Management Learnings with Jamie Dimon I JPMorganChase
发布时间 2025-04-07 11:17:15 来源
Welcome everybody. So I have a lot to say. I try to actually organize it thoughtfully and intelligently and while I'm doing this, if people have dying questions or issues or something like that, feel free to ask. I probably wouldn't have much time with them to do Q&A. I'd be happy to do that. And obviously I have some time tomorrow to talk about strategy to company, geopolitics and all those things. I just want to start with, we have like, what a company. I don't know about you guys, but I see this company in action. It just blows me away. And the quality of the people, the respect of our clients, how much they want us and countries around the world, it's extraordinary. And it's all based upon the things that you do and how you do it and things like that.
欢迎大家。我有很多话想说，我会尽量有条理地、明智地进行安排。在我讲话的过程中，如果大家有迫不及待的问题或者想法，欢迎随时提问。虽然我可能没有太多时间来进行问答，但我很乐意去解答。当然，明天我还会有时间和大家谈谈公司的战略、地缘政治等话题。首先，我想说的是，我们的公司真是让人惊叹。我不知道你们的看法，但每次看到公司在运作，我都被震撼到了。我们的团队质量、客户对我们的尊重、世界各地对我们的需求，这一切都非同寻常。所有的成功都源于你们的努力和行动。
How do we make sure we're going to do it? Stay innovative and ambitious and disciplined while killing complacency, arrogance, bureaucracy. And so we're going to do a bunch of things. None of this is out of anger. It's just out of thought about kind of reinstilling some basic disciplines. If you have 100 people, just can you live with 100 people and make that work and we should be able to, when we're asking people, everyone, oh, this is very important. Every one in this room, I'm talking to you personally. When I give these examples, don't say that's something else, that's not my unit, that doesn't affect me. It does. I'm going to tell you why, because all of you, you're responsible for this company.
我们如何确保实现目标？保持创新、雄心壮志和纪律，同时消除自满、傲慢和官僚作风。因此，我们将采取一系列措施。这一切不是出于愤怒，而是为了重新灌输一些基本的纪律。如果你有100个人，你能不能和这100个人一起生活并且让事情运作起来——我们应该能够做到。当我们要求大家时，每个人都要注意，这非常重要。在这个房间里的每一个人，我都是在跟你们个人对话。当我举这些例子时，不要说那是别的事，与我无关，或者不影响我。它确实和你有关。我会告诉你为什么，因为你们所有人都对这家公司负有责任。
That's worth $700 billion, you know, 320,000 people, all the clients you've seen around the world. You individually are responsible and you know more than you think. You travel around and talk to people and you have, you have, you have, you know more than you think. So, I bet we're asking people to do a 10% efficiency target. Again, it's a discipline. And the basic thing is, what you can, and this is basic business, this is not AI. I'm going to talk about AI in a second. This is just, can you do less? So, what, what are you, you and is doing that you can do less? They don't need to be doing it all or things like that. I apologize and when I'm being specific, that is you I'm talking about.
这价值7000亿美元，你知道的，有32万人遍布全球的客户。你个人的责任重大，而且知道的比你想象的要多。你四处旅行，与人交谈，你掌握的知识远超你的想象。所以，我敢说，我们要求每人实现10%的效率目标。这是一种纪律。而基本点是，你能做什么，这就是基本的商业，这不是人工智能。我稍后会谈论人工智能。这仅仅是问，你能做得更少吗？你或者你所在的团队是否有一些不必要或可以减少的工作？我可能说得具体了，但我说的正是关于你。
Okay, I'm not, I just, I got to get it off my chest about what we need to do and some of the things I've seen recently. On over my career, I said speed kills, but I mean slow speed. Okay, I don't mean fast speed. And I wrote down just examples, okay, of winners and losers and this is just over the last 20 to 30 years. Sears in Kmart, they're gone, Walmart has done well. Digital equipment, gone, AMP, the best supermarket in the world disappeared, taken over by Kroger's whatever. Blackberry disappeared, del did well. Apple obviously has done well, Amazon has done well. Nakeda basically disappeared.
好的，我并不是要说教，只是有些事憋在心里不吐不快，我们需要做些什么，我也想分享一些我最近看到的事情。在我的职业生涯中，我常说“速度会致命”，但这里指的是“慢速度”，而不是快速度。我列举了一些例子，关于赢家和输家，这是过去20到30年的变化。西尔斯和凯马特已经消失了，而沃尔玛发展得很好。数字设备公司不复存在，而AMP，这世界上最好的超市也消失了，被克罗格接管。黑莓已消失，戴尔表现出色。苹果显然发展很好，亚马逊也是如此。诺基亚基本上消失了。
And you know, I go on and on with these examples, it's even worse in financial services, mostly because you can manipulate the numbers and over leverage and stuff like that, but travel is blew up, city blew up twice. Bear Sterns fell, Lehman fell, bank one, I'm here because you know, bank one screwed up a bunch of businesses and stuff like that. The SNL business, the whole business got wiped out. The whole thing, savings and loans do not exist anymore. And you know what it was? Interest rate mismatch. Wammu, interest rate mismatch. Silicon Valley bank, interest rate mismatch. The whole mortgage business disappeared. A hundred percent of the brokers and stuff like that disappeared. Kitter disappeared, Drexel disappeared.
你知道，我可以一直举这样的例子。在金融服务业，这种情况更为严重，主要是因为你可以操纵数字、过度杠杆化等等。但是，旅游行业崩溃过，城市（指金融行业中的重要城市）曾两次崩溃。贝尔斯登公司倒闭了，雷曼兄弟倒闭了，第一国际银行，这家公司搞砸了很多业务等等。储蓄与贷款行业整个都消失了。你知道这是什么原因吗？利率不匹配。华盛顿互惠银行，利率不匹配。硅谷银行，利率不匹配。整个抵押贷款行业消失了。百分之百的经纪商等都消失了。基德公司消失了，德崇证券消失了。
And these were, if you look at these things, it's complacency, it's bureaucracy, it's arrogance, it's slow to adjust. A lot of it's dishonest numbers. I'm going to give you some very specific examples. Failure to set standards, bad people, bad comp schemes, disincentives, bad incentives, politics, you know, and these things like all the cancer that kills companies. And you know, we all have to be very cautious about when that takes place. And I'm going to give you examples about why I think it happens and how we have to combat it. Now, and it's even more important to say because things are faster and more complex.
这些问题，如果你仔细观察的话，就是自满、官僚主义、自大、反应迟缓。其中还有很多是虚假的数据。我会给出一些非常具体的例子。比如，没有设立标准、不良人员、不良的薪酬方案、负激励、错误的激励机制、政治问题等。这些就像是导致公司失败的毒瘤。我们必须小心谨慎应对这些问题。我会给出一些例子，说明我认为这些问题为何发生，以及我们要如何应对。尤其在当下这个信息变化更快、情况更加复杂的时代，这一点显得尤为重要。
I mean, the world is just faster and more complex. That means we got to move quicker, coordinate better, and do those things. I'm a fanatic of a proper county. Don't get me wrong. I'm going to give you a specific example where the county will lead you to the wrong answer. Regulatory rules will lead you to the wrong answer. Regulatory capital will lead you to the wrong answer. And yet, we fall into this little echo chamber. So instead of know your numbers, I'm going to change you, get your numbers right, understand them, analyze them, work them, test them, and don't be rote about them.
我的意思是，现在的世界更快也更复杂。这意味着我们需要更快速地行动，更好地协调，并完成这些事情。我确实非常推崇完善的体制。不要误会我的意思，我来给你一个具体的例子，有时候遵循体制会让你得到错误的答案。遵循监管规定也可能会出错，依赖监管资本同样如此。然而，我们常常陷入了这个回音室。因此，与其说“了解你的数字”，不如说“确保你的数字是正确的，要理解、分析、使用并检验它们，不要对它们生搬硬套。”
You've got to have the budget in their thing. You can't always compare yourself to forecast because then you're always very close. And it's just that you've got to show the budget. You've got to show the budget. And then the other one, which I hate, I really hate is comparing yourself to peer average. I mean, really? Is that what we're going to do? You should always compare yourself to the best. Where are they and where are we? Fixed in variable expenses matter. Jeremy mentioned it in the complexity of actually making decisions. This is where rote matters. You can't just say fully allocated or fully marginally. You have to think about what matters in that thing.
你得在他们的方案中有预算显示。不能总是和预测值相比，因为那样总是很接近。你确实需要展示预算。还有另一个我非常讨厌的方面，就是和同行平均值做比较。真的吗？我们要这样做吗？你应该总是和最优秀的比较。他们在哪里，我们又在哪里？固定和可变的开支很重要。杰里米提到了在实际做决策时的复杂性。在这里，需要仔细考虑。你不能只是简单地说完全分配或者边际分配，你必须考虑在哪些方面需要重点关注。
But marginal profitability is absolutely critical. When we look at it and Jeremy gave an example about anything we do, the next $100 million of revenues, while the business may have a 14% return, and this can be almost anything we do, the next 100% is a margin of 80%. And therefore, marginal rwe, and that's how you deploy capital. And so you got to, we have to always understand that. Regards review of allocated expenses. I'm going to give you an example, mostly about JP more. I give you. They are real expenses. But you have the right to question them. You have to question them.
边际盈利能力至关重要。当我们审视企业的各项活动时，Jeremy 提到过一个例子：无论我们做什么， 下一个1亿美元收入可能带来14%的回报。事实上，在几乎任何我们从事的活动中，接下来的100%收入部分都会有80%的利润率。因此，了解边际收益和如何有效利用资本是非常重要的。
接下来，我想谈谈分配费用的审查，特别是在 JPMorgan 的案例中。尽管这些费用确实真实存在，但我们有权利质疑它们，我们必须对这些费用进行质疑。
Zero base budgeting. I don't like asking people to do it. It's like too hard. But you got to think that way. If I start from ground, I have 100 people doing this thing. What do I do differently? And so a P&L is not an assessment of a business. You got to do the full assessment. Custom in metrics, turnover, apps, technology, whatever is important is what I'm talking about. We talk about numbers. It's not the P&L. In fact, the P&L could be the most deceptive thing of all. And giving their own answer and proper project reporting. Again, whenever you have a project, and this is on, it could be technology or it could be anything else.
零基预算。 我不喜欢让人们去做零基预算，因为这真的很难。但是你必须这样思考。假如我从零开始，有100个人在做这件事情，我该如何做得不同？因此，损益表并不能完全反映一个业务的状况。你需要进行全面的评估，包括定制的指标、员工流动率、应用程序、技术等等，任何重要的方面都是我所说的。我们谈论数据，不仅仅是损益表。实际上，损益表可能是最具欺骗性的。还要提供他们自己的答案和适当的项目报告。每当你有一个项目的时候，不管是技术相关的还是其他任何事情，都是这样的。
What did we say? We started it and we're today. And I remember getting to JP Morgan and one after another. Every project was like on course. But from the last forecast. But I said, show me what is from the beginning. And every single one was year too late. And it's just an honest assessment. It's not to blame yourselves and get mad about it. And also the project morphed without any discussion. And I think that's just a bad management thing. So external reporting actually matters. So I'm always quite careful reporting external is real. A lot of companies, it's not real. And what happens inside of companies, people start running that way.
我们说了什么？我们开始了，而今天我们在这里。我记得我们当时在摩根大通，一项接一项的每个项目似乎都在轨道上。尽管从最新预测来看，它们好像都没问题。但我说，给我看看从一开始的情况。结果，每一个项目都延迟了一年。这只是一个诚实的评估，并不是要责备自己或者为此生气。而且项目在没有任何讨论的情况下发生了变化。我认为这就是管理不善的表现。因此，对外的报告其实很重要。我在做对外报告时总是特别小心，要确保它是真实的。很多公司并不这样做，导致公司内部的人都朝着错误的方向发展。
And you've never seen me spin analysts. And if I spin analysts, you're going to spin us. That's it. I want to honestly show how we compared other people. Constant investment, the notion you go stop start investments is a bad idea. Constant transformation, technology and conversions. And you can't have stop start strategies almost anywhere. Proper assumptions. What do you do when you're spread on deposits and zero, but you're opening branches? What do you do? That's why I always talk about through the cycle. Think real carefully about the assumptions that go into these things.
你从未见过我向分析师兜售花言巧语。如果我兜售花言巧语，你也会对我们同样如此。就是这样。我希望诚实地展示我们与其他人的比较。持续投资的理念是，停止和重启投资是一个坏主意。不断进行转型、技术创新和融合。几乎任何地方都不能有停止和重启的策略。需要有正确的假设。当你的存款利润微薄，但你又在开设新分行时，你该怎么做？这就是为什么我总是谈论整个周期的问题。仔细思考投入这些事情中的假设。
Because sometimes they make you do stupid stuff. And sometimes they stop you from doing good stuff. When you do numbers, it's to make decisions too. Therefore, the so what? Risk of contra accounts, any contra accounts, I'm giving you some examples, balance sheet contra accounts, revenue contra accounts, off balance sheet crap. It is an absolute mine and pit of stuff that will kill you. And that's what happened. A bunch of these companies I mentioned. So here are examples. Expenses that could be great investments. The fact that it's called an expense means nothing to me.
因为有时候它们让你做一些愚蠢的事情，有时候又会阻止你做有意义的事情。当你处理数字时，也是为了做出决策。那么，这又如何呢？关于对立账户的风险，无论是什么类型的对立账户，我给你一些例子，比如资产负债表的对立账户、收入对立账户、资产负债表外的麻烦事。这些东西就像一个雷区，会毁掉你。这就是许多我提到的公司所经历的情况。这里有一些例子：那些被称作“费用”的项目可能实际上是很棒的投资。对我来说，称之为“费用”完全没有意义。
In fact, a lot of the business they capitalize it. You build a plant, you capitalize it. You don't start expensing it until it's producing. We build the branch. We don't capitalize it. We have a negative cash flow for a couple years. And then hopefully by the 50 years making a million dollars a year for eternity. So far. Bankers, same thing. And that's private bankers, investment bankers, chase wealth managers, those investments pay off over time. Expense allocations. I got to JP one. This is true by the way. Because the company was dominated by the investment bank, everything was skewed towards the investment bank. Everything.
事实上，很多企业在资本化这方面做得很好。比如你建了一个工厂，这是一种资本化的投入。在工厂开始生产之前，你不会把支出算作费用。我们建了分支机构，但不予资本化，所以前几年的现金流是负的。不过，我们希望的是，到了50年后，它每年能赚100万美元，并继续盈利。银行业也是类似的情况，无论是私人银行家、投资银行家还是财富管理者，他们的投资都是随着时间的推移而见效的。关于费用分摊，我在JP那里见过类似情况。这是我在公司时实际看到的：因为公司被投资银行所主导，所以所有事情都偏向于投资银行的利益。
She funding investment bank. They even took things like HR costs. They lumped them. So HR costs included pension, medical, executive comp, expat, all these departments. They added it together and they charged it out on head account. Really? Expat was 100% for the investment bank. Executive comp was 100% for the investment bank. The subsidy of the trading floors. We were subsidizing the investment bank $2 billion a year, which I immediately fixed. Not to punish anyone because it caused huge misallocation to capital. The big loser all that was the consumer bank. And I'm still quite sensitive about.
她资助投资银行。他们甚至把人力资源成本等项目都算在一起。这些人力资源成本包括养老金、医疗、行政补偿、外派等所有部门的费用。他们将这些费用合并，然后按人头计算分摊。真的吗？外派人员费用和行政补偿费用都完全归投资银行。我们还补贴交易楼层。每年我们都在为投资银行补贴20亿美元，我立刻纠正了这个问题。并不是为了惩罚谁，因为这种情况导致了资本严重错配。最大的受害者是零售银行，这一点我至今仍然很敏感。
We did the same thing with, I'll give you a little example. Capacity in the computer center was charged out to everybody. Whereas the extra capacity was quite expensive was necessary and required for these businesses, but not for those businesses. This is not a waste of time to get this right. And so when you all see your allocating expense, you may spend no time on it, but you shouldn't be paying for capacity we need for payment systems. That should be paid for by payment systems. And all that does over time is cause huge misallocation, analyze sales comp and I got to the company. This is always true. It always goes bad. It always morphs. Don't assume it's okay. People see things, they get paid for things, they should get paid for, they don't mention it.
我们之前也做过类似的事情，让我给你举个小例子。计算中心的容量费用分摊给所有人。然而，额外的容量虽然很昂贵，但对于一些业务来说是必要的，但对其他业务就不是。这件事并不是浪费时间，而是需要正确处理。因此，当你们分配开支时，可能不会花时间在这上面，但你不应该为支付系统所需的容量买单，那应该由支付系统来支付。长此以往，这种做法只会导致资源的严重误配、分析销售补偿的问题等。这种情况在公司里一直存在，总是会出现糟糕的结果，总是会转变。不要以为这样就没问题了，很多人看到了问题，他们拿到报酬，却没有提及这些问题。
And I'll just give you one example, but I would have 50. When I got to the company, we paid the Treasury sales force based upon estimated revenues going forward. That was it. Almost no adjustments later on. And I, it's staggering. Branches, well I can give you a lot of examples about branches. Bank One had an open to branches in five years, Chase had an open to branch for five years. They never refurbished their branches, but at least Bank One, by the time we did the merger, making a million plus profit of branch year, 2300 branches, Chase was making zero. Parts because of the allocation I mentioned, partially because no one seemed to care about them, stuff like that. But we should always analyze these, I mean these branches have been usually profitable.
我来举一个例子，但我可以举出50个这样的例子。当我进入公司时，我们的国库销售团队的工资是根据预计的未来收入来支付的。仅此而已。几乎没有后续的调整。我对此感到震惊。说到分行，我可以提供很多例子。Bank One有五年没有新开分行，Chase也有五年没有新开分行。他们从未翻新他们的分行，不过至少在我们合并的时候，Bank One每个分行每年能盈利超过一百万，共有2300家分行，而Chase则没有盈利。部分原因是我提到的分配问题，部分原因是似乎没有人关心这些，诸如此类的事情。但我们应该始终分析这些，因为这些分行通常是盈利的。
And when we don't, this goes back to a count again. We don't give a branch credit for a credit card. So when they create a Sapphire account, that's where 700 buy, I think they create a million accounts a year in the branches. That's 700 million dollars of value. I'm going to give a couple of quick examples here. And we do these NPVs about why we should close the branch. And we should do them. We should be disciplined. I think for the most part, NPVs might work, but they don't always work. And you just, you gotta use your common sense sometimes. Banksville branch, we're going to close it. It's kind of small. They show me, and I get, now I'm getting 100 complaints. Literally, there's a campaign. Every small business there, there's 200 or 300 consumers.
当我们不这样做时，这又要回到一个计数。当我们不为信用卡给予分行信用时。因此，当他们创建一个Sapphire账户时，我认为他们在分行内每年创建一百万个账户。这代表着7亿美元的价值。我会给出几个快速的例子。我们进行这些净现值（NPV）分析是为了确定我们是否应该关闭分行。这些分析是必要的，我们需要有纪律性。我认为在大多数情况下，NPV分析可能有效，但不总是奏效。有时候，你需要依赖常识。以Banksville分行为例，我们计划关闭它。它比较小。他们向我展示，我接到了100个投诉。真的，有个活动。每个小型企业以及200到300个消费者都参与其中。
Banksville is six miles. They said six miles to the closest branch. The biggest competitors were us and other branches in Greenwich. It's a six mile drive from the next closest branch. And I looked at that and that was making 500, 600,000 profit. I said, if you close that branch, you know what's going to happen? What would happen the day we closed it? Who's going to open in the same spot? Yeah, or that good Connecticut bank. And by just a little lady want to drive six miles in the winter on those windy roads. And is the branch more profitable than it kind of looks? And to me, that wasn't the NPV. It was the pawn blocking the queen.
Banksville距离六英里。他们说离最近的分行有六英里。我们与Greenwich的其他分行是最大的竞争对手。离下一个最近的分行有六英里的车程。我查看了那里的情况，它盈利有50到60万美元。我说，如果你关闭那个分行，会发生什么？我们关闭的那天会发生什么？谁会在同样的地方开新店？可能是那个优秀的康涅狄格银行。而且只是一个小老太太，愿意在冬天开车六英里，走那些弯曲的道路。这个分行是否比看起来更有利润？对我来说，那不是净现值，而是像棋局里堵住皇后的卒子。
While we're cutting, I wasted cutting. I also did something I opened the partners room. And a lot of people told me, this is just how I think about what you do and what you don't do. Do the right thing anyway. Whether it looks good, or it looks bad. The whole operating committee said, don't do it. The partners room is going to cost a million half dollars a year, et cetera. And I was, yeah, but we don't know each other. You know, and if we don't do it, there'll be years before we know each other. And you know, I could, it's a good expense. It's a judgment call. You know, you could argue, I know I love you, enjoy it.
在我们削减开支的时候，我浪费了一些在切割上的开销。我也做了一件事，就是开了合伙人会议室。很多人对我说，这就是我怎么看待你要做什么和不做什么的方式。无论结果看起来好或不好，都要坚持做正确的事情。整个运营委员会都说，不要这样做。合伙人会议室每年会花费一百五十万美元等等。我认为，是的，但我们彼此不认识。如果不这样做，我们可能需要好多年才能互相了解。而且，我认为这是一个值得的开支。这是一个需要判断的决定。你可以说，我知道我爱你，享受这个过程。
Do the right thing and explain it. They don't do that thing because you think it'll look bad for you or hurt morale a little bit. So Chick-fil-A is a great arc on the paper. They're trying to, they're using satellites and stuff like that and drones to, and now they got down to 13 seconds of sandwich through the, through the drive through line. That's what you got to be thinking. How do you make it better? Better, better all the time. Full and constant assessment, the way you do this stuff, a lot of what I've been talking about here. Always look, always learn. It's the only way, look at competition, go to other companies, go to their branches, go to, go on the road trips, take people out, take each other, you know, when you go out, take management teams to dinner.
做好对的事情，并解释原因。不要因为担心看起来不好或者可能对士气有些影响而不去做。因此，Chick-fil-A在这方面做得很好。他们在利用卫星、无人机等技术，现在他们在驾驶窗口的三明治出餐速度已经快到了13秒。这就是你需要思考的：如何不断改进，让事情变得越来越好。持续和全面的评估非常重要，就像我一直在说的那样。要时刻观察和学习。这是唯一的方法。关注竞争，去其他公司看看，参观他们的分支机构，外出考察，把一些管理团队请出去吃饭，一起交流。
When you see clients, you want to, you know, it's, they tell us that we're making a mistake. It's a gift. And by the way, very often they tell you that's a mistake, but it's not your area and some people just tend to ignore it. No, no, write it down and send it to the person. Always acknowledge your mistakes. You'll learn a lot, having winded the bar with people. And then it's okay to be a fast follower like we are in our own echo chamber sometimes. And that's not bad. That just happens, you know, and this is the way you get out of the echo chamber.
当你见到客户时，如果他们指出我们犯了错误，要把它看作是一种礼物。顺便说一下，他们常常会指出一个错误，而这个错误可能不在你的领域，有些人可能会选择忽视它。不要这样，应该记下来并告诉相关的人。总是承认你的错误，这样你会学到很多东西，与人们交流也会更顺畅。而且，像我们有时处于自己的共鸣室中一样，做一个快速的追随者是可以的，这没有什么不好。这只是常见的情况，这是你如何走出共鸣室的一种方式。
Hit the road, go to the branch, talk to small businesses, constantly assess, constantly engage. You have to have great controls, constantly review financial operational detail. You know, that's, that's, that's, and always, always, you can't, that's a discipline, that's like exercising. I bought a, I had a, we had a printing, this commercial graded printing press and to print financial reports and stuff like that. And they said we got to buy a new one, of course, two million dollars, a 0,000, 200, 2000, whatever it was.
出发，去分公司，与小企业交流，不断评估，不断互动。你需要有很好的控制力，不断审查财务和运营细节。这是一种纪律，就像锻炼身体一样。我们买了一台商业级印刷机，用来打印财务报告等东西。他们说我们需要购买一台新的，当然，这台新的要价两百万美元，或者是某个类似的金额。
I went in and said, no, no, I went to the tech field and said, just, we don't, we don't need to print all that stuff. Get rid of some, they came back very proudly and got rid of 8%. I was like, okay, well, I got my mother could have done that. And then, but we got, then we got, we needed again, and I did it. So I literally got the room that we were small coming as I'm. I got every report, there were, you know, a hundred. And I put on top the name of the people getting it. And I had you all come in, say, do you read this report? What's in it? And I cut it 50% immediately.
我进去说，不，不，我去技术部门，说我们不需要打印那么多东西。让他们删掉一些。他们非常自豪地回来告诉我已经删掉了8%。我心想，好吧，我妈妈可能都能做到。但后来我们又需要那些东西，所以我亲自处理了。我把我们小公司里的所有报告都拿出来，大约有一百份。我在每份报告上标上接收人的名字，然后让所有人过来，并问他们是否阅读这些报告，报告里有什么内容。结果我马上就减少了50%的报告。
Now, they're late around. They come back to me and say, we have to do it. We're, we're bigger and stuff like that. So I bought one of these machines for two million bucks. We just bought Primerica. I'm down in their printing plant and the guys showing me his plant and I'm saying, great. And they see one of the machines. They say, hey, I just bought one of these. He said, how much do you pay for? I said, two million. I said, how much do you pay? How much do you pay? 50,000. You know why? He bought it from a bankrupt company. It was still in the box. That's all.
现在，他们迟到了。他们回来找我说，我们必须这样做。我们变得更大了，诸如此类的。所以我花了两百万美金买了一台这样的机器。我们刚买下Primerica。我在他们的印刷厂，那个人带我参观，我觉得很不错。他们看到我买的机器，就说，我刚买了一台。他问我花了多少钱，我说两百万。他说他花了多少钱，五万。你知道为什么吗？他是从一家破产公司买的，机器还在箱子里。就是这样。
And let's, let's do that a little bit every now and then, you know, like, as it turns out, some of this is a true story. Some of those reports were being printed and shipped to people in Dallas. We had a company called Gulf Insurance. And they were being shipped to a person who died a year earlier. And then I asked, what are they, what are they doing with it? And all that stuff was being put into a warehouse. And that's dumb. And you see a phone, you're going to find some of this furniture that's been sitting in a warehouse for 10 years. Just give it away. You're going to come and send.
让我们每隔一段时间这样做一下，你知道吗？事实上，这其中有些事情是真实的。一些报告被印刷出来并寄送到了达拉斯的一些人那里。我们有一家叫做湾岸保险的公司。而那些报告被寄送到一个已经去世一年的人那里。我就问，那他们拿这些报告做什么呢？所有东西都被放到了一个仓库里。这真是愚蠢。而且你如果去看一看，你会发现一些家具已经在仓库里放了十年。就把它们送人吧。你会懂的。
Close down the warehouse. Like, what at white washing? We don't do this here, never did. But a bank one, every water report was like, how great we were. I was like, what, we suck. How's it possible? Like, they said, well, we don't want to document anything for the regulators and lawyers. And I said, no, I want an honest assessment because you're better off being a great company, which will reduce your exposure than hiding your weaknesses. You know, and so the audit report should be tough and teach us all the time.
关闭仓库。就像在漂白一样？我们这里不这样做，从来没有。可是有一家银行，他们的每份报告都说我们很好。我心想，我们很糟糕，这怎么可能？他们说，因为我们不想为监管机构和律师记录任何东西。我说，不，我要一个真实的评估，因为做一个优秀的公司比隐藏弱点要好，这样可以减少风险。所以审计报告应该严格，并且不断教导我们。
Kill bureaucracy. All the time and relentlessly it comes a lot of forms. We'd that garden. It's a mindset. Home Depot, when you're walking to Home Depot and you're walking through global galactic headquarters, the sign above says, store support center. It reminds people every day they are there because of the store. And we have to remember that. All of us, particularly staff. We are there because of a client and a branch where investment bank in front of a client. And that is an important mindset.
消除官僚作风。官僚主义会以各种形式不断出现。我们需要像对待花园一样去管理它，这是一种思维方式。在家得宝（Home Depot），当你走进去时，经过全球总部，你会看到上方的标牌写着“商店支持中心”。这提醒着人们每天都要记住他们的存在是因为商店。我们都必须牢记，尤其是员工。我们在这里是因为客户，因为他们与投资银行在前线接触。这是一种重要的思维方式。
And then you can use things like war rooms and all these things, a review customer complaints. Very often, I always look at customer complaints and sometimes I read them and I know the policy and I call up some of this and say, I agree with the customer, we could have should have wouldn't have. And you got to change your mindset. ATMs, when I got to JP Morgan, this has happened periodically. My wife called me, she didn't know Walgreens, the ATM didn't work. I tell the people around the ATM they ended bank one.
然后，你可以使用战情室等工具来审查客户投诉。我经常查看客户投诉，有时读到后根据公司的政策，打电话给相关人员说，我同意客户的意见，我们本来应该可以怎样做。你需要改变思维方式。比如关于ATM的事情，当我来到摩根大通时，这种情况也时不时发生。我妻子打电话给我，说她在沃尔格林的ATM机无法使用。我告诉ATM相关的人员，他们在银行结束后就没管了。
The guy called me and I said, no, it's working. My wife calls me, he says, it's not working. He calls, I call him up, he says, no, it's working. So I said, you need me a favor. Get in your car and drive out there. And he drives out there and it's not working. It's squiggly. Now, as it turns out, we have an outside vendor tracking this stuff. And I said, you know, I fired the vendor and I want to be paid back the last six months. Now we track it ourselves. That stuff happens all the time.
那个人打电话给我，我说，不，是可以用的。然后我妻子打电话给我，她说，东西坏了。他又给我打电话，说，不，是可以用的。于是我对他说，你帮我一个忙，开车去看看。他开车去了，发现确实坏了，信号不稳定。后来发现，我们有个外部供应商负责跟踪这些设备。我说，我已经解雇了那个供应商，并要求退还过去六个月的款项。现在我们自己负责跟踪。这种事情经常发生。
That black car story, you all know the black car story, never happened to JP Morgan. It did happen when we took over Sheerson. And I was going outside one day and there was, you know, literally, I said 50 black cars. They had given away those books to everybody. People were taken, way into seven o'clock to go home. They're supposed to just take it to the closest train station. They would pick up their dinner money. No one paid attention to it. There was one woman who took it to Glen Cove or something and back every day. She came in early in the morning and went back. Her boss knew about it. And I said to the boss, I said, you know, I can get her own car and driver for a third with that cost. Literally. And I did do it. I took away the books. I did stuff, changed some of the bunch of rules and stuff like that.
关于那辆黑车的故事，大家都听过那个故事，其实它并没有发生在摩根公司。它确实发生在我们接管Sheerson的时候。那时候有一天我走到外面，看到大约50辆黑车。那些书被分发给了每个人，人们经常到晚上七点多才回家。他们本来只需要乘车到最近的火车站，然后就可以领取晚餐费。然而，没有人关注这件事。有一个女人每天都把车开到Glen Cove之类的地方，然后返回。她每天早上很早就来，然后再回去。她的上司知道这件事。我对她的上司说，我可以用这笔钱的三分之一为她提供一辆专车和司机。真的，我做到了。我收回了那些书，改变了一些规定以及其他的一些事情。
So branches should have a branch administration group or nothing gets sent to the branch that doesn't go through this group. Because if they're getting stuff from HR, risk, legal, compliant, trading, audit, finance, options, equity, they're overwhelmed. There should be a group that says no, no. And then they organize in a way that makes sense because I used to go to Smith Barney and they'll complain. You know, I complain. They say, well, I said, I told you this. They said, you did not. I said, we sent you a memo. We give you this. And one of the branch administration members came and saw me said, he took a FedEx box, a big one, dropped in front of me, said, yeah, I get that every week from you guys. Where in it is it?
所以，各分行应该有一个分行管理小组，否则任何发送到分行的信息都必须经过这个小组。因为如果他们从人力资源、风险管理、法律事务、合规、交易、审计、财务、期权、股票等部门收到信息，他们会应接不暇。应该有一个小组负责筛选信息，然后按照合理的方式进行组织。我以前去过Smith Barney，他们会抱怨，说我抱怨啥。他们说，我告诉过你了，但他们说，没告诉过。我说，我们发了备忘录，也给过你们信息。一位分行管理小组的成员来看我，他拿了一个大大的FedEx盒子，放在我面前，说，没错，我每周都会收到你们寄来的这个。请问信息在哪儿？
So we just changed a little thing. Common sense, a little booklet called, I think we called it since we last met. Or you must read this that had a summary page and the stuff they have to read and that whenever we go out, they've got that part. And so it's just important, just little things. We had 500 coaches at JP Morgan. When I first came in, the operating committee was going through all these things and this came up. I said, 500 coaches, I kept them bringing it up and so on the operating committee said, you're going to do this every meeting. You're going to micromanage every single decision.
我们只是做了一点小改动。我们把这个改动称为一本小册子，叫做《自上次会议以来的变化》或者《你必须阅读这本》，里面有一个总结页和一些他们必须阅读的内容。每次我们外出时，他们都会带上这部分内容。所以这些小事情其实很重要。当我初到摩根大通时，公司有500名教练。经营委员会在处理所有这些事情的时候提到了这件事。我说，500名教练，我不断地提出来，以至于经营委员会说，你是不是要在每次会议上都提这个？你是不是要对每一个决定都进行微观管理？
And of course, I said, no, I'm not going to micromanage every single decision. I'm sorry, you know, it's your decision. I came in that Monday. I said, I changed my mind. I'm going to micromanage this one. I want all coaches out by the end of the week. And I'm not doing it to save money. Whose job is it to coach? We had outsource management. I mean, seriously, and I also said the operating committee, at the end of one year, any one of you can bring back a coach. You personally have to know about and think it's the right thing to do. You know, I bite.
当然，我之前说过，我不会对每一个决定进行微观管理。我觉得这是你的决定，我不插手。但是，那个星期一我改变了主意，我决定在这个事情上进行微观管理。我希望在本周结束前把所有教练撤掉。这么做不是为了省钱。到底谁应该负责教练的工作？我们已经外包了管理工作。说真的，我还告诉运营委员会，一年之后，你们中的任何一个人都可以重新引进一个教练，但前提是你必须亲自了解这件事，并且认为这是正确的决定。你懂的，我也有些犹豫。
In my whole career, I've never seen it work. Like when we're trying to save someone. It doesn't mean we shouldn't try. In my whole career, I've never seen it. Maybe there's one example where it actually worked. Kill meetings, you got to kill meetings. Meetings got to start in time. They got to end on time. Someone's got to run it. I mean, I go to a lot of meetings and no one knows who's running. We're too nice. We collaborate too much. This should be a purpose to a meeting. There should always be a follow-up list. Example of bureaucracy is always the meeting after the meeting.
在我整个职业生涯中，我从未见过这种方法有效。就像我们试图拯救某个人一样。这并不意味着我们不应该尝试。在我整个职业生涯中，我从未见过它有效。或许有一个例子确实成功了。决策会议应该被精简，会议要准时开始，也要准时结束。需要有人负责主持。我参加了很多会议，但没有人知道谁在主持。我们过于和气，合作过多。每个会议都应该有一个明确的目的，并且要有后续行动清单。有一种官僚主义的例子，就是会议后的会议。
Whereas generally with me, if you can't stay in front of my partners, don't bother to come say it to me. I'm not your messenger. Lay it on the table. It's okay. Sometimes obviously there's something that's different. You want to have privately. But usually, it's a go-around. It's a rope of dope. It's an end run. You know, usually don't allow that kind of stuff. Mistakes I made. This is going to be short. But I always said it's an anatomy of mistakes. Didn't have the right people in the room. Didn't work it hard enough. Didn't have a decision-making process that made sense. Didn't get the right inputs.
通常情况下，如果你不能当着我合作伙伴的面说，就没必要来找我说。我不是你的传话筒。有什么话就放到桌面上摊开说。这样也没问题。当然，有时会有一些特别的情况，你想私下交流。但是大多数时候，这样的行为就是绕弯子，是个托词。我一般不允许这种事发生，这是我曾经犯的错误。接下来会很简短，但我总会说这是一系列错误的反思。没有把合适的人请到现场，没有足够努力推动事情发展，没有建立合理的决策流程，也没有获取正确的信息。
Made assumptions that I've made so many. The London Whale, which I'm sure, when I die, you know, when I do, it's going to say Jamie, his resume blotted by the London Whale. But the mistake wasn't complexly the derivatives, folks. It didn't go through the regular risk committee. I didn't know that. But I had signs looking back. It should go through a risk of me. It didn't go through the risk of me exactly precisely because it was risky. And they want to play close their vest. This goes back to hoarding information, which is a disease.
我做了很多假设。在我去世后，人们一定会提到“伦敦鲸”事件——就是那个在我履历上留下污点的事件。但错误并不全在于复杂的衍生品。这件事没有经过正常的风险委员会审核，而我当时对此毫不知情。回想起来，其实有一些迹象表明这件事应该经过我的风险审核。正因为风险高，他们才想把事情捂紧，这就回到了信息封锁的问题，信息封锁是一种病。
I always thought, this goes down a long time ago because I said, it's cloud is outsourcing. I like doing it stuff for ourselves. I still do like it. And this is a mistake I made. At one point, I said, you know what? We're going to take the operating committee out to Silicon Valley. This goes back to why it's important to get in the road. They went to see Tencent and Pingan and Ali Baba. It's amazing where you learn. And we flew out there and we sat down with cloud and Amazon and stuff like that.
我一直觉得很久以前就应该明确这一点，因为我说过，云计算其实就是外包。我喜欢自己动手做这些技术相关的事情，并且我仍然喜欢。这个过程中我犯了一个错误。有一次，我说，你知道吗？我们要带运营委员会去硅谷。这也回到了为什么亲自去看很重要的原因。他们去参观了腾讯、平安和阿里巴巴。在那里你能学到很多东西，真是令人惊叹。我们飞到那里，坐下来与云计算公司、亚马逊等等进行交流。
And flying back, I said, I made a huge mistake. We're going cloud right away. And it just opens up your eyes. And you got to be obviously willing to change your mind. I remember when I got to bank one, I thought it was a mistake. One of my bigger ones. I've been there for not quite a year. I'm in Louisville. And you know, our business has been shrinking. We had open branches, customer sat stock. We had seven deposit systems. I was trying to fix all that. But I was in a branch. I realized that the branch across the street hours were nine to five. And ours were ten to four. I said, whoa, that's not so good. I called up and they said, well, we're different. You know, we're not, they're kind of bank.
飞回来的时候，我说，我犯了一个大错误。我们马上转向云计算。这让你大开眼界。同时，你必须愿意改变自己的想法。我记得我刚到Bank One的时候，我觉得这是个错误，可能是我犯过的比较大的错误之一。我在那里待了还不到一年。那时我在路易维尔，我们的业务一直在萎缩。我们开设了分行，但客户满意度并不高。我们有七个不同的存款系统，我努力想改善所有这些问题。但当我走进一个分行时，我发现街对面的分行营业时间是早上九点到下午五点，而我们的是十点到四点。我说，这可不太好。我打电话询问，他们说，哦，我们不一样，我们不是一类银行。
I said, do me a favor. Find out. Let's find out for all of our branches we had two thousand, a little over two thousand. What are ours? Our versus the average competent, not the best in the town. And they said, well, how are we going to do that? I said, well, email the branch manager manager and tell him to tell you. And so we called, co-lay this. Our average branch were open two hours less a day. And I went home. It was a Friday. I went home embarrassed. I came in. I'm wondering, just what happened? The whole branch system was there. And here's what I said to him.
我说，帮我个忙，查一下。让我们查清楚对于我们所有的分行来说，我们有两千家，稍微多于两千家。我们的分行表现如何？和一般水平相比，不是和镇上最好的相比。他们问我们要如何做。我说，给分行经理发邮件，让他告诉你。于是我们联系了各个分行。我们的分行平均每天开门时间少两个小时。我回家了。那是一个星期五。我带着尴尬的心情回家。我回来的时候还在想，刚才发生了什么？整个分行系统都在这里。我对他们说：
I apologized. I thought it was a pretty good CEO. I made a mistake. I should have recognized as much sooner. I said, on the other hand, none of you told me. Like, what's wrong with you too? Like, seriously, not a salesperson, not a branch manager, not a regional manager, not a district. Never came up. And then I said, we have to change. And so I said, well, you know, morale's already bad. And they went on and on about morale because we had to change the work hours, you know, the time for the people, when the cash gets sent in, the settlement, the financial.
我道歉了。我原以为这是一位相当不错的CEO。但我犯了个错误，我应该更早意识到这一点。然而另一方面，你们当中没有一个人告诉我。到底你们怎么了？说真的，没有销售人员、没有分行经理、没有区域经理、没有区经理提醒过我。问题从未被提及。然后我说，我们必须做出改变。我还说，士气已经不好了，他们还不停地谈论士气问题，因为我们不得不改变工作时间，比如人们工作的时间、现金寄送的时间、结算以及财务方面的安排。
And I said, well, we got to change it. We're here for customers. You know, I said, morale sucks because we suck. Moral will get better when we're better. What the hell is culture? I struggle with this one a little bit because, and I think it's all the things I'm speaking about here, by the way. I don't think you can put it in one little thing. But there are good people and bad people. And you know that I think we're almost all good people. There are people you don't trust. And people mean different things sometimes.
我说，我们必须改变。因为我们是为客户而在这里。士气低落是因为我们做得不好。我们做得更好时，士气自然会提高。所谓的“文化”到底是什么？这个问题让我有点困惑，我觉得文化包含了我提到的这些方面。我认为很难把文化总结成一个简单的概念。但在这个过程中，有好人也有坏人。我相信我们大多数人都是好人。不过，有些人你可能不信任，因为每个人对事情的理解和看法有时会不同。
They don't trust them because they lie. They shave the truth. They're not particularly honest. Or you don't trust them because you don't trust the judgment. It was a very different things, but what are their motives in life? I mean, you know, and this goes back to, what's the role of our bank? I think it's to lift up society, to help people. I create culture by doing not saying recognition is important. I was never particularly good at as most of you know. But as an amazing way, yeah, I know they're laughing, yeah.
他们不信任他们，因为他们会撒谎，掩盖事实。他们不够诚实。或者，你不信任他们是因为你不信任他们的判断力。这其实是两回事，但他们生活中的动机是什么呢？我的意思是，这可以追溯到，我们银行的角色是什么？我认为是提升社会、帮助人们。我通过行动而不是言语来创造文化，认可是重要的。我从来不太擅长这一点，你们大多数人都知道。不过，有一种神奇的方式，是的，我知道他们在笑，是的。
This is why I was at a town hall one day and so I said, what do you do to show recognition to your direct reports? And a couple of my direct reports were in the room and they burst out laughing. But I told them and I meant that they do know, and I learned lessons in this. I learned less by watching Ted Lasso and David Novak, that recognition is a form of humility and acknowledgement they did something that you didn't, that they taught you something.
这就是为什么有一天我参加了一场市民大会，我问现场的人，你是如何对你的直属下属表示认可的？当时我的几个直属下属也在场，他们忍不住笑了。但我告诉他们，真的，他们知道，我也从中学到了很多。通过观看《足球教练泰德》（Ted Lasso）和大卫·诺瓦克（David Novak）的节目，我意识到，认可是一种谦逊和承认，承认他们做了你没有做到的事情，或者他们教会了你一些东西。
And so I do think it's very important that we get it right. And I did make biscuits for my, I had Judy make biscuits for my operating committee. But then I also came in the next day and I realized I gave you biscuits and they all took them. It's how thank you. This was give business to the boss. And Mike already mentioned, fire bad clients. I've done it before, corporate clients and then you know, this wealthy guy had come into a branch, yelling at the screaming, so the branch people said he said, I mean, nobody complained, he's philanthropic.
我认为把事情做好非常重要。我让朱迪为我的运营委员会做了饼干。然后我第二天过来的时候意识到，我给了你们饼干，但他们都拿走了。这样的做法是为了感谢你。这就像是给老板送上商业礼物。而且迈克已经提到，要辞掉那些不好的客户。我以前就这么做过，辞掉了一些公司客户。有一次，一个有钱人走进我们的分公司，大声叫嚷。但分公司的人说他很慷慨，所以没人抱怨。
I knew him. It happened the second time and the third time I actually called up the branch manager. I said, what is he doing? And he told me what the guy does. And it was disgusting. I couldn't even say it here. And you know, it's just one of those people is like, to beat up and yell at people because they're a big powerful thing. And I called them up and said, you know, it's so and so. I want you to take all your business out of the base and you can't do that.
我认识他。这件事发生了第二次，当第三次发生时，我实际上打电话给分行经理。我问他说，那个人到底在做什么？他告诉我那人做的事情，简直令人作呕，甚至不能在这里说。你知道吧，那人就像那种仗势欺人的家伙，总是想要打压和大声斥责别人。我打电话告诉他们，你知道，是某某。我希望你能把所有的业务都从这个基地撤走，因为你不能这样做。
Actually, you can do it. And by the way, and you're not going to treat my people that way, don't allow it. And it doesn't matter anywhere because you know, in any client, okay, you don't do business with a client like life will go on. Higher back your guards, I've told this story about we outsourced all our guards in the United States and you know, and a union guy came to see me at young at me and I the bureaucracy didn't want me to see him. I see everybody.
事实上，你可以做到。而且，顺便说一下，你不能那样对待我的员工，不要允许那样的行为。而且无论在哪里，这都不重要，因为你知道，对于任何客户来说，如果你不与某个客户做生意，生活还是会继续。我曾经讲过一个故事，我们在美国把所有的保安都外包了，一个工会的人过来找我，对我大吼大叫，而官僚机构并不希望我见他。但我见了所有人。
He ran the SEIU, a tough union. And he said, you outsource your guards to save money. But the same people working the same job, making the same salary. He said, you're saving money because the benefits programs, you know, which were worth $30,000 to a family, they cut to 15. And then they saved you $1,500. They kept $7,500. And I called up the person who did it. It was very smart and very senior. I said, I want them all back on our payroll. I want them grid followed in pension plans. JP Morgan does not need to make our profit off the backs of our guards.
他曾经管理一个非常强硬的工会——SEIU。他说，你们为了省钱把保安外包出去，但是这些人干着同样的工作，拿着同样的工资。他指出，你们省钱是因为福利项目的削减，原本价值3万美元的家庭福利被砍到了1.5万，然后节省了1500美元，而他们则赚走了7500美元。我打电话给负责这件事的人，那是一个非常聪明且地位很高的人。我说，我要把他们全都重新放回我们的工资名册中，我要他们享受养老金计划。摩根大通不需要通过剥削我们的保安来获利。
Leading the team, regular business views like regular war room snapshots, bureaucracy busting, that type of thing, attack the problem, all dead cats on the table. I mean, our biggest mistakes are when people kind of think it's a problem, but they don't bring it up on the table in the right room. Loyalty is earned and it's also earned by getting the full input, you know, and that you've had a chance to have your input. You may, you know, sometimes we'll get things we don't want exactly right, but you earn it.
带领团队时，定期的业务回顾就像定期的作战室简报一样，消除官僚主义，采取这类行动，主动解决问题，把所有的问题摆到桌面上。我是说，我们最大的错误往往出现在有人觉得有问题，但没有在合适的场合提出讨论的情况下。忠诚是需要赢得的，它的取得建立在完整的意见反馈基础上，你知道，就是你有机会发表自己的意见。有时候，我们可能得到的结果不完全令人满意，但通过这样的过程，你就能够赢得信任。
And so, if you've had a chance of input, if you've had a chance to put the dead cats on the table, then you should get on board. But not before that. And I hate things I hear like, stand your lane, absolutely do not stand your lane. That is a bureaucratic stupid comment. You're not a good partner. You won't let stuff go. If so, it's that to me. You know what I say, right? I'm like, what do you mean? What do they do? Maybe they're right. You know, as opposed to these blanket statements that are bad.
所以，如果你有机会提出自己的看法，如果你有机会把问题摆在台面上，那么你就应该参与其中。但在此之前不要参与。我讨厌那些我听到的诸如“做好自己的事”这样的说法，绝对不要只做好自己的事。这是一种官僚主义的愚蠢评论。你不是一个好的合作伙伴，这样的话题你都不放过。如果真是那样，我会想，你懂我的意思吧？我会问，这是什么意思？他们做了什么？也许他们是对的。与其做那些糟糕的一刀切的评论，不如认真思考一下。
And, and, you know, you've got to work on this one. There's nothing wrong with disagreement, by the way, ever. Disagree is a good thing. Make it fun. You know, that's our job to have fun in life and make everything we do fun. Invite mom. When you go on the road and you're going to have management teams or stuff like that, and invite mom and dad. When I went to Kenya, I had polines, a mother, and Peter's mother and their families there.
而且，而且，你知道，你必须努力做好这件事。顺便说一下，意见不合没有什么不好。不同意见是一件好事。让它变得有趣。你知道，生活中我们的任务就是享受乐趣，把我们做的每件事都变得有趣。邀请妈妈。当你外出工作，可能会有管理团队或类似的活动时，邀请妈妈和爸爸。我去肯尼亚时，有波琳的妈妈、彼得的妈妈和他们的家人在那里。
I mean, what a gift to us to see what those moms have accomplished with those kids. And, and moms and dads love to see us. And then also, you got to take the management teams to dinner with spouse. They love to see the spouse. I mean, it's a kick. And you learn a lot about each other. Why it's hard to get good growth and innovate, test and learning is nothing, nothing that you shouldn't be testing learning.
我的意思是，看到那些妈妈们与孩子们一起取得的成就，真是一份礼物。而且，爸爸妈妈们也很喜欢见到我们。此外，我们还需要和管理团队及其配偶共进晚餐，他们也很喜欢让配偶参与其中。这真是一种乐趣，并且你可以互相了解很多。为什么要努力实现良好的增长和创新，测试和学习都是必不可少的，没有什么是不应该用来测试和学习的。
You can kill innovation with too much resource, too little resource, or bureaucracy, including NPV. And you got to really think through what you're trying to accomplish and some of these things. I'm going to give examples. Conversions, both JP Morgan and Bank want to stop to all the conversions because they're costly. They take time. They divert resources. Meanwhile, you're dying to slow death. You've got seven loan systems and five deposit systems and 26 general ledgers. You just do them.
创新可能被过多资源、过少资源或官僚作风（包括净现值）所扼杀。你真的需要仔细思考你要实现什么目标。让我举些例子。在资源转换方面，摩根大通与银行都想停止所有的转换，因为这些操作耗资巨大，耗时长久，并分散资源。同时，你却在慢慢走向衰退。你有七个贷款系统、五个存款系统和26个总账系统，你只是机械地在操作。
And then what happens is you get better at it over time. And so, transformation is a constant thing. So, don't try to make it look better than it is. And that happens all time in companies. Allocate this way, make it look better. I'm going to give you some specific examples and always do the good to bad the ugly. That will make you better. Doing just the good makes you worse. Doing the good to bad the ugly makes you get better versus the competition.
然后发生的事情是，你会随着时间的推移在这方面做得越来越好。因此，变革是一个持续不断的过程。所以，不要试图让它看起来比实际更好。这种情况在公司里经常发生。分配资源时让它看起来更好些。我会给你一些具体例子，总是经历从好到坏再到丑陋的过程。这会让你变得更好。只看到好的方面会让你变得更糟。经历从好的到坏的再到丑的过程，会让你比竞争对手更优秀。
There are good expenses, good expenses and bad expenses, good revenues and bad revenues. I hate the concept of cutting costs. The concept should always be cutting waste. Management tricks and tools. Thou reviews with it without you in the room. Have brainstorming sessions with wine. Have fun. Write memos yourself. Don't always let other people write it. Emails. When we ask questions to someone and even ask Teresa to do it and she asks Derek Walder to do it, who asked somebody else to do it, that memo should come directly back to me from that person.
有些支出是好的支出，有些收入是好的收入，但也有坏的支出和坏的收入。我不喜欢“削减成本”这个概念，应该专注于“减少浪费”。管理有诀窍和工具。与其在没有你的情况下查看，不如在场参与。可以喝点葡萄酒进行头脑风暴，享受乐趣。亲自撰写备忘录，而不是总让别人替你写。关于电子邮件，当我们向某人提问时，即便是让Teresa去做，然后她又让Derek Walder做，他再找别人做，最终这份备忘录也应该直接从那个人手上回到我这里。
Not back up the chain. And if I call it person directly, it comes directly to me. They should copy their bosses. The other thing is slow, bureaucratic. But the really important thing is it makes that person a job more important. You're enabling them. You're telling them the job is more important. Definitely celebrate but emphasize the negatives. Have a follow-up list of your own. No management problem. When you write stuff, it comes there. Try to get rid of the friggin' jargon. Speak to someone to explain something to them.
不要向上级报告。如果我直接联系那个人，消息会直接传达给我。他们应该抄送给他们的上司。另一件事就是流程缓慢，官僚作风严重。但真正重要的是，这使得那个人的工作显得更重要。你在赋予他们权力，并告诉他们这份工作很重要。一定要庆祝，但也要强调缺点。要有自己的后续事项清单。没有管理上的问题。当你写东西的时候，它就在那里。尽量去掉那些令人讨厌的行话。与对方交谈，向他们解释清楚。
Don't waste people's time. Work smart. Most people lay waste so much time. Double read emails. Triple read them. Take care of yourself. If you don't take care of yourself, it doesn't work. Here's one I really got to change. A hundred percent, you know, alive you've been meetings with me for the last 20 years. I don't think you ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever, ever. See me not through the pre-read and not get a hundred percent of my attention.
不要浪费别人的时间，要聪明地工作。大多数人浪费了太多时间。仔细阅读电子邮件，读两遍甚至三遍。照顾好自己，如果不照顾好自己，一切都无从谈起。这里有一点我必须要改变。你知道，在过去的20年里，每次开会我都全神贯注。我想你从未见过我不提前阅读会议材料，也从未见过我不给予百分百的注意力。
And people are going to meetings all the time and they're getting notifications and texts and reading email. You got to stop. You got to stop it everywhere. It's disrespectful. I didn't know that. Well, of course, you don't know because you weren't paying attention.
人们总是去参加会议，同时还不停地接收通知、短信和查看邮件。你得停下来，到处都要停下来。这是不尊重的行为。我不知道这点。当然你不知道，因为你没有专心。
And another thing, don't be lazy about this one. Write a press release about a new product, a new service, and do the FAQs as an exercise because it makes you answer a lot of questions. And people simply don't want to have a quick verbal thing. No, when you write it down, it's amazing. It focuses the mind quite a bit about how you explain what you're doing to people.
还有一件事，不要懒惰。写一篇关于新产品或新服务的新闻稿，并把常见问题解答作为一种练习，这样做会让你面对很多问题。人们并不总是想要一个简单的口头说明。当你把它写下来时，会很神奇。它能很大程度上帮助你集中思考，如何向他人解释你所做的事情。
Push the thighs low as you can. Take the other side of the argument. Be a skeptic, but not a cynic. And always answer the question, what would you do if you're Queen Queen or King for a day? And that's the big one. What would you do? What's you going to do?
尽量把大腿往下压。看看问题的另一面。要成为一个怀疑论者，但不要变成愤世嫉俗者。而且始终要回答这个问题：如果你当一天女王或国王，你会做什么？这才是关键。你打算怎么办？你会怎么做呢？
Okay, I'll end where I started. I hope this is productive. At least I feel better.
好的，我会在起点结束。希望这是有成效的，至少我感到好些了。