David Swenson on the Yale Endowment & "Unconventional Success" (2009) - YouTube
发布时间 2021-05-12 16:00:00 来源
Hello and welcome to this edition of WealthTrack. I'm Consuelo Mack. We are breaking precedent on WealthTrack this week and devoted the entire program to one guest and what a guest we have for you. It is a WealthTrack television exclusive with David Swenson, the truly legendary Chief Investment Officer of Yale's Endowment. Who you will discover in a moment pulls no punches in his approach to investment strategy, Wall Street, the mutual fund industry and just about every other topic you engage him in.
大家好，欢迎收看本期的《财富追踪》。我是康苏艾罗·麦克。本周我们打破以往传统，整个节目都将致力于一位嘉宾，而且这位嘉宾非常厉害。他是耶鲁大学基金会的传奇首席投资官David Swenson，接下来您将发现，无论涉及到投资策略、华尔街、共同基金行业或其他任何话题，他都毫不留情。本次节目是《财富追踪》电视台独家报道。
Swenson has literally transformed the way university endowments are managed all over the country. He has been so successful and influential that he has set a new standard for a wide array of institutional money managers from pension funds to foundations. And he was a recently named President Obama's new economic recovery advisory board.
Swenson 彻底改变了全国大学捐赠基金的管理方式。他的成功和影响力如此之大，以至于他为从养老基金到基金会等广泛的机构资金管理者设定了新标准。同时，他最近被任命为奥巴马总统新的经济复苏咨询委员会的成员。
Well, how do he do this? His track record tells the story. Under his leadership, Yale's Endowment generated 20 consecutive years of positive returns from 1988 until June of 2008, the end of its fiscal year. In the decade in the June of last year, the endowment had clocked in average annual returns of 16.3 percent versus 6.5 percent for the average college endowment and 2.9 percent for the S&P 500. That performance put Swenson in the top 1 percent of all institutional money managers and added an estimated $15 billion to Yale's endowment.
他是如何做到的呢？他的记录证明了一切。在他的领导下，耶鲁大学基金（Endowment）从 1988 年至 2008 年 6 月，即它的财政年度结束，连续 20 年产生了正回报。在去年 6 月结束的十年中，耶鲁大学基金的年平均回报率为 16.3%，而普通大学基金的平均回报率为 6.5%，标普500指数的平均回报率为2.9%。这种表现使 Swenson 成为所有机构资金管理者中排名前百分之一，为耶鲁大学基金增加了约 150 亿美元。
Yale did not escape last year's market wrath. As of December, the portfolio lost about $6 billion or 26 percent of its value. But how did he generate those long-term results? Well, Swenson radically altered what Yale's Endowment invests in. From the traditional mix of domestic stock, bonds, and cash, he and his team switched to alternative investments. Their stake in private equity increased from under 4 percent to over 20 percent.
去年，耶鲁大学也没有逃过市场的惩罚。截至12月，其投资组合损失约60亿美元，价值下降了26%。但是，他是如何取得那些长期收益的呢？好吧，斯文森彻底改变了耶鲁基金会的投资方式。他和他的团队从传统的国内股票、债券和现金投资组合转向了替代性投资。其私募股权所占比例从不到4%增加到了20%以上。
In real assets like timber and real estate, the allocation increased from 8.5 percent to 29.3 percent and in hedge funds from 0 to 25.1 percent. Meanwhile, the investment in domestic stocks and bonds plunged from over 70 percent to under 15 percent. The Swenson has literally written the book on university endowment management.
在实物资产例如林木和房地产方面，配置比重从8.5%增加到了29.3%，而在对冲基金方面，从0增加到了25.1%。与此同时，对国内股票和债券的投资下降了超过70%至不到15%。Swenson在大学捐赠基金管理方面写下了一本书。
His recently revised edition of pioneering portfolio management and unconventional approach to institutional investment is considered the Bible for institutional money managers. And luckily, he has brought his message to individual investors with his book unconventional success, a fundamental approach to personal investment. What should our investment approach be? We're going to ask David Swenson next on Consuelo Mack Wealth Track.
他最近修订的开创性组合管理和非传统机构投资方法已被认为是机构资金管理者的圣经。幸运的是，他通过他的书《非传统成功》，将他的信息带给了个人投资者，这是一种基本的个人投资方法。我们的投资方法应该是什么？下一步我们将在Consuelo Mack Wealth Track上求助David Swenson。
Well, we are delighted to welcome him in a Wealth Track television exclusive, the Chief Investment Officer of Yale's Endowment, David Swenson. David, it's great to have you here. Thanks for joining us. It's my pleasure. Thank you.
非常高兴能在Wealth Track电视独家专访中欢迎耶鲁大学基金会的首席投资官David Swenson先生。David先生，非常感谢您的加入，我们很高兴有您在这里。我很荣幸，谢谢您。
Let me ask you about what you've done at Yale. Because 24 years ago, you arrived at Yale, you were at the tender age of 31. Their endowment was then a billion dollars. As I just said, it went up to 22.9 billion and it's now down to around 17 billion. But you decided to make some really radical changes in the mix of the portfolio. What was wrong with the old mix? What was it when you got there? And why did you decide to make those changes?
请让我问问你在耶鲁大学的工作。24年前，您31岁的时候来到了耶鲁，当时他们的捐赠基金是十亿美元。正如我所说，它涨到了229亿美元，现在降至大约170亿美元。但是，您决定在组合投资组合中进行一些非常激进的改变。旧的投资组合有什么问题？当您到那里的时候，他们的投资组合是什么？为什么您决定进行这些改变？
So when I arrived at Yale, it was April 1st, 1985. You think there's an April Fool's joke there somewhere? Perhaps, yeah. I was totally unencumbered with formal investment management experience. And so the first thing I did was look around and see how it was other institutions invested their funds. I saw colleges and universities had, on average, 50% of their portfolio in US stocks, 40% in US bonds and cash, and 10% in the smattering of alternatives. And if you think about that, both from a common sense perspective and from a finance theoretical perspective, it doesn't make any sense.
我到耶鲁大学的时候是1985年4月1日，你觉得那里可能有愚人节玩笑吗？也许是吧。我完全没有正式的投资管理经验，于是我首先做的是看看其他机构如何投资他们的资金。我看到大学通常将50%的资产投资在美国股票上，40%投资在美国债券和现金上，10%投资在各种替代性资产上。如果你从常识角度和金融理论角度考虑这一点，它是没有任何意义的。
And first of all, diversification is a great thing. And it was even known back then in 1985 that diversification was a great thing. Even in 1985. Right. And Harry Markowitz, who's probably the father of modern portfolio theories, says diversification is a free launch. We teach our students and introductory economics. There ain't no such thing as a free launch. But diversification is. For a given level of risk, you can generate higher returns if you diversify. And diversification means a lot of different things to a lot of different people.
首先，多元化是一件好事。即使在1985年，人们就已经知道多元化是一件好事了。甚至于在1985年。哈里·马科维茨（可能是现代投资组合理论之父）说，多元化是一个免费的发射。我们教我们的学生基础经济学时说，没有免费的午餐。但是多元化是的。在风险水平相同的情况下，如果你进行多元化，你可以获得 更高的回报。多元化对不同的人意味着不同的事情。
So in 1985 at Yale and a lot of other endowments, they thought they were diversified, right? Or maybe they didn't. Maybe they were diversified when you looked at their holdings of domestic equities. And maybe they were diversified if you took a look at their holdings of bonds. But there's no way that you can argue having 50% of your assets in a single asset class, US stocks, or having 90% of your assets in US marketable securities represents diversification. The portfolio has simply failed that test.
1985年，耶鲁大学和其他很多捐赠基金认为它们已经实现了分散投资，对吧？或者也许他们并没有这样认为。也许从他们持有的国内股票来看，他们已经实现了分散投资。也许从他们的债券持仓来看，他们已经实现了分散投资。但是如果你把50%的资产投在美国股票这一类资产上，或者90%持仓在美国市场可流通证券，你无法争辩这是在实现分散投资。这样的投资组合明显没有通过分散风险测试。
But so how did you get from what you just described to what I just described in my opening remarks, which is a radically different portfolio? And why did you go the direction that you went in where you're really vastly underweighting the domestic stocks and bonds that you just talked about?
那么你是怎样从刚才描述的情况转移到我在开场白中所描述的截然不同的投资组合的呢？你为什么会朝着这个方向去，明显地低估了你刚才谈到的国内股票和债券？
Well, I mean, there's one other important element that underpins the strategy. And that's that if you have a long investment horizon. Which an endowment does. Which an endowment does. And which we do when we start our careers. And it becomes increasingly shorter as we as we get older. But this principle applies to a great many individual investors as well. With a long time horizon, you should have an equity orientation. And an equity orientation because because over longer periods of time, equities are going to deliver better results.
我的意思是，有一个重要的元素支撑着这个投资策略。那就是如果你有很长的投资期限。像捐赠基金一样。像我们开始工作时一样有捐赠基金的期限。但随着我们年龄的增长，这个期限会越来越短。但这个原则也适用于很多个人投资者。如果有一个漫长的时间周期，你就该选择股权导向。因为在更长的时间段里，股票将会带来更好的业绩。
Right. If they don't, then capitalism isn't working. And we could well be at a point where investments and equities are going to produce returns going forward that are higher than what we've seen in the past five or ten years. And we could well be in a position where bonds are priced to produce lower returns. When you see treasuries with coupons of two or two and a half or three percent, that doesn't really bode well for prospective returns.
好的。 如果资本主义无法解决这个问题，那么我们极有可能到了一个投资和股票的回报率高于过去五到十年的点。同时，债券的回报率可能会降低。当你看到国债券息票为2%、2.5%或3%时，这对未来的回报率并不利。
So a lot of people listening out there are going to say, so what does David Swinson think the returns we're going to get are going to be from equities? So what do you think? Do you do you think that what do you think equity returns? What should we expect in returns from equities in the next five, ten, twenty years? Those are the questions that are really impossible.
很多听众会问大卫·斯文森认为股票回报率会是多少？你认为股票回报率会是多少？在未来5、10、20年中，我们应该期望股票的回报率是多少？这些问题真的很难回答。
Okay. So what we're going to do is we're going to have to think about what we're going to get in the next five or ten years. So what do we do? We're going to have to think about when we're not facing the type of crisis that we've lived through in the past six or nine or a year. Is that what you're doing now? Are you looking at the process through a macro screen essentially? And if so, so take us, take us through that process.
好的。那么我们需要思考接下来五到十年我们能够获得什么。那么我们该怎么做呢？我们需要思考当我们没有像过去六到九个月经历的那种危机时应该怎么做。你现在正在运用宏观屏幕来看待这个过程吗？如果是的话，请带领我们一起来看这个过程。
I'm religiously bottom up in everything that we do. Bottom up, not top down. Yeah, bottom up, not top down, but the crisis forces you to think top down in ways that would, I think, be unproductive in normal circumstances, but are absolutely necessary in the midst of a crisis. You have to think about the functioning of the credit system. You have to think about the potential impact of monetary policy and fiscal policy on markets over the next five or ten or fifteen years.
我在我们所做的一切方面都有一个坚定的“自下而上”的宗教信仰。是自下而上的，而不是自上而下的。是的，是自下而上，而不是自上而下的，但是在危机中，你被迫以一种在正常情况下可能是无效的方式自上而下地思考，但是在危机中绝对必要。你必须考虑信贷系统的运作。你必须考虑货币政策和财政政策对未来五到十五年市场的潜在影响。
And I guess this is kind of a long way of cycling back to your question about what kind of returns do we expect from equities and perhaps other asset classes going forward. And I would say with today as a starting point, you could expect over reasonable periods of time to be rewarded for equity exposure. It's certainly a better time to put money in the stock market than a year ago or three years ago or five years ago because you've got a much more attractive entry point.
我想这可以是回答你关于未来股票和其他资产类别的回报预期的问题的方法。我认为从今天开始，您可以期望在合理的时间内获得股权回报。现在投资股票市场比一年前、三年前或五年前更有吸引力，因为您有一个更优秀的进场点。
So let me ask you about what we were talking about before as well. You looked at the endowment as it was invested in 1985 and you saw that it really wasn't well diversified and that all the studies are absolutely right so that broad diversification pays off over a long periods of time. So, and this is a question you've had many times, but a lot of people are saying now diversification didn't pay off. And in fact, the Yale endowment was down 25% from June to December of last year. So, and you have an answer for that and that answer is?
那么，让我再问一下我们之前谈论的话题。您看到1985年捐赠金投资的情况时发现，它的分散投资不够充分，而所有的研究都表明，在长期内，广泛的分散投资会带来回报。因此，您曾多次面临的一个问题是，很多人现在说分散投资并没有带来回报。实际上，耶鲁捐赠金在去年6月至12月期间下跌了25%。那么，您对此有回答，这个答案是什么？
Well, I think in the first instance, diversification isn't going to help in the midst of a financial crisis or at least the type of diversification that you see in institutional portfolios like Yale's. Diversification failed in 1987. It failed in 1998 and it failed again in this in this current crisis because in these panics that we experienced in 87 and 98 and the one that we're experiencing currently, only two things matter. Risk and safety. And people move away from risk and they move toward the safety of holdings of treasury securities. And that causes the price of all risky assets to go down simultaneously. And also causes the price of treasuries to go up dramatically. I happen in 87, I happen in 98 and it's happening today in a way that's far more pervasive and far more profound. And you have to move beyond the time, the immediate time of the crisis to see the benefits of diversification.
我认为，首先，在金融危机中，分散投资并不能帮助我们，或者至少像耶鲁大学机构投资组合那样的分散投资是没有用的。分散投资在1987年失败了，在1998年也失败了，而在这场最近的危机中又再次失败了。因为在这些恐慌中，我们只关心两件事：风险和安全。人们会朝着持有国债等安全资产的方向，远离风险。这会导致所有高风险资产的价格同时下跌，同时也会导致国债价格大幅上涨。这在1987年和1998年都发生过，并且在现在这个更普遍更深刻的危机中也正在发生。因此，我们必须超越危机的直接时间，看到分散投资的好处。
So, were there any lessons that you learned in the financial crisis that we've just come through and we're still kind of clawing our way out of investment lessons that anything that you would now do differently in the future than you did in the past?
那么，在我们刚刚经历过的金融危机中，你学到了什么教训，在我们仍在努力摆脱困境的投资经验中，你现在会采取与过去不同的策略吗？请分享你的投资经验。
I'm not sure that the crisis has caused us to conclude that we would do things differently but it's certainly highlighted the importance of liquidity. Now, one of the things that I've said consistently and I still continue to believe to be true is that investors get paid unreasonable amounts for accepting illiquidity in their portfolios. So hedge funds, private equity funds, right? And even if you look in the government bond market, there are illiquid treasury securities where you get a substantial premium relative to treasuries that are liquid or on the run.
我不确定危机是否导致我们得出了不同的结论，但它肯定凸显了流动性的重要性。现在，我一直坚持并且仍然相信的一点是，投资者为了接受其投资组合中的不流动性，获得了不合理的报酬。所以对冲基金，私募股权基金等，即使你在政府债券市场上看，也有非流通的国债证券，相对于流通的或任何一种主要债券，它们都有很高的溢价。
And then beyond that, there are full faith and credit instruments of the US government that aren't standard treasury securities that pay you even more. And it's solely a function of liquidity. So, almost everywhere in the investment world you can find illiquid alternatives that will pay a premium rate of return. But you've got to be able to manage the portfolio through a period of crisis and make sure that you generate the liquidity that you need to support in this case Yale University and you've got to be in a position to generate the liquidity that you need to support your portfolio management activities.
此外，美国政府还有全信托和信用工具，它们不是标准的国债证券，可以给你更高的回报。这完全取决于流动性。所以，你在投资世界几乎可以找到所有非流动性的替代品，它们将支付高溢价回报。但你必须能够在危机期间管理投资组合，并确保产生所需的流动性，以支持这种情况下的耶鲁大学，并且必须处于产生您需要的流动性以支持您的投资组合管理活动的位置。
I want to bring this back to the individual as well because I know you're very interested in helping the rest of us. And in unconventional success, which is your book for individuals, you stress asset allocation, diversification, who I'm important that is. A couple of major principles. So, tell us a little bit about, you know, give us kind of your thumbnail sketch of why diversification for individuals is so important and how we can figure out the appropriate asset allocation as well, which starts me as difficult.
我想将这个回归到个人身上，因为我知道您非常有兴趣帮助我们其他人。在您为个人撰写的《非传统成功》一书中，您强调资产配置、分散化。一些重要的原则。那么，请告诉我们一些关于个人分散化的重要性以及如何确定适当的资产配置的简要概述，这对我来说非常困难。
So, I think that the same basic principles apply to institutions and individuals in terms of the importance of asset allocation and having a diversified and an equity oriented portfolio. When I started writing unconventional success, what I wanted to do was take pioneering portfolio management and essentially translate it into a book for individuals that would follow the same type of strategy that we pursued at Yale. But I knew that there would have to be different investment tools that would be available to individuals because much of what we do at Yale is in vehicles that are only open to institutions.
因此，我认为资产配置的重要性和拥有多元化和股权导向的投资组合在机构和个人方面应用相同的基本原则。当我开始撰写《非常规的成功》时，我想做的是将开拓性的投资组合管理方法转化为适用于个人的书籍，这本书将遵循我们在耶鲁大学追求的相同策略。但我知道，个人会有不同的投资工具可供选择，因为我们在耶鲁大学所使用的许多工具只对机构开放。
And I was really disappointed to find that I couldn't translate what we do at Yale directly to the portfolios that individuals hold. And because you couldn't find the kind of active management available to individuals that you can find obviously at Yale. That's exactly it. You couldn't find high quality active management for all the various asset classes that we've got at Yale for the individual investor. And so I came to the conclusion that the individual has to have a radically different portfolio.
我非常失望地发现，我不能直接将我们在耶鲁大学所做的工作翻译到个人持有的投资组合上。因为你无法像在耶鲁那样找到适用于个人的高质量积极管理方式。这就是问题所在。你不能在各种资产类别中找到像我们在耶鲁那样的高质量积极管理方式，适用于个人投资者。因此，我得出结论，个人必须拥有完全不同的投资组合。
I actually came to the conclusion that in the investment world you need to be on either one end of the continuum or the other end of the continuum. You either need to be very, very active and we are at Yale. I've got 20 investment professionals in the investment office who are devoting their careers to finding these high quality active management opportunities or you should be on the other end of the spectrum and you should be completely passive. And that's where I, that's where much of us including myself, you think I belong.
我得出的结论是，在投资领域里，你需要在连续的两端之一。你要么非常非常积极，我们在耶鲁大学有20名投资专家在投资办公室工作，致力于寻找这些高质量的积极管理机会；或者你应该在另一端完全被动。这就是我，包括我自己在内的许多人认为我属于该范畴的原因。
But why can't I hire 20 terrific mutual fund managers? I mean just buy different mutual funds and allocate them among the different asset allocation classes. Why doesn't that work for me but it works for you? Well the problem is that the quality of the management and the mutual fund industry is not particularly high and you pay an extraordinarily high price for that not very good management. I cite a study by Robert Nod in my book and he looks at 20 years worth of mutual fund returns and comes to the conclusion that you've got about a 15% chance, 15% chance of beating the market after fees and after taxes.
为什么我不能雇用20个优秀的共同基金经理？我的意思是，只需购买不同的共同基金，并将它们分配到不同的资产配置类别中。为什么这对我不起作用，但对你起作用？问题在于，共同基金行业的管理质量并不高，而您为此支付了非常高的费用，却得到了不太好的管理。我在我的书中引用了Robert Nod的一项研究，他研究了20年的共同基金回报，并得出结论：除去费用和税金后，您约有15%的机会击败市场。
And his study suffers from what all studies suffer from something called survivor bias. You only get to look at the funds that have been in business for 20 years. But the mortality rate is stunning. There's a center for research and security prices, survivorship free database that has 30,000 mutual funds in it. Well 20,000 of them are alive and kicking and 10,000 of them are dead. Why is it that in the investment world because you know I we try to unwelter, I try to interview the top investment managers and many of them are mutual fund managers that kind of the cremdle a crem. So you know why is it that I can't as an individual you know pick kind of the best mutual fund managers just like I would pick the best doctor or the best lawyer in the financial world.
他的研究受到所有研究普遍存在的“幸存者偏差”的影响。您只能查看已经运营了20年的基金。但是，死亡率令人震惊。有一个名为研究和安全价格中心的幸存者免费数据库，其中拥有30,000个共同基金。其中有20,000个仍在活跃中，而另外10,000个已经死亡了。为什么在投资界中，因为我们试图理解，我试图采访最优秀的投资经理人，他们中的许多人都是共同基金经理人？所以，为什么我作为一个个人，不能像我选择最好的医生或最好的律师一样，在金融界选择最好的共同基金经理呢？
So why doesn't it work? Well there are a number of ways that you can answer the question. So we say after fees, after taxes. Well fees are too high. Right so that's something that you see throughout the entire industry. And of course we're not talking about the index funds because the index funds are the more cost way of getting exposure to the market. But why are the tax bills so high? Because turnovers too high.
为什么投资没有回报？有很多种答案。我们可以提到税费，税费太高了，这是整个行业的通病。当然，这里不包括指数基金，因为指数基金是进入市场的一种成本较低的方式。但是为什么税费如此高呢？因为换手率太高了。
The mutual fund managers are trading the portfolios as if taxes don't matter and taxes do matter. And they're trading the portfolios as if transactions cost and market impact don't matter and they do matter. And as they trade the portfolios basically what's happening is the Wall Street is you know siphoning off its slice of the pie and I guess that's a mixed metaphor sorry about that. And you know that's at the expense of the investor.
共同基金经理们交易投资组合的方式好像税费并不重要，但实际上税费非常重要。他们的交易方式好像交易成本和市场影响并不重要，但实际上非常重要。当他们交易投资组合时，实质上发生的是华尔街在分得一份饼的同时，也损害了投资者的利益。抱歉因为使用了不当的隐喻，造成了语意的混淆。
But even if you end up finding that needle in a haystack that mutual fund that is going to outperform over a long period of time you as an investor and I'm not just talking about individuals this unfortunately is true of institutions as well are likely to be motivated not by kind of pure analytical rational calculus but by fear and by greed. Morning started a study which I think is absolutely fascinating.
即使你最终找到了那个能在长期内取得超额收益的共同基金，作为投资者，我不仅指个人，这也可适用于机构，你的动机很可能不是源于分析和理性计算，而是出于恐惧和贪婪。Morning开始了一项我认为非常有趣的研究。
Ten years worth of returns for everyone of the seventeen categories of equity funds that they've got. And they compared dollar-weighted returns to time-weighted returns. Time-weighted returns of the returns you see in the prospectus of the returns you see in the advertisements. Dollar-weighted returns taken to account investor cash flows. In every one of those seventeen categories dollar-weighted returns were less than the time-weighted returns. All right.
他们拥有十年每一种股票基金的回报数据，并将美元加权回报与时间加权回报进行了比较。时间加权回报是指你在招股说明书和广告中看到的回报。美元加权回报考虑了投资者的现金流。在这十七种分类中，每一种基金的美元加权回报都低于时间加权回报。
Which meant that individuals got in after good performance and got out after bad performance and so they were buying high and selling low. So they take this mutual fund industry which produces a bunch of products that are not great to start with and then they screw it up by chasing hot performance. Right. No, absolutely. After things turn cold. Yeah. It's definitely a problem with individuals. So your. An institution too.
这意味着在表现良好之后个人进入市场，在表现不佳之后退出市场，因此他们在高点买入低点卖出。所以他们对产生了一大堆本来就不好的产品的共同基金行业造成了影响，并通过追逐热门表现而搞砸了它。没错，完全如此。等热度降温之后，个人绝对是一个问题。那么，你的机构呢？
Right. So your recommendation for individuals basically is to is to invest in index funds. And and and the your recommended asset allocation at this point would be for an equity oriented investor would be what. So thirty percent in US stocks. Fifteen percent in treasury bonds. Fifteen percent in treasury inflation protected securities. And then in in my book I talk about twenty percent in reeds. I've got a fifteen percent allocation to foreign developed equities and a and a five percent allocation to emerging markets.
好的。所以您对个人的建议基本上是要投资于指数基金。您目前建议的资产配置对于股票导向的投资者是什么？美国股票占30％，国债占15％，通胀保护证券占15％。在我的书中，我提到了20％的房地产投资信托基金（REITs）的配置。我有15％的外国发达市场股票配置和5％新兴市场股票配置。
Which I think you've up to ten percent. Right. And emerging markets at this point. So I think I probably would put some more in emerging markets. Maybe move that from five to ten and take the reeds and move it from twenty to fifteen. But that would be a basic kind of equity oriented growth oriented portfolio that that would you think would provide the kind of diversification that you need.
我认为你已经投资了10%。没错。目前来看，新兴市场很有前景。所以我认为我可能会在新兴市场投资更多，把股票比重从5%增加到10%，并将房地产信托投资比重从20%降至15%。但这将是一种基本的股权导向增长投资组合，我认为它能提供你所需要的多样化。
And you know and I guess another question is for a lot of our viewers are older. They're either in retirement or they're nearing retirement. So how does that change the equation? How defensive should we get as we get closer to retirement? Well so so I think that the best way to deal with getting older and moving from let's say the accumulation phase to the consumption phase is simply to keep that risky portfolio intact. But have a portfolio that's a blend of the risky portfolio and a riskless asset like cash or treasury inflation protected securities or something like that.
你知道，我猜还有另一个问题是我们很多观众都比较年长，他们要么已经退休了，要么快要退休了。那么这会改变方程式吗？我们在退休前应该有多大的防御性投资？我认为，应对变老和从积累阶段转向消费阶段的最佳方式就是保持高风险投资组合的完整性。但是需要在投资组合中加入一个类似现金、国库通胀保护证券等零风险资产和高风险投资组合的混合配置。
And so you know when you're in your 30s or 40s or 50s and you're saving for retirement it should probably be a hundred percent in the risky portfolio. But then as you grow older and get to the point where you're going to be actually consuming what it is that you've accumulated to move out of the risky portfolio gradually into a combination of the risky portfolio and cash or treasuries.
因此，当你到了三四五十岁并且开始为退休存钱时，你应该把百分之百资金放在高风险投资组合中。但是，当你年龄增长到需要开始使用存储的资金时，你应该逐渐从高风险投资组合转移到高风险投资组合和现金或国债的组合。
Alright that's very helpful. So David Swenson I'm going to have to ask you now for the one investment so the one thing that we should all own some of in a longer diversified portfolio what would it be?
好的，非常有帮助。所以David Swenson，我现在必须要问你：在一个更长期的多元化投资组合中，我们应该拥有的一种投资或一件事是什么？
So we talked earlier about the notion that this current crisis is causing us to think more top down. Yes. And this is an investment that addresses some of the concerns that I have coming out of this crisis. We've had this massive fiscal stimulus, massive monetary stimulus.
我们之前谈到过当前的危机会让我们更倾向于从高层管理的角度思考。是的，这次投资是针对我在这场危机中担心的一些问题的。我们已经进行了大规模的财政刺激和货币刺激。
And it's hard to see how that doesn't translate into pretty substantial inflation or at least a pretty substantial risk of inflation. Down the road. So at some point. Down the road at some point. So treasury inflation protected securities would be the one investment that I would put on the table that should be in every investor's portfolio. And another portfolio diversifier as well which is what they do kind of double duty.
很难想象这不会转化为相当大的通货膨胀，或者至少是相当大的通货膨胀风险。在未来的某个时候。因此，国库通胀保护证券将成为我认为应该在每个投资者的投资组合中的一个投资选择。另一个投资组合多元化也发挥了双重作用。
Absolutely. And it does double duty in another way.
当然。它还可以另外起到双倍的作用。
If you own new issue treasury inflation protected securities they can actually protect you against deflation as well.
如果您拥有新发行的通货膨胀保护国债，实际上他们也可以保护您免受通货紧缩的影响。
Right because you're guaranteed that you'll get your principal back.
正确，因为你保证可以拿回本金。
这句话意思是投资某个项目或商品时，因为你可以确保会获得本金的返还，所以是比较安全可靠的选择。
So new issue treasury inflation protected securities can do double duty in the portfolio.
新问题的通货膨胀保护证券可以在投资组合中发挥双重作用。