Could the Financial Crisis (2007-2009) Have Been Predicted? - YouTube

David Svensson, thank you so much for joining us on WealthTrack once again. You and I had talked earlier about the fact that you are a bottom's up guy and in this particular period of time you've got to be a top down guy. So what is your take on what has caused the financial crisis that we've been through? Did you see this coming or was it inevitable?

David Svensson先生，非常感谢您再次加入我们的财富轨迹节目。您和我之前讨论过，您是一个从基本面角度分析的人，在这个特别时期里，你必须是一个从宏观角度分析的人。那么，您对导致我们经历的金融危机的原因有什么看法？您预见到了这一切，还是这是不可避免的？

You know in some ways you could say that we saw this coming. I mean in the end of 2007 we took all of Yale's cash and put it into treasuries. And this was well before Bear Stearns failure and Neiman's failure. Why? What was it that you saw that you were concerned about? I know we were just concerned about the viability of any of a number of issues of commercial paper so we didn't want to have our money in these institutional money market funds.

你知道在某种程度上，我们早就预见到这一天会来。我是说在2007年末，我们把耶鲁的所有现金都投入到了国债中，这都是在贝尔·斯特恩斯和尼曼兄弟公司破产之前。为什么呢？你们当时看到了什么让你们感到担忧的？我知道我们当时只是担心商业票据的多个问题之一的存活能力，所以我们不想把我们的资金投资到这些机构货币市场基金中。

But maybe we didn't pay enough attention to what it was that we were doing on the cash management side and the implications for the overall portfolio because we certainly didn't sidestep the carnage that resulted from the total collapse or the near total collapse of our financial system. So there were signs and maybe with hindsight I wish that I would have paid more attention to them.

也许我们在现金管理方面没有足够注意我们所做的事情及其对整个投资组合的影响，因此我们显然没有回避由金融系统的完全崩溃或近乎崩溃所引起的悲惨后果。因此，存在着征兆，也许回想起来，我希望我当时能更加注意到它们。

So now where are we? What's your assessment of how far we've gone in repairing the financial system? Well actually I guess first how it was that we got here. And I think that Jack Bogall gave a fascinating speech a few months ago where he talked about moving from the ownership society to an agency society and about the need to move from the agency society to a fiduciary society. And it really resonated with me.

现在我们在哪里？你认为我们在修复金融体系方面取得了多大进展？首先，我们应该搞清楚我们是怎么到这里的。我认为几个月前杰克·博高尔发表了一篇非常有趣的演讲，讲述了从拥有社会转变为代理社会的过程，以及需要从代理社会转变为义务代理社会的必要性。这些话真的让我深受触动。

If you look at the investment banking world that I joined in 1979 I spent six years on Wall Street before I went to Yale. I spent three years at Lehman Brothers, three years at Solomon Brothers, they were private partnerships. The partners sat on the trading floor and knew what the exposures were because they owned the companies. So that was Jack Bogall's Ownership Society. And then you look at the absolutely insane capital structures that evolved in the intervening years. You saw way way too much leverage in the financial system. Investment banks were the worst, the commercial banks were overlovered as well.

如果你看看我在1979年加入的投资银行界，我在去耶鲁大学之前在华尔街度过了六年。我在雷曼兄弟和所罗门兄弟待了三年，在那里公司是私人合伙企业。合伙人们坐在交易大厅里，知道风险暴露的情况，因为他们拥有这些公司。这就是杰克·博格尔的所有权社会。然后再看看经过这几年的发展，绝对疯狂的资本结构。你可以看到金融体系中太多了太多了的杠杆。投资银行是最糟糕的，商业银行也随之过度负债。

And you looked at the character and quality of the assets. And the assets I think by and large were there on their way to someplace else. But of course when the music stops they don't get to go someplace else so they're there. And it was other people's money because these were publicly traded entities. And so it was, heads I win, tails you lose in terms of compensation for the individuals that these financial institutions. And the trick is getting away from this agency society, this set of financial institutions that are dealing with other people's money. Right, with that skin in the game.

你要看看资产的特性和质量。我认为这些资产大部分都是在朝着别的地方前进。但是当音乐停止时，它们就得留在那里了。而这些都是其他人的钱，因为这些是公开交易的实体。因此，对于这些金融机构的个人来说，赢了我，输了你，是一场赔偿游戏。而诀窍是要摆脱这种代理社会，这种正在处理其他人的钱的金融机构群体。对了，要有投入他们自己的资本。

Yeah, no skin or inadequate skin in the game. And then move to a fiduciary society. I think I agree with Jack, you can't put the genie back in the bottle. You can't require that all investment banks be private partnerships. So we have to figure out a way to move from this agency society not back to the ownership society but forward to a fiduciary society. So how do we do that? I mean, I think it's a very, very difficult question.

噢，这意味着没有真正的利润或者不足以激起利润的动力。我们需要向信托责任的社会发展。我同意杰克的观点，我们不能将问题塞回瓶子里。我们不能要求所有的投资银行都成为私人合伙。因此，我们必须找到一种从代理社会向前进入信托责任的社会的方法。那么我们该怎么做呢？我认为这是一个非常非常困难的问题。

But if you think about commercial banking for example, I think that it would be great if we ended up with a set of very simple deposit gathering balance sheet lenders. And the deal would be that if you get government insurance on the deposits, you have to accept a high degree of regulation. And as part of the deal, it could be that when you generate loans and these highly regulated deposit gathering balance sheet lending banks would only provide basic financial services. Are these like the old SNLs?

但是，如果考虑商业银行，我认为最好的情况是我们最终得到一套非常简单的存款收集平衡表贷款人。协议是，如果政府对存款进行保险，就必须接受高度的监管。作为协议的一部分，可能会发放贷款，这些高度监管的存款收集平衡表贷款银行只提供基本的金融服务。这些像是老的储蓄贷款协会吗？

Yeah, well actually, like the Bailey brothers savings and loan miss a wonderful life. That's exactly what they're like. And you could require that they keep a large part of what it is that they originate on their balance sheet. It doesn't mean you can't have some securitization, you can't have some syndication. But you have to eat your own cooking. You have to live with the consequences of your actions.

其实像贝利兄弟储蓄贷款所经历的美好人生一样，你可以要求他们在资产负债表中保留自己所衍生的大部分资产。这并不意味着你不能进行某些证券化或合作方式。但你必须吃自己做的菜，必须承担自己行动的后果。

Is that a possibility? Oh sure. I mean, do you see it happening? I mean, you are now advising President Obama, is that something that you're going to talk about and that we'll be talked about in Washington? I think it's one of the ideas that's on the table. And even if that particular idea isn't one that's adopted, I think that there are ways in which we can require financial institutions to behave more as principles and less as agents.

这可能吗？噢当然。我的意思是，你认为这会发生吗？我是说，你现在正在为奥巴马总统提供建议，这是你要谈论的问题，也是在华盛顿要谈论的问题吗？我认为这是桌子上的一个想法。即使没有采用这个特定的想法，我认为我们有办法要求金融机构更像原则，而不是代理人。

What about regulation? Because you have some actually pretty big ideas about needing a much more broader, comprehensive sort of regulation. So what is it? One of the causes of the problems that we find are self-facing is that there was this religion of deregulation or this cultish belief that the market was always going to get you to the right solution.

对于监管有何看法？因为您有很多关于需要更广泛、更全面的监管的大想法。那么这是什么？我们发现问题的原因之一是存在着一种去监管的宗教或信仰，即市场总是能让你得到正确的解决方案。

Right, self-governing. And Alan Greenspan was right at the top of a list of those who were advocating that position, that general attitude. And it turns out that that was an incredibly naive approach because what the deregulation led to was this huge overleveraging and this incredible lack of quality control among our large financial institutions. And when somebody like the chairman of the Federal Reserve says over and over again that regulation is worthless and not important, well, what does that do to the spree decor and the character and quality of people that end up in our regulatory organizations? It's not moving us in the right direction. So we need to have much stronger regulation, much higher quality. We need to devote far more resources to the regulation of our financial system, broadly defined. And I'm certainly not just talking about banks and securities firms. I think it's absolutely obvious that hedge funds need to be regulated.

正确的是自我管理。阿兰·格林斯潘在倡导这种态度时是正确的。 然而，结果证明，这种放松管制的方法非常幼稚，因为它导致了巨大的过度杠杆，以及大型金融机构之间极其缺乏质量控制。当联邦储备委员会主席一遍又一遍地说管制无价值且不重要时，这会对我们的监管机构的氛围、品格和质量产生什么影响呢？这并不是朝着正确的方向前进。因此，我们需要更加强有力的监管，更高的质量。我们需要投入更多资源来监管我们的金融系统，广义上定义。我当然不仅是在谈论银行和证券公司。我认为很明显，对于对冲基金等金融机构也需要进行监管。

In terms of capital, 1998, $5 billion of equity, $150 billion of positions on the balance sheet, $1.2 trillion of derivatives positions. Right. That was one institution. That one institution. Could have brought the system down. Why is it that here we are more than 10 years later, we haven't come to the conclusion that we need to regulate entities that could pose a threat to the system. I think it's absolutely obvious that any institution that could pose a threat to the system should be under the regulatory umbrella.

1998年，这家机构拥有50亿美元的股本、1500亿美元的资产和1.2万亿美元的衍生品头寸。这只是一个机构，但它就足以威胁整个金融系统。十多年过去了，我们为何仍没有得出一个结论：我们需要监管那些可能对金融系统造成威胁的机构呢？很明显，任何可能对金融系统造成威胁的机构都应该受到监管。

You've talked about the new reality and PIMCO refers to it as the new normal. So what is the new reality that we're living in now as far as the investment climate, the economic climate, looking at the big picture, what do you think the new reality is that we should expect?

你谈到了新的现实，而PIMCO称之为新常态。那么，就投资环境、经济环境而言，我们现在正在经历的新现实是什么？从宏观角度来看，你认为我们应该期待什么新现实？

Well, I think that at least for the near term, we have to have more modest expectations about what it is that our investment portfolios are going to generate for us. So for instance, what's more modest versus what Yale delivered? I mean, 16.3% returns in the Yale endowment over a 10-year period. That was a pretty good run. That was a terrific run. And I think stocks over that period were a little bit more than 3% per annum and bonds somewhere between 4% and 5% per annum. So there was just a huge gap between what it was that the portfolio produced and what you could have generated from marketable securities.

我认为，至少在短期之内，我们对投资组合所带来的收益应该有更加适度的期望。比如，什么是适度的收益，相比耶鲁大学的表现呢？十年期耶鲁基金的回报率达到了16.3%，这是一个相当好的成绩，也是一个惊人的成绩。在这段时间里，股票的年回报率略高于3%，债券的年回报率在4%到5%之间。因此，投资组合所产生的回报与市场上可流通证券所能带来的回报之间存在巨大的差距。

I mean, if we think that equities over long periods of time might be. 11%? Yeah, 10-11-12% returns. That's exactly the number I was going to come up with. I think we have just gone through a period where the economy took a more substantial hit than I think any of us anticipated. And I guess then we have in like 50 years. And we're still in a position where the financial markets, which were broken a few months ago, have yet to heal completely. And so I would say that at least for the intermediate term, you have to have lower expectations with respect to equities and maybe all other financial assets. I mean, bonds. Starting out with 3.5% coupon on treasuries, that's a very, very, very low starting point.

我的意思是，如果我们认为长期来看股票可能会获得11%的回报率。是的，10-11-12%的回报率。这正是我要提出的数字。我认为我们刚刚经历了一个经济遭受了比我们预期的更为严重的打击的时期，这可能是50年来最严重的一次。我们仍处于一个金融市场在几个月前遭受破裂的位置，尚未完全恢复。因此，至少在中期内，您必须对股票和可能所有其他金融资产的回报率降低期望。我是说，债券。国债的3.5%票息率是一个非常非常非常低的起点。

You're not. to correct me if I'm wrong, corporate bonds, we've had several guests on who are investing in corporate bonds. And they just said that the returns are pretty exceptional. Are you at all attracted to the distressed bond market or are you all attracted to the corporate bonds or high yield junk bonds?

请你不要介意纠正我。在公司债券方面，我们接待了多位正在投资于企业债券的嘉宾。他们都表示这种投资回报相当出色。你是否对困境债券市场感兴趣，或是更倾向于投资公司债券或高收益垃圾债券呢？

Those kind of securities are. And so it depends on what hat I'm wearing. If I'm wearing my Yale hat, I think there are some extraordinary opportunities in the credit markets. If I'm wearing my individual investor hat, I don't think that there are high quality vehicles that individuals can tap into. Because you don't want individuals to lose opportunities. To lose money, in other words, you don't think individuals should take the kind of risk that you can take at Yale or. Well, I think if the right investment vehicle were there, then I could recommend that an individual take those kind of risks. Because one of the things that has come out of these broken credit markets are some very attractive risk-adjusted opportunities. But the corporate bond market is very, very tough. I mean, you need to have the same kind of analytical capabilities that you have to analyze equities. And on top of that, you have to understand call provisions. It's incredibly complicated. And the mutual funds that specialize in this area generally are high cost and do a poor job of dealing with these incredibly complicated issues.

那种证券类型是有机会的，这取决于我戴哪个帽子。如果我戴着我的耶鲁帽子，我认为信用市场中有一些非常特别的机会。如果我戴着我的个人投资者帽子，我认为个人能够利用的高质量投资工具并不多。因为您不希望个人错失机会，换句话说，您不认为个人应该承担您在耶鲁大学或其他机构承担的风险。如果有正确的投资工具，那么我可以建议个人承担这种风险。因为这些破碎的信用市场带来了一些非常有吸引力的风险调整机会。但是，公司债券市场非常艰难。我是说，您需要具备分析股票的同等分析能力。除此之外，您还需要了解召回条款。这是非常复杂的。专门从事这个领域的共同基金通常成本高昂，并且处理这些非常复杂的问题做得很差。

You know, there are some hedge fund managers who have come out with mutual funds. And we've had a couple on our show Cliff Asnes from AQR and Andy Lowe, who you probably know from MIT as well. For individual investors, and it's, again, it's in the spirit of portfolio diversification, they're giving an individual an opportunity to invest in arbitrage or replicate some hedge fund returns. What do you think about those kind of options for individuals that I'm sure we're going to see more of in the years ahead?

你知道吗，有一些对冲基金经理已经推出了互惠基金。我们在节目中采访到了几个，比如来自AQR的Cliff Asnes和你可能也认识的MIT的Andy Lowe。对于个人投资者而言，这种基金以投资组合分散的精神为基础，为个人提供了投资套利或复制一些对冲基金回报的机会。你对于这些个人投资者的选择有什么看法？我相信未来的几年我们会看到更多类似的基金。

So I mean, I believe that there are a handful of high-quality managers. And I think Cliff Asnes and Andy Lowe are really impressive guys. And they're also some impressive guys on the equity side in the mutual fund world. But it's a handful among the thousands of mutual funds. And individuals by and large aren't well equipped to separate the wheat from the chaff.

我的意思是，我相信有一些高质量的经理。我认为克利夫·阿斯纳斯和安迪·洛都是非常印象深刻的人物。在共同基金领域，股票方面也有一些让人印象深刻的人。但在成千上万的共同基金中，只占一小部分。而普通人往往无法将好与坏分开。

And when the probabilities are overwhelming that they'll end up with the not so good managers or the bad managers or the terrible managers as opposed to this tiny handful of high-quality managers, I think the only reasonable advice that I can give is to stay on the passive end of the spectrum, put together a portfolio that you can implement using index funds. And again, asset allocation being the key to proper asset allocation. Well diversified by asset class and fairly equity oriented.

当很可能会得到不太好的经理、糟糕的经理、或是可怕的经理，而非这一小撮高质量的经理时，我认为唯一合理的建议是保持被动的一面，使用指数基金构建一个 portfolio。再次强调，资产配置是正确配置资产的关键。要按资产类别进行充分的分散，以股票为导向。

So it seems so unfair. But you think that individuals are always going to be at essentially at a disadvantage. So the best that we can hope for is to have market returns and to have a balance. I mean, a portfolio that has some non-correlated assets. I mean, is that? Yeah, it seems unfair in a sense. But most everybody has something that they do with their lives other than studying financial markets.

看起来很不公平。但是你认为个人在本质上总是处于劣势。因此，我们能期望的最好结果就是获得市场回报并保持平衡。我的意思是，一个组合中要有一些不相关的资产。是这样吗？是的，从某种意义上说，这似乎是不公平的。但是大多数人除了研究金融市场之外，还有其他生活中的事情要做。

Right. Right. And I know how hard it is to beat the markets. They're actually quite efficient. And so I've gotten incredibly highly qualified, wonderfully motivated group of colleagues at Yale. And we work really, really hard to put together these market-beating portfolios. And the market-beating portfolios, our viewers should know, you're not investing the money yourself. You're investing with you outsource. Yeah, without side-managements. So you're choosing right-out.

对的。我知道要在市场上获胜有多么困难。市场实际上非常高效。所以我在耶鲁大学拥有一个非常高素质、极富动力的同事团队。我们非常努力地努力组建这些能击败市场的投资组合。值得我们的观众知道的是，这些能击败市场的投资组合是由外部管理的。也就是说，你不是自己投资的，而是将投资外包。是的，没有管理人员。所以你是直接选择投资。

So how do you, is there one or two things that you insist upon in choosing a manager? I mean, what are the things that you look for in choosing a good investment manager? So if we talked about this 20 years ago, I probably would have come up with a list of objective criteria. And now? And now I'd to say it's all about the people. You want to have really high-quality people, great integrity, very intelligent, hard-working. They, people that have found an edge that they can exploit. In their particular niche. In their particular niche. And I would say it's people first, people second, people third. You just want to be partners with great people.

你如何选择一位投资经理？你坚持选择经理的一两个特质是什么？我的意思是，在选择一个好的投资经理时，你寻找的是什么样的特点？如果我们20年前讨论这个问题，我可能会列出一些客观的标准。现在呢？现在我要说的是关键在于人。你要找到真正高素质的人，具有极高的诚信、智慧和勤奋。他们已经找到了一个可以利用的优势，适用于他们特定的领域。我认为人是最重要的，其次是人，再次是人。你只想成为伟大人物的伙伴。

But size counts too, right? You don't like to invest with funds that get too big. Size is the enemy of performance. And so the people that we invest with, I like to say, have a screw loose because they don't define winning by amassing as large a pool of assets as they possibly can. Because if they did that, they would invariably make more money. Because they have asset-based fees. And they sometimes get a carry on the performance. So the bigger the pile of money, the more money they're going to make. That's one of the huge problems with the mutual fund industry. It's not about creating great investment returns.

但是大小也很重要，对吧？你不喜欢投资于规模过大的基金。规模是业绩的敌人。因此，我们投资的人们有时会有些奇怪，因为他们不将赢利的定义视为尽可能聚集更大的资产池。因为如果他们这样做，他们肯定会赚更多的钱。因为他们是按基础资产收费的。有时，他们的收益可以得到股权激励。所以资金越多，他们赚的钱就越多。这就是共同基金行业的一个巨大问题。它不关心创造出优秀的投资回报。

It's about amassing these huge piles of assets because that's the way that the fund companies generate greater profits. But the managers that we're with are actually being good fiduciaries to the university because almost invariably they'll limit the size of assets under management so they can produce great investment returns. And they define winning by having a great investment record as opposed to the greatest degree of fee income that they could possibly generate. Assets under management.

这是关于积累大量资产的问题，因为这是资金公司实现更高利润的方式。但我们与之合作的经理人员实际上是为大学担任好“受托人”，因为他们几乎总是限制管理资产的规模，以便产生优秀的投资回报。他们将胜利定义为拥有杰出的投资记录，而不是可能产生最大程度的费用收入。资产管理。

Well, speaking of having a screw loose, you could be making a lot more money if you were working for one of these investment funds yourself. So why 24 years ago? All right, so you've had 24 years to figure this out. Haven't you been tempted to leave Yale and the not-for-profit sector and make more than a poultry couple million a year?

说到有点不正常，如果你为这些投资基金公司工作，你会赚更多的钱。那么为什么是24年前呢？好吧，你已经用了24年来理解这个问题。难道你没有想过离开耶鲁大学和非盈利部门，一年赚不止几百万吗？

Well, I could pay incredibly well for what I do. I love being part of an academic community. I love being part of the economics department at Yale. I've been teaching. Teaching. It's 1980, even longer than I've been working at Yale. I love the students. I like the idea that I'm supporting one of the world's great institutions. So this is something you want to continue to do. As long as they'll have me. As long as they're going to have you for a long time.

我做的事情报酬非常丰厚。我喜欢成为学术界的一部分，喜欢成为耶鲁大学经济系的一员。我一直在教书，已经有1980年了，比我在耶鲁工作的时间还要长。我热爱学生，喜欢支持世界上伟大的机构之一的想法。所以，这是你想要继续做的事情。只要他们还要我，我愿意一直干下去。只要他们会一直留着你。

I should end it there, but I'm not going to. What about your kids portfolios? How do you invest? I've got a 21-year-old son and you've got three children. So how are you investing their portfolios? So I've got a combination of index funds and some close-in funds, trading at a discount. I guess that's in the one asterisk that I would put by the purely passive approach. I love what Jack Bogels written. I love what Charlie Ellis is written. I love what Bert Malkill's written. They're all fans of index funds, but Bert Malkill's also written about buying closed-in funds at a discount. And I think that's an interesting strategy for individuals to pursue if they just can't stand having a purely index portfolio.

我本应该在此结束，但是我不会。你的孩子组合投资怎么样呢？我有一个21岁的儿子，而你有三个孩子。你是如何投资他们的组合的呢？所以我有一些基金指数组合和一些交易折扣的结束性基金。我想这是我会加上的标记，一种纯被动的方法。我喜欢杰克·波格尔所写的东西。我喜欢查理·艾利斯所写的东西。我喜欢伯特·马基尔所写的东西。他们都是指数基金的粉丝，但伯特·马基尔也写过在折扣时购买到期基金的策略。我认为这是个有趣的策略，对那些无法承受纯指数组合的个人追求。

And at this point in our, in the economy and in the markets, are there a cup of one or two areas that you would emphasize over others that you think are going to do extremely well over the next five years, let's say? Well, tips are interesting because if the fiscal stimulus and the monetary stimulus work, it's hard to see an environment where we're not dealing with substantial inflation. If they don't work, the fiscal stimulus and the monetary stimulus, then I think you have to worry about deflationary pressures.

在目前的经济和市场环境下，您是否认为有一两个领域比其他领域更值得强调，您认为这些领域在未来五年内会表现出色？嗯，通货膨胀保值债券是有意思的，因为如果财政刺激和货币刺激起作用，那么很难想象我们不会面临重大的通货膨胀环境。如果它们不起作用，财政刺激和货币刺激，那么我认为您必须担心通货紧缩压力。

And if you buy new issue tips, you have the protection of getting your principal back. And so the new issue tips, not the ones that have accreted to above par because of the past inflationary adjustments, but new issue tips are actually instruments that could help you in an inflationary environment and in a deflationary environment. And not tips funds because you buy the new issue tips because then you hold them until maturity and you get the principal back at maturity. And to get the deflation protection, you have to keep in the new issues, right? Because if you are in an inflationary period, the value of the principal goes up along with inflation. And then you've got something that you can lose before you get back to par.

如果你购买新发行的通胀保值国债，你就有保障，可以获取你的本金。因此，新发行的通胀保值国债，而不是因为通胀调整而增加到高于票面价值的国债，是一种在通胀环境和通缩环境中有用的工具。并且不是购买国债投资基金，而是购买新发行的通胀保值国债，因为你持有这些国债至到期，就可以在到期时获得本金。为了获得通缩保护，你必须持有新发行的国债，对吗？因为如果你在通胀期间，本金的价值随着通胀而增加，那么你在回到票面价值之前就可能失去它。

And I guess the other thing that I think people should pay attention to in their portfolios is that they probably will be by and large, don't pay enough attention to it would be emerging markets exposure. I'm not sure where I come out on the decoupling issue, but you could certainly imagine a circumstance where China and Indian, Brazil, maybe some of the other big emerging markets countries, some firms substantially better than some of the developed economies where you see the direct impact of collapse of the financial system.

我认为人们应该注意的另一件事情是，他们的投资组合可能大多没有足够的关注于新兴市场的投资。我不确定我对脱钩问题的看法，但你可以想象一种情况，中国、印度、巴西，或许其他一些大型新兴市场国家的一些公司表现比某些发达经济体更好，在金融系统崩溃的直接影响下能够更好地承受。

This is your opportunity, just one last question. And that is, what is it that you would really like to say? I mean, because I know you wanted to talk about unconventional success, for instance. And I didn't ask you really about unconventional, what's unconventional about it. But what is it that we should know about your unconventional approach that individuals should take to heart?

这是你的机会，最后一个问题。那就是，你真正想说的是什么？我是说，因为我知道你想谈论非传统的成功，例如。我没有真正问你，什么是非传统的，这其中有什么是非传统的。但是，我们应该知道你非传统的方法，个人应该深入内心去接受有什么吗？

You know, I think that the sad fact is that the game is really stacked against the individual, that almost any provider of financial services to individuals, whether it's a stock broker or a mutual fund manager, has a conflict between the fiduciary responsibility that's owed to the client and the profit motive. And when you see that conflict, the profit motive more often than not wins. And so the only way that an individual is going to end up with a reasonable outcome is to educate themselves.

你看，我认为悲哀的事实是，金融服务几乎所有向个人提供的供应商都存在一个问题，这就是他们在客户的财产信托责任与追求利润之间存在利益冲突。当这种冲突出现时，追求利润的动机往往占据上风。所以，唯一能让个人获得合理结果的方式就是自我教育。

And I think the only reasonable way to do that is to read books. And you can read Charlie Ellis's book or Jack Bogels' book. What do you lose your game or enough? I mean, Jack Bogels has written a lot of books. I might add your books. I'm unconventional success. And you've just got to take control of your financial destiny and not believe that you can pass responsibility off to a trained professional and that you'll end up with a good outcome. Unfortunately, that just isn't the way the world works.

我认为唯一合理的方法就是阅读书籍。你可以读查理·艾利斯的书或杰克·博格尔的书。你是否失去了游戏或足够的东西？我的意思是，杰克·博格尔写了很多书。也许你可以看看他的书。我是《非传统的成功》的作者。你必须掌控自己的财务命运，不要相信你可以把责任转交给受过专业培训的专业人士，最终会取得良好的结果。不幸的是，这并不是现实世界的运作方式。

Well I have a suggestion for you, David Swenson, and that is you should start a mutual fund. And take your fiduciary responsibility and make it accessible to the rest of us. That's a dream, I'm sure. But thank you so much for being with us on WealthTrack. It's been so much time with us. It was just great for us, really was. This was fun. Thank you.

我有一个建议给你，大卫·斯文森，那就是你可以开始一只共同基金，将你的信托责任和投资机会让大众可以使用。我知道这只是一个梦想，但非常感谢你来到我们的权财节目，与我们共度这么多时间。对于我们来说这是非常有价值和愉快的经历。谢谢。