John Mearsheimer: World Changed Forever as Iran Defeated the U.S.
发布时间 2026-04-10 18:38:09 来源
Welcome back. Today is Friday, the 10th of April, and we are joined by none other than Professor John Mersheimer. So thank you for coming back on.
欢迎回来。今天是4月10日，星期五，我们邀请到了约翰·米尔斯海默教授。非常感谢您的再次到来。
It's always my pleasure, Glenn. So these are crazy times indeed. We saw that Trump threatened to wipe out the entire Iranian civilization with its 90 plus million citizens. Then he embraced the sudden ceasefire, which he then seemingly undermined immediately thereafter. Then he claims victory and begins to distance himself from some of the key requirements of the ceasefire deal. It can be confusing. So I was hoping if anyone can shed some light on this, it would be you.
格伦，我一直很乐意帮助你。现在的局势的确疯狂。我们看到特朗普威胁要摧毁整个伊朗文明以及其9000多万公民。随后，他同意了突然停火，但似乎又马上破坏了停火协议。他宣称胜利，并开始疏远一些停火协议的关键要求。这确实让人感到困惑。所以我希望如果有人能对此做出一些解释，那一定是你。
Yeah, I think it is somewhat confusing for sure. And I think because President Trump, you know, frequently contradicts himself and says outrageous things that it sometimes feels like it's hard to make sense of what's going on here. But I actually think it's quite straightforward. And I think if you look at his two tweets on Monday, it tells you a great deal. Now, what exactly am I saying? I think from an overarching perspective, you want to understand that President Trump is desperate to end this war.
是的，我确实认为这有些令人困惑。而且我觉得，因为特朗普总统经常自相矛盾并发表骇人听闻的言论，所以有时让人感觉很难理解到底发生了什么。但我实际上觉得这很简单。我认为如果你看一下他周一发布的两个推文，就能看出很多。那我到底在说什么呢？我认为，从整体上看，你需要理解特朗普总统急于结束这场战争。
He fully understands that we are close to going off a precipice. That if this war is not shut down, we could end up in a global depression that's worse than we saw in the late 1920s. And he wants to do everything he can to avoid that. So you get two tweets on Monday morning and on Monday evening. And they're very different tweets for sure. But they both show evidence of the desperation. In the morning, he says that he's going to wipe Iran off the face of the earth. He's going to destroy Iranian civilization forever.
他完全明白我们正处于悬崖边缘。如果这场战争不停下来，我们可能会陷入比上世纪20年代末更严重的全球经济大萧条。而他想尽一切努力避免这种情况。所以你在周一早上和晚上会看到两条推文，而且这两条推文截然不同，但都显露出一种绝望。早上，他说要把伊朗从地球上抹去，要永远摧毁伊朗文明。
This is a genocidal threat of the First Order. This is the kind of language that you expect from Adolf Hitler, not from an American president. And what's going on here is he's desperate. And he's threatening to annihilate the Iranians to get them to throw up their hands before he has to attack them that evening. He wants them to concede defeat. By the end of the day, he does 180 degree turn. And he says there's going to be a ceasefire. But most importantly, he says that the ceasefire will be based on Iran's 10 point plan.
这是一个堪比一等种族灭绝的威胁。这种言辞让人联想到阿道夫·希特勒，而不是一位美国总统。这里发生的事情是，他已经绝望了。他威胁要消灭伊朗人，以便在他不得不在晚上袭击他们之前迫使他们投降。他想让他们承认失败。然而，到当天结束时，他突然180度大转弯，宣布将停火。而最重要的是，他表示停火将基于伊朗的十点计划。
Now you want to understand that there are two plans on the table. One is the 15 point American plan, which has all the maximalist demands of the United States and Israel. And then there's the Iranian 10 point plan, which has all the maximalist demands of the Iranians. And he says that the negotiations will take place on the basis of the Iranians 10 point plan. This is really quite remarkable. He says the 10 point plan provides a workable basis for an agreement.
现在你需要知道，有两个方案被摆上了台面。一个是15点的美国方案，其中包含了美国和以色列的极限要求。另一个是伊朗的10点方案，包含了伊朗的极限要求。他说，谈判将以伊朗的10点方案为基础进行。这实在是相当引人注目。他表示，这个10点方案可以为达成协议提供一个可行的基础。
And again, these are the maximalist demands of the Iranian government. He says, furthermore, in the tweet, that almost all of the points of contention between the two sides have been revolved, have been resolved. Again, remarkable. What's going on here? He's basically found the off ramp and the off ramp is to concede defeat. It is the only off ramp. He's long had two options. One is he could go up the escalation ladder, which was he, which is what he was threatening to do in the morning.
这些就是伊朗政府的最大化要求。他在推文中进一步表示，双方几乎所有的争议点都已经解决。这真是非同寻常。这到底发生了什么？基本上，他找到了让步的途径，而让步就是认输。这是唯一的出路。他一直有两个选择，一个是继续升级冲突，这是他早上威胁要做的事情。
But as I've argued for a long time, he can't go up the escalation ladder because he loses at every step. And the idea that he's going to obliterate Iran, this is not acceptable. This cannot be done. So he can't escalate. So he's got to find an off ramp. But the only off ramp is surrender, is to concede defeat. And what he does in the second tweet, again, he reverses gears, goes in the opposite direction, and he concedes defeat.
但正如我长期以来所主张的那样，他无法在升级的过程中步步高升，因为他在每一步都会失败。而他想要摧毁伊朗的想法，是不可接受的，这是无法做到的。所以他无法升级冲突，因此他必须找到退路。但唯一的退路就是投降，就是承认失败。而在他的第二条推文中，他再次改变策略，走向相反的方向，并且承认了失败。
He says, we're going to negotiate on the basis of the 10-point plan. This means none of our demands are going to be achieved, right? None of the big four demands that we made before the war started and after the war started are going to be realized. And we're going to negotiate on the basis of the maximalist demands that Iran has put on the table.
他说，我们将以这个十点计划为基础进行谈判。这意味着我们的任何要求都无法实现，对吗？在战争开始前和开始后我们提出的四大主要要求都不会实现。而且，我们将根据伊朗提出的最高要求进行谈判。
So what I'm saying to you, Glenn, is if you look at the morning tweet and you look at the evening tweet, you see that Trump is desperate. He's desperate to end this war. And he wants to get a ceasefire as quickly as possible. And then he wants to start negotiations. But it seems like he wants to have it both ways. Because, yes, he concedes defeat. We'll accept, you know, that Iran will set up a toll on the Strait of Hormuz.
我要表达的是，格伦，如果你看看早上的推文和晚上的推文，你会发现特朗普很着急。他迫切想结束这场战争，并希望尽快实现停火，然后开始谈判。但似乎他想要两边都占好处。因为虽然他承认失败，我们也接受伊朗会在霍尔木兹海峡设立通行费。
We'll put a ceasefire, which includes Lebanon, all these things. But then once the ceasefire is in place, he seems to be still wanting to claim victory. So now his tweets are about, well, you know, you better not put any tolls on the Strait of Hormuz. And, you know, Lebanon's not included. It looks like he wants to have it both ways. He concedes defeat to get the ceasefire. But once he has the ceasefire, he wants to make this victory claim.
我们会设立一个包括黎巴嫩在内的停火协议。但在停火协议生效后，他似乎仍然想宣称胜利。所以现在他的推文内容是：你们知道的，最好不要在霍尔木兹海峡设置任何通行费。而且，黎巴嫩不算在内。看起来他想两面讨好：为了达成停火协议，他承认失败。但一旦停火协议生效，他又想宣布胜利。
Because I noticed that Pete Hegseth, he also tried to do this victory lap. He was just reading out all the people who are dead, you know, all the people they killed as a way of suggesting that this was victory. But it's, did you see it in a similar way that he, well, did you see the attempt to claim victory here? Because, you know, what they had to agree to and what they're claiming, it's, there seems to be a massive gap there.
因为我注意到，皮特·赫格塞斯也试图宣扬胜利。他只是在读出所有死去的人，以及他们杀死的所有人，以此来暗示这是胜利。但是，你是否看到他那样的胜利宣称？因为，他们所同意的和他们声称的成就之间似乎有很大的差距。
Well, first of all, Glenn, they don't have a ceasefire. Because to have a ceasefire, the Iranians have to open the Strait of Hormuz. And the Iranians have refused to open the Strait of Hormuz because the Israelis are bombing Lebanon and attacking Hezbollah inside of Lebanon. And the Iranians say there will be no ceasefire. The Strait of Hormuz will not be opened until the Israelis stop attacking Hezbollah. And that hasn't happened. So the Israelis are undermining the ceasefire.
首先，格伦，他们并没有实现停火。要实现停火，伊朗人需要开放霍尔木兹海峡。但伊朗拒绝开放霍尔木兹海峡，因为以色列正在轰炸黎巴嫩并攻击黎巴嫩境内的真主党。伊朗表示，只有以色列停止攻击真主党，才会有停火，霍尔木兹海峡才会被开放。而这种情况还没有发生，所以以色列破坏了停火。
You want to understand here that, first of all, there's the ceasefire, but then there's the negotiations to end the war. But before you can get to the negotiations, you have to get a ceasefire. But we don't have a ceasefire. That's a key point to understand. And the question is whether or not President Trump is going to be willing to lean on Netanyahu in a really serious way to get him to stop attacking Hezbollah. And then we'll get a ceasefire. Then the Strait will be opened.
首先，你需要明白这里的关键点：首先是停火，然后才是结束战争的谈判。但要进行谈判，首先需要实现停火。目前我们还没有停火，这是一个需要理解的重要点。问题在于特朗普总统是否愿意真正施压内塔尼亚胡，让他停止攻击真主党。只有这样我们才能实现停火，然后海峡才能开放。
But in terms of Hegseth and Trump declaring victory, this is putting lipstick on a pig. Come on, this is, it's clear we've lost. You just want to think about it. We went into this war with four demands. One was regime change. Two was Iran would get rid of its nuclear enrichment capability. Three is Iran would eliminate all its long-range ballistic missiles. And four, Iran would stop supporting the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. None of those four demands have been realized. None.
关于海格塞斯和特朗普宣布胜利，这就像是给猪化妆。拜托，明明已经输掉了。你只需要思考一下。我们发动这场战争时提出了四个要求：第一是政权更迭；第二是伊朗取消其核浓缩能力；第三是伊朗销毁所有远程弹道导弹；第四是伊朗停止支持胡塞武装、真主党和哈马斯。这四个要求一个都没有实现。一个都没有。
Furthermore, Iran now controls the Strait of Hormuz, which gives it enormous leverage. Furthermore, Iran still has a huge inventory of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, which allows it to attack American bases in the region, American forces in the region, the GCC states. They're allied with the United States and Israel itself. So Iran is in an excellent position today compared to the position it was in on February 27th.
此外，伊朗现在控制了霍尔木兹海峡，这为它提供了巨大的影响力。而且，伊朗仍然拥有大量的弹道导弹、巡航导弹和无人机，可以用来攻击该地区的美军基地、美军、海湾合作委员会国家以及以色列，这些都是美国的盟友。因此，与2月27日相比，伊朗目前处于一个非常有利的位置。
And furthermore, as I said, President Trump, in his Truth Social post on Monday night, this is April 6th, said, we're going to negotiate on the basis of the 10-point plan that the Iranians have put on the table. This is a clear defeat. And by the way, it's an even bigger defeat for Israel. And in Israel, there is all sorts of talk to that effect. The Israelis fully understand that if you look at where this train is headed, this is a catastrophic defeat for them. And of course, it is for President Trump as well.
而且，正如我之前所说，特朗普总统在4月6日星期一晚上的Truth Social帖子中表示，我们将以伊朗提出的10点计划为基础进行谈判。这显然是一次失败。而且，这对以色列来说是更大的失败。在以色列，关于这一点的讨论很多。以色列人完全明白，如果你看看这个局势的走向，他们将遭遇灾难性的失败。当然，对特朗普总统来说，这也是一次失败。
Well, in the future as well, if Israel or any of the Western states would want to attack Yemen or attack Lebanon or genocide the Palestinians again, then Iran could just shut down or increase the toll. You know, they have some different steps up the escalation ladder on the Hormuz. They can, you know, block some ships. I don't know. This gives massive instrumental power to the Iranians. I mean, they seem like they will exit this conflict as maybe superpowers a bit too much, but at least adjacent to a great power. This is quite an instrumental power they have.
好的，将来如果以色列或任何西方国家想要攻击也门或黎巴嫩，或者再次对巴勒斯坦人进行种族灭绝，伊朗可以采取措施，关闭或加剧紧张局势。你知道的，他们在霍尔木兹海峡有一些不同的升级手段。他们可以封锁一些船只。这样做赋予了伊朗巨大的战略力量。也许称其为超级大国有些过，但至少可以说他们接近一个强国。这确实是一个重要的力量。
And as you said, I didn't have this before the war. Well, there's two points to be made. First of all, I think you don't want to overestimate how powerful a position Iran is in. Because of years of sanctions and because of the destruction we've brought on Iran since February 28th, Iran, in a very important way, has been devastated. This is a country that has been wrecked in a lot of ways.
正如你所说，在战争之前我并没有这样的看法。这里有两个要点。首先，我认为你不应该高估伊朗的实力。由于多年的制裁以及自2月28日以来我们对其造成的破坏，伊朗实际上已经在很大程度上受到了重创。这个国家在许多方面都遭到严重破坏。
So the idea that they're coming out of this war in great shape is wrong. They're going to have to spend many billions of dollars over many years to recover or to come close to recovering from all the damage that we and the Israelis have inflicted on them. There's no question, however, that given the fact that they control the Strait of Hormuz, they have a huge amount of leverage.
因此，认为他们在这场战争中状态良好是错误的。他们需要花费数十亿美元，经过多年才能恢复，或者说要接近从我们和以色列对他们造成的所有破坏中恢复过来。然而，毫无疑问，鉴于他们控制着霍尔木兹海峡，他们拥有巨大的影响力。
And I take it a step further, Glenn. You want to remember that the Houthis are their allies. They're one of the three groups that the Iranians remain very close to, the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. And the Houthis, they can shut down the Strait that leads out of the Red Sea, as they have done in the past.
好的，我进一步说明一下，Glenn。你要记住，胡塞武装是他们的盟友。胡塞武装、黎巴嫩真主党和哈马斯是伊朗保持非常紧密关系的三大组织之一。胡塞武装有能力封锁红海南端的海峡，他们过去就曾这样做过。
So the Iranians working with the Houthis have the ability to shut down traffic coming out of the Red Sea, out of the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, and they have the capability to shut down the traffic coming out of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. So they do have enormous leverage. There's just no question about that. And this is going to present huge problems for the Israelis moving forward and for the Americans moving forward.
因此，与胡塞武装合作的伊朗人具备能力关闭从红海和曼德海峡出来的交通线，他们也有能力封锁波斯湾通过霍尔木兹海峡的航运。所以，他们确实拥有巨大的影响力，这一点毋庸置疑。这将给以色列和美国未来带来巨大的问题。
And by the way, Glenn, just to take this a step further, if you look at the maximalist demands of the Iranians, one of them is that all American military forces leave the region. I find it hard to believe that that will happen. But I would note that we have 13 bases. Let me put it differently. We had 13 bases in the region on February 28th. And the New York Times reports that of those 13 bases, all of them have either been destroyed or badly damaged. You just want to think about that. Our presence in the Gulf has been seriously undermined by this war. The 13 bases that we depended on are basically gone or almost gone.
顺便说一下，格伦，为了更深入地探讨这个问题，如果你观察伊朗方面的极端要求，其中之一是要求所有美国军事力量撤出该地区。我觉得这不太可能发生。不过我想指出一点，我们曾经在2月28日时在该地区有13个基地。《纽约时报》报道称，这13个基地都已经被摧毁或严重损坏。你可以想想这件事。这场战争严重削弱了我们在海湾地区的存在。我们依赖的13个基地基本上已经失去或几乎失去作用。
And then you have to ask yourself the question, are the Gulf states that hosted us on these bases going to want the United States to come back and rebuild those bases? And as I said, there's also the question of whether we're going to want to do that, right? And then there is the point that the Iranians want us out of the region. So what our military presence in the region looks like when all the dust settles is hard to say, but we are going to be no more, we're not going to be more, we're going to be less influential, have less power in the Gulf, less power projection capability in the Gulf when all said and done than we had before February 28th.
然后你需要问自己一个问题，那些曾经接待我们驻扎的海湾国家是否希望美国重新回来并重建这些基地？而正如我所说的，我们自己是否愿意这样做也是一个问题。此外，还要考虑到伊朗希望我们离开这个地区。所以，当一切尘埃落定后，我们的军事存在将会是什么样子很难说，但我们的影响力会减少，我们在海湾地区的力量投射能力也会比2月28日之前更弱，而不是更强。
It's quite extraordinary that, uh, how horrible this war was. And, uh, uh, but again, uh, it was a defeat, but, uh, I'm not sure what else Trump could have done than to accept defeat because there was obviously a growing desperation. I was just wondering how, where you think most of the pressure came from. Was it that they were running out of, uh, missiles, interceptive missiles? Uh, in other words, the, the military was it? The massive economic pressure, especially at the growing oil prices, or was it, uh, you know, the fueling, the political havoc at home, uh, loss of voters. So we, what, what do you think, or are there other dimensions to this, uh, disaster that we're missing?
这场战争的恐怖程度实在令人震惊。这虽然是一次失败，但除此之外，我不确定特朗普还能做些什么，似乎当时的绝望情绪正在加剧。我在想，您认为最大的压力来源于哪里？是因为他们快耗尽拦截导弹之类的军事资源了吗？或者是大规模的经济压力，尤其是不断上涨的油价？还是说国内的政治动荡加剧，导致选民流失？那么，您怎么看？或者说，这场灾难是否还有我们没有注意到的其他方面？
Well, I think the secondary factor is that militarily we couldn't figure out how to win the war in any meaningful way. Just the, you know, ground invasion didn't make sense. Uh, we couldn't use the Navy to do much of anything. Uh, we, we just, we just didn't have many options. And I think that was becoming manifestly clear. And you want to remember that in this rescue operation, uh, where they got the second pilot out, we lost more aircraft that day than we have lost on any single day since the Vietnam war. And think about that since the Vietnam war, right? We have never lost as many aircraft in one day as we lost in this rescue mission.
好的，我认为次要因素是，我们在军事上无法找到一个有意义的方式赢得这场战争。你知道，地面入侵没什么意义，我们也无法通过海军来实现太多目标，总之，我们的选择很有限。我觉得这一点已经变得非常明显。你要记住，在这次营救行动中，当他们救出第二名飞行员时，我们那一天损失的飞机比自越南战争以来的任何一天都多。想想看，自越南战争以来，我们从未在一天内损失过那么多飞机，如这次救援行动中一样。
And it just tells you that we were not doing well militarily. Uh, so I think that was of secondary importance. I think what's of primary importance here is, uh, what's happening to the world economy. I think, uh, the Chinese, uh, the Chinese, uh, the Russians are very scared about what the long-term consequences of this war are going to be for the world economy. Uh, and that includes the supply of food around the world, as well as oil and gas.
这段话的大意是：这只是告诉我们，我们在军事上表现不佳。我认为这只是次要的。我认为最重要的是世界经济目前的状况。我认为，中国和俄罗斯非常担心这场战争对全球经济的长期影响。这其中包括全球的粮食供应问题，以及石油和天然气的供应问题。
Uh, and I believe the Chinese put pressure on the Iranians and talked at great length to the Pakistanis about getting Iran to come to the negotiating table, uh, and to work out a ceasefire and then get talking about settling this war. I think the Chinese understand full well that this will have disastrous consequences for everyone. And I want to underline that word, everyone, if this war continues, this war has to be shut down.
嗯，我相信中国方面对伊朗施加了压力，并与巴基斯坦进行了长时间的对话，希望能促使伊朗回到谈判桌上，与各方谈妥停火协议，然后继续协商解决这场战争。我认为中国非常清楚地意识到，如果这场战争继续下去，将会对每个人——我要特别强调“每个人”——带来灾难性的后果。因此，这场战争必须停下来。
Uh, if you look at what's happening in East Asia, and this includes countries like South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, India, uh, and the potential for really grave damage in China, uh, and countries like Russia. Russia over the long-term, everybody understands, and I believe the Trump administration understands that we have to shut this one down. So I think you see Trump trying to do that. It's Trump who's actually been pushing hard for some sort of exit option, some way of settling this war.
呃，如果你看看东亚的情况，包括韩国、菲律宾、印尼、印度，以及中国可能面临的严重破坏，还有像俄罗斯这样的国家，长远来看，每个人都明白，我相信特朗普政府也明白，我们必须解决这个问题。所以，我认为你会看到特朗普在努力推动一些退出选项，寻找解决这场冲突的方法。
No question that Trump is deeply interested in doing that. Uh, but the Iranians, as I've long argued, have a vested interest in stringing this out. The Iranians don't want to settle this war quickly because the longer the war goes on and the more damage that's done to the international economy and the deeper the panic that Trump is in, the more leverage the Iranians have. So it's no problem, I think, from the Iranian point of view, if this ceasefire doesn't work out because as it goes on, the conflict, that is, their leverage increases.
毫无疑问，特朗普对这样做非常感兴趣。但正如我长期以来所主张的那样，伊朗人有着延长这一过程的既得利益。伊朗人不想迅速结束这场战争，因为战争持续时间越长，对国际经济造成的损害越大，特朗普的恐慌程度越深，伊朗人就拥有越多的筹码。因此，从伊朗的角度来看，如果停火协议未能奏效也没有问题，因为随着冲突的持续，他们的影响力会增加。
But nevertheless, I believe what happened here is the Chinese working with the Pakistanis and directly with the Iranians put great pressure on Iran. They might've even brought the Russians in to put pressure on Iran to go to the negotiating table because this one has to be shut down. So I think as you look at the situation today, you go back to those two tweets of, uh, President Trump on Monday, this is April 6th, and you ramp forward up to the present, and then you project out into the future. I think it's the global economy that really is driving the train here. Yeah, that's probably true. I think even now that, well, even if the war comes to an end now, uh, the amount of damage that has already been done is quite tremendous, especially for the Europeans and the Asians, uh, where you can maybe put Africa in that same category.
尽管如此，我相信这里发生的是中国与巴基斯坦人以及直接与伊朗人合作，对伊朗施加了巨大压力。他们甚至可能把俄罗斯人也拉进来，迫使伊朗走上谈判桌，因为这件事必须解决。所以我认为，当你审视当前的局势时，可以回顾特朗普总统在4月6日星期一发布的两条推文，然后跳到现在，再展望未来。我认为真正推动事态发展的是全球经济。是的，这可能是真的。我认为即使现在战争结束，已经造成的损害仍然相当巨大，尤其是对欧洲和亚洲，非洲也可能算在其中。
But, um, uh, but we've seen some reports of, uh, more U.S. troops heading to the region. I don't know. I haven't seen the exact numbers, but do you think this is, I mean, it seems unlikely that Trump wants to have another go at this because I'm not sure what he's going to do with the troops. As you said, boots on the ground never really made any sense at all. Uh, or is it just for pressure to hope that, uh, the U.S. will have a little bit more leverage in the negotiations? Because, you know, this is just a two-week ceasefire, supposed to produce an actual, uh, peace agreement. And that, that, that peace agreement is going to be very difficult for Trump to get because at the moment the ceasefire deal, which is a bit ambiguous, there doesn't seem to be a written paper, which they can point to.
但是，嗯，我们看到了一些关于更多美军前往该地区的报道。我不太清楚具体的数字，但你觉得这可能吗？我的意思是，特朗普似乎不太可能想再次尝试，因为我不确定他打算如何使用这些部队。正如你所说，地面作战从来没有真正意义。而这可能仅仅是为了施压，希望美国在谈判中能有更多的筹码。因为，你知道，这只是一个为期两周的停火协议，旨在达成一项真正的和平协议。然而，这项和平协议对特朗普来说将非常难以实现，因为目前的停火协议有些含糊，似乎没有一个明确的书面文件可以作为依据。
Uh, it's, um, you know, it's, it's easy for him to harmonize, you know, his claim for victory and also the need to, I guess, capitulate. But, uh, in an actual peace agreement, it's going to be very hard to square this. Uh, I'm just, I'm just wondering how, how do you see the possible ways of this war actually ending? Because again, we have to get from a ceasefire to an actual peace agreement, or do you think Trump's just going to try to extend the, the ceasefire indefinitely and get, you know, like, uh, I don't know, just try not to get any pen on paper. So he doesn't have to admit defeat essentially.
嗯，你知道的，他很容易把胜利的主张和屈服的需要协调起来。但是，在实际的和平协议中，这将非常困难。我只是想知道，你怎么看待这场战争可能的结束方式？因为我们必须从停火走向真正的和平协议。或者你觉得特朗普会试图无限期地延长停火，并尽量不在协议上签字，从而避免承认失败？
Glenn, he has to admit defeat. He admitted defeat Monday night. Again, we're on the precipice. We've got to shut this one down. He has no choice here. You talk about sending ground forces to the region and, uh, a ground force option. That's really going to work well. That's going to get a quick agreement. Are you kidding? Right. That's just going to make a bad situation worse. Uh, there's no ground force option here. There's no naval option. There's no air option. I guess, you know, he could use nuclear weapons and, uh, destroy, uh, Iran forever. I guess we could do that. We have that capability. Is he going to do that? No, he's not going to do that. So he's got to shut this one down.
格伦，他不得不承认失败。他在周一晚上承认了失败。我们再次处于悬崖边缘，必须停止这个行动。他在这里没有选择。你提到向该地区派遣地面部队，呃，地面部队选项。那真的会有效吗？会快速达成协议吗？你在开玩笑吗？这只会让糟糕的局势更糟糕。这里没有地面部队选项，没有海军选项，也没有空军选项。我想，他可能会使用核武器，把伊朗彻底摧毁。我想我们有这个能力。他会这么做吗？不，他不会这样做。所以他必须要停止这个行动。
And, uh, he's between a rock and a hard place because the Israelis won't cooperate with him. The Israelis won't even allow him to get a ceasefire. Again, the Strait of Hormuz is still effectively closed. The only ships that get through are the ones that the Iranians let through. Uh, so he can declare victory and talk about, you know, the fact that we've gotten everything we wanted and our goals had been achieved and so forth and so on. And, but nobody's going to believe that we lost. The Israelis lost. The problem is that there are just so many alternative media outlets where this is all made clear. Your show being one of them that they can't put lipstick on a pig and get away with it.
他现在进退两难，因为以色列人不配合他。以色列甚至不允许他达成停火协议。同时，霍尔木兹海峡仍然基本上是关闭的，只有伊朗允许的船只才能通过。所以他可以宣布胜利，说我们已经实现了所有目标等等。但是没有人会相信我们输了，以色列输了。问题在于，有太多不同的媒体渠道将真相呈现出来，比如你的节目，他们无法掩盖事实。
Pete Hegseth can say we won. Donald Trump can say we won, but who believes that? Hardly anybody. Uh, you see this in the Israeli case, you know, they'll be talking about all the wonderful things they've done because the government has a vested interest in saying that, but all sorts of people are going to point out that this is a ludicrous argument. They didn't win. They lost. Uh, so what I would say to president Trump, and I don't think he needs me to tell him this because I'm sure his advisors are telling him this, this thing has to be shut down immediately. I am sure that this is exactly what Vance is telling him.
皮特·赫格塞斯可能会说我们赢了，唐纳德·特朗普也可能会说我们赢了，但谁会相信呢？几乎没人相信。你可以从以色列的例子看到这种情况，他们会谈论自己取得的种种成就，因为政府有表达胜利的利益。但是，各种人都会指出这是一种荒谬的论调。他们没赢，而是输了。所以，我想对特朗普总统说的是，我相信他的顾问已经告诉他这一点，这件事必须立即停下来。我相信范斯也正是这样对他所说的。
I'd bet a lot of money on that, that this has to be shut down. And they're sending Vance to head this team of negotiators because they know Vance, you know, is capable of reaching some sort of agreement. Uh, you know, you don't want to depend on, uh, Steve Wyckoff and Jared Kushner. I mean, these are basically Israeli assets, not to mention the fact they're incompetent. They have a demonstrated record of incompetence now. So you want someone like Vance in charge and hopefully he can shut this down.
我敢打赌很多钱，这件事必须被关闭。他们派Vance来领导这个谈判小组，因为他们知道Vance有能力达成某种协议。你不想依靠Steve Wyckoff和Jared Kushner，他们基本上是以色列的棋子，而且他们已经表现出了无能。所以你需要Vance这样的人来负责，希望他能顺利关闭这个事情。
Uh, but, uh, it'll be tough. You know, Glenn, just to go back to the Ukraine war and think about all the endless conversations we've had on ending the war in Ukraine. President Trump was determined to end the war in Ukraine even before he came into office. But if he didn't settle that war before he came into office, he was going to settle it after he came into office. And he's been a colossal failure, right? Uh, he and his lieutenants have bumbled around and really, uh, made a hash of the negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Uh, it's the gang that can't shoot straight, right?
呃，但是，呃，这会很困难。你知道的，Glenn，回到乌克兰战争，想想我们为结束乌克兰战争进行的无尽讨论。特朗普总统甚至在上任前就决心要结束这场战争。但是，如果他在上任前没能解决那场战争，他打算在上任后解决。然而，现实是他完全失败了，对吧？他和他的助手们在结束乌克兰战争的谈判中表现得很糟糕，真是乱七八糟。这就像是个一团糟的团队，对吧？
Well, here we are now trying to shut down another war and it's the Trump administration again. And the question you have to ask yourself is, can they do it? Uh, if the cast of characters involved just President Trump, Steve Wyckoff and Jared Kushner, I'd say we're in deep trouble. But Vance is our great hope here. He's, he's the new boy in town in terms of negotiating with an adversary. And we're just all hoping that he can pull it off.
好吧，现在我们又在尝试结束另一场战争，结果又轮到特朗普政府来处理了。你需要问自己的问题是，他们能做到吗？如果参与的人只是总统特朗普、史蒂夫·威科夫和贾里德·库什纳，那我们可能麻烦大了。但万斯是我们这里最大的希望。他是谈判新手，负责与对手协商。我们都希望他能成功。
I'm sure the Chinese and the Russians, not to mention the Indians, the South Koreans, the Japanese, the Indonesians, people all over Africa, people all over the world are pulling for Vance to work out a ceasefire, then to sit down and negotiate some sort of settlement so that we can get the straight open and we can get the fertilizer. Well, we have to get that fertilizer flowing and we can get the oil and gas flowing as well. Uh, we're not going to immediately go back to the status quo ante in terms of how much those goods come out of the Gulf, but it'll be a good start.
我相信中国、俄罗斯，更不用说印度、韩国、日本、印尼、非洲和世界各地的人们都希望万斯能够促成停火，然后坐下来谈判，达成某种协议，这样我们就能打通航道，顺利获得化肥。当然，我们必须让化肥和石油天然气的供应恢复流动。虽然我们不会立刻回到之前的出口水平，但这将是一个良好的开端。
But we have to do this immediately. And I believe that President Trump understands that. It's just, it's just difficult to miss what's going on here. I'm sure that countries all around the world are calling the White House every day saying, this is a colossal disaster. Something has to be done. And again, I think the Chinese and the Russians fully understand this. These are the responsible stakeholders in the system, the Chinese and the Russians, not the United States. But I think at a certain point, even the United States, even the Trump administration gets the message.
但我们必须立即采取行动。我相信特朗普总统明白这一点。这里发生的事情不容忽视。我确信世界各国每天都在打电话给白宫，说这是一场巨大的灾难，必须采取措施。而且，我认为中国和俄罗斯对此完全理解。这些是体系中负责任的参与者，中国和俄罗斯，而不是美国。但我想在某个时候，即使是美国，即使是特朗普政府也会明白这一信息。
This is my reading of the situation. And again, Glenn, I would say, just go back and look at the two true social posts that he wrote on Monday, what he said in the morning about annihilating, uh, Iranian culture. And then look at what he said in the evening, did 180 degree turn and said, we accept Iran's 10 point plan as a basis for negotiations. This is truly remarkable. And it reflects the desperation. And by the way, uh, just if he doesn't understand, if I'm wrong, if he and his lieutenants don't understand, just give him another week or two, they'll understand, uh, what's going on here in terms of the world economy.
这是我对局势的理解。此外，格伦，我建议你回头看看他周一在“真实社交”平台上发布的两个帖子。他早上声称要摧毁伊朗文化，但到了晚上却完全转变，表示接受伊朗的十点计划作为谈判基础。这一点实在是令人惊讶，也反映出了他们的绝望。顺便说一句，即使他和他的副手们现在不明白，或者我错了，再给他们一两周的时间，他们就会明白当前世界经济的状况。
I think we should all probably be happy that Vance will take over some negotiations, but something good could come from this. So if he is successful, at least he should be more successful than Witkoff and Kushner, then perhaps, uh, Trump will have the wisdom to also send them to Moscow because I, I, it seems more, well, Vance seems more genuine, not just in opposing the Iran war, but actually wanting to put an end to the Ukraine war as well. So he doesn't seem to have, uh, he doesn't seem to have any more appetite for throwing more lives and money into this, uh, big black hole.
我认为我们应该都为Vance接手一些谈判感到高兴，这可能会带来一些好事。如果他成功了，至少他应该比Witkoff和Kushner更成功，那么，也许特朗普会明智地也派他们去莫斯科，因为Vance看起来更真诚，不仅反对伊朗战争，还真正想结束乌克兰战争。他似乎没有兴趣再把更多的人命和金钱投入到这个无底洞中。
So, uh, again, something good could come from this perhaps, but, uh, it, it is. Can I make one, can I make just one quick point on what you said? You do want to remember though, that if Vance negotiates a settlement in which we lose, and this is certainly true in the Gulf. And I believe it would be true in settling the Ukraine war, the right in the United States, the neoconservatives, which are a key element in the Republican party will blame him and go after him hammer and tong.
所以，说不定这件事情会有好结果。不过，我可以针对你刚才说的内容，再补充一点吗？你得记住，如果范斯谈判达成的和解让我们处于劣势，这在海湾地区是完全正确的。我相信在解决乌克兰战争时也是如此。美国的右翼，即共和党中的一个重要组成部分——新保守主义者，将会责怪他，并猛烈抨击他。
So you just want to understand that politically for Vance, he's in a very dangerous situation. There's no question that for the good of the United States, for the good of the Trump presidency, and for the good of the world, we need him to behave in smart and brave ways to end this disaster. We just need him to do that. But if he's successful, and let's hope he is, he will pay a political price here in the United States.
所以你需要明白，从政治角度来看，瓦恩斯正处于非常危险的境地。毫无疑问，为了美国的利益、为了特朗普总统任期的利益，也为了全世界的利益，我们需要他以聪明和勇敢的方式来结束这场灾难。我们就是需要他这样做。但是，如果他成功了，希望他能成功，他将在美国付出政治代价。
And the question you have to ask yourself is whether that will affect how he approaches these negotiations. Uh, he is surely aware of the point that I just made. I mean, he's a very smart man, whether you agree with his policy views or not. Uh, he's a smart man and he has surely figured this out. But, uh, let's just hope that, you know, he puts the good of the country and really the good of the world. It sounds funny saying that, but really we are talking about the good of the world here, uh, above, uh, his own narrow political interests and does work hard to get a settlement and is successful.
你需要问自己的是，这是否会影响他处理这些谈判的方式。他肯定清楚我刚才提到的那一点。无论你是否同意他的政策观点，他都是一个非常聪明的人，肯定已经想通了。这听起来有点好笑，但我们谈论的是国家的利益，甚至世界的利益。希望他能把国家和世界的利益放在首位，而不是只顾自己的政治利益，努力达成协议并取得成功。
Yeah, that's a great point. I actually didn't consider the domestic politics of the whole thing, but, uh, making the kind of humiliating piece, which has to be made, or maybe not humiliating, but, uh, well, yeah, perhaps humiliating. Uh, it's definitely going to come at a price. Uh, but no, it's going to be a humiliating piece. I hadn't thought of the language you use, but I think you're right. Uh, and, and as I said to you before, I don't think you can put lipstick on a pig in this case. It's just not going to work because people like us are going to point out what's going on and, uh, and even places like the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, uh, will in the end have to fess up and say that this is a real defeat.
是的，你提到了一个很好的观点。我其实没有考虑到整个事情中的国内政治因素，不过要制作这样一种令人感到屈辱的结果——或者也许不应该称为屈辱，但，总之，是的，也许是屈辱。这肯定会付出代价。但不，这将是一个屈辱的结果。我之前没有想到你使用的这种措辞，但我认为你是对的。正如我之前对你说过的，在这种情况下，你不能把口红涂在猪身上，这不会奏效，因为像我们这样的人会指出发生的事情，甚至像《纽约时报》和《华尔街日报》这样的媒体最终也不得不承认这是一场真正的失败。
And by the way, you'll see this in Israel as well. I mean, you know, we talked about Donald Trump making a catastrophic mistake. I mean, Bibi Netanyahu, whoo, a huge mistake. And as I said before, you do not want to underestimate the trouble they're having in Lebanon. Right. Um, they're not doing well. The Israelis are not doing well in Lebanon. So Israel is in, you know, terrible shape as a result of what's happened since February 28th. Well, it's a good point because I think the Israelis also bet everything on knocking out Iran here. I mean, that was supposed to be the head of the snake and, uh, because they were already overstretched. They're not successful in Gaza. They're not successful in Lebanon.
顺便说一下，你在以色列也能看到这些。我是说，我们提到过唐纳德·特朗普犯了一个灾难性的错误。而且，我是说，内塔尼亚胡也是犯了一个巨大的错误。正如我之前所说的，你绝对不能低估他们在黎巴嫩遇到的麻烦。嗯，他们在黎巴嫩的表现不佳。以色列的情况非常糟糕，这是从2月28日以来发生的事情的结果。这是一个重要的观点，因为我认为以色列人也把一切赌在了打击伊朗上。他们是认为伊朗是主要的敌人，但是因为他们已经力不从心了。他们在加沙没有成功，在黎巴嫩也没有成功。
And, uh, and, uh, now, of course, this, none of the objectives were achieved in the war against Iran. And I saw today that the IDF told, uh, Knesset, uh, it is really a parliament that the new, uh, government in Iran was, uh, quote, more extreme. Um, so again, this goes a little bit against what we're hearing from Washington, that this is a better government, easier to work with. But I think that made never, they never made any sense. You can't, you know, you can't bomb a country to bits and then assume that relations will be better, especially if that country bombed to bits comes out on, on top in terms of, um, the war. So, uh, yeah, I do wonder though, how, how the Israelis are going to deal with this because they, they can't really afford to back down either because they, again, they bet everything on this.
当然，现在，在对伊朗的战争中，没有一个目标得以实现。今天我看到以色列国防军告诉议会，也就是议会，称伊朗的新政府更加极端。 这与华盛顿传来的信息有些矛盾，华盛顿表示这个新政府更好合作。然而，我一直认为这种说法没有道理。你不能指望在把一个国家炸得支离破碎后，关系会变得更好，尤其是当这个被炸得支离破碎的国家在战争中占据上风的时候。所以，我确实很想知道以色列人会如何应对这种局面，因为他们也不能退缩，因为他们在这件事上赌上了一切。
I mean, if what you're seeing is correct, that the U.S. presence will be diminished, uh, severely in the Middle East, uh, Israel's position will be weakened Iran, which was the main adversary, which was supposed to be destroyed in this war. Uh, if not regime changed and, you know, broken up or at least the chaotic like Syria. Now it's going to kind of come up on top. I mean, this is a horror show for the Israelis. Uh, it's, it's hard to imagine that they will accept this. I'm not sure what else they can do. Of course, short of launching a nuclear weapon at the Iranian capital, but, uh, how do you think the Israelis going to deal? Are they going to, you know, will this fuel domestic divisions into a civil war or will they, you know, seek another victory on a different front?
我意思是，如果你说的正确的话，美国在中东的存在将会大大减少，以色列的地位将会被削弱。而伊朗，这个主要敌人，原本计划在这场战争中被消灭，甚至被更换政权，并分裂或者至少像叙利亚那样陷入混乱，现在似乎反而要崛起了。对以色列来说，这简直是场噩梦。他们很难接受这样的局面。我不确定他们还能做些什么，当然除非对伊朗首都发动核攻击。但是，你认为以色列将会如何应对？他们会因为内部分歧而陷入内战，还是会在其他方面寻求新的胜利？
Uh, how, how are they going to deal with this? Because, uh, it's just hard to see how they're going to recover. Yeah. Before I try to answer that question, let me just also point out that this war has done significant damage, uh, to the U.S. Israeli relationship. The United States is now in a catastrophic war, right? This will be long seen is the most foolish foreign policy decision the United States has ever made. You know, the Council on Foreign Relations did a big study, uh, a few months ago where they surveyed American diplomatic historians and they asked them what was the most foolish foreign policy decision that any president in the history of the United States had ever made.
这个，该怎么处理呢？因为很难想象他们该如何恢复。在我尝试回答这个问题之前，我还想指出，这场战争对美以关系造成了重大损害。美国现在陷入了一场灾难性的战争中，这将被长久地视为美国历史上最愚蠢的外交政策决定。几个月前，对外关系委员会做了一项大型研究，他们调查了美国外交史学家，并询问他们，美国历史上任何一位总统做出的最愚蠢的外交政策决定是什么。
And what was clearly ranked number one was George W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Well, there is absolutely no question in my mind that the decision to attack Iran on February 28th will be seen as a much worse decision than the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. There's no question that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 led to major league trouble. It was a catastrophic decision in its own right. There's no question about that did enormous damage in the region to America's reputation and so forth and so on. But it, in my opinion, pales in comparison to the decision that President Trump made on February 28th.
最明显被认为是第一位的决策是乔治·W·布什在2003年入侵伊拉克的决定。毫无疑问，在我看来，2020年2月28日关于袭击伊朗的决定将被视为比2003年入侵伊拉克的决定更糟糕。毫无疑问，2003年入侵伊拉克的决定导致了严重的问题，这是一个灾难性的决定。毫无疑问，它对该地区和美国的声誉造成了巨大的损害等等。但是，在我看来，这与特朗普总统在2月28日做出的决定相比显得微不足道。
Now, in terms of U.S. Israeli relations, it is becoming manifestly clear because there's an abundance of evidence that it's the Israelis who led President Trump into this war. This big New York Times story that recently came out that described the decision-making process made it clear that hardly anyone in the deep state, hardly any of Trump's close advisors were enthusiastic about this enterprise. And in fact, many of them were serious doubters, including the head of the CIA, the vice president, and so forth and so on. But President Trump did it because Prime Minister Netanyahu and David Barnea, who was the head of Mossad, convinced him that this would lead to a quick and decisive victory. So it is widely recognized that it is the Israelis who led us into this disastrous war.
现在，就美以关系而言，很明显有大量的证据表明，是以色列将特朗普总统引入了这场战争。最近《纽约时报》的一篇大文章描述了当时的决策过程，明确指出几乎没有深层政府中的人，几乎没有特朗普的亲密顾问对此计划感到热情。实际上，他们中的许多人，包括中央情报局局长、副总统等在内，都对此抱有严重怀疑态度。但是特朗普总统之所以这样做，是因为以色列总理内塔尼亚胡和摩萨德局长大卫·巴尔内亚说服了他，他们认为这将导致一次迅速而果断的胜利。因此，人们普遍认为是以色列引导我们参与了这场灾难性的战争。
And point number two, as we are watching what's happening now, it's the Israelis who are preventing us from getting a ceasefire to put an end to this disastrous war. So U S views the American public's views, the American elite's views on Israel is undergoing a sea change. You could see it in the poll data. And in my opinion, this situation only gets worse with the passage of time because once the shooting stops, the dust settles and people begin to reflect on the causes of this disaster. And you want to remember one thing, Glenn, I learned this during the Vietnam War. When a country loses a war, everybody goes back to the causes. They want to figure out how did this ever happen? When you win, you don't care that much about the causes, right? You won and you celebrate the victory.
第二点，我们正在关注当前发生的事情。是以色列人阻止我们实现停火，以结束这场灾难性的战争。因此，美国公众、美国精英对以色列的看法正在经历翻天覆地的变化。你可以从民意调查数据中看到这一点。在我看来，随着时间的推移，这种情况只会更糟糕。因为一旦枪声停止，尘埃落定，人们开始反思这场灾难的原因。Glenn，我在越南战争期间学到了一件事：当一个国家输掉战争时，每个人都会回过头去追溯原因。他们想弄清楚这到底是怎么发生的。而如果赢了，你就不太在意原因，对吧？你赢了，就只想着庆祝胜利。
When you lose, especially when it's a disastrous loss like this, people are going to want to say that people are going to want to know, how did this happen? How could a country like the United States do this? How could President Trump, who had been such a great politician and had been so careful in the employment of military force, allowed himself to fall off the cliff like this? What happened? And what they'll discover very quickly, because again, the evidence is clear, is that it was the Israelis who led him by the nose into this disaster. And that is going to damage US-Israeli relations. So you want to remember that on top of all the things that you and I have talked about up to now, US-Israeli relations are going to be badly damaged as well.
当你失败时，特别是像这样的惨重失败，人们会想知道，这是怎么发生的？美国这样的国家怎么会这样？特朗普总统，他曾是一位出色的政治家，并且在使用武力时一直十分谨慎，怎么会让自己陷入这样的困境？发生了什么事？而他们很快就会发现，因为证据确凿，是以色列将他引向了这个灾难。这将会损害美以关系。所以，除了我们之前讨论的所有事情之外，你还要记得，美以关系也将受到严重损害。
So your question is, where do we go from here? And in particular, where do the Israelis go from here? I think this is going to cause huge trouble inside Israel. I think it's going to lead to all sorts of domestic unrest. There are going to be serious political fights between Netanyahu on one side and other political leaders on the other side as to who's responsible for this and what price should be paid and so forth and so on. But I think most importantly, and most disturbingly, is I think the Israelis will begin to think long and hard about using nuclear weapons against Iran.
所以你的问题是，我们接下来该怎么办？特别是以色列接下来该怎么办？我认为这将在以色列内部引发巨大困扰，并导致各种国内动荡。内塔尼亚胡与其他政治领导人之间可能会有严重的政治争斗，争论谁应该对这一局面负责，以及应该付出什么代价等等。但我认为最重要也是最令人不安的是，以色列人可能开始认真考虑对伊朗使用核武器。
I think for most Americans, we understand, and this is certainly true for Europeans as well, that Iran is not a serious threat to us. I mean, Iran is not a serious threat to the United States. They did not attack us. We attack them. How is Iran a serious threat to the United States? You just can't make that argument. But that's not the way Israel thinks about Iran. Israel thinks that Iran is a mortal enemy. They think this is the second coming of the Third Reich. They've convinced themselves that Iran is determined to get a nuclear weapon and to use that nuclear weapon to eliminate Israel from the face of the earth. They don't believe that Iran can be deterred.
我认为，对大多数美国人来说，我们明白，欧洲人显然也有同样的看法，伊朗对我们并不是一个严重的威胁。我的意思是，伊朗对美国并不构成严重的威胁。他们没有攻击我们，是我们攻击了他们。怎么能说伊朗对美国是个重大威胁呢？这是站不住脚的。然而，以色列对伊朗的看法截然不同。以色列认为伊朗是他们的死敌，觉得伊朗就是二战时纳粹德国的重现。他们相信伊朗决心获得核武器，并会用这种武器来将以色列从地球上抹去。他们不相信伊朗会被威慑住。
And they now understand, the Israelis now understand, that they can't prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon with conventional means. This is what the war demonstrates. They can't do it even with us conventionally. The only way they can do it is with a nuclear weapon. And given how ruthless the Israelis are and how willing they are to engage in genocide and murderous behavior, I would not put it past them to use a nuclear weapon against Iran. So one could argue that, yes, Israel is in deep trouble and that the Iranian threat is not less than ever. It's greater than ever. You can make that argument easily from their perspective. But the question you then have to ask yourself is, where does that lead?
他们现在明白，以色列人现在明白，他们无法通过常规手段阻止伊朗获得核武器。这场战争表明了这一点。即使与我们合作，他们也做不到。唯一能够实现这一目标的方法是使用核武器。考虑到以色列的残酷无情以及他们愿意进行种族灭绝和暴力行为，我不会排除他们对伊朗使用核武器的可能性。因此，可以说，以色列面临着巨大的困境，伊朗的威胁不但没有减少，反而更加严重。从他们的角度来看，这种说法是有道理的。但接下来你需要问自己的是，这样的发展将导致什么后果？
And you're talking about a country that has no problem executing genocides and that is convinced itself that it will face a genocidal state armed with nuclear weapons in Iran down the road. And in that situation, you can imagine them trying to use their or using their nuclear arsenal against Iran. Yeah. Well, it also seems, though, that for Netanyahu, the effort of portraying Iran as dead set on acquiring nuclear weapons and also being profoundly irrational that this was also instrumental in terms of making Israel's problems into the Americans' problems because that would be the only way one could conceive Iran as a threat to the United States. If you would acquire nuclear weapons and have no way of being deterred and, you know, being devoted to using this in an offensive manner.
你在谈论的这个国家毫无顾忌地进行种族灭绝，并且坚信在未来会面临一个在伊朗有核武器支持的种族灭绝国家。在这种情况下，可以想象他们会试图使用或使用他们的核武库对付伊朗。当然，不过，对于内塔尼亚胡来说，将伊朗描绘成一心想获得核武器并且极端不理性的努力，也是为了将以色列的问题变成美国的问题，因为这似乎是唯一能够将伊朗视为对美国构成威胁的方式。如果伊朗获得核武器后没有办法被威慑，并决心以进攻的方式使用这些武器。
But it is interesting that they seem to buy into their own rhetoric, though, about the irrationality of Iran and its determination to acquire a nuclear weapon. But it also seems that this is going to be devastating for the Trump administration, I'm thinking, though, because Trump's whole bit, I think, was, you know, what he was able to appeal to. He was looking at the U.S. relative decline. That is, his power in the world, its military, its economy, the work of opposition of people in society. And he essentially blamed this on weak and foolish leaders. So the weakness of Obama, the weakness of Biden, and also the foolishness of engaging in all these wars.
有趣的是，他们似乎相信自己的说辞，即关于伊朗的非理性以及其获取核武器的决心。不过，这似乎对特朗普政府来说将是一个沉重打击。我认为，特朗普过去能够吸引人的一点在于，他注意到了美国相对的衰落，也就是其在世界上的实力，包括军事、经济，以及社会中反对力量的作用。他基本上把这些归咎于软弱和愚蠢的领导者，比如奥巴马的软弱、拜登的软弱，以及参与所有这些战争的愚蠢行为。
So the solution was essentially strength. You needed a strong man. That was Trump. He was strong. That is, you know, if he was just tough, decisive and assertive, this is, this is essentially the medicine that will bring America, you know, make it great again. And also his toughness would be matched with, you know, this intelligence, his high IQ, as he always said, because he wouldn't do this hard, this foolish forever wars. And, but now, you know, he went in, the rhetoric was all about no one else dared to do this. Trump did it. But there's a reason why no one else did it. And now, of course, he is the war president and he did something foolish. I mean, his whole persona, his whole, the core of making America great again seems to have been damaged.
所以，解决方案本质上是需要一个强者。这就是特朗普。他很强。也就是说，如果他只是强硬、果断和自信的话，这就是让美国再次伟大的“药方”。此外，他的强硬还伴随着他的智力和他总是自称的高智商，因为他不会去进行愚蠢的长期战争。但现在，他上台时，言辞间充满了其他人不敢做的事情，是特朗普做到了。但是，其他人没有做这些事情是有原因的。现在，当然，他成了战争总统，并做了一些愚蠢的事情。我是说，他的整体形象，他让美国再次伟大的核心似乎已经受到了损害。
And even he lost his key supporters, and you probably saw him scolding Tucker Carlson and Alex Jones, Candace Owens, all of these people who had supported him when he was a peace president. So he essentially had a lot of problems already before this war, and all these problems are now much, much worse. So how do you think this is going to, you know, the international economy, of course, is a mess, the military defeat was an embarrassment, but what do you think it's going to do to the political situation within the United States? Well, I think that this is all going to destroy the Trump presidency. I mean, he may remain in office all the way to the end of his term, but he's damaged goods in a truly serious way.
即使他的核心支持者也失去了，你可能看到他责骂了塔克·卡尔森、亚历克斯·琼斯和坎迪斯·欧文斯，这些曾在他担任和平总统时支持过他的人。因此，在这场战争之前，他实际上已经有很多问题，而现在这些问题变得更加严重。那么，你认为这将如何影响国际经济，当然现在是一团糟，军事失败是一个尴尬，但你认为这将如何影响美国国内的政治局势呢？嗯，我认为这将彻底摧毁特朗普的总统任期。虽然他可能会一直留任到任期结束，但他的形象已经严重受损。
But you want to think about sort of where we stand on the world stage today. Before this war started, on February 28th, the Trump administration had already done enormous damage to America's position in the world, in large part because the president, who is the ultimate unilateralist, was wrecking international institutions, paying no attention to the rules that underpin those institutions. He was disregarding and disrespecting international law, and he was treating allies with unmitigated contempt, especially the Europeans. He was talking about invading Greenland. He was talking about making Canada the 51st state.
但是，你应该考虑一下我们在当今世界舞台上的地位。在这场战争开始之前，也就是2月28日，特朗普政府已经对美国在世界上的地位造成了巨大的损害。这很大程度上是因为这位总统是个极端的单边主义者，他破坏了国际机构，对支撑这些机构的规则毫不在意。他无视和不尊重国际法，对盟友表现出极大的轻蔑，尤其是对欧洲国家。他曾谈论入侵格陵兰，还提到将加拿大变成美国的第51个州。
And if he went to East Asia, the Japanese and the South Koreans, this is before February 28th, had real doubts about relying on the United States for security. And of course, in the course of 2025, he had seriously damaged what had been good relations with India. U.S.-India relations went south during 2025. So the United States, before February 28th, was in real trouble in terms of its foreign policy. And what's happened since February 28th has just damaged us further. If you look at U.S.-European relations, you think about all the damage that was done over the Ukraine war, then all the damage that was done over Greenland.
如果他去了东亚，在2月28日之前，日本和韩国实际上对依赖美国提供安全保障有很大的怀疑。当然，在2025年期间，他也严重损害了美国与印度曾经良好的关系。美印关系在2025年倒退。因此，美国在2月28日之前的外交政策方面确实陷入了困境。而从2月28日之后发生的事情只是让我们的情况更糟。看看美欧关系，经由乌克兰战争造成的所有损害，再加上格陵兰问题所带来的损害，你就会明白问题的严重性。
And now we have this situation where President Trump is effectively trying to blame the Europeans for the fact that we can't defeat Iran. He's implying that if only the Europeans had sent their military forces, especially their navies, to the Middle East, we would have been able to break through the Strait of Hormuz, and we would have ended Iran's stranglehold on the world economy. But that didn't happen. We failed. But why did we fail? Well, not because of the United States, but because of the Europeans. So if you think about U.S.-European relations today, they're terrible.
现在我们面临这样一种情况：特朗普总统实际上试图将我们无法打败伊朗的责任推给欧洲人。他暗示，如果欧洲国家派遣他们的军队，特别是海军，前往中东，我们就能突破霍尔木兹海峡，从而结束伊朗对世界经济的束缚。但这并没有发生，我们失败了。那么，我们为什么会失败呢？不是因为美国，而是因为欧洲人。所以，如果你考虑当今的美欧关系，它们非常糟糕。
And what about other countries around the world, the Japanese and the South Koreans, the Indonesians, the Indians? I mean, the United States is a rogue elephant. Do you want to get too close to the Trump administration? No. You want to keep your distance. So I think in terms of our foreign policy, he has, you know, done even greater damage than he did before February 28th. And I don't see how he digs himself out of this hole. In fact, I think, if anything, his behavior will become more erratic with the passage of time. This is a man who thinks he's a genius. He thinks he has the Midas touch. He thinks anything he does works out well. And he always emerges victorious. He simply is not going to be able to make that argument in this case. This is not like all the previous cases that he got away with. And he's therefore seriously damaged goods as president of the United States, even if he manages to shut this one down reasonably quickly. And that remains to be seen, as we were talking about before.
世界上其他国家呢，比如日本、韩国、印度尼西亚和印度？我的意思是，美国现在就像一头不受控的大象。你想和特朗普政府走得太近吗？不，不想。你会想保持距离。因此，我认为在我们对外政策方面，他比2月28日之前造成了更大的损害。我看不出他怎么能从这个困境中解脱出来。事实上，我认为随着时间的推移，他的行为可能会变得更加不稳定。他是一个自以为是天才的人，认为自己有点石成金的能力，觉得他所做的一切都能顺利进行，总是能取得胜利。但这次他恐怕无法再用这些借口来为自己辩护。这和他以前侥幸过关的情况不同。即使他能比较快地结束这一切，他在作为美国总统的职务上已经是严重受损的形象。当然，这还有待观察，就像我们之前讨论的那样。
And in terms of his standing here in the United States, there's no way he's not going to take a huge hit politically. And you see him already, as you pointed out, going after people like Candace Owens, Tucker Carlson, Alex Jones. These are all people who have been big supporters of his in the past, and he's now in a major league war with them. And this is not going to help his standing. And furthermore, if you just look at what's happening inside the MAGA base, you look at what's happening with Christian evangelicals under the age of 50, I think he has truly profound political problems at home and on the foreign policy front as well.
在美国，他的地位肯定会受到巨大打击。正如你所指出的，他已经开始攻击像坎迪斯·欧文斯、塔克·卡尔森和亚历克斯·琼斯这样的人，这些人过去都是他的坚定支持者，但他现在和他们正处于一场激烈的战争中。这对他的地位没有任何帮助。而且，如果你观察MAGA基本盘内的情况，特别是50岁以下的基督教福音派信徒的动向，会发现他在国内和外交政策方面都面临着真正严重的政治问题。
Yeah, I was also expecting that after a disaster such as this, instead of going through this process you described before, that he's having some openness, where did we go wrong, here are the troubles, you know, learning something from the mistakes. I would assume that he would seek to blame others. I guess the Europeans would, NATO would be a good fall guy and also divert attention, maybe go for a quick victory. That is, seize Cuba or Greenland, something like this, essentially shift focus as quick as possible, because you don't want to sit around thinking about all the things, or having too many debates in the country about all the things you did wrong. This can't do anything well for him. So I guess erratic behavior moving forward is a pretty reasonable prediction.
是的，我本来以为在发生这样的大灾难后，他会有一些开放的态度，比如说“我们哪里出了问题，这些是面临的困难”，从错误中吸取教训，而不是像你之前描述的那样走这个过程。我猜他可能会选择责怪他人。我想欧洲人或者北约就是个很好的替罪羊，并且可能会试图转移注意力，比如迅速寻求一次胜利，比如占领古巴或格陵兰，之类的事情。主要是尽快转移重点，因为没有人愿意一直想着这些事情，或者在国内进行太多关于错误的辩论。这对他没有任何好处。所以我觉得往后他可能会有不稳定的行为，这个预测是相当合理的。
But if we take a step back to the wider picture, what do you think the world will look like after this? Because you and I spoke in the past about the emergence of a multipolar world that is simply the international distribution of power, suggests the concentration of power we had in the 90s is now dispersed, now you have many centers of power. The fact that, well, it looks as if this would intensify this development. Well, I think that the United States has obviously lost this war, and that will become manifestly clear to more and more people. That's for sure. I don't think it will diminish American power. I think American power is based on material capabilities.
不过，如果我们退一步看更广阔的图景，你认为这一切之后，世界会变成什么样子？因为你我过去谈到一个多极化世界的出现，这意味着国际间的权力分配在变化，90年代的权力集中现象如今已经消散，现在权力中心更加多元化。事实上，这似乎会加速这一发展的趋势。我认为很明显的是，美国已经在这场战争中失利，这一点会逐渐被越来越多的人认识到。这是肯定的。但我不认为这会削弱美国的实力，因为美国的力量是建立在物质能力上的。
And I think losing this war will not affect how much power the United States has. In making this point, I like to point to the Vietnam War. We lost the Vietnam War. It was a catastrophic defeat. It was a decisive defeat. But it didn't affect American power. We remained as powerful as ever. But this is not to deny for one second that losing a war in Iran will have a profound impact on our ability to project that power around the world and to influence other states in ways that are favorable to the United States. So, this really matters. So, again, I just want to be clear. We will remain as powerful as ever. And we do live in a multipolar world.
我认为输掉这场战争不会影响美国的权力。我想用越南战争来说明这一点。我们输掉了越南战争，那是一场惨烈的失败，是一个决定性的失败。但这并没有影响美国的实力，我们仍然像以前一样强大。但这并不意味着输掉伊朗战争不会对我们在全球范围内投射力量和影响其他国家的能力产生深远影响。因此，这真的很重要。我只想再明确一点：我们将一如既往地强大。而且我们生活在一个多极化的世界。
As you know, Glenn, my argument is we've lived in a multipolar world since 2017. And the other two great powers on the planet are China and Russia. And they're not going away. And, in fact, one could argue that they're better off as a result of this war vis-a-vis the United States. But it's not that China and Russia have become more powerful relative to the United States because of the war. I don't think that's what's happened. I think that America's ability to project power and to influence other countries has been seriously damaged. And that works to China's advantage and to Russia's advantage.
正如你所知，格伦，我的观点是自2017年以来我们一直生活在一个多极世界中。地球上的另外两个大国是中国和俄罗斯，而它们并不会消失。事实上，有人可能会说，这场战争让它们相对于美国的地位变得更好。但这并不是因为战争中国和俄罗斯变得比美国更强大。我认为真正发生的是，美国在展示实力和影响其他国家方面的能力受到了严重削弱。而这对中国和俄罗斯都是有利的。
In other words, just to take the Russian case, the Russian economy has benefited from the United States taking sanctions off of Russia in terms of selling oil. And, furthermore, the Russians have benefited from the fact that there are less weapons available for us to give the Ukrainians to fight against Russia because we're using up weapons and munitions at such a rapid pace in Iran. So, this all works to Russia's advantage.
换句话说，以俄罗斯为例，美国解除对俄罗斯的石油制裁，使得俄罗斯经济受益。此外，俄罗斯还因我们在伊朗消耗武器和弹药速度太快，导致可以支援乌克兰对抗俄罗斯的武器减少而受益。这一切都为俄罗斯带来了好处。
And in terms of China, right, what's happening in East Asia is that we're pulling forces out of East Asia. We're pivoting away from East Asia because we have to move forces that are physically located in East Asia to the Middle East. This works to China's advantage. It doesn't change the balance of power, but it changes our ability to contain China in East Asia. It creates a situation where our allies in East Asia really don't trust us very much anymore. Not only are we pivoting away from East Asia, moving military forces out of the region, but also, can you trust American judgment?
关于中国的情况，在东亚发生的是，我们正在从东亚撤出部队。我们正在从东亚转向其他地区，因为必须将驻扎在东亚的力量调往中东。这样做对中国有利。虽然它没有改变力量平衡，但却影响了我们在东亚遏制中国的能力。这使得我们在东亚的盟友对我们的信任大打折扣。不仅因为我们正在从东亚撤出部队，还因为他们对美国的判断能否信任产生了疑问。
Do you think that the United States is a responsible ally that will take care of you in the crunch? I think if you're Japanese, a Japanese leader or a South Korean leader, the answer to that question is no. You can't depend on the United States the way you once thought that you could or the way that you once could. So, again, you see the damage that we have done to ourselves. And, again, to go back to our discussion of the Gulf and where we end up, we may end up losing those 13 bases, never returning to them, and having much less ability to project power in the Gulf after February 28th than we had before February 28th.
你认为美国是一个在关键时刻会照顾你的负责任的盟友吗？如果你是日本或韩国的领导人，我认为对这个问题的回答是否定的。你无法像过去那样依赖美国，因为美国的可信度已经下降。我们已经对自己造成了损害。再回到我们关于海湾地区的讨论，我们可能会失去那13个基地，永远无法返回，导致在2月28日之后，我们在海湾地区投射力量的能力将大大减弱。
So, you see, our power position around the world in terms of our ability to project power, influence other countries, has been badly damaged. And, again, as we were saying, as you and I have said on numerous occasions, we have done enormous damage to international institutions, international law, and our treatment of allies before February 28th. So, the United States is in just so much trouble. You know, I think what I'm going to say is a relative decline as you have the rise of other powers.
所以你看，我们在全球范围内投射力量和影响其他国家的能力受到了严重损害。而且，正如我们多次提到的那样，我们在2月28日前对国际机构、国际法以及对待盟友的方式已经造成了巨大的损害。因此，美国现在陷入了非常大的麻烦。我想说的是，由于其他大国的崛起，美国的相对地位正在下降。
Because if Iran could have been knocked out, that would have been something that would have weakened the Russians, the Chinese, and, I guess, strengthened the hand of the United States. But measuring the ability to project power in terms of the alliance system as well is probably also a good approach. Because, as you said, the Gulf states are in a very vulnerable position now. I know the rhetoric now is a bit harsh towards the Iranians, but at some point, if the U.S. presence is expected to diminish, then they're going to have to try to make some peace with their neighbors.
因为如果伊朗被击垮，那将削弱俄罗斯和中国的力量，或许也会增强美国的地位。然而，通过联盟体系来衡量投射力量的能力可能也是一个不错的方法。因为，如你所说，目前海湾国家处于非常脆弱的境地。我知道现在对伊朗的言辞有些强硬，但如果美国的存在预计会减弱，那么他们迟早得尝试与邻国达成和解。
I would say, eventually, the Europeans would have to do the same. We can't fight against the Russians on our own. If the Americans will reduce their presence, we're going to have to learn how to get along with the Russians. And, you know, you can say this might be some of the calculations they're having in East Asia as well. On NATO, though, this seems to be one of the, not a casualty, but one of the organizations which has also been hit hard by the Iran war, simply by the mutual accusations.
我想说，最终欧洲人也必须这样做。我们不能独自与俄罗斯对抗。如果美国减少他们的存在，我们就得学会如何与俄罗斯相处。你知道，这可能也是东亚正在考虑的问题之一。不过，就北约而言，这似乎成了一个不是直接受害者但也受到伊朗战争严重影响的组织，只是因为互相指责的问题。
How do you think NATO will be affected by the way this war ended? Well, I think this is all disastrous for NATO, or to put it in slightly different terms, for transatlantic relations. And I think the main reason is that President Trump is going to need a scapegoat for this disaster. And I think that the Europeans will probably be the number one scapegoat, because he won't blame Benjamin Netanyahu, who is the person he should blame. And he can't really blame his advisors, because none of them were enthusiastic about this.
你认为这场战争的结局对北约会有什么影响？我认为，这对北约或者更广泛来说，对跨大西洋关系都是灾难性的。主要原因在于，特朗普总统需要一个替罪羊来为这场灾难负责。我想，欧洲人很可能会成为首要的替罪羊，因为他不会去责怪本杰明·内塔尼亚胡（他实际上应该责怪的人）。而且他也无法真正责怪他的顾问们，因为没有人对这件事情曾经表示过热情。
Maybe Pete Hexeth was. Maybe they'll get rid of Pete Hexeth. But I think what he's going to do is he's going to blame the Europeans. And he's going to make the argument that if the Europeans had anteed up, if they had come to our rescue, we would have won the war. The reason we lost was because our allies failed us. And given that situation, what we should do is basically stop supporting them. Will he end the alliance? Just put an end to it? I don't think so.
或许是皮特·赫克西斯吧。也许他们会让皮特·赫克西斯走人。但我觉得他会责怪欧洲人。他会辩称，如果欧洲人提供支持，如果他们来援助我们，我们本可以赢得战争。我们之所以失败，是因为我们的盟友让我们失望了。在这种情况下，我们基本上应该停止支持他们。他会终止联盟吗？彻底结束它？我认为不会。
He might. But I think that he will so seriously damage the alliance that in the end, it'll be largely meaningless. The other thing is, Glenn, he has, what, two years and nine months left in his presidency? Almost three years left. You know how much damage he's done in the first, let's say, 15 months? Can you imagine how much damage he's going to do in the remaining two years and nine months? It's going to be enormous, right?
他可能会这样做。但我认为，他将会严重破坏这个联盟，以至于最后它几乎毫无意义。还有一点，Glenn，他的总统任期还有两年九个月，差不多三年。你知道他在前15个月造成了多大的破坏吗？你能想象他在剩下的两年九个月里会造成多大的破坏吗？这将会非常巨大，对吧？
And in the meantime, in the meantime, the Europeans have to come up with some sort of defensive strategy for dealing with the Russians. I mean, you and I think their assessment of the Russian threat is completely overblown. But the fact is, the European elites do believe there's a serious Russian threat there. Let's take that as a given. And they also recognize that they can't rely on the United States anymore. The transatlantic partnership no longer exists. Call this a partnership? It's no longer there. So the Europeans, over the next two years and nine months, have to figure out how to deal with this situation. And that's going to push them to put NATO in the background and not take NATO seriously. So I find it hard to believe that NATO will be a meaningful alliance in January of 2029 when President Trump steps down.
与此同时，欧洲人必须制定某种防御策略来应对俄罗斯。我是说，我和你认为他们对俄罗斯威胁的评估根本是夸大其词。但事实是，欧洲精英确实相信存在严重的俄罗斯威胁。我们就先承认这个事实吧。同时，他们也意识到不能再依赖美国。跨大西洋伙伴关系已不复存在。称之为伙伴关系？已经不存在了。所以在未来两年零九个月内，欧洲人必须想办法应对这一情况。这将促使他们将北约放在次要位置，不再认真对待北约。所以，我难以相信在2029年1月特朗普总统卸任时，北约还能成为一个有意义的联盟。
Now, one could argue he may step down before then. He could be impeached. He could have medical problems. And J.D. Vance could become president. And who knows what Vance would do? I tend to believe that Vance would have a more positive attitude towards NATO than Trump would. But how much more positive is hard to say. We all remember his Valentine's Day speech in Munich in February of 2025. I mean, Vance didn't look like he was friendly toward Europe then. And if he became president, maybe he wouldn't be once he was in the White House. Who knows for sure? But the future of NATO looks grim, to put it mildly. Yeah. No, it seems to be heading towards an end.
现在有人可能会认为他可能会在那之前下台。他可能被弹劾，也可能出现健康问题。这样的话，J.D. Vance可能成为总统。谁也不知道Vance会怎么做。我倾向于相信Vance对北约的态度会比特朗普更积极一些，但这到底会积极多少，很难说。我们都记得他在2025年2月情人节期间在慕尼黑的演讲。我是说，那时Vance看起来并不太友好对待欧洲。如果他成为总统，或许在进入白宫后，他也不会对欧洲太友好。谁能确定呢？但说实话，北约的未来看起来不容乐观。没错，似乎正在走向终结。
But by extension, what will all of this mean? That is, the loss in the Iran war, as well as all the weapons and money that was spent, the economic, further economic problems for the Europeans. What does this mean for the Ukraine war? Because I see Zelensky has been taking to Twitter, and now that the Iran war is over, encouraging everyone to shift focus back to Ukraine. But it's going to be hard to see the appetite for Trump to deepen involvement there. Or how do you think, well, if you take into account all of these different variables, what would you expect, how would you expect the Ukraine war to be affected by the loss of the Iran war, but also the fragmentation now we see of NATO?
但从更广泛的角度来看，这一切意味着什么？也就是说，伊朗战争的失败，以及在战争中花费的所有武器和资金，给欧洲带来了进一步的经济问题。这对乌克兰战争意味着什么？因为我看到泽连斯基在推特上积极发声，现在伊朗战争已经结束，他鼓励大家将注意力重新转回乌克兰。但很难看出特朗普是否有意愿加深在乌克兰的介入。那么，考虑到所有这些不同的因素，您会如何预期乌克兰战争会受到伊朗战争失败的影响，以及北约如今的分裂对乌克兰战争又会有什么影响？
I think, first of all, I wish that Zelensky were correct, and the Iran war was over, and we could now focus on Ukraine. I think we're going to be focusing on Iran for the foreseeable future. I mean, this is a catastrophic situation. And with regard to Ukraine, let's assume that I'm wrong, and that two weeks from now, the war is effectively over. I don't think that's going to happen, but let's assume that happens. Okay. And let's assume that we focus on Ukraine. What does that mean? Are we going to give Ukraine a whole bevy of weapons that are going to allow Ukraine to prevail on the battlefield or do well on the battlefield? I think the answer is no.
我首先希望泽连斯基是对的，希望伊朗战争已经结束，这样我们就可以把注意力集中到乌克兰上。但是我认为，在可预见的未来，我们将不得不继续关注伊朗。这是一个灾难性的局面。至于乌克兰，假设我错了，两周后战争基本结束，我并不认为会这样，但我们姑且这样假设。然后假设我们把注意力转回到乌克兰，这意味着什么呢？我们会不会给乌克兰提供大量武器，让他们在战场上获胜或表现出色？我觉得答案是否定的。
I don't think they're going to get those weapons. We have run down the inventory to the point where the last thing we want to do is give precious weapons and precious military assets to the Ukrainians. It's just not going to happen. And with regard to the Russians, we need Russian oil in global oil markets. We just need it, right, to head off economic catastrophe. And so the Russians are going to continue to do well economically, at least in the short term. And I'm sure the Russians are getting ready to launch a major set of offensives against the Ukrainians. And the Ukrainians, as you and I have talked about many times, are in desperate straits.
我认为他们不会得到那些武器。我们的库存已经耗尽，现在最不愿意做的事情就是把珍贵的武器和军事资产交给乌克兰人。这是不可能发生的。至于俄罗斯，我们需要俄罗斯的石油来维持全球石油市场的稳定。我们确实需要石油，以避免经济灾难。因此，至少在短期内，俄罗斯的经济将继续表现良好。我相信，俄罗斯正准备对乌克兰发起一系列重大进攻。正如你我多次讨论的那样，乌克兰的处境十分艰难。
And we're not in desperate straits. And we're not in any position to rescue the Ukrainians. And this is a perfect situation for President Trump to say the Europeans are responsible. As you know, he's been pushing in that direction for a long time. So what the Europeans deal with the Ukraine situation, because you want to understand that if people like you and I are right, Glenn, and it's only a matter of time before the Ukrainians collapse on the battlefield and the Russians push them out of Donbass and the Russians conquer even more territory on the eastern front.
我们目前并不处于绝境，也没有能力去拯救乌克兰人。这种情况下，特朗普总统可以完全地指责欧洲，说他们才是应该负责的。你知道的，他一直以来都在推动这种说法。但实际上，欧洲需要处理乌克兰的局势。因为如果像你我这样的观点是对的，格伦，只是时间问题，乌克兰就会在战场上崩溃，俄罗斯人将他们赶出顿巴斯，甚至在东线占领更多领土。
But President Trump is going to want to avoid being blamed for that, and he's going to want to blame the Europeans for Ukraine's defeat. So I'm sure he, in his head, is positioning himself to create a situation where if the Ukrainians lose to the Russians and the Russians win a victory in that war, that he can say it's the Europeans' fault. We were in the fight for a long time. And as long as we were in the fight, the Ukrainians did quite well. But we could not go on forever because we had other responsibilities around the world.
但是特朗普总统会想要避免被指责为乌克兰的失败负责，他会试图把责任推到欧洲人身上。因此，我相信在他心中，他正在策划一种局面，即如果乌克兰输给俄罗斯，俄罗斯战争胜利，他可以说这是欧洲的错。我们在这场战斗中坚持了很长时间。在我们参与的过程中，乌克兰表现得相当不错。但是我们不能一直坚持下去，因为我们在世界其他地方还有其他责任。
And by the way, in terms of those other responsibilities in places like the Middle East, the Europeans would not help us. So we were in a position where we had to turn the responsibility for dealing with Ukraine over to the Europeans. And they failed. They are responsible for this defeat. So what he'll do moving forward is he'll blame the Europeans for what's happening in Ukraine, while at the same time not giving the Europeans the necessary weaponry to give to the Ukrainians to hold their own on the battlefield. And furthermore, he'll blame the Europeans for the defeat in Iran. I mean, this is the way President Trump operates. He's not somebody who ever accepts responsibility. So I think that is what the future looks like. I think in one tweet he was able to squeeze in both blaming the Europeans for Iran and also say bye-bye to Greenland or something. So he seems to be preparing both the blame game as well as a distraction, it seems.
顺便说一下，在涉及中东等地的其他责任方面，欧洲人不会帮助我们。所以我们不得不把处理乌克兰的责任交给欧洲人。而他们失败了，他们要为这次失败负责。因此，未来他会将乌克兰的问题归咎于欧洲人，同时不给欧洲人提供乌克兰人需要的武器来在战场上自卫。此外，他还会将伊朗的失败归罪于欧洲人。这就是特朗普总统的行事风格，他从来不接受责任。所以，我认为未来会是这样的。他似乎在一条推文中既责怪了欧洲人在伊朗的问题，还提到了告别格陵兰之类的事情。因此，他似乎在准备两手准备：一方面是甩锅，另一方面是转移注意力。
But no, there's – well, you can see what's going to happen, I think, in Ukraine. It's a bit strange the Europeans aren't preparing themselves. They're not sending more weapons but preparing themselves in terms of picking up the phone. That would be a good first move before this whole thing begins to unravel. But I spoke recently with Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson and he was making the point that he feels not just the United States but Europe is growing increasingly irrational. And after that, I thought about asking you actually because do we have a good theory in international relations about, I guess, rationality and declining hegemons or collective hegemons, both United States and Europe?
但是，不，你可以看到乌克兰局势将会如何发展。我觉得有点奇怪的是，欧洲人似乎没有做好准备。他们并没有加大武器援助，而是在通讯联络方面做准备。在整个局势开始失控之前，先做这样的准备会是一个不错的第一步。但我最近与劳伦斯·威尔克森上校交谈时，他提到他觉得不仅仅是美国，欧洲也变得越来越不理性。在那之后，我其实想问你一个问题：在国际关系中，我们是否有一个好的理论来解释所谓的理性与衰落霸权或集体霸权的问题，比如美国和欧洲？
Because it seems over the past years now that we're in, well, at least relative decline as there's problems in society. The assumption we had, we built up a society about, you know, ideological superiority. How would we – do you expect society and our leaders to embrace, you know, reasonfully with military defeats such as we suffered in Iran or economic decline, social havoc, social havoc? I mean, how do you – I know in political realism we put – we assume that the state is rational. But, you know, at least for the neoclassical realists, they would challenge this assumption. So how would you assess or how do you expect the reason or rationality of states to function in the years to come?
过去几年里，我们似乎正在经历一定程度的相对衰退，因为社会中出现了各种问题。我们曾经假设自己建立了一个以意识形态优越性为基础的社会。那么，我们的社会和领导者在面对比如在伊朗遭受的军事失败、经济衰退和社会混乱时，能否理性应对呢？在政治现实主义中，我们通常假设国家是理性的。但对于新古典现实主义者来说，他们会质疑这个假设。那么，你如何评估或预测未来几年国家的理性或合理性将如何运作呢？
Well, as you know, I wrote this book with Sebastian Rosado called How States Think, which deals directly with the question of rationality. And, in fact, the opening case that we talk about is Putin's invasion of Ukraine on February 22nd – February 24th, 2022. And our basic argument in the book is that states are rational if they pursue a policy that's based on a theory of international politics that makes good sense, that it's a plausible theory. And if you don't have a plausible theory underpinning your policy, then what you are doing is acting irrationally. And we also said that the decision-making process matters as well. You have to have a decision-making process that allows all the key players in the room to voice their opinions in a rational, legal way.
这本书是我和塞巴斯蒂安·罗萨多合著的，书名为《国家如何思考》，直接探讨了理性的问题。实际上，我们在书中开头讨论的案例就是普京于2022年2月22日至24日对乌克兰的入侵。我们在书中提出的基本观点是：如果一个国家的政策是基于国际政治理论，而且这个理论是合情合理的，那么这个国家就是理性的。如果你的政策没有合理的理论支持，那么你就是在做非理性的行为。我们还指出，决策过程也很重要。这个过程必须允许所有关键角色以理性和合法的方式表达意见。
And so that was our definition. I think if you look at various cases, like Putin's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, I think that was clearly rational. He thought that NATO expansion was a threat to Russia. He thought it was an existential threat. And he launched a preventive war to make sure that Ukraine did not become part of NATO. So that was, in our opinion, a rational decision. One could argue that it was the wrong decision. One could argue it was an illegal decision. One could argue it was an immoral decision. But whether a decision is rational or not depends on whether or not you have an underlying theory that is a proven theory and that that theory underpins the policy.
所以这就是我们的定义。我认为如果你看一些案例，比如普京在2022年入侵乌克兰，我觉得这显然是理性的。他认为北约扩张对俄罗斯构成了威胁，是一种生存威胁。他发动了一场预防性战争，以确保乌克兰不会成为北约的一部分。因此，在我们看来，这是一个理性的决定。当然，有人可能会认为这是一个错误的决定，也可能有人认为这是一个非法或者不道德的决定。但是，一个决定是否理性，取决于你是否有一个经过验证的理论，并且这个理论支持这些政策。
Now, let's just talk a little bit about the Europeans. I believe that the Europeans' behavior towards the United States, which often is labeled is irrational, is actually not irrational because it has a simple theory that underpins it, which you can argue is a legitimate theory. What am I saying here? The Europeans have a deep-seated interest in keeping the United States actively involved in Europe. The Europeans want the American pacifier to remain in place. Another way to put this is the Europeans want NATO to remain intact. And therefore, they want to do everything they can to accommodate the Americans so that the Americans don't get angry at them and the Americans remain in Europe.
现在，让我们谈谈欧洲人。我认为欧洲人对美国的态度，虽然常被认为是非理性的，但其实并不非理性，因为这种态度背后有一个简单而合理的理论。我的意思是什么呢？欧洲人非常希望美国能持续积极地参与欧洲事务。欧洲人希望美国能够继续发挥其“安抚者”的作用。换句话说，欧洲人希望北约能够继续保持完整。因此，欧洲人会尽一切努力来迎合美国，以避免惹怒美国，并确保美国继续在欧洲保持存在。
Because it's so important from a strategic point of view for the Europeans to have the American pacifier in place. Now, you can argue that that strategy is wrong. You can have a different theory that says that it would make much more sense for the Europeans to grow a backbone, understand that their close relationship with the United States is over, that they can't depend on the American pacifier anymore, and therefore they should act differently. A good realist like me would say that's how they should behave.
从战略角度来看，让美国这个安抚者在位对欧洲人来说非常重要。你可能会说这个战略是错的。你也可以提出另一种理论，认为欧洲人更应该有主见，明白他们与美国的紧密关系已经结束，他们不能再依赖美国这个安抚者，因此他们应该采取不同的行动。像我这样的现实主义者会说，这才是他们应该采取的行动方式。
But that's not to say that the strategy they have employed is irrational because there are different strategies based on different theories out there. And the question is, do you have a plausible theory? And I think that the Europeans' behavior towards the Americans is based on a plausible theory. I think it's the wrong theory. But there are lots of different theories, and those theories are all plausible. I could go into this in greater detail. I won't now.
但这并不是说他们采用的策略是不理性的，因为有许多基于不同理论的策略。问题在于，你是否有一个可信的理论？我认为，欧洲人对待美国人的行为是基于一个可信的理论。我觉得这是一个错误的理论。但有很多不同的理论，而这些理论都是可信的。关于这个，我可以深入讨论，但现在先不细说。
But anyway, I think a lot of what the Europeans do is not irrational. I do think it's wrong, right? But just because something is wrong does not mean it's irrational. And let me just give you one example of that. It's NATO expansion. NATO expansion was opposed by almost all realists, because all realists like me have a simple theory that says if you move NATO up to Russia's border, the Russians are going to react and you're going to have conflict. You're going to have really serious trouble.
不过，我认为很多欧洲人的做法并不是不理性的。我确实认为这些做法是错误的，对吧？但错误并不等同于不理性。让我举一个例子来说明：那就是北约扩张。几乎所有的现实主义者都反对北约扩张，因为像我这样的现实主义者有一个简单的理论，即如果你把北约推进到俄罗斯的边境，俄罗斯会作出反应，可能会引发冲突，带来非常严重的问题。
Therefore, you do not want to expand NATO. And if you do expand NATO, it's going to lead to big trouble. There was a whole set of liberal theories that underpinned our policy, not realist theories. The realist theories were rejected. The advice of realists like George Kennan and John Mearsheimer were ruled out of court. But the liberal theories said that what we want to do is we want to move NATO eastward.
因此，你并不想扩张北约。如果你扩张北约，将会引发很大的麻烦。我们的政策背后有一整套自由主义理论支撑，而不是现实主义理论。现实主义理论被拒绝了。像乔治·凯南和约翰·米尔斯海默这样的现实主义者的建议被排除在外。但是自由主义理论认为，我们希望将北约向东扩展。
And what we want to do is we want to create a zone of peace in Eastern Europe. And that zone of peace will be based on a series of liberal theories. One is democratic peace theory. The idea was that if we could spread democracy eastward into Eastern Europe to include Russia at some point, we would create a giant zone of peace. Because democracies don't fight other democracies.
我们希望在东欧创建一个和平区域。这个和平区域将基于一系列自由主义理论。其中一个是民主和平理论。其核心思想是，如果我们能将民主向东欧传播，甚至将俄罗斯也包括在内，那么我们就能创建一个巨大的和平区域。因为民主国家之间不会发生战争。
They also relied on the theory of economic interdependence. The idea was you would move the EU eastward. You would create a situation where you had a great deal of economic intercourse in Eastern Europe and maybe eventually include the Russians in that. And the end result is economic interdependence produces peace and we would all live happily ever after. So there were a set of liberal theories. These are prominent theories that are highly respected in academia that underpin the policy.
他们还依赖于经济互相依存的理论。这个想法是将欧盟向东扩展，在东欧创造一个大量经济交流的局面，或许最终还会将俄罗斯纳入其中。最终结果是经济互相依存带来和平，大家从此幸福快乐地生活。所以，这里有一套自由主义理论。这些理论在学术界中备受尊重，是政策背后的支撑。
If you read the sort of the commentary of Strobe Talbot and Madeleine Albright at the time of NATO expansion, this is in the 1990s, their policy prescription for NATO expansion was based on these liberal theories. I thought it was wrong-headed, but I did not think it was irrational. That may sound funny to certain viewers, but I think there's a difference between whether one thinks another theory is wrong or whether you think it's irrational.
如果你阅读了斯特罗布·塔尔博特和马德琳·奥尔布赖特在北约扩张时期的评论，这大约是在20世纪90年代，他们关于北约扩张的政策建议是基于这些自由理论。我认为这些理论是错误的，但我不认为它们是不理智的。对某些人来说，这可能听起来很奇怪，但我认为认为一个理论错误和认为它不理智之间是有区别的。
So I think a lot of what is done in international politics, one can think is wrong, but it's not necessarily irrational. But I could go on. But there are lots of cases of American behavior in particular, but even European behavior in recent times that would fit under the rubric of irrational. No, I think that's a good way of explaining it.
所以，我认为在国际政治中所做的很多事情，或许可以认为是错误的，但并不一定是不理性的。我可以继续谈下去，特别是在最近的时间里，有许多美国行为，甚至是欧洲行为，可以被归为不理性。然而，我认为这是一个很好的解释方式。
And no, I would agree. I don't think the European policy was irrational. As you said, it was a powerful theory. And, you know, you can link it a little bit both in political realism as well as liberalism. That is, the hegemonic peace. As long as the U.S. was all powerful, you know, the Europeans could benefit. For one, there would be no great power rivalry as the U.S. or power concentrated in the U.S. would essentially mitigate the international anarchy.
我同意你的说法，我认为欧洲的政策并不是非理性的。正如你所说，这是一种有力的理论。你可以看到它与政治现实主义和自由主义都有一定的关联。也就是说，这是霸权和平。只要美国处于强势地位，欧洲就能从中受益。一方面，当大国力量集中在美国时，就不会出现大国间的敌对关系，这在本质上能够缓解国际上的无政府状态。
There would only be one center of power and no anarchy. Second, because it was the United States. We assumed that a liberal democracy and human rights would be elevated. So we would have this democratic peace as well. And also you can put a third leg on it, which would be that the U.S. would be the pacifier in Europe, which would allow Europe to function as it had, because we've never been stood together since after World War II when the Americans came.
这意味着将只有一个权力中心，不会有无政府状态。其次，因为这个国家是美国。我们认为，自由民主和人权会得到提升。因此，我们将会拥有这种民主和平。此外，还可以加上第三个理由，那就是美国会在欧洲扮演“稳定者”的角色，这会让欧洲能够继续像二战后美国介入以来那样运作。
So, you know, you can argue that given that they can explain what they were doing, it is rational. And I think that's also why they were willing to make an enemy out of Russia by expanding NATO, because this made sure that America's presence was cemented. But my view, though, is that it could have been a good strategy. It became the only strategy, which meant there's no political imagination for anything else.
你知道，可以说，只要他们能够解释自己的行为，那么这些行为就是理性的。我认为，这也是他们愿意通过扩展北约来与俄罗斯为敌的原因，因为这样确保了美国的存在得以巩固。不过，我的看法是，这本可能是一个不错的策略，但它却变成了唯一的策略，这意味着在政治上没有为其他可能性留下想象空间。
So now that the actual political realities of it, that is, that the unipolar order, that is, it's not just a policy. It's an actual distribution of power. It's gone. And we see that for this reason, it's in America's interest to shift its policies, that is, focus less on Europe. Now it starts to feel irrational because now we're just, you know, returning to hope and expecting the U.S. to stay in Europe out of, you know, just some alliance of democracies, even though it doesn't serve necessarily its interests.
现如今，政治现实发生了变化，即单极秩序已经不再仅仅是一个政策，它是实实在在的权力分配。而这种单极秩序已经结束了。鉴于此，美国需要调整其政策重心，不再过多关注欧洲。这种情况下，继续寄希望于美国出于某种民主联盟而留在欧洲，显得不太合理，因为这样做并不一定符合其自身利益。
So it is very strange to see. Let me just ask, sorry, yeah. Look, can I just make two more points about this whole subject of irrationality? Because this is a very important subject. People surely who are watching this show will want to know whether it was rational for President Trump to invade or to attack Iran on February 28th. And I believe it was irrational. And why do I think that?
所以这件事看起来很奇怪。让我问一下，对不起，是的。请让我就这个非理性的主题再谈两点，这是一个非常重要的话题。毫无疑问，观看这个节目的观众会想知道，特朗普总统在2月28日入侵或攻击伊朗是否是理性的。我认为这是不理性的。为什么我这么认为呢？
The basic theory that underpinned the decision to attack Iran on February 28th was that we could use air power alone to topple the regime and put in place a regime that would basically dance to America's tune, would throw up its hands, surrender to us, and do what we wanted, okay? We know from the literature on international politics, which is well understood by many people in the policy world, that it is virtually impossible to create regime change with air power alone. There is no theory of victory that can be considered rational that is based on the idea that you can use air power alone to produce regime change. In fact, the literature says that's impossible.
在2月28日决定攻击伊朗的基本理论是，我们可以单靠空中力量推翻现有政权，并建立一个听命于美国的新政权，这个政权会毫无反抗地投降并按照我们的意愿行事。了解国际政治的人都知道，单靠空中力量几乎不可能实现政权更迭。没有任何合理的胜利理论可以建立在只使用空中力量就能实现政权更迭的想法上。事实上，相关文献表明这是不可能的。
So what President Trump did in deciding to go to war on February 28th was not only a foolish policy, it was irrational. Because he had no plausible theory of victory. Just very important to understand that. Let me give you another case. The decision that the United States made before the war started in Ukraine on February 24th, 2022. What's really remarkable in the run-up to the war is despite the fact we thought, we, the West, the United States in particular, thought that the Russians were going to invade Ukraine.
所以，特朗普总统在2月28日决定开战的行为不仅是一项愚蠢的政策，而且是不理智的。因为他没有一个可行的胜利理论。这一点非常重要，需要理解。让我给你另一个例子。在2022年2月24日乌克兰战争开始之前，美国所做的决定。真正引人注目的是，在战争开始前，尽管我们——尤其是美国和西方国家——认为俄罗斯会入侵乌克兰。
We did nothing, virtually nothing to stop it. Then, the United States in particular, negotiations started in Istanbul, and both sides were making very good progress. And the United States told the Ukrainians to walk away from the negotiations. Then, later, I think it was in November of that year, General Milley said that Ukraine had reached the high-water mark. You remember, the Ukrainian army had done quite well in two big offensives during 2022.
我们几乎没有采取任何措施来阻止它。之后，尤其是美国方面，谈判在伊斯坦布尔开始，双方都取得了很好的进展。然而，美国告诉乌克兰人退出谈判。后来，我想是在那年11月，米利将军表示乌克兰已经达到了顶点。你可能还记得，乌克兰军队在2022年的两次大规模攻势中表现相当出色。
General Milley, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, said, Ukraine has reached the high-water mark. Let's cut a deal now. He was told to close his mouth and not raise the issue again. Now, the question you want to ask yourself is, why was that the case? Why was the United States not attempting to prevent war? And then, why did it tell the Ukrainians to walk away and tell General Milley to keep his mouth closed? The answer is actually quite simple.
当时担任参谋长联席会议主席的米利将军说，乌克兰已经达到了最高点。我们现在就达成协议吧。他被告知闭嘴，不要再提这个问题。现在，你应该问自己，为什么会这样？为什么美国没有尝试阻止战争？而且，为什么美国要求乌克兰放手并让米利将军闭嘴？其实，答案相当简单。
We thought that we could bring the Russians to their knees with economic sanctions. We had a theory of victory that was based in part on the Ukrainians holding the Russians off on the battlefield, number one. But, number two, we believed that we could use crushing sanctions to cripple the Russian economy and literally knock the Russians out of the ranks of the great powers. That was our theory of victory.
我们认为可以通过经济制裁让俄罗斯屈服。我们的胜利理论部分基于乌克兰人在战场上顶住俄罗斯的进攻，这是第一点。第二点是，我们相信可以通过严厉的制裁来重创俄罗斯经济，实质上把俄罗斯踢出大国行列。这就是我们的胜利理论。
I thought at the time that it was wrong. I thought that it wouldn't work. But I think it was a plausible theory of victory. I think at the time, most people I know thought that it would work. They thought that we had so much economic leverage. They thought all of this globalization of the 1990s and the early 2000s had created the situation where the United States sat at the center of this economic web that allowed it to use its coercive leverage over countries all around the planet, the way we've done with Iran, the way we've done with Venezuela, the way we tried to do with China.
当时我认为这是错误的，觉得行不通。但我想这也是一种合理的胜利理论。我认为当时我认识的大多数人都认为这行得通。他们认为我们拥有巨大的经济杠杆。他们认为1990年代和2000年代初的全球化创造了一种局面，让美国处于这个经济网络的中心，能对全球各国施加压力，就像我们对伊朗的做法，对委内瑞拉的做法，以及我们试图对中国采取的做法一样。
And that's what we thought would work with the Russians. And I think it was a plausible theory of victory. I did not think it would work. It would work. I had a different view, a different set of theories. But the point is, it was not irrational. It was wrong, but it was not irrational. But again, to go back to Trump invading Iran, that was irrational because there was no plausible theory of victory there.
这就是我们认为对俄罗斯会有效的方法。我认为这是一个有可能成功的理论。不过我不认为这个方法会奏效，我有不同的看法和理论。重点是，这个方法并非不合逻辑。虽然它是错误的，但不是不合理的。再说回到特朗普入侵伊朗的问题，那是没有道理的，因为那里根本没有任何可能成功的理论。
My view on the Ukraine war, though, was initially I thought it made a lot of sense. That is, if you spend all these years investing all this money and training to build a massive Ukrainian army of hundreds of thousands of men, why would the U.S. and NATO accept it to go neutral when you can use that big army to fight and weaken Russia as a strategic rival? So, again, I think it's, you know, brutal, and I wouldn't advise it, but it made sense, rational.
起初，我对乌克兰战争的看法是，我觉得这很有道理。也就是说，如果花费了这么多年投资巨额资金并进行训练，建立了一支由几十万人组成的庞大乌克兰军队，为什么美国和北约会接受其中立，而不是利用这支大军来对抗并削弱作为战略对手的俄罗斯呢？所以，我还是觉得这很残酷，我不会建议这么做，但从理性的角度看，它是有道理的。
But my view is that after you mentioned November 2022, when General Milley said, well, it doesn't get better than this. This is when we strike a deal. It feels like at that point we were a bit swept away already by our own propaganda. That is, that the Russians were inherently weak. They could be defeated. Their economy, you know, their gas station masquerading as a country. And at this point, it looks like all the rhetoric we have to fuel the war, suddenly we began to buy into it. And here I started to wonder, how rational is this? Because if someone came along and said, well, actually, we have to assess what the Russians actually have, then immediately, no, no, well, that's pro-Russian. You know, so suddenly our ability to assess the information available to make reasonable predictions, it seemed like it was all gone.
但我认为，自从你提到2022年11月，米利将军说，“如此良机，我们应该达成协议”，似乎在那时，我们已经被自己的宣传有点冲昏了头脑。也就是说，我们以为俄罗斯本质上是弱的，可以被打败，他们的经济被戏称为一个装作国家的加油站。在这个时候，看来我们所用来推动战争的所有言辞，忽然之间我们自己也开始相信了。我开始怀疑，这到底有多理性？因为如果有人站出来说，我们应该评估俄罗斯真正的实力，马上就会有人说，不，不，这种说法是亲俄的。因此，突然之间，我们合理评估信息并进行合理预测的能力似乎全都消失了。
And you see that today as well. Everyone more or less understands that the war can't be won, but they still want to fight it. I mean, for me now, there's no reasonable strategy anymore. There's no reasonable theory of victory anymore. So it feels as if, yes, it began rational, a bit brutal, I mean, using Ukrainians to fight their rival. But now I feel like we drifted far away. But again, it's just my view. Well, just leaving aside the issue of rationality, where I think I've said enough, let me make another point. I think, Glenn, when countries get into major wars, it's very difficult for them to get out. I've said over the years, and I think it's because, for me, the Vietnam War was a formative experience.
你看看今天的情况也是如此。大家或多或少都明白，这场战争是不可能赢得的，但他们仍然想参与其中。对我来说，现在已经没有什么合理的策略了，也没有胜利的合理理论了。所以这感觉就像是，战争开始时还是有理性的，尽管有些残酷，比如利用乌克兰人来对抗对手。但现在我觉得我们已经偏离太远了。不过，这只是我个人的看法。抛开理性的问题不谈，我想再说一点。我认为，Glenn，当国家卷入重大战争时，脱身是非常困难的。多年来我一直这样说，我想这主要是因为对我而言，越南战争是一个具有深远影响的经历。
But my rhetoric is it's easy to get in. It's incredibly difficult to get out. I like to say it's like turning a giant supertanker around in the water. You don't do it quickly. And I think Iran may actually be something of an exception because of our whole discussion about the economic consequences. You know, if you take what I was saying before, and I know you agree with me on this, that the potential economic consequences here are catastrophic, right? The incentive structure may be such that we do shut this war down quite quickly, right? And it would be, I think, quite unusual in that regard. I mean, think about the Afghanistan War, 20 years. Vietnam, oh, that went on for, you know, year after year. It was very hard to get out of that war.
我的观点是，进入战争很容易，但脱身却极为困难。我常说这就像在水里掉转一艘巨大的超级油轮，你不能很快完成。而我认为伊朗可能是个例外，因为我们讨论了经济后果的问题。正如我之前所说，你也同意我的观点，这里的潜在经济后果是灾难性的，对吧？激励机制可能会促使我们很快结束战争，我认为这是非常不寻常的。想想阿富汗战争，持续了20年。还有越南战争，那场战争年复一年地持续下去，脱身非常困难。
And this is what happens when a great power like the United States or major powers like the Europeans get involved in a war. It's just very difficult to walk away. It's the whole sunk costs argument. And I think that is what has really paralyzed the Europeans and made it very difficult for them to get out. The other thing is, and, you know, you were talking about this in the context of Benjamin Netanyahu before, that, you know, after a while, you begin to believe your own arguments about Iran. You know, if you say Iran is the boogeyman for 40 years at some point along the road, even if you didn't believe it in the beginning, you certainly believe it after 40 years.
当像美国这样的超级大国或像欧洲这样的主要大国卷入战争时，情况往往是很难抽身而退的。这就是所谓的“沉没成本”理论。正是这种情况让欧洲国家感到进退两难，让他们很难脱身。还有另一个因素，就像你之前在提到本杰明·内塔尼亚胡的背景时所说的那样，当你长时间重复某个观点，比如说伊朗是主要威胁，经过40年的重复，即使一开始你不相信它，但经过这么长时间你也会慢慢相信它。
And I think in terms of the Europeans, before the war in Ukraine started, I don't think the Europeans thought the Russians were a great threat. You want to remember, you want to remember, in 2008, at the famous Bucharest summit, NATO-Bucharest summit in April of 2008, the Europeans, in the person of Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy, argued against bringing Ukraine into NATO. Merkel was adamantly opposed, as was Sarkozy. It's not like the Europeans thought there was this great Russian threat out there that had to be deterred. In fact, they thought, like you and I, Glenn, that if you expanded NATO to bring Ukraine into it, Putin would interpret it as a declaration of war.
在我看来，欧洲人在乌克兰战争开始之前，并不认为俄罗斯是一个巨大的威胁。你要记得，在2008年著名的布加勒斯特峰会上，即2008年4月的北约布加勒斯特峰会上，欧洲代表人物安吉拉·默克尔和尼古拉·萨科齐反对将乌克兰纳入北约。默克尔和萨科齐都坚决反对。这说明欧洲人并不认为存在一个需要被遏制的巨大俄罗斯威胁。事实上，他们的看法和我与你的看法一样，认为如果北约扩展接纳乌克兰，普京会将其视为宣战。
That's what Merkel has said, right? That's why she was opposed. We agree with her. But anyway, the United States foolishly pushed ahead, and we ended up in this disastrous war. But I think what's happened over time is that the Europeans have convinced themselves now that the Russians are the second coming of Nazi Germany, Putin is Adolf Hitler, that the Russian army is the Wehrmacht, and oh my God, if they don't do something, they're going to have the Russian army on the beaches of Dunkirk. I mean, I find it all hard to believe. I know you do as well, but they do believe that.
这就是默克尔所说的，对吧？这也是她反对的原因。我们同意她的看法。但不管怎样，美国还是愚蠢地推进行动，最终陷入了这场灾难性的战争。不过，我认为随着时间的推移，欧洲人现在已经说服自己，相信俄罗斯是纳粹德国的重现，普京是阿道夫·希特勒，俄罗斯军队是德军。如果他们不采取行动，俄军就会出现在敦刻尔克海滩上。我觉得这很难让人相信，我知道你也这么认为，但他们就是这么相信的。
But it's very interesting if you think about the change that has taken place over time in European thinking about the Russian threat. And by the way, just to elevate up another 10,000 feet, if you go back to NATO expansion and the decision to bring Ukraine in in April 2008, it is very important to understand that we were not interested in bringing Ukraine into NATO because we thought there was a Russian threat to Ukraine or a Russian threat to Eastern Europe. That's the realist view. The United States, which was driving the train on NATO expansion, was not operating according to realist theories. Otherwise, they would not have expanded NATO into Ukraine. They were operating on liberal theories.
如果你思考一下欧洲对俄罗斯威胁看法随着时间的变化，你会发现这非常有趣。顺便提一下，如果我们将视野再扩大一些，回顾一下北约扩张以及2008年4月接纳乌克兰的决定，就会发现我们并不是因为认为俄罗斯对乌克兰或东欧构成威胁才让乌克兰加入北约。这是现实主义的观点。主导北约扩张的美国并不是依据现实主义理论在行动，否则他们就不会将北约扩展到乌克兰。他们采用的是自由主义理论。
You want to remember that Putin was at Bucharest. They invited Putin to Bucharest. The Russians and the United States and the Russians and the Europeans actually had quite good relations at the time. We didn't see Ukraine as this great threat. Now, Ukraine is seen as a really powerful. I mean, Russia is now seen as a really powerful threat. Sorry, not Ukraine. Russia is now seen as a very powerful threat. It's really quite remarkable. The change that has taken place over time.
你要记住，普京曾经在布加勒斯特。他当时是被邀请去那里的。当时俄罗斯、美国和欧洲的关系其实相当不错。我们当时并不认为乌克兰是个很大的威胁。现在，乌克兰被认为是一个非常强大的国家。我是说，现在俄罗斯被视为一个非常强大的威胁。抱歉，不是乌克兰。确实，随着时间的推移，发生的变化非常值得注意。
But I bring all this up because it just shows you how difficult it is now, right, for the Europeans to change their view and put an end to this war, which, as you and I, Glenn, agree, would be in the interest of every European state. Yeah. Now, this was the warning of Walter Lippmann, that when you go into war, you have all this incentive to build up your adversary as just the embodiment of evil. And then when it's time to make a peace, you can't make peace anymore because you just convinced everyone that you're fighting evil. And that's essentially, yeah, I think where we are today.
我提到这些是为了说明，现在欧洲人改变观点并结束这场战争是多么困难。正如你和我，还有Glenn，都同意的，结束战争对每个欧洲国家都有好处。沃尔特·李普曼曾警告说，当你开战时，你会有很多动机去将对手描绘成邪恶的化身。但一旦到了和平谈判的时刻，你就发现无法达成和平，因为你已经让每个人都相信你是在与邪恶作战。这正是我们今天所面临的情形。
Anyways, any final thoughts before we wrap up? Just one final point. You want to remember that in the Iran war a few weeks ago, President Trump called for unconditional surrender, which is powerful reinforcement for your point. Yeah, he did not get that. So, no, it's very difficult to climb down after making such a thing. But I'm hoping that Trump's ability to shift focus and BS his way out of things could be something that helps deliver peace. But we'll see.
好的，在结束之前，还有什么最后的想法吗？我只想补充一点。几周前的伊朗战争中，特朗普总统要求无条件投降，这确实加强了你的观点。不过，他并没有实现这个目标。因此，在做出这样的要求后，很难回头。但我希望特朗普能通过转移注意力和某些不靠谱的方法来达成和平。不过，我们还得拭目以待。
Anyways, thank you so much for being so generous with your time. My pleasure, Glenn. As always, I enjoyed our discussion immensely. Thank you.
不管怎样，非常感谢你如此慷慨地付出时间。格伦，这是我的荣幸。像往常一样，我非常享受我们的讨论。谢谢你。