overlaunched this individual told me, you know, every founder and every VC in China studies the west at a nauseating level. So they listened to all the podcasts, they read everything they possibly can, they study any speech, they look at the financials, and he said the west doesn't do that of China. And you know, maybe we should be, maybe we should be studying the best in the brightest of you. Hey, Bill, great to see you. Good to see you, right? Summer has just blown past. It's almost football season. Yes. How are the long horns looking this year? They rank pretty high. What's that mean? Come on. Give me the scoop. I know, I know you're over that people that know, no, but they have the dangerous starting position of being ranked number one in the country. Oh, wow. Well, any big games coming up, they play the number two team in the country this Saturday. And so we're going to find out. We're going to find out. Ah, it's real fun. Like the Buckeye country.
Yeah, exactly. It's been really incredible. You know, I just, I just got back to Silicon Valley after, you know, being away for a few weeks, these, you know, the open AI deal, the anthropic T.O. I was just looking at these. I think these are bigger private IPOs than any public IPO done in the last five years in the tech market. Right. You had Sam say the other day, Sam Altman say, you know, two, two things can be simultaneously true. One that this is the biggest thing to ever happen in technology. But number two, that in the short run things become overheated and people can get a little bit ahead of themselves. Where are you on that? Look, there's just no denying that the amount of capital that is going into these companies earlier in their life. And the scale of hiring and their willingness to take on risk, which I think you can use cash burn. It's just a proxy for risk because you get further away from knowing unit economics.
And, and you're more threatening. You know, I think what those numbers are unprecedented. Like even against, you know, the Uberdor dash wars and all this, they're bigger than that. And so I think it's part of, we've talked about it. I think it's part of a systematic trend where investors are aware of network effects. They've watched companies that get the initial conditions right go on to really big outcomes. And they're willing to bat ahead of the curve. And as the more confident to get over more time, the more they're willing to make that bat ahead of time. And, and so, you know, it is what it is. We're seeing, you know, massive numbers. Well, I would say it's, it's a combination of two things. Extraordinary scaling. We've never seen two companies. In the case of open AI scale users and scale revenue as fast as they are.
But definitely you're absolutely right. The private markets are there to meet them. And we're seeing the depth and the breadth of capital and investment in the private markets. I think unlike anything we've ever seen. But, you know, we're going to save it for, yeah, save it for, let's save it. I, I, I, we're going to save it. Let's save that for another day. We're going to do something a little different today. You know, one topic that I think we, we've hit on time and time again. But we're going to, we're really just try to dedicate the show to it today. And that's China. You know, you just got back from China. It's one of the hottest in many ways most consequential. And also most controversial debates. I think in Silicon Valley and in Washington, you know, on the one hand, you have, I think, national security, economic hawks, you know, who are in this camp that we should decouple.
It's a little bit more cold war 2.0. A great power struggle. This is the mere shimer perspective. You know, maybe in the middle, you have, you know, tech pragmatists, I guess. I might call them, you know, like Jensen Wang or Tim Cook. I'd probably put myself in this camp who thinks we have, we have to compete. We have to re-enshore industry. You probably should have some tariffs in order to achieve that. But you definitely can't decouple or ignore or, or antagonize. And then maybe on the other end, you have kind of the globalist. I don't know Jeff Sacks, Jeffrey Sacks is probably in this camp. It's free trade, open science collaboration. And, you know, there's, this is a tremendous consequence to issues around tariffs and trade issues around military issues around AI.
And there's this new book out by Dan Wang that I want to talk about. You know, where he really takes on the differences between the two countries. But why don't we start with, you know, this trip that you recently took, you know, you just got back from China. Why did, why did you go? You know, and frankly, especially given all the, you know, blowback you've gotten personally benchmarks gotten with respect to China. Maybe for having too soft of you on China. Give me your inspiration for wanting to go and spend as much time as you did studying China.
Yeah, so I've probably been four or five times before this trip, but I hadn't been since COVID. And I've been reading, you know, about everyone that's been going. We talked about Thomas Friedman's comments from his last trip. And you hear about all the things that are different. You know, personally, my, my daughter's an Asian studies major. So she went on the trip with, with myself and my wife. And so, you know, with her studying that topic. This is, I thought it'd be a great chance for her to see things too much younger than us, but I wanted her to go around in the fact that she speaks Mandarin was helpful on the trip as well.
But you know, you've just said something, right? You said, this is probably the most consequential, you know, other nation. When it comes to thinking about America or thinking about our stock markets or thinking about how technology companies are evolving. And so I just wanted to learn like, like, like, why wouldn't you want to know more? I don't understand how you. If it is the most consequential relationship for a country, why you'd want to know less, right? And so I've always enjoyed going over there. I've always enjoyed learning things that I don't know. And I really wanted to see it up close and personal. One thing that was super helpful was Dan Wang, who you just mentioned, gave me an early copy of his book.
So I read it on the way over there. Tell us a little bit. Who is Dan Wang? So it's gentleman that lived over there. He lived over there during COVID. You know, he's a policy analyst. And he recently moved back to the US. He's not the Hoover Institute. Yeah. Been studying China for a long time. Looks at it through the lens of technology and innovation. And the book's titled Breakneck. And it's really talking about some of the acceleration that we've seen in building, you know, inside of China. But, but I would suggest the two things about the book that are really interesting.
One, he kind of uses is a mirror back on the US. So it's really about both countries. It's not just about China. And then two, he's balanced. Like he talks about the pros, you know, and the cons of what have happened over there. He starts with with this chapter that was recently republished in the Atlantic, where he highlights that the vast majority of the Politiburo are former engineers. So this is the ruling party within China. And that the vast majority of the people in Washington DC are former lawyers. And, you know, he uses that lens to say, this is why they're great at building things. And maybe why they're not so great at social things.
I think he gives the edge to having the lawyers to protecting free speech and personal rights. He did not enjoy the lockdown in Shanghai, which was fairly abrupt. He's very negative on the one child policy. And for those people that don't know the Chinese government is now trying to encourage people to have three children, not successfully. But that's the new program. So they've completely flipped from where they were. But it's a fascinating reason. It's very personal reason. You can tell that, you know, his life journey, his parents were born there and left, you know, went to Canada. And that's how he grew up in the West.
And then he went back. And so he has, I think it's a really interesting lens. But it's very, very current. One of the things he really dives into, and this is something that people that I've talked to you that know China have known this for some time. But I don't think the general people understand this. So one of the things that's led to the vast build out. So we've read about high speed trains. We've read about overnight cities. We've read about their number of companies in the solar space and the EV space. One of the reasons that happens is the provincial leaders compete with each other.
So the provinces are very competitive with one another, not in the same way the states are really. One of the reasons this is true is if you run a province and do well, you put yourself in really good standings to move up in the federal government. But wouldn't you say that's it? I mean, that seems to me like Gavin Newsom competing, you know, with DeSantis and Florida on, you know, who has more business friendly? Who is tougher on immigration? It seems a little bit the same way. I think it's a little bit the same way, but the difference is that because there's a singular government that's going to make choices like like in the US, if you do well as a governor, you might get elected. Got it. But in this case, it's more like divisions of a company. And if you run one well, you might get the CEO job.
And so that competition, you know, leads to overbilled in certain cases. So there's several ghost cities that are buildings that are empty, you know, where they've built too fast. Are now facing problems, even though there were a leader in EVs and the world leader in solar panels where some of these companies need to go bankrupt and a province may not want them to because of employment issues. Right. And so those are those are. Flip, you know, two sides of a coin, you get one benefit, you get hyper competition, we talked about the thousand flowers bloom. So the federal government publishes every five years. This this mandate of the things, these are the things that are important.
And you need to go work on. And then the province is, you know, go go at it. Like they go right against those initiatives. And that's that's how they've got taken a lead in those things. We mentioned an energy production, right. You wonder we talk about all the number of nuclear plants that they have new nuclear start solar farms, when farms dig into that bill. I think there's this general view that China's good at building things, building iPhones, but perhaps not at innovating. Right. And then, you know, Jensen Wang reminded us recently that 50% of the world's AI researchers are in China. And they're indeed innovating and not copying, you know, on the ground, when you look at the things happening in auto, when you look at the things happening in AI, when you look at that things happening in space or energy, et cetera.
How would you compare contrast as a venture capitalist, the level of rigor and innovation and excitement and enthusiasm. And investment, I guess going on against these, you know, critical future industries. Well, if you're over there, you you know that the bite dance founder is just remarkably unique. You know, Lesion, et jami is remarkably unique. And if you spend time studying those people, I just, I don't know how you would possibly think that they can't innovate. I mean, Tiktok was there first, right. And then it came here and then Reels Copy Tiktok. One thing that doesn't seem like innovation, but I was surprised by popmart is a 40, 50 billion dollar public company, which is a children's toy company that started in China and is everywhere over there.
But like just the idea that there is no innovation, you know, one, one of my favorite meetings and I promised I would protect the innocent. So I'm not going to share who it was with. But overlaunched this individual told me, you know, every founder and every VC in China studies the West at a nauseating level. So they listened to all the podcasts. They read everything they possibly can. They study any speech. They look at the financials. And he said, the West doesn't do that of China. And you know, maybe this goes back to my main motivation for going over there to learn, but that I thought that was a very provocative statement that he made, you know, and maybe we should be. Maybe we should be studying the best and the brightest over there.
Well, let's dive into, you know, maybe one industry, I guess, as a lens. I know you spend a bunch of time in the auto industry. Looking at all of these new entrants and I will help us understand the innovation that's happening. There are two dimensions. One on, you know, just electric vehicles. Number two on, you know, maybe autonomy. And then number three, I'm just curious like how Tesla is able to compete so effectively, you know, in a market where you have this hyper competition for electric vehicles. Yeah. So I had a number of auto experiences when I was over there. First of all, I was invited to visit BYD. This is my, they gave me a nice coat. I met with Stella Lee, who is their number one executive, I think, facing outside of China.
She runs all their Europe initiatives. For those people that don't know, BYD is the largest EV manufacturer in the world at about four million vehicles. They started in batteries. They, you know, they compete with Foxconn to build mobile phones. They bought Jable Circuit. You remember that old company. And they make lots of things. They make buses and subways and all kinds of different things. But they got into cars. I don't know about five to ten years ago. They have a number of models. They gave me this one. This is, you know, a very kind of high-end sports car. In fact, I met a public company CEO that was proudly showing me this was his favorite car that he drives around.
They make an SUV. You can drive into the water. I don't know exactly why you want to do that. But we rode it into the water, drove around in the water and drove out. They have cars at 10 to 15 grand price point on the entry side. They've hired a European designer. It's just how they're building stuff like this on the higher end. And they're very aggressive from a cost perspective. I think BYD more than anyone on the cost side. It's not preventing them from building higher end cars as well. So that's BYD.
I also had a chance to visit Jaume. They also gave me a car. Jaume is a super interesting story if people don't know. So I was fortunate enough to meet Ladies Jume back in 0304. But about 10 to 13 years ago he started a phone company. And that's what Jaume is. And that company is now third around the globe and handsets sold heavy in Europe, heavy in South America, not just China.
And three to four years ago, I think around 2021 he decided to build a car. And it was about the same time Apple said they were going to build a car. And in mind you, this guy was back in 03's, ran an e-commerce company called Joyo. Like he's he wasn't there’s no reason he should be able to build a phone and then build a car. So what do you attribute that to Bill? Like why? You know, when you see that, you know, again, going back to Dan Wang's book, he's like, this is an engineering culture that has built these technological ecosystems that gives rise to a higher velocity of innovation.
You know, then we see in the United States that Dan would argue is bogged down by, you know, regulatory capture and lawyers, etc. Why do you think, you know, Jume is so successful? And by the way, let me just share with you some numbers. So so they're making a thousand of these a day. They just came out with a kind of a kind of a thousand cars a day. Yeah. In this in the factory that I went to. It's it’s they're sold out. They have like a 30 to 40 week backlog. You have to pay five grand to get on the waiting list.
The factory, this is an interesting data point. The factory makes a thousand cars a day with 2000 employees. It was highly automated. Like really highly automated. I imagine that they plan to improve that number over the next five years. Let's say they took it to a thousand employees for a thousand cars. That'd be an employee per car per day. That number is like at six in the US. And that's super interesting for a number of things. Like if you want to bring the jobs back there, but the time you get the jobs back there may not be any jobs.
Like like at one because of automation, the entire global, you know, potential for car manufacturing in five or 10 years from now could be like 400 K total. And so, you know, we just need to be really thoughtful about those things. But back to Lesion. He gave a talk in 2024. We're talking about maybe people should be watching and learning in both directions that I would encourage people to watch. It's on YouTube. It's his state of the union from 2024.
And he spends about an hour talking about his approach to building a car. And it sounded like so ridiculously. I don't like like you ask about entrepreneur. He he decided that he hadn't been driving a car for 10 years because he had had a driver. So he immediately switched seats with his driver. And then he he went through the parking lot at his company. And if there was ever a car, he had not driven. He'd leave a note on it and asked to borrow it.
And then he would have the owner of the car, tell him what they liked and didn't like. So he claimed to drove 170 cars that way. And then he also liked B.Y.D. they hired a European designer that came in and helped him out. But for an entrepreneur who had never been in a car business to build a factory in a three year window and looked same thing was true. Our friend Omeid built a factory in Texas.
And he was under 40, just spectacular that these entrepreneurs are capable of doing these things. But it just kind of blows my mind. Like when I was being driven in this golf cart through this factory, just thinking that this person wasn't in the business three or four years ago. And people that don't know I'd encourage you to go online. And so the CEO Ford Farley, he went over there and I think had the exact same tour I did. And he insisted they ship him one back to Chicago. And he's been driving it around. And he's made some pretty extreme statements. After having experienced John me this car sells for about 40 K. But he said it's the most humbling thing I've ever seen. And he says even beyond that, their cost, their quality of vehicles is far superior to what I see in the West.
We are in a global competition with China. And it's not just EVs. If we do not, if we lose this, we do not have a future at Ford. You know, that that's Farley at Ford. You know, and I, by the way, I would take a pause after mentioning that to the people that are going to accuse just because I went over there to learn, accused me of somehow being like an agent for the CCP. Is that also true of the CEO Ford? You know, like why is he saying these things? Like we're just witnessing what's happening on the ground.
One of my observations is, and you hear this from Elon, you hear this from Jensen Huang, you hear this from Tim Cook, you hear it from Farley. It's extreme respect for the level of innovation, for the focus, for the engineering led culture that exists in China. And that to me, one of the reasons I wanted to do this pod on China is because I think it's as much a reflection about what the United States needs to do to reengineer its own society. Right. It's not enough to say that we want to re-enshore critical manufacturing.
It really is about, you know, this movement around American exceptionalism, America builds. It's about making the reforms necessary, whether it's regulatory capture, whether it's the, you know, tort reform, legal reform required to frankly allow, you know, this level of innovation and recognize that we're in this global competition. You know, and there are two ways in which you can, you can approach this bill. One is we can build barriers. We can try to decouple and we can pretend the rest of the world somehow won't buy China's goods.
You know, but if you look at it today, the US only represents about 14% of China's exports. The US only represents about 3% of China's GDP. Yeah. Right. So like we're just not that important to China. I don't want to understate like, you know, we're still very significant. But China has found a market in Europe. They found a market in Africa. They found a market in South America. Right. And it seems to me that the harder pill for the US to swallow.
你知道,但如果你看看今天,美国仅占中国出口的约14%。美国仅占中国 GDP 的约3%。是吧。所以我们对中国来说并不是那么重要。我不是说我们一点都不重要,我们仍然非常重要。但是中国已经在欧洲找到了市场,在非洲找到了市场,在南美洲找到了市场。对我来说,这对美国来说可能是更难接受的现实。
And this is where I think that, you know, I'm in the camp of those in the middle who say, we need to engage. We need to compete. There is a competition. We want to win the competition. But this is about focusing on us and when in running a faster race, we have a lot of reforms. I think a lot of occurring now. I think we're doing the type of things that we need to be doing in order to get more globally competitive, there are industries that are critical to our national security.
You know, things like rare earth magnets, things like, you know, steel productions, things like pharmaceuticals, where I think it is appropriate to have both an industrial policy and a terror policy that's going to provide the incentives to those industries. Yeah. But it's, you know, to me, you know, the reflection on what I hear you saying about China when I read Dan's book is that China is putting the accelerator to the floor in terms of innovation.
And it's in every single industry. It's powered by, you know, the this provincial competition you talked about is powered by people who are just, you know, naturally entrepreneurial and hard working. And there's no escaping that. And there's no putting that genie back in the box. What do you thoughts on that? Yeah. No, I think it's exactly right. I mean, B by D has a big presence in Hungary and they have a fact they're building a factory in or already have one in Mexico.
And why if you're Mexico, would you not buy the 10 to 20 grand EV? Why would you buy the 50 grand one from America? It just doesn't make any sense, right? Like you're, if for any country around the world. And I could reflect this on the US as well. If you're not going to buy, you know, domestically, you should certainly buy from the low cost producer, right? It goes back to, to compare to advantage, right?
If you can't produce a globally competitive product and you close your import border. Your people are forced to buy a product that is overpriced and not. And so from a, from a standard of living perspective, they're worse off. Then they would be if you had opened the import door. And so I don't, you know, I'll give you another example of this. So this is the B wide, this is the Apollo competitor to Waymo. So we've, we've seen the Waymo's around Austin and San Francisco. We've written in them. This is, I've written in this now. It's a little bigger. I think a little roomier than, than, than the Jaguar for sure. It's more of an SUV. But this is on the streets. You know, and Apollo is kind of interesting. It's inside of Bidu, which is a search engine company.
While people are simultaneously, what people are saying that the Waymo should be worth 170 billion inside of, of Google, you can buy shares of Bidu for zero enterprise value. It's a 30 billion market cap, 30 billion in cash on the books. And from a global perspective, I don't know why, if this is 30K, why you'd wanted to deploy Waymo's, which people say are over 150K, partially due to the, to the MIMS solid state, LiDAR advantage that China has, which we've talked about previously. So yeah, I think rest of the world is a really interesting thing to think about, you know, when you compare the two countries, because I don't think that I, I personally, I don't have a ton of data on this, but I personally don't think all the other countries in the world share the same level of hawkishness that, at least part of the members of our national government have.
And so I don't think they're going to be as afraid of their technologies. Let's think about this in the context of, you know, what you've seen, if you were giving advice to Trump on export controls, for example, Bill, you know, whether it's on, you know, AI chips or other things. You know, would you be, you know, what would your advice be? Well, I mean, I think you hit on some of it around the red tape and, you know, there's a couple different things. In certain industries where we're really behind, I would be very open-minded to JVs coming towards us. You know, for the past 50 years, you know, European car manufacturers, US car manufacturers, they open facilities in China. Some of them were forced to be 49% on 51% on.
I'd be very open to that kind of thing. There was some positive news out this past week following Trump's engagement with Korea around nuclear, which we have talked about before. Korea can build a nuclear plant for one-fourth the price that we can. Why don't you invite them to come help us build a few in the US and see what we can learn. And I wonder if we should allow for, there's going to be, there are so many EV companies, I didn't even mention, you know, Neo and Zeaker and some of these other things. They're all innovating in different ways. But some of those are going to have financial trouble. You can see those public. You can see that the stock's not doing all that well.
But would we let a ford or a GM buy one of those companies, right? Maybe we should. I don't know if the China government would let them. Would we let one of those companies open a JV with Ford or GM in the US? I think we should if we'd learned from it. And you could say the same thing about solar or any of these technologies where they have a lead, solar, nuclear. So I would be open minded to those types of things. I would be really big on trying to get regulation out of the way and recognizing that, that an autocratic country that has specific goals can move so much faster in any industry than you ever could in the US. Because we've created so many people whose jobs that are to block things.
And we're seeing I think we're seeing that type of behavior in certain states, which is why TSM season Arizona, which is why Teslas and Texas. I would give governorship here a lot of credit for reopening three mile island and what he did with I 95 like like all those things are signs of recognizing that we've built mud, you know, in our system that prevents building. And how do you get how do you start to remove that and move in the opposite direction? Specifically, you know, thinking about the tariff. So, you know, I think that the president tweeted yesterday morning if we don't get it was appearing that we're on a glide path and making a lot of progress with China. We may very well be.
I think he tweeted yesterday morning that if we don't get rare earth magnets from China, he could raise the tariff rate to 200%. There was some talk that he was going to visit China in the first week of September. So that's, you know, right around the corner. I said on a couple pods ago, I thought that, you know, the way to understand this president is that he's a self described deal junkie. He's a pragmatist. He's not an ideologue. He seems to me that when he's talking with Jensen Wang and others, he falls in that kind of pragmatic, centrist category. He certainly wants to rebuild stuff in the United States, but at the same time it appears to me he wants to get a big deal done on China. Where do you come down again if you were advisor on the tariff side of things, Bill? Do you think he's going to get a big deal done with China? Do you think that's the right thing to do? And how do you think that influences some of the building that you're talking about?
Okay. This is, I have zero insight. I didn't meet with anyone in the CCP or the government. So I have no idea what with their mindset. I think that's pure speculation on my point, my part. You already brought up the fact that we're a much smaller percentage of their exports than people realize and people think about. And as a result, you know, I think that they're going to be China is going to be far more biased by what they view as fair and face saving. Then they are necessarily like numeric. And so I think if we, if someone were to approach them in a pragmatic way, I think a pragmatic deal could easily get done. You know, if they are engineers, as Dan Wayne said, it's not like, you know, they wouldn't accept a pragmatic outcome. I think they would. But if we, if we're intent on being derogatory in our language.
And by the way, that's the thing that I just really don't understand that you see in Washington, you see it on that select committee of the CCP. And you see it from some of the people in Silicon Valley. I just don't understand the value of being a belligerent. But many people clearly are. I mean, they have four times the number of citizens on this earth than we do. Everybody's, you know, country of birth is something that happens to them outside of their control. So I just don't know why vilifying a billion people is a good idea. So I think it's possible. I think there's it. I think they would do a deal. And I just don't know if, if we get caught up in a silly tit for tat verbal war with the benefit of that is. And anything like that, and this is one of the point Saxomakes, Jeffrey Saxon, David, you might provoke war three.
So what do you, what do you, what's, how do you put that into your MPV calculation? Is it fair to say that, you know, I think if you look at tariffs, heading into this year, they basically doubled on China. But if we put tariffs on, you know, particular industries in order to incent building and industries in the United States, imagine it was a deal a bit like Japan bill where we also, you know, cut a deal with the Chinese that they had a trillion dollars of investment the way we have with other companies that go into the US into some of these, you know, industries. And that we perhaps get some reciprocity and reduction of barriers to some Chinese goods into China. Where, how would you handicap that? Did you get any sense or, or, you know, do you get any sense from the stuff you read in the United States as to the probability that I think it's one of the biggest influences as we look at growth in the back half of this year.
We look at market sentiment in the back half of this year. Just curious where you stand on that. Ironically, one of the things that, I mean, like I said, I met with, I met with companies and founders and, and a few academicians, but I did, and some journalists, but I didn't meet with, with the government. But in general, there's just not any hostility from their side, from that group of people that I met with. In fact, most of those, most of those people look up to the US founders that have done great things that I've met with. And so, I think that I've met with companies that have done great things, the jobs and the e-lons, and most of them aspire to compete globally. The same way a founder in the US would like.
And so, they would like to see all this rhetoric die down, and they would like to have the opportunity to come to the US market. They'd like the opportunity to compete in Europe and South America. Many are, Xiaomi and BYD are already are. Like I said, I think there's a pragmatic deal to do to the extent. And if, if that led to the types of programs that I just talked about, this kind of JV thing where there's a market there, a leader in, and we, you know, have that company come to the US and help us understand how to compete in some of these technologies and get to lower price points, I think that'd be fantastic.
Do you feel like over the last 20 years, who do you think's gotten the best out of the relationship, Bill? You know, I haven't read this Apple China book. A lot of people have been talking about it, and I aim to. I think the problem with looking at it that way is, you know, you and I've talked about this finite versus infinite game is, you know, where are we in the time of the planet? And what do you think the planet's going to look like, you know, 15, 20, 30 years from now?
I mean, I think it'd be very easy to say, you know, using your framing to say the US took advantage of Europe post World War II. And a lot of the manufacturing that existed prior to World War II shifted to America. And so you could then with that same frame say, yeah, China, you know, grew on the back of America and, you know, from, from that time. But I kind of look at it another way, which is there have been different periods where these different countries have industrialized, you know, we were a huge beneficiary post World War II because most of Asia and Europe had been blown up and there was no production capability whatsoever.
And a lot of the kind of glory day mindset that we have about what life and generational change should be like in the US come from that time, which is a bit unfair. And so, you know, from a global perspective, but there's a ton of hard working people over there, you know, dang job being brought capitalism underneath the Chinese government and led to the biggest, you know, increase in standard of living of any, there's like 500 million people came out of poverty as a result to that.
You know, when people say, oh, we should have never let the jobs go there. I don't think they really want to say, well, we shouldn't have let 500 million people out of poverty. You know, it's the same people that want to talk about aid in Africa and whatnot. So a lot of people benefited in China, but they're also hard working people and we talk a lot about meritocracies, right? And some of the same people that talk about meritocracies are anti-China.
And so that's a hard thing to square because if someone's willing to work twice as hard, you know, as you and, you know, willing to study harder and all that kind of stuff, are they doing not deserve a chance at a life like you have? I think the bigger complaint is that we were naive in our trade policy and therefore we allowed huge advantages to flow to other areas. And, you know, by the way, as Dan says in his book, at the same time, we were actually moving to more of a regulatory state in the United States.
So, you know, like our companies were getting less competitive at the same time we were helping their companies get more competitive. And there was a lot of collateral damage in the United States during that period of time. And I think right now people are saying, okay, we're moving into this age of AI, but we have to get back to driving reform in the United States that levels that plane field a bit. And so, you know, you can't undo the past, but I do think there's a recognition that, you know, we need to do the things in order to incentivize US industry to compete more effectively in a lot of these different categories.
I think it is going to be tricky though. You know, if you say, you know, you've got 100 competitors in the EV industry in China, they're all willing to work on razor thin margins, and they're willing to sell cars into Europe at $20,000 or $25,000. Today, as Farley said, there is not a US manufacturer, Sans, perhaps Tesla, that comes anywhere close to being able to compete in that way on a global basis.
One thing I've been studying a bit is I do think that the Chinese government's more has more scrutinists of monopolies. You know, I don't think that they, I think they would consider it a negative if there were seven companies worth $3 trillion or whatever. I don't think they care about market cap. I think they care more about employment and global competitiveness, which would cause you to support low margin companies. And, you know, they get to choose to make that choice.
I'm not judging it, but it would result in this outcome. You know, in addition to the Farley quote, the Mercedes CEO said, we need a reality check when he was talking about Chinese EVs and then Stelantis, I guess is the new name. Stelantis, who rolled up a bunch of other car companies, they said Chinese EVs are quote, possibly the biggest risk facing his car maker and Tesla. And he criticized, this is Carlos Tavarez, he publicly criticized EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles calling them a major trap for automakers.
And this is, you know, you talk about what policy would fix things. I'll tell you what policy will make things worse. You know, you start protecting US industries by putting export tariffs on the most competitive products around the world, which I talked about earlier. Now your consumers don't have access to those price points. And so you're buying inferior goods at inflated prices. And that's going to lead to inflation and prosperity and standard of living, living levels dropping in the US. So there's a lot of variables. I would say that's generally true.
I think if there's a moment, you know, if there was a national strategy to improve competitiveness in an industry that had been, you know, let's just say had an unfair plane field for a period of time. Like I could see a national strategy. For example, we talked about pharmaceutical manufacturing. We talked about chip manufacturing. We talked about rare earths where you would say, OK, we're going to actually impose a tariff because these other goods are flooding. And it deprives us of the ability to build our own domestic industry.
But I think we have to be very careful when you do that bill to your point. We know that unfettered competition will lead to, you know, is going to lead to much better products, much lower prices. And when you start protecting these industries, what I worry about is you protect the regulatory grift and the overlawiering that Dan talks about in his book, right? We got to face up to this fact that we have to reform some of these, you know, basic things in the United States. And that's why you see companies like Tesla moving to Texas where those reforms are moving forward.
但我认为,当你按照你的观点去制定法案时,我们必须非常小心。我们知道,不受限制的竞争会带来更好的产品和更低的价格。而当你开始保护这些行业时,我担心的是,你可能会保护到像 Dan 在他的书中提到的那些监管上的腐败和过多的法律操作。我们必须正视这个事实,我们需要改革美国的一些基础事务。这也是为什么像特斯拉这样的公司搬到得克萨斯,因为那里正在推进这些改革。
And I think, you know, I think we are making progress on that. But I, you know, I think there is a rationale for those critical national industries. But I generally agree with you that if we move to high levels of protection because we simply can't compete because it takes, you know, us, you know, 10 people in an auto plant to do what they do with one person in an auto plant, I think that's unsustainable. And I think we need to be careful with the rhetoric we throw around.
So, so I'll give an example. So, if you read what comes out of the biggest hawks, they say, well, everyone in China just steals things and the government subsidizes everything. So, I brought that up with, I brought up the subsidization with Stella Lee, a B.Y.D. and she said, she said, if I'm getting all this government subsidy money, can you please find it and show it to me? We're a public company. Come show me the money I'm getting from the government. She just said, I'm getting nothing.
And then, you know, you look at the US, like we give companies subsidies all the time to build factories. We've had EV credits for the past 10 years, both at a state and a federal level. Intel's getting money from the US government. Like, I don't understand where we're sitting. Like, it's very unclear to me, like what we're pointing at and accusing and why it doesn't, isn't the same thing here.
And then lastly, you know, Elon's published all the Tesla patents. Okay. So, there's free IP for Ford and GM. And I would ask you, with that free IP, if we gave Ford and GM subsidies, do you think they'd immediately be competitive with China? No, sir. Okay. And if I ask 100 smart investors that question, what would they say? I think they would agree with me.
Yeah. So, the thing we're accusing them of being the reason they're succeeding, if you flipped and gave that to the US companies, none of us have confidence that would work. So, that's what I'm saying. You just got to try and get as much information as you can, learn as much as you can. So, I just want people to have a pragmatic view and an accurate view as they make decisions.
I did a deep dive on your favorite product chat, TBT, 300 dollar version, deep research. And on the 24 members of the select committee for the CCP, and I think all the form of never been to China. Right. And the ones that went, it was seven years ago. I just encourage them to go visit if they're going to sit there and have such strong opinions. It'd be good if they were educated.
I wouldn't want, if you were putting together a committee inside of your corporation that's going to be in charge of something, wouldn't you want the most educated people on that committee? I can already hear the criticism. Oh, yeah. You know, of course, people would say, well, we don't expect the CEO of BYD to tell you the truth necessarily about government subsidies or things like that.
But here's the one thing I want to get across in, you know, kind of this pragmatist camp. We do have to be self reflective. Right. If we have this, if we have this view, the only reason China's competitive or winning is because they're stealing or they're subsidized, I think what that view does is it allows us to dilute ourselves into believing we don't need to get better ourselves.
Yeah. Right. It's like if you're playing a competition and, you know, your kids out there playing in a football game or swimming race and they lose the race and they come back to you and they say, well, the only reason that person won was, you know, they cheated. You know, like you're in mice, I think is no, you've got to get better yourself. We've got to get better. How can we get better? And I think that's why holding this balanced and realistic view of China, what's actually happening on the ground? How hard right folks are working? What the level of innovation is the fact that the United States is is a diminishing part of their trade of their GDP, etc. I think that should cause us to look a little bit inward about how the hell do we accelerate? How do we build more? How do we invest more? How do we, you know, get more globally competitive?
Why does it cost us four to five times to build a vision reactor in this country? Why are we building no nuclear reactors in this country? And so the good news is this. I feel like there's a lot of momentum under this administration that was building before this administration around investing in America, getting more globally competitive, right? A lot of people want to build things here again, you know, and you got, you have somebody like Jensen Huang who says, both can be true. We need to sell H 20s and B 30s into China. We need to stay relevant in their ecosystem. But at the same time, we need to build plants in Arizona. We need to rehabilitate and invest aggressively in our own domestic chip program. Those things can be simultaneously true.
And it's interesting that all of those CEOs who spend the most time competing in China, you know, they all fall in that pragmatist, realist camp, you know, in the center about, you know, the United States needs to get serious about the work that it needs to do if it wants to remain globally competitive. With that said, Bill, can we shift for a second? I want to, you know, look at this through the lens of kind of just what's going on in AI. You know, I know you spend a bunch of time over there looking at the key players on the model side on the, you know, thinking about the chip side, et cetera. So maybe just round out that other conversation and then shift there.
Yeah, so, so one thing, one thing to note that that isn't in the Dan Wang book, but I think that we can infer from it. The government every five years publishes this five year plan. The last one was the 14th, and I think the next one will be coming out soon. I would encourage everyone to read that because that's where they tell the provinces what's important to work on. And that historically is led to these areas where they're investing heavily and they might make a mistake in what they say to focus on, but when they've gotten a right, it's led to a lot of global competitiveness. So I would watch that. But in the in the last one in the 14th, they literally talked about open source. And so, you know, I'll put a link in. I found a document that covers all the history of Chinese open source, but it goes back 20 years. This isn't an overnight thing. And our government recently said they were pro open source in this new AI executive order, but, but, but this was kind of pushed out to the provinces.
And so two things I would say about the I market there. First of all, no one's particularly concerned about there being a monopolist because there's so many open models. So there's in general, I think from the entrepreneur's perspective, a more relaxed, you know, opinion, because they can work on products and they can take in all these different models. I think I think deep sea has the most kind of intellectual brand because of how that arrived and almost the national pride that came along with it. Quinn is a really important player mainly because Alibaba leads in the cloud market over there. They're about us. You may know you and your team may know more of these stats than me, Brad, but I think they're like a 70% player in the cloud market.
And so that just gives them a natural place to deliver models from that makes it important. And then on the consumer side, you know, bite dance, it seems to be the company to watch on anything consumer and they already have an app. If someone said whose app is closest open a eyes in China, it's already an app from bite dance that's out there. On the watch list, people are very curious if Tencent's going to do something, you know, obviously they we chat still extremely important in China. And so that's a great asset if they were to bring something, but they haven't been particularly aggressive. And then Jaume, because of Lesion, everybody wonders what he might do. And you know owning the phone and that big a market share might give you some advantages when we've talked about that with the US players.
So that's kind of that's what I would say is the state of affairs over there on when it comes to AI on the model layer. And then the middle layer is do you think there's an acknowledgement or a belief that they're basically they have the tools they have the chips, you know, with Huawei, et cetera, to be competitive like is there a sense in China that, you know, when code is going to be competitive with cloud code. You know, we know they're all open source. Do you think there is a sense that they all say at the frontier. Like I had that sense before I went just because of the number of competitive open source models in the way they can trade train each other. You just have a much more natural environment to have this kind of hyper competition that we talked about in EVs or solar, like having that many open source providers gives you that I would say even maybe more because of the way the models can help one another at least in the EV case like you can't take someone else as EV and make yours better, but here you can.
Can we talk about that just open for a second. Let me double click on this. You know, obviously we saw open AI open source, you know, a model a few weeks back. Now we have comments this week out of Elon. They're they're getting back to more aggressively open sourcing. You've obviously got meta already, you know, with llama out there on the open source front. And I saw you at a tweet yesterday, maybe bill just on you are surprised that Google had not taken a more aggressive position with respect to open sourcing Gemini. Do you think they will? Why do you think they haven't and why do you think it would be the right thing for them to do that? Well, I had some replies to that tweet to get into this, but this goes back to where you started the podcast.
I don't think public companies understand or I don't think they've internalized and really come to terms with the fact that the private markets are willing to bet so aggressively on these new players. And I, you know, we're talking about AI today, but this could be true of any new disruption in the future when I was going through the Uber lift wars and you know, we'd be in board meetings and look at these burn rates and all this money we're spending you talk about whether or not to raise another round and certainly thought about doing what Sam did and trying to talk capital out of the market, which never seems to work. But you get frustrated with that game and you want to, you know, but but you're dealing with business decisions that you would never see in another industry.
And so getting back to the question you ask, you know, I just don't know like if everything's at stake for Google, should they be willing to lose five or 10 billion dollars because the startup that's attacking their space is willing to lose that amount of money. And I think it's an ironic situation we're in where the private markets and the startups are willing to be more aggressive, perhaps and more risk seeking than the public incumbents are. And I think, you know, our friend Rich Barton took a lot of heat at Zilla when he when he chased open door, but he was faced with a situation where a private company was claiming it was going to out innovate him and disrupt his game. And some of Wall Street had come to believe that.
And so he engaged and he played that game on the field. Now that eventually turned out to not be true. And and maybe if he hadn't engaged competitively with open door, maybe they wouldn't have kind of tripped and fallen. But but it was probably the right thing to do. And I don't think a lot of public companies think that way. Now Google historically when it came to AWS open source Kubernetes and went after him when it came to Apple, the open source to Android. And certainly some of their lower models are open source and competitive on open router. But maybe they should be more aggressive even still because of what it's at stake. That was that was my point.
Okay, shifting back real quick and you know, we'll round up here in China. You know, the VC market in China, we just rewind the clock, you know, not that long ago bill. And you know, there was a lot of US enthusiasm. There were a lot of US firms investing directly in China. Right from Sequoia to GGV, a lot of those firms either shut down or spun off their operations. You know, in China. Benchmark has taken a lot of, you know, heat for doing an investment, man, is that, you know, I've read benchmark explain really isn't even, you know, based in China. What do you see, you know, when you were there, do you see a lot of US investors actively investing on the venture side in China and then what is the Chinese venture ecosystem look like?
So a couple different things. So first of all, there's a real lack of Westerners of for all my trips. This was the, the fewest Westerners that I've ever seen. And the high end hotels and the high end restaurants were fairly empty. And I think that it just has to do with the thawing of the relationship that's caused less travel from Westerners. The VC market is in a bit of a lull because when, when these policies all changed and when, you know, the Jack Ma thing happened when DD got pulled back from the US markets when the for profit education companies got taken out and when, you know, we chat went, I mean, a 10 cent went flat for a couple of years because of games reforms, all those things took a lot of air out of the system.
And caused a lot of people to reconsider. And then you also had, and I don't even know if this is more led by the US government of China government, you had splitting of the venture capital firms, Sequoia split and half GGV split now. And, and so there are much fewer Western dollars available to invest in China. And so, you know, there are a few firms that have stayed, you know, Neil Chinat Hongshan had raised a ton of money right before all this happened.
He's very active. Has a huge staff of people. Anna Fang and Zenfun, which is an angel group of very active and IDG is highly present and has been active. But that's only three firms, you know, and compared to where things were six years ago when every one of our competitors in the venture industry were making an annual trip. It's, it's kind of night and day. And then there's not that many R&B dollars available to the venture market.
A lot of the, you don't have the foundations and, and university endowments that you do here. And the billionaires that have made wealth typically are looking to diversify offshore. And so you just don't have a lot of R&B dollars seeking a home. And now you have the provinces entering the investment space, which is an uncomfortable reality for some of the VCs. They're asked, I hear they're asking for terms that you and I would consider non starters.
You know, and so that's, it's all a little bit messy. It's funny because it's simultaneously with some of these markets, EVs, autonomous robotics where they're where the country is doing extremely well. So I found those things off a little bit. And it's very, everyone's very aware that if the government decides your company is doing something that's not in the best interest of the citizenry that that's going to get corrected.
And so there's a phrase, I don't know if it was in Dan's book or I read somewhere else called don't be the tallest tree. That's a problem for you. Exactly. Yeah, in that regard, do you think, you know, that's what I was I was wondering, you know, there seems to be a ton of entrepreneurial activity, despite the fact that, you know, VCs have retreated that you have companies that are not going public and have been shut down.
You have entrepreneurs that have gone missing. It doesn't really seem to have diminished, you know, the activity around, you know, around AI, as we were talking about. Or startups or entrepreneurs and in fact, a lot of the locals heavily dispute that financial times graph that was going around about the number of startups that said it just mismeasured the whole thing.
And so no, I don't sense that there's any lack of enthusiasm from entrepreneurs and towns like Shinson, where, where DJI and B.I.D. and Huawei are all located. I mean, that town is a new young 20 million people, highly energetic, you know, town with lots of stuff happening, you know, lots of stuff. You said something to me, well, before we wrapped, is there anything else, anything else that we didn't cover that you want to, you want to hit on?
There's two things I would hit on, you know, you talked about innovation. One thing, one thing that you notice very quickly as a westerner is no one takes credit cards. They used to like the last time I went, but it's almost 100% we chat pay and I'll like pay. And if you can't get those to work on your phone, you're screwed, man, you can't pay for anything.
What's the, what's the government's position on crypto? I don't know the answer to that question. I don't, but, but because they've been using these apps for so long, you've started to see incremental innovation around that. So most restaurants you go to not to very high in ones, there's a QR code on your table that QR code not only represents the restaurant, but it represents the table.
And you can order from that, you can pay from that. Like, like, so if you are done eating, I want to pay and leave you just scan and pay and go, you walk right out and, you know, we're far away from that in the US, that amount of automation around payment. And it's just interesting and that goes from, you know, the high end hotel and restaurant will take we chat pay and the street vendor will take it.
Right. It's, it's universal. So that's one thing. The other thing that I would just mention very recently, China announced something called the K visa. And one of the, one of the things that's happened recently because of, I'd say an increased agitation between the two countries is there been a number of very recent policies in America that are impacting skilled immigration. Especially at the university level. And I did hear stories over there of groups of 50 or 100 PhD students who had been admitted into a university and we're now being told they can't attend.
And you and I and everyone have talked about skilled immigration and how that's been kept flat in the US. And now, you know, at least with regard to China, we're starting to put up blockers and on top of that, you've seen these other charts were like 50% of the I researchers in America are Chinese. And so that that's something that's super interesting to watch. And this K visa thing, which they've never done before, says, if you are studying technology, you know, I don't know the exact rules. You don't even have to have a job.
So this isn't like in the US, you need a, you're welcome to come. They're going to give you a visa. So China's basically inviting everyone to come to their university systems from around the globe. I don't know how successful they'll be. I don't know if Europeans will go there. But it's an interesting thing to see. Again, it's just a reminder to me like I continue to think that the US is in an incredible position on a global basis, an incredible position, visa, V China. But decisions matter.
And you know, we talked about stapling a green card, every, you know, every diploma as you know, the president did as part of the presidential race. And certainly I think there's ample opportunity for upside to accelerate, to attract, to build in the US. And I hope that one of the takeaways of this conversation, the many conversations we ought to have. And that's why I think being overly dogmatic leads us astray is we got to reflect on the things that we can be doing better to run a faster race ourselves.
Right. And I've heard you say this before, you know, the old quote from the godfather never hate your enemies. You know, it clouds. It affects your judgment. And I think there's a lot of that going on in Silicon Valley and other places that, you know, we're going to be a lot better off if we're very pragmatic about there's no slowing down in China. They're going to be there in AI. They're going to build chips at Huawei. They're going to build models at deep seek.
好的。我以前听你提到过《教父》中的一句名言:永远不要憎恨你的敌人,你知道的,这会影响你的判断。我认为在硅谷和其他地方,这样的事情很多。如果我们非常务实地看待问题,我们会过得更好,因为中国的发展不会放缓。他们会在人工智能领域崭露头角,会在华为制造芯片,也会在 Deep Seek 建立模型。
And the way to beat them is not to, you know, try to cut them off at the knees. We don't need to make it easy on them. But the United States needs to accelerate our race. And I think by if we focus too much on how do we slow down China, we take the eye off the ball on how to accelerate our own race. So it's fun spending one of these just digging deep on a particular topic. It sounds like an incredible trip.
Yeah. And I would just echo what you said. Like, like, especially just on learning. Like my, my main point to anyone dissensionist topic would be just make sure you have the exact right information as you then go to make decisions, especially around policy. And, you know, talk read, read what these global car CEOs are telling you they've been over there. They're seeing it with their own eyes. They don't, they don't have a reason to be as candid as they're being necessarily, but they are.
And then read Dan Wings book. I think it's fabulous. Like Tyler Collins said it might be one, it might be the best book of the year. It's very well written and and enjoy to read. And I would encourage everyone to go pick it up. It's called break neck. And I think it's out now today. Now, you literally can go on chat GPT and just ask it, you know, what your favorite CEO, you know, what's Jensen Wang think about the level of competition in China?
What's Tim Cook think? What's Elon Musk think? The reality is the people who spend the most time on the ground in China have the most respect for, you know, the innate, you know, capabilities and ongoing competition that we're going to see with China. And, you know, and I thought that Dan had a really balanced view at the end, which is, you know, we shouldn't go out of our way to make it really easy on China, but at the same time, we got to engage. We got to be, you know, pragmatic.
We can't stick our head in the sand. And we have to know that we got to reform ourselves. We got to run a faster race ourselves. Bill, it's great seeing you. I'm glad we're kind of getting back in the swing of things and look forward to continuing the conversation. As a reminder to everybody, just our opinions, not investment advice.