All of these different signals are leading people to question whether the US really still has the willingness to confront China. Mark, in your excellent column in the Sunday Times, you've been reflecting on President Xi's military parade last week. It was sort of quite unlike anything we've seen at least in recent times. Was it seen as a massive diplomatic success in Beijing as well? Well, I guess they're really pleased with it. I mean, generally, they don't do it that often, this type of huge national display of military might. So, yes, I guess they aren't pretty pleased with it. And I guess they're pleased with bringing in the leaders they did from Putin to Narendra Modi, Kim Jong Un, all of these people there in Beijing, very much showing that Xi Jinping is at the center of events as they would see it.
I think something else, really interesting has been going on with China and its relationship with the US. There's quite a lot of evidence now that the US is preparing to change its big strategic idea, which for quite some time, I mean, even if you go back to President Tsubama Biden, this idea that China was the big challenge, sometimes the word threat was used, but the big generational challenge for the US has been quite central, particularly to US security and military policy. And there's been some leaks that the Trump administration is about to abandon that policy and to say that homeland defence is the prime goal of the US national security establishment.
Now, assuming that's true, that causes a lot of disquiet in places like Taiwan, where not only have they had to see the parade in all the new weaponry that China might under certain circumstances throw at them, but this sort of central idea in Taiwan security policy over the last decades that, well, if things got really bad, the Americans would come to their help, is now open to question far more. So that's what I was writing about on Sunday is whether Xi is now arranging things in such a way and capitalising on America's desire to actually step back from the trade war that Donald Trump initially launched, are actually creating circumstances where China could change the position of Taiwan, bring it back to unification with the people's republic without a large war.
Well, I mean, you write that I mean, I hadn't been aware of the extent to which the opposition in Taiwan could be exploited to China's favour. Tell us a bit about that. Well, there's a bit of an odd paradox here. I mean, if you know a little bit about China's history in the Civil War, the people who fought the Communists were a particle, the Kwamin Tang, and they were the people under their leader, Shanghai Shek, who effectively, the last corner of China they were still had when the Communist One, the Civil War, was Taiwan. And so Shanghai Shek was the founder of the state. Now, over time, what's happened is the Kwamin Tang have become more and more Beijing friendly, and that sounds curious.
They still, the party, of course, still normally supports the existence of democratic Taiwan as a separate entity, but they have become a substantial pro-Baging faction in the Taiwanese Parliament. And there's another one too. All of which means that the Democratic Party, that the president heads and was elected in 2024, is a minority government in parliamentary terms. There are opposition parties, in other words, that have more seats in parliament than his party. And there's quite a bit of concern that if push came to shove, if there was a big crisis, let's say China had surrounded Taiwan and was saying that it was going to intercept shipping and turn back flights that were coming in there as parts were ratcheting up of security pressure, that some of these parties might combine and say, look, we don't want to war with China.
Let's stop this kind of misunderstanding and tension happening. Let's get delegation in from the people's Republic into Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, to sort of liaises and make sure things don't go wrong. That sort of scenario is the scenario now that I think many people in the region believe is possible if China chooses a moment in the next year or two to ratchet up military pressure, but short of all out war, and at the same time exploit the kind of political groundwork and information warfare that it's been doing in Taiwan for many years to bring to a head the kind of what you might call the pro-peace camp or the people who don't support, outright confrontation with China to bring about a kind of soft union of the two countries.
I mean, this would be a real paradigm shift from America as well because when America sort of made it plain that it intended or at least wished to retreat militarily from Europe and disengage itself from Ukraine to the extent that was possible, this was generally understood as being a pivot to Asia, in order to be able to devote more resources to Asia. If they're planning on pulling out of Asia effectively as well, this is a very different sort of America, isn't it?
Yeah, no, no, you're completely right. I mean, this is potentially a really big shift. I mean, I don't think even the people who are apparently putting this new national security strategy forward from the Pentagon believe in pulling out of Asia, but what it apparently does is relegates the competition or confrontation with China to secondary status. It would cease to be the main national security objective of US policy.
And that certainly got some people in London. I know that there's been some discussion in the government feeling that Trump no longer has the will to confront China. And he's a bortive hiking of tariffs and then stepping back and the fact that he's pretty keen now, fairly obviously, to get a deal done with China, has meant that he's done various things to try and soothe the atmosphere.
For example, stopped a visit of the Taiwanese defense minister to Washington that was due to happen. So all of these different signals are leading people to question whether the US really still has the willingness to confront China over the Taiwan issue and coming back to the parade that you started this topic with. The idea that the US could suffer a military reverse that China might overmatch them in a confrontation very close to the Chinese mainland in which they could bring to bear all this weaponry that they were showing off.
And they really do have deep stocks of missiles and large numbers of fighters and warships that they could bring into action around Taiwan is also, I think, causing people in the Pentagon to wonder whether it's a confrontation that they could possibly succeed in. So yeah, it's big. It's big in terms of if this is indeed right and there's been some leaks over the weekend about this, that the national security strategy will step back from rivalry with China as the main US goal or seeing off the Chinese threat.
It is really important. And I think the idea that the defense of the homeland becomes the new number one priority is consistent, of course, with what we've seen both with the immigration, the use of the armed forces to deport people and this emerging situation in the Caribbean where Trump seems to want to raise the pressure on the NARCO cartels, destroying a boat last week and putting large numbers of US Navy warships and fighter aircraft into the area.
It is potentially, I think, very significant all of that. Yeah, absolutely. Look, thank you very much. That is Mark Urban. You can hear him this time every Monday. You can read him in the Sunday Times every week. I think of Venezuela as well. I'll have to talk about next week, I'm sure.
And look, if you want more Mark Urban, he's been making some special films for the Times Originals YouTube channel. The latest is called The Old World Or Is the Old World Order Dead. And if you want to know Mark's answers to that question, search Times Originals and you'll find it there along with lots more documentaries, opinion pieces and explainers.