In conversation with Travis Kalanick | All-In Summit 2024

The reason that he was kicked out is because of this toxic culture. Some big news that took place on Christmas Eve, if you missed a Travis Kalinek, planning to leave the board at UBERT. And when he showed me what he was working on, immediately said, hey, can I invest? A popular $70 billion ride-sharing company is searching for a new CEO to take the wheel. So you want to talk about structure being completely screwy? Competition is good. I saw that my entire network, that UBERT will be here and thriving in 10 years. You're at war prematurely with your customers. Sorry about that. Alright everybody. My guy. I can't believe I get to sit down with one of the most famous investors in UBER. So I'm honored to be here. I'm a star, sir. We wanted to have a surprise for you every day. I've been, you know, Travis and I have been friends for 25 years.

他被赶出去的原因是因为这种有毒的文化。圣诞前夜发生了一些大新闻，如果你错过了，Travis Kalanick计划离开UBER的董事会。当他向我展示他正在做的事情时，我立刻说：“嘿，我可以投资吗？” 一家市值700亿美元的热门打车公司正在寻找新的CEO来掌舵。你想谈谈结构完全混乱的问题吗？竞争是好事。我看到我的整个网络，我相信UBER在十年内会继续兴旺发达。你太早和你的客户开战了，对不起。好了，大家。我不敢相信我能和UBER最著名的投资者之一坐在一起，真是我的荣幸。我是个明星，先生。我们想每天给你一个惊喜。我和Travis已经是25年的朋友了。

The first time I interviewed Travis was 1999. I was doing a little magazine out here, Digital Coast Report. You were doing a little company called SCOWER, which was a peer-to-peer network to share files. And you were 22 years old. I was 28. I think if we put those two numbers together. So just don't let people do the math. You know, it's just like, let's just keep moving. It was a while ago, 1999. And I just remember the enthusiasm, drive and fire that you had at that time. And it always struck me. I said to myself, I don't know if he's going to win on this one. I'm pretty sure he's going to get his ass handed to him, in fact. Correct, correct.

我第一次采访Travis是在1999年。当时我在这里办一本小杂志，叫《数字海岸报告》。你在创办一家名叫SCOWER的小公司，那是一种用于分享文件的点对点网络。当时你22岁，我是28岁。如果把这两个数字加起来，那就不让人计算了，就这样过去吧。那是很久以前的事了，1999年。我还记得你当时的热情、干劲和激情，给我留下了深刻的印象。我当时对自己说，不知道他这次能不能成功，其实我觉得他很可能会失败，是不是？的确如此。

But I know this guy's going to win big in the future. And sure enough, we got to go on a great journey together with Uber. And now again, with Cloud Kitchens. And every year, when we're hanging out, I say, since you left Uber, I say, you know, whenever you're ready, let's have a conversation. And here we are. And then you call me every year. I call every year. If you're ready, it does the end. I'm just a block away from you. You're all in the modern UCLA. Let's go. Come on. I'm like, all right, let's go. And this year, you said, OK, so here we are. Let's chop it up. Let's talk about Cloud Kitchens. You have since you left Uber, been working extremely hard and quietly on Cloud Kitchens. What is the vision? What is Cloud Kitchens for people who don't know?

但我知道这个人将来一定会大获成功。果不其然，我们和Uber一起踏上了一段精彩的旅程。现在又是Cloud Kitchens。每年我们见面时，我都会说，自从你离开Uber，我就一直说，什么时候你准备好了，咱们谈一谈。现在我们就在这里。每年你打电话给我，我也每年打电话给你。如果你准备好了，就到这里。我就在你附近的街区，你就在现代的UCLA。来吧，走吧。我说，好吧，这就走。今年你说，好吧，我们就在这里。我们聊聊吧，聊聊Cloud Kitchens。自从你离开Uber之后，你一直在默默地为Cloud Kitchens努力工作。Cloud Kitchens对那些不了解的人来说，有什么愿景？是什么样的？

Well, so yeah, I mean, it is kind of funny when you go from being a tech guy to a kitchen guy. I mean, that's interesting. Look, food has, I think we all know like food is it's at the center of the human experience, the center of humanity and just just how we live. But it's got a lot of problems. Health, cost, convenience, like all that stuff. And it could be a hell of a lot better. And so, of course, in my last at my last gig, we did Uber Eats. It was a starting point. But the difference with food versus rides is that the infrastructure was already there.

嗯，所以是的，我是说，从技术人员变成厨房人员确实有点搞笑。我觉得这很有意思。你看，食物是人类生活的核心，这一点我们都知道。它在我们的生活中占据了重要地位。但是，食物也有很多问题，比如健康、成本、便利性等等。而且它本可以好得多。所以，在我上一个工作中，我们做了Uber Eats，那是一个起点。但与打车不同的是，食物行业的基础设施已经存在了。

You had a bunch of cars that were 98% unutilized. And so you just had to light it up. But to do food right, you needed to build the infrastructure. And so the mission for our company is infrastructure for better food. And the idea is like, can you get the preparation and delivery of food so high quality and most importantly, so cost efficient that it starts to approach the cost of you going to the grocery store. If that happens, you do to the kitchen what Uber did to the car. And so the quiet part is like we go and buy real estate. We do construction. We then go talk to the center point of what matters in food, which is the restaurant tour, the entrepreneur who's making it.

你有一堆汽车，98%都是闲置的。所以你只需要让它们运转起来。但是要做好餐饮，你需要建立基础设施。因此，我们公司的使命就是为更好的食品提供基础设施。我们的想法是，能否让食品的准备和递送如此高质量且最重要的是如此高效，以至于它的成本开始接近你去杂货店购物的成本。如果做到了这一点，你就能把厨房变得像Uber改变汽车一样便利。因此，我们的策略是购买房地产，进行建设，然后与餐饮中心的人物，也就是那些创业的餐馆老板们进行沟通。

Who does it just because, I mean, it's a labor of love. You've got to have a deep passion for food and a deep passion for people because otherwise you couldn't survive in that world. But these guys are like true blue entrepreneurs and they are our customer. And you do it from their perspective and you help them get their vision for what they're doing out there and do it super, super efficiently. And so we like to say we serve those who serve others. We're not the restaurant. We're the guys underneath. And currently, I think we have real estate. We have facilities in all the major cities and 30 countries around the world.

谁会仅仅因为热爱而去做这件事呢？我的意思是，这是出于热爱的辛苦工作。你必须对食物和人有深深的热情，否则你无法在这个世界中生存。但这些人是真正的企业家，他们是我们的客户。你从他们的角度出发，帮助他们实现自己的愿景，并且非常高效地完成工作。因此，我们喜欢说，我们服务那些服务他人的人。我们不是餐馆，而是幕后支持的人。目前，我们在全球所有主要城市和30个国家都有地产和设施。

We also have a software division. So we have hundreds of thousands of restaurants using our software stack. And we have a robotics division that got going with a lot of the original sort of Uber ATG guys advanced technology group, the autonomy guys. So we got that crew together and have real robots that are going to already are out there but are going to be out there in a really big way over the coming quarters and years. So the premise of Uber was, hey, press a button. We move you or anything from point A to point B. What a profound, simple, but profound. Inside as an entrepreneur.

我们也有一个软件部门，因此有成千上万家餐厅在使用我们的软件系统。我们还有一个机器人部门，这个部门最初是由许多来自Uber先进技术组（ATG）的团队成员组建的，他们是自动驾驶领域的专家。我们把这个团队聚集在一起，现在已经推出了真正的机器人，并且在未来的几个季度和几年里会大规模投入使用。 Uber的理念是，只需按一下按钮，我们就能把你或者任何物品从A点移动到B点，这个想法看似简单，但实际上非常深刻。对一个企业家来说，这是一个非常有意义的洞见。

And the inside here is, hey, getting you food quickly, efficiently, and then making it easier for a restaurant to work to pop up a restaurant. Tell us the economics of a food brand when Jade and I and the family were out here on vacation over the summer in Manhattan Beach. We had a wonderful experience of ordering Gwyneth Paltrow's cloud kitchen and these new brands. Great. Great, great new brands popping up. Talk about the economics for that food entrepreneur. I mean, it's just tough. I think most of us know a restaurant tour. Some of us may have even tried to do a restaurant or be a part of it in some fashion. I had, like I said, it's a labor of love, but like your big costs are going to be labor. Let's call it between, you know, let's call it 30%, but it can range from like 25 to 40% of your overall revenue. Occupancy, which is the physical space itself. Let's call it between six and 12% of revenue. Supply chain is 30%. Marketing, let's call it 10. I'm doing missing something somewhere, but those are the big stuff. And a successful restaurant is going to have a 10% profit margin and be really pumped about that. Wow. And so, yeah, that's just how it works.

里面的情形是这样的：嘿，我们这里是快速高效地给你提供食物，然后让餐馆更容易开起来。谈谈食品品牌的经济效益吧。今年夏天，Jade和我带着家人来曼哈顿海滩度假时，我们点了Gwyneth Paltrow的云厨房和一些新品牌的餐点，体验很棒。这些新品牌真是太棒了。针对食品企业家，谈谈经济效益。我觉得这真的很不容易。大多数人都认识一些餐馆经营者，可能有些人甚至尝试过开餐馆或参与其中。就像我说的，这是一个“爱的劳动”，但最大的成本是人力成本，大约占总收入的30%，范围可以在25%到40%之间。场地租金占收入的6%到12%。供应链成本是30%。营销费用大约是10%。我可能遗漏了一些，但这些是主要的成本。一家成功的餐馆会有10%的利润率，并为此感到非常兴奋。就是这样的运营模式。

You know, one thing I want to say, just sort of the high level to like sort of how do you connect the dots on like sort of where innovation is going is that you know, my sweet spot is digitizing the physical world and you know, you could take that to mean a lot of different things. But it's basically treating atoms like bits. And so we know the bits world is a computer. The computers, well, CPU manipulates the bits, storage stores the bits. Network moves bits from point A to point B. But if you're treating atoms like bits, you go, CPU manipulates the bits, what manipulates atoms? That's manufacturing. Storage stores bits, what stores atoms? That's real estate. Network moves bits from point A to point B. What, yeah, what moves atoms? Well, that's transport of logistics. And so these are the three sort of core computing resources in a atoms based computer. And you can say my last gig was so much about the network for the physical world. But there's just a huge amount of innovation left in compute and storage for the physical world, also known as digitized manufacturing and digitized real estate. And so our company is really sort of building atoms based computers and sort of our first computer is really a food computer.

你知道，我想说的是，从一个总体层面来讲，如何把创新的点串联起来，我的专业领域是将物理世界数字化。这可以有很多不同的理解，基本上就是把原子像比特一样对待。我们都知道比特世界是一个计算机，CPU处理比特，存储器存储比特，网络将比特从A点传输到B点。如果把原子像比特一样对待，CPU处理比特，那什么处理原子呢？那就是制造业。存储器存储比特，那什么存储原子呢？那就是地产。网络将比特从A点传输到B点，那什么传输原子呢？那就是物流运输。所以，这些是基于原子的计算机的三种核心计算资源。你可以说，我之前的工作主要是关于物理世界的网络。但是，在计算和存储方面，还有大量的创新空间，这也就是数字化制造和数字化地产。因此，我们公司的目标是构建基于原子的计算机，我们的第一个产品其实是一个“食品计算机”。

So that's kind of how we think about it. Yeah. Let's take a look at the video of some of the robots that are making food in cloud kitchens. And that's our lab. We're doing that in house. All in house. All this stuff is in house. So we call this part like look, bono hands, right? So once the dispensers are full of food, nobody touches it. And what comes out on a conveyor belt is bags of food that get delivered. Amazing. Right. So, you know, lidded bag seal, you get the general idea. So now you have a restaurant that can a synchronously produce for consumers from what labor is doing. And the labor is primarily on the on the prep side of things. So we see there's kind of vessels there. I'm assuming they're having gradients in them. The bowl goes by, stuff gets dropped in, organized, covered, put it in a bag, label goes on. The human has no part in that except for maybe preparing and filling in. Yeah.

所以，这大概就是我们的思路。对。现在让我们来看一下云厨房中机器人制作食物的视频。这就是我们的实验室，所有的工作我们都是在内部完成的，全都在内部完成。因此我们称这一部分为“看，没有手”，对吧？一旦分配器里装满了食物，就不再有人接触。输送带上输送出来的就是那些即将被送达的食物袋。令人惊叹，不是吗？所以，你知道，封好盖子的袋子，基本就是这个意思。因此，现在你有了一家餐厅，它可以不依赖人工异步地为消费者生产食物。而人工主要是在准备食材方面。所以我们看到那里有一些容器，我猜那些容器里装了各种成分。碗通过时，成分会被放进去，排列好，盖上盖子，放进袋子，贴上标签。除了准备和装填外，整个过程中人类基本没有参与。对。

So you have the prep. Let's say you have prep in the morning. This machine can run for hours without anybody there. And so, you know, there's interesting, you know, so it just becomes a more efficient thing. So that if you want to do to the kitchen, what Uber did to the car, you have to make sure two things happen. One is that you need the logistics, the movement of food needs to go to the cost of that needs to go to zero. This is autonomous vehicles, things along these lines. And then the production of food must also get sort of roboticized, mechanized essentially. Those two things happen. And then we can always cook, but it can be out of choice. And, you know, I like to say, I like I like horses, but I don't write a horse to work. And so you can get higher quality food to the people at a lower cost and just give people the most precious of commodities back, which is called time to do all the things, all the other things in life that they love. And you're strategically placing these cloud kitchens in, I guess, I would assume very low cost real estate, but that's at very key locations that make it very efficient. To deliver the food. Yeah. Yeah. So on the software side, we have a software stack that, like I said, hundreds of thousands of restaurants use. We're seeing 18% of all online delivery in the US as an example, our software is touching. So because we see where all of the delivery is, we know where to put a delivery only restaurant facility. And so we find distressed real estate or sort of unique situations where it's hard to develop. And we've built a competence in sort of turning that into a 30 kitchen facility that we then lease those kitchens to restaurateurs. Let's talk about the playbook. This is something you worked on really hard at Uber, hiring, Josh in New York, Will in LA. We had a podcast and you were set on that podcast years and years ago. Hey, I'm looking for some people to run some cities to run Uber. And you found this eclectic group of samurai's and you let them go. And man, they cooked. Yeah. Talk to me about that management principle and your management principles. Hey, be pumped, you know, and bringing that enthusiasm, that fire and letting those cities cook because most people have this top down. They do things sequentially. You've really, and in those early days, got more and more emboldened and excited about doing things in parallel and letting people make mistakes in those regions and learning. They could, I remember Josh started doing messenger delivery. You let other people deliver kittens for a day to an office. It was a funny thing. Yeah, JD Vance, that's when he on install, doober. No kittens. But cookies, whatever it was, ice cream trucks. Yeah. Talk about that model of letting, you know, a thousand flowers bloom, letting the samurai go crazy.

所以，你有准备工作。假设你早上有准备工作。这台机器可以在没有人值守的情况下运行数小时。因此，这就变得更加高效。假如你想对厨房做出像Uber对汽车那样的改变，你需要确保两件事同时发生。首先是物流，食物的移动成本需要降至零。这涉及到自动驾驶车辆等方面。其次，食物的生产也必须实现机械化与自动化。这两件事发生了，我们依然可以烹饪，但那将是出于选择。我常说，我喜欢马，但我不会骑马上班。因此，你可以以更低的成本为人们提供更高质量的食物，并让人们重新拥有最宝贵的资源——时间，去做他们生活中的其他喜爱的事情。 你会战略性地将这些云厨房放置在低成本但位置关键的房地产上，使得食物配送非常高效。在软件方面，我们有一个软件堆栈，成百上千家餐厅使用我们的软件。比如，在美国，我们的软件处理了18%的在线配送订单。由于我们知道所有配送的情况，我们知道在哪里设置仅供配送的餐厅设施。因此，我们会寻找处于困境的地产或开发难度大的独特地点，并将其改造成包含30个厨房的设施，然后将这些厨房租给餐饮业主。 让我们谈谈你的管理经验，这在Uber时你花了很大力气，比如在纽约雇佣Josh，在洛杉矶雇佣Will。你在几年前的一次播客中透露，你在寻找一些人来负责运营Uber的城市。你找到了这些多元化的团队成员，并赋予他们自由，他们也确实做出了成绩。与你聊聊这种管理原则和你的管理理念，注重激励和热情，让这些城市运作起来。多数人采取自上而下的方式，而你更强调并行处理，让人们在各个区域试错、学习。我记得Josh曾启动了信使配送，你还让其他人尝试一天内向办公室配送小猫或饼干、冰激凌车之类的有趣活动。谈谈这种让"百花齐放"、让团队成员大胆创新的管理模式。

So look, we had a cultural value at Uber called let builders build. And I'm sure it was there are other companies that I think may have said that before us, but we certainly took a hold of that. And look, as it related to our GM model and how to empower GMs to do well, it starts with who is the person. And we always felt that the magic making happens when you cross sort of creative instincts with analytical capabilities or prowess, really. So we would just design tests that sort of simulated what would be like working together that tested their creative stuff, their secret, their secret sauce and creativity. But would create problems where it was crossed with the necessity to analytically solve problems. Got it. And so you put those two things together with a hungry person that maybe just got their MBA or, let's say, equivalent.

所以，你看，我们在 Uber 有一个文化价值观叫做“让建设者建设”。我确信在我们之前也有其他公司提过类似的话，但我们确实深深贯彻了这一点。就我们如何通过总经理（GM）模式赋能总经理来说，一切都始于这个人是谁。我们一直认为，当创造性直觉与分析能力相结合时，奇迹就会发生。所以我们设计了一些测试，模拟一起工作的情景，测试他们的创造力、他们的秘密武器和独特创意。但同时也会制造一些必须通过分析解决的问题。明白了吧。所以你将这些东西加在一个刚拿到 MBA 或具备同等学历，有强烈求知欲的人身上，这就是关键。

And they're fired up and ready to go and you empower them. And then you put very simple controls to make sure that they're checked that like, like, like, like, waypoints that in order to go further, they have to pass that test once they're in the job. And just simple things like we would have a pricing call in the early days of Uber where you cannot put it up in the app until you pass the pricing call. The first 30 cities, I was on that pricing call. And the thing about price when it comes to transportation, it's an amalgamation of all strategy across everything across. What does your cars look like? What's the supply? The supply.

他们充满干劲，已经准备好了，你赋予了他们力量。然后你设置一些非常简单的控制措施来确保他们得经过检查，就像路标一样，他们要通过这个测试才能进一步推进工作。简单来说，比如我们在Uber创始初期会有一个定价电话会议，如果你没有通过该电话会议的审核，你就不能在应用程序中设置价格。在前30个城市，我都会参加那个定价电话会议。当涉及交通运输的价格问题时，它实际上是综合了所有战略的结果，涉及到你的车辆样貌、供应情况等各个方面。

What does, what does Metro or public public transport look like? What is cost of labor in that city? What are their general alternatives for getting around? What are regulations like? Ultimately becomes a service with a price. You pass that and then you run, you get to run a city. But that means the previous 30 days or 90 days when they're just doing lots of stuff, I don't have to worry. And then they get to that point, they pass the test. They know what the criteria for passing the test is. So it forces them into the right. Mode. Right. Let's talk about strategy. You know, one of the great privileges of getting to be involved, you know, in your journey for a little bit was we would talk sometimes late at night, weekends. When there were really dicey strategy moments and I'd ask you what you're thinking and we would just jam out.

地铁或公共交通是什么样的？那个城市的劳动力成本是多少？他们通常有哪些出行选择？有哪些规章制度？最终，这些都会影响服务的价格。你通过了这一关，然后你就能够管理整座城市。但这意味着在之前的30天或90天里，当他们在忙碌的时候，你无需担心。等他们通过这个测试后，他们就知道通过测试的标准是什么。这会引导他们走上正确的轨道。好的，我们来谈谈策略。你知道，可以参与到你的一些旅程中，是一种很大的荣幸。有时候我们会在深夜或者周末讨论，当时有些策略问题真的很棘手，我会问你在想些什么，然后我们就会一起深入探讨。

And a couple of those conversations are, I remember calling you in a panic after having taken a lift, a ride share and we were only over black. And I said, Travis, I just got out of this fucking thing. It's $16. It would have been 60. I'm price insensitive, but man, this is going to change everything. And you're like, Jacob. And I said, you don't understand, Travis. Jacob. No, this is disrupt. And you said, we're launching it next week. We got it. You know, it is disruptive. And you saw, you know, the Lincoln towncars were so brilliant, you know, because there were such high margins, but you saw the disruptiveness of the right sharing thing and then surge pricing. We had a big debate about tipping. Let's talk about some of those seminal moments in product design. Yeah. And competition.

有几次谈话我还记得特别清楚，我有一次很慌张地打电话给你，因为我刚刚用了一个叫车服务，而且我们当时只在黑色的车上。这次经历让我很震惊，我说：“Travis，我刚刚坐了那个该死的车程，花了16美元，如果是平常的话得60美元。我平时不在乎价格，但这真是要改变一切了。” 你当时说：“Jacob。” 我回了句：“你不明白，Travis。” 你又说：“Jacob。” 我接着说：“不，这是一场颠覆。” 你说：“我们下周就要发布这个了。我们搞定了，这确实具有颠覆性。” 你当时看到了林肯镇汽车的高利润，但你也看到了叫车共享的颠覆性，还有价格波动的机制。我们还就小费问题展开了激烈的讨论。让我们来谈谈产品设计中的这些关键时刻，以及竞争的问题。

Because this was not happening in a vacuum. People forget there was sidecar. There was lift. And then there were regulators. This was a war. Yeah. So, I mean, kind of a funny story. I'm not sure if I ever told you this. You were, you were only six weeks behind Zuck. Right. Which is I first heard about lift from Zuck. And he's like, yo, yo. I think you have a situation on your hands and like such would sort of do that like with like a little. Fuck with you. Kind of. Yeah, kind of like that. Yeah, he's he's a fuck. And I'm like, thank you. And, but the thing was, was, look, it was at the beginning that was like they called their rides donation. It was a donation thing. It was non commercial because there was no insurance. There was no regulation. There was basically just citizen giving another citizen a ride across town. And we didn't do anything about it for nine months because we were already getting our asses handed to us and we were doing the legal thing.

因为这件事不是在真空中发生的。人们忘记了当时还有Sidecar，还有Lift，然后还有监管机构。这是一场战争。是的。所以，我的意思是，有一个挺好笑的故事。我不确定是否曾经告诉过你这个。你只比扎克晚了六周。对，第一次听到Lift是从扎克那儿，他说：“嘿，嘿，我觉得你遇到麻烦了。”他就是那样，有点戏谑地对你说。对，是有点像那样。是的，他真是个讨厌鬼。我当时想，谢了。但事情是这样的，一开始他们把车程称作捐赠，是个捐赠项目，不是商业行为，因为没有保险，没有监管，基本上就是一个市民载另一个市民穿越城市。而我们九个月都没采取行动，因为我们已经在苦苦应对竞争，同时我们还在走合法的路径。

And so I'm like, dude, we're we got like I got threatened by the city of San Francisco in the state of California three months after we launched Uber with 90 days in jail for every ride that had occurred. Yeah. So then this thing is like, it's a donation. I swear. And by the way, if you don't give the donation, they suggest then you get kicked off the system. Yeah. Right. So we're like, we were not going to do that. And we saw Lyft eating our market share up from the bottom up because they didn't have insurance or regulation or any of these other things. And then nine months into it, the city of San Francisco, the state of California, because it's California PUC said, you know, it's totally fine. And then we're like, Oh, shit. So then we hustled got our thing going, which is called would at the time is called peer to peer ride sharing. Right. And then just got working.

所以，我当时想，哥们，我们刚刚推出Uber三个月，就被旧金山市和加利福尼亚州威胁说，每完成一次接送就要面临90天监禁。然后我们说，这是一种捐赠，我发誓。而且，如果你不进行他们建议的捐赠，你就会被踢出系统。我们当然不打算这么干。与此同时，Lyft开始从低端市场抢走我们的份额，因为他们没有保险、没有监管，也没有其他这些东西。九个月后，旧金山市和加利福尼亚州（因为这是加州公共事业委员会的决定）说，这其实完全没问题。然后我们才意识到，大事不妙。于是我们加紧调整，开发出一个当时称为“点对点”拼车服务的东西，然后开始运营。

And the way we did it was like the reason we didn't do it in the first place is because it was clearly not like legit. And but then California said, yes. And so I made a pact with myself that was like, I'm never going to let this happen again. And so each and every city we went to, we would send, we would wait for Lyft to launch. And then we would basically say to the city, we'd send them a letter saying, there's this really cool thing called ride sharing. This company called Lyft is doing it. We think it's great, but our read of your regs is like, it's probably not allowed. Because you're thoughtful. But if you don't enforce in the next 30 days, you're like, oh, yeah. If you don't enforce in the next 30 days, we're going to participate as well. Great. So almost every city in the US, other than two, we can talk about those two, by the way, but in all every city in US, other than two Portland Vegas, we were number two in ride sharing for this reason. And we did this actually internationally. We did it across Europe. We did it everywhere. There were other folks that were out there and we would talk to the regulatory guys.

我们当时的做法是这样的：一开始我们没做这件事情是因为显然不合规。但加州后来批准了，所以我自己下定决心，不再让这种事情发生。于是，每到一个新城市，我们都会等Lyft先上线。然后我们基本上会给城市政府写信，内容大致是：有一个叫顺风车的很酷的东西，有家公司叫Lyft在做，我们觉得很棒，但我们看你们的法规，似乎不允许。因为你们很慎重。如果你们在接下来的30天内不执法，我们也会参与。结果是，除了两个城市外（我们可以聊聊这两个城市），几乎每个美国城市都是这样，因此我们在美国的顺风车市场排名第二。此外，我们也在国际上推广了这种做法，遍及整个欧洲和其他地区。我们会与当地的监管机构交流。

Say, if you're going to enforce do it, but if you're not, we're going to participate. Yeah. And that's kind of how we rolled. And surge pricing was an interesting one. You know, the brilliance of the of the Uber marketplace was in many ways, tackling demand and figuring out a way to get drivers to come out on New Year's Eve, the worst night of their lives. To drive. And you came up with a pretty novel approach, which is, hey, we'll pay you double. We'll pay you triple. Yeah. And if you don't want to participate in that as a customer, that's fine. But we think availability is more important than necessarily having standardized pricing. And man, the world got very, very upset at this. And you and I talked about when you explained it to me, I said, that makes logical sense. And I said, you know what we should do? We should write a blog post. And that blog post is still up, I think. Were you just explained it to people? I thought we were took down on my blog post. They probably, yeah, that might be a little bit.

假设，如果你要执行规定，那就去执行，但如果不执行，我们会继续参与。对，这就是我们的做事方式。动态加价是个有趣的概念。Uber市场的聪明之处，在于应对需求并找到办法让司机们在新年夜这样他们最糟糕的夜晚出来工作。你的办法十分新颖，就是说，“嘿，我们会支付你双倍、三倍的报酬。” 如果你作为顾客不想参与，那也没关系。但是我们认为，比起保持价格的标准化来说，确保供给更加重要。然而，很多人对此非常不满。你跟我解释的时候，我说，这在逻辑上是合理的。我还说，我们应该写一篇博客文章解释这个问题。我觉得那篇博客文章现在还在，或者已经被删除了。

But this blog post where you just said, Hey, here's how to handle New Year's Eve. Leave it this time. Go back at this time. Of course. But we need to get these people on the road and they deserve to be compensated. So surge pricing, there's another way to say it. Now. I called it surge pricing on purpose because I didn't want anybody to think we were trying to to see them. Right. So we said surge pricing like it's clear what's going on. But the other way to say surge pricing is called the lowest cost reliable ride. Because if surge pricing goes up too much, then you have drivers that aren't making any money. And by the way, they'll go to the competition. But if surge pricing is exactly it. And by the way, if surge pricing is not enough, you're not going to be able to get a ride because too many people are going to want it. There won't be enough cars. Surge pricing the right spot. It draws enough supply in and. Fends off enough customers in the market clears. So it's the lowest cost reliable ride. And that's why we knew it was a winner, even when all of the competition and the. World generally was like hating on this idea.

但是在这篇博客文章中，你只是说，嘿，这里有一个处理跨年夜的方法。这个时间离开，那个时间回去。当然没问题。但我们需要让这些人上路，他们理应得到报酬。所以我们用了“高峰定价”，这是另一种说法。我故意称它为“高峰定价”，因为我不想让任何人觉得我们在欺骗他们。对吧？所以我们说了“高峰定价”，这样情况就很明确。但高峰定价的另一种说法是“最低成本的可靠乘车服务”。因为如果高峰定价涨得太高，司机就赚不到钱。另外，他们会去找竞争对手。但如果高峰定价恰如其分。如果高峰定价不够高，你就无法打到车，因为会有太多需要打车的人，车却不够。而合适的高峰定价会吸引足够的供应，同时也会减少市场上的一些需求，使市场达到平衡。所以这是最低成本的可靠乘车服务。即使当时所有竞争对手和大众普遍对这个点子持反对意见，我们就知道这是一个成功的方法。

Anytime we were doing surge pricing and our competitor wasn't, we knew we were gaining market share because somebody could just come to us to get a ride when in the. Other system they couldn't. So you're proving reliability. You're proving it's the lowest cost reliable ride. That's it. Yeah. Take me to, you know, the. Yeah, real quick, led to. A massive, super interesting logistics crossed with economics problem where at the peak, I mean, I don't know what it is at Uber today, but it was like. I don't know, like a hundred, hundred and fifty PhDs working on this problem that we just described. Huh, inside the company. Yeah, which is like, how do you find that lowest cost reliable ride is a very, very difficult problem in a live, logistics system like this.

每当我们进行高峰定价，而我们的竞争对手没有这么做时，我们就知道我们在赢得市场份额，因为用户在其他平台无法叫车时，可以转到我们这边来。所以这证明了我们的可靠性和最低成本的可靠可靠性。这就是重点。快速带我到达目的地。这一极具吸引力且复杂的物流与经济学问题在其巅峰时期曾有约一百到一百五十名博士在公司内部研究。我不知道现在Uber的情况如何，但当时，我们就是在解决这个如何在动态物流系统中找到最低成本可靠出行的问题。

Let's talk about regulators in relation to people being independent contractors. This is when I realized the press was acting without. Good faith data or logic. And as a former journalist, you know, it was kind of eye opening to me to be on the other side of the table and watching this happen because. We knew full well based on driver data that they love their jobs at Uber because they had free will.

让我们谈谈监管机构与独立承包人之间的关系。这时我意识到媒体在行动时并没有使用可信的数据或逻辑。作为一名前记者，对我来说，站在桌子的另一边观察这一切发生，真是大开眼界。因为根据司机的数据我们非常清楚，他们喜欢在Uber工作，因为他们有自由选择的权利。

And they could go and do any other job they wanted. And let's be clear, the average Uber driver during my, you know, let's say at the end of my tenure was eight hours a week. So they clearly is like, is clearly a side gig. Yeah, it was a side hustle and they wanted the flexibility over everything else. Work when I want. Don't work when I want. And then these union politicians and everything said, no, and the people who own the medallions. And this is a cabal of really bad actors who were saying, no, they have to work a shift. And they have to go work for somebody who owns a medallion who gets 50, 60, 70% of the economics. And they betrayed us. Were you as the bad guy in all this? And this was the exact opposite of the truth. So, yeah, I mean, it was a union problem, which is it's very difficult to organize people. Who in this classic area, which is very union organized called drivers, it's very difficult to organize them when they choose when they want to work. Their office is their own. It's their own, like nobody controls it. Like there's just no control. And so other than the control given to the individual. And so it was very disruptive to the union and their own business model. And so they had to cut it off at the knees. And so that became a mix of a sort of political discourse and like media push crossed with sort of regulatory.

他们可以去做任何其他他们想做的工作。说清楚一点，在我任期结束的时候，一个普通的Uber司机每周工作时长大约是八个小时。所以这显然是额外的工作，显然是一个兼职，他们更看重的是灵活性。想干就干，不想干就不干。然而那些工会的政客们以及出租车牌照的拥有者们却表示反对。这是一群非常糟糕的角色，他们说，司机们必须按照班次工作，且必须为那些拥有牌照的人工作，而这些人从经济收益中拿走50%、60%、甚至70%。他们背叛了我们。你被认为是这一切中的坏人，而事实完全相反。是的，我的意思是，这是一个工会问题。 在这个传统领域，司机们是非常有组织的，由于他们可以选择自己工作的时间，他们的“办公室”就是他们自己的车，没有人能够控制他们，只有个体自己能控制。这种灵活性严重干扰了工会和他们的商业模式，所以他们不得不采取非常严厉的措施来阻止这种情况。这就引发了一种政治争论，同时媒体宣传和政策监管也交织在一起。

Lobbying and like like trying to make political apparatuses do what's necessary to constrain it. And you took the approach. We will fight. There are wartime CEOs. There are peace time CEOs. I put you in the category with Elon of wartime CEOs who it does not matter how many battles you must battle concurrently. We're going to fight because it's we're on the right side of history. But this became acute. The number of battles that you had to fight, the number of fronts increase. Take us to the darkest peak of it because every time I talked to you, I felt fine about it. But other investors, other people felt like, hey, this is too many battles to wage at once. Talk to me about you personally fighting all those battles.

游说和试图使政治体系做必要的事来约束它。你采取了这种方法。我们会战斗。有战时的CEO，也有和平时期的CEO。我把你和埃隆一起归入战时CEO的类别，不论要同时经历多少场战斗，我们都会战斗，因为我们站在历史的正确一边。但情况变得更为紧急，你要应对的战斗数量和战线增加了。请告诉我们最黑暗的时刻，因为每次我和你谈话时，我都觉得情况还好。但其他投资者和其他人觉得，这就是要在同一时间打太多的仗了。谈谈你个人在应对所有这些战斗时的感受。

My perception of you was the more battles emerged, the more you realized you were doing the right thing. It filled your bucket. It powered you. It gave energy to you to know we were on the right side. So yeah, I sort of ingest, I would say to folks, I'd be like, so, you know, I'm not sure how it became so controversial that one citizen giving another citizen a ride across town became such a thing. I'm not sure how that happened, but it did. The darkest moment, I mean, the thing is, is like, you'd keep, it was almost like we were always pushing into that area. So like, if something became easy, then we'd push elsewhere until that became hard.

我对你的看法是：战斗越多，你越能意识到自己在做正确的事情。这让你感到充实。它为你提供动力。知道我们站在正确的一边，给了你能量。所以，是的，我有点儿开玩笑地对大家说，我不知道为什么一个公民载另一个公民穿过城镇会变得如此有争议。我不知道这是怎么发生的，但它确实发生了。最黑暗的时刻，我的意思是，感觉我们总是在向那个区域推进。就像，如果某件事情变得容易了，我们就会继续进军其他地方，直到那变得困难。

So it was constant is like, I make the analogy to like, to teams that we have in different places than and now, like a world-class marathoner. I've never seen a world-class marathoner a mile 19 look like he's just honky-dory. Yeah. Right. And if he was, he's about to lose. So you push right to that edge of what's possible. And if that starts to get easy, you push further. Now it doesn't necessarily mean you push in exactly that along that axis. It could be in a totally different area.

所以这就像是，我打个比方，就像我们在不同地方有的团队，现在就像一个世界级的马拉松选手。我从来没见过一个世界级的马拉松选手，在跑到第19英里时还能看起来轻松愉快的。如果他真的那样，他可能就要输了。所以你要不断地推动自己，接近可能的极限。如果这变得容易了，你就要更进一步。现在这不一定意味着你要沿着同一条路继续推进，它可能是一个完全不同的领域。

But as long as the problems you're solving are greater than the problems you're creating, then you're fine. When the problems you're creating are, starts to, when the derivative of problems you're creating is greater than the derivative of the problems you're solving, then you have a real problem. Right. And that's when you have to start pulling back, get back to above water and then go back into it. But when I talk about creating problems, I think of it like, think of it as like a math professor. A math professor without a really cool, interesting problem to solve is a sad math professor. And that's how we would think about it.

但是，只要你解决的问题比你制造的问题多，那你就没事。当你制造的问题的增速开始超过你解决的问题的增速时，你就真的遇到问题了。那时你就需要暂停一下，恢复平衡后再继续。当我谈到制造问题时，我把它看作是一个数学教授。一个没有很酷、很有趣的问题可以解决的数学教授是悲伤的数学教授。这就是我们看待这个问题的方式。

Right. These were always pushing to the point where we're sweating. Yeah. And it's like, not sure. And there could be late nights, there could be all-nighters, it could be that thing. But because we were doing the right thing, because we had great people in the field who believed, then we could push all the way to that edge. And they could be world-class marathoners too. Only two entrepreneurs I know have had the audacity to not build their products in China. Everybody does that. That's pretty easy. But to actually operate a business in China. Yeah. You and Elon decided we're going to try to compete him with selling cars inside of China. Pretty crazy.

对。这些人总是不断努力，直到我们汗流浃背。是的，这样的感觉有点不确定，可能会熬夜，有时甚至会通宵。但因为我们做的是正确的事情，手下又有一群相信我们的人，所以我们可以一直坚持到极限。他们也可能成为世界级的马拉松选手。我认识的企业家中，只有两人有胆量不在中国生产他们的产品。大家都那样做，那很容易。但能真正去中国经营业务的就不多了。你和埃隆决定试图在中国市场卖车，这真是疯狂的举动。

And even crazier- Self-driving cars in China. Wow. Yeah. Okay. Let's go. Let's go. BYD. Like you're up against some serious competition and it's not exactly a fair game maybe. Or there might be complications to that game. We had a long conversation about China. And I said to you, wow, we're burning a lot of money there. What do you, what's the strategy here? Let me just hear it from you. And you said, we're going for gold. Yeah. I mean, there's a lot of fun there.

甚至更疯狂的是——中国的自动驾驶汽车。哇。好吧。那就让我们开始吧。比亚迪。你面临一些非常厉害的竞争对手，而且这比赛也许并不公平，可能还会有一些复杂情况。我们就中国的问题进行了长时间的讨论。我对你说，哇，我们在那边烧了很多钱。你呢，你的策略是什么？让我听听你的想法。你说，我们要争金牌。是的，我的意思是，这里有很多有趣的事情。

I mean, look, the thing about doing business in China is it forces you to rethink everything. Everything. Like if you go into China thinking you got it, you're going to get your ass handed to you. You have to start first principles bottoms up. Let's see, where could I go with this? Look, we did- Well, tell everybody the strategy. Hey, we're going for gold, but they're silver. And how you look at the world in that regard. Yeah. Yeah. So I'll get there. It is that we, so a lot of times when you go and enter China, they're basically somebody's going, you got to have a partner. If you just go and you do your first exploration trip, they'll be like, you got to get a partner. They're like 50-50 blah, blah, blah. And I'm like, why? Nobody could tell me why.

我的意思是，你看，在中国做生意的问题在于它迫使你重新思考一切。一切都要重新考虑。比如说，如果你带着自己已经搞定了一切的想法进入中国，你会惨败而归。你必须从基本原则开始，从零起步。让我们看看，这里我能怎么说呢？听着，我们做了——嗯，向大家宣布这个策略。嘿，我们的目标是金牌，但他们还在追求银牌。这与我们看待世界的方式有关。对，对。所以，我会说到这里。很多时候，当你进入中国市场时，通常有人会告诉你，你必须要有一个合作伙伴。如果你只是进行第一次探索性访问，他们会说，你必须找一个合作伙伴。比如五五分成等等，而我就想，为什么？没有人能告诉我为什么。

So then we just went on our own. I'm going to start building something. And we never saw on the ground, we never saw bias. We were treated fairly on the ground. But at some point, what I'd say is the China War went global. And what I mean by that is the Chinese government, I think it was safe. There's some, I think it were called safe. Like it was like the sovereign wealth of China, CIC. There's like a few things like that. They started investing hundreds of millions and billions of dollars in all of our competitors globally to drain us of money.

于是我们就各自行动了。我打算开始做一些事情。在地面上，我们从未看到过偏见，我们在地面上得到了公平的对待。但有一点我要说的是，中国的这场战争变成了全球性的。我的意思是，中国政府，比如说中国的主权财富基金（CIC）和其他类似的机构，开始在全球范围内向我们的竞争对手注资数亿甚至数十亿美元，以此来耗尽我们的资金。

So that it was harder to compete in China. They made Apple, and I'd love to have this discussion with Tim at some point. We had some interesting words for each other at this point. But they made Apple invest a billion dollars in DD. And Apple doesn't invest anything in anybody. No, that's not their playlist. What was he protecting there? There's something going on. So whole really amazing story there, holy cow. Anyways, the Chinese War went global. And so that's when we had to go from going for the gold to making sure we got the silver. And that's when we started negotiating with DD to basically say we had 20% of the overall entity, of the merged entity. But in order to do that in China, that's when we actually had to push our spend super hard because they had to be scared.

所以在中国市场竞争变得更加困难了。他们让苹果投资了10亿美元到滴滴，而苹果平时是不会随便投资其他公司的。这不是他们的惯常做法。那他（指的是苹果CEO Tim Cook）在保护什么呢？这里面肯定有什么事情。所以这真的是一个非常令人惊讶的故事。无论如何，中美贸易战变得全球化了。于是我们不得不从追求金牌转向确保拿到银牌。那时我们开始与滴滴谈判，基本达成我们拥有合并后实体20%的股份。但要在中国做到这一点，我们不得不大力增加支出，因为他们必须感到害怕。

So I think at the peak, right as we were negotiating the term sheet, we pushed, we were burning. I think it was $75 million a week. It's a big number. Yeah, that was that. But we knew we had the deal, but we only have the deal if they're scared. Right. This is a poker game. Our market share was skyrocketing as we did this. They're pissed and tripping. And then Emil, who's negotiating the deal is like just chain smoking. But that's how you get a deal done in China. Right. And that turned out to be. That's your wartime CEO right there. That deal, we had invested millions in China, billions in China at that point. I think we invested, yeah, we probably were on a billion, a billion and a half. And the DD stake at the time when this deal got done was eight, nine, 10, yeah, something like that. So we turned a bill and a half into eight or nine. I can't remember the exact map, but it's something like that.

所以我觉得在谈判投资条款的高峰期，我们在冲刺，花费很大。我记得当时每周烧掉7500万美元，这真是个大数字。对，就是那样，但我们知道我们拿到了这笔交易，但只有在他们感到害怕的时候我们才能达成协议。对，这就像玩扑克游戏。随着这个过程我们的市场份额急剧上升，他们既生气又紧张。然后负责谈判的Emil一边谈判一边疯狂抽烟。但在中国，就是这样谈成交易的。这就是你的战时CEO。当时我们在中国已经投资了数百万甚至数十亿美元。我记得我们大概投资了十亿到十五亿美元。而当这笔交易完成时，我们在滴滴的股份价值大概是八、九、十亿美元左右。所以我们将十亿半左右的投资变成了大约八、九亿美元。我记不清楚准确的数字了，但就是这个意思。

Let's talk about. In like two years. Yeah. Let's talk about when you got asked. This was heartbreaking, crushing, brutal. You fought hard to remain in the seat. I got out there and did what I could on the press front to try to defend you and try to keep you in the seat, but we found. And it was brutal and it was particularly hard on you because you put your soul into this company. Yeah. Well, look, I think there's a little bit more. I mean, if an investor is running a political oppo campaign against you for six months, sort of generating a crisis every week for six months straight, it's going to wear you down. And then my, this one's hard.

让我们谈谈吧。大约两年前。是的。让我们谈谈当你被问到的那段时间。这真的令人心碎、崩溃、残酷。你拼尽全力想要保住那个位置。我在媒体上尽我所能为你辩护，试图帮你保住位置，但我们最终还是失败了。这真的是残酷的，尤其对你而言，因为你为这家公司倾注了灵魂。是的。我觉得事情还有更多的层面。如果一个投资者对你进行了六个月的政治反对运动，每周都制造一场危机，这真的会让你精疲力尽。然后，这一刻真的很难。

Your mom passed. I know. I was there with you. I know. It's all good. But that's when they went in for the kill. That I just couldn't hang. Yeah. Bottom line, I just couldn't hang. Yeah. And yeah, it was, it was dark. It was dark. Yeah. So, but look, a lot of people go, hair you pissed off or this thing. And I say, first, I loved it every minute. I loved it every minute. But when you fall in love again, you don't think about the X very much. Right. Cloud Clichen ZX, you moved on. Yeah. And you put all that in there and, and the, I just want to say like, I am proud of everything you did and watching you do it and getting to be there and witness it. I learned so much from you, the community learned so much from you. And I think we all know like the playbook, I can tell you the impact you had on the next generation. Because, you know, I never talk about Uber. I brought it up once or twice. You never talk about it. I never talk about it. I try to keep it low key, but I brought it up once or twice. And it was good for my deal flow. And I got to see.

你妈妈去世了。我知道，我当时和你在一起。我知道，一切都好。但那时他们发动了致命一击。我顶不住。是的，说到底，我就是顶不住。的确，那段时间非常黑暗。但是，听着，很多人会说你是不是因为这件事感到生气。我会说，首先，我每一分钟都很享受。我每一分钟都很享受。但是，当你再次坠入爱河的时候，你就不会再经常想着前任了。对，你已经走出来了。你放下了所有这些，我只想说，我为你所做的一切感到骄傲，看着你去做以及见证这一切我受益良多，社区也从你那里学到了很多。我想我们都知道这个套路，我可以告诉你，你对下一代产生的影响。你知道吗，我从不谈论优步。我提到过一两次。你也从不提起它。我尽量低调，但我提到过一两次。这对我的交易流程很有帮助。我也见证了。

I got to see. I got. I'm so honored to be here. I'm so honored to be here too. But I got to see that. Famous Uber investor. And I mean this sincerely, the number of entrepreneurs who came to me, who said, I started this company because I watched Travis. I watched what he did. I want to be Travis. You inspired that generation along with Elon to say, I want to operate in the real world. I want to build something that has an impact and I am willing to fight and have that entrepreneurial spirit, which I'm going to be honest. There's a large amount of entrepreneurs who don't have the fight in them. They don't have the dog in them. You got the dog in you. You got the fight in you. You know, and that's so rare. And that's why you're so successful. It's because you're willing to fight the fight. Yeah. You know, look, we just saw the Olympics. And I know I made that marathon or analogy before, but like every one of those gold medalists, they got the dog in them. There's no other way. We're just playing a different sport. And I think some of the interesting parts about this sport is that it's not just an individual thing. It's a massive team and they're stakeholders and cities and citizens and all that. It's just fun. You know, like a lot of folks go, look, you did the Uber thing. Why are you doing it again? I mean, you cashed in a lot of chips. You could be just chilling. I'm like, look, Serena keeps getting on the court. She's totally badass. Why is she doing it? Right. You know, or take your favorite star of anything. Yeah, LeBron's in his 40. What is 40 now? And he's looks great out there. So it's because they have a love of the game. And it's not just show time that day. It's everything behind the scenes. It's working with people, especially in this sport. Like, again, individual stuff is a little different. Like you got to, I like the magic of working with. Magical people. Doing it as a crew is where all the good stuff happens. And they all keep coming back. You know, I've seen a lot of the folks who came for a second tour of duty with you. That speaks volumes as we end here. Darr is done. I got to know him. Yeah. Try to support the team over there for the legacy. And he's done a decent job, solid job. Profitable. What's that? Let's go. They went from my 75 million a week to profitable. I like it. Well, I mean, it is great for the legacy. We always knew it was easily to make it profitable. People were saying, oh, it can never be profitable. And you and I would talk and be like, like, we were raised the price of dollar, profitable. Like, it's not difficult. You know, look, there's an art to that too. It's all good. But yeah, like, I think Uber's gotten to a great place. The profitability is there. That means it's going to be around now. They've got to figure out the autonomous thing. That's, I think that's the next big challenge to go after.

我看到了，我看到了。我能在这里感到非常荣幸。我也很荣幸能在这里。但我要说的是，我见到了那位著名的Uber投资人。我是真心这么说的，有很多创业者来找我，说他们创办公司是因为看到了Travis，看到了他所做的一切。他们说：“我想成为Travis。”你和Elon一起，激励了那一代人，让他们想要在现实世界中有所作为，想要建立对社会有影响的东西，并且愿意为了这种创业精神而奋斗。老实说，现在有很多创业者没有这种奋斗精神，他们缺乏那种拼劲。但你有，你有那种拼搏精神，这非常难得。所以你非常成功，就是因为你愿意奋斗。 我们刚刚看到了奥运会，我知道我以前用过那个马拉松的比喻，但每一位金牌选手都有那种拼劲，没有其他方式。而我们只是玩着不一样的运动。我认为这项运动的一些有趣之处在于，它不仅仅是个人的事情，而是一个庞大的团队，有利益相关者，有城市和市民。这就是乐趣所在。很多人会问，你已经做了Uber的事，为什么还要再做一次？你已经赚了很多钱，可以放松休息了。但我会说，Serena仍然不断出现在球场上，她简直太厉害了，那她为什么这么做呢？或是你最喜欢的明星，不论是谁，比如，LeBron已经四十岁了，他在球场上依然表现出色。 因为他们热爱这项运动，这不仅仅是某一天的表演，而是幕后的所有努力，尤其是在团队运动中。个人项目会有些不同，但我喜欢和那些充满魔力的人一起工作。一起合作才是所有好事情发生的地方。而那些人总是不断回归。我见过很多跟你再次合作的人，这本身就说明了很多。 Dara做得不错，我认识他。他尽力支持那边的团队，延续了我们的遗产，他做得很不错，实现了盈利。你知道，他们从我当年每周亏损七千五百万美元，到现在实现了盈利，我喜欢这种结果。 说到底，这对我们的遗产来说是很好的。我们一直知道，实现盈利并不难。人们总说Uber永远无法盈利，你和我会谈论这些，我们会说：“只要把价格提高一美元，就盈利了，这并不难。”当然，把它做得有艺术感也是一种本事。但总的来说，我觉得Uber现在到了一个很好的地方，实现了盈利，这意味着它会长期存在下去。但他们现在必须解决自动驾驶的问题，我认为这是下一个大挑战。

Well, let me just put it out there. He's going to do his tour. And his tour is going to end. Would you consider doing what Steve Jobs did and coming back and merging Cloud Kitchens with Uber? Would you consider it if the opportunity was there or can you not go home? So you're saying there's a chance. Can you go home? I mean, if this would be the return of the king, this would be my dream. If you came back, I know it's not your dream, but it's mine. Can you give Cloud Kitchens to become part of Uber? It would be a trillion dollar company with you back in that seat. Would you take the seat again if it was offered? Would you consider it? Well, I definitely know who my head of comms would be. I'm that note, Travis Kalin is my man. I love you.

好吧，让我直接说吧。他要完成他的巡演了，然后巡演会结束。你会考虑做像史蒂夫·乔布斯那样的事情，回归并将Cloud Kitchens与Uber合并吗？如果有这样的机会，你会考虑吗，还是说你不能回归？ 所以你是说有机会。你能回归吗？我是说，如果这是“王者归来”，这将是我的梦想。如果你回来了，我知道这不是你的梦想，但这是我的。你能把Cloud Kitchens变成Uber的一部分吗？如果你回来担任这个职位，公司将会成为市值达一万亿美元的公司。这个位置如果提供给你，你会考虑接受吗？ 嗯，我肯定知道我的通讯主管会是谁。就在这点上，Travis Kalin（特拉维斯·卡兰尼克）是我的人。我爱你。