Lessons from Silicon Valley Bank
发布时间 2023-04-17 16:51:46 来源
This is The Memo by Howard Marx. Lessons from Silicon Valley Bank.
这是霍华德·马克斯写的《硅谷银行备忘录》，从中可以得到许多经验教训。
This isn't going to be another history of the meltdown of Silicon Valley Bank. Dozens of those have appeared in my inbox over the past month, as I'm surely having yours.
这篇文章不是再讲述硅谷银行崩盘的历史。过去一个月，我的收件箱里已经出现了几十篇这样的文章，我相信你的也是如此。
Thus, rather than merely recount the developments, I'm going to discuss their significance. My sense is that the significance of the failure of SVB and Signature Bank is less than it portends additional bank failures and more than it may amplify pre-existing weariness among investors and lenders, leading to further credit tightening and additional pain across a range of industries and sectors.
因此，我不仅仅是要叙述这些发展情况，而是要讨论它们的意义。我认为，SVB和Signature Bank的失败所意味的银行倒闭的重要性不如它可能加剧投资者和借款人之间早已存在的疲惫感的严重程度，从而导致进一步的信贷紧缩，并在各个行业与领域产生额外的痛苦。
One-off or a harbinger of things to come. A number of things about SVB made it somewhat of a special case, which means it probably won't turn out to be the first of many. The bank's business was heavily concentrated in a single sector, venture, capital bank startups in tech and healthcare, and a single region, northern California. Many regional banks' businesses are similarly concentrated, but not usually in sectors and regions that are both highly volatile.
这个句子的意思是：这件事是一次性的，或者是未来事情的前兆。SVB 有很多特殊情况，所以它可能不会成为多次的先例。这家银行的业务主要集中在一项领域，即风险投资，专门为科技和医疗创业公司提供服务，并且仅限于加利福尼亚北部。很多地方银行的业务也有类似的集中情况，但通常不会同时在高度波动的行业和地区。
The boom in its sector and region caused SVB's business to grow very rapidly. In recent years, startups were a major destination for investors' cash, a good deal of which they deposited at SVB. This caused SVB's deposits to triple, from $62 billion at the end of 2019 to $189 billion at the end of 2021. For the same reason, many of SVB's clients had so much capital that they had little need to borrow. As deposits piled up at SVB, there wasn't offsetting demand for loans. Few other banks have customers with similar cash inflows and consequently, so little need to borrow money.
SVB的行业和地区繁荣迅速驱动其业务快速增长。近年来，初创企业成为了投资者资金主要的投资目标之一，其中很多资金被存放到了SVB。这导致SVB的存款翻了三倍，从2019年底的620亿美元增长到2021年底的1890亿美元。由于同样的原因，许多SVB的客户拥有如此之多的资本，以至于他们几乎没有贷款需求。随着存款在SVB积累，贷款需求并没有相应增长。很少有其他银行的客户具有类似的资金流入，因此几乎没有借款需求。
Because SVB had few traditional banking uses for the cash that piled up, it instead invested $91 billion in Treasury bonds and US government agency mortgage-back securities between 2020 and 2021. This brought SVB's investments to roughly half its total assets. At the average bank, that figure is about 1.25. Presumably, to maximize yield and thus the bank's earnings in what was a low return environment, SVB bought securities with long-dated maturities. SVB designated these securities as hold-to-matured HTM assets, meaning they wouldn't be marked to market on the bank's balance sheet since it had no intention of selling them.
因为SVB没有太多传统银行业务可以使用积累的现金，所以它在2020年至2021年之间投资了910亿美元的国债和美国政府机构抵押证券。这使得SVB的投资金额约为其总资产的一半。在普通银行中，这个数字大约是1.25。显然，为了在低回报环境中最大化收益和银行的利润，SVB购买了具有长期到期日期的证券。SVB将这些证券指定为持有到到期日的HTM资产，因为它没有出售的意图，所以它们不会在银行的资产负债表上被标记为市场价值。
When the Federal Reserve embarked on its program of interest rate increases last year, bond prices fell rapidly and, of course, the longer the tenor of the bonds, the greater the decline in value. In short order, the market value of SVB's bond holdings was down $21 billion. Word of the bank's losses caused depositors to start withdrawing their money. To meet the withdrawals, SVB had to sell bonds. Consequently, the bonds could no longer be considered HTM. Instead, they had to be categorized as available for sale, AFS, meaning A, the bonds were marked down on SVB's financial statements and B, actual sales caused the losses to be crystallized. The recognized losses helped hasten the spread of negative rumors throughout the tight-knit venture capital community, which led to further withdrawals.
去年，当美联储开始加息时，债券价格急剧下跌，当然，债券期限越长，价值下跌就越大。很快，SVB的债券持有市场价值下降了210亿美元。银行损失的消息引起存款人开始提款。为了满足提款需求，SVB不得不出售债券。因此，这些债券不再被视为持有到到期（HTM）。相反，它们必须被归类为可供出售（AFS），这意味着A，这些债券被标记在SVB的财务报表上，B，实际销售导致损失得到实现。认可的损失帮助加速了负面传言在紧密的风险投资社区的传播，这又导致进一步的提款。
An unusually large percentage of SVB's deposits, 94% exceeded $250,000, and thus weren't fully insured by the FDIC. This meant they were more institutional than retail. Additionally, SVB's customers were highly interconnected. They had many backers in common, lived and worked near each other, and could exchange information almost instantaneously through social media. The sum of the above rendered SVB particularly vulnerable to a bank run if adverse circumstances developed, and they did.
SVB的存款中，异常高的比例是94%超过了25万美元，因此没有被FDIC完全保险。这意味着它们比零售更加机构化。此外，SVB的客户高度互联。他们有很多共同的支持者，住在附近工作，几乎可以通过社交媒体即时交换信息。上述情况的加总使得SVB特别容易受到银行运营的影响，如果出现不利情况，它们会发生。
However, many of these factors were peculiar to SVB. Thus, I don't think SVB's failure suggests problems are widespread in the US banking system. What did SVB have in common with other banks? I just talked about some things that distinguished SVB from other banks, but it's as important to consider the elements they shared.
然而，许多这些因素都是特有于SVB的。因此，我不认为SVB的失败意味着美国银行系统普遍存在问题。SVB与其他银行有什么共同点？ 我刚才谈到了一些区分SVB和其他银行的事情，但同样重要的是考虑它们所共有的元素。
Asset liability mismatch. Financial mismatches are dangerous, and banks are built on them. Deposits are bank's primary source of funds, and while some have longer terms, most can be withdrawn on any day without prior notice.
资产负债不匹配。金融风险匹配很危险，而银行就是建立在这样的风险上的。存款是银行主要的资金来源，虽然有些有较长期限，但大多数都可以在任何一天不提前通知就能提取。
On the other hand, making loans represents bank's main use of funds, and most loans have lives ranging from one year, commercial loans, up to 10 to 30 years, mortgages. So while most depositors can demand their money back at any time, A, no banks keep enough cash on hand to pay back all their depositors, B, their main assets don't pay down in a short time frame, and C, if they need cash, they can take them a long time to sell loans, especially if they want a price close to par.
另一方面，银行的主要资金利用方式是发放贷款，大多数贷款的期限从一年的商业贷款到10到30年的抵押贷款不等。因此，尽管大多数存款人可以随时要求取回他们的资金，但是，A.没有银行存足够的现金来偿还所有存款人，B.他们的主要资产不会在短时间内偿还，C.如果他们需要现金，他们需要很长时间来出售贷款，尤其是如果他们想以接近票面价的价格出售。
Maintaining solvency requires bank management to be aware of the riskiness of the assets they acquire, among other things, but liquidity is a more transient quality.
保持偿付能力需要银行管理层意识到他们所获得资产的风险性，以及其他因素，但流动性是一种更短暂的质量。
By definition, no bank can have enough liquidity to meet its needs if enough depositors ask for their money all at once.
按照定义，如果足够多的存款人同时要求取回他们的钱，那么任何银行都无法拥有足够的流动性来满足其需求。
Managing these issues is a serious task, since it's a bank's job to borrow short from its depositors and lend long.
处理这些问题是一项严肃的任务，因为银行的工作是从存款人那里短期借款，然后进行长期贷款。
This mismatch, like most other mismatches, is encouraged by the upward slope of the typical yield curve.
这种错位现象，就像其他大部分错位一样，都受到典型收益率曲线向上倾斜的鼓励。
If you want to borrow, you'll find the lowest interest rates at the short end of the curve. You minimize your costs by borrowing for a day or a month, but you expose yourself to the risk of rising interest expense, since you haven't fixed your rate for long.
如果你想借钱，你会发现短期借贷曲线上的利率最低。你可以借一天或一个月来减少成本，但是你会面临利息支出上升的风险，因为你没有固定长期利率。
Similarly, if you want to lend, or invest in bonds, you maximize your interest income by lending long. But that subjects you to the risk of capital losses if interest rates rise.
同样地，如果您想借出或者投资债券，您可以选择借出时间长以最大化您的利息收入。但是这会使得您承受资本损失的风险，如果利率上升的话。
If you follow the yield curve's dictates, you'll always borrow short and lend long, exposing you to the possibility of an SVB-type mismatch.
如果你遵循收益率曲线的规则，你就会始终短借长债，这将使你面临像SVB这样的短长期不匹配风险。
High leverage Banks operate with skinny returns on assets.
高杠杆银行的资产回报率很低。
They pay depositors, or the Fed, a low rate of interest to borrow the funds they need to operate. And they lend, or invest those funds at slightly higher rates, earning a modest spread, but they literally make it up on volume.
银行会以较低的利率向存款人或联邦储备系统支付借款费用，以获取运营所需的资金。而他们会将这些资金出借或投资于稍高的利率上，从中获得微薄的利差，但他们的确是凭着规模来赚钱的。
They employ heavy leverage, meaning they can do a lot of business based on little equity capital, thereby translating a low return on assets into a high return on equity.
他们采用高杠杆策略，也就是说，他们可以用极少的股本做很多生意，从而将低资产回报转化为高股本回报。
However, having a high ratio of total assets to equity capital means a modest decline in asset prices can wipe out a bank's equity, rendering it insolvent.
然而，如果总资产与股权资本之间的比率较高，那么即使资产价格有轻微下跌，也可能会导致银行的股权被抹去，并导致其破产。
There's no source of meltdown in any sector as potentially toxic as the combination of high leverage and an asset liability mismatch. Banks have them both.
没有任何一个行业的崩溃来源像高杠杆和资产负债不匹配的组合一样有潜在的毒性。银行两者都有。
Reliance on trust Since depositors put money in banks in pursuit of safety and liquidity, and in exchange, except a low return, faith in bank's ability to meet withdrawals is obviously paramount.
依靠信任
由于存款人将钱存入银行追求安全和流动性，换取的只是低收益，因此对银行能否满足提款要求的信任显然至关重要。
Depositors ostensibly can get liquidity, safe keeping, and low interest from any bank. That is, one bank's offering is essentially undifferentiated from those of others.
存款人表面上可以从任何银行获得流动性、安全保管和低利息。也就是说，一个银行所提供的服务实质上与其他银行的服务没有区别。
Thus, most depositors are perfectly willing to change banks if given the slightest reason, and there's no offsetting reason for them to leave their money on deposit if a bank's safety is questioned.
因此，大多数存款人都很愿意换银行，只要给出一点原因，而且如果银行的安全性受到质疑，没有任何理由让他们保留存款。
You may be familiar with one of my favorite sayings. Never forget the six foot tall person who drowned crossing the stream that was five feet deep on average.
你们可能熟悉我最喜欢的一句话。永远不要忘记那个身高六英尺，在平均深度为五英尺的溪流中淹死的人。
Surviving on average is a useless concept. You have to be able to survive all the time, including no, especially in bad times.
仅仅平均存活是个毫无用处的概念。你必须能够一直存活下去，包括在困难时期，尤其是在这样的时期。
Borrowing short to invest long, powerfully threatens that ability.
如果我们短期借贷用于长线投资，会对我们的能力造成严重威胁。
Being highly levered is another reason why, that, forrically, tall people sometimes drown in streams that are shallow on average.
高度杠杆化是另一个原因，为什么那些身高很高的人有时会在平均水深较浅的溪流中溺水。
And for financial institutions, customer's loss of confidence is a third.
对于金融机构而言，客户失去信心是第三大风险。
The bottom line is that banks are essentially highly levered fixed income investors.
总之，银行本质上是高度杠杆化的固定收益投资者。
Any long term fixed rate loans or bonds they own, which for most banks aren't a large percentage of total assets, are subject to declines in economic value in a rising interest rate environment.
他们持有的任何长期固定利率贷款或债券，在大多数银行中并不占总资产的很大比例，都受到在利率上升的环境中经济价值下降的影响。
Banks don't have to recognize price declines on assets they intend to hold to maturity, but any bank that is forced to sell those assets to meet withdrawals would have to show the declines on its financial statements.
银行不必承认它们打算持有至到期日的资产价格下跌，但任何被迫出售这些资产以满足提款的银行则需要在其财务报表上显示这些下跌。
Looked at this way, retaining depositors trust is an absolutely essential ingredient in a bank's activities. And that means assets, liabilities, liquidity and capital have to be skillfully managed.
从这个角度看，保持存款者的信任是银行活动中非常重要的一个因素。这意味着资产、负债、流动性和资本必须被巧妙地管理。
In SVB's case, its equity went up in smoke when rising interest rates reduced the value of a good part of its assets.
在SVB的情况下，当利率上升时，其股权被折损了，因为大部分资产的价值也随之下降了。
In that vein, I'm going to share a personal anecdote.
在这个意思上，我要分享一件个人的趣事。
When our son Andrew went off to college in 2005, Nancy and I concluded it would be great to live outside the United States for a while, something neither of us had ever done.
当我们的儿子安德鲁于2005年去大学时，南希和我得出结论，住在美国以外的地方一段时间会很棒，这是我们俩从来没有做过的事情。
We chose to live in the UK for four months of the year, during which I worked in Oak Trees London office.
我们选择在英国生活四个月，期间我在橡树伦敦办公室工作。
To generate income to cover our living expenses, we moved cash to a UK bank and asked that it be deposited in CDs.
为了赚取收入以支付我们的生活费用，我们将现金转移到了英国的一家银行，并要求将其存入定期存款。
At several building societies, what we in the US call savings and loans. One of those was Northern Rock.
在几家建筑协会中，我们在美国称之为储蓄和贷款机构。其中一家是北岩银行。
In September 2007, as the financial crisis was brewing, Northern Rock had trouble securing the financing it needed in the wholesale funding market on which it traditionally had depended.
2007年9月，金融危机即将爆发时，北岩银行在传统依赖的批发资金市场上遇到了融资困难。
That prompted depositors to queue up to close their accounts. I called my banker on a Friday afternoon to ask whether I could move my funds elsewhere, and he told me there would be a 2% penalty for early withdrawal.
这导致存款人要排队关闭他们的账户。周五下午，我给我的银行家打了电话，问他能否把我的资金转移到其他银行，他告诉我提前取款会有2％的罚款。
It took me about one second to say, please move those funds first thing Monday morning.
我花了大约一秒钟的时间说，请在周一上午第一时间转移那些资金。
A 2% penalty sounded like peanuts relative to risking my entire principal at Northern Rock. Now imagine the thinking of SVB depositors who could withdraw their money without any penalty. As it happens, the UK government guaranteed Northern Rock's deposits over the weekend in question, eliminating the need to move the funds. But that was my closest brush with a bank failure.
2%的惩罚相对于冒着在北岩银行丢失全部本金的风险来说，听起来像是小意思。现在想象一下，硅谷银行的存款人可以无惩罚地提取他们的钱，他们的心态会是怎样的。实际上，在那个周末，英国政府保证了北岩银行的存款，消除了转移资产的需求。但那是我最接近银行失败的时候。
Another new trend that has added to bank's precariousness is the emergence of digital communications, including social media. 16 years ago, it took days for Northern Rock's depositors to become aware of its difficulties. And when they decided to move their money, they had to go to their branch during banking hours, but a quaint notion, queue up and submit a withdrawal request.
另一个加剧银行脆弱性的新趋势是数字通信的出现，包括社交媒体。16年前，北岩银行的存款人要几天才能意识到它的困境。当他们决定转移资金时，他们必须在银行营业时间内前往分行，排队提交提款请求，这是一种古老的概念。
In SVB's case, word of the bond losses traveled quickly through unusually interconnected depositors who had the ability to request withdrawals online. As a result, more than one third of the bank's deposits departed in a single day. All banks have to contend with digital communication and online withdrawals these days. But SVB's depositors were particularly high flight risks, given the bank's region and the nature of its clientele.
在SVB的案例中，债券亏损的消息通过异常相互连接的存款人迅速传播，这些存款人有能力在线请求取款。结果，超过三分之一的银行存款在一天内离开了该银行。现在，所有银行都不得不应对数字通讯和在线取款。但是，考虑到银行的地区和客户群体的性质，SVB的存款人尤其具有高度的飞行风险。
About 20 years ago, my partner, Sheldon Stone, shared an interesting parable. Imagine you're on a boat crossing Lake Erie. The captain comes on the loudspeaker and says, everyone run to the left side of the boat. A minute later, he says, everyone run to the right side. And a minute after that, he says, run back to the left. It would make for an unusually rocky crossing. Today, the internet and social media are the loudspeaker, which almost anyone can take over, disseminating any message they choose. This digital herding, as Gillian Tett, of the Financial Times has labeled it, can have a huge impact in many fields, particularly those that run on information and trust.
大约20年前，我的合作伙伴谢尔顿·斯通分享了一个有趣的寓言。想象一下，你正在船上穿过伊利湖。船长用喇叭说，所有人都往船的左侧跑。一分钟后，他说，所有人都往右边跑。再过一分钟，他说，回到左边跑。这会使船上的行程异常颠簸。今天，互联网和社交媒体是那个喇叭，几乎任何人都可以接管，传播他们选择的任何信息。金融时报的吉莲·特特将其称为数码牧群，对于那些运行在信息和信任上的领域，这可能会产生巨大的影响。
Was SVB's collapse inevitable? To close the loop, I'm going to recap the interrelated factors that caused SVB to fail. If the bank had made more loans relative to the size of its deposit base, it wouldn't have bought as many potentially volatile bonds. If the bonds the bank bought hadn't had such long maturities, it wouldn't have been as exposed to price declines. If the Fed hadn't raised interest rates as much as it did, the bonds wouldn't have lost so much value. If the depositors hadn't exited on mass, the bank wouldn't have had to sell bonds and realized the losses.
SVB的崩溃是不可避免的吗？为了闭环，我要总结导致SVB失败的相互关联因素。如果银行相对于其存款基数发放更多的贷款，它就不会买入那么多潜在的不稳定债券。如果银行购买的债券没有那么长的到期日，它就不会面临这么大的价格下跌风险。如果美联储没有如此大幅提高利率，这些债券就不会失去那么多价值。如果存款人没有大规模撤出，银行就不会不得不出售债券并实现亏损。
You wouldn't think a portfolio consisting of bank loans and high-quality treasury and mortgage-backed bonds could be vulnerable to a meltdown that would render a bank insolvent. But the scale of SVB's bond investments, the length of the maturities and the extent of the Fed's interest rate hikes put SVB at risk, and the rapidity of the withdraws caused the problem to run far ahead of the solutions.
你可能不会想到一个由银行贷款、高质量的国债和按揭抵押债券组成的投资组合也可能一夜之间失去价值，让银行无力偿付。然而，SVB的债券投资规模、到期期限以及美联储的利率上涨幅度，都让它面临着风险。同时，退款的速度太快，导致问题远超出解决方案的范围。
When looking at SVB's demise, the decision-making behind its bond purchases stands out as particularly flawed and probably the primary cause of the bank's failure. According to public reports, SVB management made a bet that interest rates would hold steady or fall. While that expectation is implicit in its actions, I find it hard to believe it was a conscious considered decision, as opposed to an example of mindlessly chasing yield, perhaps abetted by wishful thinking. The bond purchases took place in 2020 and 2021. In that two-year period, the yield on the 30-year treasury ranged from 0.99%, and 2.45%. How could anyone have thought rates that low were more likely to hold steady or fall than rise?
看着SVB的失败，其债券购买的决策制定显得特别有缺陷，很可能是银行失败的主要原因。据公开报道，SVB管理层打赌利率会保持稳定或下降。虽然这种期望是隐含在其行动中的，但我很难相信这是一种有意识的考虑过的决定，而不是一种盲目追求收益的例子，也许是由于一厢情愿的想法所帮助的。债券购买发生在2020年和2021年。在这两年的时间里，30年期国债收益率从0.99%到2.45%不等。怎么可能有人认为这样低的利率更可能保持稳定或下降，而不是上升呢？
Determining how to move forward is always challenging in economics and investing. However, when the Fed and treasury flooded the economy with cash in 2020 and inflation began to rise in 2021, the one thing that should have been obvious was that there was no good reason to hold long-dated bonds at pitifully low yields, which presented profound risk and minuscule potential for return.
在经济和投资中，确定如何前进总是具有挑战性的。然而，当联邦储备委员会和财政部在2020年向经济注入大量现金，而通货膨胀在2021年开始上升时，显然应该明白的一件事情是，没有什么好的理由去持有收益微薄、风险巨大的长期债券。这种情况下，投资回报微不足道。
Comparisons to the GFC SVB's failure, along with the collapse of signature bank, the rescue of first republic bank and credit suises forced sale to UBS, roiled markets in March. This resulted from fear of bank failure contagion along the lines of what we saw during the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2008, when bear sterns, Maryland's Lehman Brothers, Bacovia Bank, Washington Mutual and AIG either melted down or required rescues. There were times in that span, particularly in the last four months of 2008, when investors were forced to contemplate the possibility of an unstoppable series of failures that could have endangered the entire financial system. Nobody wants to face that again.
与全球金融危机时期贝尔斯登、马里兰雷曼兄弟、巴克维亚银行、华盛顿互助银行和AIG的破产或救援类似，SVB的失败以及Signature Bank的崩溃，以及第一共和银行和瑞士信贷的被迫出售给瑞银，并在三月份搅动了市场。这是由于担心银行倒闭的传染性影响，就像我们在2007年至2008年全球金融危机中所看到的那样。在那段时间里，特别是在2008年最后四个月的某些时候，投资者被迫思考一系列可能无法阻止的失败，这可能会危及整个金融体系。没有人想再面临那样的局面。
While I want to state clearly that I'm not an expert on banks or their regulation, I think the similarities between 2008 and 2023 are limited to the mere fact that, in both instances, problems existed at a few financial institutions. I find the common elements mostly superficial, but follows are the differences.
虽然我想明确说一下，我不是银行或其监管方面的专家，但我认为2008年和2023年之间的相似之处仅仅在于，在两种情况下，一些金融机构存在问题。我认为这些共同点大多是表面的，但接下来是它们的不同之处。
By far, most importantly, the GFC occurred for the simple reason that investors and financial institutions experienced temporary insanity with respect to residential mortgages. They accepted unquestioningly that mortgages low-default history could be extrapolated, forced massive amounts of money into the mortgage market, loaned lots of it to subprime borrowers who couldn't or wouldn't document income or assets, built tranched and levered mortgage-back securities using subprime mortgages, and, in many cases, invested their own capital in the riskiest tranches of the RMBS to enable the formation process to be repeated. These parties ignored the possibility that excessive faith in mortgages and the resultant lowering of lending standards could precipitate massive numbers of mortgage defaults. Further, they ignored the fragility of the structured securities built out of those mortgages.
迄今为止，最重要的是，全球金融危机的发生只是因为投资者和金融机构在住房抵押贷款上经历了暂时的疯狂。他们毫无怀疑地接受了住房贷款低违约历史可以被推断的观点，将大量资金投入抵押贷款市场，向无力或不愿意证明自己收入或资产的次贷借款人贷款，并使用次贷款构建分层和杠杆抵押贷款支持证券，在许多情况下，将自己的资本投资于RMBS的风险最大的分级中，以便重复这一形成过程。这些人忽视了过度信任抵押贷款和因此降低贷款标准可能引发大量抵押贷款违约的可能性。此外，他们也忽视了由这些抵押贷款构建起来的有结构证券的脆弱性。
Investors, bankers and rating agencies, which awarded AAA ratings to thousands of RMBS issues, naively trusted that people who were willing to pay extra interest to obtain mortgages without disclosing their financial condition would repay those mortgages, even if the prices of the homes they bought fell. This led them to conclude that mortgage defaults wouldn't be sufficient to jeopardize the mortgage-backed securities viability. Subprime mortgages were totally lacking in substance, yet many of the world's leading financial institutions were happy to make those loans and invest in securities built out of them.
投资者、银行家和评级机构向数千个RMBS问题授予AAA评级，天真地相信那些愿意支付额外利息以获得抵押贷款却没有披露财务状况的人会偿还那些贷款，即使他们购买的房屋价格下跌。这使他们得出结论，抵押贷款违约不足以危及抵押支持证券的可持续性。次贷抵押贷款完全缺乏实质，但许多世界领先的金融机构愿意发放这些贷款并投资于由它们构建的证券中。
Looking at the current situation, I can't think of anything that's highly analogous to the subprime mortgages at the heart of the GFC. There are things here or there that have been overhyped or are short on substance. Some people will point to SPACs or cryptocurrencies, but they're not as massive in scale, perhaps not as lacking in substance, and certainly not held on the balance sheets of America's key financial institutions in amounts sufficient to endanger our financial system. Indeed, I think it's safe to say the most glaring market excesses were corrected in 2022 and aren't hanging over us now. However, for a caveat, please listen to this memo's last few paragraphs.
看着现在的情况，我想不到有什么事情可以和GFC的核心——次贷危机高度类似。可能有一些东西被过度炒作或者缺乏实质，但并不是重大规模的，也不像次贷那样缺乏实质，当然也没有被美国主要金融机构的资产负债表持有到足以危及我们金融系统的程度。事实上，我认为可以肯定的是，最显著的市场过度现象在2022年已经得到了纠正，并没有继续困扰我们。不过，需要注意的是，请听这份备忘录的最后几段。
In addition, whereas the list of institutions that disappeared during the GFC included some that clearly were systemically important, I don't think that can be said of SVB. I doubt our financial system was highly reliant on promises made by SVB and thus subject to extensive counterparty risk. The GFC affected some truly large banks, household names, and most people believed it was armed the way to jeopardizing even bigger ones before the government stepped in. There is no reason to think the failure of SVB poses the same risk. Finally, it should be born in mind that even though huge banks appeared to be endangered in 2008, the Fed and other economic policy makers were able to come up with rescue plans, for the institutions and for the economy, and they worked.
此外，虽然在全球金融危机期间消失的机构名单中包括一些明显重要的系统机构，但我认为这并不适用于SVB。我怀疑我们的金融体系高度依赖于SVB做出的承诺，因此不存在严重的交易对手风险。全球金融危机影响了一些真正的大型银行，这些银行是家喻户晓的，在政府介入之前，大多数人都认为这是威胁到更大的银行。没有理由认为SVB的失败会带来相同的风险。最后，我们应该记住，即使在2008年，即使巨大的银行似乎面临危险，美联储和其他经济政策制定者也能够提出拯救计划，为机构和经济提供帮助，这些计划奏效了。
In that vein, it's worth noting that the Fed's response to SVB's problems included A, guaranteeing all SVB deposits, B, making additional liquidity available to banks, C, injecting extensive liquidity into the economy, and D, letting its balance sheet grow. Even though it's been in the process of winding it down from its post-pandemic high, thus I find it hard to believe that SVB or the like can set off a chain reaction sufficient to trigger an irreversible financial crisis.
顺着这个思路，值得注意的是联邦储备委员会对 SVB 的问题做出的应对措施包括：A、保证所有 SVB 存款的安全；B、向银行提供额外的流动性；C、向经济注入大量的流动性；还有 D、允许联储的资产负债表增加。虽然联储正处于从疫情后的高峰回落的过程中，因此我觉得很难相信 SVB 或其他类似的机构会引发足以引发不可逆金融危机的连锁反应。
On the subject of the problems scale, I want to mention a new pet peeve of mine. Increasingly, we hear the media say things like this was the best month in the stock market since 2020, or we saw more new daily lows today than on any day since October. The media like this kind of dramatic sound in comparison, and the latest is that SVB is the biggest bank to fail since the GFC, but these comparisons don't always mean much. In the case of SVB, it should be noted that while this is the second biggest bank failure in history, SVB was only two thirds the size of Washington Mutual, the biggest. Further, since the financial sector has expanded meaningfully in the last 15 years, WAM used 307 billion dollars of assets in 2008, where much more significant than SVB's 209 billion dollars today.
关于问题规模的话题，我想提及一个新的烦恼。越来越多的媒体说一些像“这是自2020年以来股市最好的一个月”或者“今天我们看到的新的每日低点比10月份的任何一天都多”。媒体喜欢这种对比所带来的戏剧性声音，最新的例子是SVB是自全球金融危机以来最大的银行破产，但这些比较并不总是有意义的。就SVB而言，应该指出的是，虽然这是历史上第二大的银行失败，但SVB只有最大的华盛顿互助银行的三分之二大小。此外，由于金融行业在过去15年中有了显著的扩张，WAM在2008年使用了3070亿美元的资产，比SVB目前的2090亿美元更加重要。
A word on regulation.
关于监管的一点话。
In March 2011, in the aftermath of the GFC, I published a memo called on regulation. Its basic thrust was that financial regulation is highly cyclical. Crashes, meltdowns, and widespread misbehavior bring on calls for increased regulation. They also make increased regulation palatable to most parties.
2011年3月，在全球金融危机的余波中，我发表了一篇名为《呼吁监管》的备忘录。它的基本主旨是金融监管具有很高的周期性。崩盘、熔断和广泛的不当行为引发了对加强监管的呼声。它们也使得大多数方认为加强监管是可以接受的。
But when the new regulations succeed, and thus appear to make the financial environment safer and better functioning, free marketeers and people with vested interests typically start to argue that such strong regulation is no longer necessary, and that it restricts the financial system's effectiveness.
当新规定真正成功了，使得金融环境更加安全和更有效地运作时，自由市场主义者和有特殊利益的人通常开始争辩，认为这样强有力的监管不再必要，并且限制了金融系统的效力。
For example, in response to the great crash of 1929, massive new regulations were enacted between 1930 and 1940 to constrain contact in the Wild West of Wall Street. But by the 1990s, the pain of the crash was long forgotten, and belief in the efficacy of the free market was riding high. As a result, multiple regulations were dismantled, enabling conduct that contributed to very painful experiences in the GFC.
举例来说，为了应对1929年的股市大崩盘，在1930年至1940年间实施了大规模的新监管，以限制在华尔街的“野西”范畴内的接触。但到了1990年代，崩盘所带来的痛苦已经被遗忘，对自由市场有效性的信仰很高。因此，多项监管被拆除，促成了在全球金融危机中造成极度痛苦经历的行为。
The GFC in turn inspired another round of regulation. One of the governing principles was that financial institutions that are too big to fail, and thus will by necessity be bailed out if threatened, shouldn't be permitted to engage in risky activities, as this creates a situation where heads, the shareholders and management win, tails, the taxpayers lose.
全球金融危机进一步推动了另一轮管理政策制定。其中的一个主导原则是，那些因为规模过大而有必要获得紧急财政支持的金融机构，不应该被允许从事风险活动，因为这会导致一种情况，即在赢家——股东和管理层方面，其获得收益，而在输家——纳税人方面，则承担亏损。
That proposition seems reasonable on its face, and was implemented via the Dodd-Frank Act and its Volcker Rule, in general, bank regulation was significantly tightened.
这个提议看起来很合理，已通过道德-弗兰克法案及其沃尔克规则实施，总体而言，银行监管得到了显著加强。
As time passed, the normal pushback against regulation emerged. The aspect that's most relevant here is the regulatory threshold. Following the GFC, all banks with assets above $50 billion were subject to the strictest standards. But in 2018, regulators were convinced to raise that figure to $250 billion, thanks in part to the lobbying of SVB's chief executive officer. As a result, SVB, with assets around $50 billion at the time the threshold was raised, faced a looser regulatory regime. This helped it expand massively until it failed in a matter of days.
随着时间的推移，普遍反对管制的声音出现了。在这里最相关的方面是监管门槛。在全球金融危机之后，所有资产超过500亿美元的银行都面临着最严格的标准。但是在2018年，监管机构被说服将这个数字提高到2500亿美元，其中一部分原因是SVB的首席执行官游说的结果。因此，当门槛被提高时，SVB的资产约为500亿美元，面临着较为宽松的监管制度。这帮助其快速扩张，直到在几天内崩溃。
Nevertheless, thanks to the post-GFC rules, the major U.S. banks today are well capitalized and have significant liquidity and healthy balance sheets. This makes it less likely that we'll see a GFC-type round of bank failures.
然而，多亏了金融危机后的规定，目前美国的大型银行资本充足、流动性强，资产负债表健康。这降低了我们看到类似金融危机的银行失败的可能性。
I've heard it argued that current regulations and the resultant financial condition of banks aren't robust enough. But I believe most banks, and especially the majors, are much stronger than they were before and during the GFC, and typically much stronger than SVB.
我听说有人认为目前的监管和银行的财务状况不够强健。但我相信大多数银行，特别是主要银行，比大萧条前后更加强健，通常比SVB更强。
Interestingly, Canada, Australia, and Britain function very well with far fewer banks than the U.S. Canada, for example, has $2 trillion of GDP and just $34 domestic banks, $17 per $1 trillion of GDP. And it seems to get by. In contrast, in 2021, the U.S. had 4,236 FDIC-insured commercial banks for its $20 trillion of GDP or $212 banks per $1 trillion. Could regulators do a better job if there were fewer banks to monitor? We'll see what happens to the number of U.S. banks if big ones absorb smaller ones and deposits become concentrated in the bigger ones. But given the role of private parties and their money in our system of government, I don't expect to see a major change.
有趣的是，加拿大、澳大利亚和英国只有很少的银行，但它们的运作非常出色，远远超过美国。例如，加拿大的国内生产总值为2万亿美元，只有34家国内银行，每1万亿美元只有17家。而加拿大似乎也能够胜任。相比之下，2021年美国的国内生产总值为20万亿美元，FDIC承保商业银行有4,236家，每1万亿美元有212家银行。如果银行数量减少，监管机构能够处理得更好吗？如果大银行吸收小银行并且存款集中在大银行，我们将看到美国银行数量的变化。但考虑到私人利益和他们在政府体系中的地位，我不认为会出现重大变化。
Moral Hazard
Moral Hazard的意思是道德风险。
One problem with government solutions of any kind, like the so-called Greenspan put, is the possibility that they'll generate moral hazard. That is, players will conclude that they'll be rescued if they make a mistake.
政府解决方案的一个问题，比如所谓的“格林斯潘底部”，就是可能会产生道德风险。也就是说，参与者会得出结论，如果他们犯了错误，他们会被拯救。
This suggests they can freely engage in high-risk, high-return behavior. If it works, they'll get rich. But if it fails, they'll be bailed out. People sometimes refer to this as privatizing profits and socializing losses.
这意味着他们可以自由地从事高风险、高回报的行为。如果成功了，他们就会变得富有。但如果失败了，他们就会被救助。人们有时称之为“私有化利润、社会化亏损”。
On March 9th, when SVB was hanging by a thread, while experiencing massive withdrawals, people started talking about a possible government guarantee of all deposits. One of the arguments against such a bailout was that it would create moral hazard. If people know they'll be protected from losses, they'll have no reason to examine the solidity of a bank before depositing money, meaning the diligence function won't be performed. Consequently, poorly run, poorly capitalized banks will be permitted to stay in business and grow.
3月9日，当SVB陷入困境，经历大规模提款的时候，人们开始谈论可能对所有存款提供政府担保。一个反对这样的救助方案的论据是，它会产生道德风险。如果人们知道他们将得到保护免受损失，他们就没有理由在存款前审查银行的稳定性，这意味着勤勉的功能将无法履行。因此，经营不善、资本不足的银行将被允许继续经营和发展。
But we simply cannot expect depositors to perform that function. Since banks' operations are characterized by mismatched assets, liabilities, and a dependence on depositors' trust, it's terribly hard to assess their financial health from the outside. Maybe sometimes from the inside, too. Since SVB succumbed to what in retrospect seemed to have been obvious managerial mistakes.
但我们不能指望存款人执行那个功能，因为银行的运营表现出了资产、负债的不匹配，并且依赖于存款人的信任。从外部来评估它们的财务状况是非常困难的，甚至有时从内部来也是如此。斯威夫特谷银行就曾因明显的管理错误导致破产，这在回顾时也显而易见。
In the 28 years that Oak Tree has been in business, we've invested in relatively few deposit-taking financial institutions. Other than in cases where we've become insiders, we've generally avoided investing in banks because their complex, often impenetrable financial disclosures and reliance on trust make them harder to evaluate than we like.
在Oak Tree投资公司已经经营了28年之久，我们仅对少数收取存款的金融机构进行了投资。除非我们成为内部人员，否则我们通常不会投资银行，因为它们复杂、难以透彻理解的财务披露和依赖信任的特点使得评估它们比我们喜欢的更加困难。
Few people are capable of studying bank's financial statements and determining whether they'll remain solvent and liquid. Expecting depositors to do so could cause banking to grind to a halt. That's why deposit insurance was introduced during the Great Depression. For the same reason, the government's decision to fully guarantee SVB's deposits was quite appropriate. Notably, however, management and shareholders weren't bailed out. Rather, in today's parlance, they were bailed in or left with their losses. We can hope their losses will encourage other investors and bank managers to apply greater prudence in their future decision making.
很少有人能够研究银行的财务报表并确定它们是否能够保持偿付能力和流动性。期望存款人这么做可能会导致银行停滞不前。这就是为什么在大萧条期间引入了存款保险。出于同样的原因，政府决定全面保证SVB的存款非常合适。值得注意的是，管理层和股东并没有获得救助。相反，在今天的术语中，他们被“救入”或留下了他们的损失。我们可以希望他们的损失将鼓励其他投资者和银行经理在未来的决策中更加谨慎。
AT1s While not at all related, SVB's failure gives me a chance to discuss another topic involving financial institutions that's recently been in the news. Alternative Tier 1 bonds or AT1s. On the heels of the GFC, European regulators required banks to raise new equity capital, Tier 1 capital and D-Levour. However, given the risks surrounding the banks, potential providers of capital demanded inducements.
虽然没有任何关联，但SVB的失败给我提供了一个机会，讨论另一个最近在新闻中出现的涉及金融机构的主题：另类一级资本债券或AT1s。在全球金融危机之后，欧洲监管机构要求银行增加新的资本股本、一级资本和降杠杆率。然而，由于银行面临的风险，潜在的资本提供者要求获得激励。
With AT1s, these came in the form of bond-like yields, a promise of repayment at maturity and debt holder status, so far so good. In UBS's recent takeover rescue of Credit Suisse, Finma, the Swiss bank regulator determined that A, shareholders would receive modest compensation, and B, the holders of the $17 billion of AT1s would get nothing. There was an immediate outcry, along with threats of litigation.
有了AT1s，它们以类似债券的收益形式出现，承诺在到期时偿还并具有债权人的地位，迄今为止一切都很好。在瑞银最近救助瑞信的收购中，瑞士银行监管机构Finma确定A、股东将获得适度的补偿，而B、持有170亿美元AT1s的持有人将一无所获。立即出现了强烈的抗议，以及对诉讼的威胁。
Although AT1s are clothed as debt securities, it seems Finma had the power to alter the AT1's priority relatives of the shareholders and even eliminate their value. In this case, they chose to put the AT1s behind the shareholders, wiping out investors who thought they were creditors. As Bloomberg noted on March 23rd, this shouldn't have come as a surprise. A prospectus for the Credit Suisse AT1s highlights from the very first page, the possibility of a wipeout when there is what's known as a write-down event.
尽管AT1看起来是债务证券，但Finma似乎有权改变AT1的优先级相对于股东，甚至可以消除其价值。在这种情况下，他们选择把AT1放在股东之后，清除那些认为自己是债权人的投资者。正如彭博社在3月23日指出的那样，这不应该令人感到惊讶。瑞信AT1的招股说明书从第一页开始强调，当发生所谓的减记事件时，可能会发生抹去。
In this scenario, interest on the notes would stop accruing, and the full outstanding amount of the bonds would be automatically and permanently written down to zero. Finma has the power to decide that a type of write-down event known as a viability event has occurred if a bank's efforts to improve capital adequacy are inadequate or unfeasible, or if there is extraordinary public support to avoid a bankruptcy in solvency or halt to regular business.
在这种情况下，票据利息会停止积累，并且债券的全部未偿余额将自动和永久地降至零。Finma有权决定一种被称为可持续性事件的减记事件发生，如果一家银行提高资本充足性的努力不足或不可行，或者需要特别的公共支持来避免破产或停止正常业务。
Bloomberg's Matt Levine explained how this worked in Credit Suisse's case. If the bank's common equity Tier 1 capital ratio, a measure of its regulatory capital falls below 7%, then the AT1 is written down to zero. It never needs to be paid back. It just goes away completely. These securities are basically a trick.
彭博社的马特·莱文（Matt Levine）解释了这在瑞士信贷的案例中是如何运作的。如果该银行的普通股一级资本充足率，即其规定资本的一个度量，下降到低于7％，那么AT1就被写成零。它永远不需要偿还。它完全消失了。这些证券基本上是一个把戏。
To investors, they seem like bonds. They pay interest, get paid back in five years, feel pretty safe. To regulators, they seem like equity. If the bank runs into trouble, it can raise capital by zeroing the AT1s. If investors think they are bonds, and regulators think they are equity, somebody is wrong. The investors are wrong. In particular, investors seem to think that AT1s are senior to equity, and that the common stock needs to go to zero before the AT1s suffer any losses.
对于投资者来说，AT1看起来像债券。它们支付利息，在五年后收回本金，感觉相当安全。对于监管机构来说，它们看起来像股权。如果银行遇到麻烦，它可以通过清零AT1来筹集资本。如果投资者认为它们是债券，监管机构认为它们是股权，那么肯定有人错了。投资者错了。特别是，投资者似乎认为AT1优先于股权，只有普通股票归零后，AT1才会遭受任何损失。
But this is not quite right. You can tell because the whole point of the AT1s is that the go to zero if the common equity Tier 1 capital ratio falls below 7%, Bloomberg opinion, money stuff, March 20th, 2023. Were the investors misled? To me, the answer is no.
但这并不完全正确。你可以看出来，AT1的整个重点是，如果公共股本一级资本充足率降至7%以下，它们就会归零。《彭博观点，金融热点》，2023年3月20日。投资者被误导了吗？对我来说，答案是否定的。
In this regard, let's consider the way the prospectus for one such credit-sweets issuance, a $2 billion US $7.5% AT1 issued in 2018 was labeled Permat Levine. 7.5% 0.00% Perpetual Tier 1 contingent write down capital notes. There shouldn't have been much doubt about their riskiness when write down capital notes was in the title.
关于这一点，让我们考虑一下类似信用糖的发行中招股说明书的表述，比如在2018年发行的总共20亿美元、7.5%的AT1信用糖的招股说明书上标注了 “Permat Levine. 7.5% 0.00%永续第一级附属减记资本债券”。当标题中包含“减记资本债券”时，对于它们的风险性应该不会有太多疑问。
I once wrote a Bernie Madoff that you can say you did thorough due diligence, or you can say he passed the test, but you can't say you did thorough due diligence and he passed the test. Likewise, in the case of credit-sweets issuance, you can say you read and understood the prospectus, or you can say you thought they were like ordinary debt securities, but you can't say both. Maybe there's the third path.
我曾经写过一封信给伯尼·麦道夫，说你可以说你进行了彻底的尽职调查，或者说他通过了考验，但你不能说你进行了彻底的尽职调查并且他通过了考验。同样，在信用糖果发行的情况下，你可以说你读过并理解了招股说明书，或者你可以说你认为它们就像普通的债券，但你不能两者都说。也许有第三种选择。
Maybe you could say, I knew the regulators had the power to zero me out, but I didn't think they ever would. It seems to me that if people can take value from you legally and especially if doing so isn't unambiguously immoral, you shouldn't be surprised if they do.
也许你可以这样说，我知道监管机构有权让我破产，但我从未想过他们真的会这么做。在我看来，如果人们可以在法律范围内从你身上获得价值，尤其是这样做并不是明确的不道德，那么你不应该感到惊讶他们会这么做。
Holders of high yield bonds have for many years dealt with an analogous phenomenon called event risk, which refers to actions undertaken by company management for the purpose of transferring value from bond holders to stockholders. In the case of credit-sweets, the regulators likely gained the cooperation of shareholders by paying them a few francs per share while wiping out the AT1s. Under the circumstances, that shouldn't have come as a complete surprise. It's all part of protecting banks, which, as just stated, are risky by nature.
持有高收益债券的投资者多年来一直面临类似的现象，称为事件风险，它指的是公司管理层为将价值转移给股票持有者而采取的行动。在瑞士信贷的情况下，监管机构很可能通过支付每股几瑞郎的价格而清除AT1s，从而获得股东的合作。在这种情况下，这应该不会完全令人惊讶。这是保护银行的一部分，正如刚才所说，银行天生就存在风险。
Psychological ramifications of the SVB collapse. As I previously mentioned, I don't view SVB, Sagan-Turbank, first republic and credit-sweets as having been connected other than by the fact that they were in the same general line of work, that did give them one thing in common. Since they're all financial institutions, events involving them can broadly impact depositors and investors' confidence, or lack thereof. People seem to have trouble dealing with multiple problems at once, and the nearest simultaneous challenges at four banks caused people to string them all together like beads, crafting an errative that included a potential systemic meltdown. While they don't seem to me to be connected intangible ways, the four banks recent crises certainly had the power to shake things up.
SVB破产的心理影响。正如我先前提到的，我不认为SVB、Sagan-Turbank、第一共和国和信用甜点除了从事同一种行业之外有任何联系，这使得它们有一个共同点。由于它们都是金融机构，涉及它们的事件可以广泛影响存款人和投资者的信心，或缺乏信心。人们似乎很难同时处理多个问题，四家银行面临的最近的同时挑战让人们像串珠子一样将它们全部串在一起，构建了一个包括潜在系统性崩溃的错误故事。虽然在我看来它们以无形的方式没有联系，但四家银行最近的危机确实有能力动摇一切。
And when participants in the economy or market are shaken up, the implications can be serious. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt said in his 1933 inaugural address during the Great Depression, the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. Things don't have to be connected physically or even economically. In the markets, a series of scary events can have a very powerful impact.
当经济或市场的参与者受到动荡影响时，其影响可能会很严重。正如富兰克林·罗斯福总统在1933年大萧条期间的就职演说中所说，我们唯一需要害怕的是恐惧本身。事物并不一定要在物理上或经济上有联系。在市场上，一系列可怕的事件可能产生非常强大的影响。
The credit crises during which my partners and I have invested over the last 38 years generally have resulted from some combination of A, negative economic developments, B, excesses in the markets, C, adverse exogenous events, and D, rising fear among investors and finance industry professionals. The failures of SVB and the other banks likely aren't enough to bring on a credit crisis, but they could contribute to one.
我和我的伙伴们在过去的38年中所投资的信贷危机通常都是由以下几种因素中的一些组合而造成的：A.经济发展不良；B.市场过度；C.不利的外部事件；和D.投资者和金融业专业人士担忧情绪升高。SVB和其他银行的失败可能不足以引发信贷危机，但它们可能会对此做出贡献。
As a result, it seems inescapable that some financial institutions will reduce the amount of credit they make available, causing some borrowers to be left out. In particular, SVB's failure could mean the startup world will have a tougher time getting financing in the months ahead. Regional and community banks are likely to undergo increased scrutiny and experience deposit flight as cash flows to money market funds and larger banks are perceived to be safer. Their importance as the main financiers of real estate makes it likely that the going will get tougher for property owners and developers, just as office buildings, brick and mortar retail, and perhaps even multi-family are coming under pressuring many regions.
结果，看起来某些金融机构将不可避免地减少他们提供的信贷金额，导致一些借款人被排除在外。特别是，SVB的失败可能意味着初创企业在未来几个月获得融资会更加困难。地区和社区银行可能会受到加强审查并经历存款外流，因为现金流向货币市场基金和大型银行被认为更安全。由于它们是房地产的主要融资方，因此房地产业主和开发者可能会遭遇更困难的情况，正如许多地区的办公楼、实体零售店，甚至是多户住宅正在承受压力。
Combined developments like these with the reality that A, interest rates are no longer declining or near zero, B, the Fed can't be as accommodative as it was in the last few crises because of today's elevated inflation, and C, negative developments are popping up in portfolios, and I think the case made in my previous memo, C Change, December 2022, has been bolstered. The easy money environment of the last few years has been blamed for, among other things, the difficulties at SVB and its peers. Their failure is likely to bring stricter scrutiny to banking, meaning things are unlikely to be as easy in the period ahead. And to paraphrase Warren Buffett, now that the tide has gone out a bit, we've caught a glimpse of some who were swimming naked near shore. The remaining questions are, how many more are out there, and will the tide go out far enough to expose them?
像母语为中文的人一样说：将这些综合发展和现实结合起来，A，利率不再下跌或接近零，B，由于当今的高通胀，美联储不能像在过去几次危机中那样提供同样的宽松政策，C，投资组合中出现了负面发展，我认为我在去年12月所撰写的备忘录“C变化”所提出的观点已经得到加强。过去几年的宽松货币环境被指责为斯坦福华埠银行及其同行面临的困难之一。他们的失败可能会对银行业带来更严格的审查，这意味着未来的时期将不会像之前那么轻松。换句话说，借用沃伦·巴菲特的话，现在海水已经退去了一些，我们看到了一些在浅水区裸泳的人。剩下的问题是，还有多少人在那里，而海水会退得足够远以暴露他们吗？
When investors think things are flawless, optimism rides high, and goodbyes can be hard to find. But when psychology swings in the direction of hopelessness, it becomes reasonable to believe that bargain hunters and providers of capital will be holding the better cards, and will have opportunities for better returns. We consider the meltdown of SVB an early step in that direction.
当投资者认为一切都完美无缺时，乐观情绪高涨，告别可能会很难找到。但当心理状态转向绝望时，认为寻找便宜的猎头和资本提供者将掌握更好的机会和回报是合理的。我们认为SVB的崩盘是走向这个方向的早期步骤。
While I don't foresee widespread contagion, either psychological or financial, arising from the SVB failure alone, I can't end a memo on US banks without mentioning one of the biggest worries they face today. The possibility of problems stemming from loans against commercial real estate, CRE, especially office buildings.
虽然我不预见由于SVB的失败会引发普遍的心理或财务上的传染病，但我在结束一份关于美国银行的备忘录时，不能不提及它们今天面临的最大担忧之一：商业房地产，尤其是办公大楼贷款所可能出现的问题。
The following factors are influencing the CRE sector today. Interest rates are up substantially. While some borrowers benefit from having fixed interest rates, roughly 40% of all CRE mortgages will need to be refinanced by the end of 2025. And in the case of fixed rate loans, presumably at higher rates. Higher interest rates call for higher demanded capitalization rates, the ratio of a property's net operating income to its price, which will cause most real estate prices to fall.
以下因素正在影响商业地产领域。利率大幅上涨。尽管有些借款人从拥有固定利率中受益，但大约40％的商业地产抵押贷款将需要在2025年底之前进行再融资。并且在固定利率贷款的情况下，利率预计会更高。更高的利率要求更高的资本化率，即物业净营业收入与其价格之比，这将导致大多数房地产价格下跌。
The possibility of a recession bodes ill for rental rates and occupancy, and thus for landlords' income. Credit is likely to be generally less available in the coming year or so. The concept of people occupying desks in office buildings five days a week is in question, threatening landlords underlying business model. While workers may spend more time in the office in the future, no one knows what occupancy levels lenders will assume in their refinancing calculations.
衰退的可能性对房租和入住率以及房东的收入不利。未来一年或更长时间，信贷可能普遍不太容易获得。办公楼里的人们每周5天占用办公桌的概念受到质疑，这威胁到了房东的基本业务模式。虽然未来工人可能会在办公室花更多时间，但没有人知道贷款人在他们的再融资计算中会假定什么入住水平。
Total US bank assets exceed $23 trillion. Banks collectively are the biggest real estate lenders. And while we only have rough ranges for the data, they're estimated to hold about 40% of the $4.5 trillion of CRE mortgages outstanding or around $1.8 trillion at face value. Based on these estimates, CRE loans represent approximately 8 to 9% of the average bank's assets, a percentage that is significant but not overwhelming. Total exposure to CRE may be higher, however, as any investments in commercial mortgage bank securities have to be considered in addition to banks holdings of direct CRE loans.
美国银行资产总额超过23万亿美元。银行集体是最大的房地产贷款者。虽然我们只有粗略的数据范围，但据估计，它们持有约4.5万亿美元的商业房地产贷款的40％，即面值约为1.8万亿美元。根据这些估计，商用房贷款大约占普通银行资产的8％至9％，这个比例是显著的但不是压倒性的。然而，对商用房的总暴露可能更高，因为除了银行持有的直接商用房贷款外，任何投资商业抵押贷款银行证券也必须考虑在内。
However, CRE loans aren't spread evenly among banks. Some banks concentrate on parts of the country where real estate markets were hotter, and thus could see bigger percentage declines. Some loaned against lower quality properties, which is where the biggest problems are likely to show up. Some provided mortgages at higher loan to value ratios and some have a higher percentage of their assets in CRE loans.
然而，商业房地产贷款并不平均分布在所有银行之间。一些银行把重心放在一些房地产市场表现更好的地区，这可能导致更大的百分比下降。一些银行贷款给低质量的房产，这可能会出现最大的问题。一些银行提供更高的贷款价值比的抵押贷款，而有些银行商业房地产贷款的资产比例较高。
To this latter point, a recent report from Bank of America indicates that average CRE loan exposure is just 4.5% of total assets at banks with more than $250 billion of assets, while it's 11.4% at banks with less than $250 billion of assets. Since banks are so highly levered with collective equity capital of just $2.2 trillion, roughly 9% of total assets. The estimated amount the average bank has in CRE loans is equal to approximately 100% of its capital.
最近美国银行的一份报告指出，拥有超过2500亿美元资产的银行的商业房地产贷款暴露率仅为总资产的4.5％，而拥有低于2500亿美元资产的银行则为11.4％。由于银行杠杆化程度高，集体权益资本仅为2.2万亿美元，约占总资产的9％。估计平均银行在商业房地产贷款上的金额相当于其资本的约100％。
Thus, losses on CRE mortgages in the average loan book could wipe out an equivalent percentage of the average bank's capital, leaving the bank under capitalized. As the B of A report notes, the average large bank has 50% of its risk-based capital in CRE loans. While for smaller banks, that figure is 167%. Notable defaults on office building mortgages and other CRE loans are highly likely to occur, some already have, but that doesn't necessarily mean the banks involved will suffer losses.
这么说吧，商业房地产抵押贷款的损失可能会令平均贷款簿上的资本损失相应增加，从而令银行资本不足。根据B of A的报告，平均大型银行的风险资本中有50％投放在商业房地产贷款上，而对于较小银行来说，这个数字是167％。虽然一些写字楼抵押贷款和其他商业房地产贷款出现违约的可能性很高，甚至已经出现了部分违约，但这并不一定意味着涉及的银行就一定会遭受损失。
If loans were made at reasonable LTV ratios, there could be enough owners equity beneath each mortgage to absorb losses before the bank's loans are jeopardized. Further, mortgage defaults generally don't signal the end of the story, but rather the beginning of negotiations between lenders and landlords. In many cases, the result is likely to be extension of the loan on restructured terms.
如果贷款按合理的贷款价值比率发放，每笔抵押贷款下面可能有足够的业主股本来吸收亏损，以免银行的贷款受到威胁。此外，按揭违约通常并不意味着已经结束了一切，而是谈判的开始，谈判双方是放贷人和房东。在许多情况下，结果可能是根据重新构建的条件延长贷款期限。
No one knows whether banks will suffer losses on their commercial real estate loans or what the magnitude will be, but we're very likely to see mortgage defaults in the headlines. And at a minimum, this may spook lenders, throw sand into the gears of the financing and refinancing processes, and further contribute to a sense of heightened risk. Developments along these lines certainly have the potential to add to whatever additional distress materializes in the months ahead.
没有人知道银行在商业房地产贷款方面是否会遭受损失以及损失的规模是多少，但我们很可能会看到抵押贷款违约的头条新闻。最起码，这可能会吓到贷款人，影响融资和再融资的进程，进一步加剧风险感。如果出现这样的情况，未来几个月所出现的任何额外困扰都有可能会加剧。
April 17, 2023.
2023年4月17日。
Thank you for listening to the memo by Howard Marx. To hear more episodes, be sure to subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts.
感谢您收听 Howard Marx 的备忘录。如果想听更多的剧集，请务必在您平常收听播客的地方订阅。
This podcast expresses the views of the author as of the date indicated and such views are subject to change without notice. Oak tree has no duty or obligation to update the information contained herein.
这个播客表达了作者在指定日期的观点，这些观点可能会随时变化， Oak树没有更新此处所包含信息的责任或义务。
Further, Oak tree makes no representation and it should not be assumed that past investment performance is an indication of future results. Moreover, wherever there is a potential for profit, there is also the possibility of loss.
此外，橡树公司并不做任何陈述，并且不能认为过去的投资表现是未来结果的指示。此外，任何有利可图的机会也存在亏损的可能性。
This podcast is being made available for educational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. The information contained herein does not constitute and should not be construed as an offering of advisory services or an offer to sell or solicitation to buy any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction.
这个播客仅供教育目的而提供，不应用于其他任何目的。此处所包含的信息不构成提供咨询服务的邀请，亦不构成出售或购买任何证券或相关金融工具的邀请。请勿在任何管辖区域内进行。
Certain information contained herein concerning economic trends and performances based on or derived from information provided by independent third party sources. Oak tree capital management LP Oak tree believes that the sources from which such information has been obtained are reliable. However, they cannot guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based.
在这里包含的关于经济趋势和表现的某些信息是基于独立第三方来源提供的信息而得出的。橡树资本管理有限合伙公司认为，所采用的信息来源是可靠的。然而，他们无法保证这些信息的准确性，并未独立核实这些信息的准确性或完整性，以及此类信息基于的假设。
The podcast, including the information contained herein may not be copied, reproduced, republished or posted in whole or in part in any form without the prior written consent of Oak tree.
这个播客，包括里面包含的信息，未经Oak tree的事先书面同意，不得以任何形式全部或部分复制、再制作、重新发布或张贴。