To put it bluntly, the participation of China allowed the allies to argue that we are not fighting a race war. That symbolically hugely important and that was very important especially to the United States. That was Hans van der Ven talking about his new book on China's 20th century wars. You're listening to the history extra podcast from BBC History magazine. Whether UK's best-selling history magazine available in print and several digital formats all over the world. Find out more at historyextra.com/subscribe or look out for us in your digital newsstand or app store.
Hello and welcome to the history extra podcast. I'm Rob Atter the editor of BBC History magazine. Today's interview is with Hans van der Ven who's professor of modern Chinese history at the University of Cambridge. He is the author of a new book entitled China at War, Triumph, and Tragedy in the emergence of the new China which explores China's role in World War II and the Korean War as well as the story of China's Civil War which resulted in the communist takeover of 1949.
大家好,欢迎收听历史额外的播客节目。我是BBC历史杂志的编辑Rob Atter。今天的采访对象是剑桥大学现代中国历史教授Hans van der Ven。他是一本新书《战争中的中国:新中国的崛起中的胜利与悲剧》的作者,探讨中国在二战和朝鲜战争中的角色,以及中国内战的故事,导致了1949年共产主义接管的发生。
Putting the questions to Hans was fellow China expert Professor Rana Mitter of the University of Oxford. Hello, it's a pleasure to be here in Central London. My name is Rana Mitter and I'm a historian of modern China based at Oxford University. Among the books I've written in the past is China's war with Japan the struggle for survival and account of the political and social history of China during the years of the Second World War.
I'm still relatively unexplored topic and that's why it's such a huge pledge to be here with Professor Hans van der Ven of Cambridge University. Hans has been professor or teaching at Cambridge now for a couple of decades and during that time he's established a reputation as a very distinguished and senior scholar of modern Chinese history.
He's worked on topics including the origins of the Chinese Communist Party, Sino-American military relations during the Second World War period, and the history of a fascinating organization called the Maritime Custom Service. You want to know what that is? You're going to have to look it up. But today we're going to concentrate on Hans van der Ven's new book China at War which is about to be published by Profile in the UK this year and we'll come out in the United States next year.
Hans, welcome. This book China at War covers one of the most turbulent periods in China's modern history. Could you perhaps give us an image or a scene from that period that in some ways symbolizes this history for you? Well first of all thank you for the wonderful introduction and for your own work on the Second World War in China. And I think we share our concerns about that. I think in this period, there are many scenes that come to mind as sort of important, interesting, and so on.
You could mention the great sea island incident of December 1936 where John Keishack wounds himself as he tries to escape from somebody taking the prison. But for me, the most sort of still the most vivid image is really on September 1945 which is when Japan surrendered to China. And China did this, the Nationalist did this on the 9th of September because in Chinese that is the 9th, 9th day.
Which is of course a reference to the 11th of the 11th for the end of World War I but also in Chinese it means forever, forever. These sounds are what you call it, homophonous. So the phrase in Chinese is geo, geo, geo. Which means 9, 9 or also forever, forever. Let there be peace and forever more.
And that's a great thing but underneath that reality, if the Nationalist is trying to use that symbol to force a peace that isn't actually there. And they seem to be in control but in reality they are not. The largest part of the country remains under Japanese occupation. And in fact, the Nationalists need the Japanese in order to keep control over those areas otherwise they're going to be taken by the communists. So they are victors but in a very weak position and they need the Japanese but it's also important sort of symbolically because the Japanese decide that the best thing they can do for their own future is to work with the Nationalists.
Because that is going to keep the communists, both the Soviets and the Chinese communists away from Japan. It will then provide, it is hoped a peaceful China will provide markets for Japan that will help Japan revive its economy. And of course, that situation is so ironic because the whole war began with Japan trying to wrestle the Nationalists into the ground. And I think sort of the third aspect of that that I find so sort of almost so vivid is so important is because the United States and the British want to make the fall of Japan the end of World War II.
But in reality, the fighting in China, in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam, in Indonesia, in Malaysia and someone doesn't end so the war continues. There's a huge amount in there with lots of actors and personalities so we have the Chinese nationalists, Chinese communists, we have the Soviets, we have the British. we have the Americans
And it's really interesting that for your iconic moment you chose the very end of the war when we might think of this as an end point But the way you put it, it's almost the beginning. So to get to that I'd like to move us back a little bit and just talk about some of these actors, some of these personalities
For instance you've mentioned the Chinese leader Chang Kai-shek Now he's one of the personalities in this book who comes through very strongly He's a name that people I guess sort of remember particularly if they know a bit of mid 20th century history but from being 60, 70 years ago one of the most famous men in the world He's kind of fladed and forgotten now. Just take us back a moment or two for perhaps people not familiar with the history Very briefly who he was and where he came from. Who was he?
Let's talk a little bit about Chang Kai-shek then because he is an interesting person And I think in the key to him is to see him as struggling with his own personality Which can be one that flies into rage and all that stuff and tries to control it. He believes he has a great mission in order to realize Sun Yat-sense vision for China Sun Yat-sense is a nationalist. He is certainly a nationalist. He is also the one who has some military training but he's dealing with a very difficult situation The nationalists are divided just sort of these warlord armies all around China
And he is also dealing he's not a man who's a great of international experience and then strangely enough his international diplomacy is actually very effective Because in some ways you could see the Zhang Kai-shek as losing as armies during World War II But also getting the acceptance of the international community of China as an independent sovereign equal country that needs to be taken seriously And that said something about the sophistication of nationalist international diplomacy And Zhang Kai-shek and the nationalists play a weak military hand with great intelligence and actually with great effectiveness In some ways opposed to the British who gain a lot militarily from the United States, from the Allies But lose a lot in terms of their empire and in that triangle the nationalists are very important to Roosevelt in beginning to undermine these empires that have made up the world order until then
So for me we talk about personalities in writing this book The one personality we rarely talk about in the context of the Second World War is that of Sun Yat-sen And I think it's very interesting that he remains in people's minds all the time So Sun Yat-sen is the great Chinese nationalist leader, he's a figure of the late 19th century He's actually from Canton or Cantonese origin down in the south of China And in a very short period of time in the last few decades of the 19th century in the very beginning of the early 20th century
He becomes enemy number one for the Chinese dynasty of that time, the Qing dynasty People may know from the movie the last emperor, the last emperor was in fact the last emperor of the Qing dynasty And he was a figure who put together a political idea in some ways that was very new in China The idea that China was not a traditional empire which would become a nation state in which various different ethnicities and races should come together He wasn't a racist in that sense, but he did believe that the Chinese nation should have its own destiny in a world of nation states
So in that sense he was rather a typical figure of that kind of Asian nationalist along with Nairu and others in the early 20th century But he had of course this continuing role a legacy after his death in China Inspiring many thinkers at the time including Zhang Ka-sheng Yes very clearly and that's where all those Zhang Ka-sheng acts in the name of Sun Yat-sen It is a source of legitimacy for him a symbol that the nationalist use as this is the father of the country And it is his will that is going to be realized And the name of the second world war in China is the war of resistance but also the construction of the nation
With World War II people in the West tend to associate that period with in Europe of course the invention of Poland by Hitler Then Pearl Harbor comes along the Americans sometimes slightly jokingly sometimes not argue that it's not until Pearl Harbor that the war is really a world war because the US comes in
But your book makes a very powerful case which I'd certainly agree with that we have to take China much more seriously as an actor in World War II And I should say that's based on work that you've been doing in the academic sphere over the last 15, 20 years perhaps So it's a thesis you've brought together over a long time Could you explain in the baldest way possible really why should those of us who perhaps just know a more general sense of World War II in Europe or in the Pacific take China seriously as an actor during that war?
Well I think for practical reasons but also for how we understand the world today And I think it's what the reality is that during World War II an enormous amount of fighting and violence went on in East Asia, Southeast Asia and so on So that is simply a reality we have to take a count of And I think the emphasis on the UK role, the US role and perhaps even still to a lesser extent the role of the Soviet Union which of course did most of the fighting against Germany That speaks to a narrative that remains essentially Eurocentred And that is I think in many ways just fireball and understandable because a first generation of scholars, parents, family members who were closely affected by the war but I think it is time
So you're from the Netherlands and one of the things at the beginning of your book you're right about is your own family connections in the Netherlands with World War II That's what we just did to for 30 seconds to hear about that because you said that was a rather personally made comment when you talk about Eurocentrism I don't know if you want to detour it later but I think if you go first back to sort of why is China important in the Second World War?
I think it's important simply for the reality underground. This was part of a human story that we all need to be aware of But China also was militarily politically important, militarily usual way what people say is a tiny down and large part of Japanese forces So the general wisdom or conventional wisdom from people who know a little bit about the Asian Theatre of World War II is that whatever else happened five to six hundred thousand Japanese troops were bogged down in what the Japanese themselves sometimes refer to as the China trap or the China problem the China quagmire is that fair to say that was a Chinese contribution against the Japanese?
I think it is fair to say I mean I think as you said you have argued yourself maybe those troops were not first rate forces that's true but if Japan had been able to combine the resources of Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan that it could have done things with that especially against the Soviet Union that would have met it but I think China met it to in the geopolitics of the time Roosevelt used China well I think to put it bluntly the participation of China allowed the allies to argue that we are not fighting a race war That symbolically hugely important and that was very important especially to the United States
Could you give examples of that? I mean did Roosevelt ever speak out in open terms on the radio or elsewhere about this being not just a war for the white races but war? I think that is an aspect that I find fascinating On the one hand we have the British version Churchill goes to Washington and does his speeches and rallies the United States and his great mates with Roosevelt Roosevelt what does Roosevelt do? He does that and that is important and he goes with that but he also invites Madame Deng some mailing to come to the United States Madame Chanko-Chek, Madame Chanko-Chek and she has radio speeches but she is a huge hit all across the United States with all her mass rallies
So you see Roosevelt with the Americans in a clever way balancing Europe but also creating a positive Asian other Less well known because much less well public is that Roosevelt also used Chanko-Chek to undermine British control of India, British Empire Hang on there is a whole generation of I have to say crusty colonels living in small seaside towns even today in parts of Britain who are convinced that the Americans are the reason that the British Empire fell in the end You are basically giving them ammunition with this right?
I guess so I think Roosevelt was working towards a world order which no longer was consisted of these highly militarized empire trading blocks. He believed that that made for a very unstable situation and one is unsustainable given the kind of nationalism that were clearly emerging all across the world. And for him Chanko-Chek was a foil by which to make that happen in a very plight way.
When he had sort of Chanko-Chek appeal to Roosevelt to do things in India or to then Roosevelt sends on those messages from Chanko-Chek to Churchill knowing very well that Churchill would be very upset by this. Roosevelt was a consummate politician in this regard and he began to, of course at Cairo in the great conference in Cairo of November 1943. Roosevelt really does begin to create an alternative form of East Asia in which China is the regional power and I think a lot of things are discussed at the Cairo conference.
I was just making it clear at this point that Winston Churchill during the Cairo conference in 1943 was very unhappy in many ways. This was the only one of the great conferences of World War II where Chanko-Chek, a non-European sovereign leader of a country that was in Asia sat in equal standing with Winston Churchill and Roosevelt.
You know public photos and all of that but at the same time Churchill famously said, isn't there a way we can get the generalist of Chanko-Chek and his wife to just go off and do some tourism in the pyramids and he meant Roosevelt and he would get on with the real work. So Churchill really did not take to this at all well. No, and if you read the diaries of Lord Moran is his physician Churchill is trying very hard to make an argument about the superiority of English-speaking countries.
Roosevelt will have nothing of it. He goes off with Chanko-Chek and tries to settle East Asia with Chanko-Chek. He wants the Chinese Chanko-Chek to actually run the occupation of Japan that doesn't happen in the end. And in the Cairo community, the independence of Korea is announced or is underwritten.
That was against Churchill's wishes because he well understood the implications. Roosevelt goes back, has his fireside chats all about sort of these Asian independence and you have people in Whitehall saying, well if that's going to happen in whatever in Korea, then what is going to happen with Ampli. And indeed, that's exactly right. And so Roosevelt is trying to maneuver in the same way that he tried to maneuver the United States slowly into the Second World War.
He's trying to maneuver the world into his version of a... In many ways the post-war order that we... not well the Cold War sort of undermined that but yeah. To put it simply, would you say that taking that idea in mind and reading your book. If we want to rethink the actually rather, you know, almost clichéd Anglo-American alliance in World War II. Which we all know was an immense motor of allied power that ultimately defeated the Axis.
To understand the new and more complex way, we really have to. understand that China and China's situation was a very big deal for the United States I mean that's absolutely right And this goes about what happens after the Second World War How are going to put a new world order together? America doesn't want to return to the world of empires. The most simply put, that's it.
But I think to go back to the point you made earlier, and you talk about sort of the UK-US perspectives on World War II And I think here my background is important. That is a perspective, of course, informed by fictors who were never occupied, who didn't have to deal with the realities of occupation Coming from a country that was occupied. So you're from the Netherlands. I'm from the Netherlands. And the country was occupied and my parents lived through it out and they talked about that And I think the reality is sort of a perspective, a perspective, informed by the realities of occupation which must be true for China Does bring up a new way of looking at all this that I think begins to sort of get away from a sort of a heroic perspective in which it is Victors against the losers or heroes against enemies or good against evil. A sort of a more gray history I think is what as a second generation we should be moving towards.
So let's try and nail down something on that point more specifically. Again, many people listening may not know that much about the Chinese role in World War II. It's probably of the major theaters of the war, still the one that's been least documented in English, certainly, and ununderstood. So let me give you a very quick sketch or perhaps some common perceptions from people who know a little bit about it, but not very much. And you tell me if you think they're fair or not.
This idea is that China was invaded by the Japanese and that was of course a terrible thing and a war crime. But the China of that time was essentially a weak country, a corrupt country. It was ruled by Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalists who are pretty backward and unpleasant group of people. Eventually during the wartime period they didn't actually do that much fighting against the Japanese. By the time the Americans came along as well as the British to help them after Pearl Harbor in 1941, Chiang Kai-shek's nickname had become for some Americans cash my check. Because the rumor was that he asked for increasingly large sums of money but never actually delivered. And by the time you get to 1945 and the end of the war, the communists under Mao Zedong who would become Chairman Mao, probably the most famous Chinese person of the 20th century, rightly basically managed to conquer this corrupt and backward government and instead set up a new and much cleaner government in 1949.
Now as I say, that's not, I hate to know how that's not my view, but in my own book I've tried to push back against that. But I would say that that's perhaps a thumbnail sketch of perceptions people have. That's not entirely fair, is it? No, and I think that two elements, you have written about this in your own book in an excellent way, very vivid way to undermine that particular image.
There are two elements of this. One is sort of what do we know actually happened on the ground? And the other element of this is why did that image emerge and to what extent was US politics important in that and why has it taken so long to undermine that, to get a more realistic account of what happened on the ground? And of course, as we do know, Chinese nationalist forces did a great deal of fighting both in the early years of the war as you have described. But the fighting continued. The number of casualties didn't actually decrease very much after the first years of the fighting and sort of becomes a whole horrifying story. The whole idea that the Chinese nationalists did not want to fight the Japanese, that is no longer a story that I think.
And we can't go into huge detail in this conversation, but for those who read your book there will be names of battles such as Taira Dwarong, Changshan, Wuhan. Very unfamiliar names in the West, but you said we had to be wary about the word heroism, but some of them are really rather heroic stories. And for people who have grown up with battle names like El Alamein, Bulge, Ardenne, this would be a worthy set of battles to add to that. I think that's right. I think we need to add those names of Wuhan Taira Dwarong, but also Ichigo in 1944, to that list of battles in the same way.
Is your 1944 as the single biggest Japanese campaign in China during the whole war? I think changed much of the history, but in similar terms, the Chinese generals and some of them were really outstanding both from the nationalists and the communist side. Tanganboa would be one, but Liying-gyao would be another on the communist side. They all need to be added to it. The one thing I wanted to do in the book is to bring home the amount of fighting that actually happened, the conditions in which it had to take place, but also the enormous sacrifice is that China was willing to make, and perhaps because, despite rather sometimes in different leadership or a very weak hand, in order to resist the Japanese and to save their civilization, I think it was that serious.
Why did large parts of China keep fighting, do you think? Because this is a very agrarian society, it's a poor society. In 1940 France was conquered completely and one can't necessarily blame the French for that. Some parts of China were occupied under collaboration, but two large groupings, the Chinese nationalists under Changkai-shek, the Chinese communists with Mao Zedong, very powerful. At one point, they're really the only people in Asia who are fighting the Japanese. Why do you think they continue to do that? Today's story is that, of course, the Chinese people got together and resisted. This is very much the propaganda of the Communist Party about the idea that, of course, there would be this heroic story of resistance to invaders.
But you and I know that this isn't how wars work. People are frightened, people are human beings. They think about their families, they think about their locality, and yet they did fight. Why? They did fight initially, reluctantly, I think. I think in the first year of the war, some sort of settlement would have had broad support among the population, or... And agreement with the Japanese? And agreement with the Japanese, although not necessarily among university-going students, but they may not have been as particularly important as Dalem's thoughts. But I think by 1938, soon in 1939, there was a general will to continue to fight at a certain level, a realization that, yes, we're not going to have the kinds of offensive that is going to deliver immediate victory, but we are not going to let the Japanese will win.
And I think that is about... That is informed in part by China's deep history, deep historical consciousness of China as a civilization, as a continuing history. That has done this kind of thing before. It's a five to mongol, the menaces, the typing, and so on. It has dealt with these kinds of upheavals before. Also, of course, modern nationalism spread through radio, theatre, and through propaganda teams. I think all these things really, really do matter. And as education grew, nationalism grew as well. Yes, you have lots of schools across China. Of course, the nationalism has continued to support education throughout China during the war, but a lot of effort into that. I think very, very important.
I'd add another factor, which I think... I can tell you agree with that, but I'd add one more factor also, which is the growth in the responsibilities of government, particularly in terms of welfare. But I think this is one area where actually understanding of the wartime period is both comparable in some ways to the West and has developed in the China field of scholarship in recent years. Because we now know that there were things like healthcare schemes, refugee relief schemes. We don't know exact numbers, but something like 60, 80 million, maybe more, Chinese became refugees in their own country during the years from 1937 to 1945.
And as part of this, a whole variety of experimentation in setting up new hospitals, vaccination programs, natalist programs that were trying to encourage women to give birth to healthy babies. I mean, we see these in lots of other countries too, of course, so on both the allied and access sides. In Britain, you could say that the product of that same instinct is what we now call the National Health Service. There was nothing quite sophisticated in China, but certainly the idea that public provision should be part of it. I think that's one of the things that in the end helps to fuel enthusiasm for communism as well.
I think you're right, but I think there's a positive side to this story. I think there's also a very negative side, which I really do want to drive home in this book, which is that the government, both the nationalists and the communist, made the Chinese people, the sacrifices they demanded of the Chinese people were so severe that there was no returning back.
I think one of the aspects that people have talked very little about is the scorched earth policy of the nationalists from the beginning and at last the whole time. The whole cities were burned, the whole provinces were destroyed. Just explain the logic behind their strategy. Why did they do that? They copied this in part from, of course, Napoleon's, from the Russian approach to Napoleon's advance into Russia.
People talked about that it diswerked in order to resist an invader. You make the population sacrifice so much, the price they pay so much, there's no turning back from that. But it is also part of Chinese tradition where you sort of clear the countryside and remove everything that the enemy can use. So there is a toughness to conducting this war. I mean, this is an all-out war. This is actually one form of total war.
And that, I think, once you have made that kind of sacrifice, you may be critical of your government. You may be critical of this. You may resent or not like the fact that all these government surfaces are not perfect, but you're not going to give into the Japanese. They are the invaders, they are the enemy. And of course what I had in mind too was the US invasion of Iraq, where you think we're going to be welcome to liberate, as well forget it, you're the enemy. You are going to be resisted.
And I think that point was driven home by the demand for enormous sacrifices which were made and that itself I think is a symbol of the desire to continue, not even desire to willingness to pay all manner of prices to resist Japan. You're painting a pretty bleak picture of China during wartime. Is that the right way to think about it? Yes, I do.
Because the kinds of stories we hear about individual sacrifices, the kind of things that happened, this was a tough, tough time in which many people did suffer very griefously. And where war in the end war is very serious and often callous business, that is the nature of war.
And that is one reason why I'm sort of one reason I'm emphasizing this is because the kind of narratives in which is China as the hero which sort of could not but win in which everybody came happily together. That was a communist sort of a kind of relationship.
And again, I think it doesn't deal with that reality. We can't talk about the war without dressing at least a little bit the question of the military and military strategy. And this is a very significant and central thread to the book.
So let me if I may start with a few quite simple thoughts, but ones that I would love to hear your more complex answers to I think. The first is that if there is perhaps one general understanding of one of the effects of World War II in China, it is that it brings about a communist revolution in China.
But the fact is that there's still an overall narrative in mid-20th century China that a failed nationalist government is worn out by World War II and eventually gives way to a resurgent communist party that takes power under Mao Zedong in 1949. So how important in what way is the war against Japan important for the ultimate communist victory?
Well, Mao Zedong was absolutely right. On everything? At least on this when he had visitors from Japan, including Japan's prime minister at the time, who wanted to apologize endlessly for having invaded China, he thanked him for having done so because without a Japanese invasion as he put it, we would still be in the hills. And that is probably true.
So the conditions for the rise of the Chinese communists were clearly created by the Japanese invasion. Remember, you know all this, but remember that before 1937, before 1937, the nationalists were well on the way of eradicating the communists.
And the Japanese invasion created the spaces behind Japanese lines, the opportunities politically, economically, for the communists to establish their bases, to create armies, to bring populations under control to make propaganda, and so on and so on and so on. And just very simply put, if in 1937 the communists had whatever, 10, 15, 20,000 troops by the end, by 1945, they have, what is the figure, 500,000, a million troops. Maybe as many as a million.
So they go from the few tens of thousands to seven figure summons, but it comes with them. They claim a million, which I think is slightly propagand, but nonetheless, far more than they began with. And they control much of North China, and of course then they have the opportunity to flood into a mature, with the turn into a base from which they will occupy all of China.
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Now I think that I don't, I wouldn't challenge that basic narrative, that the Japanese occupation, the. Japanese invasion creates the opportunities militarily, socially, economically, for the communist victory to happen. And I think there's a good deal of truth in saying that by 1945 the nationalists were simply too exhausted. And I think the withdrawal of the United States from Eastern Asia, the attempted withdrawal from the United States, is an important factor as well.
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But that's sort of the international context, but the point I want to make in the book is that what we are seeing is the development, and this is why it is important today for an understanding of World War II. I think also for military affairs today, what comes out of this is, well as an anthropologist would call it a new modality of warfare.
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And what would a non anthropologist call it? How would you explain that? A non-clous Norwegian model of warfare, as military historians would call it. And for those of us who speak plain English, you're talking about different ways of fighting war, and that's what the war is. What are the changes? It's a different approach to warfare.
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And I think the book is constructed as the Japanese and the nationalist beginning, what we would call conventional warfare, conventional, how's which in warfare, which is large armies, supported by industry, supported by a modern government, fighting on the battlefield in one wind and the other doesn't, and then you have some sort of treaty or occupation and a thing.
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So in other words, what we generally think of when we think of war, you know, many in uniforms with weapons fighting each other on a battlefield, that sort of thing. And I think what World War II does generally is ending that kind of warfare, where of course the power of a state is heavily dependent on how many men it can bring into the field, because each man will carry a gun or a machine gun and that sort of your power.
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And that changes as a result of World War II, I think in two ways, well in a number of ways, but on one end one comes out of this, not even in the long run, by 1945 is nuclear war or atomic warfare, which is of course, you know, you have something you don't need so many men in the field to destroy your enemy, you drop one bomb, that's it, that's enough done.
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And clearly that shapes the post-war order in very fundamental ways, but I think the other side of this, and you know, conventional will continue in some ways, but the other side that comes out of this is what I would call national liberation war. And that in Mao has an important contribution in that, that is asymmetrical warfare as you would understand it, so the communists didn't have very powerful weapons, although they got a lot from the Japanese in the end, but they use what they have in new kinds of ways, and they avoid the battlefield.
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They are very unconventional by the time, by the standards of the time, not in trying to seek out the critical weak point in the enemy formation, but spreading it out across a very large area. They also, in this kind of national liberation warfare, what is important is the mobilization of the population ideologically, and that land reform in China was very important to bring the population.
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That's a social change, just sticking to the warfare for a moment, asymmetric one phrasing, a phrase that an awful lot of people may have heard of, and which they might associate with Mao Zedong, the communist leader of in the wartime period, is guerrilla warfare.
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When you say national liberation warfare, is it that sort of guerrilla tactics that you're talking about? As Mao would call it yes, but I think guerrilla warfare, this is where the change is, a traditional understanding of guerrilla warfare, it's sort of as a last resort. You've lost the battle, you go into the forest in the mountains. It's harassment, it's harassment.
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And Mao said, no, you're not going to win that way, and very early on, he decides that that isn't what you know. He has fought that kind of warfare in the 30s and it has failed, so he is searching for a new way of warfare, and that yes, you begin with guerrilla warfare, but you also build very large bases, you govern them.
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You conduct these propaganda campaigns through modern media to the extent that it existed at the time, but certainly newspapers and radio was very important in Mao's interest. And also indoctrination tactics with the population.
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And you draw the population into what you're trying to do, and you use the population in all kinds of ways. And for him, what he called Maoist guerrilla warfare, well, he called guerrilla warfare in a Maoist way, was then to build up those bases and gain the ability to wait the large scale battles that you would ultimately need to defeat the enemy.
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And Mao was never just guerrilla warfare in the way that we might have understood it traditionally. It was always moving towards these large scale battles. Because if we think about the way in which. the war goes on, one of the things that is very distinctive about the way you put the book is that you could almost read it as one long set of wars from let's say 1937, when you know the major war breaks up between China and Japan. And 1953, which is the end of the Korean War.
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So in that time, we have three wars. We have the Second World War in China, the War of Resistance against Japan. And then from 1946 to 49, we have the Civil War between nationalists and communists. And then almost a year later, with barely a space to breathe, the Korean War starts with the North Koreans, the Chinese and the implicit support of the Soviet Union behind them launching a war that lasts from 1950 to 1953.
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Does military tactics and techniques change for the Chinese of that time? Are they learning particularly the Chinese Communist, are they learning and adapting over the course of those three wars in a dozen years? Yeah, they are. And I think the reason I put so much emphasis on this development is because it is sort of the opposite of atomic warfare. But at least as influential because you get the same kind of fighting in Vietnam, in at least the many other areas of the world.
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And as we now know, the founders of Al Qaeda strategy read their Mao. Really? Yes, according to the British State Department they do. So I'll take their intelligence for it. And that makes sense. You have in the same way that Mao read Closowitz. And I think it's these circulations that I find very interesting.
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But to go back to your original question about this, about sort of, you're right, I defined as this period as 1937, 1953. And as you say, there are sort of three wars. And I think they are interlinked that it would be my argument.
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So if you have the Japanese and the nationalists begin conventional war. But by 1938, 1939, they realize that's not going to work. We're not going to control China as a result. So they begin to experiment with different ways. So the Japanese... Just explain that. That's because in the end China is just very big, very rural, holding it down conventionally with lots of troops stationed. It's like sort of pouring a small amount of water into a massive frying pan. So that's a lovely image. Not going to work.
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And so they do two things. They begin aerial bombardment and they're trying to create a new China in their terms, which is a very federalist China. Which actually I think for which there was much more support than we probably think. I think that's right. And from your readings of Joe Fohai and Wang Jingwei, you will have seen that it is probably the case. So there wasn't a stupid move at all. But it doesn't work. Which again demonstrates how serious ultimately China was about not having the Japanese run their country. To the nationalists themselves sort of they spread out the war and they tried to keep it going but waiting for a foreign assistance either the USSR or the USA. And that sort of gets stuck and it doesn't work.
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The new USA comes in and that changes the nature of the war. It's sort of China can export its violence outside its borders at Doso in Burma. And then suddenly it all ends. But by that time the communists have built up their base areas, their men power, accumulated weapons, trained their forces and they can flood into Nigeria.
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So it's 1949. Maldives communist forces have finally defeated the nationalist forces of Chankha Shek. Chankha Shek has been sent, has gone to Taiwan in exile, never to return as it turns out. And the official story, if you go to read any textbook in China and goodness knows I've read a few of them, is that that is when a new peaceful stable regime is set up. And 1949 is the beginning of new China, capital N, capital C, right? Right sort of.
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But not entirely. But not entirely in this sense that we keep, just keep in mind that nationalist forces continue to fight in China well until 1949. So these are Chankha Shek's, right? Chankha Shek's forces. You have Muslim forces. The famous Ma family fighting from Mongolia. It's a recent continuous from Burma. But I think more importantly, there's so much upheaval in the country going on. There's so many guerrillas, bandits, whatever, that this is not a society at peace.
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But then comes the challenge of Korea. The Korean War. And that is, we can talk, I think for a long time about this. But that is I think where Mao's National Liberation War finds out that its power to is limited.
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We don't have to go into detail about the Korean War, but let's say the Americans come in and they push the North Koreans back. Then the Chinese believe that they have to enter. They do many of the sort of guerrilla things that they've learned during the Civil War. They're going behind enemy lines, spreading out, waiting that kind of guerrilla warfare.
Paragraph 1: and tearing the whole battlefield out through very large areas. And they do very well. But then the Americans are challenged to say, do we fight back or not? Probably more of a result of situation in Europe than the whole idea that Korea is called war.
Paragraph 2: The idea that Korea is clearly not a strategic threat to the United States. But by this time you have the Cold War beginning. You have the idea that we have to contain the United Soviet Union. And so Korea becomes a test of that resolve. And the Americans under Truman put in lots of forces. And they stabilize at the 38th parallel.
Paragraph 3: Mao continues to push for offensive against the Americans until he must accept that he cannot win. The hope of a communist victory across Northeast Asia, including Manchuria, remains very strong in China, of course, in North Korea, as well as in the Soviet Union. But in the end, the kinds of military power that Mao has by did time is not enough to dislodge the Americans.
Paragraph 4: The Americans are not willing to pay the price for going all the way to Beijing, for instance, or doing anything they did. So I think by this time, so it was 1953, end of the Korean War, Stalin is dead. There is an acceptance all around that borders are going to be stabilized in the way with which we still live.
Paragraph 5: We're coming towards the end of the conversation. I want to just throw some thoughts at you about some of the contemporary legacy of all of this. Because you're dealing with history. But I sometimes like to say that this whole wartime period in Europe is history. In Asia, it's basically current affairs, even today.
Paragraph 6: And the three wars we mentioned, the Second World War in China, the Civil War, and the Korean War. They'll actually have a tremendous amount of impact in the way that the region is shaped and deals with its own traumas and issues in the present-day.
Paragraph 7: What do you think these wars mean to the Chinese people today? Do they think about them? And if so, how do they think about them? Well, I'm sure you remember from our Superficians, whenever I read this, they're Chinese people. I just want to tell that Hans has passed form as someone who actually attempted to teach me many, many years ago.
Paragraph 8: You made your judge have successful or otherwise. He wasn't that indefinitely. So, yes, I better. The Chinese people is too big a chunk for me to do. I think that's probably because it's various levels. The Chinese government today is using World War II in much the same way that the Russian, British, the Dutch, the French, maybe less the French.
Paragraph 9: The American governments are using World War II and that is about creating a national story that tries to bind people together. This was a good war where we fought eager. It's a feel-good type narrative. And I think that's fair enough. I could get beautifully in your own book.
Paragraph 10: So, I have no problems with that. I think at different levels there is still a lot to be thought about. And at lower levels you can see the different sorts of commemoration. People are beginning to talk about the Wang Jingwei, the collaborationist element. The equivalent of Peter, who loves our remains in the French.
Paragraph 11: Yes, his poetry is widely admired, even though prescribed, but circulates, which I think is very interesting. But it does. When I talked with people, they said, oh, yes, Wang Jingwei is poetry. Very good poetry. So, it is known. So, I think there's probably a greater sophistication than commemoration.
Paragraph 12: I was very interesting. I have had, I teach some of this. Of course, I have seminars with Chinese people there. And they are very suspicious of the central narrative they have. What they do find when I sort of make comparisons with war commemoration in here and the United States or in Europe, is I think there's a longing for local commemoration to see the individual stories of each individual.
Paragraph 13: So, in town, soldiers or the village that was burnt down nearby, that sort of thing. That kind of story is a, I think was a real longing for. And as I'm sure you know, the Chinese are perfectly capable of taking the Mickey out of any central narrative. You have to come on the Chinese internet these days to see all the sarcastic comments, yes. So, in that sense, it's complicated.
Paragraph 14: But I think the point that this is still alive and remains something that is still in the process of being discovered at deeper levels is very true. And that is very important. But something perhaps to finish off that is not yet deep, I think, is Western understanding of these conflicts and their significance.
Paragraph 1: So, in the end, if you have readers and you know, those listening in will primarily, I think, from the Anglophone world. And they'll have, you know, I think perhaps not had as much exposure to the history of China World War II as is the case for say Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, Japan and the Pacific, the United States.
Paragraph 2: So, if someone listening is moved and I hope they are to order a China at war and read through, what would you want them to come out? knowing or thinking about China's role, particularly perhaps in World War II during this period? What would you like to understand that perhaps you have a sense that people don't understand at the moment?
Paragraph 3: I think two things. One is that when we talk about World War II, it is very important that we talk or have in mind a global perspective, that we see World War II in all its diversity. Yes, there was a unified World War II. Yes, there were the Allies. Yes, there was collaboration at that point. But there was also lots of regional difference. And of that, we need to be much more aware.
Paragraph 4: And I think China is a very good case study for seeing that kind of difference. But for other areas, the Middle East, Africa, going, you can go on and on, Southeast Asia, that is all important. I think the other aspect of one is that war was all on-composing. But we have to have an eye for the human story, the humanity that is at the bottom of all this. And that it won't do to have a very simplified heroic narrative.
Paragraph 5: And that sort of the human story behind all this is very important. I mean, heroism is one thing. Another phrase that came to mind maybe a word is gratitude. Is there any sense in which the West we ought to perhaps just be a little more grateful for China deciding that it would fight Japan in the very dark days of 1937, 1938, 1939? Yes, and that is of course the point you have made brilliantly.
Paragraph 6: I think that is sort of what's behind your argument there. It is part of our story as much as of it is not just a damn story. We have to see them as them in the sense that it isn't the same as us. But when we talk about a global history of Wulfford, then it is all our story. And that complexity we must see.
Paragraph 7: That was Hans van de Ven in conversation with Ranamitra. China at war, triumph and tragedy in the emergence of the new China will be published later this month in the UK by profile. And in the US it will be available as a Kindle edition.
这是Hans van de Ven与Ranamitra的访谈。《中国战争:新中国崛起中的胜利与悲剧》将于本月末在英国由Profile出版。在美国,它将作为Kindle版提供。
Paragraph 8: For more on this subject you might also be interested in Ranamitra's book, China's War with Japan, 1937 to 1945, The Struggle for Survival, which was published back in 2013 by Alan Lane.
Paragraph 9: Meanwhile, you can read a written version of Hans and Ranam's conversation in issue five of BBC World History's magazine, which is currently on sale.
Paragraph 10: You can find it in many good retailers and order it direct from us via the website by subscriptions.com. Now before we go, don't forget that tickets for our live events at Winchester and York are currently on sale.
Paragraph 11: The weekends take place from the 6th to 8th of October and 24th to 26th November respectively. And talks are now beginning to sell out. Head to historyweekend.com for more details and to purchase tickets.
Paragraph 12: Well that's about it for today but please do join us again on Thursday when we'll be delving into a shocking crime story from 1970s Iceland.
Paragraph 13: Thanks for listening to this History Extra podcast, which was produced by Jack Fletcher. Do let us know what you think about this episode by emailing podcast at historyextra.com and we might read out your messages in future editions.
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