Mr. Chu, you are here because the American people need the truth about the threat TikTok poses to our national and personal security. TikTok collects nearly every data point imaginable from people's location to what they type and copy who they talk to biometric data and more.
Even if they've never been on TikTok, your trackers are embedded in sites across the web. TikTok surveils this all and the Chinese Communist Party is able to use this as a tool to manipulate America as a whole and more. Even if they've never been on TikTok, your trackers are embedded in sites across the web.
TikTok surveils this all and the Chinese Communist Party is able to use this as a tool to manipulate America as a whole. We do not trust TikTok will ever embrace American values values for freedom human rights and innovation.
TikTok has repeatedly chosen the path for more control more surveillance and more manipulation. Your platform should be banned. I expect today you'll say anything to avoid this outcome like your 100% responsible for what TikTok does.
That you suddenly endorse a national data privacy standard. That project Texas is more than a marketing scheme. That TikTok doesn't harm our innocent children or that your ties to the Chinese Communist Party through bite dances just the myth. We aren't buying it.
In fact, when you celebrate the 150 million American users on TikTok, it emphasizes the urgency for Congress to act. That is 150 million Americans that CCP can collect sensitive information on and control what we ultimately see here and believe.
TikTok has repeatedly been caught in the lie that it does not answer to the CCP through bite dance. Today, the CCP's laws require Chinese companies like bite dance to spy on their behalf. That means any Chinese company must grant the CCP access and manipulation capabilities as a design feature.
Right now, bite dance is under investigation by the DOJ for surveilling American journalists, both digital activity and physical movements through TikTok. We also know that many of your employees still report directly to Beijing.
Internal recordings reveal there is a backdoor for China to access user data across the platform. Your employees said, quote, everything is seen in China. A gateway to spy is not the only way TikTok and bite dance can do the bidding of the CCP.
TikTok has helped you race events and people. China wants the world to forget. It's even censored an American teenager who exposed CCP's genocide and torture of wager Muslims. The facts show that bite dance is beholden to the CCP and bite dance and TikTok are one and the same.
TikTok also targets our children. The 4U algorithm is a tool for TikTok to own their attention and pray on their innocence. Within minutes of creating an account, your algorithm can promote suicide, self-harm and eating disorders to children.
It encourages challenges for them to put their lives in danger and allows adults to pray on our beautiful beloved daughters. It's also a portal for drug dealers to sell a illicit fentanyl that China has banned yet is helping Mexican cartels produce, send across our border and poison our children.
In China, the CCP proactively prohibits this type of TikTok content that promotes death and despair to kids. From the data it collects to the content it controls, TikTok is a grave threat of foreign influence in American life. It's been said it's like allowing the Soviet Union the power to produce Saturday morning cartoons during the cold war, but much more powerful and much more dangerous.
Banting your platform will address the immediate threats. Make no mistake, this committee is also looking to the future. American needs to be prepared to stop the next technological tool or weapon China will use for its own strategic gain.
We must prevent any app website and platform like TikTok from ever spying on Americans again. And we must provide the strongest protections possible for our children. That is why this committee is leading on a national privacy and data security standard.
It restricts sensitive American data from reaching our adversaries to begin with and what big tech and data brokers collect processed store and sell. It makes it illegal for any platform to track and target children under 17.
Mr. Chu the committee has requested that TikTok appear before us for a long time. For those we serve we're glad the day has finally come. Today the world is watching. By dance is watching. The Chinese Communist Party is watching. But the answers you owe are to the American people, a free people who cherish their god given unalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness for all.
They deserve the truth. Complete honesty is the standard and the law you are being held to before this committee. As we seek to get answers in a full understanding of what happens at TikTok under your watch.
Thank you Madam Chair and let me say that I agree with much of what you just said and I certainly appreciate your enthusiasm and your commenting on being a mother and concerned about children and I am glad that we are having this hearing today.
Big Tech has transformed the information superhighway into a super spreader of harmful content invasive surveillance practices and addictive and damaging design features. Data is Big Tech's most valuable commodity and by collecting far more user data than they need. Big Tech platforms can use share and sell information to generate billions of dollars in revenue.
Today the American people are powerless to stop this invasion of their privacy and we can't wait any longer to pass comprehensive national privacy legislation that puts people back in control of their data. We must hold Big Tech accountable for its actions and transparency is critical to that accountability.
In the past several congresses this committee has served from senior executives of other social media platforms about troubling and repeated instances where they put profits over people. Now today we intend to bring more transparency to TikTok which is control by its Beijing Communist-based parent company Bright Dance and while TikTok videos provide a new fun way for people to express their creativity and enjoy the videos of others the platform also threatens the health privacy and security of the American people and I'm not convinced that the benefits outweigh the risk that it poses to Americans in its present form.
More than 130 million people in the United States use TikTok every month including two-thirds of American teenagers. TikTok collects and compiles vast troves of valuable personal information to create an addictive algorithm that is able to predict with uncanny accuracy which videos will keep users scrolling even if the content is harmful inaccurate or fees destructive behavior or extremist beliefs.
Now the combination of TikTok's Beijing Communist-based China ownership and its popularity exacerbates its danger to our country and to our privacy. The Chinese Communist government can compel companies based in Beijing like TikTok to share data with the Communist government through existing Beijing law or coercion.
National security experts are soundly alarm warning that the Chinese Communist government could require TikTok to compromise device security maliciously access American user data, promote pro-communist propaganda and undermine American interests. Dense information campaigns could be launched by the Chinese Communist government through TikTok which has already become rife with misinformation and disinformation, illegal activities and hate speech.
A recent report found the 20% of TikTok search results on prominent news topics contain misinformation. Social media's profitability depends on growth and engagement. More eyes on their content for longer time leads to more advertising dollars and revenue generation. Addictive algorithms are fine tuned to optimize growth and engagement without necessarily taking into account potential harms to users. Children and teens are particularly vulnerable, frequent online use of interactive media on digital devices is associated with increased levels of depression among middle and high school students.
Research has found that TikTok's addictive algorithms recommend videos to teens that create and exacerbate feelings of emotional distress including videos promoting suicide, self-harm and eating disorders.
Public outrage and hollow apologies alone are not going to reign in big tech. Congress has to enact laws protecting the American public from such online harms and we simply cannot wait any longer to pass the comprehensive privacy legislation that I authored with then ranking member now chair Rogers-Less Congress that overwhelmingly advanced out of the committee. It ensures that companies wherever they live, it ensures I should say that consumers wherever they live in this country will have meaningful control over their personal information.
Our legislation establishes baseline data minimization requirements ensuring that companies only collect process and transfer data necessary to provide a service and it provides heightened privacy protections for children and teenagers. So I think it's time to make this legislation the law of the land. And we also have to examine the reforms needed to section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
The liability shield for social media platforms has for too long been abused and led to a lack of accountability for social media platforms. So I hope we can find a bipartisan pay-off forward on that issue too and I think you're having a hearing next week on it. So we can stop the very real harms to our country and democracy under the current law.
I look forward to the discussion today as we continue to bring accountability to big tech and let me say to Mr. Chu, I know this is about TikTok but I am focusing all my attention not only on TikTok but on these concerns, wide concerns about social media and the protection of privacy. And with that I yield back. Thank you again, Madam Chair for having this very important hearing.
Chair Rogers, ranking member Pallon, members of the committee. Thank you for your time. I am Chu and I'm from Singapore. That's why I was born as one of my parents. And after serving in Singapore's military, I moved to the UK to attend college and then here to the US to attend business school. I actually met my wife here. By the way, she was just born a few miles away from here in Virginia.
Two years ago, I became the CEO of TikTok. Today, we have more than a billion monthly active users around the world, including over 150 million in the United States. Our app is a place where people can be creative and curious. And we're close to five million American businesses, mostly small businesses, go to find new customers and to fuel their growth.
Now, as TikTok has grown, we've tried to learn the lessons of companies that have come before us, especially when it comes to the safety of teenagers. While their vast majority of people on TikTok are over 18, and one of our fastest growing demographics are people over 35. We spent a lot of time adopting measures to protect teenagers. Many of those measures are first for the social media industry. We forbid direct messaging for people under 16, and we have a 16-minute watch time by default for those under 18. We have a suite of family pairing tools so that parents can participate in their teens' experience and make the choices they are right for their family. We want TikTok to be a place where teenagers can come to learn, which is why we recently launched a feed that exclusively features educational videos about STEM. STEM videos already have over 116 billion views on TikTok, and I think TikTok is inspiring a new generation to discover a passion for math and science.
Now, we'd also like to talk about national security concerns that you have raised, that we take very, very seriously. Let me start by addressing a few misconceptions about bite dance, of which we are a subsidiary. Bite dance is not owned or controlled by the Chinese government. It's a private company. 60% of the company is owned by global institutional investors, 20% is owned by the founder, and 20% owned by employees around the world. Bite dance has five board members, three of them are American.
Now TikTok itself is not available in mainland China. We're headquartered in Los Angeles and in Singapore, and we have 7,000 employees in the US today. Still, we have heard important concerns about the potential for unwanted foreign access to US data and potential manipulation of the TikTok US ecosystem. Our approach has never been to dismiss or trivialize any of these concerns. We have addressed them with real action.
Now, that's what we've been doing for the last two years, building what amounts to a firewall that seals off protected US user data from unauthorized foreign access. The bottom line is this, American data stored on American soil by an American company overseen by American personnel. We call this initiative project taxes, that's why Oracle is headquartered. Today, US TikTok data is stored by default in Oracle service. Only vetted personnel operating in a new company called TikTok US data security can control access to this data. Now, additionally, we have plans for this company to report to an independent American board with strong security credentials. Now, there's still some work to do. We have legacy US data sitting in our service in Virginia and in Singapore. We're deleting those and we expect that to be complete this year. When that is done, all protected US data will be under the protection of US law and under the control of the US led security team. This eliminates the concern that some of you have shared with me that TikTok user data can be subject to Chinese law. This goes further, by the way, than what any other company in our industry have done.
We will also provide unprecedented transparency and security for the source code for the TikTok app and recommendation engine. Third party validators like Oracle and others will review and validate our source code and algorithms. This will help ensure the integrity of the code that powers what American C on our app. We will further provide access to researchers which helps them study and monitor our content ecosystem.
Now, we believe we are the only company that offers this level of transparency. Our trust is about actions we take. We have to earn the trust with decisions we make for our company and our products. The potential security, privacy, content manipulation concerns raised about TikTok are really not unique to us. The same issues apply to other companies. We believe what's needed are clear transparent rules that apply broadly to all tech companies. Ownership is not at the core of addressing these concerns.
Now as I conclude, there are more than 150 million Americans who love our platform and we know we have a responsibility to protect them. Which is why I'm making the following commitments to you and to all our users. Number one, we will keep safety, particularly for teenagers as a top priority for us. Number two, we will firewall protect the US data from unwanted foreign access. Number three, TikTok will remain a place for free expression and will not be manipulated by any government. And fourth, we will be transparent and we will give access to third party independent monitors to remain accountable for our commitments. I'll be grateful for any feedback that you have and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
As you know, the testimony that you are about to give is subject to Title 18 section 2001 of the United States Code. As you state in your testimony, bite dance is TikTok's parent company. Is it accurate to say that you are in regular communication with the CEO of bite dance beyond robot? Chair Rogers, yes. I am in communication with him.
Okay. Kelly, Zhong is the CEO of bite dance China. Over seeing Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok. Are you in regular communication with Kelly? I'm not in regular communication with her. The bite dance editor in chief is Zhong Poo Ping, correct? I believe so. And Wu Xu Geng is Beijing bite dance technology board member and also an official of the cyberspace administration in China. Is this correct? I believe so. They are not in the right. Thank you.
All of these individuals work or affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party are not the highest levels of leadership at bite dance. A company where you previously served as a chief financial officer and where you regularly communicate with their CEO. TikTok has told us that you weren't sharing data with the CCP but leaked audio from within TikTok has proven otherwise. TikTok told us that you weren't tracking the geolocation of American citizens. You were. TikTok told us you weren't spying on journalists. You were.
In your testimony, you state that bite dance is not beholden to the CCP. Again, each of the individuals I listed are affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party including Zhong Poo Ping who is reported to be the Communist Party secretary of bite dance and who is called for the party committee to quote take the lead across all party lines to ensure that algorithm is enforced by quote correct political direction. Just this morning, the Wall Street Journal reported that the CCP is opposed to a force-sailed TikTok by bite dance quoting a CCP spokesman saying that Chinese government would make a decision regarding any sale of TikTok. So the CCP believes they have the final say over your company. I have zero confidence in your assertion that bite dance and TikTok are not beholden to the CCP.
Next question. Heating content is a way of promoting and moderating content in your current or previous positions within Chinese companies. Have employees engaged in heating content for users outside of China. Very quickly, yes or no. Our heating process is approved by our local teams in the various countries. The answer is yes, thank you.
Have any moderation tools been used to remove content on TikTok associated with the weaker genocide? Yes or no? We do not remove that kind of content. TikTok is a place of freedom of expression and cherishes. If you use our app, you can go on it and you will see a lot of users around the world expressing content on that topic and many others. Thank you.
What about the massacre in Tiananmen Square? Yes or no? I'm sorry, I'm not here to question. The massacre in Tiananmen Square. That kind of content is available on our platform. You can go and search it. I will remind you that making false or misleading statements to Congress is a federal crime. I understand. Again, you can go on our platform. You will find that content.
Reclaiming my time, can you say with 100% certainty that bite-dance or the CCP cannot use your company or its divisions to heat content to promote pro-CCP messages for an act of aggression against Taiwan? We do not promote or remove content at the request of the Chinese government. The question is, are you 100% certain that they cannot use your company to promote such messages? It is our commitment to this committee and all our users that we will keep this free from any manipulation by any government. If you can't say a 100% certain, I take that as a note.
As I previously referenced, TikTok's spied on American journalists. Can you say with 100% certainty that neither bite-dance nor TikTok employees can target other Americans with similar surveillance techniques? I first of all disagree with the characterization that is spying. It was an internal investigation. Yes or no? Can you do surveillance of other Americans? We will protect the US user data and fire it all from all I want to foreign access. It is a commitment that we have given to the committee. I guess my question is, I want you to, I wanted to hear you say with 100% certainty that neither bite-dance nor TikTok employees can target other Americans with similar surveillance techniques as you did with the journalists.
Again, I don't disagree with the characterization of surveillance. We have given our commitments, chair registrar, the four commitments. I think I saw commitment that we will not be influenced by any government on these issues. DOJ is investigating this surveillance right now. Do the American people watching today hear this?
TikTok is a weapon by the Chinese Communist Party to spy on you, manipulate what you see and exploit for future generations. A ban is only a short term way to address TikTok and a data privacy bill is the only way to stop TikTok from ever happening again in the United States. I yield back. And now yield to the ranking member for five minutes.
Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me just start up by saying, Mr. Chu, that I don't find what you suggested with Project Texas and this far will that's being suggested to whoever will be acceptable to me. In other words, you know, the I still believe that the Beijing Communist government will still control and have the ability to influence what you do. And so this idea, this Project Texas is simply not acceptable.
According to recent report, TikTok is on target to make between 15 and $18 billion in revenue this year. Is that an accurate forecast? Congressman, as a private company, we are not sharing all. How much money will TikTok make by delivering personalized advertisements just to your users in the United States? Will you give me that information? Again, Congressman, respectfully, as private companies will not disclose that.
Look, the impression you're giving, and I know I can understand why you're trying to give that impression, is that you're just performing some kind of public service here, right? I mean, this is a benign company that's just performing a public service. I maybe you're not, maybe that's not what you're saying, but I don't buy it, right? My concern here is primarily about the privacy issue. The fact that TikTok is making all kinds of money by gathering private information about Americans that they don't need for their business purposes, and then they sell it. And I mentioned this legislation that the Chair and I have that would minimize data collection and make it much more difficult for TikTok and other companies to do that.
So, if you want to make some commitments today, why don't I, I'll issue to make some commitments with regard to this legislation, and you know, you're going to tell me, well, the bill isn't passed, and so therefore I don't have to do it. But, you know, you say you're benign, you want to do good things for the public. So, let me ask you, why not, what about a commitment that says that you won't sell the data that you collect? Would you commit to that? Not selling the data you collect?
Congressman, I believe we don't sell data to any data brokers. You don't sell to anyone. We don't sell data to data brokers. I didn't ask you data brokers. You sell it to anyone. In other words, under our bill, you can only use the data for your own purposes, not to sell it to anyone. Would you commit to not selling your data to anyone? Congressman, I actually am in support of some rules.
I didn't issue with whether it rules. I issue whether the company TikTok would commit to not selling its data to anyone, and just using it for its own purposes internally. I can get back to you under details. Okay, get back to me. Alright.
Another thing that's in our bill says that we were prohibiting targeting marketing to people under the age of 17, which would be willing to agree to prohibit targeted marketing to people Americans under the age of 17. The Congressman, we have actually stricter rules for advertisers in terms of what they can show to our users. Do you prohibit targeting? Do you prohibit targeting marketing to those under 17? That's what's in our bill.
I understand that there's some talk and some legislation around this around the country. Again, I'm not interested. I'm wanting you to make that commitment without the legislation since you say you're a good company. You want to do good things? Why not? It's something we can look into and get back to. Okay, I appreciate that.
Okay, we also have in our bill a requirement of heightened protection for sensitive data, particularly location and health data. Would you commit to not gathering or dealing with location or health data unless you get affirmative consent from the consumer? In other words, under our bill, those are categorized as sensitive and unless the person specifically says, I want you to collect that data, you wouldn't be able to location and health data. Would you commit to that?
A Congressman, in principle, I support that, which by the way, we do not collect precise GPS data at this point and I do not believe we collect any health data. All right, so you'd be willing to make that commitment. That from now on, you won't collect location and health data without what you're saying at all. This is data that's frequently collected by many other companies. I know other companies do it. I don't think they should without affirmative consent.
You said, you want to be a good actor. So why not make that commitment to me today? We're committed to be very transparent with our users about what we collect. I don't think what we collect. I don't believe what we collect this more than you see. The problem here is you're trying to give the impression that you're going to move away from Beijing and the Communist Party. You're trying to give the impression that you're a good actor. But the commitments that we would seek to achieve those goals are not being made today. They're just not being made. You're going to continue to gather data. You're going to continue to sell data. You're going to continue to do all these things and continue to be under the ages of the Communist Party through your organization that owns you. So in any case, thank you. Thank you Madam Chair. Gentlemen, yields back.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas. Mr. Burgess, but five minutes.
主席现在认可来自德克萨斯州的贵族伯爵伯吉斯先生,发言时间为五分钟。
I thank the Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chu, for joining us today. I think we've heard you say multiple times that TikTok is not a Chinese company. The by-dance is not a Chinese company. But according to an article in today's Wall Street Journal, quoting here, China's Commerce Ministry said Thursday that a sale or divestiture of TikTok will involve exporting technology that has to be approved by the Chinese government. Continuing to quote, the reported efforts by the Biden administration would severely undermine global investors' confidence in the US said, should you take a Ministry spokeswoman, continue to quote, if that is true, China will firmly oppose it, she said, referring to the forced sale.
So despite your assertions to the contrary, China certainly thinks it is in control of TikTok and its software. Is that not correct? Congressman, TikTok is not available in mainland China. Today, we're headquartered in Los Angeles and Singapore. But I'm not saying that the founders of by-dance are not Chinese, nor am I saying that we don't make use of Chinese employees just like many other companies around the world. We do use their expertise on some engineering projects. But according to their Ministry spokeswoman, it would be a divestiture of exporting technology from China. So they, again, China thinks they own it, even though you do not.
Madam Chair, I just ask Nancy to put today's Wall Street Journal. Without objection, so ordered. Into the record.
主席女士,我只是请求让南希把今天的《华尔街日报》列入记录。没有反对的话,就这样决定了。
Mr. Chu, I wouldn't ask you to discuss any privileged attorney client materials, but did anyone, aside from your lawyers, assist you in preparation for today's hearing? I prepared for this hearing with my team here in DC. Did anyone at by-dance directly provide input, help, or instruction for your testimony today? Congressman, this is a very high profile hearing. My phone is full of well wishes. You know, that's, you know, but I prepared for this hearing with my team here in DC.
Are you willing to share who help prepare you for this hearing with the committee? I can follow up with you. Can you guarantee that no one at by-dance at a role in preparing you for today's hearing? Like I said, Congressman, this is a high profile hearing. A lot of people around the world were sending me wishes and unsolvened advice, but I prepared for this hearing with my team here in DC.
Are the attorneys representing TikTok also representing by-dance? Yes, I believe so. What percentage of TikTok revenue does by-dance retain? Just give me a ballpark estimate if you don't precisely know. Congressman, like I said, as a private company, we are not prepared to disclose our financials in public today. Can we ask you to get back to us with a ballpark? We're not asking for the precise figures, but so the committee can have some understanding of the percentage of TikTok revenue that by-dance retains.
I understand the question. Respectfully, as private company, we're not disclosing our financials today. Prior to today's hearing, did anyone affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party discuss this hearing with you, or anyone else on TikTok senior management? A Congressman, since I've been CEO of this company, I've not had any discussions with Chinese government officials. So what about the Chinese Communist Party itself? Have any of those officials discussed this with you? Like I said, I have not had any discussion with Chinese government officials. I don't know the political affiliation I've everybody I speak to, so I can't verify the statement.
Let me ask you a question in a different direction. A few weeks ago, this committee had it field hearing data in MacAllen, Texas, and it was on the issue of fentanyl and illegal immigration. And one of our witnesses, Brandon Judd, a 25-year veteran and border patrol agent, said that all social media platforms play a role in illegal immigration. That's one of the ways cartels advertise their services throughout the world and convince people to put themselves in their hands and come to the United States. The cartels all use social media platforms. Are you aware of this phenomenon? Any content that promotes human abuse is a relative of our community guidelines, which dictates what is allowed and not allowed on our platform. We proactively identify and remove them from our platform. It would be very helpful if you would share with the committee examples of how you have removed people. Because what we heard at the hearing was that TikTok was one of the platforms that recruits adolescents in the United States to help with transporting people who have been trafficked into the country as well as contraband substances. Would you help us with that understanding who you have removed from your platform? Congressman, I would be delighted to check at my team and get back to yours and be collaborative. Thank you all, you're back. Gentlemen's time has expired.
Chair's recognizes the lady from California Miss Eshu for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Chu, thank you for being here today. As members of Congress are very first and top responsibility is to protect and defend. Protect and defend our constitution and the national security of our country. So I view this entire issue. Now there are many parts of it that are not part of our national security in my view, but first and foremost for our national security. So in examining TikTok breaking away from bite dance, I'd like to ask you some questions about that and how a a a a a severance in terms of the relationship with bite dance. How user data American users data would be protected.
Now under Beijing's security laws, as article seven, compels companies to provide data. Article 10 makes the reach of the law extra extra territorial. Now this is very clear. I don't need to read all of it into the record, but that's those are the laws of of the PRC. How does bite dance? How does TikTok rather? How do you convince the Congress of the United States that there can be a clean break? Why would the Chinese government sidestep their national law including article seven, article 10 in terms of user data? Congressman thank you for the question. I'm glad you asked this. As I said in the opening statement, our plan is to move American data to be stored on American soil.
I understand that. I understand that, but but you're sidestepping or I haven't read anything in terms of TikTok. How you can actually say and you spoke in your opening statement about a firewall relative to the data. But the Chinese government has that data. How can you promise that that will move into the United States of America and be protected here? I have seen no evidence that the Chinese government has access to that data. They have never asked us. We have not provided. I have asked that question. I find that actually preposterous. I have looked in, I have seen no evidence of this happening. In order to assure everybody here and all our users, our commitment is to move the data into the United States to be stored on American soil by an American company overseen by American personnel. So the risk will be similar to any government going to an American company asking for data. If that.
Well, I'm one that doesn't believe that there is really a private sector in China. And when you look at their national law and what specifically these two articles, Article 7 and Article 10 are very clear. So I think that there is a real problem, a real problem relative to our national security about the protection of the user data. I don't believe that TikTok has. that you have said or done anything to convince us that information, the personal information of 150 million Americans that the Chinese government is not going to give that up. So can you tell me who writes the algorithms for TikTok? Today, the algorithm that powers the US user experience is running in the Oracle Cloud infrastructure. Yes, you know, initially there were parts of the source code, especially in the infrastructure layer that doesn't touch the user experience. Now, that's a collaborative global effort, including built by engineers in China, just like many other companies. By the way, the phone you use, the car you drive is a global collaborative effort. Now, but today, the business sites and the main parts of the code for TikTok is written by TikTok employees. And Congresswoman, what we are offering is third-party monitoring of our source code. I am not aware of any company. The American companies are otherwise that has actually done that. Because we are saying we want to give you transparency and rely on third parties to make sure that we get all the comfort that we need about the experience.
Well, thank you, Madam Chair. Unlike the Chinese Communist Party, the United States believes in individual freedom, innovation, and entrepreneurship. That is, in part, why Congress enacted section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Our goal is to promote growth of the online ecosystem in the United States and to protect companies from being held liable for good faith efforts to moderate their platforms. Last year, a federal judge in Pennsylvania found that section 230 protected TikTok from being held responsible for the death of a 10-year-old girl who participated in a blackout challenge, also known as the choking challenge. TikTok actually pushes video on her feet. Unfortunately, this is one of the many devastating examples of children losing their lives because of content promoted by TikTok. Section 230 was never intended to shield companies like yours from amplifying dangerous and life-threatening content to children. You consider this to be a good faith moderation. Congressman, as a father myself, when I hear about the tragic death, so my question is, it's hot. Do you think we find that good faith moderation?
Well, Congressman, section 230 is a very complex thing. Yes or no? We are very focused on safety and all these stages turn into something that is a little bit. Do you believe TikTok deserves this liability protection? I'm sorry, Congressman. You believe that TikTok deserves this liability protection under section 230. Congressman, as you pointed out, 230 has been very important for freedom of expression on the Internet. It's one of the commitments we have given to this committee and our users, and I do think it's important to preserve that. But companies should be raising the bar on safety. Let's follow up really quickly from your own testimony. When you told us and you repeated it, we'll keep safety particularly for teenagers. They top priority for us. When you're saying you're making that following commitment, why do you have to wait for now to make that following commitment now and not having done it before when this 10-year-old lost her life? Congressman, I'm reiterating the commitment internally in all my priorities, which is public to my employees. This company is a picture-perfect example of why this committee in Congress needs to take action immediately to amend section 230.
When we recently met, I asked you if the Chinese Communist Party can currently access user data and you did not have a clear answer. So today, I want to follow up. You heard it a little bit, but I want to be absolutely sure of this answer.
Our employees of bite dance subject to Chinese law, including the 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires any organization or citizen to support, assist and cooperate with state intelligent work in accordance with the law. Like many companies, including many American companies, we rely on the global workforce, including engineers in China. Okay, but no, yes, no.
So in the past, yes. So in the past, yes, yes, but we are building project taxes and we're committing the firewall law to all protect the data. I want to follow up. Taking the as a yes, because again, on your article, the article seven of the 2017 National Intelligence Law, which I just said, as it says in addition, as I asked a little bit earlier, the 2014 counterintest, espionage law states that when the state security organ investigates and understands the situation of espionage and collect relevant evidence, the relevant organizations and individuals, it does not say may, it says shall provide it truthfully and may not refuse.
Yes or no, do any bite dance employees in China, including engineers, currently have access to US user data? Today, all US user data is stored by default in the Oracle Cloud infrastructure and access to that is controlled by American companies. I imagine that employees in China, including engineers, currently have access to US data.
Congressman, I would appreciate this is a complex topping. Today, all data is stored by people. No, that's not that complex. Yes or no, do they have access to user data? After project taxes is done, the answer is no. Today, there's still some data that we need to meet. We've heard originally from the breaking member that he doesn't really see that project taxes is going to be useful. So I think I'm taking that as a no because again, the question is what can come up earlier on December 22nd of last year when bite dance confirmed some of its Chinese employees had access TikTok data to monitor and track monitor and track the physical location of journals? So I took that as a yes from an earlier answer.
Now earlier this week, you posted a TikTok videos asking American users to mobilize in support of your app and oppose the potential US government action to ban TikTok in the United States. Based on the established relationship between your company and the Chinese Communist Party, it's impossible for me to conclude that the video is anything different than the type of propaganda that the CCP requires Chinese companies to push on its citizens.
Thank you, Matt. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, like my colleagues, I'm concerned about the influence of China on TikTok and what that does for US users, but I'm also concerned about how the content in TikTok is being distributed particularly to young people. This is not a problem unique to TikTok, but TikTok has 150 million users in the United States. And so I think you'll agree that TikTok has a particular responsibility to monitor content to make sure that it's safe and accurate. Would that be fair to say? Yes, I agree with that.
So, you know, I know you said in your opening statement, there's a ban for or limited for kids under 13 and under 18 and so on, but I know it won't be news for you that that computer savvy kids actually can bypass some of those restrictions quite frequently and they can do it even if they have parental oversight. And so what I want to ask you is rather than putting the burden on young people and parents to accurately put in the birth date and so on when registering for TikTok, I want to ask you what TikTok can do to make sure to monitor this content.
And I want to give you some examples of some of the extreme content. Mr. Latta talked about the blackout challenge and some of the dangers to young people's safety, but there's also extreme content around healthcare information. In one study, 13 out of 20 results for the question, does mugwort induce abortion? It's it talked about herbal so-called abortifications like papaya seeds which don't work.
And so if people searching for information on safe abortions went on TikTok, they could get devastatingly incorrect information. Another another study showed that TikTok was had a hydroxychloroquine tutorial on how to fabricate this from grapefruit. Now there's two problems with that. Number one, hydroxychloroquine is not effective in treating COVID. So that's one issue.
The second issue is you can't even make hydroxychloroquine from grapefruit. So again, this is a really serious miscommunication about healthcare information that people looking at at TikTok are able to get. And in fact, it's being pushed out to them.
So I want to know from you and I will give you time to answer this. You have current current controls, but the current controls are not working to keep this information mainly from young people but from Americans in general. What more is TikTok doing to try to strengthen its review to keep this information from coming across to people?
Thank you for the question. Congresswoman, the dangerous misinformation that you mentioned is not allowed on our platform. It violates them. I'm sorry to report it is on your platform, no. Congresswoman, I don't think I can sit here and say that we are perfect in doing this. We do work very hard.
How can you make yourself more perfect? I don't want you to say it's not there or you apologize. What can you do to limit it as much as possible more than what you're doing now? We invest a significant amount in our content moderation work. I shared that number in my written list.
I know you're investing, but what steps are you taking to improve the AI or whatever else you're doing to limit this content? For example, if you search for certain search terms, we do direct you on TikTok to resource safety resources. That's one of the things we have done. We will continue to invest in this.
I recognize and fully align with you that this is a problem that faces our industry that we need to really invest and address. This I'm very in alignment. The vast majority of our users come to our platform for entertaining safe content, but there are people who do have some who do spout some dangerous misinformation and we need to take that very seriously invest in it, correctively identify it and remove it from our platform.
Okay, I'm going to stop you right now. I asked you specifically how you were increasing, how you're trying to increase your review of this and you gave me only generalized statements that you're investing, that you're concerned, that you're doing more. That's not enough for me. That's not enough for the parents of America. I'm going to ask you to supplement your testimony and have your experts tell me what you're doing to make this a higher level of scrutiny, not just public hearing. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you. Lady yields back.
Chair recognizes gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hudson for five minutes. Thank you, Chairwoman, more broaders for holding this important hearing. I appreciate the witness.
Mr. Shoji Chu for making yourself available here today. While many consider TikTok to be just another video sharing app and reality, TikTok has been functioning as a massive surveillance program, collecting vast swaths of personal data from more than a billion people worldwide. This includes data from the personal devices of federal employees, contractors, and most concerning US military service members and their families at places like Fort Bragg in North Carolina.
As Fort Bragg's congressman, I have serious concerns about the opportunities TikTok gives the Chinese Communist Party to access the non-public sensitive data of our men and women in uniform. This personal data and location information can be harvested and could be used for blackmail to conduct espionage and possibly even reveal troop movements.
While the Department of Defense and most agencies have banned TikTok on government issue devices, I believe more needs to be done at the command level to urge troops and their dependents to erase the app from the personal devices and keep them off home Wi-Fi. Having an app banned on a device in one pocket, but downloaded on your device and the other doesn't make a lot of sense to me.
I believe Congress and DOD should address the continued use of TikTok on military installations as well as any use that depicts US military operations. Mr. Tuk Tuk, does TikTok access the home Wi-Fi network? Only if the user turns on the Wi-Fi. I'm sorry, I may not understand that.
So if I have a TikTok app on my phone and my phone is on my home Wi-Fi network, does TikTok access that network? It will have to access the network to get connections to the internet if that's the question. Is it possible then that it could access other devices on that home Wi-Fi network?
Congressman, we do not do anything that is beyond any industry norms. I believe the answer to your question is no. It could be technical. Let me get back to you. Okay, I'd appreciate it if you can answer that.
I'd like to change directions real quick. Do you receive personal employment, salary, compensation, or benefits from bite dance? Yes, I do. What is your salary from bite dance? I'll congressman if you don't mind. I would prefer to keep my compensation private.
Okay. You personally have any company shares or stock in bite dance or doy-in? Congressman if you don't mind, I would like to keep my personal assets private. Is TikTok the company your only source of employment compensation? Where's your other source of income outside of TikTok? It's my only source of compensation.
Do you have any financial debts or obligations to bite dance, doy-in, or any other bite dance of the late identity? Personally? No, I do not. Does your management team receive separate salary, compensation, or benefits from bite dance? We receive salaries from the entities that we are employed in, but we do share in the employee's option plan that is available from the bite dance top company. So your primary salary comes from TikTok, but you have other compensation that comes directed from bite dance? You can correct the rise of this. Yes.
Does your management team have company shares or stock in bite dance or doy-in? Yes. Some of our employees are compensated in shares in bite dance. Does TikTok share technological resources with doy-in? Are the two technology systems or IT systems interconnected in any way? There are as with many companies, some share resources on some services, but it doesn't include anything that involves US user data, congressman, is in project Texas as we talked about. Stored by default in America's oil, by the American company. But currently there is shared technology or interconnected IT systems. Congressman, respect, I have to get back to you. This could be a very broad question. For example, we could all be using Microsoft Windows. If you could get back with details on that, I'd appreciate it. Yes.
你们的管理团队是否持有字节跳动或抖音的公司股票?是的。我们的一些员工以公司股票作为报酬。
抖音和TikTok是否共享技术资源?这两个技术系统或IT系统是否有任何互通性?和许多公司一样,有些服务有一些资源共享,但这并不包括任何涉及美国用户数据的内容,议员们正在讨论的得克萨斯计划的默认存储由美国公司保管。但目前不存在共享技术或互联 IT 系统。议员,恕我回复迟缓,请回复具体内容。这是一个非常广泛的问题,例如,我们都可能在使用Microsoft Windows。如果您能回复详细信息,我会感激。是的。
Can doy-in personnel or employees access TikTok user data? Not after project Texas. This is not allowed. Are there employees who are employed by both doy-in and TikTok? I do not believe so. Okay. I don't believe so. Again, I'll allow you to come back in the red response if you could give me a definitive answer. I will go back and check to be very sure. Okay. Thank you.
I've also concerned about an issue that our chairwoman brought up about an apparent pattern of misinformation, misrepresentation from your company in regards to the amount and extent of data that you're collecting as well as how much has been accessed from inside China. There are dozens of public reports that conclude individuals and the peoples of public China have been accessing data on US users directly contradicting several public statements about TikTok employees. I'm referencing Project Raven, which was first reported on by Forbes last October. Their investigation revealed, I'm sorry, I'm about at a time. Do you want to respond to that? Yes, Congressman.
We do not condone the effort by certain former employees to access US TikTok user data in an attempt to identify the source of leaked confidential information. We condemned these actions. After learning about them, we found a highly reputable law firm that thoroughly investigated the incident. We took swift disciplinary action against employees who were found to be involved and are implementing measures to make sure this doesn't happen again. We have made this team available to you. I think they have breathed many of you in this committee very extensively and I will continue to make them very available to you as part of our transparent commitment. Thank you. My time is expired. I yield back.
Gentlemen, yields back. Chair recognizes the lady from Illinois Miss Hirkowski for five minutes. Thank you. So today in the Wall Street Journal, they said today China's commerce minister said that China opposes the sale of TikTok because it would involve exporting China's technology and this is the important part and would need to be approved by the Chinese government. So all of what you've been saying about the distance between TikTok and China has been said to be not true in the paper today and I would like to see what you have to say in response.
The Congresswoman, I do disagree with that characterization. I think we have designed project taxes to protect US user interests and move forward here in the US. Again, the protections of storing American data on American soil by an American company looked after by American personnel. And I do not think that our commitments to this committee and all our users is impacted by any event that you mentioned.
Now, the whole discussion on this resolution of this is an ongoing and developing event. So we will continue to pay attention to this and we'll get back to you when we have more specifics.
So if it's an ongoing debate, apparently with China. So it's hard to say with any certainty that China would not have any influence.
因此,如果这是一场正在与中国进行的辩论,那么很难确定中国没有任何影响力。
But let me ask another question. So last fall, along with Gus Villorakis, who were chair and co-chair of the subcommittee together, we're told that TikTok had surveilled, was involved in surveillance of users, very personal information. And you might say, well, not more than other companies. And I agree with ranking number plone that I really don't want to go by that standard particularly.
But that TikToks in app browser surveilled everything from Americans, including passwords and credit card numbers, et cetera. So I just want to ask you if TikTok did track and collect the sensitive data that Americans don't want to have disclosed.
Congressman, thank you. I'm glad you asked this question because like you pointed out, we actually do not believe we collect more data than any other social media company out there. A lot of these reports, and we can talk about which specific one you're talking about. A lot of them are not that accurate. Some of them we have contacted the, we have actually gotten in touch with the authors to help them understand the data that we're collecting.
A lot of it is speculation. You know, this is something they could do. They could do. But if you look at the subtext, this is something that every company could do. I'm running out of time. Let me just say that if TikTok toes not to take this sensitive information that you don't need for transaction and support our comprehensive privacy bill, that would be that would be very helpful.
The other thing I wanted to ask. So really this is a yes or no. That TikTok does TikTok share user information from companies, from parent companies, from affiliated or or send user information to overseas.
In the past, yes, for interoperability purposes. Now after project taxes, all protected US data will be stored here with the access controlled by a special team of US, US personnel. Again, Congressman, this is something that as far as I understand, no other company, including American companies, are willing to go. So maybe this is something that we can ask the industry to provide, not just us.
In the case of sharing information, I do want to quote from employees that you had that and here's the quote, everything is seen in China is really what they said. People who were in touch with the sensitive data were saying that, how do you respond to that? I disagree with that statement. Well, I know you disagree with that statement, but my point is, how does that happen that employees of the company are saying that in fact, that's not true?
I cannot speak to, I don't know who this person is, so I cannot speak to what the person has or has not said. What I can say is, you know, based on my position in this company and the responsibility that I have, that statement is just not true.
Chair recognizes the lady from Florida, Miss Kamik for five minutes.
主席认可来自佛罗里达的女士卡米克,准许她发言五分钟。
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Shou, are you aware of Chinese Communist Party Leader, Chairman Xi Jinping's comments in May 2021 during a Communist Politburo study session, where he instructed colleagues to target different countries, different audiences with short form video. Are you aware of these comments? Yes or no?
Okay. Well, and as was pointed out by Chairwoman Rogers, you have regular contact with Chinese Communist Party Secretary, Mr. Zhang Fouping, who is your boss at Byte Dance, correct?
Yes. We have to be more specific. Yes. After Project Texas? No. I'm not asking after Project Texas. I'm asking now. Yes. Some user data is public data, Congresswoman, which means everybody can access.
What's interesting to me is that you've used the word transparency over half a dozen times in your opening testimony and subsequently again, in your answers to my colleagues. Yet the interesting thing to me is that Byte Dance, your parent company has gone out of their way to hide an airbrush corporate structure ties to the CCP, the company's founder, and their activities. You can look no further than the fact that Byte Dance website has been scrubbed. In fact, we found web pages from the Beijing Internet Association. The industry association charged with communist party building work of Internet companies in Beijing. They have been archived, but since deleted, makes you kind of wonder why.
Yes or no. Byte Dance is required to have a member of the Chinese government on its board with Vito Power. Is that correct? No, that is not correct. Byte Dance owns some Chinese businesses and you're talking about a very special subsidiary that is for Chinese business license. Mr. So, I'm going to have to move on.
You've said repeatedly that there is no threat that this is a platform for entertainment and for fun. I have to ask you then, if there is no threat to Americans, if there is no threat to our data privacy security, why did an internal memo from TikTok corporate headquarters explicitly coach senior management to quote downplay the parent company Byte Dance? Why would they say downplay the China association and downplay AI? This is from an internal memo from your company. Why if you had nothing to hide, would you need to downplay the association with Byte Dance in China? Congressman, I have not seen this memo. You can answer that question.
Mr. So, I'd like to direct your attention to the screen for a short video if you don't mind. Mr. So, that video was posted 41 days ago. As you can see, it is captioned me as F at the House Energy and Commerce Committee on March 23rd of this year. This video was posted before. This hearing was publicly noticed. I think that's a very interesting point to raise. But more concerning is the fact that it names this chairwoman by name.
Your own community guidelines state that you have a firm stance against enabling violence on or off TikTok. We do not allow people to use our platform to threaten or incite violence or to promote violent extremist organizations, individuals or acts. When there is a threat to public safety or an account is used to promote or glorify off platform violence, we ban the account. This video has been up for 41 days. It is a direct threat to the chairwoman of this committee, the people in this room. Yet, it still remains on the platform. You expect us to believe that you are capable of maintaining the data security, privacy and security of 150 million Americans where you can't even protect the people in this room.
I think that is a blatant display of how vulnerable people who use TikTok are. You couldn't take action after 41 days when a clear threat, a very violent threat to the chairwoman of this committee and the members of this committee was posted on your platform. You damn well know that you cannot protect the data and security of this committee or the 150 million users of your app because it is an extension of the CCP. And with that, I yield back. Can I respond? Chair? No, we are going to move on. General Lady Yields back.
Chairman recognizes the lady from California, Ms. Matsui for five minutes. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And I'm really glad that we are having this very important hearing here today. And let me just say, make no mistake, the Chinese government represents a real and immediate threat. Look no further than even the vulnerable gear. Still in our telecom networks that needs to be ripped in replace. But we can't lose sight of the important Internet governance issues TikTok and other social media companies represent.
I'm especially committed to demanding transparency from large platforms about the algorithms that shape our online interactions, especially for teenagers and young users. And that's why I introduce the algorithmic justice and online platform transparency act to bring greater visibility into this ecosystem. My bill would require prohibit algorithms that discriminate on the basis of race, age, gender, ability, and other protected characteristics. It also would establish a safety and effectiveness standard for algorithms for requiring new forms of oversight.
Now, this bill would require online platforms to publish annual public reports, detailing their content moderation practices, which I believe should be a baseline requirement to enable meaningful oversight and consumer choice. Mr. Chu, just yes or no. Do you believe a requirement for annual content moderation practices for social media platforms would be beneficial? Yes or no? Yes.
This transparency bill would also require online platforms to maintain detailed records describing their algorithmic process for review by the Federal Trade Commission in compliance with key privacy and data identification standards. Mr. Chu, does TikTok currently maintain records describing their algorithmic processes? Yes or no? Congressman, I would need to check and get back to you on what kind of specific records you are talking about. I wait for that.
Over the past few years, alarming information brought to light by whistleblowers have shown that social media companies are intimately aware of the effect their products have on young women, political extremism, and more. Despite this, they will have those studies or decline to investigate further. In either case, it shows that pattern evasive or negligent behavior that I find concerning in extreme.
Mr. Chu, does TikTok conduct its own studies on effective algorithms and content distribution models on mental health or safety? And if so, how and when are those findings made public? And if not, do you believe they are necessary? Congressman, we rely on external third parties and fund their research to help us understand some of these issues. For example, we worked with the digital wellness lab at the Boston Children's Hospital to understand the 60-minute time limit that we put for all our under 18 users. And we are supportive of legislation that provides more funding for research, like for example, for the NIH.
Okay. TikTok tailors is recommended content based on user activity to encourage people to spend more time on the app. Well, this practice is by no means unique to TikTok given the prevalence of young users and the digestible nature of short form video. I'm concerned about the absentee to exacerbate existing mental health challenges. Mr. Chu, does TikTok have different policies for amplifying contact that would be related to depression or dieting versus content like gardening and sports? If you ask to describe these policy differences, if no, why not? Yes. Congressman, thank you for this is a great question. The answer is yes. We are trying out some policies together with experts to understand certain contents that are not inherently harmful.
Like extreme fitness, for example, but shouldn't be seen too much. And these are models that we're building and we are trying to understand, you know, together with experts how to best implement them across our platform, particularly for younger users under 18. In cases where users have been engaging with potentially harmful content, I believe it's imperative that the app takes steps to moderate that behavior rather than continuing to promote it.
I mean, in a sense, I apologize. I wasn't clear. First, anything that is relative and harmful will remove. What I meant to say were things content that is not inherently inherently harmful. Like some of the extreme fitness videos about people running 100 miles. It's not inherently harmful, but if we show them too much, the experts are telling us that we should disperse them more and make sure that they're not seen too regularly. So you're not intentional about that then. It's something that you are working on. We are working on it. Yes.
Okay. I yield back. Jenny, gentle lady yields back. Chair recognizes gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bill Rockis for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very much. Thanks for holding this hearing.
Mr. Chu, your algorithms have prioritized providing harmful content directly to children, like self-harm challenges and even suicide. Just three days ago, Italy opened an investigation into the TikTok over user safety concerns after the so-called French Scar Challenge Winvaro on your platform.
I know you know about the blackout challenge, which others may know as the choking challenge that encourages children to bring them to the point of unconsciousness or in some cases tragically death. If that, if that isn't enough, I want to share the story of Chase Naska, a 16-year-old boy from New York who tragically ended his life a year ago by stepping in front of his train.
I want to thank his parents. Again, they are here. I want to thank his parents for being here today and allowing us to show this. Mr. Chu, your company destroyed their lives. Your company destroyed their lives. I admire their courage to be here and share Chase's story in the hopes that it will prevent this from happening to other families.
The content in Chase's 4U page was not a window to discovery as you boldly claimed in your testimony. It wasn't content from a creator that you invited to roam the hill today or stem education content that children in China see. Instead, his 4U page was sadly a window to discover suicide. It is unacceptable, sir, that even after knowing all these dangers, you still claim TikTok as something grand to behold.
I want you to see what Chase would see. I think if you want, again, would you share this content with your children, with your two children? Would you want them to see this? Again, I want to warn everyone watching that you may find this content disturbing, but we need to watch this, please.
There it is. You gotta kill yourself. Oh, word? Like right now? And then I'm going to put a shotgun in my mouth and blow the brains of the back of my head. Cool. This is a cute story. My brother, who was addicted to pain killers, blew his head off on the state street bridge. Now hold on. It gets better. No letter. No goodbye.
Mr. Chu, Mr. Chu, please, your technology is literally leading to death. Mr. Chu, yes or no, do you have full responsibility for your algorithms used by TikTok to prioritize content to its users? Yes or no, please. I'll just like to respectfully, we don't mind. I would just like to start by saying, it's devastating to hear about the news of yes as a father myself.
This is certain. Yes or no, I'll repeat the question. Do you have full responsibility over the algorithms used by TikTok to prioritize content to its users? Yes or no, please. A Congressman, we do take these issues very seriously. Yes or no. And we do provide resources for anyone who types in anything that.
Sir, yes or no, I see you're not willing to answer the question or take any responsibility for your parents, companies, the technology and the harms that creates. It's just very, very sad. Very sad. This is why Congress needs to enact a comprehensive privacy and data security law to give Americans more control over their information and to protect our children.
We must save our children from big tech companies like yours who continue to use and manipulate them for your own gain. And I'll you back Madam Chair. Gentlemen, yields back.
Chair recognizes the lady from Florida, this caster for five minutes. Well, thank you Madam Chair. Colleagues, it is urgent that the Congress pass and online data privacy law that protects the personal privacy of Americans online and particularly our kids.
While this hearing shines a light on TikTok, this hearing also should serve as a call to action for the Congress to act now to protect Americans from surveillance, tracking, personal data gathering and addictive algorithmic operations that serve up harmful content and has a corrosive effect on our kids' mental and physical well-being.
For many years, I've sounded the alarm in this committee of how big tech platforms like TikTok and Facebook and Instagram, incessently surveil, track, gather personal private information and use it along with data brokers to target and influence our behavior. This is a much broader issue than TikTok and China.
There are other malign actors across the world who gather data to use it as an element of social control and influence pedaling and worse. And as I detailed in this committee last year when we passed our online privacy law, the harms to children are very serious and demands swift action. Big tech platforms profit immensely from keeping children addicted.
They do not care about the privacy, safety and health of our kids. They are the modern day tobacco and cigarette companies that for so long resisted and misled Congress. And it took the Congress, it took action by the Congress to actually protect our kids and to outlaw smoking by young people.
In early 2020, based upon the growing body of evidence to harm to kids online, I introduced the Kids Privacy Act and the Kids Act. And I want to thank all of the researchers, the young people, the parents, the surgeon general of the United States who have explained the correlation between social media usage and body dissatisfaction, disordered eating habits, anxiety, depression, self injury, suicide, ideation and cyberbullying. Heck, Francis Hound in the Facebook whistleblower was right here and testified to us that Facebook and Instagram conducted research on this topic. They knew and understood the harms, but they continued to elevate profits over the well-being of children. And TikTok does the same.
Last Congress, when we passed the ADPPA, the Committee Incorporated, many of these important child online privacy and safety provisions from my bills. But we can make the 118th Congress's version of this bill, of this new law, even more protective of children. And I look forward to working with the chair and the ranking member to make that happen.
Mr. Chu, TikTok has incredible sway over children in the U.S. But you don't have a very good track record. In 2019, TikTok was hit with the largest civil penalty by the Federal Trade Commission in the children's privacy case. Four years later, TikTok still has not taken sufficient action to fix the problems. I assume because child users are incredibly profitable to your bottom line.
So answer me this. TikTok allows advertisers to specifically target advertising to children age 13 to 17, correct? Yes, I agree. Congressman, I do want to disagree with the statement that child abuses are not allowed enough platform at all. Yes, yes, yes. It's deplorable conduct and it's not allowed enough platform. Target advertising to young people age 13 to 17. We do serve personalized advertising at this point, but the policies are very safe for them. How much money does TikTok make selling ads targeted to miners? Congressman, can I clarify minus and what age? From just say age 13 to 17. For the teenager population, I want to clarify that we do have a 13 under 13 experience and zero advertising on that platform.
For those, well, that's a whole other top. Between 13 and 17, if you don't mind, I'll check into my team and get back to you on those answers. TikTok could be designed to minimize the harm to kids, but a decision was made to aggressively add to kids in the name of profits. And it's our responsibility members tax swiftly to address this. This has gone on for too long. We've delied out too much. This committee, thankfully, we've taken responsibility enacted, but we have an enormous responsibility to act swiftly and get this bill to the floor of the house and passed into law as soon as possible. Thank you. I yield back from time.
General Lady yields back. Chair recognizes gentleman from Ohio. Mr. Johnson for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, I'm an information technology professional been doing it for the most of my life. You've been evasive in many of your answers. I'm going to talk to you in some language that maybe you'll better understand. One's in zeros. Okay? Let's talk about the citizen lab report.
This is something your team frequently mentions in hearings as a way to exonerate yourself. For example, in the limitation section, it reads, we could not examine every source code component and test in the apps in every circumstance, which means our methods could not find every security issue, privacy violation, and censorship event. So it's an incomplete assessment. The report notes that Tiktok's data collection using third-party trackers was an apparent conflict with the GDPR and that multiple themes were censored by Tiktok. What is shocking to me is the shared source code between Tiktok in the United States and the CCP-centered Doan.
The citizen lab report says that many of the functions and classes were identical and that the differences in behavior between Tiktok in the United States and Doan in China are slight changes in hard-coded values. Incredibly, specific censorship parameters from Doan are present in Tiktok, but just turned off. The authors say that for unknown reasons, the parameter variable itself is preserved. So while citizen lab may have been afraid to say the obvious conclusion, Mr. Chu, I am not, Tiktok's source code is riddled with backdoors and CCP censorship devices.
Here's the truth. In a million lines of code, the smallest shift from a zero to a one, on just one of thousands of versions of Tiktok on the market, will unlock explicit CCP censorship and access to American data. Mr. Chu has CEO of Tiktok. Why have you not directed your engineers to change this source code?
事实就在这里。在 Tiktok 市场上成千上万版本中的其中之一,如果从零变成了一的最小偏移,就会解锁明确的中国共产党审查和对美国数据的访问权限。 Tiktok 的 CEO 为 Mr. Chu。您为什么没有指示您的工程师更改源代码呢?
Congressman, thank you for the question. Have you directed them to change the source code? Like what we are offering in the source commitment? Have you directed them to change that source code? Congressman, if you give me a bit of time to just. No, I don't. It's a yes or no question. Have you directed your engineers to change that source code? I'm not sure, I understand.
Why are you allowing Tiktok to continue to have the capacity for censorship and yet you claim here that you don't? Let me remind you of something. Do you realize that making faults and misleading statements to Congress is a federal crime? Yes, I do. Okay, so have you directed your engineers to change that source code? I am giving third-party access monitoring by experts and Congressmen. What person. You are an expert on this. You could agree with each and no other company does. What person can take Tiktok's source code is the same as Dowein? What percentage? I can get back to you on the specifics. Okay, I'd appreciate that.
Where was the source code for Tiktok developed? Was it developed in China or in the United States? It's a global collaborative effort. It was a developed company. Was it developed in China? Some of it. Some of it is.
Okay, at bite dance. Can the. When it's compiled in the compilation process, can bite code be manipulated? We've talked a lot about source code. What about the bite code? The ones and zeros that actually execute on the device. Can they be manipulated? Yes. Congressman, to give you comfort, that's why we're giving third-party monitors. As an expert, I think you can agree that very few companies.
I've got the report here by CitizenLab. I want to read you something from Ron Deber. Specifically, in your written testimony to Congress, you stated on page 9, CitizenLab found that there was no overt data transmission by Tiktok to the Chinese government, and that Tiktok did not contact any servers within China. You implied that CitizenLab exonerated Tiktok from any information sharing with China. Well, the director of CitizenLab saw this and issued a statement correcting the record yesterday.
And I'm quoting Ron Deber, the director of the lab. I am disappointed that Tiktok executives continue citing the CitizenLab's research and their statements to government as somehow ex-cultitory. I've called them out on this in the past, and it's unfortunate that I have to do it again. Unquote. He goes on to say, and I quote, we even speculated about possible mechanisms through which the Chinese government might use unconventional techniques to obtain Tiktok user data via pressure on bite-damps.
End of quote. Mr. Chu, you sent Congress written testimony citing this lab as a support of your claim that China cannot access user data, US user data. And now this lab has come out to say, we never said that. That's misleading. Mr. Chu, I hope you understand what that is. That's misleading. Mr. Chu, this is yet another instance of Tiktok attempting to mislead Americans about what their technology is capable of and who has access to their information. Madam Chair, I'd like to respond to that. Madam Chair, I'd like to respond to that. I'm Ron Bieber and the Citizens Lab into the record. Without objection. With that, I yield back. Gentlemen yields back.
Chair yields to the gentleman from Maryland. Mr. Sarbanes, five minutes. Thanks very much, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, I'm going to pick up on a theme. We've already covered here, which is the effect that your platform, along with many other social media platforms, by the way, has in terms of mental and behavioral health in this country. I won't speak to what's happening elsewhere in the world, but we've talked about the impact that it's having on children, on teens. We took some action last year in this committee to try to improve access to resources, reauthorize critical programs, and so address mental health needs, but we need to do even more than that.
And we got to address with the big tech companies like TikTok are doing, because those are platforms that expose children, teens to additional risks. The more time that middle and high schoolers spend on social media, the evidence is the more likely they are to experience depression and anxiety. And this is particularly troubling since apparently 16% of American teenagers report that they use TikTok quote, almost constantly.
That's, I think, about 5 million teenagers in this country that are on TikTok all the time. And we know that big tech, including TikTok, uses design features that can manipulate users, including children's and teens, to keep them engaged, designed to feed them a never-ending stream of content, keep their attention for hours on end, which includes capitalizing on the desire for others' approval through like features praying on the fear of missing out, through push notifications, and so forth.
Again, you're part of an industry that's set up to do this, you in some sense don't appear to be able to help yourselves in reaching out and finding that new user and then holding onto them. TikTok itself has acknowledged that these features and others like the endless scroll feature can have an outsized effect on teens. And we've been discussing today how your app only intensifies that harm by amplifying dangerous content and misinformation.
I don't want to be too paternalistic here because we have young people in the audience. We've got TikTok users that are watching this hearing. And I'm sure they have their own ideas about how this technology is being managed by TikTok and other social media platforms. They like to access the platforms and they should be able to do that safely. So it's certainly in their interest and they can drive this conversation, I think, perfectly well.
But it's not a fair fight, is it? I mean, the algorithms are on one side of the screen. Human brain is on the other side of the screen drowning in these algorithms. In many instances at an age where the brain's not even fully developed yet. So those addictive impulses are being sort of perfected by the technology. And again, it leaves the users sort of helpless in the face of that. Are you looking at ways to redesign core features, like the ones I mentioned, to be less manipulative, excuse me, and addictive for users? And can you commit to making some of those modifications here today?
Congressman, thank you. We do want to be leading in terms of safety of our users, particularly for teenagers. We were the first to launch a 60-minute watch limit. Let's talk about the 60-minute watch. And I'm very glad to see others in our industry follow. For many of their recommendations, we'll study them very seriously.
We actually have a series of features. Like, for example, if you're under 16, you cannot use a direct messaging feature, because we want to protect those younger users. If you're under 16, you cannot go viral by default. If you're under 18, you cannot go live. And use the- Let me go back to the 60-minute limit, because my understanding is that teens can pretty easily bypass the notification to continue using the app if they want to. I mean, let's face it.
Our teens are smarter than we are by half. And they know how to use the technology, and they can get around these limits if they want to. Are you measuring how many teens continue to exceed the 60 minutes of time on that app? We understand how that's working. We understand those concerns. What we- our intention is to have the teens and their parents have these conversations about what is the appropriate amount of time for social media. That's why we give the parents what we call family past.
Let me ask you this question before I run out of time. If you concluded that putting some reasonable limits in place and trying to find a way to enforce them, would lead some percentage of your users to leave TikTok and go somewhere else? Is that something that you're prepared to accept? Yes.
Really? Well, I'd love to get the research on how these limits are being implemented, how they're being bypassed, and the things that you're taking- the measures you're taking to address those issues going forward. Please bring that information back to our committee as we move forward. I'll be happy to. I yield back.
Chair recognizes gentlemen from Kentucky, Mr. Guthrie for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair, for yielding. I appreciate the time, Mr. Chu. Your terms of service specifically state that TikTok does, and I quote, not allow that a picture in promotion or trade of drugs or other controlled substances.
Despite this content being against your terms of service, and I brought this up with other service providers, but despite this content being against your terms of service, content on your platform related to illicit drugs, like fentanyl, drug trafficking, and other illicit activity is pervasive and racks up hundreds of thousands of views.
For example, in 2020, the Benadryl Challenge resulted in the death of an American teenager. When we heard of another one, challenge earlier today that brought the death of a teenager, were you at bydance, if you were the CFO for bydance, did doing allow related illicit drug trafficking or her challenges resulting in death or injury to kids?
Congressman, I represent TikTok here today. I can tell you that TikTok does not allow illegal drugs and just do it in China. I believe they don't allow this, but I would need to check, I don't run their business. I can tell you TikTok does not allow this.
That's what we're concerned about, and my guess, and it would do in allow for 41 days a threat against a member of the Chinese Communist Party to stand on their site for 41 days. Again, I cannot speak for Thouin, and I'm sorry, I didn't hear the second part of why you said. Well, we had a threat against the chairman of our committee that was on your site for 41 days. My guess is that would not be allowed in China. That content is if it's violated, I would look into the specifics, and if it violates our guidelines, you'll be taken down on TikTok.
Yeah, surely, here's that it does, but the problem is that what I'm trying to get at is you seem to be able to prevent this content in China. But you, so not even taking it down, just prevent it from being posted, and yet it's all on your website.
So I have a couple of questions about, you said earlier, as soon as you find this information, you take it down. So how quickly does your algorithm detect keywords or content that involve illicit drug trafficking before these posts are self-reported or used by others?
We have about 40,000 people working on this now together with the machines that we train. I don't think any company in our industry can be perfect at this. This is a real big challenge for our industry, but our goal is to get this any violative content, including illegal drugs, down to a very, very small number.
That is the problem when we have these hearings, we have CEOs of different companies and of your colleagues and competitors. And we always hear apologies, and we always hear, we want to do better at this, but it just doesn't seem to keep improving, and we see our stories of our children, and obviously, that's been talked about today.
So how many posts and accounts have been identified and removed from TikTok due to content posts posted related to illicit drugs or other controlled substances?
“因发布与非法毒品或其他受控物质相关的内容,TikTok识别并删除了多少篇帖子和账户?”
Congressman, we do publish that in a transparency report. I can get my team to get the information to yours. Thank you, I appreciate that.
Also, we understand that the way that people use TikTok or other platforms similar to yours is that they ensure a flag user content isn't permitted to jump from. So my question, so what we've heard is that the instances the user see a drug advertisement and then give a code to go to another site.
So my question is, do you work with other platforms to ensure flag user content isn't permitted to jump from one platform to others?
我的问题是,您是否与其他平台合作,以确保有待处理的用户内容不会从一个平台跳到另一个平台?
I will check with my team. I would love to work with our industry to make sure that we stamp out these problems. Violative content should not be allowed on any platforms in my opinion.
So what's kind of frustrating to all of us here is that we look at what's happening on your sites and the others, and particularly that we know because we've done a research that you can't have access to illicit drug information or others on do you in?
Which is a sister company, as you say in China. And so it absolutely, if you can prevent it on one and not the other, you obviously have the ability to stop it from moving forward. And yet, would you like to expand how one of your sister companies can prevent that? And you're not, I know you don't represent D to N, but they don't allow it, but it happens on your platform. What's the difference?
First of all, the majority of the content on TikTok is fun and detaining informative and very positive for our users. Like other companies that operate in this country, we have to deal with some bad actors who come and publish some content on illegal drugs. Other bad actors don't seem to be able to access D to N. The TikTok US experience should be compared to other US companies because this is common.
Oh, Congressman, there is no technology that is perfect in doing this. We have to deal with the reality of the country that you were operating in. And here in the United States, as with other companies, we share this challenge. We are investing a lot to address the challenge, but we are, you know, it's a shared challenge. You invest a lot to seem to be interested in China, but not here. Again, you know, I think the comparison has been within the single country. You know, we face the same set of challenges here in the US. What's the difference? I'm sorry, I'm out of trouble. What's the difference in China and here? Let me give you an example, Congressman. In my home country, Singapore, there is almost no illegal drug content because Singapore has very strict drug laws. Thank you. I'm my time's expired. Now you're back. Gentlemen, yields back.
Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Tonko, for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm concerned that TikTok's algorithm prize plays on vulnerable people, including those struggling with addiction, eating orders, disorders, and other mental health conditions. The platform is designed to push content to users that will watch more frequently and for longer periods of time. Unfortunately, for many people suffering from certain mental health disorders, videos that reinforce their fears or negative self-image are more engaging.
On top of that, TikTok has received sensitive patient health information and records of browsing activity from multiple telehealth companies like Better Health, Health, and Cerebral. People's personal struggles should not be fuel for TikTok's profits. People should be able to seek help to address serious medical concerns without being afraid that their information will be shared with social media companies trying to push more products, services, or content at them. So, Mr. Chiu, will TikTok continue to get information from third parties on its users' health, including their mental health? Yes or no? We'll continue to work with experts. Yes, if that's the question.
Well, identify these issues. Will you continue to get information from these third parties, including their mental health? Yes or no? Congressman, sorry, I may not understand your question. If your question is working with them on these issues, the answer is yes. It's not the question. It's will you continue to get information from these third parties on its users' health? Get information. We do not get any user health information from third parties, Congressman. We have talked a lot about user privacy and safety. Will you commit here today to no longer using data about users' health, particularly their mental health to push them content or sell ads? Yes or no? We take our users' mental health very seriously. Yes or no? As far as I'm aware, we don't do that, Congressman. It's not what the answer is. So the answer is no. You will no longer use data about users' health.
Tiktok systematically exploits users' anxieties by pushing alarming and distressing content onto their 4U page. For example, in May of 2022, the LA Times found that some pregnant users searching for information about their pregnancies on Tiktok were then shown information about miscarriages, still births, and delivery room traumas. Your company knows that distressing content can have the perverse effect of feeding user engagement. And for Tiktok, engagement means money. In the course of a week, what percentage of content that a user sees is considered potentially harmful or distressing content? Congressman, we work with a lot of experts on this. Even before we set the 60-minute time limit for our 18s, if you spend too much time on our platform, you can try it. If you spend too much time, we will actually send you videos to tell you to go out and get some air and get off the platform. What percentage of content that a user sees is considered potentially harmful? I will need to follow up with my team and get back to you on that. Or fallpark. I will need to follow up with my team.
So our teenagers in particular shown more distressing content? The opposite is true. We actually put in more restrictions to make sure that our teenagers get a better experience. Are our expected or new parents shown more distressing content? I know of many parents, including one I met recently, who actually use our platform to find communities, to connect with other parents and learn a lot more. I've heard amazing stories of creators who have difficulties. And reclaming my team.
Are individuals with eating disorders shown more distressing content? We do not remove all content that glorifies eating disorders. And we have worked with experts to look at certain content that may not inherently be harmful, like diet trends, and make sure that we disperse them more throughout our algorithm.
What about those with mental health issues? Are they more distressing content? If a user searches words that express mental health issues, we actually redirect them to a safety page. Like, for example, if you, I don't know if I should say this in public, if you search, I want to die. We will redirect you to a safety page, for example.
So what about those suffering from addiction? Are they given more distressing content? I'm sorry, Congressman, I missed that question. Those suffering from addiction, are they given more distressing content? I missed the first few guys. I apologize. What about those suffering from addiction? Are they given more distressing content? Those suffering from addiction. Addiction. Do you mean drug addiction or any order of addiction? If people search for content, and you can try on a variety of subjects, we will actually direct you to a safety page to give you more resources. And a lot of recovering addicts have actually found the communities on TikTok, and it's really helped them find their voices and the community and the courage to really overcome the addiction. I personally have heard stories of that.
Well, I appreciate your answers, but I was looking for yes or no, and we did not get those. And again, I think the more that they watch this distressing content, the more profit TikTok makes, and that's distressing. Gentlemen, yields back.
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. And we're glad that you're here, Mr. Chu. As Chair Rogers and Representative Burgess mentioned, this morning, the Wall Street Journal reported that China will firmly oppose any force sale or divestiture of TikTok. And this is based not on conjecture, but it's based on comments provided by the official spokesperson at the Ministry of Commerce, who said that any TikTok sale or spin-off would amount to a technology export and would have to hear to Chinese law and approval. This spokesperson was quoted as saying that Chinese, and I quote, the Chinese government will make decisions according to the law, the Chinese government.
Mr. Chu, do you agree with this official? Yes or no?
朱先生,你是否同意这位官员的意见?是或否?
Congressman, I cannot speak on behalf of a Chinese government official. Do you agree with that official?
国会议员,我不能代表中国政府官员发表意见。您同意该官员的观点吗?
We will need to look at this, because Project Texas is designed to move forward here in the United States, and we are not discussing this, so I don't have specifics.
You know, your company has valued at upwards of $50 billion, and has been on the verge of force sale or ban for three years, at least, correct? Do you expect this committee to believe you haven't already discussed this scenario with your team, and you should have an answer to this.
Yes, you know, I agree with a Communist party, or I don't agree with a Communist party. So I guess I would say at that point, you disagree with a Communist party. Explain your discrepancy.
Congressman, for two years, we spent a billion and a half US dollars to build Project Texas. This is often very extensive discussions with Project Texas. Project Texas is just something expanded for the future. We're talking about now. We're talking about what you're doing now, what your expectations are now, what your relationship is with the Communist Party, which is our major concern of what the impact that will be with a country.
Let me rephrase that with a Communist Party that doesn't care about America, and sees us as standing in their way for superpower. That's our concern, and for you, to have direct ownership, direct ownership with bite dance, and to not have a characterization, or an agreement or disagreement that you say explicitly with this party policy. It's hard for us to believe what you're saying. Let me move on.
Following up on what Mr. Lada asked about data access by Chinese engineers, and responding to Mr. Lada, you talked about where American user data would be stored in the future. But the question was about access today, storage in the future versus access today. This is total redirection. This blows up any trust we could desire to develop.
So to be clear, Mr. Chu, today, do bite dance employees in Beijing have access to American data? Congressman, we have been very open about this. We have relied on global interoperability. You have access to American data. Congressman, I'm answering your question if you give me just a bit of time. We rely on global interoperability, and we have employees in China. So yes, the Chinese engineers do have access to global data.
We have access to global data. We have heard. Not storage. No, storage has always been in Virginia and Singapore. The physical service. You have no access to storage to American data today. That's not what I said. So you do have access to American data, and you have storage of American data. The American data has always been stored in Virginia and Singapore in the past. And access of this is on an S-required basis as an engineer's globally by engineers for business purposes.
By engineers? By engineers? By bite dance? By bite dance? The Communist Party? No. No. Why? How can you say that? If they have access? If they have access. This is a private business. And like many other businesses, many other American companies, we rely on the global workforce.
So the global workforce that includes bite dance, which is connected directly to the Chinese Communist Party, that is characterization that we disagree with. No. That's not what we can disagree with. That's a fact. It's not unfortunate. The CEO of bite dance. And your relationship to them? Congressman, respectfully. In my opening statement, I said, this is a private company. It's owned 60% by global investors. Three out of the five foreign members of bite dance are Americans. This is a private business.
And you report directly to bite dance with a CEO who is a member of the Communist Party. Let me move on. We're not. I think we got the answer. Sadly, at this point, I believe my time has expired, so I yield back. Gentlemen, yields back.
Chair recognizes Ms. Clark for five minutes. Thank you, Chairwoman Rodgers. Thank the ranking member, Pellone, for holding today's hearing. Throughout this hearing, I also want to think of witness for being here to testify on what are very important issues before us today. Throughout this hearing, my colleagues have outlined the potential threat posed by the security of American's data by TikTok being affiliated in some would say owned by a Chinese company.
Foreign adversaries having direct access to American's data, as well as the ability to influence this content, American C on a prolific social media platform, represents an unprecedented threat to American security and to our democracy. However, the problems of social media platforms, content moderation, algorithmic discrimination and safety are neither new nor unique to TikTok.
Mr. Xu, I share the concerns raised by my colleague, Congresswoman Matzui, related to algorithms. I believe that without mitigation against bias, platforms will continue to replicate, exacerbate discrimination that is illegal under civil rights law, as well as exclude important dialogue about sensitive topics like race from occurring on the platform.
For example, I was disturbed by reports that TikTok content moderation algorithm flagged words like black or black lives matter as inappropriate content. So my first question, Mr. Xu, is do you agree that platforms like TikTok should be subject to regular audits or transparency requirements to identify whether policies have a disparate impact on communities that are protected classes like race, religion, national origin, or gender?
I think, Congresswoman, I think platforms should be very transparent on what they do there and disclose a lot of information. We can get back on the specifics of what we mean by an audit, but I do agree very strongly that platforms should be very transparent and it's a commitment that we're giving to this committee and all our users.
That our platform will be a place for freedom of expression. We embrace all diverse points of view, all ethnic minorities. You can come and say whatever you want, as long as you don't violate the rules of safety that were put in place. And we will also commit to be free of all and any government manipulation. So I think I'm in strong agreement with a lot of what you said.
Well, thank you. My bill, the Agarithmic Accountability Act, would require platforms to be transparent about their algorithms, measure disparate impact, and require risk mitigation. It is vital that the diverse culture of the United States is reflected online, but I'm concerned the algorithms and content moderation practices employed by TikTok are ignorant to the fundamental diversity while also failing to remove content that is harmful, like child sexual abuse, material hate speech, or domestic terrorism content.
My next question to you is it's my understanding that users must be in good standing to be eligible for compensation from TikTok's creator fund. For example, they can't have violated community guidelines. Is this correct? There are some details there, but directionally, yes.
If TikTok's algorithm is flagging content incorrectly, resulting in creators violating community guidelines, when in fact, they have not, those creators would not be eligible to receive compensation under the creator fund, correct? We do have an appeals process. You have an appeals process. Yes.
In my view, if TikTok employs algorithms that disproportionately misremove content from black creators, it's disproportionately silences and excludes black creators from compensation opportunities. And this problem happens in parallel to the lack of adequate recognition, attribution, and compensation to black creators for their content.
The exploitation, cultural misappropriation, the erasure of black creators' ownership of their fashion, art, and media is nothing new. We need transparency, accountability, and bold action to mitigate against misinformation, bias, and exclusion of certain communities from the opportunities present on platforms like TikTok.
So let me just say this. I'm concerned about transparency. I am concerned about algorithmic accountability. And I'm not clear that your organization holds those values. So I want to ask that you take a look at this, because this is all part and parcel of what we're concerned about with respect to social media platforms and the misappropriation, the ways in which those algorithms can discriminate within the context of the social media platform. With that, Madam Chair, I yield.
The co-consuming, is it OK if I just very quickly respond? This is a very important topic. Unfortunately, we only have four and a half hours with you. And I'm going to try to get to every minute. So we're going to keep going.
It is very important, I would love to follow. There will be other opportunities. The lady yields back, gentlemen, from Georgia, Mr. Buddy Carter has recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Crew, welcome to the most bipartisan committee in Congress. We may not always agree on how to get there, but we care about our national security. We care about our economy, and we sure as heck care about our children.
We sure do. And that's why you're here today, because two-thirds of all the youth in our country are on your app. They spend an average of 95 minutes on your app. And you know, research has shown that TikTok is the most addictive platform out there. And the reason for that, as we've been told, is because it has the most advanced algorithm.
In the Chinese Communist Party knows this, and I don't speak for everyone, but there are those on this committee, including myself, who believe that the Chinese Communist Party is engaged in psychological warfare through TikTok to deliberately influence US children.
You see behind me, if you look behind me, Mr. Crew, you see some of the challenges that we've seen on TikTok. You know about them. You know about the milk crate. You know about the blackout challenge. You know about the Nyquill Chicken Challenge, the Benaduril Challenge, the Dragon's Breath liquid nitrogen trend, are the challenge that promotes car theft.
I want to ask you, as I understand it, there's a sister app in China. Doikin, I'm sorry if I'm butchering the pronunciation. Do they have these same things over there? Do they have these kind of challenges in China? Congressman, I'm really glad you asked this question.
Do they, yes or no? I'm not sure, because. Well, come on now. You're not sure. I really am not sure. Remember you, too? The chair lady said you got to tell the truth, OK? Do you know whether they have these kind of challenges like this over in China? Because it's my understanding they don't.
I'm not sure, because I spend my energies running TikTok. And you don't look at any of your other competitors or look at anything similar to yours. So you don't know whether they have. They don't have this over in China. We have it here, but they don't have it here. And that's why I'm asking you this. Why is it that TikTok consistently fails to identify and moderate these kinds of harmful videos? Why is it? Why is it that you allow this to go on?
We've already heard. God bless you from parents who are here with us, who have lost children. I submit to you, everybody up here cares about the children of this country. Tell me, tell me why. This is a real industry challenge. And we're working very hard. The industry, this is TikTok. We're talking about TikTok. We're talking about why is it that you can't control this? And although I believe in giving credit, what credits do I want to thank you, it's my understanding that the video that threatened life with a chairwoman has been removed. Thank you for doing that. Sorry, we had to bring it to your attention here, but it's been removed.
I want to shift gears real quick. I want to talk about biometric matrix. And I want to talk specifically, can you tell me right now? Can you say, with 100% certainty that TikTok does not use the phone's camera to determine whether the content that elicits a pupil dilation should be amplified by the algorithm? Can you tell me that?
We do not collect body, face, or voice data to identify our users. We do not. How about you? You don't? No. The only face data that you get that we collect is when you use the filters to have sunglasses on your face, we need to know where your eyes are. Why do you need to know what the eyes are if you're not seeing if they're dilated? And that data is stored on your local device and deleted after use if you use it for facial.
Again, we do not collect body, face, or voice data to identify our users. I find that hard to believe. This is our understanding that they're looking at the eyes. How do you determine what age they are then? We rely on age gating as our key age assurance. Age gating. Which is when you ask the user what age they are, we have also developed some tools where we look at their public profile to go through the videos that they post to see whether.
Well, that's creepy. Tell me more about that. It's public. So if you post a video that you choose that video to go public, that's how you get people to see a video. We look at those to see if it matches up the age that you talked about. Now, this is a real challenge for our industry because privacy versus age assurance is a really big problem.
Look, look, you keep talking about industry. We're talking about TikTok here. We're talking about children dying. Do you know any children have died because of this? Do you have any idea? Can you tell me?
Congressman, again, it's hard breaking. And you tell me if how many children in America have died because of challenges like this? The majority of people who use health platform use it for positive experiences.
That's not what I ask. You ask. You ask. You tell me the number of children of US children who have died because of these challenges. Congressman, again, the majority of people who come on our platform get a good experience.
I'm not talking about the majority of children. I want to know a number. Dangerous changes are not allowed in our platform. If we find them, we will remove them. We take this very seriously. Obviously, you found one today and you removed it. We had to bring it to your attention. And I know I'm out of time. Thank you for being here.
Welcome again to the most bipartisan committee in Congress. Gentlemen, yields back. We will now take a brief recess and resume in 10 minutes. The committee stands.
Carden, thank you. That's good. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate this opportunity for this committee to have this important hearing regarding TikTok. And it's a fact on the American people, especially the American children and the potential effect, not potential, but the effects that it has had and may have in the future when it comes to our democracy and misinformation and disinformation that permeates on TikTok.
It's unfortunate that I think most Americans or most parents think that TikTok is this innocent little thing where kids get on there and they do a little dance or something like that. But TikTok is much, much more as some of my colleagues. And I thank them for bringing up some of these serious issues, literally life and death issues that TikTok is right in the middle of.
And also, what I'd like the witness to acknowledge is that it appears that Miss Kamek, my colleague, brought up those two posters and since then, TikTok has taken them down since then, not before then. Are you aware of that, Mr. Chu? I was brief doing the break that I'd taken down. Obviously.
How do you feel about the fact that it was up for apparently 40 some days, 41 days, and yet in the middle of this hearing, it was brought directly to your attention and as a result, it has been taken down so quickly. It goes to show the enormous challenge that we have to make sure that although the vast majority of users come for a good experience, we need to make sure that bad actors don't post violated.
Yes. And the way, Mr. Chu, that you can make sure is that you can make sure that you choose to invest more resources, more money into more ability to pull down damaging and deadly information from your platform. Are you investing more and more and more every day into bringing down that kind of content? That's my question. Are you?
Yes. And I'm committed to investing more in this regard to stay on top of the growth. Right here in the United States, many, many languages are used and spoken. For example, TikTok in the United States is being used in many languages. Specifically, when it comes to Spanish language, are you dedicating more resources today than you did months ago, years ago, on making sure that you are combing through that content to make sure that if content is dangerous or damaging or deadly, that you are bringing it down as quickly as possible?
Yes. We are investing in more Spanish language content moderation. And yes, we will, once we identify, the validative content, we'll take it down as soon as possible. Thank you.
And your testimony today isn't the only opportunity for you to commit to answering questions to this committee. So I'd like you to forward to this committee. Again, I'm not asking for trade secrets, but I would like to get some semblance of understanding as to how much you are investing with a number of bodies, the number of people, the number of resources, and making sure that you are investing more in pulling down content that is either deadly or dangerous on your platform. Can you forward that to the committee? I will check it, my team. I'll be back to you on this. Thank you very much. Appreciate that opportunity.
As was mentioned earlier, it might sound a little funny, but you have, in fact, been one of the few people to unite this committee members, Republicans, and Democrats to be an agreement that we are frustrated with TikTok. We're upset with TikTok. And yes, you keep mentioning that there are industry issues that not only TikTok faces, but others. You remind me a lot of Mike Zuckerberg. When he came here, I said to my staff, he reminds me of Fred Astaire. Good answer with words. And you are doing the same today. A lot of your answers are a bit nebulous. They're not yes or no.
So I'd like to ask you a question. Yes or no, is your revenue going up at TikTok month over month or year over year? Yes, I'll revenue is going up. OK. And with that, some of the answers I'd like you to forward this committee is are you investing more and more money into making sure that content that is dangerous and or deadly? You're investing more and more resources in that aspect of your expenditures and your commitment to your users and to your organization. Yes, I commit to that. And we are investing more and we will continue to do that.
My last question is this. Are you a Chinese company? TikTok is a company that's now headquartered in Singapore and Los Angeles. OK. We are not available in mainland China. I would use this in other countries around the world. OK. Is there a corporation that has any authority above TikTok?
TikTok is a subsidiary of Bydance, which is founded by a Chinese founder. And Bydance is a Chinese company? Well, Bydance owns many businesses that operate in Chinese. Is it or is it not a Chinese company? Congressman, the way we look at it, it was founded by Chinese owners. I'm not asking you how you look at it. Fact, is it a Chinese company or not? For example, Dell is a company. It's an American company. They have activities all over the world. Is it a Chinese company? I frequently have this discussion with others. On what is a company that is now global? That's OK. I prefer you answer the question and stop dancing verbally. Madam Chair, my time has expired. Thank you very much.
Chair recognizes gentleman from California, Mr. Oble-Nolte. Well, thank you very much. Mr. Chu, it's nice to see you again.
主席注意到加州的奥布尔-诺特先生。非常感谢您,朱先生,很高兴再次见到您。
If I could just bring us back up to 30,000 feet for a second, I just want to talk about what we're afraid of here, what we fear might happen. Social media companies and TickNoc as you can this is not unique in this, gather a tremendous amount of user data and then use powerful AI tools to use that data to make eerily accurate predictions of human behavior and then seek to manipulate that behavior. That's something that's not just TickDoc. It's all our social media companies that are doing this.
Ultimately, the solution is to enact comprehensive federal data privacy legislation that will prevent that kind of behavior or at least allow users to consent to it. And that's as I know something that the chair is working on the ranking member. I hope that this committee will act on that this year.
The specific concern here, though, as regards TickDoc, is that this type of capability falling into the hands of foreign countries is something that has national security implications and that's why Congress is getting involved on this issue. So I know that you have proposed Project Texas in an effort to alleviate these fears. So I wanted to ask some specific technical questions about Project Texas and the way that you believe that it will solve this problem.
So one of the things that you've said in your testimony is that part of Project Texas will have engineers at Oracle going through the source code for TickDoc. How large is that code base? Well, it's not small, but it's not just Oracle Congressman, we're also inviting other party monitors where in the process of figuring out who the best. Sure. So we talk a million tens of millions of lines of code. How big is the base? It is significant. But it's something that we believe can be done. And again, I want to say that I have not heard of another company, American or not. I know. A lot for this to happen.
I mean, you're kind of at any unique position having to answer these concerns of Congress. So are they going through the code for just the app or the app and the server code? I can get back to you on the technical details. But it's comprehensive, including the software that powers a lot of the software that powers the experience. And how long will that review take? I need to get back to you on the timeline. But we are progressing quite well on Project Texas. And whenever we hit a milestone, I commit to be very transparent about them. OK.
So I'm wondering, because I'm also concerned as a software engineer about the process in which new code is introduced into the code base, do you use a software configuration management system at TikTok? The way we plan for a new code to be done is that even before the code becomes live, it has to be reviewed. The changes have to be reviewed by the body. You're talking about a code review. That was another question I had for you. So the code review is it done with a team of engineers or just with a single engineer? Oh, it's going to be a team effort.
And that's going to be done at Oracle or elsewhere. It's going to be done in one of our transparency centers so that we still need to make sure that the code itself is secure. So what I'm hearing you say is that even though the code might be written by someone not in the United States, before the code is integrated, it'll be reviewed in a code review by a team of engineers within the United States. That's the plan. OK.
And back to the question about the software configuration management system. How do you manage the integration of that code change into the rest of the TikTok code base? The long and short of it is we have built a team of American personnel with security credentials. The person who leads the team used to work for the secret service. No, I understand. But I mean, there's a software solution for integrating those code changes into the code base. What's the solution is that? I would need to check anything. Get back to you on the details.
Well, specifically, what I'd like to know is to make sure that this isn't something that TikTok has created custom, which many companies do, because that would mean that you'd have to review the source code for that as well for security. How do you protect against threats like the malicious actor being hired not by TikTok, but by Oracle, for example, or by USDS? The approach that most companies take for these things is to have several layers of monitoring to make sure that everything that somebody has reviewed, there's a secondary review, so that one malicious actor is not able to create the damage than the malicious actor can do. But you rightly pointed out these problems are industry right problems. Every company has to do with them.
OK, well, let me ask a specific question about that. I mean, I, in thinking about if I were a malicious actor, a software engineer on one of your projects, how I would go about writing a malicious code. I wouldn't put it right there and say, hey, I'm malicious. I would put unrelated lines of code in different sections of the code that work together to do something malicious. How do you think that that could get caught? Again, we have to rely on third-party experts to help us with that. I think there are enough experts who can catch a lot of these things. The work on security globally, on all data security, is never perfect.
But we can have a lot of oversight to keep it safer than any other experience. I appreciate the effort. My concern, Mr. Chiu, is I don't believe that it is technically possible to accomplish what TikTok says it will accomplish through Project Texas. I just think that there are too many backdoors through that process to allow that to be possible. And I think a malicious actor would succeed in inserting malicious code in there if they wanted to. But I see where at a time. I hope we get an opportunity to talk some more about this. I yield back, Madam Chair. Gentlemen yields back.
Chair recognizes the General Lady from Michigan. Mrs. Dingell. Reviving. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, and Renky member Pologne for holding this hearing. And to Mr. Chiu for testifying here today, you're good news, you're halfway through with me.
A screen time increases so-do inherent risks. And with the proliferation and popularity of new social media platforms, so does the potential reach of dangerous, provocative, and often harmful content. And my fear, the abuse of collected data. As a representative from the state of Michigan, I can speak from experience on how social media has been used to target members of the Michigan delegation, including a polite to kidnap our governor, and how it can be weaponized to perpetuate harms towards individuals and communities.
And you saw firsthand how it targeted the chair of this committee. Today, many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle have raised legitimate concerns about protecting children online, misinformation, and securing our data. Concerns that I share, and has been said by many of my colleagues, are bipartisanly shared.
I think of many ways these myriad of issues highlight the need for comprehensive data privacy legislation that would ensure the safety and integrity of every American's data on every social media platform and mitigate potential harms.
One important area of concern I have regarding data collection is geo-location data. And how it can be abused. I've seen it abused. I have seen women die because it has been abused. This subject has dangerous implications for survivors of domestic violence, people seeking medical care, and protecting children from potential predators.
Mr. Chu, in your testimony, you wrote that current versions of the app do not collect precise or approximate GPS information from US users. Yes or no answers, please. Mr. Chu, have any prior versions of Tiktok's app collected precise GPS information from US users? Yes or no? Yes, from back in 2020, about three years ago.
Are there currently Tiktok users who still hold old versions of the app that collect precise GPS information from US users? Yes or no? There could be, but that's a small percentage. Still dangerous.
Has Tiktok at any time fed precise GPS information collected from US users into algorithms to serve user ads? Yes or no? I would need to check on the details because we do not currently collect that. So, I'm ready to check on the details. Yeah, I'm sure there isn't. Yes, there. But has Tiktok at any time fed precise GPS information collected from US users?
I love the rhythms. I know I'm happy. I've talked today to make inferences about users. Yes or no? I'm not sure of that specific. And like answers, yes or no, after this. Has Tiktok at any time sold precise GPS information collected from US users? Yes or no? We do not sell data to data progress. If that's the question. And you've never done that. I don't know. Police are.
Has Tiktok at any time sold or shared with third parties allow forensic inferences that were made using in part or in whole precise GPS information collected from US users? Yes or no? I need to check on these specifics. What I can tell you is right now, we do not collect precise GPS location data in the United States.
Does Tiktok still use inferences that were made using in part or in whole precise GPS information collected from US users? I'm sorry. Would you repeat that? Does Tiktok still use inferences that you've gained that were made using in part in our whole precise GPS information collected from US users in your algorithm? That will be a very technical question. Now we'll have to check and get back to you.
Has Tiktok at any time provided the Chinese government with either precise GPS information collected from US users or inferences made from that data? That I can give you a straight up. No.
Mr. Chu, even in Congress, even if Congress were to be in Tiktok, I'm concerned that China or others would still have access to US consumer data by purchasing it through data brokers. Will you commit not to sell any of Tiktok's data to data brokers now or in the future? We do not do that. We do not sell data to data brokers now. Will you commit to not do it in the future? This is a certain members of our industry who do this. I think this has to be broad legislation to help us the whole industry address this problem. I think out of time, thank you, Madam Chair. I'll yield back. General Lee yields back.
Chair yields five minutes to the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer. Thank you. When the Chinese Communist government bought a share of bite dance, it's been described as the Chinese Communist government's way of quiet or form of control. And the companies have a little choice in selling a stake to the government if they want to stay in business. And what I'd like to know is when the Chinese Communist government moved to buy shares of bite dance, were you informed beforehand, yes or no? No.
Congressman Bite dance. Were you? Were anyone with TikTok asked for your opinion about the sale of shares of bite dance to the Chinese Communist government? Yes or no? It just hasn't happened.
Did you or anyone employed by or affiliated with TikTok state any objections or concerns about the possibility of the Chinese Communist government? Once they had shares in bite dance, exercising control over content using your platform for conducting misinformation campaigns or restrictions and sharing nothing as posted reflex badly on the Chinese Communist government or for surveillance and data collection for use against anyone. Did any of your you or anyone affiliated with TikTok raise any concerns about that? Congressman, we do not collect. We do not collect. I didn't ask you that. We do not promote. Did you raise any concerns about it? Because that's why we're here. But we do not promote or remove any content at the behalf of the Chinese government.
Did you communicate in any form of fashion with the directors of bite dance that there might be concerns about government control over content? Yes or no? You either did or you didn't.
Congressman, I just wanted to make this clear. We do not remove or promote content at the request of the Chinese government. TikTok insiders have already said that the company is tightly controlled by bite dance. It even gets down to the hours they work. So obviously you didn't say anything. There's a serious concern by Chinese companies, privately held companies, about doing anything against what the Chinese Communist government wants.
I want to ask you this. Does TikTok screen against manipulative content from child predators, yes or no? Do we screen against them? Yeah, we do. How about drug cartels? Drug cartels child predatory content. You have a drug cartel that was engaged in a police chase with Spanish authorities and they posted it on TikTok and got over a million views. Why was that taken down? And are you doing it with human traffickers or terrorists? I mean, do you withhold content from nations that might be committing crimes against humanity? Yes or no?
Congressman, I will platform this case to freedom of expression and uses it here. We talk about that. But yes or no, do you screen against content from nations that commit crimes against humanity? Congressman, I will use this comment. Yes or no? Yes or no? Yes or no? So you need points of view to it? You don't. And it's a commitment to keep this free from it.
Well, actually, there's Michael Beckerman, who is your vice president and head of public policy for the Americas, right? Is he part of the team that helped you prepare for this meeting, yes or no? Can I clarify who you mean? Michael Beckerman. Yes, yes. OK, where is he at this moment? I'm sorry? Where's Mr. Beckerman at this moment? He's probably here. No, you know he's here. He's sitting right behind you.
I want to know why when Mr. Beckerman was on with Jake Tapper on CNN and asked repeatedly to condemn Chinese government streetmaid of the Wiggers, when that treatment has been classified by the United States as a genocide, when a UN report classified as a crime against humanity, why after multiple questions, Mr. Beckerman refused to address that, are you afraid of the Chinese communist government? No, because you can find that content and I'll platform any content that I'll use this one. Why could the vice president use the public policy in the United States? He is head of public policy for the Americas. And an American on an American television news channel. Why couldn't he say, why couldn't he condemn that?
I think it's very important to look at our platform. And if you use an open-out app, it's search for any content. I'm not asking about your personnel now, because personnel is policy. Everybody in this room understands that, except maybe you. Personnel is pro.
Let me just conclude with this. And I hate to bring this up because this is part of the stuff that I've said, but deception is fundamental to the Chinese Communist Party's political, intelligence, and military strategy. And you have repeatedly used the word transparency throughout this hearing. And every time you've said it, what I've heard is deception.
Chair recognizes, gentlemen, from Texas, Mr. VC, for five minutes.
主席宣布:亲爱的先生们,德克萨斯州的VC先生有五分钟的发言时间。
Thank you, Madam Chair. I've got to tell you, Mr. Chu, as a father of a 16-year-old that likes social media, a lot of your evasiveness today in answering many of these questions really disturbs me.
Because I can tell you that the teenagers of today, they really don't want to be on Facebook. They want your platform. And you were asked to come before this committee to testify about many things. And a lot of us are worried about our kids' personal data. As the co-chair of the Congressional Loading Rights Caucus, also worried that TikTok is the world's most powerful and extensive propaganda machine, allowing the Chinese Communist Party to use TikTok's platform to influence public opinion and undermine the integrity of our democratic elections.
And I have a report called TikTok and Facebook Fail to Detect Election Distant Formation in the US while YouTube succeeds. And this report was published by the nonprofit Global Witness and the Cybersecurity for Democracy team at NYU. And the purpose of the study was to test platforms like TikTok and whether or not they can detect and take down false political ads targeted at US voters, young voters ahead of last year's midterm elections. And according to this report, 90% of election disinformation ads tested were approved by your platform. Again, that is 90% of ads containing false and misleading election misinformation went undetected on TikTok.
And just to add some color to the type of misleading ads that were approved by TikTok, this included ads that were live on TikTok that said the wrong election day and actually encouraged people to vote twice. You do know that voting twice is a felony.
Mr. Chu, you do know there's legal to vote twice. Congressman, any misinformation that comes around a political action is something we take very seriously. Let me, I'm particularly sure about this type of information because it can run rampant on TikTok. And given that TikTok again, y'all are appealing to a very young and diverse user base that is exactly the people that we've seen targeted time and time again with voter suppression campaigns run by malicious actors.
Mr. Chu, do you agree with me that it is completely unacceptable that 90% of these ads were undetected on your platform and can you detail for us right now TikTok's policy regarding election misinformation and paid political ads and how the company monitors such information and how you plan to get that number down to zero.
While TikTok is a place for our users to come and express their points of views freely, we do take misinformation, dangerous misinformation, particularly around an election very seriously. We work with third party experts to identify misinformation.
You call allowing 90% of false content, political content on your platform to be taken, you call that, you define that as being taken seriously? I need to look into the specifics. I'm not sure where the number came from, but I can tell you, Congressman, that we are the only platform that I know of that doesn't actually take political ads. We don't accept money. I don't think other platforms can say that.
Mr. Chu, can you detail how you respond it to that report? Did you respond to that report that I just mentioned? I need to look at the specifics of the report, Congressman, and I can get back to you on that.
Mr. Chu, I want to shift to Project Texas. I know that we've discussed this initiative throughout today's hearing, but I want to dive deeper into your notion that promises about Project Texas should give us any confidence and TikTok's ability to localize US data and discontinue access to that data to bite dance employees in China.
Why? Because we've already had a TikTok executive appear before Congress and give sworn testimony about the comfort that we should take in TikTok's US-based resources. Well, TikTok data security practices will be scrutinized by the US government, and unfortunately, we've since found out from journalists and recorded conversations that those assurances were worthless.
In your testimony, you also mentioned that Oracle has already begun inspecting TikTok source code and has access to the platform's recommendation algorithm. Why should this give the American public any great assurances, particularly given that Oracle now owns a stake in TikTok and sends the gain monetarily the more revenue that TikTok and its algorithm generates?
Congressman, not only is Project Texas unprecedented in our industry in protecting US user data and interests, we are inviting third parties to come in and monitor this, and we will be transparent in that process, and this is more beyond most companies that I know of, my industry.
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, I'm aware that arriving in the DC this week, you appeared on TikTok and posted you had 150 million US users, 5 million US businesses, that represents a lot of data.
You also referenced your appearance before this committee as a chance to share all the TikTok is doing to protect Americans using the app. Mr. Chu has bite dance spied on Americans at the direction of the Chinese Communist Party. No.
Madam Chair, I'd like to enter into the record this October 20th, 22th, Forbes article, entitled TikTok Parent Bite Dance, Plan to Use TikTok to Monitor the physical location of specific US citizens. Without objections, the word. Thank you.
The Project assigned this to a Beijing-ledity, and they were going to follow individual American citizens. I ask you, Mr. Chu, has bite dance spied on American citizens?
I don't think the spying is the right way to describe it. This is ultimately, we can differ on that. This is ultimately an internalization. Any TikTok or bite dance data that is viewed stored or passes through China is subject to the laws of China. One party, authoritarian, state hostile to all American standards of privacy. China's court system reports to and falls under the Chinese Communist Party.
And like fentanyl analogues that we all know are also manufactured in China. Although they are illegal there, I fear TikTok will grow into a much bigger problem, a cancer, if you will. I'm deeply worried that it may be too late to stop the spread of this cancer. Like fentanyl, another China export, which causes addiction and death, dangerous algorithms in Chinese Communist Party are not good for Americans, not good for our families, and definitely not good for the United States.
Mr. Chu, prior to serving as the CFO of bite dance, you served as a CFO and director global operations for show me from 2015 to 21, is that correct? Are you asking me in 2015? Very good. You might be reputting that piece. Madam Chair, I'd like to enter another article into evidence. This is from the National Cybersecurity Center in Lithuania. Without objection, so ordered. Thank you. This report outlines numerous data security risks, including how the privacy of European users was violated in clear cases of unauthorized collection of user data by show me. This sounds exactly what many of my colleagues have been talking about today.
Where she at the show me phones sold to Europeans had a list of 449 words and phrases, which would be automatically censored on the device. Sensor phrases included the voice of America and democratic movement among others. This analysis was conducted on devices which are manufactured and sold to Europeans while you were the head of operations for show me. It does not follow that you expect us to believe that you would not censor. I'll be half of the Chinese Communist Party, since you've already done so. I want to be unequal vocal on this.
We do not remove or promote content on behalf of the Chinese government. Your word strives to deliver on their mission to inspire creativity and bring joy to American users. I assure you that is not the mission or goal of the Chinese Communist Party, which runs the People's Republic of China that TikTok's parent company, Bite Dancer's Domestial Deal. Mr. Chairman, you can check with our users that to see the world is the beginning. You have not given straightforward answers. We don't find you credible on these things. And with that, Madam Chair, I'd like to yield a balance. Congressman, you have given me no time to answer your questions. I reject the characterizations. I yielded Mr. Albinolte. Dr. Dunn.
Mr. Albinolte? Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, I'd like to continue our discussion of Project Texas. If we could, part of Project Texas is that engineers at Oracle will review the algorithms used by TikTok to confirm that they're free of foreign influence. I have a question about that because we're talking about AI. That's a very generic term. Do you use machine learning to influence the algorithms at TikTok? This gets very technical, and we have published several blocks about this, which I can forward to your team. Yes, it's mainly based on interest signals. So here's my question. How could looking at the algorithm confirm that it's free from foreign influence? Because the algorithm is just a neural net architecture with inputs and outputs and weights, and how to train that. I mean, the influence is an external factor. So I'd appreciate it if you could give us, I see we're out of time again, I've written answer to that. But again, I'm concerned that what you're proposing with Project Texas just doesn't have the technical capability of providing us the assurances that we need. I'll go back, Madam Chair. Gentlemen, yields back.
Chair recognizes Ms. Custer. Ms. Custer is in here. Ms. Baragon, for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, TikTok warns users when content is graphic or disturbing and labels state-affiliated media accounts to ensure the viewers aren't seeing propaganda. Does TikTok provide similar information to Spanish speakers, users as well as English speakers? I believe so, Congressman. I will get back to you on that.
OK, and do you know if TikTok has a specific strategy for tackling Spanish language content that violates its trust and safety guidelines? We do. I will get back to you on the specifics on that. OK, when offensive English language search terms or hashtags are blocked for violating community guidelines in English, is the Spanish translation of the term or the hashtag automatically blocked as well? I believe so, but let me check the specifics and I'm back to you.
Do you have any idea how many people that you might have? We're going to TikTok that addresses Spanish misinformation? I know ballpark is quite a significant team, but I can get back to you on the details.
You said significant. So are you saying it's, you have a ballpark at all? You can give us, would you say it's like 10% of your force? Or more? It's an important number, so I want to be precise, and I'll get back to you.
Do you happen to know how TikTok can effectively ensure that Spanish speaking users between the ages of 13 and 17 are not being targeted by at promoting harmful content? We have very strict policies for our users who are in the teenage age group, and regardless of what language they speak. So we want to make sure that they are given a very safe experience on our platform, regardless of the language day.
Well, I know, I'm just trying to, I'm trying to ascertain resources you may be putting into Spanish speaking and Spanish language. Last year, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus met with TikTok. This was one of the conversations and a source of the discussion was addressing Spanish language disinformation and misinformation. It remains an urgent priority for the Congressional Hispanic Caucus as Hispanics across the country increasingly turned to social media, provide all information.
We heard earlier in this hearing that there was, you know, video, there was a TikTok post threatening the chair of the committee and it took some 40 days to take it down. So I guess I'm a little concerned. If your team doesn't have the resources and the capability to flag that, what kind of capability is it going to have to bring down misinformation, disinformation, to Spanish speakers, which I'm assuming is a smaller fraction of the workers that you have at TikTok.
TikTok is a place for, you know, all our users to come and express their very diverse views. And, you know, we are open to all ethnicities, you know, and we are open to all, everyone to come here and express their freely expressive views. So it is our commitment to make sure that the safety of those users, regardless of the language, you know, and of course, you know, the Spanish language user base is super important to us.
Okay, so you need to make sure that we continue to. Okay, so you don't have an answer then. Okay, I will look forward in your coming back.
好的,那么你需要确保我们继续下去。好的,那么你没有答案。好的,我期待你的回来。
We've heard a lot about the concerns about children who may be on TikTok. Mr. Chu, at what age do you think it would be appropriate for a young person to get on TikTok?
We have three different experiences here in the United States. There is an experience for under 13s, which is highly respected. I'm asking what you think would be the appropriate age to have a child get on TikTok?
Our approach is to give differentiated experiences for different age groups and let the parents have these conversations with their children to decide what's best for their family.
我们的方法是为不同年龄段提供不同的体验,让父母与孩子们进行对话,来决定什么对他们的家庭最好。
So you think that there is a sufficient safety mechanism for an eight-year-old to be able to access TikTok?
An ADO's experience on TikTok will be so highly restricted that every single piece of content he or she will see will be vetted by common sense. Our third-party child safety expert in, the ADO will not be able to post and the ADO will not be able to see any personalized feed and zero advertising in that experience. So I believe yes, it is the appropriate experience for an ADO.
I have seen these news articles. I would like to address that. My kids live in Singapore, and in Singapore, we do not have the under 13 experience. If they live here in the United States, I'll let them use the under 13 experience. Okay, so you're saying it's because of the country you live and it doesn't have the same mechanisms. Is there a reason you don't have the same mechanisms everywhere?
In principle, we want to provide good experience for users in general. We don't want to monetize from people under 13. In the US, we are co-pilot compliant. And as part of that, we will deem as a, I want to get this specifics right. I want, we will deem as a particular type of audience, makes audience app. Make sure that that's right. And as a result of that, we have to provide an experience to our under 13 users in this country as well.
Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, my children are getting ready to run a marathon. And I know, to join us hearing that they'll be running for about the same amount of time that you'll be sitting in that chair today. Unfortunately, I only get you for five minutes, so instead of a marathon, I'd like to do a sprint with you. And I want to, I want to go back up to that 30,000 feet level. Would you agree with me that Section 230 was created to protect platforms like yours from lawsuits when you distribute information? I don't overcomplicate it, just like 3,000 feet.
Yeah. So then would you agree that there's a line drawn between publishers of information and distributors of information, specifically in the Section 230 language?
I think 230 is a very complex topic. I understand, but remember, it's 30,000 feet. So in short, your platform distributes content that other people's publish. One of the early challengers to Section 230 was when AOL refused to take down a post of somebody that had inappropriately put a phone number associated a phone number with Oklahoma City bombings. The courts ruled that AOL was not liable for that post because of Section 230.
Now, I want you to do a hypothetical with me, because I'm going to use the absurd to try to make a point here. Let's suppose hypothetically that AOL, instead of just posting that, actually, wanted to magnify that voice. And so they took out an ad in the Wall Street Journal, linking that phone number with Oklahoma City bombing. And let's suppose they didn't stop there, but they went further. And they took out a Super Bowl ad, linking that phone number with Oklahoma City bombing. And let's suppose hypothetically they didn't stop there. They sent a flyer to every home in America linking that phone number to the bombing. And I guess the question is, would AOL have moved from a distributor to a publisher in this made-up example?
Congressman, I think everybody can see how they would. This is not a hard question. Moving that far away from the intent would have moved them to a publisher. So my question is, is platforms are protected because they post content. But I want this room to see, not just you. The protection has limits. And if AOL moves to a distributor instead of a publisher, they go outside of those limits.
Now let's talk algorithms just super quickly. We've thrown that word around a lot today. Let me hear again go 30,000 feet. And we'll use another platform. So it's not sensitive. But Pinterest, I like to go on Pinterest. My wife and I are building a home working on the yard right now. If you went on Pinterest page, you would see swing sets and things made for my grandkids. Now another hypothetical, let's suppose that there's some devious intent in site Pinterest.
And they decide they want to influence John Curtis with these algorithms. And they want me to believe it's the end of the world. And all of a sudden, now I'm buying bomb shelters and swing sets for my kids. Have they become a publisher? And I should not be protected from section 230. And if you don't feel, I'm pretty sure the room understands that they have crossed this line.
And you can tell me if you think they have or not. Congressman, I will have to study that specific example. And thank you. It's a hypothetical. But you can see that at some point, they've crossed the line and they have become a publisher and a distributor.
So we've touched on this today. But I want to be super specific. Is it possible that TikTok had enough data, could get enough data on me, that you could use artificial intelligence and your algorithms and machine learning to write an algorithm that could persuade me to change how I view a policy issue? Is that possibility existed? The way we look at it. 30,000 feet.
On the sprint. I will stay very high level. The way we look at it is how users come in and express whatever views they want. That's not the point. The point is, you couldn't write an algorithm that would change. We've actually seen that Washington Post reported the stop the Willow campaign shows how TikTokers are tackling climate change. I think that's all fine, right? And all good. Unless somebody has interjected into that and magnified or diminished voices in that.
And what I'm proposing to you today is that that pushes them across the line from a distributor to a publisher if they make those decisions. Now, serious allegations have been made against your platform and others. Many of them here today and you're not new to these right to these allegations. This isn't your platform.
But some time ago, there was an allegation that a platform recommended ISIS-related videos we've talked about, the weight loss videos we've talked about. We didn't talk about it, but there's still any elections. Whatever the motivation, I'm trying to point out that as you move from a publisher by you manipulate this data with algorithms that you step out from the protections of TechSection 230, do you see that logic? This is a very complex. I understand it's very complex, but you see the logic.
In your mind, has TikTok ever stepped across the line from a distributor to a publisher? Congressman, again, this is a very complex topic. I would need to get back to him. I understand that. OK, and finally, very quickly, you produced a video that now is well known about your visit here in today in Washington, D.C. Can you tell me 100% that no TikTok employees manually manipulated that to get more views?
Chair recognizes Ms. Blunt Rochester. Five minutes.
主席认可布伦特·罗切斯特女士发言,时间为五分钟。
Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, as I'm sure you know, this hearing is part of an ongoing effort by our committee to examine data security and other concerns with social media companies broadly.
And I have to tell you, I came to this hearing interested to hear the actions that TikTok is taking to combat misinformation, protect our young people, and ensure our national security. But I'm not been reassured by anything you've said so far. And I think, quite frankly, your testimony has raised more questions for me than answers.
As some of my colleagues already noted, platforms like TikTok can easily manipulate and undermine user autonomy with addictive features and invasive data collection practices and disseminating misinformation and disinformation. That's why I will be reintroducing the Detour Act to mitigate this harm.
Mr. Chu, yes or no, would you oppose legislation that banned the use of intentionally manipulative design techniques that trick users into giving up their personal information? In principle, it's just a yes or no.
In principle, I agree that the kind of practices is not.
原则上,我同意这种做法是不对的。
And can TikTok users opt out of targeted ads? Yes or no?
TikTok用户是否可以选择退出定向广告?是还是不是?
At this moment in time, we believe that this is a very important part of the experience.
此时此刻,我们相信这是体验中非常重要的一部分。
Yes or no, time is ticking.
是或否,时间正在流逝。意思是要在规定时间内作出决策或回答问题。
It is an important part of the experience. If even if someone wants targeted ads, do you give a user a clear opportunity to prevent TikTok from using tools like pixels to collect their data and track them off of the TikTok platform? We give our users a lot of tools to control their privacy that settings are now at. And by the way, if you're below 16, it's private by default. So you cannot even go viral.
In August of 2022, response to a letter I wrote to your company on abortion misinformation, TikTok asserted several actions to address abortion misinformation. In light of recent attacks on safe and effective medication abortion, I'm remained worried by this misinformation. And following on Mr. Getz questioning, how many posts did you actually take down that contained abortion misinformation?
Contents on views on both sides of the abortion is allowed on a platform, it's just freedom of expression. If it's dangerous misinformation, we rely on third party experts to help us identify and remove them. I can get back to you on specifics. Yes, please get back with us on the specifics.
Mr. Chu, in your testimony, you indicated TikTok has taken several steps to implement Project Texas. You said you've spent in your testimony $1.5 billion. You've hired 1,500 full-time employees. Can I ask for some specifics about the implementation? This $1.5 billion, what was it used for? The employees, where they, people that you already had, that you just transferred over, and what types of roles will they have?
OK, this billion and a half US dollars is spread across many things, including the infrastructure we have to build, the migration of the data to a new cloud infrastructure, and all the third party security partners that we're hiring, and of course, the new employees. Now, this team will now be run by a gentleman who used to be this, who has spent his career as a chief security officer in other companies. And another gentleman who used to work, I believe, in. If you could just follow up with us, that would be very helpful. I will.
Because we would really like to understand the details. Where's the money going? How many people, and what will they be doing?
因为我们真的想了解详情。这些资金去了哪里?会有多少人,他们将会从事什么工作?
OK. You know, as I put just kind of a finer point on this, one of my concerns is that we came here hoping to hear some actions that would alleviate some of our concerns in our fears. We've got family members. We have a lot of folks here that are constituents, that are content creators. And for us, we were looking for action. We wanted to see, make us feel like we really can trust as you use the word.
What I leave here with is thinking about the fact that your company is, I learned that you have personalized data advertising for kids as young as 13. And we've heard until Project Texas is supposedly stood up, engineers in China still have access to personal data. And that means engineers in China have access to personal data of 13-year-olds in the United States. And I think that really summarizes why you see so much my partisan consensus and concern about your company. And I imagine that it's not going away anytime soon.
That's not my question. My question is, do you agree that the Chinese government has persecuted the weaker population?
这不是我的问题。我的问题是,您是否同意中国政府迫害了较弱势的人口?
Well, it's really concerning to hear about all accounts of human rights abuse. My role here is to explain what our platform does. I think you're being a piece of it. It's a pretty easy question. Do you agree that the Chinese government has persecuted the weaker population? Congressman, I'm here to describe TikTok and what we do as a platform. And as a platform, we allow our users to freely express their needs on this issue and any other issue that matters to them.
Well, you didn't answer the question. Earlier today, Chairman Rogers asked you, and I quote, have any moderation tools been used to remove content associated with the weaker genocide, yes or no? Your answer, we do not remove that kind of content. Yet, in 2019, TikTok suspended the account of Faroza E's Azeez, an American 17-year-old after she put out a video about the weaker genocide. So your answer, sir, does not align with history. That particular case was a mismoderation. I believe that video had a picture of Osama bin Laden. So we thought it was content that was inappropriate.
My next question. India banned the use of TikTok in their country in 2020. New Zealand has banned the installation of TikTok on devices connected to the country's parliamentary network. Canada banned the installation of TikTok on government devices. The United Kingdom has banned the TikTok app from government-owned devices. Belgium banned the TikTok from government phones. The European Union banned the installation of TikTok on government devices. All-sided security risks with the company's data collection and connection to the Chinese Communist Party.
Recently, our US FBI director Christopher Ray said about TikTok, quote, this is a tool that is ultimately within the control of the Chinese government. And to me, it screams out with national security concerns. Mr. Chu, how can all of these countries and our own FBI director have been wrong?
I think a lot of risks that are pointed out are hypothetical and theoretical risks. I have not seen any evidence. I'm eagerly awaiting discussions where we can talk about evidence. And we then can address the concerns that are being raised. Yes.
My next question revolves around an article. India banned TikTok in 2020. The March 21st Forbes article revealed how troves of personal data of Indian citizens who once used TikTok remain widely accessible to employees at the company and its Beijing-based parent bite dance. A current TikTok employee told Forbes that nearly anyone with basic access to company tools, including employees in China, can easily look up the closest contacts and other sensitive information about any user. This current TikTok employee also said, quote, if you want to start a movement, if you want to divide people, if you want to do any of the operation to influence the public on the app, you can just use that information to target those groups.
Why would a current TikTok employee say this if it wasn't true? This is a recent article I have asked my team to look into it. As far as I know, we have rigorous data access protocols. There's really no such thing where anybody can get access to tools. So I disagree with a lot of the conclusions. Madam Chair, I request unanimous consent at the Forbes March 21st, 2023 article be added to the record.
And I would like to turn over the rest of my time to Mr. Abernoldy. Thank you, Madam Chair.
我想把我剩下的时间让给Abernoldy先生。谢谢,主席女士。
Mr. Chiu, I'd like to continue asking with the question that we were ran out of time last time. So as part of Project Texas, you're going to have engineers at Oracle review the algorithms, the machine learning algorithms that TikTok uses to ensure that they're free from foreign influence. But as you and I were discussing, reviewing the algorithms doesn't do anything. The algorithms were simple. That's not where the secret sauce is. The secret sauce is in the data used to train them and the outcomes that you're asking them to predict. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Chiu,我希望能够继续上次由于时间没赶上而未提问的问题。作为德州项目的一部分,您将让Oracle的工程师审查TikTok所使用的机器学习算法,以确保它们不受外部影响。但正如您和我所讨论的那样,审查算法并没有什么用处。这些算法非常简单,这并不是它们成功的秘诀所在。成功的秘诀在于用于训练算法的数据以及您要求它们预测的结果。您同意这一点吗?
I actually believe that with third party monitoring, you can identify a lot of the motivation of the code. And with enough third party expert, you can identify a lot of what the code is designed to do. But how would you verify that you couldn't ask the algorithm for a different outcome than the one that the rest of the source code is asking for? The algorithm will be trained with this, it gets very technical, but it will be trained based on weights, for example. And those are things that we can verify. What weights are you putting on lines? You could give us a written response of that. I'd appreciate it because I'm interested.
But thank you, Madam Chair, you'll back. Lady yields back, General Man, General. Lady yields back, Chair recognizes for five minutes, gentlemen, from Florida, Mr. Soto.
Thank you, Madam Chair. The Genie's really out of the bottle on this now, so to speak, 150 million Americans are now on TikTok. That's almost half of America. They're expressing themselves in art, music, poetry, short film, comedy, among other creative expressions, and many of them are inspiring talented young people.
But we also, on the committee, recognize there's a darker side to it, right? Violence, adult themes, drug and alcohol, sexualization, suicide, all major issues on TikTok, but also Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other social media platforms. So the solution, as I see it, is to regulate TikTok and other social media platforms. And that job, Mr. Chu, as you know, really falls to us.
There are real concerns. By partisan common ground we've already had. We had a federal device band that was voted on by partisan in the omnibus. And I co-introduced a bill with my dear friend, Representative Kamek, about notices of that federal band. Madam Chair, I think the first key is privacy. We have to pass the comprehensive legislation that got out of this community, but alluded us in the last Congress. I'm really hoping we can get that done, and I'm really excited about hearing that from folks.
The other thing is that TikTok needs to be an American company with American values, and it ties to the Chinese Communist Party. This is something that'll be critical as we look and go forward. And then three, we all agree we have to protect our kids. The committee should consider banning the use for children under 13 of not just TikTok, but also social media platforms, or at least empower parents.
In addition, have rules of the road for teens that are 13 to 17, so that families can do which right for their families. So for privacy, that's on us. Internet privacy is on us. As far as being an American company, Mr. Chu, as you know, the committee on foreign investment in the United States at the Department of Treasury reviews foreign investment that affects national security.
Right now, they've negotiated with your company about this Oracle setup that you've talked about, servers in an American company, in American Texas, and then Oracle would monitor the algorithms. But pressure is mounting. So Mr. Chu, would TikTok be prepared to divest from bite dance and Chinese Communist Party ties if the Department of Treasury instructed you all to do so?
A congressman, I said in my opening statement, I think we are need to address the problem of privacy. I agree with you. I don't think ownership is the issue here with a lot of respect. American social companies don't have a good tri-architect with data privacy and user security. I mean, look at Facebook and Cambridge and the litigah.
Just one example. So I do think that, you know, it is not about the ownership, it is a lot about making sure we have project taxes, making sure that we're protecting and firewalling us user data for my wonderful and excess, giving third parties to come in to have a look at this and making sure that everybody is comfortable. We're giving transparency and third party monitoring. And that's what we're doing for project taxes.
Well, I would at least encourage you all to start having the dialogue. Should that be where the president in the Congress ends up going? The third thing is on parents. I had a constituent of mine, brandy of Lake known as say, I'm a parent of two teenagers, 14 and 18 years old, both of whom have been harmed by social media.
TikTok's algorithms supply my 14 year old son with a continuous stream of inappropriate content and has negatively influenced his perception of all females. I noticed the attention span of both of my teens has changed or decreased dramatically. And social media has made my daughter insecure leading to an eating disorder and ultimately depression. What safeguards do you have? And what should we tell brandy of Lake known about how we can help her protect her children?
We have a differentiated experience. I mentioned just now about the experience if you're below 13, very, very restricted. If you're below 13 to 17 congressmen, we actually have a whole series of things. First, the content that you see, we make sure that we remove things that could be mature themes from your feet. We also, by default, do not allow under 16s to use direct messaging. We do not allow under 16s to, we set the accounts to private by default. They can go viral.
If you're below 18, we shot off some features for you. Like, for example, you're not allowed to post live streams. Neither are you allowed to send virtual gifts. So we take this very seriously. And we want to continue to build to ensure that we're giving our under 18 teenagers on our platform. Although today, there are only a minority of our user base today, but we still think it very seriously. Mr. Chiu, I'd encourage you to continue thinking about how to get the word out to parents across the nation on some of these tools as well.
As we hear, craft a privacy law that will help provide well-needed regulation of social media companies across the nation. Thank you. And I yield back.
听说,制定一项隐私法,有助于对全国的社交媒体公司进行必要的监管。谢谢。我结束发言。
Gentlemen yields back. Chair recognizes, gentlemen, from Indiana. Mr. Pence, for five minutes. Thank you, Chairwoman Rogers, and ranking member Plone for holding this hearing. I love both of your opening remarks.
Like my colleagues have discussed today, our increasingly digital world leaves Hoosiers and all Americans in the dark about who has access to their information. For TikTok users, that could be third-party data brokers, advertisers, or the Chinese Communist Party.
TikTok aggressively feeds addictive content to users to glean massive amounts of personal data that's worth a fortune. For Hoosiers watching at home, this isn't just data about your favorite sports team. If there really are 150 million users in the US, this suggests to me that the CCP has a finger on the pulse of almost half our nation's population. I find that hard to believe.
But this week, I decided I would ask my constituents in Southern Indiana to share their stories with me. Went out Monday night, and we got 800 responses in less than 12 hours.
Let me share a couple of those with you. One of my constituents shared, I quote, I'm a mental health counselor. Most of my teenage clients are on TikTok. They spend hours online being negatively influenced by others. I've seen kids experience self-harm, gender dysphoria, and many mental illnesses they have picked up from TikTok. I will not allow my children to have TikTok.
The creators know the algorithms are addicting our children. They know that children are suffering more anxiety and depression from screen time, but they do not care. They will not change their algorithms because it's financially lucrative for them to keep their kids addicted.
Another parent said, we let our child, our daughter, try it out. The feed was continuously suggesting sexually explicit, stupid, and vulgar videos. We discontinued it within a week. And there's been many more, many more. Like I said, 800.
In your testimony, Mr. Chu, you walk through a number of supposed actions taken by your company to create a safe environment and power parents to oversee content shown to their children. But virtually everything we've heard reflects the opposite. And some of your answers are a little confusing.
All of those sitting here and maybe watching on C-SPAN, this is the 30-second hearing we have held about privacy and big tech. Each hearing I've been part of, we've heard the same stories about our constituents' experience and the same promises for big tech to do better.
The truth of the matter is this disgusting and dangerous content littered across your platform is not just a file, fileable, and it's uncontrollable. Americans' data is not safe and big tech is doing nothing to protect it.
Butting aside the dangers of the C-C-P involvement and after these 32 hearings, I believe it's actually time to change the narrative, change the focus, and change the outcome by talking about the money you're making at TikTok. Mr. Chu, I have a question. How much revenue is generated per user?
A Congressman, we. Private company in your company. Does each user receive a comparable benefit for the amount of profit their data brings to your company? We do share some revenue with some creators who produce, say, one-minute plus informant content.
When am I going to get paid for the data that you are selling or you're getting revenue from advertisers? When am I going to get paid for the data you're getting from my children, my grandchildren, my neighbors? I think that's the only way to get your attention is talk about the money you're making and maybe that'll get you all to do what you're supposed to do.
I respect and understand your opinion. The vast majority of our users have a great experience. I sent a video recently as well. I got hundreds of thousands of comments. What am I getting? It's a great experience. What about these 800 bad experiences that people in the Indiana Six District have been getting? We will look into them and a lot of people.
We're going to look into it, but this is my 30. This is a 30-second big tech hearing and you're always going to look at it. Frankly, I think you're all stalling is what you're doing. You're just trying to buy time while you're making the 18 billion perhaps, whatever you're making.
I. The majority of our users have a great experience and I'll platform. It is out duty to keep it safe. I agree with you. That's why I'll commitment is to make sure that's safety. I think it's. I think it's your duty to pay attention to what you're doing and maybe you paying people for the information that you're getting from is a way to get that done.
Thank you for being here, Mr. Chu. I'm really concerned about everything that we are hearing in this conversation today and I appreciate your good intentions but the actions are really falling short.
谢谢您到场,朱先生。我非常关心我们今天在谈话中听到的一切,我非常感谢您的善意,但行动确实不够。
As a pediatrician and the parent of a teenager, I'm particularly concerned about how social media generally and tic-toc specifically is affecting our kids and teens. We just heard a lot about this from testimony from a psychologist.
Last year, the American Academy of Pediatrics sounded the alarm about our children's mental health crisis and as a pediatrician, I know this has been going on for more than a decade. In fact, it tracks perfectly with social media engagement and during the pandemic, teens who are missing out on in-person interactions turn to even more to social media to connect with friends.
Social media is designed to be addicting. That's the business model and your platform is the most addictive of all. And this endless, mindless scrolling takes teens away from human relationships and here's what's important. It keeps teens awake all night, well past their bedtime at a time in their lives when sleep is critical for brain and physical development.
In fact, sleep deprivation alone, ignoring even content, alone can cause depression, anxiety, social withdrawal, in attention, porous coping skills, and academic failure.
So Mr. Chu, I just want to follow up a little bit on what my colleague, Mr. Sarbanes, was discussing. It is your business model to keep eyes on the app, to keep it addictive. I know you likely have experts who have advised you on how to design this, to keep those eyes on your platform for the longest possible time. So I want to know if you have psychologists or other health experts on staff looking at screen time, hours of use, and sleep.
We worked with the Digital Wellness Lab, Congresswoman at the Boston Children's Hospital, and we came out with a 60 minute default limit for any users under 18, but the first we do it in the industry. That isn't an opt out, and I can tell you, they're going to immediately opt out. It is addictive. We also give tools. We also give kids smoke or not to take the next cigarette, it is not going to happen.
And by the way, so first I have a question, then I'll go back to Boston Children's. Mr. Sarbanes asked earlier, what is the percentage of teens who actually adhere to the 60 minute limit? I would need to check on those numbers and get back to your specific numbers. I'd appreciate those numbers. I'm guessing it is an incredibly low percentage who actually heed that.
Now, as far as Boston Children's goes, I know you're referring to them as a source for these ideas about gets, you know, go outside, get some air, take some time out. But I can tell you as a pediatrician, I'm guessing their suggestions were a little stronger than that, and so I'm wondering what is the next step? What are you doing when you find out that almost nobody is really opting out after 60 minutes to take this burden off of the kids and off of the parents and change your algorithms to make them not so hooked?
We give our parents as you pointed out. The family saved the family pairing tool, and in that tool, if you pair it with your teenager's phone, you can actually set the restriction. How many minutes? And we believe it's very important for parents to have these conversations with their teenagers. So the decide was best for their family.
I also, Congressman, a lot of people come to our platform to have a really informative experience. Like I said, there were 116 billion pieces of content on STEM, and we're creating a fee dedicated to that. Book talk has 115 billion.
We've also heard today that well over 20% of the information is misinformation. We heard that about medical remedies that are not really remedies. We've heard it about mental health topics. I mean, this becomes very dangerous, especially when people who are not trained to think very critically are being given information and thinking that it's true. And you've said many times that the destructive information isn't available to kids, but it is. Like we keep seeing examples here. And so I'm just wondering, what are you going to do with the algorithms?
I mean, just because you're removing something that says anorexia, bulimia, or eating disorder, that doesn't do it. If you show girls repeatedly skinny bodies and advice on how to cook meals that are less than 300 calories, that's dangerous. We have worked with, first of all, all anything that glorifies eating disorders, we removed that from our platform is violated. We're working with experts now. It's a challenging problem for our industry.
But we actually identify some of these themes that you're talking about. And trying to build models where the kind of content is not a chain up for the younger users. So it's something we take very seriously too. We're seeing eating disorders in elementary age kids now. And I need you to expedite that process as much as possible. Because parents out there are worried. And I'm worried as a pediatrician, parents can't take themselves off of these platforms. Kids, there's no way they're going to take themselves off. And we need you to do your part. It may affect your bottom line. But it could save this generation. I'll show you a consensus and I commit to doing more. General A.D. yields back.
Chair recognizes General Man from Pennsylvania, Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chair Rogers, and ranking member Pallon for holding this hearing. According to an August 2022 article in the New York Times, TikTok's in-app web browser can track every individual key stroke made by a user. We have heard today about the various ways in which the apps code could be used to monitor or track users. And likewise, we've heard concerns that this data may not be fully isolated from access by the Chinese Communist Party. That said, I'd like to know more about the historical non-public US personal data that your company has already amassed.
Mr. Chu, you have publicly stated that the non-public information of TikTok users in the United States is being transferred to an Oracle-based cloud infrastructure because of safety concerns. Will that be completed by the end of this week, by the end of this month? What's the outline for dealing with that data that you've already amassed? All new data is already stored by default in this Oracle Cloud infrastructure with the same amount. I'm talking about the data that you've already amassed. We are in the process of deleting. What timeline will that data be able to be stored? We will. I believe we'll be able to get it done this year. I'm highly sure. Thank you.
It's not going to occur anytime soon. To be clear, until that data transfer happens, user data remains accessible to the Chinese Communist Party. On March 1st of this year, the committee asked you when you plan to delete non-public historical US user data. Are you aware of this? Congressman, I disagree with this assessment that the Chinese government can get access to the data. It's really for, this is a private company. This is Chinese employees. You responded. You responded in writing to this committee. I have the response that we got back from you on March 7, just six days later. Your attorneys wrote the company, quoting, the company plans to begin the process of deleting non-public historic US user data this month and anticipates that the process will be completed this year. You came up with a supposed plan in the summer of 2022, specifically based on our concerns that the Communist Chinese government was spying on US users. But you only just came up with the idea to delete historic non-public US data just two weeks ago.
Let me read it again. On March 7, your attorneys wrote, and I quote, the company plans to begin the process of deleting non-public historical US data this month and anticipates that the process will be completed this year. Mr. Chu, did you just come up with this plan only because we asked about it on March 1st? No, we started deleting this. Because that's what it looks like to me. We highly, incredibly just at the helm. Wouldn't you agree that awaiting even minutes for this personal privacy protection is absolutely wrong? And it is not in the best interest of your users? Congressman, respectfully, there are many companies that use a global workforce. We are not the only one. We are just taking action after hearing the decision. Given the delay, many other companies have not.
And what we've already established about the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to access personal user data, would you agree that no US government electronic devices should have access to TikTok platform as your lackluster security currently stands? I disagree with that characterization. I guess I think the US individual should be utilizing that on any government platform. I think the government devices shouldn't have no social media apps to be honest. And particularly to talk. Mr. Chu, join this hearing. You have mentioned several times that there is a quote, different experience, your words, for children under the age of 13. That is correct. Different experience. Mr. Chu, do you allow your children under the age of 13 to participate in TikTok? Yes or no? I did just explain this in detail. This experience doesn't exist in Singapore. Are my children live? If my children live here, then yes.
Based on what we've heard today, it's clear to me that TikTok as a company cannot be trusted. And that Americans remain significantly at risk because of the TikTok app. I still contend that TikTok is the spy in Americans' pockets.
I want to acknowledge that TikTok does have the ability to make those changes. But unfortunately, we have not heard that from you today. We have not heard a commitment to be able to protect the personal privacy that Americans expect and that Americans deserve. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield to remainder of my time. Gentlemen, yields back.
Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, many big tech CEOs have sat where you're seated today and tried to run out the clock during a hearing like this one. They were trained not to answer questions and just wait for the new cycle to pass so that they could get on with business as usual.
So same executives want this moment, TikTok's moment under the microscope to distract Congress and the American people from the very real issues that exist on their platforms. You have an opportunity to turn the tables on them. While US-based social media giants have regressed on protections for children and teens, on protecting our data privacy, and on embracing transparency, you can lead and you should lead.
Last month, you announced that TikTok would expand access to its researcher API, but I'm concerned that your new policy could be more bark than bite. That it won't actually lead to the rigorous research that we, as lawmakers, and that parents and everyday TikTok users need.
In fact, your terms of service demand that researchers delete their data at TikTok's unilateral direction. It puts onerous restrictions on how researchers findings can be published. And it only allows access to public data, which researchers already have access to within the app.
In order to actually address the content moderation and algorithmic amplification concerns that my colleagues have raised here today, and that I've heard about directly from parents in my home state of Massachusetts, independent researchers, not just other tech companies like Oracle. Need to be able to evaluate how TikTok's algorithm is making decisions to promote content.
Mr. Chu, will you commit to expanding your API to include data that would let researchers investigate how your algorithm is pushing content to users, whether it's showing up on your for-you page, the hashtag page, or somewhere else?
We are one of the commitments I gave in the opening statement is a commitment to transparency and third-party monitoring. So, Congresswoman, I will look into the details of that and get back to you. And as well as the algorithm, including data on what types of users were targeted by the algorithm, so that researchers can fully understand what content is being prioritized and who it's being pushed to. Again, we have a commitment to transparency. These are very important questions, and I will get back to you on the specifics.
Under the same proposal, you require that researchers give TikTok, quote, worldwide, free, non-exclusive, and perpetual end quote rights to their papers. This threatens to clash directly with well-established practices of exclusive publication rights in research journals. Mr. Chu, why does TikTok need those rights?
We need to get back to you on that specifics. If that's okay. Yes, I don't see how we can expect researchers to do their work under these terms and then toot transparency.
I'm gonna shift gears with the time that I have remaining, Mr. Chu, I'd like to talk about TikTok's efforts to protect children and young users. In 2021, the UK's age-appropriate design code went into effect mandating 15 standards that companies like you need to follow to protect children on your platform.
You still operate in the United Kingdom, which means you should be in compliance with this code. So my question is simple. Will you commit to extending the protections currently afforded children in the UK to the millions of kids and teens who use your app here in the United States?
We take the safety of the younger users on our platform very seriously. It's a good way to prove it. Every country is a little bit different in context. And so let me look at the specifics and bring some of the best practices across the world. But.
Well, those best practices are in. You're being executed around the world. We just want the same for our kids here in the United States. I mean, Mr. Chu, when we spoke a couple of weeks ago, you indicated interest in taking steps to earn trust or trust. And to me, it hasn't happened today so far. But rather, you've ducked behind industry standards and comparable to your competitors, which we know are woefully insufficient.
I strongly urge you to consider these terms, these commitments, make the case for why you're different from your American competitors and do better than them on transparency, which you've mentioned countless times today, but which we don't really have anything tangible to point to. Yes, I don't want to make excuses for our industry or ourselves. I think there's a lot of work that needs to be done. We take this very seriously. Nothing is perfect. We need to keep investing to stay ahead of our growth. So I agree that we need to prioritize safety and continue to do that as part of our company. Well, I look forward to getting back your comments and your commitments and those updated terms of service. When you write back to the committee, thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. General Eddie yields back.
Chair recognizes gentlemen from North Dakota, Mr. Armstrong, five minutes.
主席宣布来自北达科他州的Armstrong先生有5分钟发言时间。
Thank you, Madam Chair. You know, we've heard a lot today about the procedural safeguards, independent code reverio, server locations and the corporate independence between bite dance and the CCP. But I think there's something else a little more telling.
You know, when you were asked about Chinese censorship, you pivoted immediately to drug use in Singapore. You have absolutely tied yourself in knots to avoid criticizing the CCP's treatment of the weaker population. And I think it begs the first question. Before we ever get to project Texas, which I'll get to in a section, if the CCP demanded that bite dance handover all of the data that they had on us users in their possession and bite dance refused, I wonder what would happen. I wonder if Jack Mom might have an opinion on that. And I wonder if he'd be allowed to give it.
But let's talk about project Texas for a second. Project Texas envisions a new US-based TikTok subsidiary. You have stated that this arrangement is unprecedented. I'd argue the reason it's unprecedented is because it requires continual oversight and monitoring by the US of a private business because it poses a national security threat.
The new subsidiaries board would report to and be approved by CIFIAS. CIFIAS will also specify hiring requirements as well as interact with Oracle as it performs its data role. That is an extraordinary corporate governance structure. I have questions whether it complies with corporate law and fiduciary duty to shareholders. Yet the core concern is that the proposes unparalleled integration with the US government with a private company which will require significant government resources.
All of that to allow a continued operation of a social media platform that has serious national security implications. And CIFIAS's workloads already dramatically increased in recent years with a 30% increase in declarations and a 45% increase in joint voluntary notices. And there's bipartisan consensus that CIFIAS needs to be expanded as we speak. The only, Mr. Chu, can you identify any a similar corporate arrangement that requires federal government to expand such resources to monitor and alleged data privacy and national security risk?
Congressman, I'm not an expert on this matter. I believe that there are certain similar arrangements, but I'm not an expert on this matter. Well, the only one I could find was the UK created the Huawei Cybersecurity Evaluation Center in 2010 to assess Huawei's tech and to detect malicious activity and guard UK's networks. That's worked so well that the United Kingdom is now planning on kicking Huawei out of Great Britain.
You stated that TikTok has invested $1.5 billion in project taxes. Are you aware of any discussions or proposals that entail TikTok, that entail TikTok funding or offsetting the cost of CIFIAS role? Those discussions are, I need to get back on you, don't do specifics, but I can tell you, yes, we did spend approximately $1.5 billion US dollars on our site.
You spent $1.5 billion on project taxes. But do you have any, I mean, you agree that if CIFIAS takes on this role, they're going to need a massive influx of dollars in human resources, right? I cannot speak on behalf of CIFIAS, Congressman. Should the US government expend such resources to create this extraordinary arrangement for TikTok, especially considering alleged data privacy and national security risk? Congressman, I cannot speak on behalf of the United States.
Well, the project Texas doesn't work without CIFIAS, right? Project Texas, project Texas, as you guys have proposed it, does not work without CIFIAS involved. The idea behind Project Texas is the firewall of US user data. Make sure it's stored by an American company overseen by American personnel. And we will invite third party monitors to monitor this. So that, in essence, at least as far as I know, is the majority of the cost, because it will rely on not just us building the infrastructure, but us finding and hiring these third party monitors were vetted to come in and monitor this structure.
You talked earlier about the shareholders ownership of TikTok. And you said 60% global investors, 20% is employees, and 20% is original founders. Are all those voting shares the same? No, the founder has a weight of voting by his says is common in our industry. So as far as a voting block of share of zoned and by danced, if the Chinese Communist Party, not Chinese Communist Party officials, the Chinese Communist Party, do you know what their percentage of the actual voting block share of by dances? So this Communist Party doesn't have voting rights in the by dance Chinese Communist Party members is a different question. I do the founders control the voting block of by dances shares. I do know that the founder himself is not a member of the Communist Party, but we don't know the political affiliation of our employees, because that's not something we ask. Does the Chinese government know the political affiliation of their Chinese citizens? I cannot answer that question on Debbie Hath. I yield back.
Gentlemen yields back. You'll to the lady from General Lady from New Hampshire, Ms. Kustler. Five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Tru, I just want to say I agree with all the comments of many of my colleagues today that we need to take close look at whether TikTok poses a national security risk. But for today, I'm going to focus my limited time on how TikTok can better protect its youngest users. And I think a number of us have identified as parents today and have serious concerns as we relate to you. Just this week, I heard from a parent in my district in Nashua, New Hampshire, whose child was served harmful content on TikTok and has needed counseling as a result. This experience is not unique to this family. And it underscores the need for better child protections on your app.
I'd like to dig further into TikTok's current safety and privacy controls for children. I understand that TikTok restricts certain app capabilities for users under age 18 and has additional restrictions for users under age 16 or 13, such as limiting who can interact with them on the platform. However, these protections are worthless if any savvy child can easily bypass these age restrictions by deleting their own account and creating a new one with a different age. And by easily, I mean, you can literally go in and open another account using the same email address. So I've been made aware by child safety groups, including fair play for kids and common sense, that it is that simple for young users to bypass the age restrictions on TikTok. Yes or no, are you aware of this issue? I apologize. I think that's a great issue question that you raised. If a user inputs an agent as blocked, my understanding is that if the user tries to do it again within a short period of time, and I won't discuss part of it. We did it in our office yesterday. You can go right back in, use the exact same email address and open a new account. So can I get your commitment that you will at least fix that bug? I will go ahead and have a look at it. Yes. Thank you.
We're here today to talk TikTok and not other platforms, but I'm happy to look at legislative solutions. In the interim, TikTok has a responsibility to do more to protect its young users. And I will accept your commitment to take a look at fixing that issue. Will you, let's see. Sorry, I recognize that TikTok has made efforts to provide parents and guardian increase options to monitor and limit their child's activity on the app, including family pairing and time limit features. But I still have concerns. In order to access family pairing, parents then must download the app onto their phone. And this sounds like a design to lure more users onto the app rather than a practical safety feature.
Furthermore, downloading the app may not be a viable option for many patients. Parents, Mr. Chu will TikTok commit to developing other methods for parents to monitor their child's use of the app without having to download the TikTok app on their phone. I can look into that specifically and get back to you. But the family pairing that you mentioned is a very good tool that we develop. I encourage parents with teenagers to use it. But it's not a perfect tool. And let me just say, one of my concerns is that the minimum time limit TikTok lets parents set for their children is 40 minutes, which for a young child is a very long period of time. Actually, giving parents control would mean providing them the freedom to set the screen time that makes sense for their family.
Now, I've got a copy of the app page that shows just the four options. Would you commit to adding another option so that the parent can easily set their own screen time limit? I can take a look at that. I think it's important. I think parents are looking for control. They're looking to allow their family to use these apps without TikTok taking over their child's media use.
I've heard reports of users struggling to access the feature. And so I will look forward to hearing back from you on adding another so that a parent can add a custom limit.
So finally, I ask that you commit to report back to this committee in the American public on how TikTok addresses these safety issues and the steps that you are taking to default children's accounts to the most protective possible settings. And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back. General Edy yields back. Or yield to Chair Edyls to the gentleman from Ohio five minutes, Mr. Balderson.
Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chen, for being here today. I would like to start by inserting into the record a report entitled TikTok Bite Dance and their ties to the Chinese Communist Party, which was published by the Australian Parliament just over a week ago if I could add that to the record list. Now,
objections, so ordered.
Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, we know that your company Zagoretham has been exposed for delivering videos to China that encourages them to develop eating disorders, promotes challenges that have caused children to accidentally commit suicide, glorifies the use of drugs and pornography. Despite the constant media coverage of this issue, your company continues to feed our children with this dangerous and harmful content.
Can you explain to parents back at my congressional district why it should be their burden and not TikToks to set up that guardian perennial controls for the children so that they do not view content, which encourages eating disorders or committing suicide? Congressman, I take this issue very seriously. If the user is a teen issue on our platform, we actually have a differentiated experience, including certain models that we are building with experts to help identify certain content that's not inherently harmful, but could lead people to eating disorders. Anything that glorifies eating disorders is violated for our platform and we remove that. And I want to show you that I take this very, very seriously, this commitment.
OK. Mr. Curtis, my colleague mentioned the use of heating tool on your platform to make specific videos go viral or get more views. Just TikTok use a calling tool where employees can manually limit the amplification of content that TikTok should hide by content that promotes eating disorders, drug use, or suicide among children.
The only promotion tool that we have is approved by the local teams, so in the US, by the US team. And it's for commercial purposes like Taylor Swift. I think when she onboarded, we heated it up. So that is yes or no?
I just want to make sure that I'm answering your question with specifics. If this to exist, why isn't it being used to cool then, the spread of dangerous content? I mean, why is it still happening? The dangerous content has their violates. We remove them. When we see them, we actually remove them from the platform. OK.
The fact of the matter here is that, despite whatever action you take, that TikTok is taking to protect teams, your algorithm continues to promote harmful content. When you agree that indicates there is something inherently wrong with the algorithm your platform employees. I do respectfully disagree with that.
The algorithm drives a great user experience for many, many users. I talked about STEM content. That has 116 billion views on our platform. I want one more example. Booktalk. It's a trend that happened on our platform. It's to encourage people to read. And globally, there has 115 billion views. And it's fantastic. I felt people telling me that they are reading more because of Booktalk. So there is a lot of good and joy and positive that can be derived from the TikTok experience. Yes, there's some bad actors who come in and post-vilative content in their job to remove them. But the overwhelming experience is a very positive one for our community.
But if the chair dropped her, removed them. It's been said many times here today, about the 41 days that that video stood up with addressing Mrs. Chairwoman. After this, I'm going to go and look into the specifics of that. All right. Thank you. Madam Chair, you're back. Gentlemen, yields back.
Chair recognizes the leave from Texas. Ms. Fletcher, for five minutes. Thank you, Chairwoman McMorris Rogers. And thanks to Ranking Member Ploen for holding today's hearing. And thank you, Mr. Chu, for appearing today.
It's been a long day. But we're here to learn about a complex set of issues that relate to TikTok and how to address them. And I think that's what we're hearing from colleagues on both sides of the aisle today is a real effort to grapple with the challenges that we see for national security and for the safety and protection of American citizens, especially our children and young adults. And we've already covered today a lot of the information about the extensive use of the app, the number of users who are children and young adults.
But I think it bears repeating, as Mr. VC mentioned, that TikTok is the preferred platform of young Americans. And they use it for all kinds of creative and important things. And we have seen that. But there are also some dangerous things that we know it has and continues to be used for. And that also, that the data that's collected is posing additional dangers. And that's what we're here for.
Most people using TikTok do not realize that TikTok is collecting data about their key strokes or about their browsing history on other sites and so much more. And I agree with my colleagues that we need a comprehensive set of data privacy laws here in the country. And we've heard some very good ideas today.
Mr. Chu, you've mentioned several times today that these are industry-wide issues. And I agree with you that there are industry-wide challenges here. But there are also some specific things relating to TikTok that I want to focus my questions on and really want to understand where there's a difference and how we can craft legislation that addresses the very real challenges that we've been hearing about today.
As you know, states across the country have joined an ongoing investigation into possible violations of consumer protection laws by TikTok as they pertain to TikTok's effect on the mental health of American children and teenagers.
As part of this investigation, states have requested to review internal TikTok communications that takes place on LARC. That's TikTok's primary instant messaging system. Is that right? Yes. OK. And does every TikTok employee have a LARC account? It is very similar to companies that you slack or any other instant messaging tool. But LARC is a proprietary instant messaging tool. It's not slack. Is something that was developed? Yes, by dance. It was developed by TikTok? No, it's developed by dance. It was developed by dance. OK.
And so a couple of questions, stemming from that. Is it true that LARC video conferencing has a translation feature in which Chinese is translated to English text and vice versa? That is correct. It helps with global inter-cooperation. OK. And those translated conversations are somehow saved into the LARC system. I would need to get back to you on the specifics. There is, I will get back to you on the specifics. OK. That would be great to know.
And then do you have a, there's some kind of profile for your instant messaging system. So every employee identifies their manager and their department, who they work for, what they do. Is that all included in their LARC profile? Do you know? It's very common for companies to have enterprise messaging tools that companies use. It does. And I guess I'm asking specifically about LARC since it's specific to TikTok, whether it includes information like identifying who, for example, your manager is. Do you know whether that's something that's identified in LARC? Yes.
And again, some of these HR features are built into a lot of enterprise tools that we use. And yeah. So like for your own profile, does it identify who your manager is? Yes, it does. And who does it identify as your manager? I report to the CEO of ByteDance. OK. And so that is Sean Neaming. Is that identified as your manager? That's the former CEO. He has stepped down from the board and as the CEO. Yes. OK. So Mr. Rubo is identified now as your manager on ByteDance. Yes, the system.
OK. And as you mentioned, it was developed by ByteDance. So it's not just used by TikTok employees. It's also used by ByteDance employees. Is that right? Also by other companies now. I think LARC is selling it. Then it's a good tool for instant messaging. So LARC is available to third parties outside of the ByteDance system as well. Yes. And do you personally ever use LARC to communicate with ByteDance? With employees at ByteDance? Yes, I do.
OK. Well, I'm running out of time. And I'm sorry to say because this is really interesting. I do think it underscores some of the concerns that have been raised in this hearing. So I think it's clear we have work we need to continue to do here in the Congress to address data protection and privacy. And with that, Madam Chairwoman, I thank you. And I will yield back.
When you're the CFO of ByteDance to the Chinese government structure on how content to be moderated was to be moderated on Doi Yen or TikTok.
当你是字节跳动的CFO,你需要遵守中国政府关于如何审核Doi Yen或TikTok上的内容的结构。
I was not in charge of that. That's what you were saying.
我不负责那个事情。你就是这样说的。
OK. We have a discrepancy that reports have shown that TikTok accounts managed by media links to be a propaganda arm of the CCP push divisive content before the recent midterm election.
Mr. Xu, yes or no? Do your knowledge has the CCP coordinated or utilized TikTok influence users to algorithms, state-paid content creation, or in any other capacity?
OK. And the process is done by our content moderation team, headquartered in Ireland and Dublin, sorry, Ireland and the US. And we will only remove content if it violates our guidelines. And that's something that we audit. Or if there's a valid legal order.
So OK. Several reports hearings and leaked internal documents have been carried out. Has repeatedly censored or de-amplified content that is critical Chinese Communist Party policies in the US and abroad.
I don't think that's accurate, Congressman. Or are you not? Are you aware of those reports? There could be some reports to see that, but that action itself is not. But here, testimony here today is that you can keep up with stuff and make it as clean as possible to quote unquote.
Are you aware of those reports? I want to make it very clear that we, there is content on TikTok that's great and fun. There is content that's critical of China and that's what you're saying.
And let's be honest, TikTok is indoctrinating our children with divisive, woken, pro-CCB propaganda, all while threatening our national security with Chinese spyware.
In fact, in fact, let me look at my notes here. You have an exchange with Anna S.U. And your exchange would come with an F.U.
事实上,让我看看我的笔记。你和Anna S.U.有过一次交流,而你的交流将会带来一些不满意。
You said that, quote, extreme fitness videos shouldn't be viewed too much.
你说过,极限健身视频不应该看太多。这样的视频可能会给身体带来潜在的损害。
Do you remember that exchange here today? What extreme is reduced? What Anna S.U. out of California?
你还记得今天在这里的交流吗?有哪些极端被缩减了?安娜来自加州吗?
Any content that has extreme is content, it's not a loud no platform, it would be, we identified them.
任何具有极端性质的内容都不会被无声的屏蔽,我们会对其进行辨别和识别。
Was that also true about the gun video that you saw today?
今天你看到的枪支视频也是真的吗?这句话的意思是询问对方今天看到的枪支视频是否真实。
Was that extreme content that you should have been taken down?
那个内容是否过于极端,应该被删除了吗?
I would need to look at the specifics of the whole video. There was a bit of lag just now. We couldn't see the whole video.
我需要查看整个视频的具体内容。刚才有些延迟,我们没有看完整个视频。
OK, you know what threatened our committee chair here? That is unacceptable. OK.
你知道谁威胁了我们的委员会主席吗?这是不可接受的。好的。
So you're aware of that extreme video. And why did it take 40 plus days to get it down? Does it take literally an act of Congress? Should we plan to have a committee hearing every time, every day, every time there's something brought up so that we can limit the content on TikTok?
Or yeah, Chair recognizes Mr. Ruiz from California for five minutes.
是的,主席认可加州的Ruiz先生发言五分钟。意思是,主席允许Ruiz先生在会议中发言五分钟。
Thank you, Chair Rogers.
谢谢您,罗杰斯主席。表达感谢之意。
I echo my colleagues' concerns about TikTok's impacts on the health and well-being of the American public as a doctor.
作为一名医生,我也同意我的同事们对TikTok对美国公众健康和福祉的影响所持有的担忧。
As the ranking member of the Selects Subcommittee on the Coronavirus pandemic, I am troubled that TikTok is rife with medically inaccurate information, including dangerous misinformation and the intentional disinformation about COVID-19 and vaccines. TikTok's community guidelines state that the company will remove content or accounts that involve, quote, misleading information that causes significant harm, unquote.
However, since the early stages of the pandemic, TikTok has been used as a platform for people pushing misinformation, disinformation, including by those casting doubt on the safety and efficacy of life-saving vaccines. And despite TikTok's pledge to address harmful misinformation, these videos are being viewed millions of times.
For example, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue found that a sample of 124 TikTok videos containing vaccine misinformation were viewed 20 million times. And media matters found that a sample of 18 videos with COVID-19 misinformation were viewed over 57 million times. Here's another shocking study.
The Journal of American Medical Informatics Association found that when searching hashtag, quote, coronavirus on TikTok, almost 30% of the videos that came up contained misinformation. Videos in that sample containing a high level of misinformation were viewed a median of 9.4 million times.
Mr. Schoo, why are these dangers videos falling through the cracks of your company's efforts to enforce its own community guidelines and remove harmful misinformation? Before I answer that, in my response to an open question. Mr. Schoo, you're in my time. Answer my question. I understand. If I would like to clarify. I'm clarified. I have five minutes in my time. You're in my time now. Answer my question.
Yes. Any dangerous misinformation is part we partner with third party experts to be able to identify and help us with subject domain expertise. And with the expertise that we recognize, we rely on those to develop policies, to recognize and remove contact.
Your efforts are have failed and they're dangerous. It's public health risks that you're putting millions of people's lives at risk for not being able to do a better job. And I'm concerned that TikTok's features make it users uniquely vulnerable to the spread of this misinformation.
For example, TikTok makes it extremely easy to reuse audio and videos to create content, which allows misinformation to quickly spread through the platform. And TikTok's algorithm to recommend videos means that a user viewing one video containing misinformation can easily result in their quote unquote for you page, becoming filled with videos containing similar misinformation. This is a dangerous feedback loop.
So is TikTok taking any action to modify these features so that they no longer facilitate the spread of this misinformation or this misinformation feedback loop?
Congressman, again, like I said, any dangerous misinformation, we work with third parties to recognize that and it's proactively removed from our platform.
议员,就像我之前说过的那样,任何危险的误导信息,我们与第三方合作识别并积极将其从我们的平台上删除。
OK, so it doesn't need to get into those loops. So I can go back and read you the data and the Journal of American Medical Informatics, 30% of videos after searching for hashtag coronavirus had misinformation, almost one out of three, your third party, and your company are missing almost one out of three misinformation videos. So you're telling me what you're doing. I'm telling you the data shows that you are grossly failing at that effort.
The other question I have for you is a TikTok's also in Spanish. And Spanish-speaking populations have been specifically targeted to misinformation when it comes to many aspects, especially medical misinformation. And as chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, we reached out to you last Congress on this issue.
So what is your intent or how does your team look like to address Spanish versus English? How many staff do you have focusing on Spanish versus how many staff do you have focusing on English misinformation?
Congressman, I was like I'd explained just now. The Spanish-speaking population is very important to our platform. We do have a lot of Spanish-speaking moderators and we will continue to know how many Spanish-speaking staff versus English-speaking staff for misinformation do you have?
I can get back to you on the specifics, but dangerous misinformation is moderated regardless of language. Not to the degree that it needs to be. We can continue to work hard. When there's misinformation, people base their decisions that oftentimes put them at risk in exposures and their families at risk. And with the coronavirus, especially prior to the vaccines, the risk was their life.
Thank you, real bad. Madam Chair, I would like to clarify something. In the follow-up question to Representative Dan's question just now, I'm misunderstood. The follow-up about bite-dance spying on behalf of the Chinese government, my answer to that question should be a no, because it came very rapidly. I just want to clarify that. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chairman recognizes the gentleman from Idaho, Mr. Fulture, for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Chu, we've been going a long time here right now, and a lot of questions have been answered, and a lot of them have not been answered. And primary thing I want to do is just share some thoughts of what I've seen learned today, been exposed to.
First of all, I've got to compliment you on having a product that's impressive. It is a very influential tool. It is addictive, and that's what you want users to be exposed to, is something addictive, and it is a data gathering masterpiece. So clearly, it's got the potential to sell products, connected like-minded people with that artificial intelligence capability in a viral, viral fashion, and perhaps spread information quicker, better than anything else has been developed out there.
Now, I'm just going to tell you, I'm not a subscriber, at least a willing subscriber. But probably in that database somewhere is my preferences with colorers or foods or who I've spoken to or what I've said, they're my favorite newspapers. I don't know. But that's available to be sold or given to whomever or whatever. And the whatever is what bothers me.
I'll use myself as an example again. If, for whatever reason, I became a target in this, I began to somebody you didn't like, and I know that'd be hard to believe, because you got to like me. But let's say you didn't, or a company didn't, or for whatever reason, I became an app target. That artificial intelligence algorithm could be shared or spread selectively to a targeted audience with negative information that maybe they has been paired up with that knowledge and that app to make me look really, really bad. Or to the converse. Same thing could be done to make me look really, really good. Here's a problem. It's someone else or some artificial intelligence algorithm that has inordinate power to subjectively combine strategic data with strategic audiences to shape whatever thoughts and news they want. And I've equipped it not even knowing it. Now, process could apply to anyone or anything. There's the danger. It could be the president of the United States. It could be their kids. It could be a company. It could be a political party. It could be a news outlet. Anything could be targeted for that selective viral spread of just some information.
Mr. Choo, this may be genius, but that doesn't make it fair. It doesn't make it good, and it doesn't make it accountable. I wouldn't want my government to have that ability. I wouldn't want a company or a political party or my friend August here or my mother to have that capability. I certainly don't want that to be accessible to anyone in China.
Now, there's no question it's got immense value. And as proof of that, you're here, because this hasn't been a fun day. I know that. Hasn't been a fun day for us either. Artificial intelligence is difficult to manage once it's on auto cruise control. And it's, as we've talked about, nearly impossible to wall-off data. I know the idea. No little bit about databases. I know a little bit about corruption of those databases. It's very difficult to wall things off. And unfortunately, there's this thing in called human nature where there's some dark components from time to time. There's always a temptation to monetize things or perhaps use some of these tools for in a various purposes, and they can have absolutely devastating consequences.
So, Mr. Shue, I'm going to wrap up my comments and just say that this is so attractive. Tick-tock poses as a Mr. Rogers' neighborhood, but it acts like big brother. And that's got to stop.
Madam Chair, are you all right? Well, the gentleman yield. Gentlemen yields back. Gentlemen yield. Oh, gentlemen yields. You yield to Mr. Morgan Griffith? I thank the gentleman for yielding, Mr. Shue. Earlier, we had submitted into evidence the Tick-Tite bite dance and their ties to the Chinese Communist Party report that was filed as an exhibit last week with the Senate in Australia. If you have any comment, I'd like to get it on this paragraph out of their summary. Our research confirms beyond any plausible doubt that Tick-tock is owned by bite dance, bite dances, a PRC company, and bite dances subject to all the influence guidance, and de facto control, to which the Chinese Communist Party now subjects all PRC technology companies. We show in this report how the CCP and the PRC state agencies together the party state have extended their ties into bite dance to the point that the company can no longer be accurately described as a private enterprise. You keep calling it a private enterprise, but all the countries in the world are saying it's not a private enterprise, it's part of the Chinese Communist Party. What say you, sir, yes or no? Is it part of the Chinese Communist Party? Is everybody thinks? Or are you still living in some mystical world? I disagree with many conclusive things. Are you living in the mystical world? I yield back. Gentlemen, yields back.
Chair recognizes is the general lady from Minnesota, Ms. Craig, for five minutes. Well, thank you so much, Madam Chair, for yielding. Mr. Chu, I'm probably like a lot of parents who are also members of Congress out here. I know a number of us, when you testified earlier today, you mentioned that the over 35 segment was a growing group of potential users. As if over 35 is old, and I realize that my own children think that I'm ancient are four boys. But like a lot of us up here, we understand that there is some potential good, and of course, many of your influencers are doing what they're doing for all the right reasons. But one thing in your testimony you said a lot was safety. But as a mother and as a member of Congress, and as someone who is very concerned about drug use in our country, I was surprised that that didn't come up once in your testimony. No real reference to it here today.
You know, I've raised my concerns in general about social media platforms serving as an illegal marketplace for drugs in prior big tech hearings. And I plan to continue that focus during today's hearing. Mr. Chu, March 8, 2023 article in the Washington Post detailed the fact that TikTok has made little progress in combating the sale of illegal drugs on your platform. In fact, Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser said that getting drugs on platform like yours was nearly as convenient as using a phone to order a pizza or call an Uber. That same article mentions that law enforcement agencies have been frustrated by TikTok's lack of competition in the form of data sharing. In my view, TikTok has taken little action in response to this crisis.
According to a May 2022 blog post from TikTok, you donated $125,000 or 0.001% of your 22 revenue to an antidrug effort on your platform in the form of ad credits. You also redirected hashtag drugs, hashtag fentanyl, and other obvious hashtags away from posts selling drugs to a community resources page as if a teenager looking for drugs is going to look for them at hashtag drugs. Drug dealers have easily worked their way around this, using emojis and slang to communicate that they have drugs for sale. To this day, it is possible for anyone to log into your platform and acquire drugs and the consequences of that can be fatal.
What are you doing to move past these token efforts to prevent teenagers from accessing drugs on your platform? Look, as parents up here today, we may not understand everything about your platform. I'm not a tech guru. Many of us up here may not use exactly the right language, but we know when our kids are at risk, and our kids are at risk on your platform. So what are you going to do to move past these previous token efforts? We do take illegal drugs, content on our platform, very seriously. It violates our guidelines to proactively identify and move them. And as you pointed out, if anybody searches for any drugs on our platform, we do point them to resources to help them with that. At the same time, we have also taken product changes. For example, we don't allow our under-16 users to use direct messaging. And the reason is because we wanted to, there was a trade-off here, and we believe that it will protect these younger users better from getting contacts from people trying to push illegal activity. So we will continue to work on it. Again, no company can be perfect at this.
Mr. Chu, I, with all due respect, the no company can be turf perfect line. It has been used way too much today. I'm going to reclaim my time. Clearly in the three plus hours you've been before us today, what you're saying about project Texas just doesn't pass the smell test. My constituents are concerned that TikTok and the Chinese Communist Party are controlling their data and seeing our own vulnerabilities. If you are an American company, we could look at your 10K, and see who your shareholders are. The answer you provided earlier today, you'd rather not tell us what your compensation is or how it's derived. Well, no American CEO would like to tell us that, but they have to because they're an American company. So what you're doing down in Texas, it's all well and good, but it is not enough for us to be convinced that our privacy is not at risk. So how can you say that you're protecting American users' privacy with the CCP being so heavily involved with bite dance? It's not possible. China won't even carry your product. How is it that you can convince us that our privacy is not at risk? And more than that, our kids' privacy is not at risk in this country. In my opening statement. Thank you, Madam Chairman. General, General, ladies and gentlemen, we're going to have to continue on.
Gentlemen from Georgia, Mr. Allen's, recognize for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr. Chief, for being here today. September 2021, the Wall Street Journal published an article titled, How Tiktok Serves Up Sex and Drug Videos to Miners. The article gives a chilling depiction of the types of content that TikTok's algorithm is curating for our children. This article claims that your application served an account that was registered as a 13-year-old quote, videos about drug use. It referenced to cocaine, methodics, and promotional videos for online sales of drugs. The algorithm was also found to have delivered countless videos, depicting quote, pornography, and other adult content. To the device of an account that was registered as a 13-year-old, could you please explain to the members of this committee and parents across the country why your company deems it acceptable for such inappropriate content to be prominently featured on a child's for you page?
A lot of the content that you mentioned, and the government, are violated of our own policies, and we are redoning that acceptable, and we will remove them when we identify them. We take this very seriously. I mentioned this. This is an industry-wide challenge, we're investing as much as we can. We don't think it represents the majority of the users' experience on TikTok, but it does happen. Some bad actors try and come in and post some of this content, and we're doing our best to invest as much as we can to remove them. I would say you're not done enough. There were 14 grandchildren, Mr. Chew. You personally believe that such content is appropriate for minor children to consume. A lot of the content that you mentioned, like porn, for example, is not allowed in our platform. So, no, I do not think that acceptable for young people to consume.
Early this week Wall Street Journal published an article titled QUOTE TITLE TALKS, Chinese partner has another wildly popular app the US. This app is called CapCut is a video editing tool to help users go viral on TikTok. While for obvious reasons, most of our attention is focused on TikTok and bite dance. Other companies and their applications are also continuing to exploit the privacy of Americans. TikTok, CapCut, Clark, FaceU, all of these apps are also controlled by bite dance, control by bite dance and pros serious privacy concerns. In 2022, it's a part of the top buzz in the international version of bite dance censored Chinese news app was used to spread pro-China messages to Americans.
When it comes to the data privacy of Americans, we must have a clear set of guidelines to ensure Americans data is protected and not passed along to unknown third party actors who could pose a threat to our security. I urge my colleagues to continue to work together to pass a national data privacy bill, not just one of the house energy and commerce committee, but also through the House of this Congress. It is the only systematic way we can address privacy concerns. Unfortunately, I've been given no reason to believe that TikTok does not pose a threat and cannot be trusted to follow our laws when they conflict with the desires of the Chinese Communist Party.
Paragraph 1:
Your firewall that you're talking about, if you had a bad actor in your what you call your Texas initiative, could get through that firewall and send any information that they wanted to send anywhere direct to the Chinese Communist Party. Would you deny that?
Paragraph 2:
Congressman, this risk that you talk about exists for every company, bad actors. I'm talking about TikTok, sir. In fact, the risk is lower for us because this is a risk, correct? The personnel will be vetted. So the risk is actually lower than most companies in the industry.
Paragraph 3:
Well, that is why we have to deal with your company. And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back. General McNeild's back.
这就是为什么我们必须和你们公司打交道了。现在,主席女士,请允许我结束发言。McNeild将军让步。
Paragraph 4:
Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Peters, for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, thanks for being here today. You are testimony discussed in effort. Your company is named Project Texas. And the investments your company has made in creating a firewall between the United States user data and entities in China susceptible to influence by China's government. And with your company's recent announcement by CIFIUS, that CIFIUS has instructed TikTok to separate itself from bite dance or face a ban, TikTok's commitment to retaining this firewall is at a crossroads.
Paragraph 5:
So I want to ask you some questions about your company's long-term plans to ensure the safety and security of American data. And this for me is the crux of the concern for me about TikTok.
Paragraph 6:
First of all, does the Chinese government need to approve Project Texas for TikTok to agree to it? Congressman, we have designed Project Texas to move forward in the United States. This is something that we have described at length in the written testimony and in my opening statement, the firewall of American data on stored American soil by an American company overseen by American personnel. This is designed to move forward in the United States. Does the Chinese government need to approve Project Texas for you to agree to it? We do not believe so.
Paragraph 7:
How is TikTok considering the future of Project Texas in the event of a sale or other ownership changes? Are there elements of the Project Texas that TikTok would change prior to? I cannot speak on this hypothetical or on potential owners who I cannot represent. OK, you don't know. I don't know. Yes.
Paragraph 8:
Despite Project Texas' plan positive changes, it does include several broad exceptions that would allow large amounts of US user data to routinely lead the country. I don't want to know a little bit more about these exceptions so I can understand whether Project Texas can live up to its promise protecting Americans user data.
Paragraph 9:
I understand that under Project Texas business data and public data will be permitted to regularly leave the United States. Is that correct? Almost all the data is under the definition of protected data. This accepted data that you mentioned, I can get back to your team on this, is really for interoperability purposes. To make sure that the business can still operate and the American users are still getting the benefit. Can you tell us a global plan? What data, where the data goes and how it's used by the company? It will travel outside of the United States, but I can get back to you on this specifics. It's data that it cannot be used to identify users. So it really is data that ensures the interoperability of the platform.
Paragraph 10:
I understand that I think we would want to have some understanding of how we would distinguish that by definition and then also how it would be enforced. I can get back to you on those specifics. How is the US data used to promote certain content back in the United States market, for instance? I'm sorry. US data feed the. Can you discuss where the data goes and how it's used by the company?
Paragraph 11:
How and at what points of data transfer does the US data feed the PRC developed algorithm used by TikTok? How would the data that you're talking about? TikTok does not. it's not available in mainland China. The PRC developed algorithm used by TikTok. How does US data get fed by that? The US. The algorithm that leads to the US app is in the Oracle Cloud infrastructure and is trained by US and global data. Again, TikTok does not. it's not available in mainland China.
Paragraph 12:
How can we trust that these exceptions for project Texas won't be used by China's government or by foreign adversaries? We can. This is the fourth commitment, transparency, third party monitors, including the definitions of these exceptions and. You know, we can be very transparent on how they're used.
Paragraph 1:
Okay, I guess my question will be that you want to get back to me in writing. That's fine, but how we would distinguish between the data or interoperability that you suggest needs to be shared with what data would it be shared? It's.
Paragraph 2:
Again, you know, it's. First of all, public data is not part of the protected data definition because public data is what users want to share globally. So if we post a video and you want someone in France to see it, just by definition it has to leave the United States. Otherwise, the world cannot see it.
Paragraph 3:
Now, there's certain aggregated and anonymized data sets that is useful for interoperability for advertising, for example. And that is part of what we are talking about. Right. I can get back to you on the specifics, but. I think we'd also want to know how it's anonymized and how. What oversight and enforcement we can count on. Okay, I can get back to you on specifics. Thank you. I yield back.
Paragraph 5:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chiu, I got to hand it to you. We've actually done something that in the last three to four years has not happened, except for the exception of maybe Vladimir Putin. You have unified Republicans and Democrats. And if only for a day, we're actually unified because we have serious concerns.
Paragraph 6:
Do you. Does TikTok support good? I mean, does TikTok have platform for good? Just yesterday. I believe yes. Okay. Does TikTok support Vremus speech? Yes. Is one of the commitments I have given this committee? Do you personally support the first amendment?
Paragraph 7:
Congressman, I'm here to talk about it. As a CEO of TikTok. I'm here to talk about TikTok. As a CEO of TikTok, do you support? To talk. Supposed freedom. Thank you.
Paragraph 8:
Does TikTok support genocide? Again, Congressman, I'm here to talk about TikTok. TikTok support genocide. Does TikTok? No. Okay. Thank you. But I'll reclaim my time.
议员,我来讨论的是TikTok,它是否支持种族灭绝?不支持。好的,谢谢。不过我要收回我的发言时间。
Paragraph 9:
I'm going to go to a video now. And it's from NS Cantor Freedom. And I'd like you to see NS Cantor Freedom who has spent his entire career post-MBA fighting against human rights violations within the Chinese Communist Party. Go ahead and play this video, which highlights a situation that allegedly shows some human rights violations inside China. Please play.
我现在要播放一个视频,来自NS Cantor Freedom。我希望你们能看看NS Cantor Freedom,他在完成MBA学位后的整个职业生涯都在与中国共产党内的人权侵犯作斗争。请播放这个视频,它突出了一种据称在中国内部存在的人权侵犯情况。请播放。
Paragraph 11:
Are you familiar with this basketball player? I'm not familiar with this specific stuff. Yes. But I can tell you that you're familiar with the player in this Cantor Freedom. Congressman, I'm not specific. I'm not. Okay.
Paragraph 12:
You know this. You just have to open TikTok and just search for this kind of content. It really exists. I've read the moderation policy. Let me just quote what you've talked about content moderation. TikTok has a moderation policy, yes. We do have community guidelines. One of the guidelines says material that in the sole judgment of TikTok is objectionable. Is this an example banning in a Cantor Freedom? Is that an example of objectionable material inside the Chinese Communist Party in mainland China? We do not take down content simply because it's critical. It was banned one week after this video. We do not do that. We do not do that. I can't keep you from mentioning it. If you need a note, go ahead. Note says he's not bad. His account was taken off one week after. We can check on his specifics. We can check.
Paragraph 13:
So let's get to some other questions. Thank you for the slide. Your privacy policy states that you collect a greater rate of data, keystroke patterns, app file names and types. Sometimes approximate locations, GPS locations. Are keystroke patterns and rhythms part of TikTok gathering the data that is gathered by Teixhach? If you're talking Congressman specific about keystrokes, we do not engage in keystroke logging to monitor what they use to say is to identify bots for security purposes and this is a standard industry practice.
Paragraph 14:
You gather a lot of data. Safe to say. We don't believe we get them more than any other social media company. That gathers a lot of data because your value proposition as you set in my office and told me was to connect people to each other around the world. You told me this in my office. So you gather data on what they like and what they don't like and then you show them things that they don't know they like, but eventually they may. You told me this. I think that's what I said. What I said is that we connect people together, yes.
Paragraph 15:
Are you interested in those? And that doesn't mean that we collect more than enough. Are you aware of any instances of TikTok distributing content from Chinese state media on the platform? We will label them clearly to follow users to understand that.
Paragraph 1:
Do you disagree with FBI director Ray and NSA director in Neckosone when they said that the CCP could have the capability to manipulate data and send it to the United States? Do you disagree with their statement? Their statements says could. So do you disagree with that? No, I don't disagree with that.
Paragraph 2:
So it is possible that the CCP under the auspices of bite dance, which is your parent company, which you get paid from, has the ability to manipulate content that is being shared with 130 million Americans, yes. What's congressman? I watch this one make sure I'm understanding all these questions. I don't disagree with them that data risk in general. That's what I meant.
Paragraph 3:
There's a big data risk on us specifically. Are there engineers located inside mainland China that work on TikTok? Not Doijen, but TikTok. We are not the only company that has that. Are there engineers inside mainland China currently working on the algorithm for TikTok? congressman like I said.
Paragraph 4:
As you told me, there are the companies that SIT told you in the office. By the way, I'm going to reclaim my time. Please rename your project. Texas is not the appropriate name. We stand for freedom and transparency and we don't want your project. I yield back. General McNeil's back.
Paragraph 5:
General lady from Tennessee is recognized for five minutes. Mrs. Harshberger. Thank you, Madam Chair and thank you, Mr. Chief for being here today. Both President Trump and now President Biden have back forcing TikTok to sell to an American company. However, the Chinese Communist Party has put export controls on algorithms, Biden's zones, that power TikTok.
Paragraph 6:
And of course, this is created a gauntlet of regulatory hurdles in China and the US that prevented the sale of TikTok. Now, as a long time business owner, I want to tell you, Mr. Chu, that waiting until your hands are forced will only drive down the price of your app. And right now, both your hands are tied.
Paragraph 7:
And you're going to have to make a decision about whether you choose freedom from the CCP or you continue to be an agent of the CCP. And I'll tell you why I say it that way. As a former member of Homeland Security, a point blank asked, FBI Director Ray, is TikTok a national security threat. And without hesitation, sir, he looked at me and said, yes, Congresswoman, it is.
Paragraph 8:
Now how much data is bydance collecting through TikTok that's worth continuing to fight this regulatory gauntlet? You know, why don't take the money and run like any other company would do? Long time businessmen, we built project taxes in order to safeguard. And we listened to the concerns they have raised and we're building something that's unprecedented.
Paragraph 9:
And no other company is offering to protect you as user interests. And we believe that this rigorous and robust. And we're even offering third party transparency and monitors to comment and to verify this. Frankly, I haven't heard any good reason why this doesn't work. I've heard a lot rhetoric around this, but I haven't heard a good reason why it doesn't work.
Paragraph 10:
Look forward to these conversations, by the way. Absolutely. Well, let me go down this road. When TikTok was unveiled to the public, its business model was solely based on generating revenue from advertising. Of course, bot dance operated a separate app called Dooyant for the Chinese Marketplace.
Paragraph 11:
TikTok is embarking on becoming a so-called super app. In other words, it's one stop shop, what everything you do is representative culture said. It's reported that TikTok's algorithms are so powerful that owner to buy dance has begun to license it to other companies.
Paragraph 12:
TikTok's recommendation engine drives usage on the platform and this leads to promises of quick exposure and fame that leads to even more people joining. And when you sign up, TikTok starts collecting data about you, your location, your gender, your age, your facial data. The user never gets to the end of the content. And that's by design.
Paragraph 13:
And obviously, that makes you a lot of money. Now, I know that the Chinese Communist Party is preventing bydance from selling TikTok due to export restrictions on the technology. And this causes me to question, how are you going to power TikTok with your Oracle servers located into the US with that Texas project?
Paragraph 14:
With bot dance technology, if it can't leave China, how's that going to happen? I just want you to explain how it's going to happen. Congressman, the way that we design this is so that any piece of software that is impactful to the code that enters, that some technical details around this will be reviewed by a third party or a few third party monitors just to make sure that we're all comfortable to code.
Paragraph 1:
I want to say this again, I don't know of any other company in my industry with offering this level of transparency.
我想再强调一下,我并不知道我所处行业中有任何其他公司提供这种透明度水平。
Paragraph 2:
Well, why are there two different versions of apps, one in China and one in the United States? It's just a different business.
为什么中国和美国有两个不同版本的应用程序呢?这只是因为不同的业务需求。
Paragraph 3:
Well, I think we all know the reason that the Chinese get a different version because bot dance, which China first in America last. And TikTok has, with everything we've heard today, sir, when you see 13-year-old, 16-year-old, you see the degradation that's happening to our youth and our society. You know, it's deceptive and it's destructive comment and it's comments and the worst thing is that it's deliberate, sir. And that's not acceptable.
Paragraph 4:
With that, Chairwoman, I yield back. General Lady yields back.
因此,议长,我放弃发言权。女士们和先生们放弃了发言权。
Paragraph 5:
General Lady from Iowa, Ms. Miller-Mex, recognized for five minutes. Thank you, Madam Chair. And just like to thank our witness, Mr. Chu, having been in the hot seat, so to speak, before when I was in the state Senate, I know how challenging this can be and thank you for your demeanor throughout all of this. But certainly, as you can see, in a bipartisan way, we have concerns and those concerns are valid.
Paragraph 6:
And this is a yes or no question. Does TikTok track users' individual keystrokes? Only for security purposes, for example, like detecting bots, but we don't monitor what users say. So the only purpose that you would monitor keystrokes is for security purposes.
Paragraph 7:
I can get back to you on more specifics, but this is not unlike what many other companies in the industry does. So the keystroke monitoring does not go beyond what common industry practice in comparison to platforms like Facebook or Instagram use. Yes, I believe so.
Paragraph 8:
And does TikTok keep records of users' credit cards and passwords? I'm not aware of that. You don't need that to log in. Of course, I can get back to you on specifics if you make a transaction on an e-commerce platform, but regardless, all that US data will be stored within the project Texas firewall. Within Oracle Cloud Infrastructure and overseen by American personnel.
Paragraph 9:
So you would store credit card and password information? I need to check on the specifics. We are launching a pilot e-commerce plan, and we're making sure that that data is very secure within the Oracle Cloud Infrastructure.
Paragraph 10:
I think you've made a point of saying that your platform is not different than other platforms on social media, and therefore are no more responsible than Facebook or Instagram or Twitter or the other social media platforms. The concern, however, comes with where the technology is generated and whom it is owned by. And in the case of other companies, it is generated in the US under US guidelines, under US privacy laws, with certain parameters versus generated through a parent company, bite-banz, which, as we know, is susceptible to the laws of the Chinese Communist Party, which has access to all of that data and information.
Paragraph 11:
And I understand that TikTok has just reinstated Inus Cantor's account recently. So our concern, and the question I have for you is, why would China or the Chinese Communist Party be opposed to a forced sale of TikTok? I cannot speak on behalf of the Chinese government. I can say that we designed Project Texas to take it forward here in the United States. And again, I believe in office, I'm president of protection for US user data.
Paragraph 12:
Yeah, I think the problem is when there is a lack of transparency, then that leads people to believe that there's something more nefarious and that there is, in fact, data that is captured is stored and poses a risk not only to children in the United States, but also poses a risk national security, with that I yield the rest of my time to my colleague, Jay Obernolte.
Paragraph 13:
Thank the general lady from I.O.F. Revealing. Mr. Chu, I'd like to continue our discussion about Project Texas and the technical details about what you're proposing to do. So you are migrating all storage of US user data to the Oracle Cloud infrastructure, and you think that that will be done by the end of the year. Was that right?
Paragraph 14:
Again, I can get back to you on the technical parts of it. The migration today by default, all US new US data is stored by default. I'm just using what you said in your testimony in your opening here. It is stored there by default. What I said in my testimony is I'm deleting legacy data. That's the Virginia Singapore. Who, when this migration is complete, who will have access to that data? Right now a team called TikTok US data security, that by American personnel, we have access to that. We have began this operations already.
Paragraph 1:
Okay, but the app itself has access to the data, correct? Only through them. Any employees that have the data are. What I mean is like if I lose my iPhone and I reinstall the app and I put in my username and password, my app will reconnect to the mother ship and download some of that data. My set of data.
Paragraph 2:
That's not the way it works. No, that's not the way it works. It will go through the Oracle Cloud infrastructure and that team that looks after this. Yes, I realize that. Let me ask you this, what would prevent then someone with the tail technical knowledge of the way the app is constructed from creating an almost identical version of the app that could also access that data?
Paragraph 3:
That's what we are giving you third party monitors and transparency. I know, but they're monitoring the source code for your app. I mean, by dance, these engineers have been working on this app for years. What would prevent them from making an app that could also access that data? Congressman, I think we're going into the area where, you know, what if there's a hacker? What if there is this? This is a common industry problem, as you know.
Paragraph 4:
I mean, I see my time is expired. It illustrates the point. I just skeptical that your tech is going to do. General, it's time to expire. General, lady, time has expired. Mr. Chu, I recognize that we have run over. I appreciate your time. We have just a few members left and would appreciate the chance for them to get to answer or ask their five minutes worth of questions.
Paragraph 5:
Mr. Chairman, from Virginia, Mr. Griffiths has recognized for five minutes. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Mr. Chu, you share legal counsel lawyers with bite dance. Yes or no? Yes, we do. And you testified that you prepared extensively with your legal team for this hearing. Yes or no? With my team in DC, including some of your legal counsel. Yes.
Paragraph 6:
And did they tell you about the report to the Australian Senate of March 14th that I referenced earlier? Did they tell you that that report was out there? Yes or no? I cannot recall how I found out about the report. But you know about the report. I can check. Okay.
Paragraph 7:
And did they tell you to favorably cite the citizens lab and your written testimony today? Yes or no? Congressman, I need to get back to your specifics. They helped you with the preparation of your written statement, though, didn't they? A team prepares, yes.
Paragraph 8:
And did they tell you that the director of citizen lab says he has called out your company for misrepresenting their report repeatedly and did so as ladies yesterday? Did they tell you about that? Yes or no? Congressman, the citizen lab is saying they cannot prove a negative, which is what I've been trying to do for the last four hours. All right. But you cited it favorably as saying that it did positive things for you.
Paragraph 9:
That being said, let me ask you this. You keep talking about transparency. Which I haven't been transparent with us here today. You were asked earlier by Mr. Hudson if you own stock in bite dance. You said you didn't want to reveal that. Well, we're trying to figure out what the ties are between bite dance and TikTok. I'm not going to ask you how many shares you own, but do you own shares in bite dance, sir? Yes, I do.
Paragraph 10:
All right. There you go. How about in TikTok? Right now, all employees own shares in one- Sure. I expected that. I don't understand why you didn't tell Mr. Hudson that and were transparent earlier. Instead, you made us drag it out of you. All right.
Paragraph 11:
Now, let's talk about the kids. You told several of our folks that there was a 60-minute deadline. You also told us that if you were under the age of 18, you couldn't access the live section, the live option. So I texted my 17-year-old and my 15-year-old and I basically got scoffs back, scoffs, and I said, are you all limited to 60 minutes? My older son said, well, there is a notice I get from time to time that says I shouldn't be on more than 60 minutes, but I'd never kicked me off.
Paragraph 12:
And my younger son said, oh, I'm on as long as I want to be. So I'm just informing you, whoever told you, particularly if it was your legal team, that that's not accurate, that they're on for more than 60 minutes and they can access the live section. I believe it was Mr. Carter that you said they couldn't under 18 access the live, you know, being on live section, he's done it.
Paragraph 13:
So whatever it is you think you're doing, it ain't getting done. Now, let's talk about the law for a minute. You share legal team, but you keep talking about how you got a firewall between you and bite dance. You can't have an effective firewall under the United States interpretation of such if you're sharing legal counsel because anything that you say to your legal counsel, they can share internally.
Paragraph 1:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chiu, in August, TikTok committed publicly to not sharing data with the Chinese government and TikTok has not been blocked or banned in China. Is it correct that while TikTok itself is not available in China, it's sister app, Duoyin, is available in China and shares some of the same code base as TikTok?
Paragraph 2:
That's correct. Duoyin is available in China.
没错,抖音在中国是可用的。
Paragraph 3:
So, can officials in the Chinese government obtain U.S. TikTok user data through Duoyin or other means?
那么,中国政府官员是否可以通过抖音等途径获取美国TikTok用户数据?
Paragraph 4:
Absolutely not. We have a data center in the United States. All of the data of TikTok U.S. users is in the United States.
绝对不是。我们在美国有一个数据中心,TikTok美国用户的所有数据都在美国。
Paragraph 5:
So, let me go back to the code base question and the fact that TikTok shares code with Duoyin. Does that include algorithmic code?
因此,让我回到与多影共享代码的问题以及TikTok是否包括算法代码。
Paragraph 6:
Yes, they share some of the code, including algorithms and other things.
是的,它们共享一些代码,包括算法和其他内容。
Paragraph 7:
So, as I understand it, ByteDance owns both apps. Is that correct?
据我所知,字节跳动拥有这两个应用程序,这是正确的吗?
Paragraph 8:
ByteDance owns TikTok. Duoyin is our equivalent app in China.
字节跳动拥有TikTok这款应用。而在中国,抖音是我们相对应的应用。
Paragraph 9:
And is it also true that ByteDance employees work on both apps?
ByteDance的员工同时从事这两个应用程序的开发吗?
Paragraph 10:
That's correct.
没错。这是正确的。
Paragraph 11:
So, given all that, it's fair to say that officials in the Chinese government could have access to data on TikTok users in the United States.
因此,考虑到这一切,可以说中国政府的官员可能可以获取在美国的TikTok用户的数据。
Paragraph 12:
That's false.
那是错误的。
Paragraph 13:
You've got the same lawyers. Now maybe you have two different teams of lawyers in the law firm, but that's not what you said to us today. You said you share lawyers. There is no firewall legally. I'm just telling you. So if you want to clean it up and be transparent, you need to do something about that. Wouldn't you agree? Yes or no? Of course. You need to do something about that.
Paragraph 14:
You'll look into it. You'll look into it all the time. You told Dr. Burgessman asked if your employees, if your employees who were members of the Chinese Communist Party had access to TikTok data from the US, you said you didn't know who was a member of the Communist Party. But then to Congressman Wahlberg, you said that the CEO of TikTok was not a member of the Chinese Communist Party. And to Congressman Kelly, you said the founder of TikTok was not a member of the Communist Chinese Party.
Paragraph 15:
Sir, either you know who isn't a member of the Chinese Communist Party or you don't, which one is it? I submit that you know and you just aren't giving us the straight story. Clearly, you know, but you deny that to Congressman Burgessman. I can ask one or two people, but we have no policy to ask them, please.
Paragraph 16:
I can ask one or two people, but who are in charge of it. But it's reasonable to assume that with a significant number of members of the country, of China being members of the Chinese Communist Party, logic would tell us, you're a logical man, I assume.
Paragraph 17:
Logic would tell us that there are a fair number of your employees who are members of the Chinese Communist Party, at least a dozen or so, who have access to this data. Isn't that so? Again, like I said, I can ask one or two people. We don't have a policy that has everything. I said earlier, you're living in some kind of a cloud world. Because either you know or you don't know, I yield back. Thank you, man.
Paragraph 18:
Gentlemen, from South Carolina, Chair recognizes for five minutes. Mr. Dunton.
先生们,来自南卡罗来纳州的议长,请给予Dunton先生五分钟时间。
Paragraph 19:
Thank you, Madam Chair. I think what's been revealed, there's not a degree of separation between bite dance and TikTok. I'd like to enter in the record Heritage Foundation document, TikTok generation, a CCP official in every pocket without objection, so ordered. And I like the old bounce of my town to Kelly Armstrong from North Dakota.
Paragraph 20:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Chiu, the TikTok privacy policy details extensive data collection on users. Online states that we may collect information about you from other publicly available sources. What publicly available data is TikTok collecting and adding to the profiles of users?
Paragraph 21:
It will be publicly available, but I can get back to you on specifics.
这些信息将是公开的,但我可以在具体细节上再回复你。
Paragraph 22:
Okay. What is the purpose of obtaining even more data on your users beyond the data collected from the platform?
好的。除了从平台收集到的数据之外,获取更多用户数据的目的是什么?
Paragraph 23:
We collect data. We want to give our users, by the way, a lot of transparency on what data we collect. We give them choices on the controls of their privacy settings, and they really used to serve them a better experience. This is the reason why so many people left the app. It's a great experience.
Paragraph 24:
So how does the non-tikTok related data service provide, relate to the service provided?
那非与TikTok无关的数据服务如何与提供的服务相关呢?
Paragraph 25:
I need to check the specifics and understand the cost and get back to you.
我需要核对具体情况并了解费用,并回复您。
Paragraph 26:
Okay. Do you think the average TikTok user knows that you are and understands that TikTok's data collection extends the information outside the use of the app?
Paragraph 27:
We do give transparent information on this. And like I said, I don't believe we collect more information than most of the social media platforms out there.
我们确实提供了透明的信息。正如我所说的,我认为我们收集的信息并不比其他社交媒体平台更多。
Paragraph 28:
And the reason I asked this is because I'm going to go back into the corporate structure. You described that TikTok is a subsidiary of bite dance. Mr. Griffith just said that you guys share the same lawyers. You have stated that your direct report is the CEO of bite dance.
Paragraph 29:
But you've also stated that at certain levels, TikTok operates without direct daily control from bite dance. You have used content moderation as an example for that. TikTok's privacy policy states that you may share user data within your corporate group. Does that corporate group include bite dance?
Paragraph 30:
If you are talking about that one entity that has the share for Chinese media licensing purposes, I think it's called Beijing To-In Services. If you're talking about that entity of the government share, the answer is we have cut off all excess of US data sets to that. So, employees of the entity. But your user privacy, so your corporate group, bite dance is part of your corporate group. Bite dance is the top company. So yeah, you're talking about the other entities within the group.
Paragraph 31:
So you just testified that you fire while this. So you're saying the TikTok's executives that operate independently of bite dance, but does that statement not hold for sharing of access to data?
Only by requirement is really only by requirement. But then employees may need to require some access of data to help build the product. But for US, we have moved it for Project Texas and by the end of this year will be by a wall the way.
But this is your privacy policy today. I understand what you're telling us. What's potentially going to happen in the future? I have concerns again about syphias and government involvement, private organization, all of that.
I'm just saying this is your user agreement today. So your user agreement says that you share access with your corporate group. You're telling me what's going to happen whenever Project Texas gets done. I'm asking you today, who has access to TikTok's user data?
You know, user agreement congressman in our privacy policy. We also added a link so that users in the US can be informed of our Project Texas. The link is there.
So the link is there to private, but I understand what you're trying to do moving forward. I have my own concerns about that, but we're sitting here today in a hearing and your privacy data, your privacy policy is different than your testimony.
Your privacy policy specifically says that you can share user data within your corporate group. So you're saying even though your privacy policy says that you're not doing it.
Like I said, I don't think there's any contradiction here. Like I said, Project Texas when it's done, we filed wall after data. We still have some legacy data in Virginia and Singapore that we started deleting and will be done by the end of this year.
Why haven't you changed your privacy policy? Why haven't you updated it? We did update it and we gave our users more information on Project Texas. We did update it.
Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chu for bringing Republicans and Democrats together. Appreciate that.
谢谢主席女士。感谢Chu先生将共和党人和民主党人团结在一起。我非常感激。
I want to get right to the critical point of concern. So TikTok is able to collect massive amounts of personal data. We all know that.
我想直接谈论关键问题。TikTok能够收集大量个人数据,这是众所周知的。
That means it could, if it desired, to use this data to influence narratives and trends, create misinformation campaigns, encourage self-destructive behavior, purposely allow drug cartels to communicate freely and organize human and drug trafficking.
And to be fair, all social media companies could do that. But here's the difference. It is only TikTok that is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, all these other social media companies, are not.
Well, I think for example, though the chief editor at Bite Dance, Zhang Buping, is the Communist Party secretary, correct? He works under Chinese business, not on TikTok.
Right. He works for bite dance. The parent company. Works under Chinese business. Right. The parent company of TikTok. The Chinese business is called the wind. Yeah.
It's all associated with bite dance, right? So bite dance owns a number of businesses. Right. They are. You all report to bite dance. Everybody's part of bite dance.
Okay. And do you know of any other employees that work for bite dance that are part of the Chinese Communist Party? Like I said, you know, bite dance has owns Chinese businesses and they operate in China.
Yeah. I mean, the CCP holds a. what's called a golden share invite dance that allows the CCP to control one board seat invite dance.
是啊,我的意思是中国共产党持有所谓的黄金股邀请权,这使得中国共产党可以控制一个董事会席位的邀请。
That's public, isn't it? That's not correct. It's not correct. It's been publicly reported. They admit it to it.
这是公开的,不是吗?那是不正确的。不正确。这已经公然报道了。他们承认了这一点。
You can. on a website we have updated it so we can give people more transparent information on this. They have a share in a subsidiary that is only for the Chinese businesses.
There's nothing they do with TikTok and it's for the purposes of content licensing in China. an internal CCP committee, which is a regular thing that happens in China that they have a CCP committee internally inside the company.
So here's the main point of concern. China's 2017 national intelligence law states very clearly that, quote, any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with state intelligence work in accordance with the law and maintain the secrecy of all knowledge of state intelligence work. In other words, bite dance.
And also your TikTok employees that live in China, they must cooperate with Chinese intelligence whenever they are called upon. And if they are called upon, they're bound to secrecy. That would include you.
So Mr. Chu, if the CCP tells bite dance to turn over all data that TikTok is collected inside the US, even within Project Texas, do they have to do so according to the Chinese law? Congressman, first I'm Singaporean. That's fine. But there are employees of yours and bite dances in China. We understand this concern. In my opening statement, we said, we hear these concerns. We didn't try to avoid them or, you know, trivialize them. We built something where we take that data and put it out of reach.
This is what we did. We put it out of reach. But they own you. No, we put it out of reach by, by dance. By dance. By dance owns TikTok. If bite dances to and the CCP owns bite dance because the CCP owns everybody in China. So by law, they can make them do whatever they want. And they say that by law, you can't tell anyone about it. So they can make you hand over that data. Is that correct? Data is stored here in American soil. By an American company.
You see that? We talked that. But leaked audio from 80 internal TikTok meetings shows that US user data has been repeatedly accessed from China when you said it hasn't been. And here's the other thing. Following back on my colleague's line of questioning, in your own privacy policy, it says that you made an in-share information within your so-called corporate group.
Is bite dance part of that corporate group? If you're talking about the share of the entity with the share, like I shared with the previous, um, this bite dance part of the corporate group. Bite dance as a holding company is part of the corporate group. Yes. It's part of the corporate group. Okay. So your own privacy policy says you have to share data with bite dance. And if the CCP says, hey, bite dance, you're going to do what we say. And you can't tell anyone about it because by law, according to that 2017 national intelligence law, they have to do it. That's our concern.
Maybe you haven't done it yet. But my point is that you might have to. And that's where our concerns come from. I mean, over 300 TikTok employees have worked for China's state run propaganda media. That's just from looking at their LinkedIn profiles.
Okay. So here, and my last point is this. I want to say this to all the teenagers out there and then TikTok influencers who think we're just old and out of touch and don't know what we're talking about, trying to take away your favorite app. You may not care that your data is being accessed now, but it will be one day when you do care about it. And here's the real problem.
Data comes power. You can see in how you see it. They can make you believe things that are not true. They can encourage you to engage in behavior that will destroy your life. Even if it is not happening yet, it could in the future.
The long-term goal of the Chinese Communist Party is the demise of the American power, and that starts with our youth. At any moment, they could demand that all of TikTok's data be used to design an AI algorithm with the sole purpose of promoting Chinese interests and destroying our society from within. You want to know why that's, why that's, why do I, Democrats and Republicans have come together on this? That's why we are so concerned.
Thank you, and I yield back. General Min yield's back.
谢谢您,我结束发言了。总司令明将军已经结束发言。
I remind the members they have ten business days to submit questions for the record. And I ask our witness to respond to the questions promptly. Pursuing to committee rules, I ask unanimous consent to enter the documents from the staff list into the record without objection.