Markets Weekly October 12, 2024

Hello my friends, today is October 12th and this is Markets Weekly. So this past week was a really good week in markets. We had the S&P 500 soar to new all-time highs. Now I think of price as a good indicator for sentiment and it's looking pretty euphoric out there. But today let's talk about three things. First, let's talk about the 10-year yield surging to above 4%. Let's talk about what could be driving that. Secondly, now over the past two years many people have pointed to the rise in autolone delinquencies as signs that the consumer is cracking and the Fed has to cut rates ASAP. Well a few Fed researchers took a deep dive into the data and they're coming away with a slightly different conclusion. Let's hear what they have to say. And lastly, this past week Vice Chair Jefferson of the Fed gave not one but two speeches on the discount window. He really likes the discount window. So let's take a listen to what he has to say about the history and potential future of the discount window.

你好，朋友们，今天是10月12日，这里是《市场周刊》。在过去的一周里，市场表现非常好。标准普尔500指数飙升至历史新高。我认为价格是衡量市场情绪的一个不错指标，而现在市场情绪看起来相当乐观。不过，今天我们来谈谈三件事情。 首先，我们聊聊10年期国债收益率飙升至4%以上，并探讨可能的驱动因素。 其次，在过去两年里，很多人把汽车贷款违约率上升视为消费者面临危机的迹象，认为美联储必须立刻降息。不过，美联储的一些研究人员深入分析数据后得出了稍微不同的结论。让我们来听听他们的看法。 最后，在过去的一周里，美联储副主席杰斐逊发表了两次关于贴现窗口的演讲。他对贴现窗口非常感兴趣。让我们来听听他对贴现窗口的历史和未来潜力的看法。

Okay, starting with the 10-year yield. Well the 10-year yield closed Friday at around 4.1%, marking a notable surge for the past up a couple weeks actually. Now many people have been commenting how does it make sense for the 10-year yield to rise even as the Fed is cutting rates. Now there's a couple ways to think about this. Now if you are a doomer you can say that the Fed made a tremendous policy mistake, inflation is going to surge out of control and the 10-year yield is responding to that. Or you can simply say that because the Fed has been more aggressive in trying to get ahead of a potential recession there's less of a chance of a recession and so the market is pricing in, pricing in fewer rate cuts. Now the rise in the 10-year yield started in a big way last week when we had a better than expected jobs report. Again, jobs created much higher than expected and that seemed to really calm the market's fear of a potential US recession and if you have less of a chance of having a US recession then obviously the market is going to price in fewer rate cuts.

好的，先来说说10年期国债收益率。上周五，10年期国债收益率收于约4.1%，过去几周实际上有明显的上升。很多人都在讨论，为什么10年期国债收益率会上升，即使美联储在降息。对此可以有几种理解。如果你持悲观态度，可以说美联储犯了严重的政策错误，通货膨胀将失控，而10年期国债收益率正对此作出反应。或者你可以简单地理解为，由于美联储更积极地尝试预防潜在的经济衰退，衰退的可能性变小了，市场因此对减少降息的可能性进行定价。 10年期国债收益率的大幅上涨始于上周，当时公布了一份优于预期的就业报告。新增就业人数远高于预期，这似乎大大缓解了市场对美国潜在经济衰退的担忧。如果美国经济衰退的可能性降低，显然市场会对减少降息进行定价。

Now another interesting data point came this past week and that has to do with inflation. Now we got CPI data and looking at CPI it was across the board higher than expectations. Now if you take a step back and look at core CPI year over the past few years you should also notice that core CPI basically seems to be in a different regime. Now we were around 2% before the pandemic and now we are comfortably above 3 and more recently it looks like core CPI on a year over year level seems to be moving higher. Now let's see a year or two ago the Fed wanted to focus not so much on core CPI or headline they wanted to focus on something that they created called Supercore which is Services X Shelter. Now if you look at Supercore again Services Service Inflation Excluding Shelter Excluding Rent you'll notice that that measure of inflation also is pretty high and pretty sticky. That is largely due to elevated wage growth which has moderated but is still higher than pre-pandemic levels. So on the one hand in looking at the chain of yield you can say that you know there's less of a chance of recession on the other hand you can also think of it as inflation looks to be a bit stickier above pre-pandemic trends.

最近这周出现了一个有趣的数据点，与通货膨胀有关。我们得到了消费者价格指数（CPI）数据，CPI普遍高于预期。如果回顾过去几年的核心CPI，你会注意到核心CPI似乎处于一个不同的状态。疫情前大约在2%，但现在稳定在3%以上，最近核心CPI的年同比水平似乎在上升。大约一两年前，美联储希望不太关注核心CPI或整体CPI，而是更关注他们创建的一个指标，叫做超级核心（Supercore），也就是服务业通胀不包括居住成本。如果再看超级核心，你会发现这个通胀指标也相当高且稳定不变，这主要是因为工资增长虽然有所减缓，但仍高于疫情前的水平。因此，一方面看收益链，可能认为经济衰退的可能性降低，另一方面也可以认为通胀似乎比疫情前的趋势要更为顽固地偏高。

Now of course this has a direct impact on how the Fed thinks about monetary policy. Now not too long ago the market was pricing in quite a bit of red cuts throughout the end of this year. Today the market is pricing in just one 25 basis point cut in November and a 25 basis point cut in December so 50 basis points to go. Now this past week we had some pretty interesting Fed speak where one Fed president actually said he was comfortable with escaping rate cuts in November but that person was not terribly important and the more important people in the Fed seemed to be intent on their plan to continue to cut rates but at a gradual pace and so the market is no longer expecting 50 basis point cuts.

现在，这当然直接影响到美联储如何看待货币政策。不久前，市场预计今年年底之前会有较大幅度的降息。而现在，市场预期只会在11月和12月各降息25个基点，总共50个基点。上周，美联储的一些官员发表了有趣的讲话，其中一位美联储主席表示，他对11月保持利率不变感到满意，但这个人的影响力并不大，而更重要的美联储官员似乎坚定计划以更缓和的速度继续降息，因此市场不再预期会有50个基点的降息。

Now looking forward for the next few years when we're thinking about interest rates it's not completely not all about what the Fed does but we also have basic supply and demand dynamics as well in the treasury market. Now there's some interesting work by a nonpartisan organization about estimates of what the fiscal deficit would be under a Harris administration or under another Trump administration. Now according to this work they're thinking that both of them of course will spend a lot of money but person Trump will spend notably more. Now of course we have to keep in mind that spending is largely a decision of Congress so what really matters is who wins Congress and also there's a big difference between what a candidate says on the campaign trail and what they actually do in office but I think it's pretty clear that if you look at our political culture again president Trump the past week telling everyone that you know let's just cut taxes more this time let's cut taxes for Americans living abroad so they don't have to pay worldwide income tax which is I think great idea but in any case it's more tax cuts and Harris as we all know would like to spend more on a subsidizing housing and so forth so we are in a cultural context where everyone is trying to get elected by buying votes either by giving you money directly or by giving you money indirectly by cutting your taxes so going forward I think the future will be different from the past and 10 euro below 4 percent has always been a bizarre phenomenon to me.

展望未来几年，当我们考虑利率时，不完全取决于美联储的决定，国债市场的基本供求关系也是一个因素。最近，一个无党派组织做了有趣的研究，估算在哈里斯政府或另一届特朗普政府下的财政赤字情况。据估计，两位领导人都会花很多钱，但特朗普的花销会明显更多。当然，支出主要还是国会的决定，因此真正重要的是谁能赢得国会选举。此外，候选人在竞选时期说的话与他们真正执政后的行为之间也有很大差异。不过，我想很明显的是，如果我们再看看我们的政治文化，特朗普总统在过去一周内还在告诉大家要多减税，比如对在国外居住的美国人减免全球所得税，我认为这是个不错的想法。但无论如何，这都是为更多的减税。而众所周知，哈里斯更愿意在住房补贴等方面增加支出。因此，我们处在一个文化背景下，所有人都在通过给选民直接送钱或通过减税间接送钱来拉选票。展望未来，我认为未来会不同于过去，而且我一直觉得10年期国债收益率低于4%是一个奇怪的现象。

Okay now the next thing that I want to talk about is auto loan delinquencies. Now looking at this chart of auto loan delinquencies you notice that they've gradually ticked up and are comfortably above where they were pre-pandemic. Now many people have been looking at this and suggesting that this is an indicator that the consumer is cracking Fed needs to cut rates ASAP this is really really bad so some Fed researchers took a deeper dive in the data and they're coming up with a slightly different conclusion. Now the first thing they did was to look at this one level lower not on an aggregate auto loan delinquency level but by vintage.

好的，接下来我想讨论的是汽车贷款逾期问题。看这张汽车贷款逾期的图表，你会注意到逾期率逐渐上升，已经显著高于疫情前的水平。很多人据此认为，这表明消费者财务状况不佳，美联储需要尽快降息，因为情况非常糟糕。然而，一些美联储的研究人员对数据进行了更深入的分析，他们得出了略有不同的结论。首先，他们没有只看汽车贷款逾期的整体数据，而是分年份进行了研究。

What that means is let's look at the delinquency rates according to when the loan was originated and what they found was there was a normal the higher delinquency rate for loans that originated in 2022 and as everyone recalls 2022 was kind of the height of the post-COVID boom everyone was happy spending money stock market going to the moon interest rates really really low so it seemed that that cohort seems to have more problems paying down their debt. Now then they took another look at this data in another way and looked at it according to the mount borrowed and also by interest rates. Now what they came out with was that well one thing that stood out about the 2022 cohort is that they tended to borrow a lot more principle for their auto loans than they did in the past. So from their reading that reflects the tremendous amounts of inflation we saw back then. Now from in 2022 again we were still suffering supply chains from COVID so there wasn't a very big supply of new cars and that meant there was massive competition for them so car prices rose and also used car prices rose a lot as well. So if you wanted to buy a car at that time you needed to borrow more money and so at that time the people had higher loan balances which of course implies higher monthly payments and if you have higher monthly payments that means it's more like that you default because maybe you can't pay it.

这段话的意思是，让我们来看一下拖欠率，这里是根据贷款发放的时间来看的。他们发现，2022年发放的贷款拖欠率较高。众所周知，2022年是在疫情后经济繁荣的高峰期，大家花钱很积极，股市上涨，利率很低。因此，那一年贷款的人在还债方面似乎遇到了更多问题。接下来，他们又从另一个角度分析这些数据，根据借款额度和利率进行分析。他们发现，2022年的借款人往往为汽车贷款借了更多的钱，以往其贷款额较少。这反映出当时严重的通货膨胀。再者，2022年我们仍在经历因疫情导致的供应链问题，新的汽车供应不足，竞争激烈导致车价上涨，二手车价格也大幅上升。所以在那时买车需要借更多的钱，因此人们的贷款余额更高，这自然意味着每月还款额更高，而更高的月还款额也意味着你更可能拖欠贷款，因为可能无法支付。

The next thing they looked at is interest rates. Now looking at this chart what's really interesting well first off it's a chart where on the x-axis you can see the interest rate you have to pay depending on your credit score very clearly lower credit score people pay higher loan rates on their auto loans and on the y-axis is a loan interest rate. Now what's really interesting about this chart is as you can see over the past few years interest rates have gone higher for for auto loans but what's really noteworthy is that among the borrowers with low credit scores so on the left hand part of the x-axis you'll notice that in any case whether loans whether interest rates were zero or whether or five and a half percent they had to pay really high interest rates. The bigger difference had to do with people with very high credit scores for them the Fed's rate hiking campaign had more of an impact on their auto loan interest rates. So basically if you have a low credit score no matter where the Fed is setting interest rates you have to pay a really high really high interest rates because you are a higher credit risk and so the researchers are looking at this and says that because most of the delinquencies are in people with low credit scores and these low credit score people have to pay high interest rates regardless of whether or not the Fed has rates at zero or five percent it's unlikely due to the Fed's interest rate campaign that's causing this rise in delinquencies. The rise in delinquencies seems to be driven by the inflation we had in the price of autos which forced them to take out bigger auto loans even if the Fed were had interest rates very low they would as this chart shows still have to pay very high interest rates. So given that fact they look at the data today and they notice that car prices have come down a lot and banks have also tightened up their credit standards and so because of these two aspects we're unlikely to see a rerun of this surging auto loan delinquencies in 2022 for auto loans originated today. So the overall amount of auto loans from my perspective that delinquency rate seems to basically maybe be along its heights and rather than worsen it's probably going to trend lower going forward so maybe this surprising loan this rise in that alone delinquencies overall seems to be due more to these idiosyncratic inflation secondary effects rather than anything to do with interest rate policy or as a clear sign of what's happening in the labor market especially in the context of the broader data where GDP growth continues to be strong and at least by official data standards jobs continue to be created.

他们接下来研究的是利率。现在看这张图表，有趣的是，首先在x轴上可以清楚地看到，取决于你的信用评分，支付的利率是多少，信用评分低的人在他们的汽车贷款上支付更高的利率，而y轴显示的是贷款利率。这张图表真正有趣之处在于，过去几年里汽车贷款的利率有所上升，但值得注意的是，对于那些信用评分较低的借款人，即x轴左侧部分的借款人，不论贷款利率是零还是五个半百分点，他们都不得不支付非常高的利率。差别更大的是那些信用评分非常高的人，联邦储备的加息行动对他们的汽车贷款利率影响更大。所以，基本上如果你的信用评分很低，不论联邦储备设置的利率是多少，你都得支付非常高的利率，因为你是一个较高信用风险的借款人。研究者们注意到，由于大多数拖欠贷款的人是低信用评分的人，而这些低信用评分的人无论联储的利率是零还是五个百分点都必须支付高利率，所以拖欠贷款的增加不太可能是由联储的利率政策导致的。拖欠贷款增加似乎是由汽车价格的通胀驱动的，这迫使他们即便在联储利率非常低的时候，也需申请更大额度的汽车贷款，因为正如这张图表所示，他们仍然必须支付很高的利率。鉴于这一事实，他们查看了今天的数据，发现汽车价格已经大幅下降，银行也收紧了信贷标准，因此由于这两个原因，在2022年汽车贷款拖欠激增的情况不太可能在现在发放的汽车贷款中重演。从我的角度来看，汽车贷款的整体拖欠率似乎基本上处于顶端，而不是恶化，可能在未来呈下降趋势。因此，这种贷款拖欠的惊人增长似乎更可能是由于这些偶发的通胀二次效应，而不是利率政策造成的，也不是劳动市场状况的一个明显信号，尤其是在更广泛数据的背景下，其中GDP增长仍然强劲，并且至少根据官方数据标准，仍在创造就业。

Okay now the last thing that I want to talk about is the discount window. Now Vice Chair Jefferson at the Fed gave two speeches on the discount window the past week talking about its history and its potential future. Now the backdrop of this is that the Fed is thinking about revamping its discount window policy but first let's listen to some history. So now before there was a Fed now the the nation was under a gold standard and it was heavily agrarian. Now today most maybe one or two percent of the people are in agriculture back then a big chunk of people were in agriculture it was a big sector in the economy. Now when you have when you're under the gold standard again and you don't have a lender of last resort banks are a little bit more constrained in the amount of loans they can provide because there's a real risk that they could be set for a run.

好的，现在我想谈谈的最后一个话题是贴现窗口。美联储副主席杰斐逊在过去一周内发表了两次关于贴现窗口的演讲，他谈到了它的历史和潜在的未来。背景是美联储正在考虑重新调整贴现窗口的政策，但首先让我们了解一些历史。在美联储成立之前，美国实行金本位制，经济主要以农业为主。如今，可能只有百分之一或二的人在从事农业，但那时，很大一部分人是在农业领域，农业是经济中的一个重要部门。当你处于金本位制并且没有最后贷款人时，银行在发放贷款的数量上会受到更多限制，因为它们面临被挤兑的真实风险。

After all you can run out of gold and there's no one to backstop you. Now in that context when you have an agrarian economy credit demand is very cyclical especially around harvests around harvests time farmers would have to take out loans hire a whole bunch of people to harvest and then they could sell the crop and get their money back and pay back their loans. So there are some cyclical demand and credit and credit was less elastic and so around say see snow times money would flow from the financial centers at that time say New York to the regional banks and there would be some tightness of credit and maybe some fragility as well because if you have a harvest that's not very good maybe you have trouble paying back your loans and so that system didn't seem to be ideal and so they wanted to have a federal reserve as a central bank lender of last resort to be able to backstop credit and make sure that they wouldn't have these so much a seasonal tightness.

毕竟，黄金可能会用完，而且没人能为你提供支持。在这种背景下，当一个经济体以农业为主时，信贷需求通常是周期性的，尤其是在收获季节。农民们在收获季节需要借款雇佣大量人手来收割作物，然后他们可以出售作物，收回资金并偿还贷款。因此，信贷需求具有周期性，并且信贷的弹性较小。例如，在冬季，资金会从当时的金融中心，比如纽约，流向地区银行，这可能会导致信贷紧张，甚至出现一些脆弱性。因为如果收成不好，可能会面临还款困难的问题。因此，这种系统并不理想，人们希望建立一个联邦储备作为最后贷款人，能够在信贷紧张的时候提供支持，确保季节性紧张不会过于严重。

Now so the federal reserve was born now at that time you know you have this fed backstopping and it seems like the banks were pretty active in barring the discount window and maybe that contributed to some of the bad loans made by the banking sector in the 1920s and maybe some of the speculation and so starting in the 1920s the Fed became a bit weary of making discount loans and wanted to discourage their active use. Again this is going to be a long-running thing throughout the Fed's history whereas the Fed wants to backstop the system but also doesn't want to create moral hazard where banks see that the Fed is there to backstop them and begin to make riskier loans or speculate.

在那时，美国联邦储备系统（美联储）刚刚成立。当时，美联储为银行提供了支持，而银行积极使用“贴现窗口”——这可能导致了银行业在1920年代的一些不良贷款，以及一些投机行为。因此，从1920年代开始，美联储对发放贴现贷款变得有些谨慎，并希望限制其过于频繁的使用。这种情况在美联储的历史中一直持续，美联储希望在提供系统支持的同时，又不希望因为其支持导致银行冒更大风险或进行投机，从而产生道德风险，即银行确信美联储会支持它们，于是开始进行更高风险的贷款或投机活动。

Now starting in the 1920s the began to do something called open market operations we call them you know basically go out and buy securities. That was a potential solution to this dilemma whereas instead of making adding liquidity through emergency loans the discount window maybe they would go out and buy securities adding cash into the banking system and just let the markets work and distribute that liquidity throughout. Now over the next few decades the Fed will try to struggle to strike that balance between backstopping the system and also preventing moral hazard. Now in the 1960s the Fed actually set the discount window loan rate to below market and what they would try to do to prevent banks from abusing that was basically regulation and moral suasion. They would tell the banks heavily discourage them to not tap the discount window unless they needed to.

从20世纪20年代开始，美联储开始进行一种被称为公开市场操作的活动。简单来说，就是他们会购买证券。这是一种解决困境的潜在方法，相比通过紧急贷款增加流动性，或者使用贴现窗口，美联储会选择购买证券，将现金注入银行系统，并让市场自行运作来分配这些流动性。在接下来的几十年中，美联储将努力在支持系统与防止道德风险之间取得平衡。 到了20世纪60年代，美联储将贴现窗口的贷款利率设定为低于市场利率。他们通过法规和道德劝告来防止银行滥用这一政策。他们要求并强烈建议银行不要动用贴现窗口，除非是必要情况下。

They would create different types of lending to make it clear that you know you only do this if you really need it and some of this is meant for short term and so forth but in the end it wasn't very successful. Now Jefferson has this chart where looking at discount window loans as a percentage of Fed balance sheet you can notice that 70s and 80s a lot of banks were borrowing in the discount window pretty regularly. Oh and I forgot this really quote chart from the 1920s that shows that again back then many banks were borrowing from the Fed's discount window all the time and so some of them were basically were having using the Fed regularly a huge number of banks and so that's part of the reason why the Fed became worried about moral hazard.

他们会设计不同类型的贷款，以便明确告诉你只有在真正需要时才使用这些贷款，其中一些贷款是短期的，等等，但最终这些措施并不太成功。现在，杰斐逊有一张图表，上面显示折扣窗口贷款占美联储资产负债表的百分比。你可以注意到，在70年代和80年代，许多银行会经常从折扣窗口借款。噢，我还忘记提到一张来自1920年代的有趣图表，它显示当时很多银行也一直在从美联储的折扣窗口借款，因此其中一些银行实际上是定期依赖美联储，这使得大量银行这样做。这也是为什么美联储开始担心道德风险的原因之一。

Anyway back to the 1970s and 80s so the Fed realized that their moral suasion was not super useful in discouraging banks because again discount window loan rates below market banks were just leveraging up and borrowing but then we will come into the 90s and we realize back then there was a kind of a big banking crisis many banks went bust and as they were getting into trouble they would borrow heavily from the discount window and so the market began to associate discount window borrowing with the bank doing very poorly. It became a very strong stigma attached to borrowing of the discount window and so you can see from this chart again that say in the late 80s and 90s not much borrowing in the discount window because all the banks were aware that if they borrowed from that given all the bank failures at the time they would be they would be tarred and so the bank held big discount windows basically not used.

无论如何，回到20世纪70年代和80年代，美国联邦储备系统意识到，他们之前通过道德劝说来抑制银行借贷并不是很有效，因为贴现窗口的贷款利率低于市场利率，银行会大量借贷以扩大杠杆。到了90年代，我们意识到当时发生了一场大的银行危机，许多银行倒闭。当银行陷入困境时，它们会大量从贴现窗口借款。因此，市场开始将贴现窗口借款与银行经营不善联系在一起，这种借款带上了强烈的污名。你从这张图表中可以看到，在80年代末和90年代时，贴现窗口借款并不多，因为所有银行都知道，如果它们选择从贴现窗口借款，在当时那么多银行倒闭的背景下，它们会受到负面影响。因此，银行基本上不使用贴现窗口。

Now the Fed looked at this and began to realize well if we have a discount window and no one's using it then it's not very useful and so they revamped it again in the early 2000s and the way that they're doing this since then is that rather than have below market rates and then just dissuade you they would have the discount window set at above market rates and let you borrow whenever you want no question asked provided of course you know you're in good standing and not let's see there aren't any solvency concerns. Now that did seem to be helpful we saw that during the great financial crisis tremendous surge in discount window borrowing and more recently in the Silicon Valley crisis Silicon Valley bank crisis as well but one other thing that happened in after the 2008 financial crisis that we had new legislation called the Dodd-Frank Act which actually mandated the Fed to disclose in detail after two years who borrowed from the discount window and so it seemed like there's a return of discount windows stigma given that if you borrow from the discount window people are going to find out eventually.

美联储注意到这个问题，开始意识到如果设立一个贴现窗口却没有人使用，那就没有太大用处。因此，他们在 2000 年代初对其进行了改进。从那时起，他们不再提供低于市场利率的贴现窗口以劝阻使用者，而是将贴现窗口的利率设定在高于市场利率，让符合条件的借款人随时借款，而不问其他问题。他们只需要确保借款人信誉良好，并且没有偿付能力问题。这一改变在一定程度上是有效的，例如在金融危机和最近的硅谷银行危机中，我们看到贴现窗口的借款大幅增加。然而，在 2008 年金融危机之后，美国出台了新的法案《多德-弗兰克法案》，要求美联储在两年后详细披露从贴现窗口借款的情况。这意味着贴现窗口的污名重新出现，因为如果从贴现窗口借钱，最终会被他人知道。

So recently when we had that Silicon Valley bank panic the Fed realized that something really strange was that Silicon Valley bank they had a liquidity problem but they didn't really borrow from the discount window because they weren't even set up to borrow from the discount window they were borrowing from the home loan banks and they didn't really have the documents in place to borrow from the Fed and that set up alarm bells because that tells the Fed that we have this to sound window no one's using it not just that but no one a lot of people are not even already even set up to use it and so what they're trying to do now is one make sure that everyone is at the very least set up to use it and two they're finding ways to try to reduce the Sigma so that you know make the discount window useful again.

最近，当硅谷银行出现恐慌时，美联储意识到一个非常奇怪的现象：硅谷银行出现了流动性问题，但他们并没有从贴现窗口借款，因为他们甚至没有做好从贴现窗口借款的准备。他们是从住房贷款银行借款的，并且并没有准备好从美联储借款所需的文件。这引起了警报，因为这表明我们设立的贴现窗口没有人使用。不仅如此，许多人甚至没有做好使用贴现窗口的准备。因此，他们现在想要做的是，首先，确保至少每个银行都能使用这个窗口；其次，他们正在寻找方法来减少使用贴现窗口的负面影响，从而重新让它变得有用。

Now during Covid they did lower the discount window borrowing rate so that it's not really far above market but right now they're working on the stigma one making sure that all the banks are able to borrow it from it and two there seems to be some news suggesting that the Fed is going to make it mandatory for at least some of the bigger banks to make periodic test drawings from the discount window and recall I think during their most recent panics in Covid for example they were strong arming big banks to borrow from the discount window just to remove that stigma and so that seems to be the current campaign for the Fed trying to create make the discount window into something that's a bit more useful and maybe throwing in some regulatory sweeteners as well recently Bar of the Fed was suggesting that you can if you have treasuries you can borrow against treasuries with a discount window and that can count against your liquidity regulations in a good way but that could really just be to encourage greater treasury holdings as well by making them more fungible with reserves.

在新冠疫情期间，美国联邦储备系统下调了贴现窗口的借款利率，使其不再远高于市场利率。但目前，他们正在努力解决两大问题：一是确保所有银行能够从贴现窗口借款，二是有消息称美联储可能会要求至少一些大银行定期从贴现窗口进行测试性提款。在最近的疫情恐慌中，比如新冠疫情，美联储强制大银行从贴现窗口借款，以消除相关污名。这似乎是美联储当前的行动，目的是使贴现窗口更加实用，可能还会加入一些监管奖励措施。最近，美联储官员 Bar 建议，如果你拥有国债，可以用国债作为抵押通过贴现窗口借款，这可以对你的流动性规则产生积极影响。但这也可能只是为了鼓励更多储备国债，使其与储备金更加互通。

In any case that seems to be the Fed's new project more discount window usage and we'll see if that's successful at the next banking crisis. All right so that's all I prepared for today thanks so much for tuning in again if you're interested in hearing more about all my thoughts check out my blog FedGuy.com and if you're interested in learning more about markets check out centralbanking101.com where I have online courses and if you don't like the courses you get a full refund no questions asked talk to you all next week.

无论如何，这似乎是美联储的新项目——更多的贴现窗口使用。我们会在下次金融危机时看看这是否成功。好了，这就是我今天准备的全部内容，非常感谢大家再次收听。如果你对我的所有想法感兴趣，请访问我的博客 FedGuy.com。如果你想了解更多关于市场的信息，请访问 centralbanking101.com，我在那里提供在线课程。如果你对课程不满意，可以全额退款，无需任何理由。我们下周再聊。