive rates when the additional subsidy was first added between 2016 and 2017. Discounts as we theorized earlier have diminishing returns on growth.
出乎意料的是，这种额外补贴非常有效。优步现在比以往任何时候都更便宜，顾客纷至沓来，总订单增长了78％，平台上的总行程增长了100％以上，每月活跃用户人数同比增长了50％以上。在其首次公开募股前的两年中，优步保持了补贴，希望刺激持续增长。2017年、2018年和2019年每次行程的价格约为9.50美元。但是，自2016年至2017年额外补贴首次加入以来，平台、总订单、用户基础和旅行次数在随后的几年中并没有以同样的巨大比率增长。正如我们之前推理的那样，折扣对增长的回报逐渐减少。
Rather than drop the price another 10%, Uber had enough common sense to recognize that more subsidies would not be the answer. With COVID, Uber had no choice but to restore prices back to less discounted levels with the reduced supply and demand. The price per trip went up 22% from $9.41 in 2019 to $11.52 in 2020. Since the pandemic, the discounts have decreased with price per trip steadily increasing, going from $11.52 to $14.20 in 2021 and now $15.28 in 2022.
优步没有选择再次降价10%，而是有足够的常识意识到，进一步的补贴将不是答案。由于COVID的影响，优步别无选择，只能将价格恢复到少打折的水平，因为供需减少。平均每趟价格从2019年的9.41美元上涨了22%，到2020年的11.52美元。自疫情以来，优惠减少、每趟价格稳步上涨，从2021年的11.52美元上涨到2022年的14.20美元，现在是15.28美元。
In the face of inflation, record gas prices and living costs, Uber would only be digging itself into a deeper grave if the app was still offering the same generous subsidies and artificially low pre-pandemic prices. Between 2016 and 2021, even as Uber prices went up, 79-80% of every trip was still being paid to the driver.
面对通货膨胀、创纪录的油价和生活成本，如果Uber仍然提供相同慷慨的补贴和人为降低的疫前价格，它只会把自己推向更深的坟墓。在2016年至2021年间，即使Uber的价格上涨，每次行程79-80%仍然支付给司机。
If we connect the dots, we now know that when Uber drivers were out publicly protesting about inadequate pay and predatory commissions between 2017 and 2019, they actually got their facts mixed up. Uber back then wasn't taking a bigger cut, its take rate never actually changed. Instead, Uber was charging customers less for the same trip to stimulate platform growth and to make the numbers look good before IPO.
如果我们连起点来看，现在我们知道，当Uber司机在2017年至2019年公开抗议报酬不足和捕食性佣金时，他们实际上搞混了事实。当时，Uber并没有增加它的提成，它的提成率实际上从未改变。相反，Uber降低了相同行程的价格，以刺激平台增长并在IPO之前使数字看起来更好。
Drivers suddenly found themselves earning less than before, only because the fares had been reduced by 10%, and the company had not informed anyone of its price manipulation. The 2022 numbers so far show that Uber is now diverting billions of dollars that normally went to drivers into its own pocket in a desperate race to prove its profitability.
司机们突然发现自己的工资较以前下降，原因是公司降低了乘车费用10％，且没有告知任何人价格操纵的情况。截至2022年的数字显示，为了证明盈利能力，Uber现在正在将本来应该归司机的数十亿美元收入转移到自己的口袋里。
Drivers are now earning 8% less than before, despite ride fares being at all time highs, and Uber's cut has increased by 53% from $2.74 per trip in 2021 to now $4.20 per trip in 2022. The company's take rate has jumped from 19% in 2021 to now nearly 30% in 2022.
司机们现在的收入比之前少了8%，虽然乘车费用创历史新高，而且Uber的提成也从2021年的每次行程2.74美元增加到2022年的每次行程4.20美元，提成比率从2021年的19%跃升至现在的近30%。
Having just finished two work trips around the country, these numbers have added some much needed context to my recent Uber experiences. In LA, drivers would politely ask how much I paid for the ride and then reveal their earnings after ending the ride to show just how little they were making. As a long time Uber rider, I didn't believe them, but when a driver showed me on his phone that he earned less than $40 from a two stop hour long ride in traffic from downtown to LAX where I was charged $80, I was speechless.
刚刚结束了两次国内的出差旅行，这些数字为我最近的Uber体验添加了一些非常需要的背景信息。在洛杉矶，司机会礼貌地询问我付了多少钱，然后在结束行程后揭示他们的收入，以展示他们赚得很少。作为一个长期的Uber乘客，我不相信他们。但是当一个司机向我展示他的电话，证明他从市中心到LAX的两站小时长的交通中只赚了不到40美元，而我被收取了80美元的费用时，我无语了。
Gale tripping is unpleasant, and more drivers these days seem to be pushing riders to make up for their lost earnings out of pocket. It's difficult to picture how drivers will stick around long enough for Dara's super app vision when Uber is now taking 30% of every trip for themselves. Take rates will only get higher in a recession and not lower.
现如今，Gale tripping（一种Uber的乘客取消订单的行为）是令人不快的，更多的司机似乎在推动乘客自掏腰包来弥补他们失去的收入。在Uber现在从每次行程中抽取30%的份额之下，很难想象司机们会坚持到达拉的超级应用程序愿景实现的时候。在经济衰退时期，收费只会越来越高而不会降低。
On the demand side, it's just as hard to imagine users paying $60 to $80 for standard rides or ordering delivery, alcohol, groceries, and other essentials when the service fees for delivery cost just as much as the items themselves. Like in the case of DoorDash, if a company needs to rely on customer tips, to pay drivers a livable wage, if it needs billion dollar subsidies to grow, and it needs to reach some magical scale where everyone in the world needs to use the service every day, just for the company to be profitable, then perhaps that business shouldn't exist.
在需求方面，很难想象用户愿意支付60至80美元的标准乘车费用或订购送货、酒精、杂货和其他必需品，因为配送费用与商品本身的价格一样高昂。就像DoorDash的情况一样，如果一家公司需要依赖客户的小费来支付司机的生活工资，需要数十亿美元的补贴来增长，并需要达到某种神奇的规模，以便每个人每天都需要使用服务，才能实现盈利。那么，或许这家公司不应该存在。
The on-demand online to offline platform business is a modern fairy tale spun by Silicon Valley. Value creation as a product of unsustainable subsidies and artificial discounting is not disruption, it's fraud.
这句话意思是，由硅谷创造的按需在线到线下平台业务是一个现代童话故事。由于不可持续的补贴和人为降价造成的价值创造并不是颠覆，而是欺诈。