Timeless Secrets of the World’s Greatest Investors | Warren Buffett, Peter Lynch & More! (TIP762)

发布时间 2025-10-18 22:45:01 来源

So any business that is expected to grow but fails to meet the market's expectations is going to experience a pretty big price drop. The keys are just try to stay ahead of the market. Let's suppose that you think a business is maybe some sort of structural decline. In that case, I'd rather exit early, potentially forgoing profits to avoid the mass exit assets. Probably can follow once it's well established that the businesses in a structural decline.

因此，任何被预期增长但未能达到市场预期的企业，其股票价格可能会大幅下跌。关键是要尽量走在市场前面。假设你认为某个企业可能处于某种结构性下滑，那么我宁愿早点退出，可能错过一些利润，以避免资产大量流失。当明确认识到企业处于结构性下滑后，你可能会更容易继续跟随这些趋势。

So what Sleep in Zakaria really nailed was that the businesses that they chose were just so good that even if they grew at lower rates, they still maintained a reasonable evaluation because it was just common knowledge that these businesses had near-impregnable modes and had high levels of customer loyalty. Hey, real quick before we jump into today's episode. If you've been enjoying the show, please hit that subscribe button. It's totally free, helps out the channel a ton, and ensures that you won't miss any future episodes. Thanks a bunch!

在《Zakaria的睡眠》这本书中，真正揭示的是他们所选择的这些生意实在太优秀了，即便它们的增长速度较慢，它们仍然保持了合理的估值，因为大家普遍知道这些企业有着几乎不可攻破的经营模式，并且拥有高度的客户忠诚度。在我们进入今天的节目之前，快速提醒一下：如果你喜欢我们的节目，请点击订阅按钮。这是完全免费的，对我们的频道有很大帮助，并且确保你不会错过任何未来的节目。非常感谢！

Today, I'll be discussing 10 lessons from value investing legends. Since I spend so much of my time trying to uncover subtleties that legendary investors have employed to achieve their incredible results, I thought it would be a good idea to maybe break down one major lesson from each of them. I've intentionally chosen ones that I think have impacted others and myself, but might not necessarily be the most obvious choice in some of the cases. I could easily spend an entire episode on any of these investors, and I have done so, a hundred yearly, every investor that I will mention today.

今天，我将讨论价值投资传奇人物带给我们的10个投资课程。我花了很多时间研究这些传奇投资者所运用的细微技巧，以取得他们惊人的业绩。所以，我认为总结每位传奇人物的一个重要课程是个不错的主意。我精心挑选了一些我认为对他人和我本人都有影响的课程，尽管在某些情况下，这些课程可能不是最显而易见的选择。我可以轻松地花整整一期节目来讲述任何一位投资者，而且我每年都会这样做，今天提到的每位投资者我都已经分析过不止一次。

But today, I'm going to focus on these 10 timeless lessons that I think I've learned from investors just at the apex of their profession. Now, the first person I'm going to cover is none other than the goat himself, Warren Buffet. So it was hard to choose what exactly I wanted to share from Buffet because when it comes down to what I've learned from Buffet, I can't help but think of that great Jim Senegal quote. He was asked to be learned a lot from sole price about the retail industry, and Jim replied, no, that's inaccurate. I learned everything.

今天，我要重点讲述从顶级投资者那里学到的10条永恒的经验教训。第一个我要介绍的人就是传奇人物沃伦·巴菲特。要挑选出我想分享的巴菲特的经验确实不容易，因为当我回想从他那里学到的东西时，我不禁想起吉姆·塞内加尔的一句名言。有人问他从索尔·普莱斯那里学到了很多关于零售业的知识吗？吉姆回答说，不，确切地说，我学到了一切。

I have learned nearly everything I know about investing from researching Warren Buffet. But the lesson that I chose from Buffet is just how to succeed with maximum integrity, honesty, and transparency. You see, Warren Buffet isn't admired just for his monumental gifts in investing and value creation. He's also admired for his character. He's a person that you can genuinely trust to put shareholders' needs above his own, to be honest about his mistakes, and to not hide or sugarcoat things when it's obvious that he's made a mistake.

我几乎从研究沃伦·巴菲特那里学到了我所知道的所有投资知识。但我从巴菲特那里选择学习的最重要的课程是如何在最大程度上保持诚信、诚实和透明。你知道，沃伦·巴菲特之所以受到钦佩，不仅仅是因为他在投资和创造价值方面的巨大才能，还因为他的人格。他是一个你可以真正信赖的人，他会把股东的利益放在首位，对自己的错误诚实坦荡，在明显犯错时不会隐瞒或粉饰。

The thing about Buffet's honesty and transparency is that I believe they really contributed significantly, if not entirely, to his success. Without his honesty and integrity, I think it's unlikely that he would have continued to receive fantastic opportunities in private businesses, which he has added to Berkshire's list of fully owned companies. Warren certainly has a history of being out there and searching for ideas, but he's also so well-liked and admired by others that people will go out of their way to make introductions on Buffet's behalf.

关于巴菲特的诚实与透明，我认为这些素质显然在很大程度上，甚至可能完全成就了他的成功。没有他的诚实和正直，我觉得他不太可能继续在私营企业中获得如此多的绝佳机会，而这些机会最终成为伯克希尔公司全资拥有企业的一部分。沃伦确实有主动寻找想法的历史，但他也非常受人喜爱和尊敬，以至于人们愿意不遗余力地为他引荐机会。

And they do this simply because he's just built such an excellent reputation over the years that making a deal with him can be very easy if you're very well aligned with how he thinks. Now one notable example of this is a little-known subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway called Forest River, an RV manufacturer. So picture this, it's 2005. Warren Buffet is relaxing in his office, pouring over annual reports. A two-page fax arrives at his office. Warren curiously reads the fax from a man named Peter Legal. He explains that he'd love to sell his RV manufacturing business to Berkshire Hathaway. The price? $800 million.

他们这样做，仅仅是因为多年来他建立了极好的声誉，如果你的思维方式与他非常一致，与他达成交易会变得非常容易。其中一个显著的例子是伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下一个鲜为人知的子公司——福瑞斯特河，这是一家房车制造商。想象一下，这件事发生在2005年。沃伦·巴菲特在办公室里悠闲地翻阅着年度报告。这时，一份两页的传真传到了他的办公室。沃伦好奇地读了这份来自一位名叫彼得·利格的人的传真。彼得在传真中解释说，他想将自己的房车制造公司卖给伯克希尔·哈撒韦。要价是8亿美元。

Warren Buffet didn't know a thing about the RV industry, but given what he learned from the fax, he began doing some due diligence. The next day Buffet made him an offer, and within a week, Legal was in Omaha to shake on a deal after a 20-minute meeting. Legal said, regarding that agreement, it was easier to sell my business than to renew my driver's license. Now there just aren't that many people on earth who can do business in this way, and I think it's a significant reason why Warren has been successful over the years.

沃伦·巴菲特对房车行业一无所知，但从传真中学到的信息让他开始进行一些尽职调查。第二天，巴菲特就提出了报价，并且在一周内，Legal就来到了奥马哈，在一次20分钟的会议后握手达成交易。Legal表示，比起续我的驾照，卖掉我的业务要容易得多。地球上没有多少人能以这种方式做生意，我认为这是沃伦多年来成功的重要原因。

Business owners know that when Berkshire acquires them, they can remain in control of the business without worrying that Buffet's going to come in and lay off Hathaway's workforce or massively change their culture. They also know that Warren is very likely to hold onto that company forever, and if the business requires additional capital, Warren will gladly provide it, assuming the returns on investment are adequate. Transparency and trust offer additional benefits that aren't discussed very much as well. For one thing, trust, just like a good business, compounds over time. Every cent you drop in the trust jar today will be worth multiple times its worth if you continue to add to that bank. Warren has always been a trustworthy person, even back in his 20s when he started the Buffet Partnerships, and that trust has evolved into its current state, and it's not an advantage that competitors can easily attack.

企业主们知道，当伯克希尔收购他们的公司时，他们仍然可以保持对业务的控制，而无需担心巴菲特会进来裁员或大幅改变公司的文化。他们也知道，沃伦很可能会永远持有这家公司，如果业务需要额外的资金，假如投资回报是合理的，沃伦会很乐意提供。透明度和信任还带来一些不常被讨论的额外好处。首先，信任就像一个好生意，会随着时间的推移而增长。每一分钱投入信任的储蓄罐中，只要你继续增加，将来都会多倍增值。沃伦一直是一个值得信赖的人，早在20多岁成立巴菲特合伙公司时就是如此，这种信任已经发展到现在的状态，而这并不是竞争对手能轻易攻击的优势。

Another interesting point about transparency is that it can really save a company a significant amount of money and headaches. A good example of this is Warren's own shareholder letters, so since he has nothing to hide, he's written them the entire time, and they're always full of a lot of honesty and transparency. If he had things to hide, he might be forced to just, you know, hire a PR firm that can charge exorbitant fees to clean up any of his messes. And then lastly, his high levels of honesty attract just like minded individuals, which is why Berkshire Hathaway has so many CEOs that are just absolute super stars in its ranks. Talent just attracts talent, and people are well aware of this.

关于透明度的另一个有趣点在于，它可以真正为公司节省大量的金钱和避免麻烦。沃伦的股东信就是一个很好的例子，因为他没有什么需要隐瞒，所以一直以来他都亲自撰写这些信件，内容总是充满诚实和透明。如果他有要隐瞒的事情，他可能就不得不花高价聘请公关公司来处理麻烦。最后，他的高度诚实也吸引了志同道合的人，这就是为什么伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的高管们都是绝对的明星级人才。人才总是会吸引人才，这一点人们都心知肚明。

Lucimpsin is an excellent example of a tremendous investor with an incredible track record and a long history of working at Berkshire Hathaway. However, there's been several high performing individuals who have worked or currently worked for Berkshire, and I'm sure there'll be several more. The common saying is that we are the average of the five people that we spend most time around. Buffet knew this, so his nature allowed him to be surrounded by people who continued to push him and make him even better. If you could adopt Buffet's traits of trust and transparency, chances are you'll attract some very high quality individuals into your life that will make you better, too.

Lucimpsin 是一位卓越的投资者，他在投资方面有着令人惊叹的成绩，并且长期在伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司工作。然而，在伯克希尔工作过或目前在职的其他表现出色的人还有很多，我相信将来也会有更多。常言道，我们是与我们相处时间最长的五个人的平均值。巴菲特了解这一点，因此他的性格使他能够被那些不断激励他并让他变得更好的人包围。如果你能够学习巴菲特的信任和透明的特质，你很可能也会吸引一些高质量的人进入你的生活，从而让你变得更好。

Once such high quality individual who pulled Warren into his orbit was Benjamin Graham. And while I wanted to get fancy with a lesson from Graham that wasn't super obvious, just his bedrock principle of margin of safety was just too hard to pass up. So the margin of safety is a simple principle. Buy assets for less than their worth. It's such a simple lesson, but surprisingly few investors actually use it to help avoid making big mistakes and taking on too much risk. While the few investors who do consider margin of safety assume that margin of safety is embedded in things like assets and boring capital intensive legacy businesses, there is definitely a margin of safety in many areas of investing, not just in these boring companies without data business models.

有这样一个高质量的人物把沃伦（巴菲特）吸引到他的圈子中，那就是本杰明·格雷厄姆。尽管我想分享格雷厄姆的一个不那么显而易见的教训，但他关于安全边际的基础原则实在太重要了，很难忽视。安全边际是一个简单的原则：以低于其真实价值的价格购买资产。这是一个非常简单的道理，却很少有投资者真正利用它来避免犯大错和承担过多风险。而那些考虑安全边际的投资者通常以为它仅存在于一些资产和无趣的资本密集型传统企业中。但事实上，投资中的许多领域，甚至是那些非传统数据业务模式的公司，也存在安全边际。

So while Graham loved using a company's balance sheet to find a margin of safety, there are more areas inside of a business that you can use to search for a margin of safety. So earnings predictability is one way of looking at it. You can have a capitalite business that has a ridiculously high book value and the company can still have a very large margin of safety. So let's take a simple example here. We'll call a business fast growth to illustrate. So let's say this company is in the grow stage of its development, but the company also has a loyal customer base and very high switching costs. The businesses are expected to grow its earnings per share by about 26% annually with good visibility for the next three years.

因此，尽管格雷厄姆喜欢使用公司的资产负债表来寻找安全边际，但在企业内部还有更多的领域可以用于寻找安全边际。盈利的可预测性就是一种方法。即使是一家轻资本的企业，其账面价值相对较高，公司仍然有可能拥有很大的安全边际。举个简单的例子，我们称这种业务为“快速增长公司”来说明这个概念。假设这家公司处于发展的增长阶段，同时拥有忠实的客户群和很高的转换成本。预计在接下来的三年中，公司的每股收益将以每年约26%的速度增长，并且增长前景明朗。

So the company currently has an EPS of a dollar and trades at only 10 times earnings. Now this implies a share price of just $10. In three years, the company is expected to have an EPS of $2. Let's also note that the business has very low tangible assets and trades at five times book value. It also has negative working capital. So using Graham's traditional margin of safety of looking at networking capital, this business is not interesting at all, but we know a few things. So a business growing this fast probably shouldn't trade at 10 times earning multiple. What should it have? Probably something higher than the market. As of August 7th, the PE of the S&P 500 is around 29. So let's say 30 is a better number.

这家公司目前每股收益（EPS）为1美元，市盈率仅为10倍。这意味着其股价仅为10美元。预计三年后，该公司的每股收益将达到2美元。值得注意的是，这家公司的有形资产很少，市净率为5倍，而且营运资本为负。因此，如果按照格雷厄姆传统的安全边际，即观察营运资本来评估，这家公司似乎没有吸引力。不过，我们了解一些情况：一家增长如此迅速的公司，市盈率不应仅为10倍。合理的市盈率可能应该高于市场平均水平。截至8月7日，标准普尔500指数的市盈率约为29倍。所以，我们可以假设30倍是一个更合理的数值。

Now that we have a better idea of a terminal multiple, we think the business is going to be worth about $60 in three years time. The business converts 100% of earnings to cash just to keep things simple. So using an 8% discount rate, this business is worth $47. So we are achieving a massive margin of safety without considering assets at all. Now in this case, if we can buy the business for $10, we have a massive massive margin of safety. And that margin of safety allows the company to make several hiccups and screw ups and we still won't lose any money.

现在我们对终端倍数有了更清晰的了解，我们认为这家企业在三年后将值大约60美元。为了简化计算，假设企业100%的收益都转化为现金。那么，使用8%的贴现率计算，这家企业现在的价值为47美元。因此，我们在不考虑资产的情况下，已经获得了一个巨大的安全边际。假如我们能够以10美元的价格购买这家企业，那么我们就拥有非常非常大的安全边际。这个安全边际允许公司出现一些失误和意外时，我们仍然不会亏损。

Now what might some of those mistakes look like? So I came up with three hypotheticals. So let's say the terminal year comes around. The market turns bearish and we have to use a lower terminal multiple. Let's say it just stays at 10 times earnings. In that case, the business is still worth $20. Double our initial buy-in. Heck, even if the multiple cuts in half, we're still breaking even. Second is the business's growth stalls. So let's say EPS growth gets cut in half in just 13%. In three years, the EPS is now about $1.50. Perhaps now the PE of 10 makes a little more sense and the business is now worth $15. We still haven't lost money. We actually made 50%.

现在那些错误可能会是什么样子呢？我想出了三个假设情境。假设到了最终年度，市场变得悲观，我们不得不使用更低的最终倍数。假设它只是保持在收益的10倍。在这种情况下，公司仍然价值20美元，翻倍了我们最初的买入价。即使倍数减半，我们也还是能保证收支平衡。第二种情况是公司的增长停滞。假设每股收益增长减半，仅为13%。三年后，每股收益约为1.50美元。也许此时10倍市盈率更合理，公司现在价值15美元。我们仍然没有亏钱，实际上我们赚了50%。

Now, worst case scenario is the whole growth thesis just completely falls apart. Let's say the business is not growing. It's taking on debt to just stay afloat. Let's say EPS halves to 50 cents and the PE multiple contracts to five times as it's just no longer seen as a growth business. Now, yeah, you're losing money as the stock price is trading for just a quarter of what you bought a four. So these are just a few scenarios that could happen to a business that aligns a lot more closely with what I specifically look for and how I view a margin of safety.

现在，最糟糕的情况是整个增长理论完全破裂。假设企业没有增长，而是负债维持运转。假设每股盈利（EPS）减少一半到50美分，市盈率（PE）倍数缩减到五倍，因为它不再被视为一家成长型企业。这样的话，你就亏钱了，因为股票价格只剩下你买入价的四分之一。所以，这些只是可能发生在企业身上的一些情况。这些情况更符合我特别关注的内容，以及我对安全边际的看法。

So traditional value investors such as Graham would argue that fast growth has no margin of safety simply because its tangible assets are so low. However, we live in a market where intangible assets simply reign supreme and examining the margin of safety in the way that I just outlined is an excellent way to measure the risk involved in any bet. One interesting aspect of Benjamin Graham was that he was a highly quantitative investor and what quantitative investors often overlook is how a company's fundamentals can also contribute to its margin of safety.

传统的价值投资者，如格雷厄姆，会认为快速增长没有安全边际，因为其有形资产太少。然而，在我们这个无形资产占主导地位的市场中，用我刚才提到的方法来检查安全边际，是衡量任何投资风险的极佳方式。一个有趣的方面是，本杰明·格雷厄姆是一个高度量化的投资者，而量化投资者经常忽视的是公司基本面也可以对其安全边际作出贡献。

So a company's business model can offer a margin of safety that might not be visible to a quant. Factors such as switching costs, network effects, economies of scale or even brand can all make a business far more valuable than its financial statement might indicate. Or what about culture? Over the long term, a business's actual value will depend on the culture that has been established within it. A culture of innovation and excellence will always outperform one that ciphels innovation and pushes out its top performers.

因此，一家公司的商业模式可以提供一种量化分析无法显示的安全边际。换言之，一些因素，比如转换成本、网络效应、规模经济，甚至是品牌，都可以使一个企业的价值远高于其财务报表所显示的。那么文化呢？从长远来看，一家公司的实际价值将取决于其内部建立的文化。追求创新和卓越的文化将始终优于那些扼杀创新并排挤顶尖人才的文化。

Let's suppose you were to find two businesses today with similar margin of safety. In that case, you know, chances are the business with the excellent culture probably has additional hidden variables and further increases its margin of safety. The company with the plur culture may look cheap on paper in the short term, but over the long term, this is the business that's most likely to deteriorate. Now, there's an additional valuable lesson from Benjamin Graham that I really wanted to share as well, which is crucial to understand.

假设你今天找到两家企业，它们都有类似的安全边际。在这种情况下，你应该知道，拥有优秀企业文化的公司可能还有一些隐藏的优势，这会进一步提高其安全边际。而那家企业文化较差的公司，虽然从短期来看似乎价格便宜，但从长远来看，更可能会出现衰退。此外，还有一项来自本杰明·格雷厄姆的宝贵经验，我也很想与大家分享，因为这一点至关重要。

And that's his experience of just holding Geico. So Geico is fascinating because it was a holding that generated the majority of Graham's net worth. There's no way to know for sure, but I've read that Geico's stake made up over 50% of his net worth once he retired. Now, the most interesting thing about Geico was just that it was odds with many of the investing tenants that he put forth in the intelligent investor. I came up with three here. So the first one was broad diversification.

这是他持有Geico的经历。Geico很有趣，因为这是一个让格雷厄姆的大部分净资产得以增长的投资。虽然无法确切知道，但据说格雷厄姆退休时，Geico所占的比例超过了他净资产的50%。而Geico最有趣的是，它与格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》中提出的许多投资原则不一致。我想到这里有三点不一致之处。第一点是不够分散化的投资。

So since Geico made up nearly 50% of his net worth, he wasn't really practicing much diversification at all when it came to Geico. The second is just his reliance on investing in cigar butts. Geico may have started as a cigar butt, but it really turned into a compounding engine, which wasn't traditionally what Graham was known for looking for. And the third one here is just his principle of selling when price reaches intrinsic value.

所以，由于Geico构成了他净资产的近50%，他在Geico上并没有真正实行多元化投资。第二个问题是他过于依赖购买"烟蒂股"（廉价但基本面较差的股票）。Geico可能开始时是一个"烟蒂股"，但后来的发展转变为一个能增强价值的引擎，而这并不是格雷厄姆通常所追求的目标。第三点是他的一个投资原则，即当股票价格达到其内在价值时就卖出。

So this one's a little bit tougher to say because it's really impossible to find any data on what Geico traded for for the nearly 25 years that Graham held many, many decades ago. However, my assumption is that it's pretty impossible that Geico's price never exceeded its intrinsic value over 25 years. I just find that hard to believe. Now, here's what Benjamin Graham himself wrote about his thoughts on Geico. Ironically enough, the aggregate of profits accruing from this single investment decision far exceeded the sum of all the others realized through 20 years of wide-ranging operations in the partner's specialized fields involving much investigation and less pondering and countless individual decisions.

这段话用中文翻译并尽量易读的表达为：这部分内容稍微有些难以表达，因为我们几乎找不到关于格雷厄姆在几十年前持有近25年Geico股票的交易数据。然而，我的假设是，在这25年间，Geico的价格不可能始终低于其内在价值。我很难相信这种情况。现在，这是本杰明·格雷厄姆他自己写下的关于他对Geico看法的文字。有讽刺意味的是，这一项单独投资决策所获得的总利润远远超过了他在20年间通过广泛运营、深入调查、大量思考及无数其他个人决策而实现的所有收益总和。

Are there morals to the story of value to the intelligent investor? One is that one lucky break or one supremely shrewd decision can we even tell them apart? May count for more than a lifetime of journeyman efforts. So the lesson here is that you can be flexible on some of your core principles if the opportunity is right. Next, we move on to someone who taught me just so much about identifying new sock ideas. And that's Peter Lynch.

这个故事对聪明的投资者有什么价值吗？其中一个道理是，一个幸运的机会或一个非常精明的决定——我们甚至能分辨出它们吗？——可能比一辈子的平庸努力更有价值。所以，这里的教训是，如果机会合适，你可以在某些核心原则上保持灵活。接下来，我们来说说彼得·林奇，他教会了我许多识别新股票理念的方法。

So the beauty of Peter Lynch is in the simplicity of one of his methods for just finding sock ideas. And that's through simple real life observation. The overarching point that Lynch made was to invest in what you already know. This meant you didn't need to mentally overreach to understand a potential investment. But let's get into some of the more specifics of how you can use this to your advantage. The first step is to do something such as looking at your shopping habits. There are a few ways to take advantage of this.

彼得·林奇的精妙之处在于他其中一种找寻股票投资想法的方法非常简单：通过简单的生活观察。林奇所强调的核心观点是投资于你已经了解的事物。这意味着你不需要费劲去理解一个潜在的投资。现在我们来看看你如何具体地利用这一点。第一步是观察你的购物习惯。这里有几种方法可以利用这一点。

First, you can just look at your monthly bills. Find out where you're spending all your money and determine if you can easily stop spending money there or switch to something cheaper. If you're finding that there's products or services that you just can't replace or just don't want to quit using, you might find an excellent investing idea to dig into. That is, of course, assuming the business is publicly traded.

首先，你可以查看每个月的账单，找出你的钱都花在哪里，然后看看能否轻松减少这部分开支，或者换成更便宜的选择。如果发现有些产品或服务是你无法替代的，或者你不想放弃使用的，那么这可能是一个不错的投资方向。当然，这要假设这家公司是上市公司。

Second is just observing where you shop. So even if you don't shop for a specific product, if you're in an area such as your local shopping mall that has several different stores, just monitor which ones are the busiest. One of the TIP mastermind community members did this to just find an idea which was Dutch Brothers. So every day, he'd pass one of their locations and see just cars lined up literally going into the street with people who wanted to buy beverages from Dutch Brothers.

其次，只需观察你在哪里购物即可。因此，即使你没有特定的购物目标，如果你在一个像当地购物中心这样有多家店铺的地区，只要留意哪些店铺最忙碌即可。一位参与TIP智囊团社区的成员就是这样发现一个点子的，那就是Dutch Brothers。他每天经过这一品牌的店铺时，都会看到有车排成长龙，甚至排到街道上，都是想购买Dutch Brothers饮品的人。

I've used this as well to find one of my biggest investing successes in Aritzia. So when I first started learning about the business case for Aritzia, I would look in stores whenever I was near one and I began asking women, I knew about their experiences as Aritzia as well. And it was super helpful in helping me understand the strength of their brand. I also use this as a monitoring tool. So whenever I'm in a city within Aritzia locations such as Hawaii or New York or Toronto, I always try to make it a priority to walk into the store to see how busy it is.

我也用这种方法找到了我在Aritzia投资上最大的一次成功。当我刚开始了解Aritzia的商业案例时，每当我靠近他们的店铺，我都会进去看看，而我也开始询问身边的女性朋友对Aritzia的体验。这对我理解他们品牌的强大非常有帮助。我还将其作为一个监控工具。因此，每当我到有Aritzia店铺的城市，比如夏威夷、纽约或多伦多时，我总是优先去店里看看是否很忙。

And I can honestly say that they're always always busy which is an excellent sign. A few other points to consider when using this method that Lynch made sure to emphasize. So first thing is when you travel, notice what stores are full and which ones are empty. Another one is to make sure that you're looking for things such as long lines, new store openings, rapid shelf turnover. And then lastly, just compare your observations with multiple locations to see if it's a real trend and not just a trend in a single location which obviously isn't interesting at all.

我可以诚实地说，他们总是非常忙碌，这可是个好迹象。在使用这种方法时，还有几点需要注意，这是林奇特别强调的。首先，当你旅行时，注意哪些商店是满员的，哪些是空闲的。另外，要留意诸如长队、新店开张、货架上商品快速更新等情况。最后，把你的观察结果与多个地点进行比较，以确定这是否是真正的趋势，而不是某个单一地点的现象，显然单一地点的现象并不具备普遍意义。

So the next one I like to observe is how my wife's tens are money. So my wife loves shopping a lot more than I do. So I'm constantly peppering over questions about interesting products she's considering or even new e-commerce sites she's exploring. And this can give you a vast range of options. For instance, when I own in mode, a facial aesthetics machine manufacturer, I recall my wife telling me that she knew one of her mother's friends who would use one of their machines and had a very positive experience with it.

所以接下来我想观察的是我妻子的金钱观。我的妻子比我更喜欢购物。因此，我经常向她提问，了解她正在考虑的有趣产品，或者她正在探索的新电商网站。这可以为你提供很多选择。比如，当我拥有一家面部美学仪器制造商InMode的股份时，我记得我妻子告诉我，她认识的一位母亲的朋友使用过他们的机器，并且有非常好的体验。

Now this helped me understand that in mode had a decent chance of continuing to scale their products since at least one of their customers liked what they were offering. Another great way my wife has helped me is just simply by asking questions about specific brands that she knows better than I do. So I've already mentioned Eritrea and my wife grew up literally five minutes away from the very first Eritrea location. Additionally, she's been shopping at Eritrea for 20 plus years.

这让我明白，"in mode"有很好的机会继续拓展他们的产品，因为至少有一个客户喜欢他们提供的东西。我的妻子也通过询问关于某些她比我更了解的品牌的问题很大程度上帮助了我。我已经提到过Eritrea，而我妻子从小就在离第一家Eritrea店面仅五分钟距离的地方长大。此外，她已经在Eritrea购物超过20年了。

So she's a gold mine of information to just help understand how Eritrea has created this customer loyalty. And on my own, I just would never have probably gotten these insights. So it's really, really helpful. Another way to find your investment ideas is just to observe the products and services that your children enjoy. For instance, my son loves a few things. So I got five here. One, YouTube, which is owned by Alphabet, two Disney, a publicly traded company, three Hot Wheels owned by Mattel, four Lego, not publicly traded, and five Fisher Price also owned by Mattel.

她就是一个信息宝库，可以帮助我们理解厄立特里亚是如何建立起顾客忠诚度的。单凭我自己，可能永远也无法获得这样的见解，所以这真的非常有帮助。另一种寻找投资想法的方法就是观察你孩子喜欢的产品和服务。例如，我的儿子喜欢几样东西。我列出了五个：一，YouTube，由Alphabet拥有；二，迪士尼，一家上市公司；三，风火轮，由美泰公司拥有；四，乐高，没有上市；五，费雪，也由美泰公司拥有。

So with that information, I can see if maybe there's an investment case for Alphabet, Disney or Mattel. I could tell you right off the bat that Disney just doesn't interest me. Alphabet could be interesting. And I checked Mattel, but it has a 10-year compound annual growth rate of revenue at 0.15% and EPS of only 2.2%. So that instantly tells me there's nothing to be interested in. As for Lego, too bad is private because sometimes I actually wonder if I like Lego more than my son does.

根据这些信息，我可以看看是否有投资于谷歌、迪士尼或美泰的理由。我可以马上告诉你，迪士尼对我没有吸引力。谷歌可能会很有趣。我查了一下美泰，发现它的10年复合年增长率仅为0.15%，每股收益只有2.2%。这让我立刻觉得没什么值得关注的。至于乐高，很可惜它是私营公司，因为有时候我甚至觉得我比我儿子更喜欢乐高。

Now I did a check on Lego anyways to see what kind of growth that it might have or what's disclosed even though it's a private business. Unfortunately, its metrics are also very uninteresting if they are indeed true. So the numbers I found were that revenue actually decreased by 2% in 2023 and in that same year, operating profits declined by about 5%. So numbers like that caused me to have zero interest. Now out of all these, Alphabet would probably be the one that I find the most interesting. However, since the business is just so large, I would still probably take a pass.

现在我查了一下乐高，看看它可能有什么样的增长或公开的信息，尽管它是个私营企业。不幸的是，如果数据是真的，它的指标也很无趣。我发现的数据显示，2023年收入实际上下降了2%，而同年营业利润下降了约5%。这样的数字让我完全没有兴趣。在所有这些公司中，Alphabet 可能是我觉得最有趣的一家。然而，由于公司规模实在太大，我可能还是会放弃考虑。

But, you know, according to Reuters, YouTube could be valued as something like $500 billion. Now to be honest, if YouTube was spun out, I'd probably have a very, very close look. So not only does my son love it, but I also love YouTube and use it very, very often. I also reuse it as a research tool as part of my job. TIP is obviously also very present on YouTube. You might actually be watching or listening to this on YouTube right now.

但是，你知道，根据路透社的报道，YouTube 的估值可能高达5000亿美元。老实说，如果 YouTube 独立出来，我可能会非常关注。不仅我的儿子喜欢它，我自己也非常喜欢 YouTube，并且经常使用。我还把它当作工作中的研究工具。显然，TIP在 YouTube 上也有很多内容。你现在可能就在 YouTube 上观看或收听这些内容。

Now this transitions to the last area where I like to look for ideas, which is from your job. So I use several services on a very regular basis. And a few of these off just the top of my head. I use Gmail, Google Calendar, Google Drive, Slack, LastPass, Riverside, and Adobe Audition. Now the owners of the first three are Alphabet; Salesforce owns Slack; LastPass and Riverside are private; and Audition is owned by Adobe.

现在，我们转到我喜欢寻找灵感的最后一个领域，那就是从你的工作中获取灵感。我经常使用几个服务，其中一些我能很快想到的有：Gmail、Google Calendar、Google Drive、Slack、LastPass、Riverside，以及Adobe Audition。前面三个服务属于Alphabet公司；Slack属于Salesforce公司；LastPass和Riverside是私有公司的产品；Audition是Adobe公司的软件。

Now we've already covered Alphabet, so I'm not going to go over it again. Salesforce and Adobe are actually pretty interesting. So looking at the 10-year KEGERS for Salesforce first, revenues 27%, EPS 28%, and free cash flow 31%. They have no debt either, and they’re led by their founder, Mark Benioff. Adobe is buying back shares, has a 10-year KEGGER of 13% revenue growth, and 14% earnings per share. So out of those two, I like the growth of a business like Salesforce, but I will admit that I just don't know that much about the company.

现在我们已经讨论过Alphabet，所以我就不再重复了。Salesforce和Adobe实际上非常有趣。先来看Salesforce的10年复合年增长率（CAGR），营收增长27%，每股收益增长28%，自由现金流增长31%。他们也没有负债，并且由创始人马克·贝尼奥夫（Mark Benioff）领导。Adobe正在回购股票，10年营收增长率为13%，每股收益增长14%。在这两家公司中，我更喜欢Salesforce的成长性，不过我承认我对这家公司了解得不多。

Perhaps I should put it on the wait list. However, before I would ever decide to invest in a business like Salesforce, I'd have to conduct pretty extensive research and due diligence, which brings us to the next investor, whom I consider to be just the master of that area. And that person is Philip Fisher. So he wrote the excellent book, Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits, which I discussed in a lot of detail on TIP 646.

也许我应该把它放到等候名单上。不过，在我决定投资像Salesforce这样的企业之前，我需要进行相当深入的研究和尽职调查，这就引出了我们要介绍的下一位投资者，我认为他是这个领域的大师。那个人就是菲利普·费雪（Philip Fisher）。他写了本很棒的书《普通股与非凡的利润》，我在TIP第646期中详细讨论过。

And one of my biggest lessons from Mr. Fisher regards the power of Skullbutt. So Skullbutt is just one of the most potent ways that investors can gain an information edge. Skullbutt is simply learning more about a specific business by using alternative sources of information. Everyone has access to things such as the company's public documents. Therefore, reading them or other easily accessible information on the internet won't provide you an informational edge.

我从费舍尔先生那里学到的一个重要教训是关于"Skullbutt"的力量。Skullbutt 是投资者获取信息优势的最有效途径之一。Skullbutt 的意思就是通过非传统的信息来源，来更多地了解一家特定的公司。人人都可以查阅公司公开文件等信息，因此，仅仅阅读这些文件或互联网上容易获取的信息，并不能带来信息优势。

It's definitely required, but again, it won't provide you an edge. But if you speak to other people who are involved in the business, the industry the company is in, or in the competition of the business, you can learn a heck of a lot. So in the book, The Slooth Investor, the author discusses examining three different parties to Slooth within a company. They're customers, employees, and suppliers.

这肯定是必要的，但同样地，它并不会给你带来优势。不过，如果你与参与该业务、公司所属行业或竞争对手的人交谈，你可以学到很多东西。在《侦探投资者》这本书中，作者讨论了如何调查公司内的三方：客户、员工和供应商。

All zero in on customers here because I think that's the most critical area to look at. So when it comes to customers, there are three specific types to consider. There's the end user, there's the person who decides whether to sign a check, so to purchase a product, and then there's the check signers themselves. You can also look at things like current customers, former customers, and potential customers.

这里所有人都专注于客户，因为我认为这是最关键的领域。在涉及客户时，有三种特定类型需要考虑。有终端用户，也有决定是否签署支票来购买产品的人，当然还有直接签署支票的人。此外，还可以关注当前客户、过去的客户以及潜在客户。

Speaking to any of these people will yield very high value information about the relationships that customers have with the business. The primary purpose of Skullbutt is to gather non-financial information about a business. So it enables you to learn about factors such as competitive advantages, management quality, growth prospects, and potential risks. Other great people that would be interesting to talk to would be suppliers who can just reveal the company's bargaining power, payment reputation, and reliability. You can talk to competitors who are often the best critics as there have no problem highlighting where a company is going to be strong a week. You can talk to employees, current, or former, which can provide incredibly valuable insights into things like culture, management effectiveness, and innovation. And then lastly, people like industry experts who can offer a lot of contextable trends, regulation, and market dynamics.

与这些人交谈将带来关于客户与企业关系的极高价值信息。Skullbutt的主要目的是收集关于企业的非财务信息。这样可以让你了解到企业的竞争优势、管理质量、增长前景和潜在风险等因素。其他值得交谈的人还包括供应商，他们可以揭示公司的议价能力、付款信誉和可靠性。你也可以和竞争对手交谈，他们往往是最好的批评者，因为他们不介意指出公司潜在的强项和弱点。员工，无论是现任的还是前任的，也能提供关于企业文化、管理效率和创新等方面的宝贵见解。最后，行业专家也值得咨询，他们可以提供很多关于市场趋势、法规和市场动态的背景信息。

So I try to stay informed about all of the businesses that I own, but I must admit that it's pretty challenging. A CEO of a company is likely to know who all of their customers are, but they're very unlikely to share that information as that's an action that's frowned upon. Suppliers can also be very tough to find simply because it's not obvious who the suppliers are for a specific company. Competitors are probably the easiest to figure out because anyone involved in the business won't have a problem sharing that information with you. When you look at current employees, personally, I find it nearly impossible in my experience. People just don't seem to want to speak about their own business, probably just to avoid getting in tiny trouble.

所以，我尽量了解我所拥有的所有业务，但我必须承认这相当具有挑战性。一家公司的首席执行官可能会知道他们所有的客户是谁，但他们很少会分享这些信息，因为这样做不被认可。要找到供应商也很困难，因为很难明确一家公司的具体供应商是谁。相对来说，竞争对手可能是最容易找出的，因为从事这个行业的人通常不会介意和你分享这方面的信息。至于现有员工，根据我的经验，我发现几乎是不可能了解情况。人们似乎不愿意谈论自己的业务，可能是为了避免惹上小麻烦。

Industry experts are not hard to get information from either. So industry experts can be found just all over the internet, but you have to understand some of the incentives of the industry experts. Generally speaking, they're incentivized to talk up the industry. So if you find one to talk, remember that very, very closely. I recall finding a coal expert who was widely available on the internet, a guy was all over YouTube and podcasts. And while he always appeared to be very thoughtful, given his various positions within the industry in terms of investments, it was evident that talking up the commodity was in his best interest.

行业专家的信息也不难获取。行业专家在互联网上随处可见，但你需要了解他们的一些动机。一般来说，他们有动力去美化所在的行业。所以当你与某个专家交流时，一定要非常留意这一点。我记得曾找到过一位在网上颇为活跃的煤炭专家，他频繁出现在YouTube和播客中。尽管他看起来总是很有见地，但考虑到他在行业内的各种投资职位，很明显，吹捧煤炭这个商品对他是有利的。

So our next lesson comes from Sir John Templeton, and that's to fish where there's just no fisherman. My idea came from this when reading the book, The John Templeton Way. So Templeton began investing in Japan in the 1950s, nearly three decades before the major bubble began to form. And he was investing in Japan during a time when just nobody was willing to touch Japanese stocks with a 10-foot pole. But John saw incredible value at this time. So in the early 1960s, the Japanese economy was growing at an average of 10 percent, and the US economy was growing at an average rate of only 4 percent. In other words, the Japanese economy was expanding two and a half times faster than the US economy.

所以我们的下一课来自约翰·邓普顿爵士，他的建议是要在没有其他渔民的地方钓鱼。这个想法源于我阅读的《约翰·邓普顿之道》一书。在20世纪50年代，邓普顿开始投资日本，比主要的泡沫开始形成早了近三十年。在那个时候，几乎没有人愿意碰日本的股票，但约翰看到了惊人的价值。因此，在20世纪60年代初，日本经济以平均10%的速度增长，而美国经济的平均增长率仅为4%。换句话说，日本经济的扩张速度是美国经济的两倍半。

But many stocks in Japan cost 80 percent less than the average of the stocks in the United States. So in a written report in 1960, there were two reasons why foreign investors refused to invest in Japan despite these cheap valuations. The first one was that there were too many fluctuations in the stock price, and the second was that there just wasn't enough information. So this really got me thinking about where could other investors in today's markets find areas of the market that have large amounts of volatility and lack information. And if you look hard enough, there's always areas of the market like this. My personal choice has been microcaps.

在日本，许多股票的价格比美国平均股票价格低80%。然而，在1960年的一份书面报告中，有两个原因说明为什么外国投资者尽管看到如此低廉的估值，仍拒绝投资日本。第一个原因是股票价格波动太大，第二个原因是信息不足。这让我思考，在当今市场上，其他投资者可以在哪里找到具有大幅波动和信息缺乏的市场领域。如果你仔细寻找，总是能发现这样的市场区域。而我个人的选择是投资微型股。

Instead of looking at the massive US market, I stick with my home country Canada, and in Canada specifically, I look at microcaps. So whenever I'm speaking with members of the TIP mastermind community, they often ask about microcaps and how I research them. And it's ironic because one of the main impediments I hear from people is that they specifically don't research microcaps specifically because there's a lot less information out there on them. So if you look at the popular news or analysis sites such as Seeking Alpha, you're going to be very disappointed at what you find when trying to research microcaps.

与其关注庞大的美国市场，我更倾向于关注我的祖国加拿大，尤其是加拿大的小市值公司。每当我与TIP大师社区的成员交流时，他们常常询问关于小市值公司以及我如何研究它们的情况。有趣的是，我听到的主要障碍之一是，许多人不研究小市值公司，正是因为关于它们的信息相对较少。如果你查看热门新闻或分析网站，比如Seeking Alpha，想要研究小市值公司时，往往会感到失望，因为上面可找到的相关信息非常有限。

And that's because barely any analysts cover microcaps because they know that funds or the readers just can't or don't want to buy them. So that is why when you look at a business such as, you know, Alpha bit or Amazon, you're never going to learn out a new analysis which can help inform you. But the problem with investing this way is that you're investing in very well-known businesses and there's just less inefficiencies. I'm never going to say that there aren't inefficiencies in large microcaps. You know, consider Meta for further proof of that. But I will say that there are areas of the market where there's just these massive inefficiencies and they occur a lot more often.

这主要是因为几乎没有分析师关注小市值股票，他们知道基金或读者根本买不起或不愿意购买这些股票。这就是为什么当你查看某个企业，比如Alpha bit或亚马逊时，你永远无法获得新的分析来帮助你做出更明智的决策。但是，投资这样的知名企业的问题在于，这些企业的市场效率较高，不容易出现价格低估的情况。我不否认大型小市值股票中存在效率缺失，举个例子，比如Meta就是一个证明。但我想说的是，市场上某些领域存在巨大且更为频繁的效率缺失现象。

And in my opinion, the part of the market that I think I can understand that is regularly inefficiently priced are microcaps. So this is also backed by research. In the book What Works on Wall Street by James O'Shaughnessy, he writes, between 1964 and 2009, as if as a Compustat scenario, one illustrates you required stock prices greater than a dollar, but put no return limit and allowed first stocks with missing data to be included. Then the portfolio earned an average compound annual return of 28%. Yet when you require that all stocks have share price of greater than a dollar and have limited the monthly return to any security to 2000 per month, as we see with scenario two returns declined by approximately 10% and the portfolio earns an average compounded return of 18.2%. So this second number, even though it's obviously a lot lower than the first one was way higher than other market cap desiles.

在我看来，我认为自己能够理解且经常被错误定价的市场部分是小型市值公司。这一点也有研究支持。在James O'Shaughnessy的《华尔街的制胜策略》一书中，他描述了一个例子：在1964年至2009年期间，假设一个Compustat情境中，只要求股票价格高于一美元，不设定收益限制，并允许包含数据缺失的股票。那么，这个投资组合的年平均复合收益率为28%。但当你要求所有股票的股价都高于一美元，并将每月的单只股票收益限制为2000美元时，如我们在第二个情境中所见，收益下降了大约10%，投资组合的年平均复合收益率为18.2%。尽管这个第二个数字明显低于第一个，但它仍然比其他市值分组的收益率要高得多。

Now, I'm sure that some investors have identified other maybe rare aspects of the market that are inefficient to exploit. And if you look close enough long enough, you're probably going to find areas that you can find very easy to understand, but might not be understandable by the average investor. And that's an area that you could exploit. So the key is really an understanding where to fish where there are no fishermen. Jim Rohn once said that you're the average of the five people you spend the most time with, and I really could not agree with them more.

现在，我相信一些投资者已经找到了市场中其他可能较少见但可以利用的低效环节。如果你足够深入地观察并持续一定的时间，很可能会发现一些很容易理解的领域，但这些领域可能对普通投资者来说并不容易理解。这就是你可以利用的机会。所以关键在于要了解如何在无人问津的地方捕鱼。吉姆·罗恩曾说过，你是与你相处时间最长的五个人的平均值，我非常赞同他的观点。

And one of my favorite things about being a host of this show is having the opportunity to connect with high quality, like-minded people in the value investing community. Each year, we host live in-person events in Omaha and New York City for our CIP master rank community, giving our members that exact opportunity. Back in May, during the Berkshire weekend, we gathered for a couple of dinners and social hours and also hosted a bus tour to give our members the full Omaha experience. And in the second weekend of October 2025, we'll be getting together in New York City for two dinners and socials, as well as exploring the city and gathering at the Vanderbilt 1 Observatory.

我最喜欢主持这个节目的其中一个原因是，有机会与价值投资社区中高质量、志同道合的人士建立联系。每年，我们都会在奥马哈和纽约市为我们的CIP大师级社区举办面对面的线下活动，为我们的成员提供这样的机会。今年五月，在伯克希尔股东周末期间，我们聚在一起共进晚餐、进行社交活动，还组织了一次巴士旅行，让我们的成员充分体验奥马哈。在2025年10月的第二个周末，我们将在纽约市聚会，安排了两次晚餐和社交活动，同时还会探索城市，并参观范德比尔特一号天文台。

Our master rank community has around 120 members, and we're capping the group at 150. And many of these members are entrepreneurs, private investors, or investment professionals. And like myself, they're eager to connect with kindred spirits. It's an excellent opportunity to connect with like-minded people on a deeper level. So if you'd like to check out what the community has to offer and meet with around 30 or 40 of us in New York City in October, be sure to head to theinvestorspodcast.com slash mastermind to apply to join the community. That's theinvestorspodcast.com slash mastermind or simply click the link in the description below.

我们的高级会员社区大约有120名成员，我们将成员人数限制在150人。而这些成员中很多都是企业家、私人投资者或投资专业人士。和我一样，他们也渴望与志同道合的人交流。这是一个与志同道合者深度交流的绝佳机会。所以，如果你想了解这个社区提供的内容，并计划在10月与我们中的30到40人在纽约市见面，务必访问theinvestorspodcast.com/mastermind申请加入社区。您可以访问theinvestorspodcast.com/mastermind，或者简单地点击下方的链接。

If you enjoy excellent breakdowns on individual stocks, then you need to check out the intrinsic value podcast hosted by Sean O'Malley and Daniel Monca. Each week, Sean and Daniel do in-depth analysis on a company's business model and competitive advantages. And in real time, they build out the intrinsic value portfolio for you to follow along as they search for value in the market. So far, they've done analysis on great businesses like John Deere, Ulte Beauty, AutoZone, and Airbnb. And I recommend starting with the episode on Nintendo, the Global Powerhouse in gaming. It's rare to find a show that consistently publishes high-quality, comprehensive deep dives that cover all of the aspects of a business from an investment perspective.

如果你喜欢关于个股的精彩分析，那么你一定要收听由Sean O'Malley和Daniel Monca主持的“内在价值”播客。每周，Sean和Daniel都会对一家公司的商业模式和竞争优势进行深入分析。同时，他们会实时构建内在价值投资组合，让你在市场中寻找价值时可以跟随。他们已经分析过约翰迪尔、Ulta Beauty、AutoZone和Airbnb等优秀公司。我建议你从关于任天堂这家全球游戏巨头的那期节目开始收听。这类节目很少见，它能始终如一地发布涵盖企业所有投资角度的高质量、全面深入剖析。

Go follow the intrinsic value podcast on your favorite podcasting app and discover the next stock to add to your portfolio or watch list. There's four of them. So the first one is to find areas of the market where information is just hard to find. The second is that the higher the volatility, the better. The third is that if you can't find any analysis, you're probably on the right path. And fourth, try to find a community of people who specifically try to exploit some of these mispricings.

请在您喜爱的播客应用上关注"内在价值"播客，寻找下一个值得添加到您投资组合或观察列表中的股票。这个播客主要有四个要点：首先，要寻找市场中信息难以获取的领域。第二，波动性越大越好。第三，如果您找不到任何分析，可能说明您找对了方向。第四，尝试找到一个专门研究如何利用这些错误定价的社区。

Today, there's tons of communities out there that specialize in pretty much anything that you're interested in. If you can find and get access to those communities, you can usually access pretty small groups of people trying to find inefficiencies in the market together. John Templeton, in his time, just didn't have access to this, so he had to do it all by himself. I can reach out to many, many people to find interesting ideas and microcaps. And since there's just so many ideas, the idea flow just never really ends.

如今，有很多社区专注于你感兴趣的几乎任何事情。如果你能找到并加入这些社区，通常可以接触到一些聚集在一起寻找市场不效率的小群体。在约翰·邓普顿的时代，他并没有这样的资源，所以他需要独自进行研究。而我可以联系到许多人，获得有趣的想法和小盘股信息。而且，因为有太多的想法，这种思路的涌现几乎从未停止过。

The interesting thing about them inefficiencies is that they rarely last. Microcaps tend to grow through cycles of popularity and unpopularity. In Templeton's case, once the rest of the world started catching on to just how much of a bargain Japanese stocks were, they began bidding up the prices, which removed that inefficiency. But by that point, Templeton was long gone. So if you exploit inefficiencies, you must keep your ear to the ground to observe when there are disappearing. Otherwise, you risk holding the bag. And if you're holding the bag, you either break even if you had the right entry point, you lose money if the cycle goes down more than you thought, or yet to wait a multi-year time period until that cycle changes to make a profit.

关于这些低效市场有趣的一点是，它们很少会持续存在。微型股的受欢迎程度通常会经历周期性的起伏。在邓普顿（Templeton）的案例中，一旦全球开始意识到日本股票有多么划算，他们就开始抬高价格，这就消除了这种低效性。但在那时，邓普顿早已离场。因此，如果你想利用这些市场低效现象，就必须保持敏锐，观察它们何时正在消失，否则就有可能陷入困境。如果你手里还留着这些股票，就可能面临以下情况：如果买入时机正确，最多只是保本；如果市场走势比预期更差，你会亏钱；或者，你需要等待数年，直到市场周期再次转变，才能获利。

Now, the next investor I want to highlight is John Neff, who I just released a episode about on TIP 747. One of my favorite aspects of John Neff was that he was an investor with very value-based approach, but he also wasn't afraid to buy businesses that I think most traditional value investors wouldn't touch. So Neff considered himself a low PE investor, and that's definitely where the bulk of his money was made. However, he also understood that flexibility was just crucial to achieving superior long-term returns. He owned names like Home Depot that traded over 20 times earnings, and even owned names like IBM, Xerox, and Intel during the latter part of the Nifty 50 years. So Neff wasn't afraid to take positions in businesses where he found value.

现在，我想强调的下一位投资者是约翰·奈夫，我刚刚在TIP 747节目中发布了一期关于他的内容。我最喜欢约翰·奈夫的一个方面是，他是一位以价值为基础的投资者，但他也敢于投资于一些我认为大多数传统价值投资者不会涉足的企业。奈夫自视为一名低市盈率的投资者，这确实是他赚大钱的主要方式。然而，他也明白灵活性对实现卓越的长期回报至关重要。他持有过像家得宝这样的公司，其市盈率超过20倍，甚至在“漂亮50”时代的后期还持有IBM、施乐和英特尔等公司的股票。因此，奈夫对于那些他认为有价值的企业并不害怕投资。

Now, this is a valuable principle to consider for investors who might limit themselves to a single investing strategy. If you're only looking at businesses with single-digit PEs, for instance, there will be boom and bust periods in your opportunity set. And it's totally okay to invest that way. People like Bob Robody have made a career out of investing in this manner. However, I think you really brought in your horizons if you view value the way that Neff did, and that's to find undervalued assets rather than focusing exclusively on low PE. And this is a lesson that I've tracked for nearly my entire investing career. While I do enjoy investing in stocks with single-digit PEs, I'm also attracted to businesses that might have a PE that exceeds 30, but for good reason.

这对于可能仅限于单一投资策略的投资者来说是一个重要的原则。如果你只关注市盈率（PE）为个位数的企业，那么你会经历投资机会的繁荣和萧条期。以这种方式投资完全没有问题。像Bob Robody这样的人就是以这种方式取得成功的。然而，我认为，如果你像Neff那样看待价值，寻找被低估的资产，而不是只关注低市盈率，你会拓宽自己的视野。这是我几乎整个投资生涯都遵循的教训。我确实喜欢投资于市盈率为个位数的股票，但我也被那些市盈率超过30但有合理原因的企业吸引。

Some businesses are just so exceptional and resilient that they simply deserve to be priced higher than a lower quality alternative. A sticky SaaS business that is growing its recurring revenue at 30% per year and has nearly all of its revenue as recurring revenue deserves a premium versus a cigar butt that is trading cheap based on its assets. So let's dive into this topic in some more detail.

有些企业确实非常出色和具有韧性，以至于它们理应比质量较低的替代品定价更高。一个稳定的SaaS企业，如果其经常性收入每年增长30%，而且几乎所有收入都来自经常性收入，那么这样的公司理应比一个仅因其资产便宜的“烟蒂股”享有更高的估值。让我们更详细地探讨这个话题。

So let's make up a hypothetical cigar butt business. We're going to call it ugly duckling or just ugly for short. So ugly is a discount shoe retailer that buys leftover inventory from failed brands and re-sells it in outlet style stores. So it's competitive advantage is just it's cheap and it has no loyal customers. It's got no in-house brand, sales are lumpy and completely unpredictable. Since the business is a low cost provider, it grows margins typically range in the 15 to 20% range. But the company is struggling to grow because this operating results just aren't strong and banks are very hesitant to lend it any money.

让我们假设有一个叫“丑小鸭”（简称“丑丫”）的公司，这是一家雪茄蒂生意。丑丫是一家折扣鞋零售商，它从倒闭的品牌中购买滞销库存，然后在奥特莱斯风格的店铺中转售。它的竞争优势在于价格便宜，并且没有忠诚的客户群。公司没有自有品牌，销售额不稳定且不可预测。由于是一家低成本提供商，它的利润率通常在15%到20%之间。然而，由于运营结果不佳，公司在增长方面遇到了困难，银行也很犹豫是否要向它提供贷款。

Going to the capital markets is an option, but their growth prospects are so dire that it just might not work out the way management wants. However, if you examine the balance sheet, they don't require much debt to operate. They own a significant amount of their stores and they have substantial amounts of inventory. So if you were to look at this on a balance sheet basis as maybe a liquidation play, you would make money just by selling all the businesses assets rather than keeping the business running. So what's a business like this worth? It might trade at five times earnings attracting value investors to the company. Perhaps the catalyst would just be some sort of liquidation event of the entire business.

前往资本市场融资是一个选择，但由于其增长前景极其黯淡，这可能不会如管理层所愿。然而，如果查看资产负债表，他们的运营并不需要太多负债。他们拥有大量的门店以及丰富的库存。因此，如果从资产负债表的角度来看作是一个清算项目，你通过出售所有业务资产而不是继续运营公司，就可以获利。那么这样的公司价值几何呢？它可能以五倍的市盈率交易，吸引价值投资者。可能的催化剂只是整个业务的某种清算事件。

Or maybe a new leadership could come in and improve the business and identify new ways to expand. The point is the business is cheap and I think kind of deserves to be. Could this business be worth 10 times earnings resulting in a double if they maybe strong together a few good quarters? I doubt it. Let's look at a business we'll call cloud nest. So this business is a cloud-based collaboration software for small businesses. Customers pay a yearly fee for project management, file sharing and communication. The business has 95% of its customers on multi-year contracts.

或者，或许新的领导团队可以接手并改进业务，找出扩展的新方法。关键是这个业务目前估值很低，我觉得这也是合理的。这个业务有可能以10倍市盈率计算，从而在有几个好的季度表现后翻倍吗？我对此持怀疑态度。让我们看看一个名为“云巢”的业务吧。这个业务提供基于云的协作软件，专门面向小型企业。客户每年支付一次费用，用于项目管理、文件共享和沟通。这个业务的95%客户都签订了多年合同。

Revenue is about as predictable as the sun rising and setting and gross margins are 75% and climbing as the business onboards new customers and tests out its pricing power. Customers are extremely loyal with retention rates of about 98%. The market is just massive as they've only penetrated about 1% of small businesses in North America. Additionally, the company is developing new modules that current customers are willing to pay more for as they expand their offerings. The business is hugely profitable, boasting 25% net margins and net income has grown out of 30% kegger for the last three years showing no signs of slowing down.

收入就像太阳的升起和落下一样可预测，毛利率达到了75%并且还在上升，因为公司正在吸引新客户并测试其定价能力。客户极为忠诚，保留率约为98%。市场非常庞大，他们在北美的小企业中仅占据了约1%的份额。此外，公司正在开发新的模块，而现有客户愿意为扩展服务而支付更多费用。这个业务非常盈利，净利润率达到25%，净收入在过去三年中以30%的年增长率增长，且没有放缓的迹象。

Now, do you think cloud nest has any business trading at a five times earnings multiple? Ten times seems like an absolute steal. Heck, a business like this trading at 20 times its value could still yield excellent results if it can continue growing at those rates while improving its margins. So let's say this business can continue growing net income at 30% for the next three years. That means EPS will more than double over a three year period. So if you bought it at 20 times earnings, your investment should double with absolutely no multiple expanse needed.

现在，你觉得Cloud Nest以五倍的市盈率交易合理吗？十倍看起来简直是捡便宜。天啊，一个这样的企业就算以二十倍的市盈率交易，如果它能继续以现在的速度增长并提高利润率，依然能带来很好的回报。那么，我们假设这个企业在未来三年内可以继续每年净收入增长30%。这意味着每股收益将在三年内翻倍多一点。因此，如果你以二十倍的市盈率购买该股票，你的投资应该能翻倍，而且不需要市盈率的增长来实现。

However, a business like this can easily justify you know 30 or 40 times earnings. That would add a substantial amount to the investment. This is why growth should be factored into any investment and reflected in its stock price. Now, let's move on here and imagine that the year is 1999 and Howard Marx is at a quiet dinner in Midtown Manhattan. The Nasdaq has just tripled in the last three years and the air is just thick with the optimism of innovative technology. Everyone at Howard's table is eagerly discussing dot com stocks, young billionaire founders, fast moving IPOs and the fortunes that were made in a matter of weeks.

然而，像这样的企业可以轻松地证明其市盈率为30倍或40倍。这将为投资带来可观的价值提升。这就是为什么在任何投资中都应考虑增长因素，并反映在其股票价格中。现在，让我们继续想象一下，现在是1999年，霍华德·马克斯正坐在曼哈顿中城的一场安静晚宴上。在过去三年里，纳斯达克指数已经翻了三倍，创新科技带来的乐观情绪弥漫在空气中。霍华德的桌子上，每个人都热切地讨论着互联网公司股票、年轻的亿万富翁创始人、快速发展的首次公开募股(IPOs)以及在短短几周内创造的财富。

Someone leads over to Marx and asks, Howard may I ask what your hottest tech pick is right now? Marx slowly smiles, shrugs and says none. It's a baffling response to the normal person. To most people in the room, not owning dot com stocks is complete madness. But this is why Marx has been so successful for so long. He doesn't think like everyone else. Instead of asking what everyone else was asking, which was what stock should I buy that will continue going up in price, he was asking what happens when everyone else buys a stock and I don't.

有人走到马克思身边问：“霍华德，我能问一下你现在最看好的科技股是什么吗？”马克思慢慢地笑了笑，耸了耸肩说：“没有。” 这个回答对普通人来说令人困惑。对房间里的大多数人而言，不持有互联网股票简直是疯狂的。但这正是马克思这么长久以来获得成功的原因。他的思维方式与众不同。大多数人都在问“我应该买哪只股票，它的价格会继续上涨？”，而他则在思考“当所有人都买某只股票，而我没有买，会发生什么？”

So the way everyone else was wrapping up this question was by using something called first order of thinking. It's a simple and direct way of thinking. Most people concluded that companies growing rapidly in terms of revenue or those even with just an idea that revenue would increase in the future were the ones that were becoming these market darlings. Therefore, they were the ones that people should buy. But second order of thinking is much more complex and requires more mental energy. Marx would look at the problem this way.

大家对这个问题的普遍思考方式是运用所谓的“第一层次思维”。这是一种简单直接的思考方式。大多数人得出的结论是，那些营业收入快速增长的公司，或者即使只是一个未来收入会增加的想法的公司，正是市场上的宠儿。因此，人们认为应该买入这些公司。然而，“第二层次思维”更加复杂，并且需要更多的脑力。马克思会用这种方式来看待问题。

Since everyone knows the company is growing fast, there will be significant buying pressure. As buying pressure increases, the stock price will rise. So the question wasn't is the company any good? It was what is the best decision to make knowing that everyone is piling into the stock. Marx wasn't looking at the surface question. He was peering and looking in actually are deeper examining factors such as the expectations embedded in the stock price, which gave him a much more accurate view of the market psychology.

由于大家都知道这家公司发展迅速，因此会出现显著的买入压力。随着买入压力的增加，股价将会上升。所以问题不在于公司好不好，而在于在人人都涌入这只股票时，做出最佳决策是什么。马克思并没有停留在表面问题上，而是深入分析了股价中包含的预期等更深层次的因素，这使他能够更准确地理解市场心理。

Let's now look back even further and go back to the mid 1800s. When thousands of people rushed to California to live out the American dream by finding a very precious resource, gold. So Americans headed to California and Droz, carrying pickaxes and shovels. And they did this with visions of glittering fortunes. They were thinking in the purest form of first order logic. Gold is valuable. Go to where the gold is and find it yourself.

让我们现在回头看得更远一些，回到19世纪中期。当时，成千上万的人涌向加州，试图通过寻找一种非常珍贵的资源——黄金，来实现美国梦。于是，美国人带着镐和铁锹，向加州进发。他们怀揣着闪闪发光的财富梦想。这种想法可以说是最简单直接的一种逻辑：黄金很有价值；去有黄金的地方，自己去寻找。

Now in 1853, a Bavarian immigrant arrived in San Francisco. His name was Levi Strauss. Instead of thinking about gold like everybody else, he noticed a need that was missing for all gold diggers. This was a pair of just good pants that wouldn't rip a few days or weeks after digging. Instead of joining the gold-finding frenzy, he decided to make his fortune by supplying the prospectors with just strong pants that could withstand a lot of punishment. And this is how Levi's jeans was born.

1853年，一位巴伐利亚的移民来到了旧金山。他的名字是李维·施特劳斯。当其他人都在想着淘金时，他注意到了一个被忽视的需求，那就是一条在挖金子时不会在几天或几周后就破掉的结实裤子。于是，他没有加入淘金的热潮，而是决定通过为这些淘金者提供耐磨的结实裤子来赚取他的财富。于是，李维牛仔裤就这样诞生了。

So Levi Strauss was thinking in the second order. And instead of taking the risk of finding gold or just going completely broke like many people did, he simply just supplied the diggers with the equipment they needed to attempt to find their own riches. And in the process, he built an incredible business that remains in existence today 172 years later. Now we get back to Marx.

李维·施特劳斯考虑到了二阶思维。与其冒险去寻找黄金或者像许多人那样彻底破产，他选择了为淘金者提供他们需要的装备，让他们自己去尝试寻找财富。在这个过程中，他建立了一个了不起的生意，这个生意直到172年后的今天仍然存在。现在，让我们回到马克思。

So the people at his dinner most likely ignored his comment. They went all in on the Dock-Con bubble. And a year later, many of these people were seeking a new career or employer as their funds and fortunes had evaporated. Marx by contrast would continue to compound his investors capital successfully for many more decades, like he's doing today. And Marx did this by investing in the less obvious deals that everyone on the street didn't love. And that's really the lesson in Marx' brilliance. Don't just ask what will happen, but continue to ask what will happen after that. Just do that for a few decades and you're bound to find some incredible investments with just large margins of safety and a more than adequate upside.

所以，他晚餐上的宾客很可能忽略了他的评论，他们全心投入了Dock-Con泡沫。而一年后，很多人都在寻找新的职业或雇主，因为他们的资金和财富已经蒸发。相比之下，马克思则继续成功地为他的投资人积累资本，并且持续了几十年，就像他今天所做的一样。马克思之所以能做到这一点，是因为他投资于那些街头上不被人看好的不太明显的交易。而这正是马克思聪明才智的秘诀所在。不仅要问接下来会发生什么，还要不断问，再往后会发生什么。只要这样做上几十年，你就一定能找到一些极具安全边际且有相当优厚收益的投资机会。

So my favorite use case for this is determining whether I'd be taking too much risk by buying an investment at a given price. So purchasing an expensive business means the business is just priced for perfection. And when a company is priced that way, it must continue to meet sky-high expectations. The problem with this line of thinking is that businesses will stumble. You know, regulators will get in the way. The economy will throw a curveball or management will face some sort of crisis.

我最喜欢的应用就是用来判断在某个价格购买一项投资是否会承担过多的风险。购买一个昂贵的企业意味着这个企业的价格非常完美。而当一家公司以这种方式定价时，它必须一直满足极高的期望。这个思维方式的问题在于，企业总会遇到挫折。监管机构可能会制造障碍，经济可能会出现意外变化，或者管理层可能会面临某种危机。

So I like using second order thinking to determine if a business's expectations are set correctly. Poor quality businesses are likely to fail to meet expectations. High quality businesses tend to beat expectations alarmingly regularly. I also employ second order thinking to observe enterprises that don't meet expectation in the short term, but are likely to improve in a long run. Next, we encounter two exceptional investors in Nick Sleep and Case Sikaria, who founded the Nomad Investment Partnership. These two made an investing career out of riding just three key stocks and doing as little tinkering as possible while holding them.

我喜欢用二阶思维来判断一家企业的期望是否设定得当。质量差的企业往往达不到期望，而高质量的企业却经常能够超出期望。我还用二阶思维来观察那些短期内达不到期望但长期可能会改善的企业。接下来，我们会遇到两位杰出的投资者，尼克·斯利普和凯斯·西卡里亚，他们创立了游牧投资合伙公司。这两位投资者通过持有并尽量少调整三个关键股票，成就了他们的投资生涯。

And the lesson here is simple, but not easy to put in practice. And that's to treat your winners as businesses that you keep, not ones that you trade in and out of. And these aren't investments you just look to, you know, double your money, then run to the next idea. Sleep and Sikaria spent their entire investing career looking for a very specific business model. These were what was called scale economies shared. It says that when a business grows, it passes on its scale benefits to its customers rather than retaining them for their own use. The three businesses that they rode were Brutcher Halfaway, Costco, and Amazon.

这里的教训很简单，但并不容易实践。就是说要把你的赢家投资视为你长期持有的企业，而不是频繁买卖的对象。这些投资不是让你投入后赚两倍就立刻转向下一个想法的那种。Sleep 和 Sikaria 把他们整个投资生涯都用在寻找一个非常特定的商业模式上。这种模式被称为共享规模经济，即当企业扩张时，它会将规模带来的好处传递给客户，而不是自己独享。他们选择持有的三家企业是伯克希尔·哈撒韦、Costco 和亚马逊。

Now, I've tried to grasp whether this is a business template that appeals to me, and I concluded that I would never say no to a business model like that, but I'm also not going to go out of my way to exclusively search for business models that fit the scale economy shared model that Nomad was obsessed with. Instead, I search for businesses that I can ride for hopefully multi-year and maybe even multi-decade time periods and businesses that are likely to just increase in intrinsic value over my holding period. This is what Sleep and Sikaria were trying to do.

现在，我试着弄清楚这种商业模式是否吸引我，最后得出结论，我绝不会拒绝这样的商业模式，但我也不会特意去寻找那些符合规模经济共享模式的商业模式，尽管Nomad对此非常痴迷。相反，我会寻找那些可以长期持有的公司，希望能持有多年甚至数十年，并且这些公司在我持有期间可能会提高自身的内在价值。这正是Sleep和Sikaria想要做的事情。

They had basically whittled down all of their decisions to these three stocks that I just listed. And the stocks were just so good that they were able to extend their holding periods for longer and longer periods of time. And even since they closed their fund, in 2014, they still hold the vast majority of their net worth in these three names. But they didn't reach this conclusion overnight. They invested in other businesses that even shared the same business model but didn't quite make the cut. There are other companies, you know, Air Asia, Carpet Right, ASOS, that were in the portfolio at one point along with several other classic value investments trading at a fraction of liquidation value.

他们几乎把所有的决策缩减到了我刚才提到的这三只股票。这些股票非常优秀，以至于他们可以将持有期延长得越来越长。即使在他们于2014年关闭基金后，他们仍将大部分净资产投入这三只股票中。但他们并不是一夜之间得出这个结论的。他们也曾投资过其他业务，那些业务甚至有着相同的商业模式，但最终没有被选中。你知道的，还有其他一些公司，比如亚航（Air Asia）、地毯公司（Carpet Right）、ASOS等，曾经和一些经典的价值投资一起进入过他们的投资组合，这些经典价值投资的交易价格仅为清算价值的一小部分。

But over time, Sleep and Sikaria observed that the businesses that were at the top of the rung, even within the ultra-specific business model, were the ones that deserved most of their capital. I enjoy reviewing my top three businesses and noting if they exhibit any specific characteristics. So my top three positions make up 42% of my portfolio. And to be honest, they don't really share a business model between the three and I'm perfectly fine with that.

随着时间的推移，Sleep 和 Sikaria 观察到，即使是在极为特定的商业模式中，那些处于顶端的企业才是最值得投入大部分资本的。我喜欢复查我最看重的三家企业，并注意它们是否表现出任何特定的特点。因此，我的前三大投资占了我投资组合的 42%。说实话，这三家公司之间并没有共享相同的商业模式，而我对此完全没有意见。

So even though I find Nomad's approach interesting, it's not the actual business model that taught me the most significant lesson. It's simply to find businesses that you can ride for extended periods of time and make sure to hold them as long as they continue to perform well. And in that sense, yes, I think I'm doing that pretty well. The three businesses in my top three generate a significant amount of cash. And when I think about them, they do actually share a few similarities.

尽管我觉得Nomad的方法很有趣，但对我来说教益最深的并不是他们的商业模式。关键是要找到可以长期持有的企业，并在它们表现良好时继续持有。在这方面，是的，我认为我做得还不错。我的前三名企业都产生了可观的现金流。仔细想想，这些企业之间确实有一些相似之处。

So I came up with five. So the first one is that they don't pay a regular dividend. Second, they don't meaningfully buy back shares. Third, they consistently invest more and more in growth. Fourth, they don't allow cash to grow excessively. And fifth is that their modes are continuing to expand. Now, these are all characteristics of businesses that can compound value simply because they can reinvest all of their cash flow back into their business at high rates of return. So while their free cash flow numbers may not look amazing, I'm actually okay with that because they're constantly using that cash to reinvest into their business at very high rates of return. So this is a business model that really attracts me the most.

我总结了五点。首先，他们不定期支付股息。其次，他们没有大规模回购股票。第三，他们持续加大对增长的投资力度。第四，他们不让现金过度积累。第五，他们的业务模式在持续扩展。这些都是能够增加价值的企业的特征，因为他们可以将所有现金流高效地再投资到企业中去。因此，尽管他们的自由现金流数字可能看起来不那么惊人，但我对此没有意见，因为他们一直在用这些资金以很高的回报率重新投资在业务上。这种商业模式对我最有吸引力。

While many value investors are looking for businesses that are growing, you know, maybe in the high single digits or low double digits, they're also accepting that return. They're going to come from things like multiple expansion, buybacks or even dividends. I just prefer to not rely on them as much to give me returns. While I love buying businesses on a cheap multiple, one of the great benefits of compounders is just the steadiness in which they can compound capital. So for that reason, they tend to carry higher multiples and maintain those higher multiples.

虽然许多价值投资者在寻找增长率为高个位数或低双位数的公司，他们也接受这种增长带来的回报，这些回报可能来自市盈率的扩展、股票回购甚至是股息。我只是更倾向于不太依赖这些方式来获得回报。尽管我喜欢以低市盈率购买公司，但复合型公司的一个重大优势就是它们能稳定地实现资本复利。因此，它们往往拥有更高的市盈率，并能维持这些较高的倍数。

As of today, the forward earnings multiple on my top three businesses are 29 times, 41 times and 90 times. So the third business, which I won't name with the 90 times multiple, is pretty distorted by the fact that it's growing so rapidly, which penalizes it very significantly under IFRS due to significant depreciation and amortization. So the multiple gets cut significantly when I make a lot of adjustments, but it still is a pretty high ratio. So you'll notice that the first four points mean businesses are just optimized for growth. They aren't trying to grow a steady dividend to, you know, draw in capital. They know that the best use for capital is to invest in the businesses that they're already in.

截至今天，我前三名企业的预期市盈率分别是29倍、41倍和90倍。其中第3个企业的市盈率高达90倍，这有点被它的快速增长给扭曲了，因为在国际财务报告准则（IFRS）下，由于大量的折旧和摊销，它的估值被严重影响了。当我进行大量调整时，这个倍数会被大幅削减，但即便如此，其比例仍然相对较高。可以看出，这些企业主要关注于增长优化，它们并不着眼于稳定的分红来吸引资本，因为它们知道，最好的资本利用方式是继续投资于当前正在发展的业务。

The risk of owning businesses like this relates purely to just the future and the unknown. Once the market no longer believes that these businesses will grow at high rates, they will no longer be given a premium multiple. This is my most significant concern. My primary maintenance tasks are basically tracking growth and observing the direction that things are moving. I learned this the hard way with Evolution AB, an eye gaming business. So any business that is expected to grow but fails to meet the market's expectations is going to experience a pretty big price drop. The key is to just try to stay ahead of the market.

拥有这种企业的风险主要与未来和未知因素有关。一旦市场不再相信这些企业会高速增长，它们就不会再享有溢价的倍数了。这是我最担心的地方。我的主要维护任务基本上是跟踪增长并观察事物的发展方向。我在一家名为Evolution AB的眼动游戏公司中学到了这一课。所以任何被期待增长但未能满足市场期望的企业，其股价都会大幅下跌。关键在于要尽量领先于市场。

Let's suppose that you think a business is in maybe some sort of structural decline. In that case, I'd rather exit early, potentially for going profits to avoid the mass exit assets, probably can follow once it's well established that the businesses in a structural decline. So what Sleep in Zakaria really nailed was that the businesses that they chose were just so good that even if they grew at lower rates, they still maintained a reasonable evaluation because it was just common knowledge that these businesses had near and penetrable modes and had high levels of customer loyalty.

假设你认为一家企业可能正在经历某种结构性衰退。在这种情况下，我宁愿及早退出，即便可能放弃一些利润，以避免当大家都认为这家企业在结构性衰退时引发的大规模资产撤出所带来的风险。Zakaria 的成功之处在于，他们选择的企业质量极高，即便增长速度较低，它们仍能保持合理的估值。因为普遍认知是，这些企业拥有几乎无法攻破的壁垒，并且客户忠诚度很高。

To execute no mass strategy on yourself, you must have active patience. I first learned of active patience from Ian Kassel, who wrote, the longer I invest, the more I realize you get one or two great opportunities every few years. The rest of the time is spent wondering if you'll ever get another great opportunity again and convincing yourself to own mediocre opportunities while you wait. Mediocrity is a price you pay for impatience.

要在自己身上执行"无大量行动"策略，你必须具有主动的耐心。我第一次了解到主动耐心是从伊恩·卡塞尔那里，他写道：我投资的时间越长，就越意识到每隔几年才会有一两次绝佳的机会。其他时间则是在想着自己是否还能再次遇到好的机会，并在等待中说服自己去拥有一些平庸的机会。平庸是你不耐烦的代价。

No matter how did an exceptional job avoiding impatience and practicing active patience, if you want to learn to improve the skill of active patience, focus on three areas. So the first area is developing your temperament. This is done by managing your emotions and understanding your default reactions to things like risk, losses, and volatility. By journaling on your decision making, you can build awareness to help anticipate emotional triggers and respond intelligently rather than relying on things like impulse.

无论多么努力地避免不耐烦并练习积极耐心，想要提升积极耐心的技巧，您可以关注三个领域。第一个领域是培养自己的性情。通过管理情绪和理解自己在面对风险、损失和波动时的默认反应，可以做到这一点。通过记录自己的决策过程，您能够提高自我意识，这有助于提前识别情绪诱因，从而做出更加理智的反应，而不是依赖冲动行事。

Second, find your principles. Clear principles provide a north star for evaluating opportunities. Create things like a non-negotiable checklist of criteria that you just refuse to deviate from. This helps filter incoming ideas to further help remove mediocrity. And third is just commit to your principles. Once you know temperament and principles, the hard work really comes in. So the hard work is just staying true to your rules and avoiding the temptation of good enough. You can try to reduce noise by doing things such as improving your investing environment and saying no firmly and often.

第二，找到你的原则。明确的原则可以充当评估机会的指引。创建一些不可妥协的标准清单，并严格遵循。这有助于筛选出新的想法，从而进一步避免平庸的出现。第三，坚持你的原则。一旦你明确了自己的性格和原则，真正的挑战就来了。挑战在于始终忠于你的规则，避免满足于“差不多就行”。你可以通过改善投资环境、坚决且频繁地说“不”来减少干扰。

Moniche Pabri has evolved as an investor very similar to Sleep in Zakaria, moving from sheep's to garbots to businesses that are a little higher up in quality. But I think it's important not to only focus on where investors like Pabri are today. But also to learn lessons from their experiencing managing smaller sums of capital. So let's imagine we're in 2012. Moniche Pabri finds himself in quiet reflection in the evening, scanning financial news, using his usual mild skepticism.

Moniche Pabri作为一个投资者的发展历程与Zakaria的Sleep十分相似，他的投资从羊毛产品逐步转向稍高品质的企业。但我认为，不仅要关注像Pabri这样投资者今天所处的地位，也要从他们管理较小规模资本的经验中汲取教训。想象一下，我们回到2012年。Moniche Pabri在一个宁静的夜晚进行反思，带着一贯的谨慎态度浏览金融新闻。

But a specific car company gives him a jolt. In Moniche's mind, the financial press is sharing fears of the business with headlines such as Fiat teeters on the brink of bankruptcy. Moniche gets interested as he checks the price of Fiat and sees it trading at the very bottom of the bargain bin. But even though it's cheap, how can a business in just this bad of a financial situation be saved? His answer comes in the form of Sir Giovanni, the man who had saved the company in the first place.

但是，某家特定的汽车公司给了他一个惊喜。在莫尼奇的脑海中，金融媒体正在用诸如“菲亚特濒临破产边缘”这样的标题来传播对这家企业的担忧。当莫尼奇查看菲亚特的股价时，他发现它已跌至价格洼地，这引起了他的兴趣。但即使价格便宜，一家财务状况如此糟糕的公司又如何能得以拯救呢？他的答案来自乔万尼爵士，这位曾经拯救过这家公司的传奇人物。

Moniche begins conducting his due diligence on the business and his skepticism slowly fades as he learns more and more. Fiat Chrysler has a market cap of $5 billion but has annual sales of $140 billion, meaning the business was trading at less than 4% of its revenues. Additionally, the company was still turning a profit and a very good one at that given its share price. It had $2.22 in EPS and was trading at a price of around $4, meaning it had a PE of around 2 times. Now, his eyes really began to widen.

莫尼奇开始对这家企业进行尽职调查，随着了解的深入，他的怀疑逐渐消退。菲亚特克莱斯勒的市值为50亿美元，但年销售额达到1400亿美元，这意味着公司的交易价格不到其收入的4%。此外，公司仍在盈利，考虑到其股票价格，这个利润相当可观。公司的每股收益为2.22美元，而股价约为4美元，这意味着市盈率约为2倍。现在，他的眼界真的大开了。

But Pabri does some more digging. He knows not to fall for every business with low single-digit P multiples because many of these businesses just don't deserve to be held by an intelligent investor. Many of these businesses are on life support and aren't worth the hassle of trying to understand any deeper than that. But Fiat Chrysler has an additional asset that the market is overlooking, and that's Ferrari. At this time, Ferrari was a subsidiary of Fiat Chrysler. He decided to deduct 40% of the 2012 purchase price as a value drive from Ferrari, and this is how he arrives at a PE of only one.

Pabri 继续深入研究。他知道不应该轻易被所有市盈率低于个位数的企业吸引，因为很多这样的企业根本不值得一个聪明的投资者持有。许多这样的企业实际上是在苟延残喘，不值得花时间去深入了解。然而，菲亚特克莱斯勒（Fiat Chrysler）拥有一个被市场忽视的额外资产，那就是法拉利（Ferrari）。在当时，法拉利是菲亚特克莱斯勒的子公司。他决定根据2012年的购买价格，扣除40%的价值作为法拉利的价值驱动，正因如此，他得出了市盈率只有1的数字。

From there, the rest is history. It's not publicly disclosed when he sold, but within two years, Fiat Chrysler was trading in the teens and low 20s, meaning there was a multi-bagger from that $4 price point, which he reportedly started buying. By main lesson here, isn't actually that you have to find businesses that have a PE of one. However, companies where you as an investor can just peer into the future often have valuations that simply do not make any sense.

从那时起，其余的就成为了历史。据报道，他开始购买时，菲亚特克莱斯勒的股价是4美元，但具体何时卖出并未公开透露。不过在两年内，菲亚特克莱斯勒的股价升到了十几美元甚至超过20美元，这意味着他从4美元的价位开始买入，获得了多倍的回报。这里的主要教训其实并不是你必须寻找市盈率为1的企业，而是那些你作为投资者能够预测其未来的公司，其估值往往是没有道理的。

Whether that's a PE of one, five, ten, or twenty, or whatever number you want to use, there are businesses out there that are just significantly mispriced. The key here is just in finding them. They won't appear on things like traditional screens, and like Pobri's research into Fiat, additional adjustments to a business's financials are required in order to really get a clear picture of that business's intrinsic value. That's where the opportunity exists, in understanding the value of a company offers that is being overlooked by the market.

无论市盈率是一倍、五倍、十倍还是二十倍，或者任何你想用的数字，市场上总有一些被严重低估的企业。关键在于找到这些企业。它们不会在传统筛选工具上显现出来，就像Pobri对菲亚特的研究一样，需要对企业的财务数据进行额外的调整，以真正清晰地了解企业的内在价值。这就是机会所在，通过理解被市场忽视的公司价值来发现潜在收益。

So when examining Fiat, it was apparent to Pobri that the market wasn't properly valuing the golden goose within Fiat, specifically in Ferrari. Once a few simple adjustments were made, the core Fiat Chrysler business was even cheaper than the market thought. So how can investors use this to their advantage? You can look at a business as the sum of its parts, looking at each segment of a business individually, valuing each, and then adding it altogether to come up with a more accurate picture of value.

在分析菲亚特时，Pobri 很明显地发现市场并没有正确评估菲亚特中的“金鹅”，特别是法拉利这个部分。一旦做出了一些简单的调整后，核心的菲亚特克莱斯勒业务比市场预期的还要便宜。那么，投资者如何利用这一点呢？你可以将一家企业视为多个部分的总和，逐一分析企业的每个部分，对每个部分进行估值，然后汇总这些估值，以形成一个更为准确的企业价值图景。

This is a method that I've used in the past, but haven't always been very successful with. Bosch Health was a business that appeared cheap on a sum of the parts calculation. Still, poor management ultimately just completely derailed the entire hypothesis, and investors just headed for the exit in droves once they realized that management was unlikely to help the market recognize its full value. This experience left a very bad taste in my mouth regarding some of the parts investments.

这是我过去用过的一种方法，但并不总是非常成功。博世健康这家公司在拆分计算后似乎很便宜。然而，由于管理不善，整个假设彻底失败。当投资者意识到管理层不可能帮助市场实现其全部价值时，他们纷纷撤资。这次经历让我对某些拆分投资感到非常失望。

As I evolved, the model still made sense to me just in a different form. So Moniche was looking for a business where the future cash flow of the company provided the margin of safety. Like I mentioned with the evolution of Ben Graham's a margin of safety principle, this was a lesson that really helped me improve my thought process as an investor. Instead of looking at a business as a sum of their assets, use the future earnings or cash flow to help you determine what a business is worth.

随着我的成长，这个模型对我来说仍然有意义，只是形式有所不同。所以，Moniche在寻找一种业务，这种业务的未来现金流可以提供安全边际。正如我提到的，发展自本·格雷厄姆的安全边际原则，这是一个真正帮助我提升投资思维的经验。与其把一家企业视为资产的总和，不如用未来收益或现金流来帮助你判断一个企业的价值。

That would give you a very firm floor on your downside and a nice upside if the business had additional growth levers that it could pull. In this light, if you look far enough into the future, really any business growing at a decent rate becomes a PE of 1. If a business today is trading at a PE of 30 and growing EPS at 25%, then it becomes a PE of 1 in 15 years. Now, I don't trust myself to assume what any business can grow at 10% for 15 years let alone 25%. So instead of using the number 1, I like to see what I think the multiple will be just a few years down the road based on its current stock price.

这意味着，如果企业有额外的增长手段可以利用，你在投资中的风险会有一个很坚固的下限，同时在企业实现更多增长的情况下会有不错的上升潜力。从这个角度看，如果展望足够遥远的未来，任何以不错速度增长的企业最终市盈率都会降到1。如果一个企业目前的市盈率为30，并且每股收益以25%的速度增长，那么在15年后，它的市盈率将成为1。然而，我不敢断定任何企业能在15年内持续以10%甚至25%的速度增长。所以，与其假设一个市盈率为1，我更倾向于根据当前的股价来预测未来几年企业的市盈率可能是多少。

When I look at a business like Topicus, I think it will grow its owner's earnings by about 30% a year from now. That means its future price to owner's earnings drops by about 23% in just a years time. And if it continues to grow at that high rate for a few more years, the multiple will continue to drop precipitously. And that's my opportunity. Since the market won't allow the number to continue to fall, I make money simply by owning it and letting my conviction and their ability to compound their cash, keep me as a shareholder.

当我看到像Topicus这样的企业时，我认为它的所有者收益每年将增长约30%。这意味着它未来的市盈率将在一年内下降约23%。如果它继续以这样的高速度增长几年，这个倍数将急剧下降。这就是我的机会。因为市场不会允许这个数字继续下降，所以我只需持有它，通过相信公司及其持续增值现金的能力，就能获利，这让我愿意一直做它的股东。

And as long as I have conviction that the future cash flow can grow at a given rate, then I have my blow PE stock. So instead of looking at a business with a PE as just a single target, I view PE as more of a moving target. And this is how I can justify owning some of the higher price businesses in my portfolio that I believe can continue to grow at rates the market just doesn't expect them to grow at. This method works exceptionally well in some of the smaller businesses I own, which can grow their bottom lines at 30, 50% or even more in a year.

只要我确信未来的现金流能够以某种速度增长，那么我就达到了我的理想市盈率。因此，我不将市盈率视为一个固定目标，而是看作一个动态目标。通过这种方式，我可以解释为何我持有一些高价的公司股票，因为我相信这些公司能以市场意想不到的速度持续增长。这种方法在我持有的一些小公司中效果特别好，因为它们每年的利润能增长30%、50%甚至更多。

When a company can double its income in a year, the trailing PE shown to the market isn't an accurate reflection of what that business is likely going to be worth in a year's time. So let's say a business will double its profits in a year, but only has two quarters of profits. So its trailing 12 month PE may not even exist since the earnings from the last two quarters don't actually cover the losses from the two preceding them.

当一家公司可以在一年内将收入翻一番时，向市场展示的市盈率并不能准确反映该公司在一年后可能的价值。假设一家公司将在一年内实现利润翻倍，但目前只有两个季度的利润。因此，它的过去12个月的市盈率可能根本不存在，因为最近两个季度的收益实际上还无法弥补之前两个季度的亏损。

Therefore, many investors will examine these businesses just very briefly conclude that it's not profitable and move on. However, if you examine the business more closely and determine that it can sustain its momentum in sales and high profit margins, then profits are likely to continue growing into the future. And if future quarters are anything like the previous two, then the business can grow very quickly.

因此，许多投资者会简单地浏览这些企业，迅速得出结论认为它们不盈利，然后就不再关注。然而，如果你更仔细地研究这些企业，并确定它们能够保持销售势头和高利润率，那么它们的利润很可能会继续增长。如果未来几个季度与之前两个季度相似，那么这些企业可能会迅速增长。

So let me just use a straightforward example here. So let's say a business will call XYZ. It's grown its revenues at 50% for the last three years, but is only inflected positively in net income in the previous two quarters. In the last quarter, they had 1.25 million in profit. The business doesn't require any dilute of financing or debt. The company is valued at about $10 million today. So let's assume that they can continue selling while keeping costs controlled.

让我来举一个简单的例子。假设有一家名为XYZ的公司，过去三年的收入每年增长50%，但净收入直到最近两个季度才开始盈利。上一季度，他们的利润是125万美元。这家公司不需要额外的融资或债务稀释。公司目前的估值约为1000万美元。我们假设他们能够继续销售，并保持成本控制。

And if we annualize a profit, we arrive at $5 million and the business is trading at a forward PE of only two. Now this happens more regularly than you think. You just have to be willing to go and look for the opportunity. So finally here, we get to Charlie Munger, the person who may have had the most considerable impact on me, not only in investing, but in life.

如果我们对利润进行年化计算，我们会得到500万美元，而这家企业的预期市盈率只有2。这种情况比你想象的更常见。你只需愿意去寻找机会。最后，我们要谈到查理·芒格，他可能是对我产生最大影响的人，不仅仅在投资方面，也在生活中。

There are so many lessons I have learned from Charlie, but I've chosen one that I've started really leaning into more and more lately, which is to invest in and surround myself with people who offer win-win outcomes. So I believe this principle is most effective in personal relationships, which I'll discuss further shortly. But it also obviously applies in investing.

我从查理身上学到了很多东西，但我选择了一条我最近越来越重视的原则，那就是投资于和自己周围的人，并确保这些人能带来双赢的结果。我认为这个原则在个人关系中最为有效，稍后我会进一步讨论。但显然，这个原则在投资中同样适用。

And the business that Charlie invested in that best exemplifies this is Costco. So it's hard to find a party that just doesn't win from being part of the Costco ecosystem. The prime parties that come to mind are customers, suppliers, employees, and investors. Let's start here with customers. So what do I get from shopping at Costco? I get things like the lowest prices that I'll find on essential items.

查理投资的企业中，最能体现这一点的是Costco。因此，很难找到在Costco生态系统中没有获益的一方。首先想到的主要受益方包括客户、供应商、员工和投资者。让我们先从客户开始。那么，在Costco购物我能得到什么呢？我能以最低的价格买到一些必需品。

I may have to buy larger quantities, but the pricing is just unmatched by most stores because they just can't match Costco's buying power. Costco has also developed deep trust with customers due to their exceptional return policy. I also occasionally enjoy the extra perks such as Costco cookies. Next up are suppliers. So suppliers gain added stability and reliability from working with Costco, which is a trusted long-term partner in the market.

我可能需要购买更大数量的商品，但大多数商店的价格都难以与Costco媲美，因为他们无法与Costco的采购能力相匹敌。Costco还因其卓越的退货政策赢得了顾客的深厚信任。我也偶尔享受一些额外的好处，比如Costco的饼干。接下来是供应商。由于Costco是市场中值得信赖的长期合作伙伴，供应商通过与Costco合作可以获得额外的稳定性和可靠性。

If a business wants to grow and scale, then partnering with Costco is just a great opportunity as it has the ability to put your product in front of many customers and help build your brand. Since Costco has been partnering with suppliers for such a long time, they're also very, very reliable. Now, when we look at employees, employees at Costco are very well taken care of. Since Costco can buy their product for cheaper, it allows it to spend more money elsewhere, such as on its employees. This enables them to pay above average wages and offer great benefits extending them to part-time workers as well. They also do a great job of promoting from within. As a result, they have lower turnover rates compared to their competitors and have built a very solid reputation among employees.

如果一家企业想要发展壮大，与Costco合作是一个绝佳的机会，因为它可以让你的产品展示在众多客户面前，并帮助建立品牌。由于Costco与供应商合作已有很长时间，因此他们非常可靠。对于员工来说，Costco对他们的照顾也非常好。因为Costco能够以较低的价格购买产品，所以可以在其他方面投入更多资金，比如员工福利。这使他们能够支付高于平均水平的工资，并为兼职员工也提供优厚的福利。他们还非常擅长内部晋升。因此，与竞争对手相比，他们的员工流动率较低，并在员工中树立了非常良好的声誉。

Lastly, we have investors. This is a pretty easy one. Since Costco's inception as a private business in 1985, the stock has returned nearly 30-800% to shareholders, which is about a 20% kegge. And the returns just keep on coming, so if you look at the last five years, its kegge has been 25%. The business is resilient through economic cycles and pays a steady and growing dividend. They also have growth opportunities as they expand their store network. So as you can see, Costco is one of those rare businesses that truly creates win-win outcomes across the board. That's why Charlie loved it. Because it's not just profitable, it's fair, durable, and trusted by nearly everyone involved.

最后，我们来说说投资者。这部分相对来说比较简单。自1985年Costco作为一家私人企业成立以来，其股票为股东带来了接近30-800%的回报，相当于每年的复合增长率约为20%。而且回报还在持续增长，过去五年的复合增长率达到了25%。公司在经济周期中表现出强大的韧性，并且支付稳定且增长的股息。随着店铺网络的扩展，他们也拥有增长机会。正因为如此，Costco是一家能够全面实现双赢成果的罕见企业。这正是Charlie喜爱它的原因——它不仅盈利，还公平、持久，而且受到几乎所有相关方的信任。

But here's the thing. While I admire this dynamic in business, I've actually found that principles even more powerful in life. Businesses may come and go, but the quality of your relationships determines the quality of your life. And just like Costco, the best relationships that I've had are the ones that everyone walks away better off. All my best relationships are with people that I can hopefully try to provide as much value as possible to. But there's no way I can offer the right amount of value to everyone, which is why I think you can only maintain a very limited number of very high quality relationships. However, the key is to ensure that the relationships you do have are mutually beneficial.

但是，事情是这样的。尽管我很欣赏商业中的这种动态，我实际上发现这些原则在生活中更为强大。商业可能会兴衰存亡，但你人际关系的质量决定了你生活的质量。就像Costco一样，我拥有的最好关系是那种每个人都能从中受益的关系。我所有的最佳关系都是我希望能够尽可能多地为对方提供价值的人建立的。但是，我不可能为每个人提供足够的价值，这就是为什么我认为你只能维持数量有限但质量非常高的关系。然而，关键是要确保你拥有的关系是互惠互利的。

So what exactly constitutes a win-win relationship? I think it's reciprocity that multiplies. Whenever I try to give value, I often find that I receive it back multiple times over. A hidden benefit of win-win relationships is just the exposure to serendipity. When you have people in your life who want to provide you with value, they often surround themselves with people looking to do the exact same thing. And this allows you to tap into their network, further enhancing the power of win-win relationships. Then, most importantly, I derive most joy from relationships where I'm just excited to be around that person rather than dreading it. Win-win relationships must be nurtured.

那么，什么才是真正的双赢关系？我认为是互惠并且倍增。每当我试图付出价值时，我常常发现自己会收到数倍的回报。双赢关系一个隐含的好处是偶然机遇。当你生活中有人愿意为你提供价值时，他们通常也会围绕着那些希望做同样事情的人。这样你便可以接触到他们的网络，进一步增强双赢关系带来的力量。而最重要的是，我从那些让我感到兴奋而不是厌烦的关系中获得了最大的快乐。双赢的关系需要细心培养。

One thing I've noticed as I've gotten older and taken on more and more family responsibilities is that maintaining relationship is a lot more difficult than when I had fewer responsibilities. Since I have a lot less time, I'd rather eliminate toxic people from my life as my time is precious. Now by focusing my time and effort on people that really bring me joy, I build a self-reinforcing cycle of support, generosity, and opportunity. When it came to toxic people, Charlie Munger once said, the great lesson of life is to get them the hell out of your life and do it fast. And I think that's very key. I've come to learn that people just tend not to change their mindsets.

随着年龄的增长和家庭责任的增加，我发现维持人际关系比以前拥有较少责任时要困难得多。由于我的时间有限，我更愿意将消极影响的人从我的生活中剔除，因为我的时间非常宝贵。现在，通过专注于那些真正给我带来快乐的人，我建立了一个自我强化的支持、慷慨和机会的循环。关于消极影响的人，查理·芒格曾说，生活中一个重要的教训就是迅速地把他们赶出你的生活。我认为这非常关键。我已经认识到，人们往往不会改变他们的思维方式。

If people are stuck in an entitlement or scarcity mindset, it's very doubtful that I, or anybody else for that matter, will change their minds on that. So toxic people have a way of offering win-lose relationships where you put in value and you receive none in return. The simple removal of these relationships is just a massive boost to the quality of your life. Ultimately, a life curated around these win-win relationships is just one that's filled with higher quality interactions, deeper fulfillment, and significantly reduced exposure to negativity. And that, to me, is the essence of the win-win principle.

如果人们陷入自认为理所应当或缺乏的心态，我或者其他任何人都很难改变他们的想法。所以有毒的人际关系往往是一种你付出价值却得不到回报的关系。简单地去除这些关系就会极大地提升你的生活质量。最终，围绕双赢关系建立的生活会充满高质量的互动，更深层次的满足感，并显著减少对负面情绪的接触。而在我看来，这就是双赢原则的核心。

Invest deeply in people and relationships where value flows both ways and be quick to cut out all the ones that don't. In investing, that might look like Costco. In life, it looks like surrounding yourself with people rooted in trust, generosity, and abundance. In both cases, the rewards compound over time, not only in terms of wealth, but also in terms of happiness and meaning. That's all I have for you today. Want to keep the conversation going? Follow me on Twitter, add a rational MR, KTS, or connect with me on LinkedIn. Just search for Kyle Greef. I'm always open to feedback, so feel free to share how I can make this podcast even better for you.

深入投资于那些双方都能获得价值的人际关系，并迅速摆脱那些没有价值的关系。在投资方面，这可能类似于购买Costco的股票。在生活中，则是与那些以信任、慷慨和富足为基础的人为伴。在两种情况下，回报都会随着时间的推移而积累，不仅体现在财富上，还体现在幸福和意义上。今天我就说这些。如果你想继续交流，可以在Twitter上关注我，加理性MR，KTS，或者在LinkedIn上找Kyle Greef与我联系。我一直欢迎反馈，请随时分享如何让我能更好地为你做这个播客。

Thanks for listening and see you next time. My investing philosophy is that I invest like a business owner, not a trader or a speculator. Every stock that I own, in my mind, represents a real ownership and a share of a business.

感谢收听，下次再见。我的投资理念是像企业主一样进行投资，而不是像交易者或投机者。对我来说，我拥有的每一支股票都代表着对一家企业实际的所有权和份额。

And I don't take that process lightly. I try to imagine that people managing my money are close associates who I know personally. This can create biases, sure, but my primary goal is to invest in people like trust and give them a chance to make improvements when things inevitably go sideways.

我非常重视这个过程。我会想象管理我资金的人是我认识的亲密伙伴。虽然这可能会带来一些偏见，但我的主要目标是投资于我信任的人，并在事情不可避免地出现问题时给他们一个改进的机会。

Timeless Secrets of the World’s Greatest Investors | Warren Buffett, Peter Lynch &amp; More! (TIP762)

Timeless Secrets of the World’s Greatest Investors | Warren Buffett, Peter Lynch & More! (TIP762)