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Anthony Beaver is one of the world's best-selling military historians. He's mainly known for his books on Second World War battles, such as Stalingrad, Berlin, and Arnhem. But for his latest book, which has published this month, Anthony is exploring the events of the Russian Revolution and Civil War.
Following the story from the overthrow of the Russians on, Nicholas II in February 1917, through to the Bolshevik coup of October that year and the brutal conflict that followed, pitting the Bolshevik Red Army against the multitude of opponents ranged against them. Robata spoke to Anthony to find out more.
Most of the books you've written over your career so far have been focused primarily on the Second World War era. What made you decide to head back some 20 years for this book? The most important thing was really to understand the chicken and egg, the chain of history of the disasters of the 20th century, which actually are still with us today as we see in Ukraine.
And that he's totally important for everybody and also above all, for a historian when writing about that particular period, to see how it fits in. The one great German historian referred to the First World War as the original catastrophe. And that is true and that led to this great debate. What was the long war of the 20th century? Did it go from 1914 to 1945 or from 1914 to 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union? Michael Howard and one or two others argued that the original part of the First World War was an extension of the great past struggles of the 19th century.
So I can go back if I'm once to it. But all I'm saying is sort of a question of arguing that is it's a question of just understanding the way it did all came together. And the importance as I'd realized years ago, I think, because I wanted to write about this subject long ago when I was actually not ready to tackle it.
Was the Russian Civil War and all of the civil wars around it? Let's face it, Hungary, Finland, Germany. I think that period at the end of the First World War, 1917, 1918, 1919, because that was what led on. It created a terrible fear amongst the middle classes, after the horrors, the destruction, the wanton destruction of the Russian Civil War, some 12 million dead in it even rivaling the whole of the First World War.
And at the same time also, it had galvanized the left, the Bolsheviks of Communists. And this is where one sees that vicious circle of rhetoric which developed above all in the 1930s, and as you know, I've written about the Spanish Civil War. And once there, of course, once again, one sees this fear of what had happened in Russia, being this huge influence and a knock on effect, providing, if you're at the proxy war of the Spanish Civil War, and even the Russian Civil War itself, it was to a larger degree also, a proxy war with British intervention under Churchill.
So this is really what dominates the whole of our century. And I think that the Russian Civil War is not understood well enough partly because it's a very much more complex and focused subject than the many of the others. And that was why something for the me has always been a sort of a tremendous challenge to do at some particular time. And it's all in fact almost entirely due to the possibility of the wonderful research done by my great Russian colleague over the last five years, Louis Vinaigradava, which has made this one possible.
And so as you said, you and your colleague have spent many years researching this book, what new perspectives on the period in the conflict have emerged from the work that you've done over the past few years? I mean, to be very honest, the sheer horror of it. I mean, the Spanish Civil War was cruel enough, but that was cruel in killings. Here one sees a savagery assadism, which is very, very hard in a way to still to comprehend.
It's a very difficult question. And I mean, it's one which I'm still mulling over and trying to understand, not just the build up of hatred over centuries, but the way that there was a vengeance which seemed to be required, which as I say, went beyond the killing. I mean, it was it was the sheer horrible inventiveness of the tortures which were inflicted on people.
And one therefore needs also to look at the origins of the Civil War in the sense of, you know, who started it, how did it start, was it avoidable. But one also needs to see the different patterns between the red terror and the white terror. And this again was something reflected within the Spanish Civil War and almost all wars in a way, all civil wars. And looking at the question, why are civil wars so much cruel as so much more savage than state-on-state wars?
Terms of the terror that was inflicted by both sides on the Civil War, how far was that being centrally directed by the Bolshevik leadership or the white generals? And how far did that just emerge from the chaos of war?
Well, a lot of it obviously did emerge from the chaos of war, even the checker and the commander Felix Zysinski never really controlled many of the local checkers where some of the worst atrocities were committed in Kiev, Karkov. I mean, again, names we're seeing every day in the newspapers here.
It was a different pattern from two points of view. One was that as we found, say with Franco and the nationalists in the Spanish Civil War, a smaller party trying to control or a smaller political grouping, trying to control areas where they are in a tiny minority will often resort to terror simply to make up for the numbers.
This was very much the case of Lenin determined to crush opposition to the Bolshevik coup d'etat in November of the great revolution which they referred to which actually was a coup d'etat. They're immediately attacked by all the other socialist parties for their arrogance and determination to run everything. And they were obviously going to push them aside, having already then issued basically threat of civil war which was basically a threat of class genocide against the Bolshevik regime, referring to them as lice, cockroaches or whatever, which had to be exterminated. And from Lenin's point of view, therefore the red terror was something which was essential right from the beginning.
The other thing which actually funny enough we are seeing again today from the Kremlin is the torrent of lies of complete falsehood. And that was actually how the Soviet Union started. Lenin had promised the peasants that they were going to get the land when it was taken from landowners and the Orthodox Church. He promised the factory workers that they would be running through the Soviets, they would be running the factories. And he promised the soldiers suffering on the eastern front that they would have peace when in fact he was determined to change the imperialist war into civil war. There were three fundamental lies right from the start. And truth has never been a factor if you like ever since throughout the whole of the Soviet Union.
And I think that this has been something one can go back into the Sari's times, of course the U.S. was lies there. But that was much more a question of simply believing they're in propaganda. Here it is quite shameless, quite deliberate. As one saw right from the start in 1917 and right through all the way through the whole period of the Soviet Union. And this was to cover up basically their plan or Lenin's plan to exert total control in all directions.
And he and Trotsky of course completely despised any idea of Bushwa democracy in their particular way. Because they knew that they would not win the elections to the Constituent Assembly. And of course there were theorists and that was why although they had in theory supported the Constituent Assembly which had been called forth by the provisional government, the moment that they were in par and it was the date of the Constituent Assembly to open in the Torae Palace. They then completely crushed it by bringing in the loyal vanguard of sailors from the Baltic fleet basically to eject and then prevent any of the elected deputies from returning. And that was that very very brief moment of very brief chance of democracy.
So it was the infanticidal democracy. So yes so there was before the October revolution where there was of course the February revolution where the Tsar abdicated. And also there was a few months where Russia had this provisional government and had perhaps the potential for democracy.
Well liberals and especially one thinks of a wonderful liberal tradition of Russia, of Houtsern, of Chekhov, of Tolstoy, of all of their sort of wonderful writers and thinkers. They in fact were in a way incapable of getting their ideas across to the mass of the people who had been deliberately undereducated, who had been kept in ignorance for centuries, particularly obviously the servant's selfs before the abolition of Serfdom.
There was a fundamental problem also which was a political one. Houtsern described the pregnant widow, the idea that when one regime was fallen, this is very dangerous into regdom before a new regime emerged.
And the provisional government was in an impossible position. It was basically liberals but then emerged with socialists from the patriotic area of Soviet, trying to hold together a country which was obviously was split, where the whole administration, both in the countryside and in the towns, had disappeared.
I mean the police of course were the most hated of all of this or its institution. And they had all had to flee their lives for those of them who had not been killed during the February Revolution. People forget that the February Revolution actually was a very bloody revolution, it wasn't a bloodless one.
But even then there was a tremendous optimism that sort of a loss will be freedom and that sort of effect everybody's attitudes that Russians would love one another and all the rest of it. But in fact, with the destruction that was left after the riots, the way that in the countryside particularly peasants and soldiers returning from the front would loot every alcohol base or every distillery they could. And then would start burning and smashing up the estates and the landowners, manor houses and so forth.
And when they tried to hand over their manor houses to the peasants on the estates and said, look, it's yours, don't destroy. They would still feel compelled that another landlord would come back in the future so they did have to destroy it. And this suited the Bolsheviks and Lenin exactly what they needed. They wanted lawlessness, they wanted chaos because this upsurge of chaotic violence was actually bullosing away through for the Bolsheviks to cease power because the liberals were incapable of basically doing anything about it.
They had the levers of power attached to no forces of power. And all they could do was to say, well, we can't take any decisions until the new democratic constituent of assembly has come together and has taken the decisions. So that was why it was sort of doubly dangerous and why they were vulnerable. And it was frustration with the lack of decision making, which of course increased the power of the Bolsheviks simply because they were the seem to be the only ones who were in a position really to force through change.
But nobody knew what the changes were going to be because Lenin had kept that very, very quiet of what his real plans were. And once the Bolsheviks had seized power in October 17, how revolutionary was the government that they installed? Well, even many Bolsheviks were shocked by Lenin's extremism, the idea of abolishing the police, abolishing the army and all the rest of it and having just read guards from the factories of nationalizing absolutely everything.
This wasn't apparent beforehand, you know, they were going to take over the banks and not surprisingly, both whether it was the banks or in the ministries. Many of the civil servants didn't want to work with the new government.
So this is when the paranoia started and Lenin wanted to bring in the checker saying, actually, I mean, he was even accusing the Bolsheviks of somehow sabotaging food supplies. Well, actually, the Bolsheviks had virtually no control of food supplies at all.
A lot of the problem had been due to the railways and the lack of railing stock. And in fact, in the earlier part of the year, Russia had roughly valid, but that lived good food reserves. But many of those were just wrecked during that chaotic summer with the lack of planting, with the lack of work on the farm. And this was the start of a downward cycle. And every single measure that the Bolsheviks brought in to try to grab food from the persons to give to the cities only made the situation worse and worse.
Still to come on the history extra podcast. These were communists from the cities sent out to extract the food. And they would just seize the seed corn as well for the next year. So the harvests were totally disastrous. And I mean there was cannibalism in many areas.
So do you think there was anything that the Bolsheviks could have done differently to prevent the civil war that came? Was it really inevitable after their coup d'état? The Bolsheviks, no, Lenin wanted the civil war. I mean, he argued straight out. He said the civil war is the sharpest form of class conflict, which is exactly what he wanted. He was the only way in his view for the Bolsheviks to take power.
He knew that by, and this is where the other socialist party is, you know, the socialist revolution is the mention of it, were horrified by his plans because they knew that after he had smashed the cadets, the liberals and conserved to parties, he would turn on them and he certainly did. Even the left socialist revolutionists who split away from the main part of the socialist revolutionary party, even they joined the Bolshevik government, surely because they thought that Lenin was going to implement the land reforms which they had advocated themselves.
Well, this was just a cover tactic on Lenin's party. He said, I'm, he announced that he was pinching all of their ideas, which they welcomed. But then of course, there's not going to do anything about it. And eventually they then turned against him and reverted in the following year until they were crushed as well. So there was no question about it. Lenin despised anybody who disagreed with him, even within its ratio, within his own party. The, truly, say, the less extreme members who warned against this complete seizure of power, this total dictatorship, which Lenin was planning. You know, they were either more as rejected from the party or sort of kept in a, kept in the sort of subservient position.
As soon as we got well into 1918 when Lenin's arguments over the whole question of the agreement was Germany, the Brechtleys Tosk Treaty. And that of course is when the left-right socialist revolution is realized that they've been tricked and were so dissatisfied and angry.
What was striking was how little resistance there was in the February revolution. Basically, everybody, it was so angry and exasperated with the total incompetence of the war effort, with a lot of the corruption back in Moscow and in Petrograd, that, you know, they just simply didn't even bother to lift a finger. And there was no organized opposition whatsoever.
The opposition to the regime, Lenin started to come about when I say to the regime, but to the provisional government. And you started coming about when Alexander Kurenski was the prime minister and was sort of living in a fantasy world. And the generals led by General Kornilov, certain generals, they're by General Kornilov, started to become exactly the thing we've got to reintroduce the death penalty, which had been abolished. The simply to make sure that the soldiers stay there because they just tried this attempted, this disastrous offensive in the summer, in on the southwest front against the Germans, which led to virtually the collapse of the Tsarist army there.
And this frustration did start to create the first hints possibly of a coup, not led by General Kornilov, funny enough. I mean, the Kornilov whole thing, which actually provided the Bolsheviks with their real opportunity that summer, was a result of a major misunderstanding. And it was largely Kurenski's fault. It was also Kornilov was not a very intelligent man. And there was a complete misunderstanding between the two of them.
Kurenski believed that Kornilov was going to try and overthrow the provisional government and seize power himself, which was not true. And Kornilov had been talked to by a complete fantasist, quote, law of not the principle of the provisional government, but another one, who had tried to persuade him that he was the one who should seize power, and that Kurenski wanted him to cease power. And this led to not just from misunderstanding, but the whole of the collapse of this Kornilov affair, meant that the communists were in a position really to start infiltrating the key areas of the security services and a whole of other things, which put them in a very, very good stead, ready for their coup when it eventually came.
But even then, Lenin was about the only one within the Bolshevik party who actually believed that the coup was possible. Even Trotsky was nervous. What Lenin perceived, and he was absolutely right, was that the success of a coup depends on the apathy of the majority, not on how many people you had real supporters. Because Trotsky estimated that within the garrison, the huge garrison in around, in and around Petrograd, there were probably a couple of thousand who were actually Bolshevik supporters when there were about 140,000 who weren't, but they weren't prepared to do anything to save the provisional government. But that was all the Bolsheviks needed. Though with a tiny minority, they were actually able to seize power.
And how important to the outcome of the war was the fragmentation and disunity of the whites compared to the centralization and unity of the Bolsheviks? Very important point, absolutely essential to the understanding of the war.
The trouble with the whites was that they, when one talks to the whites, one long-term actually refers to mainly the forces led by former generals and commanders from the First World War, from the Saurist Army. But there were also the various socialist revolutionaries who are pulled by the dictatorship, which has been created in Petrograd, and the way that the constituent assembly had been disbanded.
And they set up, in, for example, in the sort of Vavolga region at Samara, there was a Komoch which was basically supporters for the from the socialist revolution, supporters of the constituent assembly. And they made an uneasy alliance with groups of white officers in that particular area. And there was always going to be tension right from the start, because most of these officers were anti-Semitic, there were many Jews in the socialist revolutionaries and the other socialist parties. They wanted to bring back shoulder boards, they also wanted to bring back the punishments of the Saurist Army, which meant they could punch soldiers in the face on a summary charge that they could even have the whipping of soldiers with using rifle cleaning rods and things like that. And all the worst aspects, if you like, of the Saurist Army. And of course, this created a terrible tension the whole time.
And once all this particular in Siberia, where, where, but not just at Samara, but then later, Ulfa, when they tried to get a conference says to bring together this extraordinary amalgam, or basically Siberian Cosac hosts, with the Samara, Komuch, the liberal and social democrats, when obviously the two were completely incompatible. And in the south, there you had, shall we say, an uneasy alliance again between the Don Cosacs and, say, later the Kuwaiting Cosacs and the white officers, who basically distrusted the Cosacs as they thought the Cosacs were not prepared to believe in a greater, in the greater Russia or in the all Russia, that they believed in.
But they wanted, they saw them as separate ships basically, that they wanted to have their own sort of Cosac Federation. And the fundamental problem, especially when it came to the whites and their relationship, not just with the Allies, but above all, with possible allies like the Finns under Marshall Manaheim, who had was winning the Finnish Civil War at this particular time of, in the early part of 1918. But also the Estonians and the Baltic states, and the Poles later on with Marshall Pysodsky, because if they had combined, they could well have defeated the Communists, I mean, right down the whole of that Western Frontier, from Finland all the way down through to Ukraine and the Donbass and the Don area.
There they were in a tremendous advantage and they had trained troops, who were extremely effective. But so the political aspect, the political disunity and the arrogance of the white generals and the way that they treated, whether the Finns or the Estonians or whatever, basically telling them they were still part of the Russian Empire. And so as a result, all of the nationalist aspirations of these border states were insulted and basically treated in a very, very stupid way, which actually made the white cause deeply unpopular, almost as unpopular, as there are polling social policies towards the peasants.
I mean, as far as they were concerned, certainly for the Tsarists, they wanted to have all their land back from the peasants, which was something which of course was going to create a tremendous hatred and fear amongst all of those peasants who had profited from them. And so as a result, there was almost continual war, they had no proper administration. All they were interested in was basically getting what they could from these local areas and the food which they did not pay for in many cases or paid that in little four. So their own rear areas were always going to be open to resistance groups, particularly if one thinks of again, all of this area, basically east of the Nipa, the area we're looking at now, these very day in our newspapers, when for example the great anarchist leader, Makhna and Nesta Makhna, raised armies which first of all fought the whites when they were there, but he also hated the rids for their dictatorship and cruelty. As a result, you know, you have this almost triangular war going on in all of that area of eastern of eastern Ukraine.
In your last answer, briefly referred to the involvement of international powers in this conflict and many of the great powers of Europe did line up on the side of the white army. How was it that they weren't able to shift the outcome of the conflict? Did they just, as involved as they needed to be? Were they not as sincere about their commitment? The commitment was, should we say, unclear and this was always a problem. They couldn't make up their in-mind.
One has to remember that the Supreme Allied Council in Paris during this particular period of 1918, they were trying to sort out the whole world almost, which was an impossible task at that particular time. Now, when in the early part of 1918, President Woodrow Wilson thought that they might be able to somehow create some form of peace in Russia. He suggested a conference in the islands of Pinkippo in the Sea of Marmara, close to Constantinople, but the whites were so furious at the reds and what had happened of the murders of the aristocracy, the destruction and everything like that. But they refused to sit down with the reds and Lenin and the Bolsheviks had no intention at that stage. They thought they were going to win and had no intention really of taking part themselves. And this gave Churchill his thoughts, his great opportunity, because they had agreed that there would be a certain amount of help to the white cause in terms of providing weaponry.
Now, you can provide weapons and you can provide supplies. You've got to be able to get them there first and they weren't able to get until the First World War came to an end in in November 1918. They didn't have access through the Daughter Nells and they couldn't therefore supply the Cossacks and Denikin's White Armies in the south of Russia. The first sort of supplies were able to come in through the North through Mermonts where the British already had a base and a archangel with some Marines who'd been landed earlier on at the beginning of 1917 and 182 protect the supplies which would be delivered there which were afraid that the Germans from the finish of the war might take over. So there was again a sort of curious triangle of conflict right up in the North.
And then of course in the Far East you have and this is terribly important again from the future. This rivalry between America and Japan, Japan of course was one of our allies towards the end of the First World War and so the Japanese were starting to land huge numbers of troops. I mean at one stage they had almost 70,000 troops in Siberia and the Americans of course were extremely anxious about this. They sent in place into about the equivalent of a small division of troops as part of an expeditionary force. The British landed in a couple of battalions, the middle sector regiment and hamcher regiment eventually, but there were also Italians who were Serbs who were Greeks and then the French of course in when they came into Odessa and into the Black Sea.
You had quite a large French force which actually proved to be a disaster because so many of their troops after the mutinies of 1917 following the New Vella offensive from the First World War were politicized and were much more sympathetic towards the Bolsheviks than they were towards their own officers. And this proved with the mutiny of the Black Sea fleet proved a tremendous blow to French pride and morale.
And there were also tensions between the French and the British even though they were allies where the British were supporting if you like the Cossacks and Denikin over in the Caucasus and the Donbass region while the French were concentrating around Odessa. So you'd again, this is where one starts to have that's proxy war of the 20th century.
No, so was there a particular battle or campaign that was decisive in the Red's ultimate victory or did the White campaign essentially fizzle out in the end? The interesting thing is when you're talking about Stravace, Lannmasse of Russia, you can have huge advances which would then collapse suddenly.
The whole idea, the critical mass, the whole idea that you would suddenly lose momentum because the supplies weren't getting through and then you'd have to retreat and as soon as you were retreating then suddenly it would swing back in the other direction. The Reds had this huge advantage of internal lines. They were based really in one of the most populous areas of central Western Russia between basically, you know, between the Volga, between the Volga and the, sort of roughly in the Periut Frontier.
But they also had the population with some of the largest cities, particularly in the north and many of the factories and particularly the arms factories. The whites of course did have a huge advantage, something in the sheer delivery of all of the surplus ammunition guns, artillery, machine guns, rifles, etc. which made up for the lack of factories and also lack of pre-literate or factory workers, you know, to build the sort of things that they needed.
But that question of internal lines was incredibly important especially when it came to the crucial moments. I mean, there were moments when the Bolsheviks themselves thought that they'd lost the civil war and almost were preparing to abandon Moscow. And for example, there was the southern advance of Kolchak's troops right all the way back towards the Volga in very early 1918-1919.
Meanwhile, the trouble was that the great advance of Denikin from the South in 1919 did not coincide. The Kolchak's advance had petered out, in fact they were in full retreat by the time that the march on Moscow, which Denikin called on in the early summer of 1919, had started. And the advance went well, but they swarmed up towards Moscow and again there were moments when Trotsky and others really thought that this might be it.
But what they had managed to do in fact was that the Red Army had concentrated its troops from the South, the previous, at the end of the previous year against the Eastern Front, against Kolchak's troops in Siberia and pushed them back. And this actually was what saved them in a way because although they lost a huge amount of ground to begin with the following year when Denikin advanced, by the very fact that they had no longer had to worry about Kolchak's troops to the Eastern Siberia, they were able to reinforce the troops and turn it around and in October 1919 once saw this complete turnaround. This was the final turning point if you like in the war. Churchill couldn't believe what had happened.
I mean he was sending these signals the whole time to General Homan who was the commander of the Rishmila Tremision saying, I can't believe this, what's happened? You know there they are well, you read through in full retreat and now suddenly they seem to be beating them but whites on every front, what's happened? And he'd failed to understand that actually it was purely because they had reinforced that Eastern Front at a crucial moment. And then again with the advantages of their internal lines, we know to bring them back very rapidly to transform the whole situation.
One man we haven't talked about huge amount so far is Joseph Stalin. And I know that over the years his supporters and detractors have either sought to build up or downplay his role in the revolution in civil war. From your point of view how important to figure was he at this stage?
Well he was an important figure from the point of view of what the future held. I.e. the alliances that he made within the party were actually what brought him to part, James Pirate. He made a closer alliance with Chazinsky, the head of the Czecha. Interestingly both of them had been studied to be priests and then termed fissiously against religion in his all of its form. And he also made alliances with the first cavalry army. And this was started at Zarin Seen, which later became Stalin grad named after him.
Now a lot of this of course was sort of a fuhrib, myths later on or part of the whole of the cult of personality which Stalin developed. He was a commissar, basically a political commissar who then sort of portrayed himself as a military leader. And he did then play a critical but probably the Sarada disastrous role in the invasion of Poland in 1920. Because Stalin refused to follow orders and General Tukachevsky later the famous marshal who was the court of one of the first people killed by Stalin in the purchase of the Red Army in the 1930s. So ordered the southern front to come to the north and to stop trying to create their own area of view like of operations towards Lviv, as it is not. And Stalin, as I say, flagrantly disabaid orders. Despite Trotsky's instructions and all the risks of it. And he often was therefore blamed by Tukachevsky and many others for the disaster which befell the Red Army in the battle of the vestular, the battle before before Warsaw.
When Trotsky took this tremendous risk, it was a brilliant one of cutting off all of the armies in the north and basically breaking the back of the Red Army for some time. Stalin only managed to get away with it, I think, by sheer brass neck when you were someone back to Moscow to sort of explain. And he was pushed sideways for a bit. But the point was that having made his particular sort of contacts within the party and the way that of course he was despised is basically as an uncultured pop-marked gangster and despised by Trotsky and the others who were much more intellectuals. This sort of bitterness was going to come out very much later, as he started to, immediately after Lenin's death or in fact even during Lenin's serious illness, Stalin was going to be the one who would emerge.
Having seized the levers of power without the others realizing because they had despised it. You should never underestimate somebody, but he was in a position eventually to take those levers of power a bit by bit until he had to complete control. And this was very much what Stalin did. So once the civil war, Russian civil war is eventually over and it's led to huge loss of life, huge destruction, was Russia really on its knees at this point? Oh yeah, it was starving. I mean it was actually the American relief program. I mean to begin with Lenin refused this idea that they should seek help abroad. But I mean there were appalling famines all down the Volga, those, a lot of the black earth area. And this was because of the way that the peasants had revoted against the the food detachment sent out. These were communists from the cities sent out to extract the food and they would just seize the seed corn as well for the next year. So the harvests were totally disastrous. And I mean there was cannibalism in many areas in the Siberia too, particularly in in Western Siberia. And then the suffering was simply appalling. And this is actually what Gorky had warned about right from the start when he tried to warn the Russian people, you know, that this is where Lenin is leaving.
What was the reaction around the world to communist victory in the civil war? How concerned were the Western powers by the triumph of the Lenin in the Bolsheviks? I think they were greatly perturbed to Timahla, I mean just looking at the British. One has to remember that at the end of the First World War there was considerable problems of obviously getting demobilizing the British army, which was huge by that stage. And I mean the mutinists, large mutinists in France. We didn't suffer the mutinists at the French army, it suffered which was actually during the war like the ones after the New Evel offensive.
But the were serious ones and at one particular point, you know Churchill and General Wilson, the chief of the general staff, considered the British democracy was basically basically on the knife edge at that particular point. What the great split in a way was really between Lloyd George and Churchill. Churchill felt that we had to defeat the Bolsheviks so as to prevent the disease spreading. The Lloyd George was arguing if we spend all this money on supporting the whites in Russia, we're going to have a Bolshevik revolution here. So they were looking at the same problem but from totally different points of view.
Now quite a few times in the course of this conversation, you've alluded to the fact that some of the places being fought over then have been fought over again recently in the Russia, Ukraine war.
But how far do you think the Civil War does prefigure the events of today or actually is it not really a sensible parallel to be making?
I don't think we're going to make too many parallels at all.
There are lots of superficial parallels that one can make.
I mean for example, I think one of the most important ones was that we never expected Putin to invade partly because rather like in the late 1930s and say the time of Munich, the British and the French could not believe after the horrors of the First World War that anyone would ever want another World War or another battle in that particular way.
They've totally failed to understand that Hitler was determined to have a war and in fact was angry that Chamberlain had given in at Munich and he'd been deprived of his war against Chukus Vartia.
Now this is the thing, we always fail to understand dictators, this is the problem.
Dictators didn't think like generals.
One could put oneself into the boots of a general and get a rough idea of how they see things but it's very very different.
But to go back to the Russian Civil War, there one has to see among the concede the way that in fact this was really the moment when Ukraine was starting to develop a more modern nationalism.
Now this was very much more a nationalism coming from intellectuals.
There was already a Ukrainian culture in the countryside, in the poetry and in a lot of the literature but then there was Peclerus and with the Ukrainian Radar.
There they really did want to take Ukraine forward to create a completely different state and they've been given the opportunity, this is what Putin has been raging about, it was Lenin who almost gave away Ukraine at that particular stage.
Rather like with Finland at the Bolsheviks, thought that there was going to be no trouble about allowing a certain amount of autonomy or independence to these former nation states of the Russian Empire because the world revolution would bring them back under control and that's where they made the great mistake.
That was Anthony Beaver, Russia, revolution and civil war 1917 to 1921 is out now published by Widenfeld in Nicholson.
You can read a version of this interview in the July issue of BBC History magazine which will be in the shops in the UK from the 9th of June.
Thanks for listening, this podcast was produced by Daniel Kramer Arden.