Management Learnings with Jamie Dimon I JPMorganChase
发布时间 2025-04-07 11:17:15 来源
Welcome everybody. So I have a lot to say. I try to actually organize it thoughtfully and intelligently and while I'm doing this, if people have dying questions or issues or something like that, feel free to ask. I probably wouldn't have much time with them to do Q&A. I'd be happy to do that. And obviously I have some time tomorrow to talk about strategy to company, geopolitics and all those things.
欢迎大家。我有很多话想说。我会尽量把内容组织得既有条理又合乎逻辑。在我讲的时候，如果大家有急需解答的问题或者其他疑虑，欢迎随时提问。我可能没有太多时间来进行问答环节，但我很乐意回答。当然，明天我也有时间来讨论公司的战略、地缘政治等话题。
I just want to start with, we have like, what a company. I don't know about you guys, but I see this company in action. It just blows me away. And the quality of the people, the respect of our clients, how much they want us and countries around the world, it's extraordinary. And it's all based upon the things that you do and how you do it and things like that.
我想先说一下，我们的公司真是了不起。我不知道你们的感觉，但每次看到公司运作，我都感到震撼。员工的素质、客户的认可以及来自世界各地的需求，真是太不寻常了。这一切都归功于你们的工作和工作的方式。
How do we make sure we're going to do it? Stay innovative and ambitious and disciplined while killing complacency, arrogance, bureaucracy. And so we're going to do a bunch of things. None of this is out of anger. It's just out of thought about kind of reinstilling some basic disciplines. If you have 100 people, just can you live with 100 people and make that work and we should be able to, when we're asking people, everyone, oh, this is very important.
我们如何确保我们能做到这一点呢？保持创新、雄心和纪律，同时消除自满、傲慢和官僚习气。为此，我们将采取一系列举措。这些举措并不是出于愤怒，而是为了重新灌输一些基本的纪律。假如你有100个人，你能和这100个人一起好好工作吗？我们应该可以做到，我们在要求大家的时候，每个人都要明白这一点的重要性。
Every one in this room, I'm talking to you personally. When I give these examples, don't say that's something else, that's not my unit, that doesn't affect me. It does. I'm going to tell you why, because all of you, you're responsible for this company. That's worth $700 billion, you know, 320,000 people, all the clients you've seen around the world. You individually are responsible and you know more than you think. You travel around and talk to people and you have, you have, you have, you know more than you think.
在座的每一位，我是在跟你们每个人说话。当我举这些例子时，不要觉得那是其他人的事情，或者与你所在的部门无关，也不会影响到你。事实上，它确实会影响你。我要告诉你原因，因为你们每个人都为这家公司负责。你们知道吗？这家公司市值7000亿美元，有32万名员工，还有遍布全球的客户。你们每个人都肩负责任，而且你们比自己想象的知道得更多。你们常常旅行，与许多人交流，你们真的比自己以为的更了解情况。
So, I bet we're asking people to do a 10% efficiency target. Again, it's a discipline. And the basic thing is, what you can, and this is basic business, this is not AI. I'm going to talk about AI in a second. This is just, can you do less? So, what, what are you, you and is doing that you can do less? They don't need to be doing it all or things like that.
因此，我猜我们是在要求人们实现10%的效率目标。这是一种纪律。基本的原则是，你能做到什么。这是商业的基本常识，不是关于AI的。我稍后会谈AI。这里的意思是，你能做得更少吗？就是说，你和你的团队正在做的事情，有哪些是可以减少的？有没有不需要做的事情？
I apologize and when I'm being specific, that is you I'm talking about. Okay, I'm not, I just, I got to get it off my chest about what we need to do and some of the things I've seen recently, on over my career, I said speed kills, but I mean slow speed. Okay, I don't mean fast speed. And I wrote down just examples, okay, of winners and losers and this is just over the last 20 to 30 years. Sears in Kmart, they're gone, Walmart has done well. Digital equipment, gone, AMP, the best supermarket in the world disappeared, taken over by Kroger's whatever. Blackberry disappeared, del did well. Apple obviously has done well, Amazon has done well. Nakeda basically disappeared.
我道歉，当我具体谈论某事时，我指的是你。我不是在批评你，只是需要倾诉一下我们需要做的事情，以及我在职业生涯中最近观察到的一些现象。我曾说过"速度致命"，但我指的是慢速度，而不是快速度。我列举了一些过去20到30年中赢家和输家的例子。西尔斯和凯马特已经消失，但沃尔玛做得很好。数字设备公司（Digital Equipment）消失了，AMP，这个曾经世界上最好的超市，被克罗格吞并了。黑莓消失了，戴尔表现不错。显然，苹果和亚马逊都取得了成功，而诺基亚基本上消失了。
And you know, I go on and on with these examples, it's even worse in financial services, mostly because you can manipulate the numbers and over leverage and stuff like that, but travel is blew up, city blew up twice. Bear Sterns fell, Lehman fell, bank one, I'm here because you know, bank one screwed up a bunch of businesses and stuff like that. The SNL business, the whole business got wiped out. The whole thing, savings and loans do not exist anymore.
你知道吗，我可以不停地举这些例子，在金融服务业中情况更糟，主要是因为你可以操控数字、过度杠杆化之类的事情。但旅游业崩溃了，城市崩溃了两次。贝尔斯登倒下了，雷曼倒下了，第一银行（Bank One）倒下了。我在这里是因为你知道，第一银行搞砸了一堆业务。储蓄和贷款行业整个被抹去了。整个行业，储蓄和贷款现在已经不存在了。
And you know what it was? Interest rate mismatch. Wammu, interest rate mismatch. Silicon Valley bank, interest rate mismatch. The whole mortgage business disappeared. A hundred percent of the brokers and stuff like that disappeared. Kitter disappeared, Drexel disappeared. And these were, if you look at these things, it's complacency, it's bureaucracy, it's arrogance, it's slow to adjust. A lot of it's dishonest numbers.
你知道这是怎么回事吗？利率错配。Wammu银行，利率错配。硅谷银行，利率错配。整个抵押贷款业务消失了。百分之百的经纪人之类的也都消失了。Kitter消失了，Drexel消失了。如果你看看这些事情，原因在于自满、官僚主义、自大和反应迟缓。很多数字其实是不真实的。
I'm going to give you some very specific examples. Failure to set standards, bad people, bad comp schemes, disincentives, bad incentives, politics, you know, and these things like all the cancer that kills companies. And you know, we all have to be very cautious about when that takes place. And I'm going to give you examples about why I think it happens and how we have to combat it.
我要给你一些非常具体的例子。比如未能设立标准、不良分子、不合理的薪酬方案、不利的激励措施、糟糕的激励和办公室政治等，这些就像是扼杀公司的癌症。我们必须对此保持高度警惕。我会给你举例说明我认为这些问题为什么会发生，以及我们应该如何应对。
Now, and it's even more important to say because things are faster and more complex. I mean, the world is just faster and more complex. That means we got to move quicker, coordinate better, and do those things. I'm a fanatic of a proper county. Don't get me wrong. I'm going to give you a specific example where the county will lead you to the wrong answer. Regulatory rules will lead you to the wrong answer.
现在，说这句话更显得重要，因为事情发展得更快、更复杂。我的意思是，世界就是这样——更快且更复杂。这意味着我们必须行动更迅速，协调更好。我是一个对适当规章制度非常热衷的人。别误会我的意思，我会给你一个具体的例子，说明这些制度如何会导致你得到错误的结论。监管规则也可能引导你走向错误的答案。
Regulatory capital will lead you to the wrong answer. And yet, we fall into this little echo chamber. So instead of know your numbers, I'm going to change you, get your numbers right, understand them, analyze them, work them, test them, and don't be rote about them. You've got to have the budget in their thing. You can't always compare yourself to forecast because then you're always very close.
监管资本会把你引向错误的答案。然而，我们常常陷入这个小小的回声室。所以，与其说要了解你的数字，我要告诉你，要把数字弄准确，理解它们，分析它们，测试它们，而不是机械地对待它们。你要在这件事情中融入预算。你不能总是拿自己和预测相比，因为那样的话，你总会和预测结果非常接近。
And it's just that you've got to show the budget. You've got to show the budget. And then the other one, which I hate, I really hate is comparing yourself to peer average. I mean, really? Is that what we're going to do? You should always compare yourself to the best. Where are they and where are we? Fixed in variable expenses matter. Jeremy mentioned it in the complexity of actually making decisions. This is where rote matters. You can't just say fully allocated or fully marginally. You have to think about what matters in that thing. But marginal profitability is absolutely critical. When we look at it and Jeremy gave an example about anything we do, the next $100 million of revenues, while the business may have a 14% return, and this can be almost anything we do, the next 100% is a margin of 80%. And therefore, marginal rwe, and that's how you deploy capital. And so you got to, we have to always understand that.
这段话的意思主要是在讨论预算和绩效比较。首先要展示预算，这是必须的。此外，对于绩效评估，不应该仅仅将自己与同行平均水平进行比较。相反，应该与最优秀的人进行比较，以了解他们在哪些方面做得更好，并找到自己的差距。固定和可变费用对决策来说都很重要，这在Jeremy谈到的复杂决策中尤其明显。需要深入思考哪些因素真正重要，而不仅仅是简单地使用全部分配成本或边际成本。边际盈利能力至关重要。以Jeremy的例子为例，如果公司业务的回报率为14%，那么实现下一个1亿美元的收入的边际收益率可能是80%。因此，理解边际收益率是如何影响资本运用的非常重要。我们必须始终牢记这一点。
Regards review of allocated expenses. I'm going to give you an example, mostly about JP more. I give you. They are real expenses. But you have the right to question them. You have to question them. Zero base budgeting. I don't like asking people to do it. It's like too hard. But you got to think that way. If I start from ground, I have 100 people doing this thing. What do I do differently? And so a P&L is not an assessment of a business. You got to do the full assessment. Custom in metrics, turnover, apps, technology, whatever is important is what I'm talking about. We talk about numbers. It's not the P&L. In fact, the P&L could be the most deceptive thing of all. And giving their own answer and proper project reporting.
关于分配费用的审查。我想给你一个例子，主要是关于摩根大通。我给你的都是实际开销，但你有权质疑它们。你必须质疑它们。零基预算我不喜欢让别人去做，因为太难了，但你必须要有这种思维方式。如果我从头开始，有100个人做这件事，我会有什么不同的做法？所以损益表并不是对业务的真正评估。你必须进行全面的评估。定制指标、员工流动率、应用程序、技术，无论什么重要，这就是我在说的。我们谈论的是数字，不是损益表。实际上，损益表可能是最具误导性的。而是应该进行自己的答案和适当的项目报告。
Again, whenever you have a project, and this is on, it could be technology or it could be anything else. What did we say? We started it and we're today. And I remember getting to JP Morgan and one after another. Every project was like on course. But from the last forecast. But I said, show me what is from the beginning. And every single one was year too late. And it's just an honest assessment. It's not to blame yourselves and get mad about it. And also the project morphed without any discussion. And I think that's just a bad management thing. So external reporting actually matters. So I'm always quite careful reporting external is real. A lot of companies, it's not real. And what happens inside of companies, people start running that way.
再次提醒，无论你在做哪个项目——无论是科技项目还是其他内容。我们之前怎么说来着？我们启动了项目，然后到了今天。我记得在摩根大通，一个接一个的项目，似乎都在进度上。但从上次的预测来看，我问他们，给我看看从一开始的情况。结果每一个项目都晚了一年。这只是一个诚实的评估，并不是要责怪大家或对此感到恼火。此外，项目在没有任何讨论的情况下就发生了变化。我认为这反映了管理不善。所以，外部报告非常重要。我对外部报告一直很谨慎，因为对于很多公司来说，这些报告并不真实。那么公司内部的情况就可能变得混乱。
And you've never seen me spin analysts. And if I spin analysts, you're going to spin us. That's it. I want to honestly show how we compared other people. Constant investment, the notion you go stop start investments is a bad idea. Constant transformation, technology and conversions. And you can't have stop start strategies almost anywhere. Proper assumptions. What do you do when you're spread on deposits and zero, but you're opening branches? What do you do? That's why I always talk about through the cycle. Think real carefully about the assumptions that go into these things. Because sometimes they make you do stupid stuff. And sometimes they stop you from doing good stuff.
你们从来没有看过我对分析师进行操控。如果我去操控分析师，那么你也会来操控我们。就是这样。我想诚实地展示我们与其他人的比较。不断投资，认为可以时而停止时而开始投资是个坏主意。持续的转型、技术和融合。几乎在任何地方，你都不能采取忽停忽开的策略。合理的假设。当你的存款利差为零，但你还在开设新分支时，你该怎么做？这就是为什么我总是谈论整个周期。仔细思考这些事情背后的假设。因为有时它们会让你做蠢事，有时它们又会阻止你做正确的事情。
When you do numbers, it's to make decisions too. Therefore, the so what? Risk of contra accounts, any contra accounts, I'm giving you some examples, balance sheet contra accounts, revenue contra accounts, off balance sheet crap. It is an absolute mine and pit of stuff that will kill you. And that's what happened. A bunch of these companies I mentioned. So here are examples. Expenses that could be great investments. The fact that it's called an expense means nothing to me. In fact, a lot of the business they capitalize it. You build a plant, you capitalize it. You don't start expensing it until it's producing. We build the branch. We don't capitalize it.
当你处理数字时，是为了做出决策。因此，要问“那又怎样？”的问题。有关对冲账户的风险，任何对冲账户，我来给你一些例子，比如资产负债表对冲账户、收入对冲账户、以及不在资产负债表上的东西。这些东西就像一个充满风险和陷阱的地雷场，会给你带来灾难。这正是我提到的那些公司所发生的事情。这里有一些例子：某些被称为“费用”的项目，实际上可能是很好的投资。对我来说，把它称为“费用”并没有什么特别的意义。实际上，很多企业把这些“费用”资本化了。比如，当你建一个工厂时，你会将其资本化。直到它开始生产，你才会开始计入费用。但是，如果我们建一个分支机构，我们不会将其资本化。
We have a negative cash flow for a couple years. And then hopefully by the 50 years making a million dollars a year for eternity. So far. Bankers, same thing. And that's private bankers, investment bankers, chase wealth managers, those investments pay off over time. Expense allocations. I got to JP one. This is true by the way. Because the company was dominated by the investment bank, everything was skewed towards the investment bank. Everything. She funding investment bank. They even took things like HR costs. They lumped them. So HR costs included pension, medical, executive comp, expat, all these departments. They added it together and they charged it out on head account. Really?
我们几年来一直处于现金流负的状态。不过，希望在50年后每年能够赚取一百万美元，并且这个收益可以持续下去。到目前为止，银行家们都是一样的，无论是私人银行家、投资银行家还是追求财富管理的人，那些投资随着时间的推移能见成效。关于费用分配，我遇到了一个JP的例子。这是真实的。因为公司被投资银行主导，一切都倾向于投资银行。所有的费用都被投入到投资银行中。他们甚至把像人力资源成本这样的费用也合并了。这样，人力资源成本就包括了退休金、医疗、执行补偿、外派人员等所有部门的费用。他们把这些费用加在一起，然后按人头计算，真的？
Expat was 100% for the investment bank. Executive comp was 100% for the investment bank. The subsidy of the trading floors. We were subsidizing the investment bank $2 billion a year, which I immediately fixed. Not to punish anyone because it caused huge misallocation to capital. The big loser all that was the consumer bank. And I'm still quite sensitive about. We did the same thing with, I'll give you a little example. Capacity in the computer center was charged out to everybody. Whereas the extra capacity was quite expensive was necessary and required for these businesses, but not for those businesses. This is not a waste of time to get this right.
外派人员100%为投资银行工作。高管薪酬也100%用于投资银行。交易大厅的补贴问题。我们每年在补贴投资银行20亿美元，我立刻修正了这个问题。不是为了惩罚任何人，而是因为这导致了资本的巨大误配。最大的输家是消费银行，我对此仍然非常敏感。我们也在其他方面做过类似的事情。举个小例子，计算机中心的容量费用是向所有人收取的，而额外的容量虽然相当昂贵，却是这些业务所需的，而不是那些业务。纠正这个问题并不是浪费时间。
And so when you all see your allocating expense, you may spend no time on it, but you shouldn't be paying for capacity we need for payment systems. That should be paid for by payment systems. And all that does over time is cause huge misallocation, analyze sales comp and I got to the company. This is always true. It always goes bad. It always morphs. Don't assume it's okay. People see things, they get paid for things, they should get paid for, they don't mention it.
所以，当你们看到分配的开支时，可能不会花太多时间在上面。但你们不应该为支付系统所需的资源买单，那应该由支付系统来支付。长期来看，这只会导致严重的资源错配、分析销售补偿，然后我就来到了公司。这种情况总是存在的，结果总是不好，总是会变形。不要假设一切正常。人们会观察到一些事情，他们会因为某些事情而得到报酬，他们应该得到报酬，但他们不会提及这些事情。
And I'll just give you one example, but I would have 50. When I got to the company, we paid the Treasury sales force based upon estimated revenues going forward. That was it. Almost no adjustments later on. And I, it's staggering. Branches, well I can give you a lot of examples about branches. Bank One had an open to branches in five years, Chase had an open to branch for five years. They never refurbished their branches, but at least Bank One, by the time we did the merger, was making a million plus profit per branch a year, 2300 branches, Chase was making zero.
我给你一个例子，但其实我还有50个这样的例子。当我进入公司时，我们是根据预期的未来收入来支付给财政部门销售团队的报酬。仅此而已，之后几乎没有做过调整。这让我感到震惊。关于分行的情况，我也可以给你举很多例子。Bank One在五年内没有开设新分行，Chase也是五年没有开分行。虽然他们从未装修过分行，但至少Bank One在我们合并时，每个分行每年能获得超过一百万的利润，共有2300个分行，而Chase的利润为零。
Parts because of the allocation I mentioned, partially because no one seemed to care about them, stuff like that. But we should always analyze these, I mean these branches had been usually profitable. And when we don't, this goes back to a count again. We don't give a branch credit for a credit card. So when they create a Sapphire account, that's where 700 buy, I think they create a million accounts a year in the branches. That's 700 million dollars of value.
部分原因是由于我提到的分配方式，部分原因是似乎没有人关心这些问题，以及类似的情况。但我们应该始终分析这些问题，因为这些分支机构通常是有利润的。如果我们不分析，这又会影响到我们的计算。我们没有给一个分支机构因为信用卡而给予信用。当他们创建一个蓝宝石账户时，这就是700的购买量。我认为他们在分支机构每年创建一百万个账户，这相当于7亿美元的价值。
I'm going to give a couple of quick examples here. And we do these NPVs about why we should close the branch. And we should do them. We should be disciplined. I think for the most part, NPVs might work, but they don't always work. And you just, you gotta use your common sense sometimes. Banksville branch, we're going to close it. It's kind of small. They show me, and I get, now I'm getting 100 complaints. Literally, there's a campaign. Every small business there, there's 200 or 300 consumers.
我要在这里举几个简单的例子。我们通常会进行净现值（NPV）分析，来决定是否应该关闭一个分支机构。这是我们应该做的，而且要保持严谨。我认为，大多数情况下，净现值分析是有用的，但并不总是奏效。有时候，你需要运用常识来判断。比如我们要关闭Banksville的分支机构。这个分支机构比较小。他们告诉我后，现在我收到了100个投诉。这里真的有一个反对关闭的运动。那里每家小企业、200或300个消费者都参与进来了。
Banksville is six miles. They said six miles to the closest branch. The biggest competitors were us and other branches in Greenwich. It's a six mile drive from the next closest branch. And I looked at that and that branch was making 500, 600,000 profit. I said, if you close that branch, you know what's going to happen? What would happen the day we closed it? Who's going to open in the same spot? Yeah, or that good Connecticut bank. And by just a little lady want to drive six miles in the winter on those windy roads. And is the branch more profitable than it kind of looks?
翻译成中文并表达意思，尽量易读：
Banksville 离这里有六英里。他们说最近的分行有六英里远。我们和格林威治的其他分行是最大的竞争对手。离下一个最近的分行开车也是六英里。我查看了那家分行，它每年盈利50万到60万美元。我说，如果你关闭那家分行，你知道会发生什么吗？我们关闭它的当天会发生什么？谁会在同一个地方开新分行？可能是其他好的康涅狄格银行。一位老太太冬天会愿意在那些弯弯曲曲的路上开车六英里吗？这个分行的利润是否比看起来更高呢？
And to me, that wasn't the NPV. It was the pawn blocking the queen. While we're cutting, I wasted cutting. I also did something I opened the partners room. And a lot of people told me, this is just how I think about what you do and what you don't do. Do the right thing anyway. Whether it looks good, or it looks bad. The whole operating committee said, don't do it. The partners room is going to cost a million half dollars a year, et cetera.
对我来说，那不是净现值（NPV），而是一个阻挡了皇后的卒子。当我们在做决策时，我曾浪费过一些时间。但我也做了一件事，我开放了合伙人的房间。很多人告诉我，这反映了我如何看待你该做什么和不该做什么的问题。无论事情看起来好还是不好，都要做正确的事。整个运营委员会都说，不要这样做。开放合伙人房间每年会花费一百五十万美元等等。
And I was, yeah, but we don't know each other. You know, and if we don't do it, there'll be years before we know each other. And you know, I could, it's a good expense. It's a judgment call. You know, you could argue, I know I love you, enjoy it. Do the right thing and explain it. They don't do that thing because you think it'll look bad for you or hurt morale a little bit.
“是的，但是我们彼此还不熟悉。你知道的，如果我们不这么做，可能要过好多年我们才能了解彼此。我觉得这是值得花费的。这是一个判断的问题。你可以说，我知道我爱你，要享受这个过程。做正确的事情并解释清楚。他们不这么做，是因为他们认为这样会让自己看起来不好，或者会稍微影响士气。”
So Chick-fil-A is a great arc on the paper. They're trying to, they're using satellites and stuff like that and drones to, and now they got down to 13 seconds of sandwich through the drive-through line. That's what you got to be thinking. How do you make it better? Better, better all the time. Full and constant assessment, the way you do this stuff, a lot of what I've been talking about here. Always look, always learn. It's the only way, look at competition, go to other companies, go to their branches, go to, go on the road trips, take people out, take each other, you know, when you go out, take management teams to dinner.
因此，Chick-fil-A在纸面上表现非常出色。他们正在尝试使用卫星、无人机等工具，并且现在已经将得来速的三明治制作时间缩短到13秒。这就是你需要考虑的事情：如何不断改进，持续让一切变得更好。不断进行全面评估，就像我之前谈到的那样。要始终观察、始终学习。这是唯一的途径：观察竞争对手，去其他公司，去他们的分店，进行实地考察，带人外出，带着管理团队一起外出吃晚餐等。
When you see clients, you want to, you know, it's, they tell us that we're making a mistake. It's a gift. And by the way, very often they tell you that's a mistake, but it's not your area and some people just tend to ignore it. No, no, write it down and send it to the person. Always acknowledge your mistakes. You'll learn a lot, having winded the bar with people. And then it's okay to be a fast follower like we are in our own echo chamber sometimes. And that's not bad. That just happens, you know, and this is the way you get out of the echo chamber.
当你见到客户时，要明白，他们指出我们的错误其实是给了我们一个宝贵的礼物。而且，经常他们指出来的错误可能不在你的专业范围内，有些人就会倾向于忽视这些意见。但不要这样做，要记下来并将信息反馈给相关人员。始终承认自己的错误，这样你会学到很多东西。与不同的人交流后，你会发现，有时候跟随他人并不坏。我们有时会困在自己的“回音室”，这并不可怕。重要的是你要知道如何走出这个“回音室”。
Hit the road, go to the branch, talk to small businesses, constantly assess, constantly engage. You have to have great controls, constantly review financial operational detail. You know, that's, that's, that's, and always, always, you can't, that's a discipline, that's like exercising. I bought a, I had a, we had a printing, this commercial graded printing press and to print financial reports and stuff like that. And they said we got to buy a new one, of course, two million dollars, a 0,000, 200, 2000, whatever it was.
上路走访，去分公司，与小企业交流，不断评估，不断互动。你需要有良好的管理，不断检查财务和运营细节。这就像锻炼一样，是一种纪律，始终要坚持。我买了一台商业级印刷机，用来打印财务报告等等。他们说我们需要买一台新的，当然要花两百万美元，尽管具体数字是多少。
I went in and said, no, no, I went to the tech field and said, just, we don't, we don't need to print all that stuff. Get rid of some, they came back very proudly and got rid of 8%. I was like, okay, well, I got my mother could have done that. And then, but we got, then we got, we needed again, and I did it. So I literally got the room that we were small coming as I'm. I got every report, there were, you know, a hundred. And I put on top the name of the people getting it. And I had you all come in, say, do you read this report? What's in it? And I cut it 50% immediately.
我进去说，不，不，我去找技术部门说，我们不需要印那么多东西，删掉一些。他们回来时非常自豪地说删掉了8%。我心想，好吧，这点事我妈都能完成。不过后来我们确实又需要一些数据，所以我亲自去做了。我拿到一间小会议室，把所有报告都拿来，大概有一百份。我在每份报告上标上接收人的名字，然后让大家进来，问他们是否看这份报告以及里面有什么内容。我立即削减了50%。
Now, they're late around. They come back to me and say, we have to do it. We're, we're bigger and stuff like that. So I bought one of these machines for two million bucks. We just bought Primerica. I'm down in their printing plant and the guys showing me his plant and I'm saying, great. And they see one of the machines. They say, hey, I just bought one of these. He said, how much do you pay for? I said, two million. I said, how much do you pay? How much do you pay? 50,000. You know why? He bought it from a bankrupt company. It was still in the box. That's all.
现在，他们总是迟到。他们回来跟我说，我们必须这么做。我们现在更大了，诸如此类的话。所以我花了两百万美元买了一台这样的机器。我们刚收购了Primerica。我在他们的印刷厂，工厂的人向我介绍他们的工厂，我说，很好。他们看到其中一台机器，就问我，你买了这个。我说，是的，花了两百万。我也问他你们花了多少钱？他说五万。你知道为什么吗？他从一家破产公司买的，机器还在箱子里，仅此而已。
And let's, let's do that a little bit every now and then, you know, like, as it turns out, some of this is a true story. Some of those reports were being printed and shipped to people in Dallas. We had a company called Gulf Insurance. And they were being shipped to a person who died a year earlier. And then I asked, what are they, what are they doing with it? And all that stuff was being put into a warehouse. And that's dumb.
让我们偶尔做一点这类事情，你知道的，事情是这样的：有些报告是真实的。有些报告曾经被印刷并运送到达拉斯的人那里。我们有一个叫做高福保险的公司，而那些报告被寄给了一个在一年前就去世的人。然后我问，这些报告他们拿来干什么？全部都被放进了一个仓库。这真是太愚蠢了。
And you see a phone, you're going to find some of this furniture that's been sitting in a warehouse for 10 years. Just give it away. You're going to come and send. Close down the warehouse. Like, what at white washing? We don't do this here, never did. But a bank one, every water report was like, how great we were. I was like, what, we suck. How's it possible? Like, they said, well, we don't want to document anything for the regulators and lawyers.
你会看到一个手机，你会发现这些已经在仓库里放了10年的家具。就送掉吧。你会来安排发运。关闭仓库。好像在粉饰太平？我们这里不这样做，从来没有。但银行的每一份报告都说我们有多么优秀。我觉得，我们做得很糟糕。怎么可能呢？他们回答说，我们不想为监管机构和律师留下任何记录。
And I said, no, I want an honest assessment because you're better off being a great company, which will reduce your exposure than hiding your weaknesses. You know, and so the audit report should be tough and teach us all the time. Kill bureaucracy. All the time and relentlessly it comes a lot of forms. We'd that garden. It's a mindset. Home Depot, when you're walking to Home Depot and you're walking through global galactic headquarters, the sign above says, store support center.
我说，不，我想要一个诚实的评估，因为相比于隐瞒自己的弱点，成为一家优秀的公司能更好地降低风险。所以审计报告应该要严格，并不断给我们提供教益。要不停地削减官僚主义，因为它会以多种形式出现。我们要像除草那样来处理好它，这是一种思维方式。在家得宝，当你走进家得宝、穿过全球总部大楼时，头上的牌子写着“商店支持中心”。
It reminds people every day they are there because of the store. And we have to remember that. All of us, particularly staff. We are there because of a client and a branch where investment bank in front of a client. And that is an important mindset. And then you can use things like war rooms and all these things, a review customer complaints. Very often, I always look at customer complaints and sometimes I read them and I know the policy and I call up some of this and say, I agree with the customer, we could have should have wouldn't have.
这句话每天都在提醒人们，我们能在那里是因为商店的存在。我们必须记住这一点，特别是作为员工。我们在那里是因为有客户，而我们在客户面前就像是一家投资银行的分支。这是一种重要的思维方式。你可以利用一些工具，比如战情室，来审查客户投诉。我常常查看客户投诉，有时候读了投诉后，根据政策，我会打电话给有关人员说，我同意客户的意见，我们本可以、应该做得更好。
And you got to change your mindset. ATMs, when I got to JP Morgan, this has happened periodically. My wife called me, she didn't know Walgreens, the ATM didn't work. I tell the people around the ATM they ended bank one. The guy called me and I said, no, it's working. My wife calls me, he says, it's not working. He calls, I call him up, he says, no, it's working. So I said, you need me a favor. Get in your car and drive out there.
你需要转变一下思维。当我刚到摩根大通的时候，有时候会出现这种情况。我太太打电话告诉我，她在Walgreens那里取款机坏了。我告诉在取款机附近的人，他们停用了某某银行。那个人打电话给我，我说，不，取款机是好的。我太太再打电话给我，说还是不行。我又打电话给那个人，他说，确实没问题。所以我说，拜托你，开车亲自去看看吧。
And he drives out there and it's not working. It's squiggly. Now, as it turns out, we have an outside vendor tracking this stuff. And I said, you know, I fired the vendor and I want to be paid back the last six months. Now we track it ourselves. That stuff happens all the time. That black car story, you all know the black car story, never happened to JP Morgan. It did happen when we took over Sheerson. And I was going outside one day and there was, you know, literally, I said 50 black cars. They had given away those books to everybody. People were taken, way into seven o'clock to go home. They're supposed to just take it to the closest train station.
他开车到那里，却发现问题没有解决。线路很不稳定。结果我们发现有个外部供应商在追踪这些东西。我说，我解雇了这个供应商，并要求退还最近六个月的钱。现在我们自己追踪这些，这种事情时常发生。关于黑车的故事，你们都听说过，那事从未发生在摩根大通。但的确发生在我们接管Sheerson的时候。有一天我正要出去，看到外面大约有50辆黑车。本来这些车只需要把人送到最近的火车站，却被用来一直载着人忙到晚上七点才回家。
They would pick up their dinner money. No one paid attention to it. There was one woman who took it to Glen Cove or something and back every day. She came in early in the morning and went back. Her boss knew about it. And I said to the boss, I said, you know, I can get her own car and driver for a third with that cost. Literally. And I did do it. I took away the books. I did stuff, changed some of the bunch of rules and stuff like that. So branches should have a branch administration group or nothing gets sent to the branch that doesn't go through this group. Because if they're getting stuff from HR, risk, legal, compliant, trading, audit, finance, options, equity, they're overwhelmed.
他们会拿到晚餐的费用，没有人对此在意。有一位女士每天都会把费用带到格伦科夫或者类似的地方，然后再带回来。她每天一大早就到那里，之后再返回。她的老板知道这件事。我对老板说，你知道吗，我可以用三分之一的费用给她配车和司机。真的可以做到。我确实这么做了，整理了账目，修改了一些规定等等。因此，分支机构应该有一个管理团队，任何发送到分支机构的东西都必须经过这个团队。因为如果他们同时接收来自人力资源、风险、法律、合规、交易、审计、财务、期权、股票等部门的东西，他们就会应接不暇。
There should be a group that says no, no. And then they organize in a way that makes sense because I used to go to Smith Barney and they'll complain. You know, I complain. They say, well, I said, I told you this. They said, you did not. I said, we sent you a memo. We give you this. And one of the branch administration members came and saw me said, he took a FedEx box, a big one, dropped in front of me, said, yeah, I get that every week from you guys. Where in it is it? So we just changed a little thing. Common sense, a little booklet called, I think we called it since we last met. Or you must read this that had a summary page and the stuff they have to read and that whenever we go out, they've got that part.
应该有一个团队来说不，不。然后他们以一种合理的方式组织，因为我以前去史密斯巴尼时，他们总是会抱怨。我也会抱怨，他们会说，我已经告诉过你了。他们则回应说，你没有告诉我们。我说，我们给你们发过备忘录，也给过你们材料。其中一位分支管理成员来找我，他拿了一个大大的FedEx箱子，放在我面前说：“对，我每周都会收到你们这样的材料，那你告诉我我要看哪里？”于是我们做了一点小改变，编了一本叫《自上次会议以来》或者《你必须阅读》的小册子，上面有一个摘要页面，还有他们必须阅读的内容，这样每次我们出去开会，他们都有这些材料。
And so it's just important, just little things. We had 500 coaches at JP Morgan. When I first came in, the operating committee was going through all these things and this came up. I said, 500 coaches, I kept them bringing it up and so on the operating committee said, you're going to do this every meeting. You're going to micromanage every single decision. And of course, I said, no, I'm not going to micromanage every single decision. I'm sorry, you know, it's your decision. I came in that Monday. I said, I changed my mind. I'm going to micromanage this one. I want all coaches out by the end of the week. And I'm not doing it to save money. Whose job is it to coach?
所以，重要的是一些小事情。我们在摩根大通有500名教练。当我刚加入公司的时候，经营委员会正在处理各类事务，这件事提上了议程。我说，500名教练，我不断提起这件事，结果经营委员会跟我说，你要在每次会议上都提这个问题，你要对每一个决定都进行微观管理。当然，我说，我不会对每一个决定都进行微观管理。抱歉，这应该是你们的决定。然后我在周一来上班时，我改变了主意。我说，我要对这件事进行微观管理。我希望在本周结束之前，所有教练都离开。我这么做不是为了省钱。那么，培训员工的责任是谁的呢？
We had outsource management. I mean, seriously, and I also said the operating committee, at the end of one year, any one of you can bring back a coach. You personally have to know about and think it's the right thing to do. You know, I bite. In my whole career, I've never seen it work. Like when we're trying to save someone. It doesn't mean we shouldn't try. In my whole career, I've never seen it. Maybe there's one example where it actually worked. Kill meetings, you got to kill meetings. Meetings got to start in time. They got to end on time. Someone's got to run it. I mean, I go to a lot of meetings and no one knows who's running. We're too nice. We collaborate too much.
我们曾进行过外包管理。我是说，认真地说，我还告诉运营委员会，在一年结束时，你们中的任何一个人都可以重新找回一个教练。你个人必须了解并认为这是正确的事情。你知道，我是认真的。在我的整个职业生涯中，我从没见过这样的方法奏效。就像当我们试图挽救某人时。这并不意味着我们不应该尝试。在我的整个职业生涯中，我从没见过有效的例子。也许有一个例子真正奏效了。取消会议，你必须取消会议。会议必须按时开始，按时结束。必须有人负责管理。我是说，我参加了很多会议，却没人知道谁在主持。我们太好心了，合作得太多了。
This should be a purpose to a meeting. There should always be a follow-up list. Example of bureaucracy is always the meeting after the meeting. Whereas generally with me, if you can't stay in front of my partners, don't bother to come say it to me. I'm not your messenger. Lay it on the table. It's okay. Sometimes obviously there's something that's different. You want to have privately. But usually, it's a go-around. It's a rope of dope. It's an end run. You know, usually don't allow that kind of stuff. Mistakes I made. This is going to be short. But I always said it's an anatomy of mistakes. Didn't have the right people in the room. Didn't work it hard enough. Didn't have a decision-making process that made sense. Didn't get the right inputs.
这应该是会议的目的。会议结束后应始终有一个后续事项清单。官僚主义的一个例子是会议结束后的会议。而对于我来说，如果你不能当着我合作伙伴的面说，就不要来找我说。我不是你的传话人。直接把事情摆出来，这没关系。当然，有时候有些事情确实需要私下讨论。但是通常，这是一种迂回、一种障眼法，是一种绕道而行的做法。通常我不允许这样的事情发生。以下是我犯过的错误。这会很简短，但我总是说这是错误的剖析：没有找对合适的人参与，没有足够努力，没有合理的决策过程，没有得到正确的信息输入。
Made assumptions that I've made so many. The London Whale, which I'm sure, when I die, you know, when I do, it's going to say Jamie, his resume blotted by the London Whale. But the mistake wasn't complexly the derivatives, folks. It didn't go through the regular risk committee. I didn't know that. But I had signs looking back. It should go through a risk of me. It didn't go through the risk of me exactly precisely because it was risky. And they want to play close their vest. This goes back to hoarding information, which is a disease. I always thought, this goes down a long time ago because I said, it's cloud is outsourcing. I like doing it stuff for ourselves. I still do like it. And this is a mistake I made. At one point, I said, you know what? We're going to take the operating committee out to Silicon Valley.
我做了很多假设，真的非常多。关于“伦敦鲸”事件，我确信，当我去世时，我的履历上会一直有这件事的阴影。但是问题并不完全在于那些衍生品。这个问题没有经过正常的风险委员会，而我当时并不知情。事后回想，我确实有一些预兆。它本应该经过我们的风险审核，但没有，正是因为这个问题本身就具有风险。他们想保密信息，这是一个通病。我一直认为，这个问题是因为信息孤岛。很久以前，我说过，云计算就是外包，而我更喜欢自己完成这些事情。我确实仍然喜欢这样做，这也是我犯的一个错误。有一次，我说，你知道吗？我们要带运营委员会去硅谷参观学习。
This goes back to why it's important to get in the road. They went to see Tencent and Pingan and Ali Baba. It's amazing where you learn. And we flew out there and we sat down with cloud and Amazon and stuff like that. And flying back, I said, I made a huge mistake. We're going cloud right away. And it just opens up your eyes. And you got to be obviously willing to change your mind. I remember when I got to bank one, I thought it was a mistake. One of my bigger ones. I've been there for not quite a year. I'm in Louisville. And you know, our business has been shrinking. We had open branches, customer sat stock. We had seven deposit systems. I was trying to fix all that. But I was in a branch.
这就回到为什么走出去非常重要的原因。他们去拜访了腾讯、平安和阿里巴巴。这些经历让人惊叹不已。在那里，我们与云服务部门和亚马逊等公司进行了交流。飞回来的时候，我意识到自己犯了一个巨大的错误：我们应该立即转向云服务。这次经历开阔了我的视野，也让我意识到必须愿意改变自己的想法。我记得当我加入某银行时，我认为这是个错误，也算是我犯过的更大的错误之一。我在那里工作还不到一年，并前往路易斯维尔。我们的业务一直在萎缩，分行开张，客户满意度停滞不前。而且，我们有七个不同的存款系统，我一直在努力解决这些问题。我当时就在某个分行里。
I realized that the branch across the street hours were nine to five. And ours were ten to four. I said, whoa, that's not so good. I called up and they said, well, we're different. You know, we're not, they're kind of bank. I said, do me a favor. Find out. Let's find out for all of our branches we had two thousand, a little over two thousand. What are ours? Our versus the average competent, not the best in the town. And they said, well, how are we going to do that? I said, well, email the branch manager manager and tell him to tell you. And so we called, co-lay this. Our average branch were open two hours less a day.
我发现街对面的分行营业时间是从早上九点到下午五点，而我们的营业时间是从早上十点到下午四点。我心想，这样不太好呀。我打电话过去，他们说，因为我们不一样，我们不是那种银行。我说，帮个忙，查一下情况吧。我们有两千多个分行，看看我们的营业时间和平均水平相比如何，不是和本市最好的比。然后他们问，怎么做呢？我说，给各分行经理发邮件，让他们告诉你。我们查了一下，发现我们的分行平均每天少营业两个小时。
And I went home. It was a Friday. I went home embarrassed. I came in. I'm wondering, just what happened? The whole branch system was there. And here's what I said to him. I apologized. I thought it was a pretty good CEO. I made a mistake. I should have recognized as much sooner. I said, on the other hand, none of you told me. Like, what's wrong with you too? Like, seriously, not a salesperson, not a branch manager, not a regional manager, not a district. Never came up. And then I said, we have to change. And so I said, well, you know, morale's already bad. And they went on and on about morale because we had to change the work hours, you know, the time for the people, when the cash gets sent in, the settlement, the financial.
我回家了。那是一个星期五。我带着尴尬的心情回家。我进了家门，心里在想着：到底发生了什么？整个分支系统都在那儿。我对他们说，我道歉了。我觉得自己是个不错的CEO，但我犯了个错误，我应该更早认识到这些问题。我还说，另一方面，你们也没有人告诉我这些问题，究竟你们怎么了？说真的，没有一个销售人员、分支经理、区域经理或地区经理提过这件事。然后我说，我们必须改变。但如你们所知，士气已经很低落了。他们不停地谈论士气的问题，因为我们不得不调整工作时间，比如说员工上班的时间、现金汇总的时间、结算的时间、财务等。
And I said, well, we got to change it. We're here for customers. You know, I said, morale sucks because we suck. Moral will get better when we're better. What the hell is culture? I struggle with this one a little bit because, and I think it's all the things I'm speaking about here, by the way. I don't think you can put it in one little thing. But there are good people and bad people. And you know that I think we're almost all good people. There are people you don't trust. And people mean different things sometimes. They don't trust them because they lie. They shave the truth. They're not particularly honest. Or you don't trust them because you don't trust the judgment.
我说，我们必须进行改变。我们是为客户而在这里的。士气低落是因为我们表现不好。当我们变得更好时，士气自然会提升。什么是文化？我对此有些困惑。我觉得文化涵盖了我在这里提到的所有内容。我不认为文化能被简单定义。但确实存在好人和坏人。我相信我们几乎都是好人。有些人你不信任。有时是因为他们撒谎，不够诚实，或者隐瞒事实。还有的时候是不信任他们的判断。
It was a very different things, but what are their motives in life? I mean, you know, and this goes back to, what's the role of our bank? I think it's to lift up society, to help people. I create culture by doing not saying recognition is important. I was never particularly good at as most of you know. But as an amazing way, yeah, I know they're laughing, yeah. This is why I was at a town hall one day and so I said, what do you do to show recognition to your direct reports? And a couple of my direct reports were in the room and they burst out laughing. But I told them and I meant that they do know, and I learned lessons in this.
这是一件非常不同的事情，但他们生活中的动机是什么呢？我指的是，我们银行的角色是什么？我认为是提升社会，帮助他人。我通过行动而不是语言来创造文化，认可是重要的。正如大家所知，我在这方面从来不是特别好。但这是一个了不起的方式，是的，我知道他们会笑，所以有一天我在一个市政厅里说，你如何表现对你的直接下属的认可？我的几个直接下属当时就在场，他们笑出声来了。但我告诉他们，我是真心的，而且我也从中学到了不少。
I learned less by watching Ted Lasso and David Novak, that recognition is a form of humility and acknowledgement they did something that you didn't, that they taught you something. And so I do think it's very important that we get it right. And I did make biscuits for my, I had Judy make biscuits for my operating committee. But then I also came in the next day and I realized I gave you biscuits and they all took them. It's how thank you. This was give business to the boss.
从观看《Ted Lasso》和大卫·诺瓦克的演讲中，我了解到，认可是一种谦逊的表现和对他人教会你某些东西的承认。因此，我确实认为做出准确的认可非常重要。我让朱迪为我的运营委员会做了一些饼干。不过，第二天我再去的时候，发现我给你们的饼干都被他们拿走了。这是他们向老板表达感谢的一种方式。
And Mike already mentioned, fire bad clients. I've done it before, corporate clients and then you know, this wealthy guy had come into a branch, yelling at the screaming, so the branch people said he said, I mean, nobody complained, he's philanthropic. I knew him. It happened the second time and the third time I actually called up the branch manager. I said, what is he doing? And he told me what the guy does. And it was disgusting. I couldn't even say it here.
迈克已经提到过，要解雇那些不好的客户。我以前也这样做过，包括一些企业客户。有一次，一个有钱人跑到一个分行，大吵大闹，分行的人都说他很慷慨，但我认识他。这种事情第二次、第三次发生后，我实际上打电话给分行经理，问他那个人在干什么。他告诉了我那个家伙在做的事情，真的很恶心，我在这里都说不出口。
And you know, it's just one of those people is like, to beat up and yell at people because they're a big powerful thing. And I called them up and said, you know, it's so and so. I want you to take all your business out of the base and you can't do that. Actually, you can do it. And by the way, and you're not going to treat my people that way, don't allow it. And it doesn't matter anywhere because you know, in any client, okay, you don't do business with a client like life will go on.
你知道的，有些人就是那种仗着自己有权有势就喜欢欺负和大喊大叫的人。我给他们打了电话，说，你知道的，是某某公司。我要求你把所有业务都撤出那个基地，因为你不能那样做。事实上，你是可以做到的。而且，顺便提一句，你不能那样对待我的员工，我不会允许的。而且这其实无所谓，因为在任何情况下，你不能这样对待客户，生活还会继续。
Higher back your guards, I've told this story about we outsourced all our guards in the United States and you know, and a union guy came to see me at young at me and I the bureaucracy didn't want me to see him. I see everybody. He ran the SEIU, a tough union. And he said, you outsource your guards to save money. But the same people working the same job, making the same salary. He said, you're saving money because the benefits programs, you know, which were worth $30,000 to a family, they cut to 15.
重新雇用你们的保安，我之前讲过这个故事，我们在美国把所有的保安工作都外包了。然后有个工会的人来找我，冲我喊叫，而官僚机构不想让我见他。但我会见所有人。他带领的是一个非常强硬的工会，叫SEIU。他对我说，你们外包保安是为了省钱。但那些做同样工作的员工，工资也没有变。他说，你们之所以省了钱，是因为原本价值3万美元的福利被削减到了1.5万。
And then they saved you $1,500. They kept $7,500. And I called up the person who did it. It was very smart and very senior. I said, I want them all back on our payroll. I want them grid followed in pension plans. JP Morgan does not need to make our profit off the backs of our guards. Leading the team, regular business views like regular war room snapshots, bureaucracy busting, that type of thing, attack the problem, all dead cats on the table.
然后他们为你节省了1500美元，他们自己留了7500美元。于是我打电话给负责这件事的人。这是一个非常聪明且资深的人。我说，我希望他们都回到我们的工资单上。我希望他们能参与我们的养老金计划。摩根大通不需要通过压榨保安来获取利润。带领团队，进行经常性的业务评估，就像定期作战室快照一样，打破官僚主义，解决问题，把所有的问题摊开来。
I mean, our biggest mistakes are when people kind of think it's a problem, but they don't bring it up on the table in the right room. Loyalty is earned and it's also earned by getting the full input, you know, and that you've had a chance to have your input. You may, you know, sometimes we'll get things we don't want exactly right, but you earn it.
我想说，我们最大的错误常常是，人们觉得这是一个问题，但没有在合适的场合提出。忠诚是需要赢得的，而赢得忠诚需要获得全面的意见，你知道的，这意味着每个人都有机会发表自己的看法。有时候，我们可能得不到完全正确的结果，但这也是获得忠诚的一个过程。
And so, if you've had a chance of input, if you've had a chance to put the dead cats on the table, then you should get on board. But not before that. And I hate things I hear like, stand your lane, absolutely do not stand your lane. That is a bureaucratic stupid comment. You're not a good partner. You won't let stuff go. If so, it's that to me.
所以，如果你有机会参与意见表达，如果你有机会把“死猫放到桌面上”——也就是把问题说出来，那么你就应该加入进来。但是在那之前不要加入。我讨厌听到诸如“做好自己的事”这样的话，绝对不要局限于自己的职责。这是官僚主义的愚蠢言论。如果有人这样说，那么在我看来，你不是一个好的合作伙伴，因为你不愿意放下问题。
You know what I say, right? I'm like, what do you mean? What do they do? Maybe they're right. You know, as opposed to these blanket statements that are bad. And, and, you know, you've got to work on this one. There's nothing wrong with disagreement, by the way, ever. Disagree is a good thing. Make it fun.
你知道我在说什么，对吧？我就像是在问，你什么意思？他们做了什么？也许他们是对的。相比那些不具体的笼统说法，这样更好。而且，你知道，你得在这个问题上多下功夫。顺便说一下，意见不合并没有什么不好，永远都是如此。不同意见是一件好事，可以让它变得有趣。
You know, that's our job to have fun in life and make everything we do fun. Invite mom. When you go on the road and you're going to have management teams or stuff like that, and invite mom and dad. When I went to Kenya, I had polines, a mother, and Peter's mother and their families there. I mean, what a gift to us to see what those moms have accomplished with those kids.
你知道，我们的任务就是在生活中寻找乐趣，并让我们所做的事情都充满乐趣。邀请妈妈一起。在外出旅行或与管理团队进行活动时，别忘了邀请爸爸妈妈。我去肯尼亚的时候，有保琳娜的妈妈、彼得的妈妈和他们的家人在场。能够见证这些妈妈们和他们的孩子一起取得的成就，这对我们来说真是一种恩赐。
And, and moms and dads love to see us. And then also, you got to take the management teams to dinner with spouse. They love to see the spouse. I mean, it's a kick. And you learn a lot about each other. Why it's hard to get good growth and innovate, test and learning is nothing, nothing that you shouldn't be testing learning. You can kill innovation with too much resource, too little resource, or bureaucracy, including NPV.
家长们都很喜欢来看我们。而且，你还需要带管理团队和他们的配偶一起吃饭。他们很喜欢看到对方的配偶。这真是件有趣的事情，你们也会更了解彼此。为什么获得良好的增长并进行创新、测试和学习如此困难呢？其实，任何事情都可以进行测试和学习。不当的资源分配或官僚主义（包括净现值分析）都会扼杀创新。
And you got to really think through what you're trying to accomplish and some of these things. I'm going to give examples. Conversions, both JP Morgan and Bank want to stop to all the conversions because they're costly. They take time. They divert resources. Meanwhile, you're dying to slow death. You've got seven loan systems and five deposit systems and 26 general ledgers. You just do them.
你需要仔细考虑你想要实现什么目标和一些相关的事情。我会给出一些例子。对于系统转换，JP摩根和银行都希望停止所有转换，因为这些转换既昂贵又费时，还会分散资源。同时，你正在缓慢地走向衰落。你有七个贷款系统、五个存款系统和26个总分类账。你就是要处理它们。
And then what happens is you get better at it over time. And so, transformation is a constant thing. So, don't try to make it look better than it is. And that happens all time in companies. Allocate this way, make it look better. I'm going to give you some specific examples and always do the good to bad the ugly. That will make you better. Doing just the good makes you worse.
随着时间的推移，你会慢慢变得更擅长这件事。因此，变革是一个持续的过程。所以，不要试图让事情看起来比实际的更好。这种情况在公司中时常发生：通过这种方式分配资源，让事情看起来更美好。我会给你一些具体的例子，并始终从好到坏、再到丑陋，那会让你变得更好。只做好的部分反而会让你变得更糟。
Doing the good to bad the ugly makes you get better versus the competition. There are good expenses, good expenses and bad expenses, good revenues and bad revenues. I hate the concept of cutting costs. The concept should always be cutting waste. Management tricks and tools. Thou reviews with it without you in the room. Have brainstorming sessions with wine. Have fun. Write memos yourself. Don't always let other people write it. Emails. When we ask questions to someone and even ask Teresa to do it and she asks Derek Walder to do it, who asked somebody else to do it, that memo should come directly back to me from that person. Not back up the chain. And if I call it person directly, it comes directly to me. They should copy their bosses.
做好事、坏事和丑事会让你在竞争中变得更强。费用有好坏之分，收入也有好坏之分。我不喜欢削减成本的概念，策略应该是削减浪费。管理的技巧和工具。当你不在场时，也要进行审查。带着葡萄酒进行头脑风暴，享受其中的乐趣。自己写备忘录，不要总是让别人代写。至于邮件，当我们向某人提出问题时，即便是让特丽莎去做，她又让德里克·沃尔德去做，再叫其他人去做，备忘录最终应由那个人直接返回给我，而不是再通过层层转交。即使我直接联系某人，也应该直接回复我，同时抄送给他们的上司。
The other thing is slow, bureaucratic. But the really important thing is it makes that person a job more important. You're enabling them. You're telling them the job is more important. Definitely celebrate but emphasize the negatives. Have a follow-up list of your own. No management problem. When you write stuff, it comes there. Try to get rid of the friggin' jargon. Speak to someone to explain something to them. Don't waste people's time. Work smart. Most people lay waste so much time. Double read emails. Triple read them. Take care of yourself. If you don't take care of yourself, it doesn't work.
另一件事是缓慢、官僚化。但真正重要的是，这让那个人的工作显得更加重要。你在赋予他们权力，告诉他们工作更重要。一定要庆祝，但也要强调消极方面。准备一个你自己的后续事项清单。没有管理问题。当你写东西时，这些都会体现出来。尽量摆脱那些烦人的行话。与人交流时，用简单明了的方式解释。不要浪费别人的时间。聪明地工作。大多数人浪费了太多时间。写邮件时仔细检查，最好检查两到三遍。照顾好自己。如果你不照顾好自己，一切都行不通。
Here's one I really got to change. A hundred percent, you know, alive you've been meetings with me for the last 20 years. I don't think you ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever. See me not through the pre-read and not get a hundred percent of my attention. And people are going to meetings all the time and they're getting notifications and texts and reading email. You got to stop. You got to stop it everywhere. It's disrespectful. I didn't know that. Well, of course, you don't know because you weren't paying attention.
这段话的大意是：
“这次我真的要做出改变。百分之百地，你知道的，在过去的二十年里，你一直在和我开会。我想你从没有看到我在会前不做准备，或者在开会时不全神贯注。但是，现在的人在开会时总是会收到各种通知、信息，还在看邮件。你们不能再这样了。这种行为到处都是不尊重。我不知道这点。嗯，当然你不知道，因为你当时没有认真聆听。”
And another thing, don't be lazy about this one. Write a press release about a new product, a new service, and do the FAQs as an exercise because it makes you answer a lot of questions. And people simply don't want to have a quick verbal thing. No, when you write it down, it's amazing. It focuses the mind quite a bit about how you explain what you're doing to people. Push the thighs low as you can. Take the other side of the argument. Be a skeptic, but not a cynic.
还有一点，不要对此懒惰。撰写一份关于新产品或新服务的新闻稿，并作为练习编写常见问题解答，因为这样做可以让你回答许多问题。人们通常不希望得到简单的口头说明。写下来真的很神奇，它能让你更专注于如何向人们解释你的做法。尽量把大腿压低一点，尝试从另一种角度来考虑问题。要做一个怀疑者，但不要做一个愤世嫉俗的人。
And always answer the question, what would you do if you're Queen Queen or King for a day? And that's the big one. What would you do? What's you going to do? Okay, I'll end where I started. I hope this is productive. At least I feel better.
翻译如下：
"而且一定要回答这个问题：如果你成为一天的女王或国王，你会做什么？这是个重要的问题。你会做什么？你打算怎么做？好吧，我会在我开始的地方结束。我希望这次交流是有意义的，至少我感觉好多了。"