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Ep 386. Takeaways from Warren Buffett’s Shareholder Letter and Analyzing Ted Weschler’s Dillards Investment

发布时间 2023-03-03 12:00:00    来源
Welcome, welcome, welcome. How's everybody doing? Hope you are doing well. My name is Andrew Coon from Focus Compounding on air live with the co-host of the Focus Compounding podcast, Jeff Gannon. Jeff, how's it going today? It's going very well, Andrew. How's it going with you? It's going great. We hope it's going great with everybody else as well.
欢迎欢迎欢迎！各位都怎么样？希望你们都过得好。我是Andrew Coon，来自Focus Compounding，我和Focus Compounding Podcast的联合主持人Jeff Gannon在直播中。Jeff，今天怎么样啊？非常好，Andrew。你过得怎么样？很好啊。我们也希望大家都过得很好。

This is the first time you're tuning in with us. Thank you so much for joining us. Be sure to check out all of our content that we put out there on the internet, the best place to get everything that we push out into the world is to follow me on Twitter at at focus compound.
这是你第一次和我们一起收听。非常感谢你的加入。务必查看我们在网上发布的所有内容，获取我们发布到世界上的所有最佳信息的最佳途径是在 Twitter 上关注我 @ focus compound。

Of course, all the information is down in the description below. You could go to focuscompounding.com to get free investment write-ups, investment topic write-ups, just overall blog posts going all the way back to 2005. From Jeff, by going to focuscompounding.com. And of course, if you're interested in learning about our money management services, reach out to me at andretfocuscompounding.com. Let's start the conversation.
当然了，所有信息都在下面的说明中。您可以前往focuscompounding.com获取免费的投资报告、投资主题报告，以及涵盖从2005年开始的所有博客文章。通过访问focuscompounding.com，您可以从杰夫那里了解更多。当然，如果您有兴趣了解我们的资金管理服务，请通过我的邮箱andretfocuscompounding.com联系我。让我们开始对话吧。

So Jeff, I was just telling you, and I was like, wait, we should stop talking. We like to keep it all real here. Let's hit the record button and talk about this. It's 11 a.m. right now. We normally record at 3.30, and I got to say, I'm like three espresso's in. Haven't had any food yet. So I'm still fasting. I've gone on a walk, you know, just get the brain going, get the brain pumping. I have a Celsius that I've yet to open up right next to me. Of course, the best flavor, sparkling orange. And I feel amazing.
嗨 Jeff，我刚告诉你，然后我就想，等等，我们应该停止说话。我们喜欢保持真实。让我们按下录制按钮并谈论这个。现在是上午11点。我们通常在下午3:30录制，我必须说，我喝了三杯浓缩咖啡。还没有吃东西。所以我还在斋戒。我出去散步，让大脑动起来，让大脑运转起来。我旁边有一瓶尚未打开的Celsius。当然，最好的味道是闪闪发光的柳橙味。我感觉很棒。

It's 11 a.m. so I feel much better recording at 11 a.m. instead of 3.30. So perhaps we could start recording at 11 a.m. That's how I'm feeling. How are you feeling?
现在是上午11点，所以我希望在上午11点而不是下午3点进行录制，感觉好多了。也许我们可以在上午11点开始录制。这就是我的感觉。你现在感觉怎么样？

Yeah, that's fine with me. Fine with you? It's not right here. I have a top right here.
嗯，对我来说没问题。你呢？这里不是对的地方。我这里有一件顶部。

Very good. Very good.
很好，很好。

Well what are we talking about today? I don't even know. March 1st, we could get right into it. Did you have a chance to check out the Buffet Letter? I did. I read the Buffet Letter, yeah.
今天我们在讨论什么？我甚至不知道。3月1日，我们可以直接开始谈。你有机会查看巴菲特的信吗？我是的。我读了巴菲特的信，是的。

Did you print it out? Or did you read it on your computer screen? Yes, I have it right here. Right there. They just see the back of pages.
你有把它打印出来吗？还是在电脑屏幕上看的？是的，我这就有它。就在这里。他们只看到页面的背面。

And I'm not a lot of evidence, but yeah, that's the letter. Okay. So did you print the whole annual report? Or did you just print out the letter? No. Nope, just the letter for this podcast. Because I figured we'd probably go over the letter. People would ask about the letter, but not the entire annual report.
我没有太多证据，但是，是的，那是这封信。好的。所以，你是把整份年报都印出来了吗？还是只印出这封信？不是的。不是的，只印了这封信来做这个播客。因为我想我们可能会谈论这封信。人们会问这封信的事，而不是整份年报。

So I guess before we go through it and go over our thoughts, what are your initial thoughts about the letter? This is probably our third or fourth, I guess probably fifth year of doing this going over the letter. So what are your general thoughts before we jump into it?
那么，在我们开始审阅并讨论这封信之前，你对它有什么初步的想法呢？这可能已经是我们第三或第四，甚至可能是第五年审阅这封信了。那么，在我们开始之前，你有什么总体想法？

Well I thought it was very short. I thought it wouldn't tell anyone much about Berkshire if they didn't know about Berkshire and this was the letter that they were looking at to decide on making the investment. I also thought it was very good in some of the things that said, especially something that we've talked about a little bit. And I think Charlie Munger has talked about more.
嗯，我觉得这封信非常简短。如果他们不知道伯克希尔是什么，而这封信是他们决定是否要投资的依据，那么它不会告诉他们太多关于伯克希尔的信息。我也认为其中有一些非常好的内容，特别是一些我们已经谈论过的内容。我认为查理·芒格也讲过这些内容。

Buffet goes into talking about how he's actually only made about one truly good decisionary five years or so at Berkshire. Yeah, about 12 of them. And also how he's made a lot of mistakes, but because the mistakes compounded at a low rate and the success is compounded at a high rate. They become a very small part of Berkshire. So I thought that was all actually very good and very helpful in understanding the record.
巴菲特说他在伯克希尔公司只有约五年左右拥有大约12个真正好的决策。他也承认自己犯了很多错误，但由于这些错误的复利率很低，而成功的复利率很高，它们只是伯克希尔公司很小的一部分。我认为这些话实际上非常好，并且有助于理解他的记录。

And he did talk a little bit about some other things like saying how the media doesn't cover the stock correctly and to ignore operating earnings. And he also talked about float and it talked about making sure that people go and read a description of float. So if they did all that, then I think they would learn a lot about Berkshire compared to what things the media gets wrong.
他提到了其他一些事情，比如说媒体没有正确报道股票，要忽略运营收益。他还谈到了浮动股数，建议人们去阅读浮动股数的描述。如果他们都这样做了，我觉得他们会比媒体报道的更了解伯克希尔公司。

Dude, I thought, I mean, apparently he listens to podcasts. So I'm just going to go on a limb and say he listens to the focus compounded podcast. And when he was to your point, right, and I have this because I thought it was one of the most important sentences or paragraphs in the letter. So I highlighted it in blue when he says the lesson for investors, the weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom over time. It takes just a few winners to work wonders.
伙计，我想，我的意思是，显然他听播客。所以我冒险猜测他听的是聚焦复利播客。当他提到你的点，我有这个想法，因为我觉得这是信中最重要的句子或段落之一。所以我用蓝色标记了它，他说投资者该学习的是，杂草在时间推移中逐渐变得无关紧要，而花却开得更加绚烂。只需要几个胜利者就能产生奇迹。

And yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well. And then how he was talking about, yeah, the once every five years he's come up with like these big, great decisions. But it reminded me of how you would manage your personal portfolio and advice you would give to other individuals where you come up with perhaps one idea per year. You don't sell. And then over time, assuming you are good at this, the winners should just take, you know, it should become a huge part of the portfolio. And then the losers just become minuscule compared to the rest of the portfolio over time.
是的，从早期开始，并活到90岁也会有所帮助。他谈到的那些像每五年一次的重大决策，让我想起你管理个人投资组合的方式和你给其他人的建议。你每年或许只有一个想法，却不卖出。随着时间的推移，如果你擅长这个领域，赢家应该会占据整个组合的很大一部分，而输家则变得微不足道，与整个组合相比变得微不足道。

Yeah. And that works for Berkshire because they have earnings and they have float. And that would work for individuals if they're saving. You know, that's where we talk about the difference between like a portfolio idea, which is usually I feel talk about like how much should I have in this or something. And the reality of how you're going to save, which is usually that, you know, when you're 20 something years old, you could put 100% into something because at that point, you've managed to save almost nothing, right? But your savings in future years are going to be a lot larger than they were initially.
是的，这对伯克希尔公司来说是有效的，因为他们有收入和流动性。如果个人在储蓄方面也是如此，那么这同样有效。你知道，这就是我们谈论投资组合理念与实际储蓄之间的区别。投资组合理念通常是如何分配资金，或者说在某个领域投资多少资金。但实际上，你要考虑的是如何进行储蓄。当你还年轻时，比如20多岁，你可以将100%的钱投资到某个地方，因为那时你的储蓄几乎为零，你需要把每份收入都用来储蓄。但在未来的几年中，你的储蓄会比最初的时候大得多。

And since I'm sort of think of Berkshire, you know, he talks about how float increased 8,000 percent. I mean, 8,000 times, sorry. Yeah. And so of course, the same thing wouldn't work out if he had a limited pool of capital and nothing more came in, right? I feel like if you kept the text out, middle open for 20 years longer than it should have been open. But he'd been dealing with like a portfolio that you would get because you inherited something and you never saved money again. This is for more flows of money coming in each year. But that's how most people are saving and investing. And it's how Berkshire does it. It's how most companies work. You don't just have a pot of money that you get one time to deal with and you have to sell to buy something else. You get more flows coming in over time.
嗯，既然我在考虑伯克希尔公司，你知道，他谈到了浮动资本增长了8000％。我的意思是，增长了8000倍，抱歉。是的，所以当然，如果他只有有限的资本池，而且没有更多的资金流入，那么同样的事情就行不通了，是吗？我觉得如果你把这个中间部分留出来，再延长20年，就成了更长的报告了。但他在处理的投资组合，就好像你继承了一些东西，但你从未再存钱一样。这是每年都要有更多的资金流入。但这是大多数人存钱和投资的方式。这也是伯克希尔公司的做法，也是大多数公司的做法。你不仅仅拥有一笔资金来处理，然后只能卖出购买其他东西。你会有更多的资金流入，一直引入。

So there are a lot of fund managers that listen to the podcast. How do you think they should think about it in the context of perhaps they're continuously getting inflows, hopefully, from investors as well? And how you would think about that? Yeah, I mean, that's the problem. Ben Graham made a bit more than half of his money, made most of his money from his Geico position because he agreed to buy Geico for the fund. It was distributed and he took his distribution of it and he never sold it. He just viewed as a different kind of stock, didn't sell it, right? So he actually made more money from that than he did from managing money that way.
所以有很多基金经理会听这个播客。你认为他们在可能不断获得投资者流入的背景下应该如何考虑这个问题？你会如何思考这个问题？是的，这是问题所在。本·格雷厄姆从他的Geico头寸中赚了一半以上的钱，因为他同意为基金购买了Geico。它被分配出去后，他拿到了分配股份，从未出售。他将其视为一种不同的股票，没有卖出，因此他实际上从中赚到的钱比从管理资金中赚到的钱还要多。

Bill Miller invested in Amazon. And so with the fund and everything has always held it, but it's trimmed it back to whatever 5% or whatever the normal thing for mutual fund would be. So it made a lot of money over time. But of course, if it just had held it since, you know, first buying it would be doing much better than if he did all the decisions that he did since then. So the problem is a lot of this can't be applied that well to the approaches that money managers have, right? Because it's not what people are looking for that way.
Bill Miller 投资了亚马逊。他一直持有该股票，并减持到了普通共同基金的5％左右。随着时间的推移，他赚了很多钱。但是，如果他从一开始就持有，就会比他之后的所有决策都好很多。所以问题在于，这些思路不适用于资产管理人的方法，因为这不是人们所追求的方式。

So I don't know the answer to that, except it's difficult. Sequoia over the years had a Berkshire and trimmed it back and everything. So it can still contribute a lot to your results, but it's not going to have the same contribution over time that way. Buffett also talks about how the rest of the decisions were, you know, on average, didn't add or to track that much, right? So that is one thing to keep in mind is that like churning the smaller parts of the portfolio might not matter that much for fund managers to think about.
我不知道那个问题的答案，除了它很难。Sequoia多年来一直拥有一家Berkshire公司，并对其进行了修剪和调整。因此，它仍然可以对您的业绩做出很大的贡献，但它的贡献不会像以前那样持续不断。Buffett还谈到其他决策，平均而言，并没有增加或追踪太多，对吧？因此，需要记住的一件事是，像轮换投资组合较小的部分可能并不重要，基金经理也不需要过多考虑。

So if you have, you know, say you have a fairly high level concentration, so you have, you know, your top 10 stocks or something account for 50%, 70%, or whatever of your portfolio, what you're doing in the other part is probably churning even faster than the part that you have the bigger positions in. And it probably is one, the ideas aren't particularly good or particularly bad, you know, as Buffett's experience has been. And two, it's a smaller percentage in each of them. So it may be that the portion of your portfolio you're churning more is, you know, less important that way, you're spending too much time thinking about that.
如果你有一个相当高的集中度，比如说你的前十支股票占你投资组合的50％，70％或其他比例，那么你在其他部分可能会更频繁地买卖。这可能是因为这些股票的想法并不是特别好或特别糟，就像巴菲特的经验一样。而且它们在每个股票中的占比比较小。因此，你更频繁地买卖的投资组合部分可能不是很重要，你花太多时间思考它了。

And what he talks about the, you know, one idea every five years, right? I mean, this line right here, he reiterates how they're not stock pickers. They are business pickers.
他说的是每五年一个新点子，你知道的对吧？我是说，这句话表明他们不是股票拣选人，而是企业拣选人。

And I think when you think in the context of the portfolio and how he thinks about, well, you have this flow coming in and how over time your winners should make up for all of your losers, it's just an interesting framework that I think a lot of people don't, you know, sometimes think about.
我认为当你考虑到投资组合的背景和他的思考方式时，有一个投入流和随着时间推移赚钱的股票占据失败股票的规律。我觉得这是一个有趣的框架，很多人有时候并没有想到它。

I mean, sometimes like I got flamed on Twitter because I was talking about how, and I knew this was going to upset a lot of people, but I was saying how you should approach from like a framework perspective, doing research on a stock as if you're going to acquire the whole company.
我的意思是，有时我因为谈论如何看待股票而在推特上遭到了攻击，我知道这会惹恼很多人，但我是在说你应该从框架的角度出发，像你要收购整个公司一样进行股票研究。

No, you're not ever going to get to go and sit in like a special office where they have all their financials with a bunch of lawyers and accountants and be able to go and do that level of due diligence.
不，你永远不可能去坐在一个特殊的办公室里，那里有大量的律师和会计师，了解他们的财务状况并能够进行如此深入的尽职调查。

But basically what I was trying to say is I believe most investors, when they approach a company, they're truly thinking about it more so from like the numbers and how the numbers work and doing all this Excel monkey work and stuff like that.
基本上我想表达的是，我相信大多数投资者在接近一家公司时，真正考虑的是数字和数字的运作方式，并且做所有这些Excel猴子工作等。

As opposed to thinking about, well, if I was going to purchase the whole company, guess what I would be thinking about, who are your customers, who are their competitors, and really thinking about like understanding the relationship from those two, you know, perspectives or whatever.
与其思考，嗯，如果我要购买整个公司，你猜我会考虑什么，我会考虑谁是你们的客户，谁是他们的竞争对手，并认真考虑这两者之间的关系，你知道的，从那两个角度或任何其他角度去理解。

So I had said, you know, you should approach it as if you're going to acquire the whole company.
那么，我说过，你应该把它看作是要收购整个公司一样去处理。

Of course, I mean, I'm under no illusion that you will never be able to do, they're not one in the same.
当然，我的意思是，我并没有幻想你永远不能做到，它们并不是一回事。

However, I do think it's a good framework because I think it gets people away from thinking about just the numbers and really starts to get people to think more so about like everything we talk about in the podcast, right?
然而，我认为这是一个很好的构架，因为我觉得它让人们远离仅仅关注数字，开始更多地思考我们在播客中谈论的一切。

Like the competitive advantage, how durable is the business, but more so the customer and competitor decision making because one of the best things we've ever said, and I think it's so true is that you can't understand our business until you understand those two things, right?
和竞争优势一样，该企业的持久性如何，但更重要的是客户和竞争对手的决策能力，因为我们曾经说过的最好的一句话是，除非你了解这两个方面，否则你无法理解我们的业务，对吧？

The decision making that customers and competitors both make.
客户和竞争对手都做出的决策。

So when Charlie or when Warren and Charlie speak about not being stock pickers and how they're business pickers, they're not thinking of stocks like, oh, we have a 10% position or portfolio and we should trip it back and we're managing this, you know, this beta and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
当查理或沃伦和查理说他们不是股票选择者，他们是商业选择者时，他们不是考虑像“我们有10%的头寸或投资组合，我们应该削减这项业务，我们正在管理这个beta等等”。

It's really, they're investing in businesses, right?
他们真的在投资企业，对吗？

So what does that mean to you when they say, yep, we're not stock pickers, we're business pickers?
当他们说：“是的，我们不是股票选择者，我们是业务选择者”，对你意味着什么呢？

Well, he kind of lays it out in different parts. He doesn't put all in one spot, but basically what he says is, Berkshire does two things differently when it takes a full position and when it buys an entire company instead of an individual stock.
嗯，他在不同的部分提出了这个观点。他没有把所有东西都放在一个地方，但基本上他所说的是，伯克希尔哈撒韦在采取满仓位和购买整个公司而不是个别股票时有两种不同的做法。

And those two things are it controls capital allocation and it picks management.
这两件事情就是它掌控资本配置和挑选管理层。

And so where you're saying, you know, people are saying, it's not the same thing buying a stock versus buying the whole company. It's exactly the same things that for two things.
所以，在你说的那个方面，人们说，买股票和买整个公司不是同一回事。对于这两件事，确实是完全一样的。

You don't get to select capital allocation and you don't get to select the management.
你没有选择资本配置的权利，也没有选择管理层的权利。

Now in exchange for that buff, it says you can get a bargain price when buying pieces of business, you'll never get a bargain price buying the entire business.
现在，这个牛肉干可以换取一次购买生意片段时的特价哦。但是，购买整个生意是永远不可能有特价的。

That is, I mean, they won't knowingly sell to you at a bargain price.
我的意思是，他们不会有意以低价卖给你。

They will knowingly sell a stock to you.
他们会有意地向您出售股票。

I mean, we've had that happen that people believe that they're selling you too cheaply, but they'll do it.
我是说，我们曾经遇到这种情况，有些人认为他们以太便宜的价格卖给你，但他们会这么做。

But they're probably not going to do that except as he says, except under duress if they control the company.
但是除非他们控制了这家公司，在受到压力的情况下，他们可能不会这样做，就像他所说的那样。

So in exchange for getting a bargain price, you give up control of capital allocation and picking the management.
所以，为了获得便宜的价格，您得放弃资本配置和选择管理团队的控制权。

So that's one reason why Berkshire focuses a lot on capital allocation and management when buying stocks because then it doesn't matter as much that they don't have control of that. Right?
所以这就是为什么伯克希尔在购买股票时非常关注资本分配和管理的原因之一，因为这样他们就不必太在意是否掌控了这些股票。对吗？

So like when they bought a piece of capital cities in the market, a small amount and they sold it later just in the public markets, that really isn't different for them than when they got a very influential purchase that would have given them a lot of control over capital cities, ABC when they merged together because they didn't, they liked the management and would have wanted to keep it and they wouldn't have wanted capital allocation to be any different.
就像当他们在市场上购买Capital Cities公司的一小部分，然后稍后在公众市场上出售，对他们来说并没有什么不同，就像当他们获得了非常有影响力的资产，本来可以控制Capital Cities或ABC，但他们没有这么做，因为他们喜欢管理层并希望保持现状，他们也不希望资本分配有任何差异。

So it's better for them just to buy as a passive buyer in those cases. So I think that's the approach that we always use.
所以在这些情况下，他们最好只是作为被动买家购买。所以我认为这是我们一直采用的方法。

Certainly the approach that I always use is to the big mistakes have been not buying something because not buying something that I certainly would have bought if I was offered the whole company. Right? So we've talked about that before.
当我面临决策时，我总是采用一种方法，避免犯大错误，那就是不要因为没有购买某件东西而错过了它。如果有人给我整个公司，我肯定会购买这个东西的，对吧？所以我们之前谈论过这个问题。

Right? So like that's why I say dream work and animation or something was a mistake because it's not that it went up all that much or whatever before being sold to someone else. But if they said you can buy the whole company here, it is for this amount. I would have said, okay, I'll buy it as would have, you know, a lot of other studios and stuff.
对吧？就是这个原因，我才会说做梦工作和动画之类的事情是个错误，因为在被卖给别人之前，并没有太大的飞跃。但是，如果他们说能够在这里买下整个公司，就需要这么多钱。我会说，好的，我会买下它，就如同很多其他工作室和公司那样。

So that's buying the whole company. The, a lot of people get caught up on the difference between the two, right? And I'm not sure how big the difference is it's difficult to calculate because for one thing, you don't know the way in which you'll get your return.
所以，这就是购买整个公司。很多人会纠结于两者之间的差别，不是吗？我不确定这个差别有多大，因为首先，你不知道你将如何获得回报。

So most people kind of assume a continuation of the status quo sort of thing. So you look at a company and they always assume, oh, well, it'll stay public and it won't change its policies about dividends or whatever it won't get bought out management won't offer to buy it out.
很多人通常都认为现状会持续下去。所以你看一个公司，大家总是觉得它会一直保持公众股份，并且不会改变其股息政策或被收购，管理层也不会提出收购。

So I won't try to buy it out. People who are involved in it won't die merge it together, whatever. Okay. But at some point they will and whatever gap there was will close, you know, instantly at that time. So that's always one of the arguments.
所以我不会试图买下它。那些参与其中的人不会把它合并，随便。好吧。但是在某个时候，他们会合并，并且任何间隙将会立即关闭，你知道的。所以这总是其中的一个争议点。

I have invest in companies where management controls all of the company. I mean, I have invest in companies are management controls more than 90% of the shares, owns more than 90% of the shares. And in cases where the company's gone private because management is taking them over, which has happened in a few cases, you know, you've gotten well compensated.
我已经投资了那些管理层控制公司的企业。我的意思是，我已经投资了那些管理层控制超过90％股份并拥有超过90％股份的企业。在一些情况下，公司变成私有是因为管理层接管了它们，这在一些情况下已经发生过，你知道的，你会得到很好的补偿。

So eventually you've got a price that's closer to the fair price that you'd get. Sometimes management participates in buying out the company. Sometimes management has to be given different things on either side, whatever. But you know, eventually the only way to think of the asset is what it's worth to people, you know, economically in general.
最终，你得到了一个更接近公平价格的价格。有时管理层参与收购公司。有时管理层必须在双方之间给予不同的东西，不管怎样。但是，你知道，最终的想法只能是将资产视为对人们有经济价值的东西。

And so if you get too far away from that, then you're thinking about like, well, what can they report in earnings or something? It doesn't matter.
如果你离那个原则太远了，那么你会思考像：他们能报告多少收益之类的东西？但这并不重要。

You know, that's why cash will matters and those things because these things matter not because we say that they matter and it's magic that this works out this way. But because that could be used in some way by owners, it can be used to pay debts. It can be used.
你知道的，这就是为什么现金很重要，以及那些东西，因为这些事情很重要，不是因为我们说它们重要，而是因为这样可以被业主以某种方式使用，可以用来偿还债务，可以使用。

So it can be used to finance a deal. If something strategically important in the industry, then it has value, even if it doesn't have value in terms of reporting earnings today, right?
所以它可以用来融资交易。如果在该行业中具有战略重要性，即使它今天在盈利报告方面没有价值，它仍然具有价值，对吧？

So all of those things matter a lot. And I don't see any other way of doing it except asking what's the value to a private owner.
所以，所有这些事情都非常重要。我认为除了询问私人所有者的价值之外，没有其他途径。

I mean, that's also something that Buffett, Munger, others have talked about that when they say here, the things about Ben Graham that are things that are true for now and true forever, the two that they really talk about are how to think about the market fluctuation. So the Mr. Market idea, they talk about margin of safety.
我是说，巴菲特、芒格和其他人谈到本·格雷厄姆时，提到的是一些现在和永恒的真理，他们特别谈论的是如何思考市场波动的问题。他们谈到了“市场先生”理念以及“安全边际”的概念。

But the other thing that they'll mention is the idea of the value to a private owner, thinking of a business. I think it was stock as a business instead of thinking of as a stock.
他们还会提到的另一件事是私有者的价值观念，考虑到商业。我认为应该把股票看作一个商业而不是仅仅看作一只股票。

That's why Ben Graham thought about it and that's the way Buffett, Munger, think about it. And it's a different way if thinking that Graham was thinking about what's the liquidation value.
这就是为什么本·格拉汉姆思考了这个问题，也是巴菲特、芒格这样思考的方式。这是与格拉汉姆不同的思考方式，因为格拉汉姆思考的是清算价值。

But it's the same argument that people would say, well, what does net-curren-asset value matter? Because they're not going to liquidate. But ultimately, the fact that they could liquidate that that would be a better use of the company means that you'll get a better return in from that.
但人们会说同样的论点：净流动资产价值有什么意义呢？因为他们不会变现。但最终，事实是他们可以变现，这样会更好地利用公司，从而获得更好的回报。

So that's why looking at the entire company, looking at the stock as if it's the company, makes a lot of sense. And I don't see another way of doing it.
那就是为什么要从整个公司的角度去看待股票，因为这是很有意义的。我也没有看到其他的方法。

I don't have a better method for how you would do it that would make sense. Now, over very short periods of time, sure. Like, over one day, then if you're buying an option that expires at the end of the day, then you're just going to use zero-to-day supply-expiration, maybe.
我没有更好的方法来解释如何去做，这个方法必须是有意义的。当然，如果是在非常短的时间内，比如一天之内，那么如果你购买的期权在当天到期，那么你可能会使用零天到到期日的供应到期。

Yeah. So you're just going to assume random movements, right? But over a longer period of time, it's just common sense in terms of the business and how the business does. And that's all that's going to matter in the really long term. Are you generally pretty skeptical of management buyouts?
哦，所以你只是要假设随机运动，对吗？但从长期来看，这在业务和业务运作方面很明显是常识。而这才是在真正长远的时间内所关心的。你通常是否对管理层收购持怀疑态度？

Like, in those situations, right? We talked a little bit about this last week, especially in net nets, how well they could buy out your net net for 100 or 200 percent higher. And then you could still be upset because you're like, well, it's actually probably still worth three or 400 percent higher.
就像在那些情况下一样，对吧？上周我们谈到了这个问题，尤其是在净资产净值法中，他们可以用100%或200%的价格买下你的净资产净值，但你还是会感到不满，因为它实际上可能还值得三到四倍的价格。

Yeah. I mean, I'm not as skeptical that they'll happen. I do believe that management will buy out their shareholders in a lot of cases, especially in places like the US and stuff where it could be aggravating to be a public company. Yeah, I think that that happens a lot. I've been in situations where it's happened.
是的。我的意思是，我不太怀疑它们会发生。我确信管理层将在许多情况下收购他们的股东，尤其是在像美国这样的地方，成为一家上市公司可能会很烦人的地方。是的，我认为这种情况经常发生。我曾经遇到过这种情况。

Yeah, you don't get as good a deal, sure. Because it's not being shopped around management can block it from being shopped around. But sometimes you get a pretty good deal. So examples of like management buyouts, we talked about, I've talked about in the past bank insurance, which was eventually taking out at less than book value. But at a very high, but you know, almost close to 100 percent premium, 80 to 100 percent premium over what it originally said.
是的，你可能不会得到很好的交易，因为管理层可以阻止它被商业化。但有时你可以得到一个相当不错的交易。比如说我们之前聊过的管理层收购，还有银行保险，后来以低于账面价值的价格出售。但是，它的价格非常高，几乎是最初价格的80至100%溢价。

Some things in Japan, we're taking no right management. Hunter Douglas, we talked about, right? And that, that stock, there were three, four, 10, so over 15 years to take it private. And then finally they did with also getting a little skin in the game for taking private to. So not 100 percent taking private, but sort of that helped, I think, finalize the deal. And then we also talked about Cambria, the automotive company in the UK.
在日本，我们正在采取不正确的管理方式来处理一些事情。我们谈到过Hunter Douglas，对吧？那个股票，我们花了15年来私有化，最终他们也成功地加入了一点私有化的资金。所以不是完全私有化，但是这有助于我们最终达成交易。然后，我们还谈到了在英国的汽车公司Cambria。

And that one also, you know, you got a higher price than you had before, but you didn't have an amazing price. But on the other hand, how bad is the price if you compare it to like virtue or other UK card dealers, because they've all been valued at less than five times EBITDA for seven, eight years or something now, you know, some of them, they haven't consistently traded over five times EBITDA for any one year that I can bank of.
那个交易，你知道，你得到了比之前更高的价格，但并没有很惊人的价格。但另一方面，如果与类似 Virtue 或其他英国卡片经销商相比，价格有多糟糕呢？因为它们都被估值为不到七八年的五倍 EBITDA，有些公司甚至没有一个连续的年度交易达到五倍 EBITDA。

So you could say, well, the price was what they again, the public markets. But that is what Buffett's talking about, fortunately, management is taking advantage of the individual shareholders, the way they think about stocks as opposed to the way they think about entire businesses. By announcing a deal, you can in stocks like Contra Douglas to a point, although at the end, they couldn't, I mean, they got left with the shareholders who would never sell no matter what, you know, that's what ended up with them, which made it hard.
你可以说，嗯，价格就是公众市场上的价格。但这正是巴菲特所谈到的，幸运的是，管理层正在利用个人股东的思维方式来对待股票，而不是整个企业。通过宣布交易，你可以在像康特拉·道格拉斯这样的股票中获得收益，尽管最终他们无法做到，我的意思是，他们留下了永远不会卖掉的股东，这使得事情变得困难。

They couldn't squeeze out the last 10 percent or whatever, because over time they bought most of it, but they were left with only the people who turned down every tender offer and stuff. Well, with Cambria, you know, you can take advantage of this people because it's a small percentage of their portfolio, some of them are professional money managers, whatever, they're ready to move on to other things. And so they can't get together a big enough group to block a deal, right?
他们无法挤出最后10%或者其他东西，因为随着时间的推移，他们买了大部分，但是只剩下那些拒绝每一次收购要约的人。但是，对于康布里亚来说，你知道，你可以利用这些人，因为这只是他们投资组合的一小部分，其中一些是专业的资金管理人员，他们已经准备好转向其他事情。因此，他们无法组成足够大的团体来阻止交易，对吧？

Whereas if they were people who are members of your family, an extended family that also own those shares or something, and you said, well, I want to take it over from this small group, it wouldn't work because they would view the stock differently, but because it's a public-a-trade stock, people in public-a-trade stocks are going to be taking advantage of by the majority owner or by potential buyer or even LBOs and things, because you can just offer 30 percent above the past market price and take it. Yeah. Private in a lot of cases, yeah.
如果他们是您家族的成员，一个也拥有这些股份的大家庭，那么如果您说，我想从这个小团体手中接管它，那是不行的，因为他们会以不同的方式看待股票，但由于它是一家公开交易的股票，公开交易的股票持有人会遭受大股东或潜在买方或甚至 LBO 的利用，因为您可以只需提供过去市场价的 30% 就可以接管它。是的，在很多情况下是这样。

Regardless of how cheap it was. So it could be, it could be worth 10 times what it's selling for. You offer 30 percent more and you've got a good chance of taking it private. Hmm. Crazy. So it's, at this point, a report card for me is appropriate in 58 years of Berkshire Management.
不管它有多便宜，它可能值10倍于售价。如果你出价多了30％，你有很大机会将其私有化。嗯，太疯狂了。所以现在，在伯克希尔管理了58年后，一个报告卡对我是合适的。

Most of my capital allocation decisions have been no better than so, so. So I'm curious to hear your thoughts on that. Is that Buffett just. That's true. Being conservative, you believe that? No. I 100 percent believe it. Now, in.
我的大部分资本配置决策都不太好，所以我很想听听你的想法。这是巴菲特的真实情况吗？没错，是的。你认为保守是对的吗？不是的，我百分之百相信这一点。现在，在……

So there's stock. In the digital stock for the rest of us is what you're saying. You're telling me there's a chance. I don't know about that because I don't think that his results in stocks have been particularly mediocre. Inpying entire companies, yeah, they have been.
所以有股票。你是说数字股票是为我们其他人准备的。你告诉我有机会。我不知道，因为我认为他在股市方面的成绩并不特别出色。不过整个公司被收购的情况下，他们确实表现得不好。

I think this is a big explanation of what happened from about the time of the January deal to today of why Berkshire's performance has not been as good.
我认为这是一个从一月协议时到现在发生的事情的大解释，解释了为什么伯克希尔的表现不如预期。

The stock market got quite expensive around 1996 or so. And Berkshire's last purchase is that he talks about here in 94 and 95 around that area. They do the merger with January a couple years later.
大概在1996年左右，股票市场变得相当昂贵。Berkshire最后一次购买是他在大约94年和95年左右谈到的那个区域。几年后，他们与1月份合并。

It's in that neighborhood of the later 90s, in the 90s bubble, starting the 90s bubble into the full size of it. That Buffett's performance really weakens a lot. And I think that also explains why he moves to buying entire businesses.
这个意思是说，那个时期处于90年代后期的那个泡沫经济里，巴菲特的表现真的很差。我认为这也解释了他为什么转而去买整个企业。

There are some advantages to Berkshire to buying entire businesses. It's also why he bought preferred stock. So there's some tax advantages.
购买整个企业对伯克希尔有一些优势。这也是为什么他购买了优先股。因此，有一些税收优惠。

Berkshire is inefficiently an inefficient vehicle for taxation purposes. So it's going to pay more in taxes than you would owning stocks. But it does benefit. It does offset that, to some extent, that double taxation issue in cases where it can collect a dividend from one corporation to another.
伯克希尔作为一辆税收工具车辆并不高效，因此比拥有股票多交税。但它确实有好处。在它能从一个公司收取红利转移到另一个公司的情况下，它确实部分地抵消了双重征税问题。

So in many cases, Berkshire buying a preferred stock would be more attractive to it than you buying the same preferred stock.
因此，在许多情况下，伯克希尔购买优先股比您购买同样的优先股更具吸引力。

Now, I don't think that matters much because in the cases where Buffett was very successful in preferred stocks with large amounts of money, he would have been better off buying the common stock. Now, sometimes they worked out okay, fixed investments, so as alternative sub-ons.
现在，我觉得这没多大关系，因为在巴菲特在优先股中以大量资金获得巨大成功的情况下，买普通股会更好。现在有时候，它们可以是固定的投资，作为替代的下属股。

But in general, he just should have bought more, like Gillette Moore, American Express, as a common stock as much as he could. You certainly could have done as well better by copying him in those things. But he wanted to make investments in things like USA or Solomon Brothers, a champion, a bunch of other ones, if it wasn't that he was getting different taxes on that.
但总体而言，他应该多买一些类似吉列·摩尔、美国运通这样的普通股票。如果你在这些股票上模仿他，你当然也可以表现得更好。但他想要投资于像USA或Solomon Brothers这样的公司，还有一些冠军企业，如果不是因为他对这些公司税收有所区别。

He also would not have bought a lot of businesses, I think, unless it was due to the tax situation. So I mean, there is in the book of permanent value, he has quoted in that as talking about that with Derek Queen.
我认为，如果不是因为税收问题，他也不会购买那么多企业。所以我的意思是，他在那本永久价值的书中引用了他与德里克·昆恩谈论这个问题的话。

That Derek was a public-traded company and he would not have bought it as a stock. They bought it because it was more attractive and he estimated as being something like 20% more attractive to them or something based on that. That would have to be trade 20% or 30% even lower for him to buy it as a stock.
德里克是一家公开交易的公司，他不会以股票的方式购买它。他们购买它是因为它更有吸引力，他估计它对他们来说会更有吸引力，大约增加了20%，或者根据这个来计算。但如果他以股票的方式购买，那么这个吸引力就必须下降20%或30%。

So I think that his record in buying control businesses is not so great. His record in stocks is a lot better. There's a lot of stocks. They're all available to you. The owners, you know, that can't block you from buying into them. And you get much better prices.
所以我认为他在收购控制业务方面的记录并不那么好。他在股票方面的表现好得多。有很多股票。它们都对你开放。你知道，业主无法阻止你买入它们。而且你可以获得更好的价格。

In control businesses, his record is very mixed. I think anyone could, you know, anyone with a lot of common sense and all that could get pretty close to what he's done with control businesses if we're doing it in like a hit rate.
他在掌控业务上的记录相当复杂。如果我们按“击中率”来算的话，我认为任何一个有常识的人都能接近他在掌控业务方面所做的事情。

Now, that doesn't mean that his decisions with very large business purchases have been bad. But I think that that's true. And part of it is that his ability to buy things in the industries that he likes best is probably very limited. So control purchases of financial companies is just not something that Berkshire could probably do a lot of.
那并不意味着他在进行大型商业采购时做出了糟糕的决策。但我认为那是真的。这部分原因是他在自己最喜欢的行业购买东西的能力可能非常有限。因此，控制金融公司的购买可能不是伯克希尔公司能够大量进行的事情。

I doubt that he's got a chance to buy many brands. You know, he's probably limited in lots of things, whether it's media things or whatever, his usual kind of circle, competent stuff. So food, media, insurance and banking and all that stuff is probably not where he's getting offers, getting a lot more offers and retail and a ton of things related to home building and the 2000s and stuff. And so his record on those are very mixed.
我怀疑他有机会买很多品牌。你知道，他可能在很多方面受到限制，无论是媒体还是其他方面，他通常的圈子、能干的事情。因此食品、媒体、保险和银行等等这些东西可能不是他得到报价的地方，他在零售业和与家庭建设和2000年代有关的许多领域得到更多的报价。所以，他在这些领域的表现非常混乱。

I was just thinking about this. Do you think Buffett has ever invested in other funds or anything like that similar to Munger investing in Lee Lu, Munger investing in all these different things? If you had to guess, or do you think Buffett just kind of sticks to Berkshire than his personal account?
我刚刚在想这件事情。你认为巴菲特有没有投资其他基金或类似于门格投资李璐、门格投资这些不同事物的投资吗？如果你不得不猜测，或者你认为巴菲特只是坚持投资伯克希尔而不是他的个人账户？

Oh, his personal. Well, I mentioned a permanent value. It has a chapter on his personal account. And I think we have some pretty good estimates about what he's done in his personal account from things he said if they're literally true.
哦，他的个人账户。我提到了一个永久价值。它有一个关于他个人账户的章节。如果他说的话字面上是真的，我觉得我们对他在个人账户上所做的事情有一些非常好的估计。

So at the time of the financial crisis, he's quoted saying to Hank Paulson that he could put in $100 million into something and then that's about 20% of his net worth outside of Berkshire. So that his personal portfolio was about $500 million at that time, which sounds about right.
在金融危机期间，他对汉克·保尔森说，他可以投入1亿美元，这大约占他在伯克希尔之外的净值的20%。因此，他当时的个人投资组合大约为5亿美元，听起来是正确的。

We know he was in a ton of reeds and he's, you know, there's a chapter on that in the book. And because he went over the 5% limit on that, he also says around the time of the financial crisis that when he says in the Buy American because I am one, he says that he's been buying American stocks in his personal portfolio.
我们知道他在一堆芦苇中，并且在书中有一章专门讲这个。而且因为他在这方面超过了5%的限制，所以他还在金融危机时期买美国股票，并在个人投资组合中持有。

We know he bought like JP Morgan, for instance, probably for his personal portfolio and there may end up, he would have owned what's a serrage, right? Was a personal purchase.
我们知道他购买了像JP摩根那样的股票，可能是为了他个人的投资组合，他最终可能会拥有什么是塞拉贡（一家公司）的股份，这是一项个人购买。

So he says in that that he had only owned government bonds a few years earlier. Judging by that, we would know that in the earlier 2000s, shortly after the blow up of the.com stuff, he was in reeds looking for them to liquidate and some liquidating stuff.
他说他几年前只持有政府债券。从这可以看出，在2000年代初期，.com泡沫破裂后不久，他正在寻找债券以进行清算和一些清算处理。

There's also like, there's a couple other stocks we know of. They're not mentioned in the book, but I remember reading about them, which is a liquidation and stuff. So he was in special situations sometime in the early 2000s, then he's out of those and only in bonds by the financial crisis. We also know he was in Korean stocks because he picked those personally off that manual. And they said they want to probably for Berkshire. That was also early 2000s. So we have some information about like early 2000s stuff for Berkshire.
还有一些其他的股票我们知道。它们没有在这本书中提到，但我记得读过关于它们的文章，其中包括清算等。所以他在2000年代初期曾处于特殊情况中，然后在金融危机中只做债券了。我们还知道他投资了韩国股票，因为他个人挑选手册上的股票。他们说可能会投资伯克希尔公司。这也是在2000年初期。所以我们对于伯克希尔公司早期的一些信息有所了解。

As far as being in funds and stuff, no, I believe he's never been in funds or anything like that. Berkshire itself has been, it has participated in funds run by other people. There was an arbitrage operation that they invested in and some stuff like that. What was that situation? And I was just curious like from a private perspective, they just like, they just like seeded someone. There were some things in insurance and things like that. So they're people that they've basically, I mean, we don't know all the deals of it, but I believe that they ran an arbitrage operation that would have been like what Buffett was doing.
就他的资金和其他事情而言，不，我认为他从来没有过什么资金之类的东西。伯克希尔本身参与了其他人经营的基金。他们投资了一个套利操作之类的事情。那是什么情况呢？我只是好奇他们从私人角度就像种子一样，给了某个人。他们从事过一些保险等方面的业务。所以基本上他们是一些人，我是说，我们并不知道所有的交易，但我相信他们经营过一些像巴菲特所做的套利操作。

Buffett would have been doing himself similar to what investment banks would do. They had some stuff of the Katie, which I think would have been similar to. So I think they'd be willing to put in money with some people to manage stuff that way. They've also done some things where people have managed stuff for them for maybe like tax purposes, a tax credit purposes that we know about.
巴菲特应该会像投资银行一样做。他们拥有一些Katie的资产，我认为这方面的做法应该是相似的。所以我认为他们可能愿意跟一些人合作管理这些资产。此外，他们也会让有些人代为管理一些资产，可能是为了税收抵免之类的目的，我们也知道这方面的情况。

So I think my, I don't know, my guess is he would never do something like the Lee Lou thing. It's possible that he would give money to someone to do stuff in markets that he's not involved in. I could see that happening with Berkshire or something at one time. So for instance, like, you know, he's doing arbitrage with with the Activision all of that, but I could see certainly arbitrage in certain markets or something in different commodities. We talked about how he bought silver and stuff himself.
我觉得他从来不会做像李露事件那样的事情。可能他会给某些人钱去操作他没有涉足的市场。比如说，我可以想象他曾经会跟伯克希尔公司（Berkshire）为某项业务进行套利。比如他现在在做的Activision投资套利，我可以想象他会在某些市场或不同的商品上进行套利。我们曾经谈到过他曾经自己买过银之类的商品。

So I, yeah, I could see that. And there's probably things for his personal portfolio. We can guess are probably related to things like that from what we know. They're probably smaller, some leverage things, some supply demand things that might have been in commodities and stuff like that, probably liquidations. The reats were just like trading below in that tangible asset value type stuff.
我能理解这个问题，我猜他个人的投资组合里可能有一些这样的项目。根据我们所知的，那些项目可能比较小，是一些利润较高的供需关系或者在商品市场上的套利交易，可能会进行一些清盘。而像房地产信托基金这样的物业交易似乎有些低于现实资产价值的交易。

So probably very bang, gram type things, maybe, maybe bordering on things like going to go to the AQR or something, that kind of stuff. Probably honest, but on a smaller scale and more certain betting bigger, probably. So if you had to guess like what the Kager on that personal portfolio has been, if we knew it was around half a billion in the financial crisis, what would you guess?
所以可能是非常激烈，类似于克拉姆之类的事情，也许接近去参加AQR之类的事情，那种东西。很可能是诚实的，但规模较小，更有把握打赌更大。那么，如果我们知道在金融危机期间个人投资组合的Kager约为50亿美元，你会猜测多少？

Well, I don't think it's grown like much at all since then probably. Really? So yeah, because I think it's just idle for a long period of time. We have like no information about him doing anything with it. It's very unclear about that. So I, we have very, very little information since the financial crisis on it.
嗯，我不认为它自那时以来有很大的增长。真的吗？是的，因为我认为它已经长时间处于空闲状态。我们几乎没有关于他对此做了什么的信息。这非常不清楚。在金融危机后，我们对此几乎没有任何信息。

And also the fact that he would buy some personal things that could be in the same categories like a Berkshire, I feel like suggests that he probably hasn't spent much time thinking about it. I think decades ago, he probably spent a brief period of time working on it and made a bunch of money. So, but when that was, I don't know, maybe sometime in the very late 70s or early 80s through the early 2000s, but I think sense about the housing crisis. I don't think that he's done much of anything with it.
我认为他会购买一些与伯克希尔类似的个人物品，这也表明他可能没有花太多时间去思考它。几十年前，他可能只花了很短的时间来研究它，然后就赚了一大笔钱。但是，那是什么时候，我不知道，可能是在70年代末或80年代初到2000年初期间，但我觉得在房屋危机之后。我不认为他会花太多时间去做任何与它有关的事情。

Yeah, I mean, whenever people meet with him, obviously they want to talk about Berkshire and everything around that. If we ever had dinner with him or if we were ever interviewing him, I think I would want to spend the whole time talking to him about his personal account and what he did in there.
是的，我的意思是，当人们见到他时，显然想谈论伯克希尔和周围的一切。如果我们跟他一起吃饭或采访他，我会想花整个时间跟他聊他的个人账户以及他在里面做了什么。

So we can move on. Okay, so he had said that I'm curious to hear your thoughts on this. Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions. That would be about one every five years and sometimes forgot to manage the favors, long-term investors, such as Berkshire. So I'm kind of curious to hear your thoughts on that.
我们可以继续下去了。好的，他说了“我很想听听你的想法”。我们的令人满意的结果是由大约十几个真正好的决定产生的。这大约是每五年一个，有时会忘记管理那些像伯克希尔这样的长期投资者的好处。所以我有点想听听你的想法。

So the hit rate on that from a good decision standpoint, one every five years. Well, we've been doing this podcast for five years and I was talking about how long that feels, right? So investors always want to just own stuff all the time. It seems like. So I'm kind of curious, what do you think those good decisions would be? Those truly good decisions, as he said, if you had to start listing them?
那么，从一个好决策的角度来看，成功率是每五年一次。我们已经做了这个播客五年了，感觉时间很漫长，对吧？投资者总是想一直拥有东西。看起来是这样。所以我很好奇，你认为那些真正好的决策会是什么？如果你必须列出它们，那会是什么？

Oh, well, he talks about two from the 90s that would make sense, which would be things like American Express and Coca-Cola. He doesn't mention one that actually is on usual smaller. So it's from an unusual period. But around 2000 or 30 I don't remember exactly when it was. He did also buy as much as he could of what was then done in Brad Street so that he could get yours of Moody's when it was spun out.
哦，好吧，他谈到了90年代的两个公司，这些公司像美国运通和可口可乐这样有意义。他没有提到一个通常较小的实际上存在的公司。因此，这是来自一个不寻常的时期。但大约在2000年或30年左右，我不记得确切的时间。当时，他也买了尽可能多的布拉德街的股票，这样他就可以获得穆迪公司股票剥离时的股票。

So Moody's was obviously a great one, but it wasn't big enough size to Berkshire to matter a great deal. Washington Post is a good example. In terms of control businesses, these candies was a big one. National indemnity.
所以穆迪显然是很棒的一家公司，但对于伯克希尔而言规模还不够大，不能产生很大的影响。《华盛顿邮报》则是一个很好的例子。至于控股企业，这些糖果公司是其中一家重要的企业。国家保险公司亦是如此。

But that's more complicated if he's counting insurance things because insurance is really funding their performance that way. In terms of stocks that we know that they bought from years ago and everything, one easy way to look at is what stocks do we know that Buffett bought and that went up like 10 times or something. And this is why I mentioned in particular things like media and financial because this is where they're concentrated. He had affiliated publications, right? It was an amazing one for them. It was along with Washington Post, so both newspapers.
但是如果他在计算保险方面的东西，那就更复杂了，因为保险确实是以这种方式资助他们的表现。就我们所知，对于从几年前开始购买的股票，一个简单的查看方法是我们知道巴菲特购买了哪些股票并且涨了大约十倍。这就是为什么我特别提到像媒体和金融这样的东西，因为这是他们重点投资的领域。他有关联出版物，对他们来说这是一个惊人的收益。它和《华盛顿邮报》一起，所以两家报纸。

And then also, you know, the ad agencies in that time period also did really well. Those are all concentrated in time period in the like 74 or 73 something around there time period in the 1970s. He may have been buying for a few years before then and some of them went down for like three years or something, but a lot of them were concentrating that period.
嗯，那个时期那些广告代理公司也做得很好。它们都集中在1970年左右的74或73年那个时期。他可能在那之前买了几年，有些公司可能下降了三年左右，但很多公司都集中在那个时期。

And in terms of acquisitions of total companies, you know, there's somewhere he's made very big acquisitions in recent years. And so that might matter that the results haven't been amazing, but they've been good enough when combined with how they did them that I think matters.
就整体公司的收购而言，你知道，他在近年来进行了很大的收购。因此，即使结果不是惊人的，但是与他们的做法相结合，成果已经足够好了，这是很重要的。

There's very few from the 2000s that I put in that category. The only one that's probably really strong in that is the railroad. And then another controlled investment which they've done also as a individual, also as a public-marked investment too though, is a Geico. So in terms of like total control of a company thing, the ones that have made a lot of difference in terms of size and performance have been the railroad, being SF and Geico in the last, you know, a couple of decades.
2000年代我认为可以放入这个类别中的公司很少。其中唯一一个在这方面可能非常强大的是铁路公司。另外，他们还以个人的身份和公共市场投资的形式控制了另外一家公司，那就是Geico。就完全掌控一家公司的事情而言，在过去几十年里，影响最大的就是铁路公司，即旧金山（SF）铁路和Geico公司了。

Yeah, Moniche Pobry had tweeted this and he said these are likely 10 of the 12 probably not in order. Number one, hiring a G2 national identity three apple four, Berkshire Houthway energy five BNSF six Geico seven Bank of America eight C's nine coke, a cola, 10 AMX. He said what might the last two? What might be the last two season Buffalo News were bought from Blue Chip float cap cities question mark oxy slash Chevron question mark Gillette question mark.
哦，Moniche Pobry发推文说这些可能是12项中的10项，但没有顺序。第一项是聘请G2国家身份证的人，第三项是苹果公司，第四项是伯克希尔·哈撒韦·能源公司，第五项是BNSF（美国铁路公司），第六项是Geico（美国汽车保险公司），第七项是美国银行，第八项是C's（谷歌的新母公司Alphabet的子公司），第九项是可口可乐，第十项是AMX。他还说最后两项是什么呢？是从Blue Chip Float Cap Cities买来的季节性水牛新闻（Buffalo News）吗？还是Oxy/Chevron公司？或者是吉列公司？

I saw it. G G G S's in fact he talks he's talked it before about how they made a very big mistake in not going out and buying more little savings and loans just because there was a limit of 1% that you could get 1% of the common stock for each savings alone you own. So they should have just gone out and bought like every little savings and loan that was out there and stuff. So but they sold those eventually right. So what I'm talking about is like fanium for any type stuff. Yeah. So those get forgotten now but they were good performers for them for the time that they were in them.
我看到了它。G G G S's实际上谈到过他们犯了一个非常大的错误，那就是不去购买更多的小储蓄和贷款，只因为你拥有的每个储蓄和贷款你只能获得1%的普通股。所以他们应该只是出去买像每个小的储蓄和贷款那样的东西。但是他们最终卖了那些，对吧。所以我说的是像fanium这样的东西。是的。现在那些被人忘记了，但是对于他们来说，那些在他们的时间内表现良好。

When he says the hit rate is one great idea every five years, how do you think about that? Do you agree with that? Yeah. Yeah. Do you think investors should almost lower their expectations as they're sifting through a bunch of these names and raise the hurdle if the world's greatest investor is saying, hey look, it really comes down to about a dozen ideas over my lifetime which is a very long life and the hit rate is one every five years. I mean, how do you sort of what's your takeaway from that?
他说成功率一年只有一个绝佳点子，你对此有何看法？你同意吗？嗯，嗯。你认为投资者在挑选这些项目时应该降低期望并提高要求吗？因为世界上最出色的投资者说，实际上在他的一生中只有约十几个绝妙的想法，这是一个非常漫长的人生，而成功率每五年才会有一次。那么你怎么看待这个问题呢？

Well, a few things.
嗯，有几件事情。

I'm not sure that I've done better than one every five years. Certainly you have more ideas than one every five years but you have to recognize the idea that large enough on in and hold on to it for a while. So he means not that he had a good idea once every five years but that he that they benefited from his realization of a good idea fully enough.
我不确定我做得比每五年一次好。当然，你拥有比每五年一次更多的想法，但你必须认识到那个足够大的想法并且抓住它一段时间。他的意思不是他每五年有一次好想法，而是他们从他充分实现好想法中获益。

Yes. I'm sure he's had. Yes.
我确定他有。

Well, we're talking about the personal portfolio. He could come up with ideas for his personal portfolio but they can't move the needle. So that's part of the issue is that Berkshire is too big. The other part is that there's long stretches of time in which he doesn't have any good ideas.
好的，我们正在谈论关于个人组合投资。他可以想出他个人投资组合的创意，但是它们不足以带来实质性变化。这就是问题的一部分：伯克希尔太大了。另一部分问题是在一段长时间里，他没有好的创意。

So, you know, from the late 1990s through about the financial crisis, Berkshire has virtually no good investments than it may. You know, like I just mentioned, uh, Dene Brasser or something's like the only thing that they did. Anything else. I mean, if they had been in cash instead of being in that stuff, I don't know how big the difference would have been and then they could have gone bigger into things afterwards. Um, you know, they did buy some stuff that worked out fine, like they bought some junk things, um, but they couldn't do it in huge scale. The market was just expensive, you know? Um, and so that's very difficult.
所以，你知道，从1990年代末到金融危机期间，伯克希尔几乎没有任何好的投资机会。就像我刚才提到的，Dene Brasser或其他事物似乎是他们唯一的选择。其他的东西，我是说，如果他们当时持有现金而不是持有那些东西，我不知道差异会有多大，然后他们以后可能会更大规模地涉足其他投资。他们买了一些东西，效果还不错，比如他们买了一些垃圾股，但他们无法在大规模上做到这一点。市场只是太昂贵了，你知道的。所以这非常困难。

When they're using almost all their money to buy private businesses, it probably indicates that the public markets are too expensive for them or that they just can't find things in what they want there. Um, and so they have to resort to that and he says that you don't really get good prices on that. So that's how he's judging it.
当他们将几乎所有的钱用于购买私人企业时，这可能表明公开市场对他们来说太昂贵了，或者他们在那里找不到自己想要的东西。嗯，所以他们不得不借此来解决问题，他说这样做并不能得到很好的价格。所以他是这样判断的。

I mean, Berkshire's that performance, you know, which they cover in the first page, uh, in market value versus the S&P is 10%. So, at times Berkshire has been, uh, leveraged about 1.5 times to, to one. Uh, however, there's long stretches of time in which as best we can gauge his performance and stocks, it's about 20% a year.
我是说，伯克希尔公司在市值方面与标普的表现，你知道，在第一页上进行了涵盖，嗯，是10%。因此，有时伯克希尔公司的杠杆比率约为1.5比1。然而，有长时间段，我们最好能够衡量他在股票方面的表现，约为每年20%。

So the stock performance is actually similar buffets stock picking at times has been similar to Berkshire's return, even though they use leverage. So what's happening with it? Uh, the leverage in, in fact, is leveraging okay prices on the business side, right?
那么，股票表现实际上与巴菲特的股票选择有时类似于伯克希尔的回报，即使他们使用杠杆。那么它的情况是怎么样的？呃，杠杆实际上正在利用商业方面的良好价格。

So like, it's allowing Berkshire to invest fully by being, you know, by being leveraged up so that results that would otherwise not be so great on the private business side, um, look okay if they're done with leverage. So like, when I gave the example of the railroad, let's say you bought the railroad at 20 times, uh, you know, the part, the 75% or whatever that they bought that, um, you didn't already own at about 20 times normalized free cash flow or something like that. Um, they borrowed a bunch of the money to do that for a little while.
嗯，这能让伯克希尔公司通过杠杆来充分投资，使得在私营业务方面可能会不那么出色的结果，通过杠杆来实现的话，就看起来还是很不错的。比如我前面提到的铁路案例，假设你以20倍的价格购买了铁路公司的那部分股权，这部分股份的自由现金流大约是75%左右。他们暂时借了一大笔钱来实现这个交易。

Then they also have the credit rating they have and then they can also not guarantee the credit of the, the, um, railroad or whatever. So there's some benefits to that like, because it had a, I don't know, uh, maybe the market gap was three times the debt or something. So it had a bunch of debt. But if you just get an okay price on the railroad, let's say, let's say it was something like a 5% yield or something, obviously you're paying 20 times zone earnings, um, then with a little leverage it works out, right?
然后他们也有他们所拥有的信用评级，他们也不能保证货车或其他的信用。所以它有一些好处，比如，因为它的市场缺口可能是债务的三倍，什么的。所以它有一堆债务。但是如果你只是在铁路上得到一个可以接受的价格，比如说，它有一个5%的收益率，显然你会以20倍的盈利买进，然后再加上一点杠杆，就能够运作下去了，对吧？

If you're using float or something with owners money, it, it might do what the historical return in the S&P over time has been, but it won't kind of beat the S&P. It may be the S&P going forward if the S&P is really overvalued, but that's kind of the thing that they face.
如果你正在使用浮动资金或拥有者的资金，它可能会表现出历史上S&P的回报率，但它不可能在S&P的基础上取得更高的成绩。如果S&P被高估，未来它可能与S&P相当，但这是他们面临的问题。

Um, so when we get into things like, is returns in the 70s from stocks, that's part of the really impressive result is that two things were happening. One, he bought these stocks that really love values, you know, and they went up a lot. So there's stocks that went up 10 times or something that we talked about, immediate advertising and all that stuff. But also, although their combined ratio was not good, they had a bunch of float.
嗯，所以我们进入关于股票回报率在70年代的话题时，一个非常令人印象深刻的结果是发生了两件事。一，他买入那些真正喜欢价值的股票，你知道的，它们涨了很多。所以有一些我们讨论过的股票涨了10倍之类的，即刻广告等等。但是，尽管它们的合并比率不好，他们有一堆浮动资金。

So a huge amount, you know, there's a higher degree of leverage back then in the business and more of it is allocated to stocks. And so the, their best years really are years where there's a significant amount of float and it's in, um, stocks. As float comes down and as you buy private businesses, I think you just see the difficulty of it that, um, I mean, it's ironic because we talk about efficient markets and public markets, but really the market is more efficient in the private space for them to buy control of entire businesses. That's where it's harder to get inefficiencies.
那么，你知道，业务中的杠杆率很高，而更多的资金被分配给股票。因此，它们最好的年份真的是那些有大量流动资金，并且这些资金被分配到股票的年份。随着流动性下降和购买私人企业，我认为你会发现它变得更加困难。这很讽刺，因为我们谈论着市场的有效性和公共市场，但实际上，在私人领域，市场更有效，他们购买控制整个企业更难实现效率。

Mm-hmm.
嗯嗯。

So the secret sauce, you think he talks about Coca-Cola and AMX as examples because those are two businesses that everybody could visualize and would be familiar with?
所以，你认为他举了可口可乐和AMX作为例子，是因为这两个业务是每个人都能想像并熟悉的吗？

Uh, it's possible, but like I said, with the exception of, um, Moody's, these are two of the best, um, stock investments that he's made in the last, um, 30 years or so, 25 years.
嗯，这是有可能的，但就像我说的一样，除了穆迪斯外，这些是他在过去大约30年或25年中做出的最好的股票投资之一。

And, um, also, the other examples would be like things that you buy, total control of. So I think he wanted to use stock examples. I think that's absolutely right. Yeah.
嗯，另外还有一些例子，比如你购买的物品，完全控制等等。我觉得他想要使用股票例子。我认为这是完全正确的。是的。

And stocks that they don't for a really, really long time. So these are two. If they still in Wells Fargo, he might have used Wells Fargo as an example, you know, time back a few years. Yeah.
他们持有的一些股票已经很长时间没有出售了。所以这两个股票。如果他们仍然持有富国银行的股票，那么可能会以富国银行为例子，你知道，就像几年前一样。是的。

Yeah. My takeaway from this section was one word time, really owning it for a very long time.
嗯，这一部分给我留下了一个词：时间，真正拥有它并持续很长时间。

So for Coca-Cola, they purchased a $1.3 billion worth, $400 million shares, the cash dividend in 1994 was $75 million by 2022. That $75 million was $704 million. And he, you know, talks about how all they had to do was just cash the quarterly dividend checks that he talks about American Express as well.
所以对于可口可乐来说，他们购买了价值13亿美元、4亿美元的股份，1994年的现金股息为7500万美元，到2022年，这7500万美元成了7.04亿美元。他还谈到了只需要兑现每季度的股息支票，他也谈到了美国运通公司。

The cost was $1.3 billion. And the dividends received from AMEX have grown from $41 million to $302 million today. And that he also believes those two dividends will continue to grow in the future.
这个成本是13亿美元，而从AMEX获得的股息已经从4100万美元增长到了今天的3.02亿美元。他还相信这两个股息将来还会继续增长。

But he does say these dividend gains, though pleasing are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices.
但是他说这些股息收益，虽然令人愉悦，但并不令人惊叹。但是它们带来了股价重要的收益。

And he says that year on our co-investment was valued at $25 billion, which is obviously a lot more than the $1.3 billion at cost. And the AMEX was $22 billion, which is a lot higher than the $1.3 billion at cost in AMEX as well.
他说，去年我们的合资估值达到了250亿美元，这显然比原价13亿美元高得多。而AMEX的估值则高达220亿美元，也远远超过13亿美元的原价。

So any thoughts on those two investments?
你对这两笔投资有什么想法吗？

Yeah. Well, one thing is if you run the math on it, the dividend growth rate is pretty high, like it's significantly higher at Coke than the growth in the business and stuff.
嗯，有个问题，如果你计算一下，可口可乐的股息增长率相当高，比业务增长率和其他东西都要明显高。

So it may surprise people how much the dividends grown. And then American Express is a little, not as good, but it's fine. And it might be a bit cheaper and it is bigger reason is that it's buying back stock, you know, is why the dividend is lower.
可能会让人们惊讶的是，股息增长了多少。而美国运通则稍逊一筹，但也不错。它可能会更便宜一些，还有一个更大的原因是它在回购股票，你知道，这就是股息较低的原因。

But yeah, I think that the dividend growth rate in those cases, you know, a meaningful part of it. And then in the case of Coke, re-rating of a multiple from much of the time he's owned it.
嗯，我认为在这些情况下，股息增长率是其中很有意义的部分。而对于可口可乐的情况，他所持有的多数时间里，多重估值率都得到了提升。

However, it probably is one of the stocks he was talking about when he said, not a nist letter, but he said in the past, I probably should have sold some of our largest holdings during the bubble, meaning he maybe he should have sold Coke in 2000. So maybe he should have only held it for 10 to 15 years instead of for 30 some years. Yeah.
然而，当他说“不是NIST信，但他过去说过，泡沫时期他可能应该卖掉我们持有的一些最大股份”时，这很可能是他所说的股票之一，这意味着他可能在2000年应该卖掉了可口可乐。因此，也许他只应该持有它10到15年，而不是30多年。是的。

Thought other than that? Yeah. Do you have any thoughts on the past year in brief section? Talks a little bit about purchasing Allegheny. We've covered that on the podcast.
你还有其他想法吗？嗯，你对过去一年有什么简要的思考？稍微谈谈购买了Allegheny。我们在播客中已经谈论过这个了。

I did think it was interesting when which you hit on earlier since purchasing our first property, casualty, insurer in 1967. Berkshire's float has increased 8,000 fold, your acquisitions, operations and innovations. But of course, that's not captured in there. Financial statements might take away mainly from this, which is how important float is to Berkshire's operations and how crucial or strong it's been to the success of the company.
我觉得你早先提到的，在我们1967年购买第一家财产事故保险公司以来，伯克希尔的资产池增长了8000倍，你们的收购、运营和创新使此成为了有趣的事情。当然，这些并没有完全反映在财务报表上。财务报表可能主要强调伯克希尔运营中资产池的重要性，以及它对公司成功至关重要或者说是强大的程度。

Yeah. So there's kind of two things. One is that Buffett's record is pretty close to the record of Berkshire, but that his ability to do it in size has only been because of float. So like Berkshire, if you're talking about Berkshire's record as a stock, it is driven very, very heavily by float.
嗯，有两点需要注意。一方面是巴菲特的业绩与伯克希尔公司（Berkshire）的业绩非常接近，但实现大规模投资的能力仅是因为浮动资金的存在。所以就像伯克希尔公司一样，如果我们谈论作为股票的伯克希尔公司的业绩，浮动资金会对这些业绩产生非常大的影响。

Buffett as a stock picker, sure. If he stayed running a fund and he distributed money every once in a while, said, okay, I'm going to pay this out and stuff when I ran it like Renaissance or something, then yeah, his record would be really good over a huge period of time, but he couldn't grow to bigger and bigger sizes. The way they've been able to do it is with float.
如果把巴菲特视为一名股票筛选专家，那没错。如果他一直经营基金，并且不时分发资金，如，好的，我将支付这个，我经营就像复兴那样，那么在相当长的一段时间内，他的记录会非常好，但他无法变得越来越大。他们能够做到的是利用浮动资金的方式。

And so the success of Berkshire has a ton to do with float and the miscalculations of the value Berkshire always have to with people saying it's like a closed end fund and all that, which it has nothing in common with those things. It's like a banker and an insurer or something like that that's able to get money at low cost and then earn a spread over it because it has so much money in float that they talk about there.
所以，伯克希尔的成功很大程度上与流动资金有关，以及对伯克希尔价值的错误估计也与人们认为它像一个封闭式基金之类的东西完全无关。它更像一个银行家或保险人之类的东西，因为它能够以低成本获取资金，然后赚取回报，因为它的流动资金数量非常之多。

It's such low cost that if you turn around and you vest that even in things like bonds, then you could make a lot of money. And I think obviously people don't think about that.
这个成本太低了，所以如果你把它投资在像债券这样的东西里，甚至可以赚很多钱。我想显然人们没有考虑这一点。

There are some calculations that people make of the stock, not people who are probably listening to this podcast, but who basically just valued in terms of liquidation and language of look at things like price to book and all that. But effectively, let's say it has 100, you know, this is 100, what does he say? They have up to 160 some billion in float.
有一些人对股票进行了某些计算，这些人可能并不是听这个播客的人，但他们基本上只是从清算和观察价格资产比等方面进行估值。但实际上，我们假设它有100，你知道的，这是100，他在说什么呢？他们在流通中拥有多达1600亿的资产。

If you have that much and it's two year yields, you know, 5% or whatever, then given how long that you have on your float and everything, you can invest 100% into that because actually even if Berkshire stopped writing tomorrow or something, it would take that long for it's a book to run off to a significant, even a meaningful part of it. It's not going to have more than 50%.
如果你有那么多资金，而且是两年期的收益率，比如5%之类的，那么考虑到你浮存资金的持续时间，你可以将100%的资金都投资进去，因为即使伯克希尔明天停止交易，至少也需要那么长的时间才能把一本账的重要部分清算完毕。所以它不会有超过50%的损失。

I mean, it's not going to have 100% of the float roll off in two years and it's probably depending what they're in, not going to have 50% roll off in a year. So, you know, you're going to earn money on that, which is billions and billions of dollars.
我的意思是，它不会在两年内完全失去100%的浮动市值，根据投资产品的不同，也不会在一年内失去50%的浮动市值。所以，你知道，你会赚到许许多多的钱，这是数十亿美金。

You know, the spread that you're going to earn on that is, that we're talking about is something like, you know, one and a half billion a quarter or something. And that's excluded from the valuation of the company when people talk about it as if they're using owner money when they're not there.
你知道，你将通过那个扩散获得的收益，大约是每季度15亿左右。而且当人们谈论公司时，他们似乎在使用所有人的钱，而这个收益却不被包括在公司的估值中。

It's the same as using deposits or something. So, it's incredibly important for Berkshire that it has that float. And he also with the alligator thing, the thing he did say, which is interesting is like that they will benefit alligator from being part of Berkshire because of Berkshire's strong balance sheet and their approach, which is basically that they're going to not lay off risk on anyone else because I think that Berkshire's the only insurer that literally does not pass on risk to anyone else.
它就像使用存款或其他东西一样。因此，对于伯克希尔来说，拥有这种资金储备是非常重要的。他还提到了鳄鱼方面的事情，他说的有趣的一点是，鳄鱼将受益于成为伯克希尔的一部分，因为伯克希尔拥有强大的资产负债表和他们的方法，基本上他们不会把风险推给其他人，因为我认为伯克希尔是唯一一家真正不会将风险转移给任何其他人的保险公司。

If you look at like tables of the largest insurance groups, even those that are very, very highly rated do maybe just to manage their earnings or whatever, seed some risk to others. Right. So, even if they themselves own reinsures and everything, they seed stuff to other reinsures, Berkshire's premiums and the amount that they're keeping is the same.
如果你看看最大的保险集团的数据，即使那些非常非常受欢迎的公司也可能只是管理他们的收益或者其他东西，将一些风险转移给其他人。对的。所以，即使他们自己拥有再保险公司和其他一切，他们也会将一些东西转移给其他再保险公司，而Berkshire的保险费和他们所保留的金额是一样的。

They're basically keeping everything for themselves, which means that if you buy a company that was seeding some, then you're going to keep more of the risk for yourself. So even if they write the exact same amount of business, you're going to keep more on your balance sheet.
他们基本上是把所有东西都留给了自己，这意味着如果你购买了一家正在进行资本注入的公司，那么你将会承担更多的风险。所以即使他们写下完全相同的业务量，你也会在你的资产负债表上拥有更多的权益。

So, it's kind of like if they bought a bank that was selling the loans off to someone else, now they're going to buy that bank and keep all of it for their own book. That's the kind of approach when they buy insurer.
嗯，这有点像他们买了一家把贷款卖给别人的银行，现在他们要买下这家银行，把全部都留在自己的账本里。当他们买保险公司时，也是这种做法。

We get to into talking about share buybacks, kind of throw out jabs at the politics of it and then taxes. Were you surprised that he's, do you think he was kind of coming out a little bit fiery than normal on this or what?
我们开始谈论股票回购，对其政治方面有所抨击，然后谈论税收。你觉得他这次表现比平常更为激烈，想知道你是否感到惊讶？

No. Okay. I think the share buyback thing probably bothers him a lot. Okay. Why? And why is that? Because it encourages stupid and unethical behavior. Right. Because you're taxing something which is an ethical use of it.
好的。我认为回购股份的事情可能会让他很烦恼。为什么呢？为什么会这样呢？ 因为它鼓励愚蠢和不道德的行为。是的。因为你对一件道德使用的东西征税。

I think it also bothers him because of some of the ways he's talked about trade, for instance. You'll notice that the way he talks about the buyback being beneficial to everyone, not harming anyone is exactly the way that people, um, turn 50 years ago or whatever, um, talked about, uh, trade, uh, talked about free trade and the importance of it.
我想他也因为一些他谈论贸易的方式而感到不悦。你会注意到，他谈到回购对每个人都有益处，没有伤害任何人的方式，正是人们50年前或者更早之前谈论贸易和自由贸易重要性的方式。

And what his point is is, um, they're not forcing anyone. This isn't a deal. You're not, for instance, we talked about management buyouts or something. If you tax people for squeezing out shareholders, that's a different thing. Uh, this is something in which the people who are selling are electing to sell. And the people who are buying are buying because they think it benefits others that way. It's also helping to not waste the capital on other things.
那么他的观点是，嗯，他们并没有强迫任何人。这不是一笔交易。例如，我们谈到了管理层收购之类的事情。如果你通过对人们征税来挤压股东，那就是另一回事了。啊，这是一种卖方自愿出售的东西。而买方之所以购买，是因为他们认为这样有益于他人。这也有助于不将资本浪费在其他事情上。

Um, so to him, I think it's the same as if you said, okay, let's tax, um, you know, voluntary trade between people. Um, it, and so it's just not a good idea. I also think that it probably bothers him because it does encourage not on ethical behavior. And because you don't really need to encourage more buybacks, um, I mean, less buybacks, you don't need to encourage people to not buy back stock.
嗯，我觉得对他来说，这就像你说：好吧，让我们对个人之间的自愿交易征税一样。这样做并不是一个好主意。我认为这可能会使他感到困扰，因为这会鼓励不道德的行为。因为你并不需要鼓励更少的股票回购，我是说，鼓励人们不要回购股票。

As we know, um, management is very inclined not to buy back stock. They would prefer not to buy back stock. They would prefer to expand the business, have a bigger business to, um, run, obviously, they would prefer acquiring things. They prefer doing lots of things other than, uh, treating their partners who don't have a, um, a organized vote often very well.
我们都知道，管理层不太愿意回购股票。他们更愿意扩大业务，拥有一个更大的业务来运营，很明显，他们更喜欢收购。他们喜欢做很多其他事情，而不是优待那些没有组织投票权的合作伙伴。

You know, they don't have representation on the board and stuff usually. I mean, they can, in theory, you all together as a disorganized group, we know, vote sometimes, but, um, they're basically not very well represented. And, uh, they can be mistreated as kind of silent partners because individually like, um, that's kind of what they become. Yeah.
你知道，通常情况下他们在委员会中没有代表。我的意思是，理论上他们可以作为一个不组织的群体一起投票, 但是，他们基本上没有很好的代表。而且，他们可能会被视为沉默的合伙人而受到虐待，这就是他们个人成为这样的原因。是的。

So I mean, this also, you'll notice in the very beginning of the letter, he says something interesting where he talks about individuals, and he, the sabre slide. Yeah. So he says, but specifically says individuals, he's probably annoyed with the ESG stuff and the black rocks and the vanguards and things of the world.
所以，我是说，你们会注意到这封信的开头就说了一些有趣的话，他谈到了个人和剑鞘划痕。是的，他确切地说了个人，他可能对ESG和黑石和万得等的事情感到烦恼。

Um, but he decided not to go after them and to say bad things about them. But he, I don't think he has good things to say about them anymore. He made a very strong point of saying individuals. I think he's kind of shifted in terms of how he's going to talk about shareholders and stuff.
“嗯，但他决定不跟随他们去说坏话。但我不认为他还有什么好话要说他们了。他坚持说个人的事情很重要。我认为他在他讲股东等方面的话语中有所转变。”

I think they're going to totally ignore passive shareholders and say that they don't count, um, you know, indexing shareholders. Uh, and, you know, but to some extent, that's his fault because he wants to get in the S&P.
我想他们会完全忽略被动股东，并说他们不重要，你知道，指数股东。嗯，但在某种程度上，这是他的错，因为他想进入S&P。

So why did he slash it comes up in? Yeah, no, that's why he did it. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, he may have, he may have, yes, he may have even written a section and then deleted it or something, but it's clear recently that he's gone annoyed with all that stuff. Yeah.
那么，他为什么删掉它呢？是的，这就是他为什么这么做的原因。我觉得，可能是他写了一部分，然后又删掉了，但最近他明显对所有这些事情感到很烦恼。

Um, and I think the share by back in the individuals, yes, and not institutions are just passive owners of the company. Yeah. That's funny. Yes. I didn't pick up on that. Oh, yeah. Yeah.
嗯，我觉得个人回购股份，而不是机构，只是公司的被动股东。是的，这很有趣。是的，我没有注意到那个。噢，是的。是的。

Um, and I think that's connected with him because his one of his really, really big things in terms of ethics and stuff with Buffett is, uh, poor stewardship, right? So the, the requirement to, uh, use other people's money properly and when it's entrusted with you to treat them well, not to abuse it to take whatever things and, and, and all that.
嗯，我认为那跟他有关系，因为对于伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的几项伦理问题中，他的一个非常非常大的关切点就是贫弱管家管理，对吧？所以，你必须恰当地使用他人的钱，如果信任你，就要好好对待他们，不要滥用它们，也不要拿走任何东西，等等。

Um, so which sometimes is a little different from other things. He's, he's seen as being very, um, his politics being very left wing or whatever things. But this is a big part of his concern about it.
嗯，有时候它跟其他事情有点不一样。他被视为非常左翼的政治人物，或者其他方面。但这是他非常关注的一个重要部分。

Uh, you remember the, uh, the boys town thing, right? That was the one time he gave a story to someone and everything. And that's exactly what the problem was there is, is, um, mishandling of it, bringing in money when you actually were, uh, you know, continuing to bring in more and more money when you actually were spending more than you needed anyway, you know, you didn't need to bring in any more money.
嗯，你还记得那个“男孩之城”的事情吗？那是他唯一一次给别人讲故事的时候。问题就在于那里的处理不当，实际上你一直在赚钱，即使你其实已经花费超过你所需要的，你知道的，你不需要再赚更多的钱了。

Um, so I think his problem with the stock buyback thing, honestly, is that it's encouraging management to do, to mistreat their owners and not to think of their owners as partners. And that is a bigger part of the whole stakeholder issue. Mm hmm.
嗯，我认为他对股票回购的问题的担忧，说实在的，就是它会鼓励管理层不尊重业主，不把他们视为伙伴。这是整个利益相关者问题的更重要的一部分。嗯。

To think about is that as you widen what groups you think you're responsible for, then you become responsible to no one. I mean, in a sense, when you say our, our act, you know, you start your annual part by saying our actions touch all the world and, you know, um, and all that stuff, then you're saying we're not responsible to our shareholders in a special way. We're not responsible to the particular country we're in in a special way because we're, we're for everyone and all things and stuff. You know, as you do that, so you can have a few stakeholders.
要考虑的是，随着您认为自己负责的群体范围扩大，您就没有责任感了。我的意思是，从某种意义上说，当您说“我们”的时候，您开始通过说我们的行动触及全世界等等来开始您的年度演讲时，您就在说我们不以特别的方式对我们的股东负责，也不以特别的方式对我们所在的特定国家负责，因为我们是为所有人和所有事情服务的。随着您这样做，您可能只有很少的利益相关者。

If you say, um, you know, our, our customers are, um, our owners, whatever, the things that you would often see in reports, but as you broaden that out, then it becomes more and more of an issue of, um, then you don't feel special responsibility for certain groups. And I think he feels special responsibility for shareholders and wants the companies that he's invested into feel that special responsibility. And the share buyback tax is very, um, damaging that way.
如果你说，嗯，你知道的，我们的，我们的客户是，嗯，我们的所有者，无论是在报告中经常看到的这些事情，但如果你把它扩大，那么这就成为了一个更大的问题，你就不会感到对某些群体有特殊责任感。我认为他对股东有特殊责任感，并希望他投资的公司感到这种特殊责任感。而股份回购税在这方面非常有害。

It's a good excuse for people not to do it. And then also he probably, um, the other thing is it wasn't talked about a lot because it's a very small tax, but that's how all tax, you know, usually you start as a very small tax and then you're going to change it later when you want to. Um, so yeah, I think that that's not something that he's particularly happy about.
这是人们不去做的好借口。然后呢，他很可能会觉得另一件事是，因为这只是一种很小的税收，所以没有被经常讨论。但这就是所有的税收，通常都是从很小的税收开始，然后你想改它的时候再进行改变。所以，我认为他可能不是特别开心这个税收的事情。

Um, but I think he's also tried definitely in recent years to avoid, uh, being as involved in political stuff. Cause he had some bad experiences with that. I think mainly from the early Obama period with the Buffett tax and all that. And so I think since then he's even said sometimes when asked about it, why haven't you said as much about your supporting this person doing this and I feel this way about this and everything that, um, he tries not to call people out on that as much.
嗯，我认为他最近几年也试图避免涉足政治事务。他曾经有过一些不好的经历。我认为主要是在奥巴马早期普遍征收所得税的时期。因此，我认为自那时以来，即使有时被问到为什么你没有像其他人那样公开支持这个人，认为这件事，他也尽量避免对他人指责。

So, um, talks about his, um, comfortfulness, holding a ton of cash. Um, said as for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and US treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs that inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the chief risk officer.
嗯，他谈论了他的舒适度，握着许多现金。关于未来，伯克希尔将始终持有大量现金和美国国债，以及各种各样的企业。我们还将避免任何可能导致不舒适的现金需求的行为，包括金融恐慌和前所未有的保险亏损。我们的首席执行官将始终是首席风险官。

You have any thoughts on that aspect of me? He's always been very comfortable holding cash. Mm hmm. Yeah.
你对我那一方面有什么想法吗？他一直非常喜欢持有现金。嗯嗯。是的。

Um, not really. He's the same thing that he said before that, you know, again, it's a, that's a, um, subtle way of criticizing every financial institution, every investment bank, every whatever. Who has a designated risk chief risk officer? He's saying the chief risk officer is the CEO. There should be no chief risk officer. Sure. Yeah.
嗯，实际上不是的。他说的话之前已经说过了，你知道的，这又是一个微妙的批评所有金融机构、所有投资银行、所有任何东西的方式。有哪个机构有一个指定的风险首席风险官呢？他说首席风险官就是CEO。不应该有首席风险官。当然。是啊。

And in fact, that's something that like government and stuff likes to have is that regulators like to have the chief risk officers and saying that you can't do that. Um, yeah. So, and again, it's a stewardship type thing because if your chief risk officer whoever signs off on it, then you feel like, Oh, well, then it's not my responsibility. I said, I'm going to take this risk. They said it's okay. So it's okay. Right. Whereas if you're taking it personally and you're the buckstaffs with you, then you have a different attitude about it. Mm hmm. So I think it goes to that same thing. But again, he does it in a nice way. Yeah. I'm saying that they don't need the chief risk officer, but he's that language specifically because others, uh, mentioned chief risk officers and stuff and do it as a way of not having the CEO be the one who handles, um, responsibility for all those risks and has to judge that. Mm hmm.
实际上，政府等监管机构喜欢有首席风险官监管，以便限制企业的风险行为。这也是一种责任感，因为如果是首席风险官签字批准了这个风险，你就觉得这个风险不是由你个人作出的决策，而是有人授权的，所以就更容易接受了。但如果你个人承担责任，你对这个风险的态度就会有所不同。他以一种巧妙的方式提出了这个观点，并不是说首席风险官没用，而是在别人提到首席风险官时，他使用了这种语言，以便让CEO不必负全部风险责任和判定。

So then he talks more about federal taxes, right? Is this sort of a continuation on, uh, being upset and criticizing like the, uh, share by back tax, right? How he's basically saying, Hey, we do contribute. Berkshire's contribution via the corporate income tax was 32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the treasury collected. Mm hmm. Yeah. I'm not sure what this is about. This is started. I mean, he's done this at times a long time ago in terms of the size of it, um, about the company, everything. But he doesn't usually criticize when he's talking about the amount of taxes that they pay. Mm hmm.
那他就谈了更多关于联邦税了，是吗？这有点像是继续抱怨和批评那个股份回购税，对吗？他基本上是在说，嘿，我们确实做出了贡献。伯克希尔通过企业所得税在这十年中贡献了 320 亿美元，几乎恰好占到了财政部所收到的所有款项的千分之一。嗯。是的。我不确定这是关于什么的。这是从他开始的。我的意思是，他早些时候就做过类似的事情，关于公司的规模等等。但他通常不会在谈论他们支付的税款金额时进行批评。嗯。

However, he also is debt. You'll notice a difference in that when talking about personal tax and stuff that he pays, he says they're under tax. He never says Berkshire's under tax. Mm hmm. So there's clear, it's not that he's saying that Berkshire doesn't pay enough or something. Um, I notice it more in a sense they've been involved in the heavily regulated businesses. And I do feel that maybe Buffett is concerned with, um, maintaining good relations with the government and stuff that were now that they're in energy and railroad. Um, and avoiding, um, criticism of the company overall for its ownership of those things and people going after them and stuff. So yeah, I do think there maybe is a bit of a shift that way. Mm hmm.
然而，他也有债务。你会注意到当谈到他支付的个人税款和其他费用时，他说这些都在纳税之下。他从来不说伯克希尔公司在逃税。嗯，显然他并不是在说伯克希尔公司不付足够的税之类的事情。啊，我更多地注意到他们涉及到强监管行业的情况。我觉得巴菲特也许担心与政府保持良好关系，以及因为拥有能源和铁路业务而遭受整体公司的批评和攻击。所以是的，我认为可能会有一些这样的转变。嗯。

And then he's like, well, in case these words don't mean much, let me pay in a picture for you and tell you just how much we paid in taxes. And he says, imagine piling up 32 billion, the total of Berkshire's 2012 to 2021 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height. If you, uh, converted it to $100 bills and stacked it up about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise. So he's really hitting on that.
然后他说，如果这些话不是很清楚，让我给你看一张照片，告诉你我们缴纳了多少税。他说，想象累积32亿美元，这是伯克希尔公司2012年至2021年联邦所得税的总额。现在，这个数字增加到超过21英里。如果你将它转换成100美元的钞票，并将它堆叠到商业飞机通常巡航的高度的三倍，那么他真正地强调了这一点。

Um, I, I, I mean, they thought to myself, I'm like, so did he just calculate this himself as somebody thought through this thought exercise? You just probably ran the math himself and estimated what it would be. Yeah, probably. I mean, I think of the size of a bill and stuff and it's not difficult to do that. Uh-huh.
哦，我是说，他们自己想到了，他是不是自己算的这个数学题？你可能只是自己跑了一下数学，估计了一下会是多少。对，可能是这样。我的意思是，我想到了一张钞票的大小之类的，这不难算。嗯，没错。

Um, there is, I didn't think about this before, but actually when I was reading, I did think about it. He doesn't get into it much, but it is possible that part of his reason for discussing this a little bit is, um, he wants to sound very positive on America's future as a country. At the same time is not being super positive on its, um, budget deficit and its inflation situation. And the likelihood of that continuing and I don't know what that's all about if he fears that they'll be higher taxes in the future or he or what, but I think he has some awareness of, of that issue. Um, and he gives it very short mention in the letter that, you know, there's almost no mention of it, but, mm-hmm.
嗯，其实之前我没有想到这一点，但是我阅读的时候确实考虑到了。他没有深入探讨，但有可能他提及这个话题的部分原因是，他想要对美国的未来发展表达出非常积极的态度。与此同时，他并不是对预算赤字和通货膨胀非常乐观。他认为这种情况可能会继续下去。我不知道他是否担心未来会有更高的税收，或者其他原因，但我认为他对这个问题有所觉察。他在信中只简短提及，几乎没有讨论，但是确实有涉及到这个问题。嗯。

And then he spends some time talking about Charlie. And he had said he were a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast.
然后他花了一些时间谈论 Charlie。他说他分享了他的几个思想，其中许多是从最近的播客中得来的。

So I was looking, I'm like, where's this podcast? So internet, you have to do your thing and send it over if you could find it.
所以我在找，然后就想，这个播客在哪里呢？因此，请互联网尽你所能，如果你能找到，就把它发送过来。

A lot of this, uh, stuff has been said over the years, but, you know, good ideas don't go stale. So it's nice to, um, you know, read a lot of these again.
这些话多年来讲过很多次，但是你知道，好的想法永远不过时。所以很高兴能够重新阅读这些东西。

I mean, a lot of them from like poor Charlie's all men. I can actually wonder people were speculating if I guess they're doing like a video form of poor Charlie's all men, I saw a two minute clip.
我的意思是，很多人都来自像可怜的查理的所有人一样的地方，而且都是男性。我可以想象人们在猜测，他们是否正在制作类似于可怜的查理的所有男性的视频形式，我看过一个两分钟的片段。

I think it was the striped guys, one of them are interviewing monger at his house. So I'm thinking maybe that's the podcast that Buffett just saw before. It was a publicly available.
我认为是那些有条纹的人，其中一个正在采访蒙格尔在他家里。所以我认为那可能是巴菲特之前看到的播客。它是公开可见的。

But hey, man, my life is complete because Buffett, you know, he listens to podcasts apparently. So I was, uh, yeah, did you ever think that the word podcast would appear and it's got to be the first time that's ever, yeah, that's got to be the first time.
但是，嘿，伙计，我的人生很完整，因为巴菲特，你知道的，他显然会听播客。所以我，嗯，你有没有想过“播客”这个词会出现，这肯定是第一次，是第一次出现。

So I was like, we made it, we made it. He's definitely searched born Buffett or Berkshire. I'm just going to guess he's had, he's definitely come across our podcast.
所以，我就像是，我们做到了，我们真的做到了。他肯定搜索了巴菲特或伯克希尔的出生地。我会猜想他一定听过我们的播客。

But yeah, I don't know. I mean, do you know of a podcast that has come out on monger? No. Okay. No.
嗯，我不知道。我的意思是，你知道有什么关于Monger的播客吗？没有，好的，没有。

Anything from this section that stood out to you? No. I mean, obviously it's different in that he doesn't normally do this. So um, dedicate a section to him. Correct.
这一部分有什么让你印象深刻的吗？没有。我的意思是，很明显他平常不这样做。所以，我们应该给他开辟一个专门的部分。没错。

Yeah. And it's not specific, you know, anniversary of whatever things and stuff. So yeah. Um, I think you talked about in recent letter, I don't remember which one it was. It was a year ago or something about whether it's a victory lap or what sort of, uh, the letter was like, you know, um, this is definitely doing that with with Charlie. Yeah.
嗯。而且它不是特定的，你知道，纪念某些事情和东西的周年纪念之类的。所以，对。嗯，我认为你在最近的信中谈到了，我不记得是哪一封了。大概是一年前左右，关于它是不是一个胜利之旅或者是什么样的，信就像，你知道的，这肯定是在和Charlie一起做。Yeah.（译者注：最后的Yeah可以翻译成“是的”）

Trust 99, right? 99 years old. Yeah. Yeah. So, um, I mean, and with COVID and everything that happened with them, not having in person meetings and we've talked about that.
信任99，是吧？99岁了。是的，是的。所以，我是说，加上COVID和他们所经历的一切，没有面对面会议，我们已经谈论过这个了。

Um, yeah, I think that that has definitely changed the tone of some things. I think like there's a tone of the meeting or things since then, uh, because of that happening, not so much that there was a pandemic or something, but that it caused there not to be meetings for a little while and everything. Mm hmm.
嗯，是的，我认为那绝对改变了某些事情的语气。我认为自那以后会议或事情的语气发生了变化，因为那件事发生了，不是因为有流行病之类的事情，而是因为它导致了一段时间没有会议和一切。嗯嗯。

I did think it was interesting that the daily journal didn't have an in person meeting this year, but obviously Berkshire had a meeting last year in Omaha.
我认为很有趣的是，日报今年没有面对面开会，但伯克希尔去年在奥马哈开了一次会议。

Perhaps that was just a difference of the states that those two companies operated or whatever, but I did, I thought that was interesting.
也许那只是这两家公司所处的州份的差异或其他原因吧，但我认为那很有趣。

My guess would be that it's Warren doesn't do zoom. And Charlie is probably on zoom 24, seven. Yeah. Um, it's more of that kind of thing. Yeah. Mm hmm. Yeah. It's easier for Charlie, you know, yeah.
我猜应该是沃伦不会用zoom。而查理可能一直在使用zoom。是啊，更多的是这样的事情。是啊。嗯，对查理来说更容易，你知道的。

Charlie has said that he, uh, he really enjoys zoom. So yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I also think Charlie would be more likely to do, uh, you know, with to do something where he talks.
Charlie说过他非常喜欢Zoom。嗯，是的。是的。我也觉得Charlie更倾向于参与谈话或讨论之类的活动。

If he can just switch from talking to one person to the next, we'll sit in the same place that way. Um, yeah. No, I think that Buffett definitely would like the crowd and everything there.
如果他能够简单地在和一个人谈话和下一个人谈话之间进行转换，我们就可以以这种方式坐在同一个地方。嗯，是的。不，我认为巴菲特肯定会喜欢那里的人群和一切。

Yeah. I don't think it's going to go virtual under, um, but well, I mean, it was like basically had to then, but other than that, I don't think it'll be virtual during Buffett's time. Mm hmm.
嗯，我不认为它会在未来消失，但是，我是说，当时基本上是必须这样做的，但除此之外，我不认为在巴菲特的时间里会是虚拟的。嗯。

Munger did say that he did have COVID and then he had sniffles for like a day or something. Then he was all good. So I mean, this man just built different Jeff.
蒙格尔说他确实得过 COVID 了，然后他不适了一天左右。之后他就没事了。所以，我觉得这个人与众不同，杰夫。

Yeah. He said he had like a bunch of vaccinations and stuff, right? So it was better in the COVID. Thank you. Uh huh.
嗯，他说他打了很多疫苗之类的东西，对吧？所以在新冠肺炎方面要更好一些。谢谢。嗯嗯。

So, uh, obviously, uh, Omaha this year, he goes through his normal pitch, talks about C's candies. Uh, I love the plugs about his own product.
那么，嗯，很显然，今年的Omaha，他像往常一样介绍他的产品，谈论C糖果。嗯，我热爱他自己产品的宣传。

Uh, shocking statistic on C's candies. Did you see that about what? How this tensales permitted? How much they sold?
哇，C糖的统计数据太令人震惊了。你看到关于什么了吗？他们是如何获准销售的？他们卖了多少？

Yeah. When I read the first part, I was, it's funny because I read the first part. He says, what does he say first? Um, 11 tons.
嗯，当我读到第一部分的时候，我感到很有趣，因为我读到了第一部分。他先说了什么？嗯，11吨。

Yeah. So when he says the, that's what it is. Yeah. So he says the tons first. So it's funny because a few paragraphs later, he breaks down everything about that.
嗯，所以当他说“the”时，就是那个意思。嗯，他先说了“the tons”，所以后面几段话就很有趣，因为他详细解释了那个东西的一切。

Yeah. When I read the tons, I'm doing in my head like, okay, so how many individual sales is that? And how many, you know, and he does it like two paragraphs later, but because it's an incredible amount. I'm like, okay, so these might be what two pound boxes.
啊，当我读到大量的内容时，我会在脑海中计算，嗯，那是多少个单独的销售？还有多少，你知道的，他在两段之后才做了，但因为数量太惊人了，我想，那么这些可能是两磅的盒子。

Yeah. Yeah. They're picturing like what a ton looks like. I think like a dump truck. How much of that is a ton? Yeah. It's crazy.
嗯。嗯。他们想象着一吨的样子。我觉得像一辆垃圾车一样。那么一吨有多少？是啊。太疯狂了。

Yeah. So I, I agree with you on what your thoughts were. I was like, it's kind of, I don't know. I mean, I've benefited from a lot of Buffett's other letters. So I mean, can't judge him. But I agree with you.
嗯。所以，我同意你的想法。我当时有点犹豫，不太确定。我的意思是，我从巴菲特的其他信件中获益良多。所以，我不能评判他。但我同意你。

When you had said that, you had felt like you didn't think this would be a good representation or learn a lot about Berkshire if you were going to invest in the company. Yeah. To me, it just seemed shorter, kind of more, just things he has said in the past. But I mean, can't judge the man for that.
当你说那话时，你感觉好像你认为如果你要投资这家公司，这并不是一个好的代表或学到很多有关伯克希尔的东西。对我来说，那只是看起来更短，有点像他过去说过的话。但是，不能因为这点去判断这个人。

Right. Yeah. And there is a lot about the decisions that they made. Right. And how the decision, so that part of it is very important. And maybe doesn't get explained enough about Berkshire. Not sure all the reasons for getting into disgusting it that way.
「好的。是的。他们所做的决定有很多相关的事情。对的。而且决策的方式，这一部分非常重要。也许关于伯克希尔的解释还不够。我不确定采用这种方式参与其中的所有原因。」

It's always interesting about why I choose to discuss what topics in what year. So I like that kind of stuff because otherwise we just have discussions of share buybacks or whatever things. He does do a good job of making a letter. It's timeless so that when you have an entire collection of them and read it, it makes sense.
我觉得讨论为何在哪一年选择哪些话题，这种东西总是很有趣。要不然的话，我们只会讨论回购或其他的一些事情。他写信的能力确实是不错的。它很经典，所以当你收藏了一整套信件并阅读时，会让人一看就明白。

We don't appreciate that now because we read the 70s or 80s letters and don't think, oh, why is it not just constantly about inflation and stuff? You know, we don't read in go, oh, why is it a discussing water gate? But when we read the because you don't think about it back then.
我们现在不太欣赏那个时期的文字，因为我们读的是70年代或80年代的信件，所以并没有想着：“为什么不一直谈论通货膨胀之类的问题呢？”你知道的，我们并没有立刻想着：“为什么在讨论水门事件呢？”但当我们读到那些信件时，因为我们没能在当时想到这些事情，所以现在才会这样想。

But when we read the letters during COVID and stuff, it was notable how little specific discussion there was of COVID and how little specific discussion there was of inflation. There's a little bit more of that at the annual meeting. But he tries to stick to things that are not just like that one year type discussion.
但是当我们在COVID期间阅读这些信件时，值得注意的是讨论COVID的具体内容非常少，而关于通胀的具体讨论也非常少。在年度会议上有更多这样的讨论。但他试图坚持一些不仅仅是一年讨论的事情。

So there is the share buyback thing, which is specific to now in it. I think the more timeless thing that's in it is this discussion of how few purchases that they've made have mattered so much. And how others have not done so good. He even says, I mean, he says two things. One, he breaks down if it didn't do well. Like if it got bond like returns, how small a percentage it would become over time. And he breaks that down for people, which is helpful. But then he also even says something like does he say?
那么现在有股票回购的事情，这是特定于现在的。但我认为其中更具普遍性的是关于他们所做过的购买中有多少真正有意义，而其他人则没有做得那么好的讨论。他甚至说了两件事。首先，他详细解释了如果某个投资表现不佳，像债券一样的回报率会使其多么微不足道。这很有帮助。但然后他还说了一些什么呢？

I don't remember. He says he uses a pretty large number, a pretty large word describing the number, like a great man in year, whatever of the businesses are not good. They're marginal. He calls them marginal. And that's a recognition that I think rarely is made about Berkshire. That in terms of numbers, there's a large number of businesses that are not very good inside of Berkshire. There's a smaller number of very good businesses. They're worth a lot more than book value and all that. But it's a mixed bag that way.
我不记得了。他说他使用一个相当大的数字，用一个相当大的词来描述这个数字，就像一位伟大的年份，无论业务好坏。它们都是边缘的。他称它们为边缘的。而且我认为这是对伯克希尔很少被认识到的认识。就数字而言，在伯克希尔内部有许多不太好的业务。有一小部分非常好的企业。它们比账面价值高出很多。但这是一个混合的包裹。

Any final thoughts? Anything else on the Berkshire letter from Mr. Buffett? No, they're good. They're very good. Well, we could hop over to PowerPoint. But we have some emails, but we're not going to spend too much time on it because I actually want to get into our topic, which came from an email to you.
最后的想法呢？有关巴菲特先生的伯克希尔信件还有其它任何想说的吗？不，它们很好，非常好。我们还可以看一下 PowerPoint。但我们有一些电子邮件，但不会花太多时间在上面，因为我实际上想要进入我们的话题，它起源于你收到的一封电子邮件。

Okay. And it's about this idea of like asymmetry in asymmetric investments. And somebody had emailed you saying, I've been reading about Ted Washler's, dealer's investment. And I wanted to know what's your opinion on the investment. What do you think gave him the conviction that it wasn't a value trap? It would stay at similar or worse prices for many years without being able to obtain a good return.
好的。这是有关不对称投资中不对称性的想法。有人通过电子邮件向您发来信息，说他一直在阅读Ted Washler的经销商投资项目。他想知道您对这个投资的看法。您认为他是怎样有信心避免价值陷阱，让投资在多年内保持类似或更差的价格而无法获得良好回报的呢？

Also, do you think he thought in advance that the return could be as good as it has been? I was curious about that when I was reading through this. And then he provided a link where somebody gave a background to the investment that I thought we could use for the podcast.
此外，你认为他预先想到回报会像现在这样好吗？当我阅读这个时，我很好奇。然后他提供了一个链接，其中有人提供了一些关于投资的背景资料，我认为我们可以用来做播客。

But when did he invest in a dealer? So I remember when the news came out, it was like peak pandemic, right? It was 2020 sometime. And what's a ticker for? Is it DDS? Is that right? Yes.
但他什么时候投资经销商的？我记得消息公布的时候正是疫情高峰，是在2020年的某个时候。那什么是股票代码？是DDS吗？是的。

DDS. So we could see what has happened. The part that was super interesting to me, Jeff, is if you pull up like an all time chart, right? It's, I mean, okay, so 2020, let's say the average, I mean, he bought what around like 30 to 25, 35 to $35 to 30 to share somewhere around there. And this guy goes into it.
我们可以看到发生了什么。对我来说, Jeff, 特别有趣的一点是如果你拉出一张所有时间的图表，对吧？我的意思是，2020年，假设平均数是，我是说，他大约买进每股30至25美元，35至30美元左右。这个人进入其中。

But this hasn't been an investment where it's like, oh, you're just back to pre-COVID highs, right? And, you know, 2015 or whatever. I mean, the stock has just gone up multiple higher than it ever has been in its history. So it is an interesting stock to look at and study and try to understand, hey, what happened here?
但这并不是一个仅仅回到疫情前的投资，你知道的，像是回到2015年那样。我是说，这只股票实际上比历史上任何时候都上涨了多倍。所以这是一只有趣的股票，值得研究和理解，嘿，这里发生了什么？

Something that I also thought was interesting and curious to hear your thoughts on it, right? So Ted invests presumably, I mean, he has an LBO background, private equity, stuff like that. But he presumably invests like Buffett, right? High quality companies. At least that's what he preaches when he talks at public. He did do a podcast. I believe in 2021 where he talked about things. And it was all about buying the great businesses, right? Munger, the same thing.
有个有趣好奇的事情，我也觉得你的想法很有趣。Ted应该是在投资方面很有经验，因为他有LBO背景以及私募股权等。但他应该也像巴菲特一样投资高品质公司，对吧？至少当他在公开场合讲话时，他会强调这点。他在2021年做了一个播客，在里面谈到了这些事情。内容就是买入伟大的企业，和蒙格尔一样。

But you look at a few of their huge winners in life have come from almost breaking their rules a little bit, right? When you think about Munger's investment in TENICO, now you think about Ted's investment in Dillards. And it reminded me of Munger's quote from the daily journal meeting, and this only comes with experience when he said, a young man knows the rules and an old man knows when to break the rules.
但你看看他们生活中的一些巨大赢家，几乎是在有点突破他们的规则时取得的，对吧？当你考虑芒格在TENICO的投资时，现在你考虑特德在Dillards的投资。这让我想起了芒格在日报会议上的一句话，这只有经验才能得到，他说，年轻人知道规则，老人知道何时打破规则。

So clearly they just saw the opportunity there. But I thought that was interesting because something clearly has changed with the business because it's the value, which is way higher than it's ever been. But so you're talking about, you know, good, versus perfect as an investment. And we could go into it. But I guess I mean, do you have any initial thoughts on this idea of asymmetry? Is it an overused financial term? Personally, I think it is.
所以显然他们只是看到那里的机会。但我认为这很有趣，因为业务显然发生了变化，因为价值比以往任何时候都要高。但是你在谈论投资中的好与完美。我们可以进入细节，但我想知道你对这种不对称的想法有什么初始的想法吗？这是一个过度使用的金融术语吗？个人认为是这样的。

But before we get into it. So, right. So we should explain this. So this is from the after dinner investor, who you can see the website, you know, seeing the website that you can see it on the video and stuff of your list, if you're watching this on the video. But he also is on the punch card investing on YouTube. So if you, if you haven't seen his website, this is that website.
在我们深入讨论之前，我们需要先解释一下。所以，对的，我们应该先解释一下。这是来自"After Dinner Investor"的内容，你可以在他们的网站上看到，如果你正在观看这个视频，你会知道它的链接在视频说明里面。此外，他还在YouTube上的"Punch Card Investing"频道发布内容。所以，如果你还没有看过他的网站，这就是他的网站。

He is not the person, the after dinner investors, not the person who sent this in. Actually, I've gotten this one of the ones. So that's why I forwarded over to you. It was floating around Twitter too. Yeah. But I mean, I've got more than one email asking us to do this. Okay. Different people. I mean, not I shouldn't say asking us to do it. They did not ask us to do it. Saying I want to understand this better and stuff, talking to me, not not necessarily for us to do in the podcast. But because this happened more than once from different people, I said, okay.
他不是那个晚餐后的投资者，也不是发出这个的人。实际上，我收到了这个之一。所以我把它转发给你。它也在推特上流传。是的。但我的收件箱里有更多的邮件要求我们这样做。好的。不同的人。我是说他们没有要求我们这样做。他们说我想更好地理解这个和其他的事情，和我交谈，不一定是让我们在播客中做这件事。但因为这件事多次发生，来自不同的人，所以我说好。

Well, you know, obviously, like you said, it's floating around and stuff that people are looking at this reading it. So, so the analysis here that we're going from that we're, we're highlighting everything may not be have anything to do with Ted Wessler's thoughts about it really. Obviously, it's, it's sort of the prism of this blog post. And then also, we may not be agreeing in terms of like how we would analyze it with how the after dinner investor would analyze it to the same thing. Right. So, so it's like three levels here when we're looking at it, we're looking at we're back in the past to look at Dylan.
嗯，你知道，显然，就像你说的那样，这些东西正在传播着，人们正在阅读它。因此，我们从这里得出的分析可能与泰德·韦斯勒对它的看法并没有真正关系。显然，这是这篇博客文章的视角。而且，我们可能不会同意如何分析它，就像晚餐后的投资者会分析同样的事情一样。对。因此，在我们看待它时，有三个层面，我们正在回顾迪伦的过去。

So it's like, how did he actually look at it? How's the after an investor looking at it? How, you know, would we look at it? But anyway, so this is very easy for people watching the video to understand all of this. But I just want that clear for the podcast because it sounds like we've got some, you know, like we're in Ted's brain or something that we're doing this. So, and I also wanted to make it really clear that this was not sent by the author of the right, you know, so yeah, go ahead with what you've got highlighted there.
所以就像，他真正是怎么看待这个问题的呢？作为一位投资者，他是怎样看待它的呢？我们自己又会怎么看待它呢？不过无论如何，观看视频的人很容易理解所有这些。但我只是想让播客上表达得更清楚，因为听起来好像我们正在做某些Ted的大脑活动一样。同时，我也想清楚地指出这不是该文章的作者发出的内容。所以，请继续讲述你所标准的内容。

So, I mean, I'm just kind of curious, do you believe that asymmetric investments come around? Like frequently, have you even come across one that you categorize as being an asymmetric upside or having extreme asymmetry where there was a lot of different ways to win? Do you think about it in terms like that? Or do you think about it more so from like a margin of safety perspective? Hey, there's a lot of layers to this. It's trading below book value. It's trading below, you know, private market value. How do you typically think about that?
我是说，我只是有点好奇，你认为不对称投资会出现吗？像常见的一样，你是否遇到过被归类为不对称上涨或具有极端不对称性的投资，其中有许多不同的赢法？你是这样考虑的吗？还是你从一个安全边际的价值观来考虑呢？嘿，这种事情有很多层面。它以低于账面价值的价格交易。它是以低于私人市场价值的价格交易。你通常是如何思考这个问题的？

Yeah, the second one. I mean, it does happen. There are ones like that. You know, we've talked about, um, any more precious metals in the past. So if something happened and it makes a bunch of money, but if you say that there's never going to be volatility, then it doesn't make any money. But at the time, it was trading at a price that kind of assumed there never be volatility again and gold and silver and things like that. Um, so that happens, we've all talked about other ones. Um, that would fall into that same sort of category.
那么，第二个。我的意思是，这种事情确实会发生。有一些类型的投资就是这样的。我们在之前也讨论过有没有更多的贵金属。所以如果出现了某种情况，可以赚很多钱。但如果说永远不会有波动，那就没有办法赚钱了。但当时，交易价格基本上假定黄金、银等贵金属不会再有波动了。这种事情也异常常见，我们也曾经讨论过其他同属于这个类型的投资。

Net nets, ten, you know, the net nets that are huge winners are always going to fall into this category, to be honest, where there's not a lot of downside, but then they people go wide event net net explode like that. What's something happened in the industry? And so just temporarily, you know, change things. Um, so yeah, a lot of net nets and things have that sort of a, some tree, although you often don't discover it ahead of time. When you look at it, you think, Oh, this is boring. Nothing will ever happen with this. And then something surprises you that happens, you know, because when it's something so cheap, it actually has a lot of upside potential. People always underestimate the upside potential because we get to re-read it all like a real business, then upside potential is going to be huge.
网净值，十个，你知道，那些巨大获胜的网净值总是属于这个类别的，老实说，没有很多的下行空间，但随后人们参加了广泛的事件，网净值就像爆炸一样。这个行业发生了什么事情？因此，暂时地改变一些事情。是的，很多网净值和其他东西都有这样的一些树，尽管你通常无法事先发现它。当你看它的时候，你会想，噢，这很无聊，不会有什么事发生。然后，某些意外的事情发生了，你就会惊讶，因为当一些东西如此便宜时，它实际上有很多的上行潜力。人们总是低估上行潜力，因为我们像真正的企业一样重新审视它，那么上行潜力将会是巨大的。

Yeah, imagine if you buy like a two or three P, which those opportunities don't come around that much. And by nature, they shouldn't, right? And perhaps there's a little stickiness to it or heriness if you're going to find companies like that. But, you know, if a company goes from a two or three P to a 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, and then has growth on top of it, I mean, that's where you could really make insane returns.
你想象一下，如果你买了两个或三个P，这样的机会并不常有。而且按照本来的性质，也不应该有太多这样的机会，是吧？也许要找到这样的公司有一点难度，但如果一个公司的股票从两个或三个P上涨到10、12、13、14、15，而且还有增长的趋势，那么你就可能会获得极高的回报。

Um, so he talks about this idea of like good versus perfect and good investment ideas and perfect investment ideas look similar. And then he continues on. He says, but oftentimes, the margin of safety is smaller than we think it is. The brand isn't as strong as we think. The real estate isn't as valuable. The product is not as sticky, et cetera. This is why investing is difficult.
嗯，所以他谈到了优秀与完美的概念，优秀的投资想法和完美的投资想法看起来很相似。然后他继续说，但往往，安全边际比我们想象的要小。品牌并不像我们想象的那么强大，房地产并不那么有价值，产品并不那么具有黏性等等。这就是投资之所以困难的原因。

Our natural bias is towards action, which kind of looping back two buffets, one every, one big idea that was successful over five years. Yes, he had more ideas in between, but just the ones that really move the needle, right? Our natural bias is towards action. We want to find investing ideas. So we end up making too many purchases of merely good ideas and we fail to be patient and load up on the perfect ideas.
我们的自然偏见是行动，就像反复尝试两个自助餐，一个每天都有，一个成功了五年的大点子。是的，他在中间有更多的点子，但那些真正能推动进展的才是我们所看重的。我们的自然偏见是行动。我们想要找到投资点子。因此，我们最终会购买太多仅仅是不错的点子，而不能耐心等待并集中投资于完美的点子。

So to set the stage, this author, he does conclude later on that he did think that the dealer's investment was a perfect investment or perfect idea. So it's good looks like perfect. That's what makes things difficult, but perfect is different with perfect investments. The downside is smaller than the good investments and it is also more defined. And you have a higher confidence level in your understanding of the very limited downside.
所以，为了让大家了解背景，这个作者后来得出结论，他认为经销商的投资是一个完美的投资或完美的想法。所以看起来很完美。这就是使事情变得困难的原因，但是完美的投资与完美是不同的。它的下行风险比优秀的投资要小，也更明确。你对极有限的下行风险的理解有更高的信心水平。

And on the upside with perfect investments, the upside is much larger than the upside you get from good investments, good and perfect investments have the same basic outline, but it's the degree of downside confidence levels and upside that separate perfect investments from good investments.
并且就投资而言，从完美的投资角度来看，与好的投资相比，优势要大得多。好的和完美的投资基本上相同，但是完美的投资与好的投资之间的区别在于下跌信心水平和优势的程度。

So that kind of reminded me of greenblaths, right? When he talked about like how he sizes his positions, his position sizes are not the ones that he thinks he's going to make the most money, the most money on it was the ones that he felt like he wouldn't lose any money. So kind of this idea of confidence, right? And we've spoken a lot recently about what does confidence mean in investing?
这让我想起了格林布拉斯，对吧？他谈论了他如何定位他的头寸，他的头寸大小并不是他认为能赚最多钱的那些，最能赚钱的是他认为自己不会亏钱的头寸。所以这个信心的概念，对吧？我们最近一直在谈论投资中的信心意味着什么？

Do you have any thoughts on that section? Yeah, I mean, the thing is it's difficult to know the difference between you have a high degree of confidence, something's going to make money that so it's really cheap and the upside because of that cheapness. So a lot of times people when you think that something is very, very safe, you tend to underestimate the upside. So what you're doing is when you're saying, oh, this has a tremendous margin of safety, often you're underestimating future circumstances under which it could have tremendous upside.
你对那个部分有什么想法吗？嗯，我的意思是，很难区分你非常有信心，某物会赚很多钱，只是因为它很便宜而有很大的上涨空间。所以很多时候，当你认为某物非常安全时，你往往会低估上升空间。因此，当你说“这有很大的安全边际”时，通常你在低估未来可能有巨大上涨空间的情况。

Because what you're saying is it's really, really cheap, but I don't think it has a lot of upside. It's kind of what you're saying when you say I'm very certain about this, but I don't feel like it has the best, you know, like it might not be the biggest winner, but a lot of times you underestimate that and actually the things are most certain and tend to become your biggest winner.
因为你所说的是它非常非常便宜，但我不认为它有很大的上涨空间。当你说我对此非常确定，但我觉得它可能不是最好的选择时，这就是你所说的。但很多时候，你会低估它，事实上，一些最确定的事情往往成为你最大的赢家。

So since I have a great example of a perfect investment, the Dillard's investment by Ted Wesshuler comes to mind sometime likely in 2020, which I remember when the news came out, Wesshuler began buying Dillard's stock by September 29th, he crossed the 5% threshold and showed up in a 13G, he likely paid 25 to 30 dollars a share, call a 30 today, Dillard's is at a 360 dollar share price and in December they're going to pay a $15 special dividend with a special dividend capital turn to date, he's likely at a 12 to 13 bagger in less than two years time, Wesshuler's investment in Dillard's was a perfect investment and we pull it up right now, Dillard's is at $358 per share.
因为我有一个完美的投资例子——特德·韦舒勒在2020年买入迪拉兹股票的投资，记得当时新闻出来时，他在9月29日超过了5%的阈值，在13G申报中出现，可能花了25到30美元一股的价格购买，现在叫做30美元，迪拉兹股价现在为360美元，12月还将支付15美元的特别股息，并且资本拆分已实施，韦舒勒可能在不到两年的时间里实现了12到13倍的投资回报率。韦舒勒在迪拉兹的投资是一次完美的投资，如果我们现在查看，迪拉兹的股价为每股358美元。

So yeah, that's been a huge home run. He had to actually get approval, I believe, from Berkshire to purchase the stock if I'm correct about that, not like that's really relevant to the investment, but he continues on, it was a perfect not just because of the result, but because of the situation.
嗯，这真的是个巨大的成功。如果我没记错，他实际上需要得到伯克希尔的批准才能购买这支股票，虽然这与投资实际上并不相关，但他继续坚持，这不仅仅因为结果是完美的，更因为情境的适宜性。

In the third quarter of 2020, Dillard's had 22 million shares outstanding, at $30 a share, that's a market cap of $660 million, that debt was $561 million, but tangible book value per share was $63, double the share price. So despite the net debt, Dillard's was selling for less than half of tangible book value. Why? I believe it was the real estate. On the books, after depreciation, the gross property plan equipment was at $1.4 billion. According to their 2019 annual report, for the fiscal year ending February 1st, 2020, Dillard's owned approximately 43.7 million square feet of store space across 285 stores in 29 states.
在2020年第三季度，Dillard's有着2,200万股股份，每股售价为30美元，这意味着市值为6.6亿美元，负债为5.61亿美元，但每股有形账面价值为63美元，是股价的两倍。因此尽管有净负债，Dillard's的售价仍不到有形账面价值的一半。为什么呢？我认为是因为其房地产资产。根据2019年的年度报告显示，在2020年2月1日的财政年度结束时，Dillard's拥有29个州285家商店的大约4370万平方英尺的店面面积，而这些房地产资产在折旧后的总价值为14亿美元。

That's on page 10. That on page F 10, they say property and equipment owned by the company is stated at cost, that's important, which includes related interest costs incurred during periods of construction, less accumulated depreciation and amortization.
在第十页上说，公司拥有的财产和设备列明成本是非常重要的。这包括在建设期间发生的相关利息成本，减去累计折旧和摊销。

This all makes me think that the after depreciation and on the books at cost, real estate property plan equipment, it's worth way more than the state of $1.4 billion. The stores they own, the 43.7 million square feet, was very likely bought at prices way less than their worth today. And just because depreciation is on the books, it doesn't mean those properties depreciated in real world value.
这让我觉得，除去折旧和账面成本，房地产、物业和设备的真实价值远远高于14亿美元的状态。他们拥有的商店，4370万平方英尺的面积，很可能是以比今天的价值低得多的价格购买的。而且，仅仅因为折旧出现在账本上，不意味着这些财产在现实世界的价值也下降了。

So do you remember that Nebraska furniture mark podcast he did? He kind of talked about, he didn't specifically say Dillard's, but I think the person asked him about finding investment ideas.
你还记得那个内布拉斯加家具市场播客吗？他谈到了一些话题，虽然并没有明说迪拉兹(Dillard's)，但我想那个人提问的意思是关于寻找投资点子。

And I think he had said just kind of they jump out at you reading the newspapers or just reading things that other people aren't reading. And I believe he had said that he was reading a furniture periodical. So I don't think he specifically said Dillard's, but he had said, hey, sometimes ideas just kind of jump out at you from just really random places.
我认为他说的是，当你读报纸或阅读其他人没有阅读的东西时，有时候东西会跳出来吸引你。我相信他说他在读一本家具杂志。所以我不认为他特别提到了Dillard's，但他说过，有时候想法会从一些非常随机的地方跳出来。

Let's see, during fiscal 2019, the company received cash proceeds of 30.6 million and realized a gain of 20.3 million, primarily related to the sale of six store properties. That sentence shows that two thirds of the sale value were gains. So it does look like the properties are worth more than book value.
嗯，让我们来看看，在2019会计年度，公司收到了3060万的现金收益，并实现了2030万的收益，主要与六个店铺物业的出售有关。这句话表明，出售价值的三分之二是收益。因此，看起来这些物业的价值高于账面价值。

Who knows if those six stores represent the average value of the other 285, likely not as they might have sold some of their worst performing stores and least valuable properties. Question mark, who knows?
谁知道这六家商店是否代表其余 285 家商店的平均价值，很可能不代表，因为它们可能已出售了一些表现最差和价值最低的物业。问号，谁知道呢？

Well, actually, we can, but just for one thing to be able to understand, he knows how many square feet they had, they had about 45 million square feet. And he knows what's carried on the books at 1.4 billion, 1.4 billion is 1,400 million. So you can convert that into it and say that it's 1,400 million divided by 44.7.
嗯，其实我们可以理解其中的一件事情，他知道他们拥有约4,500万平方英尺，还知道账面上载有14亿美元，也就是1,400万美元。因此，您可以将其转换为1,400万美元除以44.7。

So 1,400 divided by 44.7, you can see that on price per square foot, it's carried on the books at a fairly low value. Actually, tremendously low value. In fact, the replacement cost could be a lot higher because it's being carried because you can just do that division and see that, right?
你看，1400除以44.7，这表明每平方英尺的价格非常低。实际上，价值极低。实际上，因为这样记账，所以替换成本可能会更高，因为你只需要进行这种除法就可以知道了，对吧？

So you would expect it to be carried at like hundreds of dollars of square foot or something. It's being carried at tens of dollars of square foot. Yeah.
所以你会期望它能够被以每平方英尺数百美元的价格出售。实际上，它只被以每平方英尺几十美元的价格出售。是的。

Go ahead. It says, and you can also do a seritage like valuation on the 43.7 million square feet they own. Let's say they can rent that square footage at $14 a foot, which he says is conservative. Assuming the cost it takes to redevelop some of the properties, $14 a foot times 43.7 million square feet equals
继续吧。据说，你也可以对他们拥有的4370万平方英尺进行类似评估的评估。假设他们可以以每平方英尺14美元的租金出租该面积，他说这是保守的。假设重新开发一些物业需要的成本，每平方英尺14美元乘以4370万平方英尺等于……

611 million times roughly a 50% net operating income NOI margin that gives you 300 million as an annual NOI. Give it a conservative 10% cap rate. We're looking at 3 billion in real estate value. So again, building sort of a case for hey, there's a lot of tangible equity here in this business.
大约有6.11亿次，净经营收入毛利率约50%，每年净经营收入为3亿。以保守的10%资本化率计算，我们看到3十亿的房地产价值。再次强调，这个业务有很多实际的股本。

Yeah, and the replacement cost is probably very high. Yeah, because you can ask what would it take to replace almost 45 million square feet and obviously you're going to get a number that's very high, you know, higher than the number he just mentioned.
是啊，而且更换成本可能非常高。你知道，你问要更换近4500万平方英尺需要多少钱，显然答案会相当高，比他刚刚提到的数字高。

So we're back to the private market analysis. What a private buyer would pay or have to pay to build it yourself. Yeah, I mean, sure. I mean, obviously like Amazon has a deal with what coals, I think it's a coals, one of those department stores to take returns and stuff for them and things like that. So obviously some of these companies, if they want to do things, you know, in locations, need to have some sort of presence that way.
所以我们又回到了私人市场分析。一个私人买家为了建造它付出的价格或必须支付的价格。是的，我的意思是，当然。显然，像亚马逊一样的公司与某些百货商场（我想是某个叫“coals”的百货商场）达成了协议，代为接受退货等等。因此，某些公司如果想在某些地方进行业务，需要在这方面具有一定的存在感。

So it's a question of like, well, what would someone pay to buy this thing? So he says, whether you take the price on the book, sell 1.4 billion minus the 561 million of net debt, and you're looking at a tangible book value of 800 million versus the market cap of 660 million, or if you take the rose year, but still likely conservative, seritage like approach, valuing the real site after net debt at around 2.4 billion.
那就是说，关键在于，有人愿意支付多少来购买这个东西？他说，无论你以书籍价格为基础，售出14亿减去5.61亿的净债务，你看到的有形账面价值是8亿，而市值只有6.6亿；或者以玫瑰年份为基础，但仍是比较保守的seritage方式，将扣除净债务后的实际地盘价值估算在24亿左右。

Either way, you've got a big margin of safety because you're buying that own real site net of the debt for less than it is worth. So again, he's talking about asymmetry. There's downside protection. You're getting this, you know, not even talking about the income or the actual business itself. There's a lot of what do you say the book value was two times what he was paying, right? Something like that book value per share was 63 dollars, and he was buying, let's say, around $30 per share.
无论如何，你都有很大的安全边际，因为你以低于实际价值的价格购买了净房地产。所以他再次谈到了不对称性。有下行保护。你得到了这个，不需要考虑收入或实际业务本身。如果书面价值是他支付的两倍，那么说的有很多，对吧？每股的书面价值为63美元，他购买的价格大约是30美元每股。

So there's a lot of embedded value in that from like a protection standpoint. But what about the income statement in cash flow? But Dillard also makes money and has cash flow. This is where the upside investment comes from. And we were just talking about this, right? If you buy a low P stock or a net debt or whatever, and then they start to be rated like a real business, well, that's where you could make multiples on your investment.
所以，从保护角度来看，有很多嵌入式价值。但是利润表和现金流呢？但Dillard也赚钱并有现金流。这就是投资增值的机会所在。我们刚刚谈到了这个问题，对吧？如果你购买低市盈率的股票或净负债股票等等，然后它们开始被评价为真正的企业，那么你就可以在你的投资上赚取多次回报。

Dillard's has cash flowed from operations every year in the last 10 years, including during the pandemic, and they're operating cash flow minus capital expenditures of free cash flow has ranged from 400 million to 200 million in recent years. They make money at what they do. They seem to produce free cash flow. They also seem to have a culture of buying back stock, buying back more than 100 million a year, and sometimes much more in each of the last 10 years.
Dillard's在过去的10年中每年都有来自运营的现金流入，包括疫情期间，他们的运营现金流减去资本支出所得到的自由现金流在近年来的范围内为4亿至2亿。他们在所做的事上赚钱。他们似乎产生了自由现金流。他们似乎也有回购股票的文化，过去的10年中每年回购超过1亿美元，有时甚至更多。

And he goes putting it all together. He didn't think this was just a heads I went, tails I lose, but this is more like heads I win huge because a real estate net of the debt is undervalued currently, and they're likely going to stay in business and every cash must be valid at something. And tails I don't lose at all because a real estate net of debt that I'm buying is worth more than the purchase price. The upside was huge. And the more importantly, the downside was limited to almost nothing. And it was clearly defined and noble. What a home run investment.
他开始把这一切放在一起。他认为这不仅仅是一个赌博，是赢了就有很大的收获，因为现在房地产债务净值被低估了，他们可能会继续做生意，每一分钱都有其价值。而如果输了，我也不会有任何损失，因为我购买的房地产净值比购买价格更高。收益很大，更重要的是，风险非常有限。这个投资是很明智的。真是个大赚的投资。

So if he bought it at 35 or $30 a share, which whatever he said was a $600 million markup, ish, and they were doing around, let's call it, I don't know, 100 to 300 million in free cash flow. If you put a 10 multiple on that, right? You still get a price that's much higher than what he was buying it at. And then you have all that real estate value as well. Yeah, it looks like I'm enterprise value to free cash flow basis.
所以，如果他以每股35或30美元的价格购买，不管他说的是6亿美元还是左右的价值，他们在做大约1到3亿的自由现金流。如果你把它乘以10的倍数，你还是会得到比他购买时高得多的价格。然后你还有所有的房地产价值。是的，看起来我是用企业价值到自由现金流的基础。

Let's say it was maybe five to six times, you know, he said they had a half a billion or something in that debt. So low one billion, it was valued a little over one billion, say it's 1.2 billion or something, then six times, you know, so if you're taking the debt together and then you're, and then you're just saying that you're counting debt, but you're not counting the real estate. So of course, you could get rid of some of the real estate and instead put it in.
假设那个数字可能是五到六倍，你懂的，他说他们负有大约五亿美元的债务。如果债务加在一起，加上不计算房地产的话，它的价值仅仅略超过了十亿美元，约定为十二亿美元。所以说六倍，你能理解吧。当然，你可以抛售一些房地产，把它们换成其他资产。

And then you know, you'd have, if you're cash flow goes down and something presumably you wouldn't need to real estate, you could sell that if your business got worse. But of course, the timing is the issue here. So there's a few things, right? One is for the most part, if we go back to like, if you look at a chart from like the 2000s or something, the case against it would be one, it hasn't been valued all that much higher.
你知道的，如果你的现金流下降，并且你最好不需要房地产，你可以在你的生意变差时卖掉它。但当然了，时间是个问题。因此有很多事情需要考虑。首先，从大部分情况来看，如果我们回顾一下2000年的图表，我们会发现它的价值并没有增长太多，因此批评的声音很多。

Now, at the very bottom, it actually had been valued a lot higher not that many years before, but it's often been valued fairly low. Let's put it that way, you know, in the 2010s. It's not been a particularly expensive stock. So maybe the bounce back won't be as big. Two, at the exact moment you're buying the belief is that Amazon and those sorts of things will keep growing.
现在，实际上，在不久之前，它的价值曾经很高，但通常被低估。就这么说吧，在2010年代，它并不是特别昂贵的股票。所以也许反弹不会很大。其次，你购买的时候，人们相信亚马逊和类似公司会继续增长。

You'll not grow. Your real estate is believed in the among investors, not among the general public and stuff, but among investors, the belief is like, okay, the real estate that you have is like worthless because no one's going to be in this business at all in person, real estate, in person, retailing stuff. And with department stores, it's all going to be online. And so not only is your business being destroyed by that, but the real estate too.
你的生意不会有增长。在投资者中间，你的房地产的信誉还可以，但在普通民众和雇员中间，不值钱。因为没有人会亲自来这个实地的零售生意。而现在，百货商店等物品的购买都是在网上进行。所以，你的生意不仅会被摧毁，房地产也会受到影响。

I mean, that is the risk here is that the real estate and the cash flows are related. And so the stock is probably very cheap when people are negative on the entire industry, the entire concept of brick and mortar, big format department store type retail.
我的意思是，这里的风险在于房地产和现金流是相互关联的。所以当人们对整个行业、实体店铺和大型百货零售概念持消极态度时，该股票可能会非常便宜。

Yeah. Because they're negative on you as a business, but they're also negative on like your locations. I mean, don't you remember the narrative, right? In 2020, hey, all these retailers were actually going to fail over the next 10 years. COVID just sped it up. They're done.
嗯。因为他们对你的业务持消极态度，还对你的地点持消极态度。我的意思是，你还记得那个说法吧？在2020年，嘿，所有这些零售商实际上会在接下来的10年内失败。 COVID只是加速了它们的崩溃。他们已经失败了。

Yeah. So that was not going to happen. Right. Now that wasn't going to happen in the case of dealers. It's very, very safe. Right. So one, it owned a lot of the real estate, like we said, but also had a long history of very positive cash flows, pre-cash flow, which is quite a lot different than some of the other retailers that did fail or came close to failing or whatever.
对，所以那种情况不会发生。没错，对于经销商来说是非常安全的。对，因为它拥有很多房地产，就像我们说的那样，而且还有一个很长的历史，有非常积极的现金流，这与一些其他失败或接近失败的零售商相当不同。

It had a lot of pre-cash flow production over the last 20 years of being it rarely ever had negative pre-cash flow, like maybe one, two years. So it certainly had operating cash flow all the time. Yeah. Now part of that is it owns this real estate. If it, you know, it owns a lot of real estate. If it had leased everything, then it would be more likely it doesn't always go under. You know, go and have negative in this single year.
在过去20年中，它的产生了很多现金流前期生产，很少有负现金流，可能只有一两年而已。所以它肯定一直有营业现金流。原因在于它拥有这些房地产。如果它把所有房地产都租出去了，那么它就更有可能在某一年里会出现负现金流。

Would you put this in that box of being like a complete no-brainer at the time, right? Take the the result out of it. I mean, who would have guessed though that the stock would go, I mean, multiple sub-up like what it's, what it ever traded at pre-COVID. I mean, yeah, that's pretty surprising. No one would predict that, but you know, that does happen with momentum stuff once once the stock gets a lot of momentum that way.
你觉得把这个放进那个完全不费脑子的盒子里对吧？不要考虑结果。我的意思是，谁能猜到股票会像在疫情前交易时那样多次大涨呢？是啊，这真是太惊人了。没人会预测到这种情况，但你知道，一旦股票获得了强劲的势头，这样的情况就会发生。

Obviously, it also earned it. The market was completely wrong and at the market thought this would be worse than ever for it and actually it's been better than ever, right?
显然它也赚了钱。市场完全错了，市场认为这会比以往更糟，但实际上它比以往任何时候都要好，对吧？

Okay, so do you have any main thoughts on the dealers' investment, what asymmetry means, finding investments with asymmetric upside? I mean, what comes to mind for me, sort of like the power law, right? Of what, how venture capitalists think about it? You invest a very small amount, perhaps one of them hits on the roulette table.
那么，你对经销商的投资有什么主要想法，什么是不对称意味着，如何找到具有不对称上涨的投资呢？我的意思是，对我来说，想到的就是幂律，对吧？风险投资家对此的看法是什么？你投资一小笔，也许其中一个会在轮盘赌桌上赢大。

But is this different because there was real estate value there. If it gets valued on a pre-cashable basis, there's still ways you could win there. Really the way that I interpret this. Now, of course, you got to take out what has happened and what the thoughts were at the time, all the noise around this investment. There were many ways to win, right?
这是不是因为那儿有房地产价值而与众不同呢？如果评估是以前可兑现的基础进行的，仍有可能赢得胜利。我对此的解释是，当然，你必须剔除当时发生的事情以及思想，以及所有与这项投资有关的噪声。有许多赢的方式，对吧？

And do you think it has actually become way more successful than to have ever thought it could? Oh, I'm sure the stock has been more successful than he thought it could. Yeah, and such a short period of time. Yeah, I've never had a good, well, I probably never had a good investment where the stock didn't go up faster than I thought. I've had good investments where the business didn't do as well as I thought and the stock went up more than I thought. Yeah.
你觉得它实际上变得比你原以为的更成功了吗？哦，我相信这支股票比他想象中的更成功。是的，而且这么短时间。是的，我从来没有一个好的投资，股票的涨幅没有比我想象的更快。我曾经有过好的投资，公司的表现不如我想象的那样好，股票的涨幅却超出了我的想象。是的。

So, you know, you get lucky with those things. I don't know. I think there's some differences with it just being like asymmetric, like we're talking about, about having some real safety to it. Mm-hmm.
你知道，这些事情有时候是靠运气的。我不知道。我认为如果只是不对称，就像我们正在谈论的那样，可能会有一些真正的安全问题。嗯嗯。

However, so if you think about the business at the time that he was investing in it, could it fail? It's a retailer. What would that look like? Yes, it could. But it would happen slowly. It would be like seers. Seers was always an interesting case that way. But also, you know, JC Penning, that's what I was saying. So, I said, by I said, and that's where you could look at like seers, seretage, JC Penning, all these other ones. I mean, the graveyard is a mile long of retailers.
然而，如果您考虑到他当时投资的业务，是否可能失败呢？它是一家零售商。这会是什么样子呢？是的，可能会失败，但发生得很慢。就像西尔斯一样。西尔斯一直是个很有趣的例子。但同时，您知道，JC Penney也是如此。因此，我说了，在这里您可以看看像西尔斯、美国实体零售集团、JC Penney之类的公司。我的意思是，坟墓里塞满了已经关门的零售商。

But they were particularly dumb. They were like aggressively dumb. In that, they had to keep doing bad things year after year after year, not change what they were doing and make a lot of bad decisions that way. And if he knew that what management was doing here made a lot more sense, then it would be fine.
他们特别笨。他们就是很愚蠢。他们年复一年地做着坏事，不改变他们所做的事情，做出很多错误的决定。如果他知道管理层在这里所做的更有意义，那就没问题了。

So, yeah, there are ways to fail, but it would be hard to feel quickly. That's always the scary thing about these retail things where seers are anything else. If seers was going to operate as a retailer all that time and double down on everything, then yeah, it could, all your, you could lose everything and you did eventually in that. Even though there was a lot of value there.
嗯， 是的，有很多失败的方法，但很难迅速感觉到失败。这就是零售业的可怕之处, 因为股票之类的东西变幻莫测。如果零售商持续经营并进行重复投资，那么可能会全部输光，实际上有这样的例子，尽管它们本来有很大的价值。

Several of the, so, you know, but on the other hand, the thing I would compare it to in terms of how it was valued before this was Best Buy. But this wasn't as bad as Best Buy. Best Buy would have required more looking into who was going to turn the company around and stuff and understand it as a turnaround. This didn't require all that kind of thing.
有几个，你知道的，但另一方面，我会把它与之前被重视的Best Buy进行比较。但这不像Best Buy那么糟糕。Best Buy需要更多的调查谁会扭转公司的局面，以及了解它作为一种扭转。而这个不需要那样的事情。

So, in a sense, it looks like a simpler investment than that, even though it was valued a lot at the same sort of prices. But it is hard to sometimes tell them apart that way. And I don't know that the future will be, we don't know what this stock will look like, what this business will look like in 10 years either.
因此，在某种意义上，它看起来比那复杂的投资更简单，尽管以相同的价格被评价得很高。但有时很难区分它们。而且我不知道未来会怎样，我们也不知道这支股票或这个企业在10年后会是什么样子。

You probably got lucky in some things in that there's probably a realization, this is what I mean, with like comparing to Best Buy, that the market was totally wrong. So, as it turns out, Dylan probably doesn't need as much selling space in the future as it did in the past because it could sell a lot online. And the space that it has is probably has some value that you get rid of over time too. So, it's even better than people thought. And then the things with like the Amazon and all of that turned out that they've not done that well, you know, versus them since then.
你可能在某些事情上很幸运，可能意识到了市场彻底错误的事实。就像与百思买进行比较，这就是我的意思。所以，结果可能是，Dylan在未来不需要像过去那样多的销售空间，因为它可以在线销售很多东西。而且它拥有的空间可能随着时间的推移也会有一些价值。所以，它比人们预想的更好。然后，与亚马逊等方面的事情证明，它们自那时以来表现不佳，与他们相比。

So, it's totally reversed. And you wouldn't have guessed it like the pandemic would have helped these companies in any way, but it certainly didn't hurt them. And we're on trends and stuff where I don't think that we've in any way been pushed to more of the giant online companies being a bigger issue than they were before. And that was hard to see at the time in the middle of the pandemic for people.
所以，情况完全反了过来。你们可能没有想到这种疫情反而有助于这些公司，但它们确实没有受到太大的影响。我们所关注的趋势等等，并没有让我们觉得巨型线上公司比以前更加棘手。在疫情期间，这对人们来说是难以想象的。

So, it's weird because in a sense, it was already, right, it was already like a cheap stock. It was already disliked strongly that category and then it got even cheaper because of a one-time thing. So, it had a long-term stigma attached to it for a better part of a decade. And then it also had this one-time thing happen to it.
所以，这有点奇怪，因为从某种意义上来说，它已经像便宜的股票一样了。那个品类已经被强烈厌恶了，然后由于一次事件而变得更便宜了。因此，它已经带着长期的污名在大部分近十年时间里存在。然后它还遭遇了这一次事件。

And you think it was too small to do in the portfolio that he manages for Berkshire. So, if he's managing $10 or $20 million, he made a $30 million dollar bet. Clearly, that's not something he would do. But it kind of reminds me a lot of, you know, Buffett's personal count, right? I mean, you just, you're reading all this different information. You're soaking in all this different information. Sometimes you just come across an idea.
你觉得这在伯克希尔管理的投资组合中太小了。如果他管理的是1千万或2千万美元，那么他做出了3千万美元的赌注。显然，他不会这么做。但这让我想起了巴菲特的个人账户。我是说，你看到了不同的信息，吸收了很多信息。有时你会突然想到一个想法。

Yeah. And sometimes you can identify it at the time and everything. And that time had a lot of ones ahead of a lot of potential upside. This was extreme in terms of how much it's gone up, right? Yeah. So, that's the thing that's remarkable. You can come up with a bunch of examples of things that are gone up three times or something. We can't come up with a bunch of examples of stocks that are gone up 13 times.
对的，有时你可以当时就辨认出来这种情况，而且那时还有很多潜在的上涨空间。这次的涨幅确实很大，对吧？没错。所以，这就是让人惊讶的地方。你可以找到很多涨了三倍之类的例子。可是，我们找不到很多股票涨了13倍的例子。

What are your thoughts on, like, again, right? Munger and him, what they communicate, how they preach to investors. I know a certain framework to, you know, follow for investing. Would you put this dealers investment within that framework? Was this something different?
你对芒格和他所表达的、向投资者宣传的观点有什么想法呢？我知道一种特定的投资框架，你会把这个交易员的投资放入其中吗？这与以前的不同吗？啊，还记得上面那几个词语吗？

Well, I don't know. I mean, I think people here, whether they hear what they want here or whatever from things where Munger talks about something, Munger is willing to make very big bets on things that he thinks are going to pay off in a big way. And he hasn't always said that that is only in the really good businesses.
嗯，我不知道。我的意思是，我认为在这里的人们，无论他们听到什么，或者从梦杰谈论某些事情中获得什么，梦杰都愿意在他认为会带来大回报的事情上大赌注。他并不总是说这仅仅是针对非常好的生意。

So, I think a lot of that is ignored that they've invested in these other things. I mean, if you think about it, what was Munger in, we know some things about what his partnership was in, right? So, like, we know when it wrapped up, what it was in. It was in mostly a trading stamps company, which is investment portfolio. And it was in a close end fund, both very, very cheap versus their net asset values. And so they were both trading at way below liquidation value.
我认为很多人忽略了他们在其他事情上的投资。想想看，蒙格投资了些什么，我们知道他的合伙企业投资了一些什么，对吧？他们结束时的投资组合大部分是其中一家交易票据公司，还有一家封闭式基金，两者都非常便宜，低于其净资产价值很多倍，甚至低于清算价值。

We know that the biggest bet he ever made in terms of percentage of his portfolio, because he put 100% into it was, you know, presumably he borrowed and not that he sold everything at 100% of it, but was in a single arbitrage deal with not a huge spread on it and stuff. But one that was almost certain to go through for specific reasons that would be hard to imagine it not going through.
我们知道他曾做出过占据他投资组合最大百分比的赌注。大概是因为他借款而不是把所有资产都卖掉了，但这是一笔单一的套利交易，涉及的差价不是很大等等。这笔交易几乎肯定会成功，因为有很多令人难以想象的具体原因。

So, there shouldn't have been any spread on it, basically. But so we know about those. And then we also, you know, we talked about one in this podcast. So, you know, and people forget, you know, Buffett wrote up a bunch of things in Arbitrush. Right. I mean, he took the time, the Arcada thing, that deal, he described that in great detail. The whoops bonds, the power of bonds with the nuclear power. He went into long description of that. If you go back to the past annual report, past shareholder letter. So like they've talked about some of that.
所以基本上它本来不应该有任何传播。但是我们知道了那些情况。而且我们在这个播客中也谈到了其中一个。你知道，人们往往会忘记，巴菲特在《Arbitrush》中写了很多东西。对，他花了时间，描述了Arcada的交易，详细地描述了那个交易。呜呜债券，核能电站的债券力量。他对此进行了详细的阐述。如果你回到过去的年度报告、过去的股东信中，你就会发现他们谈到了其中一些。

Yeah. So, I think that those, you know, get overlooked in terms of the other things that they do, what they've said more, they've never said that the way to get rich from a small amount of money is to buy and hold great businesses. They've said the way to invest large sums of money for a long period of time is buying and holding great businesses. Because you have to keep reinvesting when you have these, you know, shorter term, you know, because you have to rotate the portfolio more.
嗯，我觉得那些事情往往被忽略了，你知道的，他们说的其他事情更多，他们从来没有说过赚取大量财富的唯一办法是买入并持有伟大的企业。他们说的是，长期投资大量资金的方法是买入并持有伟大的企业。因为你必须不断重新投资，当你拥有这些更短期的投资时，你必须更频繁地进行投资组合轮换。

And because there aren't great, there aren't as many opportunities and very big things. But you know, when we was asked how do you make 50% a year, you know, like put that with Buffett, he said that, you know, he'd go A through Z and very small stocks. And he didn't say very, the best very small stocks. He said very small stocks, you know. So, and they've told stories like the Duck Club story. And, you know, so they do tell these stories.
因为不是很出色，所以机会和大事情也不是很多。但是你知道，当我们被问及如何每年赚取50％的时候，就像与巴菲特合作一样，他说过，你知道，他会逐个检查从A到Z的非常小的股票。他没有说最好的非常小的股票，他只是说非常小的股票。所以，他们讲述了像鸭子俱乐部故事这样的故事。所以，他们确实讲这些故事。

Or how about Charlie, what was his biggest mistake ever, right? His biggest mistake ever, he said is an oil company. And again, that's a net asset value thing because that is a really good example. Now it wasn't even higher than he could have ever imagined because it became part of a huge like one of the biggest ever bidding wars at the time for an oil company. But it was well known that the oil that company controlled was worth way, way, way more than the stock was trading for. Like so in terms of the market value at the time versus the stock, it was already high. And then he benefited from oil prices went up and then oil companies were willing to pay a lot to take out other oil companies. But everyone agreed that the stock was trading for less than, you know, oil.
或者查理呢？他的最大错误是什么？他说他最大的错误是投资一家石油公司。这里涉及到净资产价值的问题，因为这是一个非常好的例子。当时，这家公司甚至没有他想象中那么值钱，因为它成为了有史以来最大的竞标战之一，争夺的是一家石油公司。但是，这家公司控制的石油价值已经远远超过了股票当时的交易价格。换言之，就当时的市场价值与股票相比，它已经很高了。后来油价上涨，石油公司愿意支付高价来收购其他石油公司，他也因此获益。但是所有人都认为，这家公司的股票交易价格低于石油本身的价值。

Then a controlling stake in it would be. So like he knew when he turned down those extra shares that he was, which is what he said was the biggest mistake is he was turned down something where other oil companies were happily by the whole company for more than he was turning down the offer at, you know, that the shares has been offered at. So same sort of thing. Those are all net asset value type bargains. It's very hard to find large net asset value bargains. And again, we see that problem here.
那么，持有它的控股权将会是什么样子呢？他知道当他拒绝那些额外的股份时，他所说的最大错误就是拒绝了其他石油公司很高兴地接受的整个公司所提供的更高价值的股份。所以，这是同样的情况。这些都是净资产价值类型的交易。很难找到大型的净资产价值交易。我们在这里也遇到了这个问题。

What was the market cap on this at the time that this was available? 600 million, right? Something like that. Yeah, 600 million had a tangible book value of 800 million. And then he thought if you said whether you take the price on the books, so the real estate 1.4 billion minus the 561 million of net debt, you're looking at a tangible book value of 800 million. So that's, yeah, I mean on a liquidation basis, I mean we could, do they say they said it had how much in debt do you remember? About 500, he says right there, 560 million.
这个可获得时的市值是多少？大约是6亿美元，对吧？是的，大约有6亿美元的实质账面价值。然后他认为，如果你看公司账面上的价格，就是房地产14亿减去净债务5.61亿，你就会得到大约8亿美元的实质账面价值。所以，我意思是，从清算角度来看，咱们可以，他们说他们有多少债务，你还记得吗？大约5亿，他在这里说了，5.6亿。

Wait, is that right? Yep, 561 million of net debt. Okay, so let's see. Do you have the exact amount of square feet of the own? Yeah, 43.7 million. Okay. Knowing that at the time, now it was probably losing or about to lose money negative cash flows during actual COVID times, or you would have assumed that it was about to be. But putting that aside, you could do an estimate on that basis, which is you can say, okay, well, what is 44 million square feet of that kind of retail space worth? We don't know exactly. It's cheaper to put out to build out something like a department store, then it is because there's not a lot to it, then it is still like a supermarket or something, which would be the most expensive. But the replacement cost is still very high on that. So you can see how much of that is over the 561 million.
等等，那是对的吗？是的，净负债达到5.61亿美元。好的，那么，你有准确的自有面积是多少吗？是的，4370万平方英尺。知道那个数字后，现在可能正在亏损或即将亏损，或者你可以假设即将发生。但如果把这些放在一边，你可以根据此估计，比如说，这种零售场所的4400万平方英尺价值多少？我们不确定。建造一个像百货商店这样的建筑比建造超市之类的建筑要便宜一些，因为它不需要太多的投资，但是替换成本仍然很高。所以你可以看到，这笔成本超过了5.61亿美元的多少部分。

So like for instance, we know that after you're getting more than 10 to $15 per square foot, so let's say $15 to be conservative. After the first $15 per square foot, the rest of it is going to the equity holders. So you can think the first $15 per square foot is going to the to cover the debt and stuff and then the rest is going to the equity holders. And then how much is that? Is it nine times more than that or something? Yeah, it could be.
就比如说，我们知道当每平方英尺的价格超过10到15美元之后，我们可以保守的以15美元为例子。在超过每平方英尺15美元之后，其余的钱就会归股权持有人所有。可以把每平方英尺的前15美元用于债务和其他费用，剩余的部分就会给股权持有者。那么这个剩余部分是多少呢？是前面那部分的九倍还是其他数值呢？可能是的。

Sure. I mean, it's probably close to $150 a square foot than 15. So that shows you how much margin of safety there is.
当然。我是说，每平方英尺的价格可能接近150美元而不是15美元。这表明了有多少保障的余地。

Now of course, it's even higher now because it's impossible to build. I mean, in the economy that we have now and stuff, it became very difficult to build out any of those things.
现在当然更高了，因为它是不可能建造的。我的意思是，在我们现在的经济和其他方面，建造任何这些东西变得非常困难。

I mean, to give an idea within a year of this, him buying this, it probably cost houses where I live now, probably cost 10 times, more than 10 times, 15 times, what the market was valuing this company square footage at to build houses out here. And this is obviously in desirable locations, this retail space, it's also highly productive, whatever.
我的意思是，就在他买下这个房产后的一年之内，他花费的钱可能是我现在所处地区的房子价格的10倍、甚至15倍。市场估价为建造这个公司房地产面积的价格和该区域房子价格相比，要高出至少10倍。显然这个地点非常理想，商业空间也非常高产。

So I'm basically saying you couldn't build anything for the kind of price that it was being put out there. So an inflation help with that and everything.
我想说的是，你根本无法用那种价格建造任何东西。因此，通货膨胀可以帮助解决这个问题。

I mean, if you have an asset thing like this, that helps. And then you have the business on top of it. There's sort of two ways of looking at it.
我的意思是，如果你有像这样的资产，那就有所帮助了。然后你还可以在其上做生意。从某种角度来看，有两种方式来看待这个问题。

So one is on the real estate basis, was it worth more than it was trading for? And the answer is yes. So how much more and how well covered is it? It's extremely well covered. We don't know exactly.
那么，这个房地产基础的价值是否超过了它的交易价格？答案是肯定的。那么超出了多少，覆盖得有多好呢？它的覆盖非常好。我们不知道具体是多少。

So like on a liquidation basis, yes, check. It could be liquidated for more than it was trading for. We know that. Right.
就像在清算基础上，是的，检查一下。它可能被清算为比交易时更高的价格。我们知道这一点。没错。

So and then we ask the question of like on an ongoing basis, how she was it. So let's say you liquidate and that's your best use of it. And then you just ask the questions at the best use and would that be what happens?
那么我们会以一种持续不断的方式询问她的情况，比如说她的情况如何。那么假设你清算了资产，那就是你最好的用途。然后你会问这些问题来确定最好的用途，这样会发生什么？

So on a liquidation basis, yes, it would be many times more. I don't know the exact amount, but probably you have a five bagger, at least, just liquidating it.
从清算的角度来看，它的价值确实会多几倍。我不知道具体数额，但仅仅通过清算就可以得到至少五倍的收益。

And then on like a cash flow basis, like we were saying, if you assume that went back to earning what it was earning before, let's say that was like 200 million or something in like after tax, owner earning type cash, you know, then you had something that again, the debt, it diverse three times of that goes to the debt, right?
然后，就像我们之前说的那样，以现金流为基础，假设它恢复到以前的收入水平，假设是2亿左右的纯利润，那么你有了一些东西，债务再次分散三倍，对吧？

And then you ask, okay, how much goes to other things? Well, if it's trading at, if you said most things, this is going to trade at a lower than most stocks and stuff, okay, well, maybe I'll trade at 10 times.
然后你会问，好的，有多少会用在其他事情上？如果它的交易价格低于大部分股票和其他东西，那么也许我会以10倍交易。

Then we take, you know, the 10 times we subtract out three times for the debt because 10 times free cash flow debt, enterprise value is pretty low evaluation. Most things are going for more than 50% higher than that.
我们这里采用的是一个十倍自由现金流的公式，然后再扣除三倍的债务，因为这样算下来企业价值是很低的。通常情况下，其他公司的估值都比这个高出50%以上。

But you take that out, you say, okay, we'll give it to the debt the first three times is to just, you know, pay out the debt three years, basically debt is three years for free cash flow. And then the, you know, it would be valued the rest of it would be valued at what we say.
但是你把这个取出来，你说，好的，我们把前三次还给债务，基本上是为了用自由现金流偿付三年的债务。而然后，你知道的，剩下的就会按我们说的价值来确定。

And that's a 1.4 billion, probably 1.4, 1.5 billion market cap. And what do we say the market cap on this was when he bought in you said 600, 600 ish. Yeah. Yeah. So 660 times.
这是一个大约14亿的市值，可能是14亿到15亿。他买进时的市值是多少？你说是大约600左右。是的。所以他赚到了660倍。

Yeah. So two to three times your money if it's on very cheap on an ongoing basis, again, saying 10 times enterprise value to free cash flow. And that's, and, and of course, the liquidation value is many times that.
是的，如果企业价值与自由现金流相比十倍之低，那么可以持续以非常便宜的价格购买，这将带来两三倍的回报。当然，清算价值会比这个高得多。

I would say the liquidation value presumably is double the on, like we've just valued the company alive at half of what it would be valued dead. But there are costs associated with liquidating something like this. This is so big, right, that the market would have trouble absorbing that much department store space.
我觉得，清算价值可能是原价的两倍，就像我们刚刚估价的公司生意活着的时候只是死亡价值的一半。但是，要清算这样的东西是有成本的。这个东西太大了，市场很难吸收那么多百货商店的空间。

And in a recession depression, whatever people could have been afraid of at the time. The easier explanation, of course, is that in the middle of COVID, no one wanted to buy something like dealers at any price.
在经济衰退和大萧条期间，人们可能会害怕各种事情。当然，更简单的解释是在 COVID 大流行期间，没有人愿意以任何价格购买像毒贩一样的东西。

Yeah. The stock that's back to owners of panic time, right? When he was just talking about the benefit of purchasing public securities, sometimes you get the other person across the table, it's just like take it at any price. Right.
对啊。那股票是恐慌时期的业主回来了，是吧？当他谈到购买公共证券的好处时，有时对方会像无论价格如何都要拿走一样。对啊。

And so this was happening for two reasons, one stock reasons that just people wanted out of stocks and didn't want stocks that were, you know, not doing well in whatever.
所以这是有两个原因的，一个是股票方面的原因，人们只是想退出股票市场，不想持有那些表现不佳的股票。

But there's also another reason which is the 1990s bubble reason. And that may explain the dealer's thing, not only were people not wanting stocks and trying to get out of that in general at the time. But if they were getting into stocks, they were selling things like dealers, so they could buy things like Amazon.
还有一个原因是上世纪90年代的泡沫原因。这可能解释了经销商的问题，因为当时人们普遍不想持有股票并试图脱离股市。但如果他们想要进入股票市场，那么他们会像经销商一样出售其他物品，以便购买像亚马逊这样的股票。

Remember, the argument was sell everything offline that they stocks were put into two buckets instead of being like value and growth or something like that.
记得，争论的重点是将所有内容线下出售，而不是像价值和成长等分类。

The two buckets were the online and the offline, right? The pandemic winners and the pandemic losers. Those are literally the words people were using as the pandemic winners, pandemic losers, right?
这两个桶是网上和离线的，对吧？疫情赢家和疫情输家。这确实是人们在谈论疫情赢家和疫情输家时所用的字眼。

And so that was how we divided up the world. You know, and of course makes no sense because you know that it's a temporary event.
所以那就是我们如何分配这个世界的。当然，这毫无意义，因为你知道这只是暂时的事件。

It'd be like saying winners, you know, winners in a war, you know, these stocks will be the winners in this war that's going on right now.
这就像说获胜者，你们知道，在一场战争中的获胜者，你知道，这些股票将会是正在进行的这场战争中的赢家。

These stocks will be the losers. Well, we don't know what will happen with the outcome will be, but we know that it won't continue forever. And if the outcome is horrible, well, we're all just screwed anyways, right? So what's there? It's your asymmetry right there.
这些股票将是输家。好的，我们不知道结果会是什么，但我们知道它不会永远持续下去。如果结果很糟糕，那么我们都将受到影响，对吧？那么，我们该怎么办呢？这就是所谓的不对称性。

But I mean, we know that it, yeah, we know that it can't continue indefinitely. So, but that was an obsession that people had at the time, obviously. So you have both of those things happening at the same time. So it was even better, even more extreme than like investing in other kinds of stocks.
但是，我们知道这个现象并不能无限期持续。当时人们的确很着迷于这个事情，所以这两个现象同时发生了。因此，这种投资甚至比其他股票投资更为激进和极端。

Because like I talked about, I knew someone who knows the exact time, but like, you know, I've that this dealers investors made, but somewhere around the same time because March of 2020 put a lot of money into frauds, right?
嗯，就像我说的，我认识一个人知道具体时间，但是你知道的，我知道这些经销商的投资者们差不多在那个时间里投入了很多欺诈案子的钱，大概就是2020年3月的时候。

But that is because took out that is correct. Yeah. So to kind of go all in there, you know, it didn't matter how much money you have you borrow or whatever to be able to buy at that price. And that's not as good a deal as dealers simply because people weren't really bailing specifically on banks at that time.
但这是因为拿出的是正确的。是的。所以为了全力以赴，你知道，你借了多少钱或者无论如何能以那个价格购买，都无关紧要。而且这并不像商家那样好的交易，因为当时人们并不特别地从银行里撤资。

So for us, it was kind of similar in that it had been cheapish for 10 years, not as hated or something as dealers, but it had been cheap for a while because the low, the no interest rate thing, right? And then it declined. It fell off a cliff on that as you can see there briefly for like a month or whatever. And it started going out.
对我们来说，它的情况有点相似，因为在过去的十年中，它一直很便宜，并没有像经销商那样令人讨厌或者其他的原因，但是由于低利率或者没有利率的原因，它已经便宜了一段时间。然后它开始下降。正如你可以在那里短暂地看到的那样，它曾经像掉下悬崖一样下降了一个月左右。之后，它开始走出低谷。

But obviously it's not going to go by some huge amount from there because it wasn't specifically hated in the same way. I mean, we can look at the the dealers one, but the stock was really not expensive before, which is the interesting thing because of course you could have justifiably, right? Because you make money have been in the stock well before the pandemic thought it was a cheap stock. And you eventually would make a lot of money. But in the meantime, you watch that stock go down a lot. Call it from like a row 70 bucks to you know, low of, let me he bought it from 25 to 30.
但显而易见的是，它不会像其他股票那样大幅下跌，因为它并没有被特别厌恶。我的意思是，我们可以看看那些交易员的股票，但股价在疫情前就并不昂贵，这是有趣的事情，因为你当然可以理智地认为它是一只廉价股。你可以早早地买进这只股票，最终赚到很多钱，但在此期间，你要看着这只股票价格暴跌，从70美元降到25或30美元。

So yeah, think about yeah. So you could you could have had a really cheap stock that dropped more than 50%. But then it went up a lot. So you'd still be up five times or whatever in the stock. And that's what happens when you have a really cheap stock. I mean, we looked at the quick I've asked up. It was pretty cheap year after year, right? Certainly it was cheap on like price to earnings and things like that. But there are other I feel like there are other department stores at times that have been fairly cheap too.
嗯，想一想吧。你本来可以买到一只很便宜的股票，下跌了超过50%。但后来它涨了很多，你仍然可以获得股市五倍的收益。这就是便宜股票的好处。我的意思是，我们看了快利業時，它一直很便宜，对吧？特别是它的市盈率等指标都很低。但有时我觉得还有其他百货商店也很便宜。

So like I said though, this one failed quickly. And I think it would be a judgment about management and their decision making. You could get stuck in it for a very long time. You know, so that was basically what the question was, is could this be a value trap? Right. How do you know it would be a value trap? And I don't know that you don't know that.
就像我之前说过的，这件事情很快就失败了。我认为这反映了管理层决策过程的判断问题。你可能会陷在里面很长时间，这就是基本问题所在。就是这是不是一种价值陷阱？你怎样才能知道它是否是价值陷阱？我不知道你是否知道。

I think you're a lot of times the investment things without knowing that it couldn't be a value trap. I don't that's a weird, you know, but even that you don't know about that word, right? Even if you discounted it 50%. The tangible equity was basically what you were paying at a discount if you're really like implementing even more margin of safety. Yeah.
我认为你很多时候会投资一些东西，却不知道它是否会成为价值陷阱。我知道这有些奇怪，但即使你不了解这个词，对吗？即使你打了50%的折扣。你基本上是在折价购买有形股本，如果你真的想要更多的安全保证。是的。

Do you think this falls in the bucket of muggers? You get a few opportunities in your lifetime and you have to seize them? Or do you think this that's not the right lesson? Right? Because I'm always trying to like, what's the correct lesson in real time from the situation? Yes, it's worked out well, right? But so like the Buffett or monger with with Ollie Balbo, right? And he talked about how he was the biggest mistake he's ever made, one of them. And how he said he forgot that it was still in his words like a damn retailer. And he got seduced by the idea of their position and the China market and blah, blah, blah.
你认为这个是劫匪的罪行吗？人生中有一些机会，你必须抓住它们吗？或者你认为这不是正确的教训？对吗？因为我总是尝试从实际情况中找到正确的教训。是的，这个情况发展得很好，对吗？但就像巴菲特或者有关奥利·巴尔博的那个故事，他谈到这是他犯过的最大错误之一。他说他忘了他们还只是一个该死的零售商。他被他们的地位和中国市场等等的想法所吸引。

And when I heard that, I was like, I don't know if that's the right lesson. Is that it's just a retailer? And that's why you know, he invested in blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, right? I was like, I don't know if that's the right lesson. So what do you think is the right lesson from Dillard's? Obviously it's been tremendously successful.
当我听到那个时，我的第一反应是，我不确定那是否是正确的教训。难道Dillard's只是一家零售商吗？这就是他们投资于诸如某某某等项目的原因吗？我并不确定那是否是正确的教训。那么你觉得Dillard's的正确教训是什么呢？显然，它已经取得了巨大的成功。

Well, it's, I think it depends on who you are and what you know. So Charles, Ted probably knew a lot more about Dillard's than Charlie knew about Ollie Balbo. It's a lot closer to his circle of competence, probably than his Ollie Balbo to mongers. There's also things which we talked about in like the quick FS type stuff that's concerning about what was happening with Ollie Balbo when Munger bought in that does not appear with Dillard's.
嗯，我认为这取决于你是谁以及你知道什么。所以，查尔斯，特德可能比查理更了解迪拉德百货公司，而查理对奥利巴尔博了解可能比特德对市场更接近他的能力圈。我们还讨论了一些关于奥利巴尔博的快速FS类型问题，这些问题涉及芒格购买时奥利巴尔博的情况，而这些问题在迪拉德百货公司中并没有出现。

So the actual track record was rapidly deteriorating in a concerning way for Ollie Balbo. In a way that is beyond just normally, oh, it's just a retailer, but just that it's incredibly competitive because you have very rapid growth and rapidly declining margins, returns on capital things like that. That mean the incremental ones are really, really bad.
其实，Ollie Balbo的实际业绩正在以令人担忧的方式迅速恶化。这种情况与通常的情况不同，因为这是一个异常竞争激烈的行业，因为你需要非常快速的增长和快速下降的利润率、资本回报率等。这意味着增长很低的收益非常糟糕。

So it depends on how well he knew the situation, right? The thing is there's not a lot of, it's hard. If we can look at quick FS to look at this, but there wasn't a ton of evidence in the past record to suggest that you were doing something particularly risky here. There was like no evidence. There was fear that the future would be a lot different than the past and there was a lot of fear that this would happen. That it was deteriorating stuff, but this was more narrative about it than we can see in the numbers.
所以这取决于他了解情况的程度，对吧？问题是情况并不容易。如果我们可以快速查看FS来看这个问题，但过去的记录中并没有很多证据表明你在这里做了特别冒险的事情。几乎没有证据。人们担心未来会与过去有很大不同，他们非常担心这种情况的发生。这是恶化的情况，但这只是叙述，不能从数据中看出。

Because if we look at the numbers, what was the operating income each year? What was the cash flow each year for many years before this? I mean, do you think he expected that one? We'd look at, okay, so 2021 negative 83 million in EBIT, but then 2022, 1.1 billion, they have never done that in their history. At least from 2014, so I'm going to assume in their history, maybe whatever, but I definitely did not think that would happen. No, no, no, definitely not. No.
因为如果我们看看数字，每年的经营收入是多少？在这之前的许多年里，每年的现金流是多少？我的意思是，你认为他预料到这一点吗？我们会看到，好的，2021年的EBIT负83百万，但是2022年，11亿，他们在历史上从未做过这样的事情。至少从2014年起，所以我认为在他们的历史上可能有过类似的情况，但我绝对没想到会发生这种事。不，不，绝对不会。不。

If we're looking at the record of companies and saying, do we think that would happen? Usually, almost always with the really good results, where it came out better than you expected. Yes. But when you asked about the asymmetry thing, I said, am I personal? I never thought that I could go up by that amount.
如果我们看着公司的记录并且说：我们认为那会发生吗？通常，几乎总是在真正的好成绩中，结果比你预想的要好。是的。但是当你问到不对称的事情时，我说，这关乎我的个人吗？我从没想过我能涨那么多。

Kwan and I had looked at encore wire, and we talked about encore wire, that if they ever got to be a more meaningful spread in terms of volatility and copper and all that, and copper got more expensive, then they make a lot of money, and the people might have been unresturing how much it was poor copper pricing that was contributing to the returns and capital being muted. They were earning good, and then if something big happened, they'd earn a lot. We never thought it would go up as much in a single year that they would earn so much.
Kwan和我看了看雄鹰电缆，谈论了雄鹰电缆。我们说，如果它们的波动性和铜价等方面出现更有意义的扩张，并且铜的价格上涨，那么他们会赚很多钱，并且人们可能会担心铜的价格下跌导致回报和资本被抑制。他们赚了不少钱，如果发生了什么大事，他们将赚取更多。我们从来没有想到他们会在一年内涨得这么多，赚这么多钱。

That's probably true that you wouldn't expect that. But what I'm saying is the argument, here's the thing. We just did two different calculations of conservatively what it would be worth, based on the record from before.
这可能是真的，你可能没有想到。但我想说的是，这是一个论点，事情就在这里。我们刚刚做了两种不同的计算，根据以前的记录，保守地估计它值多少钱。

We said, liquidation value might be five times or something like you're paying. You're paying 20% of liquidation value, something 80% of the actual state of book value, maybe something like that. There's some leverage in there, so it's a little more complicated in that. It's not like your margin of safety is 80%. But your margin of safety is big, it's half or something. Then you have the issue of the free cash flow we talked about. In a sense, you have two defenses. If the free cash flow doesn't disappear, the stock is worth two to three times, at least what it's trading at. Some people would say it's more like five times. We used a low multiple for that. It's several times more valuable. You have a 50% plus margin of safety on free cash flow. If the free cash flow disappeared and they were willing to liquidate, you have more than 50% margin of safety in liquidation.
我们说过，清算价值可能是你支付的五倍或更多。你支付20%的清算价值，大概是80%的账面价值，或者类似的数值。里面有些杠杆，所以有一点复杂。不是说你的安全边际是80%。但是你的安全边际很大，至少有一半左右。然后你有我们谈到的自由现金流的问题。从某种意义上说，你有两个防线。如果自由现金流不会消失，股票的价值至少是目前的两到三倍。有些人会说是五倍。我们使用了一个较低的倍数。它的价值是几倍于当前交易价值的。你的自由现金流有一个超过50%的安全边际。如果自由现金流消失了，他们愿意清算，你在清算中有超过50%的安全边际。

That's what I mean about. It's not like you took some huge risk that way. Alibaba is very different in that it showed deteriorating financial results and it was expensive. This was super cheap and no deterioration yet, but feared deterioration.
这就是我所说的。这并不像你那样冒着巨大的风险。阿里巴巴在财务方面表现不佳而且很贵。这个则非常便宜，而且还没有出现恶化的现象，但人们担心它会有恶化的趋势。

It looked at their diluted chairs outstanding. When he talked about there's really nothing in the past that could have scared you in a crazy way. They've continuously bought back stock.
它看着他们稀释的椅子非常出色。当他谈到过去真的没有任何东西能以疯狂的方式吓到你时。他们一直在回购股票。

I always find it interesting though. Here we are in 2022 to 2023 on an average at 6.8 billion in revenue, but just the drastic difference in that revenue converting to EBIT or cash flow is huge. It's a good lesson for other companies. It's like this is what could happen. The value creation you can have if you really hone in and whether it was a pricing thing or they cut their expenses or what, there's a drastic difference there in the revenue converting to EBIT, that income, cash flow, etc.
我总觉得这件事很有趣。在2022至2023年，我们的平均收入为68亿美元，但是这一收入转化为EBIT或现金流的差异巨大。这是其他公司的一个很好的教训。就像这样可能会发生的情况。如果你真正专注于这个，你可以创造价值，无论是定价问题还是削减开支，收入转化为EBIT、收入、现金流等方面都会有很大的差异。

Yeah. I mean some of those just leverage effects that you have. That's the issue department stores have for instance. It's just a huge amount of real estate that you have no matter what. If you sell a lot, it's a lot better business than if you don't.
嗯，我的意思是有些东西只是利用你所拥有的影响力。比如百货公司就有这个问题。无论如何，你都拥有巨大的房地产。如果你卖得很多，那么这就是一个比不卖好得多的生意。

That's why they don't look that great. They managed to not have operating income in the early 2000s at one point. If you have a bad economic year, you can run into that. There's a lot of leverage in that because you can look at the ratios. The gross numbers are good. If we look at gross profitability or something, you'll see that they're much higher than they are with other retailers that you're used to looking at. The gross margins here, especially considering what they're selling, they were 10% or more higher than Walmart for instance.
这就是为什么它们看起来不太出色。在21世纪初期的某一时刻，它们设法没有营业收入。如果经济年度不好，你可能会遇到这样的情况。由于你可以查看比率，所以这里有很多杠杆效应。总量数字很好。如果我们查看总利润或类似的东西，你会发现它们比你习惯看到的其他零售商要高得多。特别是考虑到它们卖什么，它们的毛利率比沃尔玛高10%或更多。

It's just interesting. You look at these numbers. You look at S&A 2018 to 2019, 1.7 billion. Then you look at 2022, 2023. You're kind of 2022, 1.559, 2023, 1.698. But then you look at revenue, which is up a little bit, but how drastically that could affect your earnings?
这很有趣。你看这些数字。你看看 S＆A 2018 到 2019 的 17 亿，然后再看看 2022 年，2023 年。你可能看到 2022 年是 15.59 亿，2023 年是 16.98 亿。但是，当你看到收入时，虽然有所增长，但会对你的收益产生多大影响呢？

Yeah. Well, the other thing you'll remember from COVID is that we had those unusual is some companies cut expenses, did everything they could to get ready for a drastic decline, and instead they had the biggest boom that they'd ever seen. If companies knew, let's cut as much as we can right ahead of a giant boom.
嗯，你会记得COVID带来的另一件事就是有些公司削减了开支，尽可能做好了应对激烈下降的准备，结果却迎来了史上最大的繁荣。如果公司知道，在一个巨大的繁荣来临之前，我们可以削减尽可能多的开支。

Yeah, your profitability is going to be amazing. Because normally what you have is more like what you saw with Alibaba or something, which is when you see a boom, you also see a lot of increase in costs and also, I mean, look what happened to Amazon. They're less profitable than ever in like every way. They've got more assets, earning less than cash and stuff because they went into, as did many other tech companies, but Amazon is just a retailer that's tech.
是啊，你们的盈利能力会很惊人。因为通常情况下，你所拥有的更像是阿里巴巴这样的情况，即当你看到繁荣时，你也会看到成本的大量增加，而且，我是说，看看亚马逊所发生的事情。他们的盈利能力在各个方面都比以往任何时候都要低。他们拥有更多的资产，但却比现金之类的赚得更少，因为他们像许多其他科技公司一样进入了这个领域，但亚马逊只是一家零售科技公司。

They went the opposite way and said, oh, we have to really, this is a big boom and it turned out not to be such a big, you know, it went away faster. So, it's not even a question of shrinking and stuff. They went to like flat just being about flat, and it has a drastic drop-off in your results.
他们走了相反的路，说道：“哦，我们确实需要这样，这是一个很大的繁荣，但结果并没有那么大，你知道的，它消失得更快了。”所以，这甚至不是收缩之类的问题。他们只是变得平稳了，而这会导致你的结果急剧下降。

So this is a company that, what, for like 10 years, something you have been expecting like flat type growth, right? Like in terms of top line and stuff. They're just buy back or stock kind of like gainable, right? Yeah, so what's interesting is, let's see. So what was sales in 2020, what do you have there? 2014, $6.6 billion or $6.7 billion. That was in 2019. $6.7, 2014, 2019, $6.5. So it's decline. Okay, decline.
这家公司已经经营了大约10年，你一直预计它的增长会比较平缓，对吧？在一些基本方面，像是财务收入之类的。它们只是回购或获得股票，是吧？是的，所以有趣的是，让我们看看2020年的销售情况，你有哪些数据？2014年是66亿或67亿美元，那是2019年，而2014年到2019年之间下降到65亿美元。所以它正在下降。

Yeah. So, you know, about that. Now, the interesting thing though was like, what have we seen in gross profits? Gross margin from 2014 to 2019. Do you have the gross margin? Yeah, it went down. 37% 2014, 34% in 2019. Which is like what you see in line with some other companies too.
是的，你知道吧，关于那个。现在有趣的事情是，我们在2014年至2019年间的毛利润有什么变化呢？你有这个毛利润吗？是的，它下降了。2014年为37％，2019年为34％。这与其他一些公司的趋势相似。

So, yeah, I mean, I don't think there's any way that you thought it would have gone up as much as it did obviously, but we did a few different ways of doing the math where it looked cheap. It is now presumably being valued at not such a cheap value though. Like what was 2019 sales? You said we're 6.5 billion. So let's say 6.5 billion EV now.
嗯，我觉得你应该没有想到它会上涨到这种程度，但我们有几种不同的数学方法，它们让它看起来很便宜。不过现在估值可能不那么便宜了。那么，2019年的销售额是多少？你说是65亿美元。那么现在就是估值65亿美元的市值吧。

Well, I don't know if that calculation is correct though. Is that calculation correct? I'm not sure if it's correct on the EV and market cap. But let's take market cap plus debt or whatever. We're still at levels that are like one times. So, not super cheap or anything like that, but actually it's not really value in much.
嗯，我不确定那个计算是正确的。那个计算正确吗？我不确定它在EV和市值方面是否正确。但是让我们把市值加上债务或者其他的东西。我们仍然在大约一倍的水平上。所以，不是特别便宜或者那样的，但实际上它并没有太多的价值。

It's gone to a value which is more in line with other companies, but that's about it. Because it's free cash flow margin is probably 5% or something in the years before COVID. So basically, if you're valuing it at one time, it's like 20 times free cash flow or something.
它的价值已经降到了与其他公司更接近的水平，但也仅仅是这样。因为在 COVID 疫情之前，它的自由现金流利润率可能只有 5% 左右。所以基本上，如果你以一倍的价格衡量它，那就相当于它的自由现金流利润率为 20 倍左右。

And like we said, it may have more real estate than it needs or whatever. That's just like in line with the market. I mean, it may turn out to be way too expensive because it's a particularly good time for them and then things are going to get negative from here, you know. And their future may not be as bright as other companies and whatever.
就像我们说的那样，它可能拥有比实际需要更多的房地产或其他财产。这只是符合市场的趋势。我的意思是，它可能会因为处在某个特别好的时间而变得过于昂贵，然后接下来的情况会变得消极，你知道的。而且它们的未来可能不像其他企业那么光明。

But you're talking about something that went up more than 10 times right, the stock. And it's just to what I would say is a fairly normal valuation. I certainly wouldn't call it cheap, but it's not some usually going to look at things that went up 10 times.
但你是在谈论股票上涨了超过10倍的事情，对吧。而且它的估值只是我认为相当正常的水平。我绝对不会说它很便宜，但也并不是什么通常会涨10倍的东西。

We noticed that the price to sales is, you know, 14 times. Yeah, here we have something where the price to sales is like a price to pre pandemic sales. In fact, that was, you know, gone back and everything. But it is like one times.
我们注意到售价与销售额的比例达到了14倍，你知道。我们发现现在有些东西的售价与疫情前的销售额相当。实际上，我们回顾了一下以前的数据，发现那个时候售价与销售额的比例只有一倍。

So cool.
好酷啊。

Well, I want to thank everybody so much for tuning in with Jeff and I on the focused compounding podcast.
嗯，我想要非常感谢大家收听 Jeff 和我在《聚焦复合投资》播客中的节目。

If this is the first time you are joining us, be sure to check out all of our content on the internet.
如果这是您第一次加入我们，请务必在互联网上查看我们所有的内容。

Go to focuscompowering.com to get access to investment write-ups from Jeff going all the way back to 2005.
去 focuscompowering.com 查看 Jeff 的投资报告，时间跨度从 2005 年到现在，获取投资信息。

And of course, if you're interested in learning more about our money management services, you can reach out to me at Android Focus compounding.com.
当然，如果您对了解我们的资产管理服务感兴趣，可以通过邮件联系我：Android Focus compounding.com。

I think every so much for all the support.
我非常感谢你们的支持。

And we'll see in the next podcast.
在下一期播客中我们会见分晓。

Take care.
照顾好自己。



function setTranscriptHeight() { const transcriptDiv = document.querySelector('.transcript'); const rect = transcriptDiv.getBoundingClientRect(); const tranHeight = window.innerHeight - rect.top - 10; transcriptDiv.style.height = tranHeight + 'px'; if (false) { console.log('window.innerHeight', window.innerHeight); console.log('rect.top', rect.top); console.log('tranHeight', tranHeight); console.log('.transcript', document.querySelector('.transcript').getBoundingClientRect()) //console.log('.video', document.querySelector('.video').getBoundingClientRect()) console.log('.container', document.querySelector('.container').getBoundingClientRect()) } if (isMobileDevice()) { const videoDiv = document.querySelector('.video'); const videoRect = videoDiv.getBoundingClientRect(); videoDiv.style.position = 'fixed'; transcriptDiv.style.paddingTop = videoRect.bottom+'px'; } const videoDiv = document.querySelector('.video'); videoDiv.style.height = parseInt(videoDiv.getBoundingClientRect().width*390/640)+'px'; console.log('videoDiv', videoDiv.getBoundingClientRect()); console.log('videoDiv.style.height', videoDiv.style.height); } window.onload = function() { setTranscriptHeight(); }; if (!isMobileDevice()){ window.addEventListener('resize', setTranscriptHeight); }