Clayton Christensen | How Will You Measure Your Life? | LinkedIn Speaker Series - YouTube
发布时间 2012-07-24 10:19:09 来源
中英文字稿 
Happy end day, everyone. Thank you for coming. So by way of intro to me, for those of you who don't know, I'm Dietrich Haldbeck. I'm on the business development team here at LinkedIn. And it's really great to see everyone here. It looks like everyone's as excited and honored as I am to have Professor Christensen here with us today. As most of you know, Clay is the bestselling author of the innovator's dilemma, one of the most prominent and influential books of our time. Despite being published 15 years ago, Clay's theory of disruptive innovation continues to be referenced and applied to the corporate strategies of technology companies all over the world, and is probably most relevant to companies today. In fact, just this week at Fortune's Brainstorm Tech Conference in Aspen, one of the panels was titled Disruptive Innovation Dog Fight in the Cloud and included CEOs from Box into it and you send it. LinkedIn, of course, has very successfully disrupted the recruiting industry. That's the good news. The bad news is that if we don't continue to recognize the value of innovation and take risks, we leave ourselves open to future disruptive technologies.
大家好，欢迎来参加。首先自我介绍一下，对于那些不太熟悉我的人，我是迪特里希·哈尔德贝克。我在领英的商务发展团队工作。能看到大家都很高兴和荣幸，今天能和我们一起见到克莱教授。正如大家所知，克莱是《创新者的窘境》一书的畅销作者，这本书是我们这个时代最杰出和有影响力的书籍之一。尽管已经出版了15年，克莱关于颠覆性创新的理论仍然被全球科技公司引用和应用于企业战略中，可能对当今的公司最为重要。事实上，就在本周在阿斯彭举办的财富科技头脑风暴大会上，有一个专题讨论了云计算中的颠覆性创新，包括了Box、Intuit和YouSendIt的首席执行官。领英，当然，已经非常成功地颠覆了招聘行业。这是好消息。坏消息是，如果我们不继续认识到创新的价值并承担风险，我们就会导致自己暴露于未来颠覆性技术的危险中。
Professor Christensen followed his best seller with five additional publications, including books that apply as frameworks to difficult social issues like education and health care. His most recent book, How to Measure Your Life, takes his impactful business teachings and applies them to an individual's personal life to ensure they can have a successful but also happy career benefit from fulfilling relationships. And finally, as Enron's Jeff Skilling's classmate at HBS, Professor Christensen helps us ensure we can all live a life of integrity and in his words, stay out of jail. Over the past decade, Clay has founded a management consultancy firm, a nonprofit think tank, and an investment firm. He's on the board of Tata Consultancy Services, WR, Hamburg, and Franklin Covey. He's also a professor at Harvard Business School where I was fortunate enough to get a seat in his very popular class and get to know him as an inspiring individual.
克里斯滕森教授在他最畅销的著作之后又出版了五本书，其中包括应用于教育和医疗保健等困难社会问题的框架。他最近的著作《如何衡量你的人生》将其影响力深远的商业教导运用到个人生活中，以确保他们在事业成功的同时也能从充实的人际关系中获益，过上幸福的生活。作为安然公司的杰夫·斯基林的HBS校友，克里斯滕森教授帮助我们确保我们都可以过上正直的生活，并用他的话说，远离监狱。在过去的十年中，克雷创立了一家管理咨询公司、一个非营利智库和一家投资公司。他还是塔塔咨询服务公司、WR、汉堡和富兰克林柯维的董事会成员。他还是哈佛商学院的教授，而我很幸运地有机会在他非常受欢迎的课堂上座位，并有机会了解他作为一位鼓舞人心的个体。
Clay? APPLAUSE She also was very smart. I remember exactly where she sat. It was on the top row in the center. One seat left to the, yeah. Just a couple of one other thing you need to know about me. I've had a series of difficult health problems. So the most recent one was about a year and a half ago, I had a stroke. A clot came from somewhere and lodged itself right here in my brain and killed the port of my brain where you formulate speech and writing. And just like that, I couldn't speak. And that's my profession. So it's been kind of hard. But what I did was I went to the airport and got a copy of Rosetta Stone for English. And with our oldest granddaughter, who is five years old, we started with lesson one, level one. And I've just been learning how to speak again.
克莱？掌声。她也非常聪明。我清楚记得她坐在哪里，就在顶排中间。离右边还有一个座位。还有一件事情你需要知道。我经历过一系列困难的健康问题。最近的一次是大约一年半之前，我中风了。一块血块从某处形成，落在了我的大脑这里，损坏了我表达言语和写作的大脑部分。就这样，我突然不能说话了。而这可是我的职业。所以这段时间有点艰难。但是我去了机场，买了一份Rosetta Stone的英语学习软件。我和我们五岁的孙女从第一课，第一级开始学习。我一直在重新学习如何说话。
So you'll see me wrestling over what's the word. If you know the word I'm trying to say, if you would just let me know, so it will be faster. And you'll also notice that I will tend to speak at the floor rather than you. And the reason is that if I look at you, you'll distract me. And if I just look at the floor, I can focus on what's the word that needs to come out next. And so it's not that I have become shy all of a sudden. It's just as a transition as I'm learning how to do this. It helps me. I'll just describe where this most recent book, How Will You Measure Your Life Came From? Deidre and maybe a few others of you who went to the Harvard Business School, you realize shortly after you graduate that the core competence of the Harvard Business School is soaking alumni for donations.
因此你会看到我在纠结应该用什么词。如果你知道我试图说的那个词，如果你能告诉我，那么就会更快。你也会注意到我会倾向于看地板而非你。原因是如果我看着你，会分散我的注意力。如果我只看着地板，我可以专注于接下来需要说出的那个词是什么。所以并不是我突然变得害羞了。这只是我学习如何做这件事的过渡阶段。这有助于我。我会描述最新书《你将如何衡量你的人生》是如何产生的？迪德拉和也许其他一些去过哈佛商学院的人，你们毕业后很快就意识到，哈佛商学院的核心竞争力是向校友募捐。
And it manifests itself in lots of ways. But one of the most important is every five years, they invite you back for a reunion. And ostensibly, you come to see your friends. In reality, we want to turn you upside down and shake out all of the cash you've got. And I remember I was in the class of 79. And I subsequently have come back every five years. When we came back to the fifth reunion, it was unbelievable. Almost everybody came back. Most of my classmates had married people who were much better looking than my friends were. And several of many had children that looked just adorable. Their career just seemed to be going at a pace that they didn't imagine would happen. And it just seemed like everything was going right for everybody. But then as I came back to the 10th and the 15th, 20th, and then the 25th, Chinks began to come. And to emerge in our armor.
而且这种表现方式有很多种。但其中一种最重要的是每五年，他们会邀请你回去参加聚会。表面上，你是来看朋友的。但实际上，我们想要把你颠倒过来，把你身上所有的现金甩出来。我记得我是79年的毕业班。从那以后，我每隔五年就会回去一次。当我们回到第五次聚会时，那简直令人难以置信。几乎每个人都回来了。我的大多数同学都嫁给了比我的朋友们好看得多的人。还有很多人有着看起来非常可爱的孩子。他们的事业似乎在以一种他们不曾想象的速度发展。似乎一切都在向好的方向发展。但当我回到第十、第十五、第二十和第二十五届时，我们的铠甲开始出现了裂痕。
And in particular, friends who we thought were going to come, and were excited to get reacquainted with them, didn't come. And when we'd ask around, what's happening to her or him? More often than you ever have imagined, the answer was, he's in a messy divorce. His family is just a wreck. His spouse got remarried, moved to the other side of the country. And somebody else is raising their children. And they would, some would come back with this as a history. Very wealthy and very unhappy with their life. And I think as a general rule, as I've seen my own life evolve and those of my friends and students, that in the end, the deepest source of joy in our lives comes from intimate relationships with our families and our close children and friends. If you do a correlation between money and happiness, the coefficient is not significantly, it's not significant and typically is negative. So I know how frequently this has happened in the people who I know and love.
尤其是，我们以为会来的朋友们，还兴致勃勃地想要与他们重逢，但最后却没有出现。当我们询问他们的情况时，为什么他或她没有来？你可能从未想象过，答案往往是，他/她正经历一场混乱的离婚。他的家庭破裂不堪。他的配偶重新结婚了，搬到了国家的另一边。别人正在抚养他们的孩子。有些人会回来，带着这样的经历。他们非常富有，却对自己的生活感到非常不满。我觉得，一般来说，随着我自己的生活和我朋友、学生们的生活逐渐发展，我们生活中最深层的快乐来源于与家人、亲密的孩子和朋友之间的亲密关系。如果将金钱与幸福度进行相关性分析，这两者的系数并不明显，通常是负相关的。所以我知道，在我所认识和爱的人们中，这种情况经常发生。
And I can guarantee you that there wasn't a single one of my classmates who, when they graduated, planned to go out and get divorced and have children who were an alienated from them. And yet, a shocking number of us have implemented a strategy that none of us planned to pursue. So that's one side. And then as Deidre mentioned, personally, a shocking number have ended up doing things that they never imagined that they would do. So I had a Rhodes Scholarship, went to Oxford. Every year, they send 32 from America. Two of the 32 ended up in jail. One of them was a congressman in Washington and was nailed in a slammer for a sexual relationship with a 16-year-old volunteer on his reelection campaign. And he was married with three kids at the time.
我可以向你保证，当我的同学们毕业时，没有一个人计划离婚并和他们疏远的孩子。然而，令人震惊的是，我们中有很多人竟然实施了一个我们都没有计划追求的策略。这是一面。就像迪德拉提到的，个人而言，令人震惊的是，许多人最终做了他们从未想象过的事情。我获得了罗兹奖学金，去了牛津大学。每年，他们从美国选派32名学生。32名中的两人最终入狱。其中一位是一名华盛顿国会议员，在连任活动中，他与一个16岁志愿者发生了性关系而被送进了监狱。当时他已婚，有三个孩子。
Another one was nailed for his role in a big insider trading problem. And as she mentioned, Jeff Schilling, the CEO of Enron, was a classmate of mine at HBS. And I knew these guys. And they were good people. And yet, they made decisions in their life that caused their life to go in a direction that they didn't plan on. And so I just worry that some of these generations, most promising people, will end up possessing in a life that they would not have chosen. So how to think my way through this problem with the support of my students has been really quite successful. So the course that Deidre mentioned is a course about how do we build and sustain successful companies? And in order to do that, we realized an idiot simple fact.
另外一个人因涉及一宗大规模内幕交易问题而被揭发。正如她提到的，安然公司的CEO杰夫·希林是哈佛商学院同学。我认识这些人。他们都是好人。然而，他们在生活中做出的决定导致了他们的生活朝着他们没有计划的方向发展。因此，我担心一些这些有着最优秀才能的人最终会过上他们不曾选择的生活。因此，如何通过我学生的支持来思考这个问题真的非常成功。迪德拉提到的课程是关于如何构建和维持成功的公司的课程。为了做到这一点，我们意识到一个非常简单的事实。
And that is for somehow, for whatever reason, when God created the world, he positioned us to face the future. But he made data available only about the past. And if you, like we teach our students that they should be data-driven and fact-based and analytical in making their decisions, in many ways we condemn our graduates to take action when the game is over. And the problem with that arrangement is that you've got to look into the future about which there is no data. And either you have to do it in a crapshoot, or you need to have theories of causality.
有一些原因让上帝在创造世界时让我们面对未来。但他只提供关于过去的数据。如果你像我们教导学生们那样要求他们在做决定时要基于数据、事实和分析，很多时候我们其实是在毕业生们在比赛结束后才开始行动。这个安排的问题在于你必须面对没有数据支持的未来。要么你只能靠运气，要么你需要有因果关系理论。
Because those of you who have history in science realize that when we call it something a theory, what it is is a statement of causality. What causes what and why? And with my students over the last number of years, we've been trying to build theories of causality about the business side of enterprise so that we could predict in advance that when we, as leaders, take action, we can predict with some certainty what will happen as the result of actions. And so what we did as a group of students is we spend the whole semester studying these theories of causality.
因为你们中那些有科学历史的人会意识到，当我们把它称为理论时，实际上是一个因果关系的陈述。是什么导致了什么以及为什么？ 在过去的几年里，我和我的学生一直在尝试建立有关企业商业方面的因果理论，以便我们可以预测，当我们作为领导者采取行动时，我们可以相对确定地预测将会发生什么。因此，我们作为一群学生所做的是整个学期都在研究这些因果关系理论。
And then we put them on, like a set of lenses, and try to examine a case about a company that is in a mess. And try to see through the lens of the theory can we explain how they got into this situation, and then what actions would solve the problem and which wouldn't. And then the next day, we have another case about another dimension of a manager's job. And then we put that on, like lenses, study a new case. And then we take those off and put on yesterday's theory to see, can we understand in a more holistic way how they got to where they are and what actions will solve the problems.
然后我们将它们带上，就像一副镜片，尝试审视一个陷入困境的公司案例。尝试通过理论的镜头看清他们是如何陷入这种局面的，然后采取哪些行动可以解决问题，哪些行动不会。然后第二天，我们有另一个关于经理工作的维度的案例。然后我们戴上它们，就像镜片一样，研究一个新案例。然后我们把它们摘下，戴上昨天的理论来看，我们是否能更全面地理解他们是如何走到现在这个地步的，以及哪些行动可以解决问题。
And it's been quite a useful enterprise for us as we've been trying to explain what's happening in society around us. Then the last day of class, what we've evolved into doing, is rather than looking through the lens of these theories at companies, we instead put them on the mirror and look at ourselves through these lenses. And where the question is, if I keep doing what I'm doing, what will the outcome be in my life? And if that's the outcome that I want in my life, what do I need to begin doing now that will take me in that direction?
这对我们来说是非常有用的一项工作，因为我们一直在努力解释身边社会发生的事情。在课程的最后一天，我们演变成这样做，而不是通过这些理论来审视公司，而是将它们放在镜子上，通过这些镜头自我审视。问题是，如果我继续做我现在的事情，我的生活将会有什么样的结果？如果那是我想要的结果，我现在需要开始做什么来朝着那个方向前进呢？
And so it's just been very enlightening to, I think, all of us. And as a result, with a former student and a woman who had been the executive editor of the Harvard Business Review, we decided to write a book called, How Will You Measure Your Life? So if you wouldn't mind, I'd like to go through some of the theories in our research, quickly show how we have used them to understand companies, and then turn it around and share with you what we've been seeing about our lives.
因此，我认为这对我们所有人都非常启发。作为一个结果，我和一个前学生以及一位曾担任哈佛商业评论执行主编的女性决定写一本名为《你将如何衡量你的生活》的书。如果你不介意的话，我想要快速概述一些我们研究中的理论，展示我们如何利用它们来理解公司，然后把它转过来和你分享我们对生活看到的一些东西。
So the first theory is the theory of disruption, which changed my own life, as this emerged from my doctoral dissertation. But it is a theory that explains why so many successful companies like you are toppled from the peak that you are now in. And what is it that causes successful companies to fail? And then once you become successful, who could kill you? And so I'd like to just go through this theory for those of you who aren't exposed to it.
所以第一个理论是破坏理论，它改变了我的生活，因为它起源于我的博士论文。但这个理论解释了为什么像你们这样成功的公司会从现在的巅峰被推翻。成功的公司是因为什么而失败的？一旦你成功了，谁会击垮你？所以我想简单介绍一下这个理论，给那些还不熟悉的人听听。
And I've chosen an industry that is just completely foreign to most of you, just so that you could see it in the abstract, and then we could think about you. So for those of you who haven't yet made a lot of steel in your lives, historically there are two ways to do it. Most of the world's steel historically has been made in massive integrated steel mills. It would cost today about $10 billion to build an integrated steel mill.
我选择了一个对大多数人来说完全陌生的行业，这样你们才能从抽象的角度看到它，然后我们才能考虑你们。所以对于那些生活中还没有大量生产钢铁的人来说，历史上有两种方法。历史上大部分世界上的钢铁是在大型综合钢铁厂生产的。今天要建造一个综合钢铁厂约需要100亿美元。
The other way to do it is in what they call mini mills. Minimills melt scrap in electric furnaces. And you could easily fit six electric furnaces in this room. Because you can make steel in such a small chamber, you don't have to scale up the downstream steps. And that's why they call these things mini mills. The most important dimension of a mini mill is you can make steel of any quality in a mini mill for 20% lower cost than you can make it in an integrated mill.
另一种方法是使用他们所称的迷你炼钢厂。迷你炼钢厂使用电炉熔化废钢。在这个房间里可以容纳六台电炉。由于在如此小空间内就能生产钢材，所以不必放大下游工序。这就是为什么他们称这些设备为迷你炼钢厂。迷你炼钢厂最重要的一点是，你可以用比综合炼钢厂低20%的成本在迷你炼钢厂生产任何质量的钢材。
Now just think about this for a minute. Imagine that you were the CEO of an integrated steel company somewhere in the world. You're making commodities, like you have never seen commodities before. Here's a technology, mini mills, which, if you implemented it, would reduce the full cost of making your steel by 20%. Don't you think you'd implement that technology? And yet not a single integrated steel company anywhere in the world has yet built and operated a mini mill. Sorry about this.
现在想想这个问题。想象一下，如果你是世界上某个综合钢铁公司的CEO，你在生产像你从未见过的商品。这里有一项技术，迷你厂，如果你实施了这项技术，可以减少生产钢铁的全部成本20%。难道你不会考虑实施这项技术吗？然而，世界上没有一家综合钢铁公司建造和运营过迷你厂。对此表示抱歉。
And this is my sense for why something that makes consummate sense has been impossible for smart people to do. So the steel industry, like every industry, is structured by tears. So at the bottom of the market is concrete reinforcing bar, or rebar. It is so simple that almost all of us could make rebar. At the high end of the market is sheet steel that's used to make cars. It is very complicated to make. And at the beginning of this story, the integrated mills made the full range of these products.
这是我对为什么一些看起来很合理的事情却让聪明人做不到的感觉。因此，钢铁行业，像每一个行业一样，都是由泪水构成的。市场底部是钢筋混凝土加固钢筋，简单到几乎我们所有人都可以做。市场高端是用于制造汽车的钢板，制造起来非常复杂。而这个故事的开头，综合钢厂制造了这些产品的全部范围。
The mini mill idea became technologically viable in the late 1960s. And because these guys were melting scrap in these electric furnaces, the quality that they could produce was really crummy. In fact, the only market that made would buy what the mini mills made was the rebar market way down at the bottom, because there are almost no specs for rebar to begin with. And then once you buried it in cement, you couldn't verify whether they met spec. So it was just a perfect market for crummy products.
迷你钢厂的概念在1960年代末变得技术上可行。因为这些家伙在这些电炉中熔化废料，他们所能生产的质量非常糟糕。事实上，唯一愿意购买迷你钢厂产品的市场是钢筋市场，因为钢筋本身几乎没有规格要求。而且一旦将其埋入混凝土中，就无法验证是否符合规格要求。所以这个市场对劣质产品来说简直是个完美的市场。
As they attacked that tear of the market, the reaction to the integrated mills was they were just delighted to get out of the business. It was such a dog-eat-dog commodity. Gross margins were only 7%. It made no sense to defend a 7% business when if they just got out of that business or focused their assets in the next tier, margins were 12%. So as the mini mills expanded their capacity to make rebar, the integrated mills just locked that off from their product line. As they added up the remaining numbers, their profitability improved as they got out of rebar.
随着迷你钢铁厂攻击市场份额，综合钢铁厂的反应是他们很高兴退出这个行业。这种商品市场竞争激烈，毛利率只有7%。维持一个只有7%利润的业务毫无意义，如果他们退出这个行业或者把资产集中在更高一级的领域，利润率可以达到12%。因此，随着迷你钢铁厂扩大了生产能力以生产钢筋，综合钢铁厂只能将这部分业务从产品线中剔除。在他们重新计算剩下的数字后，净利润率得到改善，退出钢筋市场带来了好处。
The mini mills, because they had a 20% cost advantage, they rolled tons of money getting into rebar. So they actually were quite their friends. Then the whole thing fell apart in 1979. What happened that year is the mini mills finally succeeded in driving the last high-cost integrated player out of rebar. If you look at what happened to the price of rebar in 1979, the price collapsed by 20%. It just turns that there's a subtle fact about strategy that we never thought about before.
迷你钢厂因为有20%的成本优势，涌入了钢筋市场，赚取了大量利润。所以他们实际上相当成功。然后在1979年，一切都崩溃了。那一年发生了什么事是，迷你钢厂最终成功地将最后一个高成本综合企业赶出了钢筋市场。如果你看看1979年钢筋价格的变化，价格下跌了20%。原来，关于战略还有一个我们以前从未考虑过的微妙事实。
And that is a low-cost strategy only works as long as you have a high-cost competitor in your market. And as soon as they had fled up, it was low-cost mini mills fighting against low-cost mini mill in a commodity business. And very quickly, competition drove prices down to the point where they couldn't make any money. So what are those poor mini mills going to do? Well, they tried to be more efficient making rebar, but that was just a recipe for survival. And then one of them looked up market and said, oh, my gosh. If we could just make bigger and better steel, we'd make money again, because the margins there are nearly double what we're doing here. And so they stretched that ability to tackle that tier of the market. As they did so, the reaction to the integrated mills was, man, they were happy to get out of that business, because it was such a doggy dog commodity. They could only make 12% gross margins, whereas if they shut those lines down and focus their assets at structural steel, the margins are 18%. So they do the same thing. As they lobbed off the lowest profit part of their product line, and then they added up the remaining numbers, their gross margins improved as they got out.
这是一个低成本策略，只有在你的市场有高成本竞争对手的情况下才能有效。一旦它们消失了，就变成了低成本小型厂战斗对决低成本小型厂的普通生意。很快，竞争把价格压到了他们无法盈利的地步。那么那些可怜的小型厂该怎么办呢？他们试图变得更高效地生产再生钢，但那只是求生的方法。然后他们中的一个看向市场高端，说，哦，天啊。如果我们能生产更大更好的钢，我们就能再次盈利，因为那里的利润几乎是我们这里的两倍。于是他们伸展能力来挑战那个市场阶层。当他们这样做时，综合钢铁厂的反应是，他们很高兴摆脱那一业务，因为那是一个恶性竞争的商品。他们只能获得12%的毛利润，而如果他们关闭这些生产线，把资产集中在结构钢上，利润率为18%。所以他们也是这样做的。当他们摒弃了产品线利润最低的部分，然后把剩下的数字加起来，随着退出市场，他们的毛利润率得到了提高。
As the mini mills got in, they had a 20% cost advantage. And so their profitability returned. And again, they were quite happy one with another. But that fell apart in 1984. That was the year when the mini mills finally succeeded in driving the last high cost integrated player out of angle Aryan and Bar and Rod. If you look at what happened to the prices of those products in that year, the price collapsed by 20%. And the reward to the mini mills for their victory is they couldn't make money. So what are these poor suckers going to do? And they got to move up market. And as they moved up, the calculation of the integrated players was the same. If we got out, our profitability improved. And so they did. And then as soon as they were gone, prices collapsed. What's Newcorgan to do? They got to figure out how to go after sheet steel, where the margins are more attractive. And as they did that, the reaction of the integrated mills was to get out of it.
随着迷你钢厂的出现，它们拥有20%的成本优势。因此它们的盈利能力得以恢复。它们彼此之间也非常高兴。但这一切在1984年瓦解了。那一年，迷你钢厂终于成功地将最后一家高成本综合生产商赶出了角阿林和钢棒和钢杆市场。如果你看看那年这些产品的价格变化，价格下跌了20%。而对于迷你钢厂取得胜利的回报是他们无法盈利。这些可怜的家伙该怎么办？他们不得不向上市场转移。随着他们的提升，综合生产商的计算方式也是一样的。如果我们退出，我们的盈利能力就会提高。于是他们退出了。而一旦他们离开，价格立即下跌。那么纽科根该怎么办？他们必须想办法进军板材市场，那里的利润更有吸引力。在他们这么做的同时，综合钢厂的反应是退出该市场。
Out of commodity steel, and focus on specialty steels. And so this is where they are today. Today in North America, the mini mills account for about 65% of all production. And all but one of the integrated mills has gone bankrupt. Now you notice that I was able to tell the whole story without using the words stupid manager once. There is no stupidity involved on either side of the equation. Every time the integrated mills got out of something, their profitability improved. And every time the mini mills got in, their profitability improved. And the causal mechanism behind this phenomenon of disruption is the pursuit of profit. And that's so you can predict with real certainty that if you're trying to start a new company, and you think you can win by jumping ahead of the equivalent of integrated competitors in your market, and you can beat them by making better products that you can sell for better profits to their best customers, they will kill you.
不再生产普通钢材，专注于特种钢材。这就是他们如今的现状。如今在北美，迷你钢厂占据了大约65%的产量。除了一个综合钢厂外，其他的全都破产了。你会注意到我在讲述整个故事时，并没有一次使用“愚蠢的经理”这个词。在这个方程的任何一边都没有愚蠢的行为。每当综合钢厂放弃某种业务，他们的盈利都会提高。而每当迷你钢厂介入某个领域，他们的盈利也会提高。这种颠覆现象背后的因果机制就是追求利润。因此，你可以非常肯定地预测，如果你试图创办一家新公司，并认为可以通过超越市场上综合竞争对手的等效者，通过生产更好的产品赚取更高的利润来获胜，那他们会将你扼杀。
But if you come in at the bottom like this and pick up the people that they don't want to go after and then go up, you set up a war where your opponent is motivated to flee rather than fight you. And that's really why you guys are who you are, is because you're disrupting the providers of services and search and placing and so on. And a whole bunch of other things. Where else have you seen this happen, where somebody comes in at the bottom of the market and then cleaned it out going up? Solar panels is wrong. We talk about that. We wish it would be successful, but it's not. Yeah, Walmart has done it to Kmart. Hard drives that's happened over and over again. In computers, it's happened over and over again. Any of you know a company called Toyota? You lose perspective, but they did not enter the Western markets with Alexis. But they came in in the 60s with rusty little subcompacts called the corona. And then they went from corona to Tercel, Corolla, Camry, Avalon, Forerunner, Sequoia, and then Alexis.
但是如果你像这样从底部进入，并吸纳那些他们不愿意追求的人，然后再向上走，你就会建立一场战争，让你的对手更愿意逃跑而不是和你对抗。这就是你们成为你们的原因，因为你们打破了服务提供商、搜索和流通商等的市场格局。还有许多其他事情。在其他地方你见过类似的情况吗，一个公司从市场底部开始然后逐渐扩张？太阳能电池板不适用。我们谈论过这个。我们希望它会成功，但却没有。是的，沃尔玛已经击败了凯马特。硬盘一再发生过这种情况。在计算机领域，这种情况也一再发生。你们有没有听说过一家叫丰田的公司？你们可能失去了视角，但他们没有用雷克萨斯进入西方市场。他们在60年代用生锈的小型轿车科罗娜进入市场。然后他们从科罗娜发展到了特锐，卡罗拉，凯美瑞，阿瓦隆，皮卡，采维亚，最后才是雷克萨斯。
And General Motors and Ford were making big cars for big people. And they would see Toyota coming up at the bottom through the 70s and 80s. They'd say, you know, we ought to go get those buggers. And so they designed products that were called Chevats or Pintos, little subcompacts. But they would then compare the subcompacts with the profitability of making even bigger SUVs and bigger pickup trucks for bigger people. It made no sense. And so Toyota disrupted Detroit. And Detroit's basically gone. Who's killing Toyota? Hyundai and Kia, the Koreans, have stolen the bottom of the market from Toyota, not because Toyota's asleep at the switch. But why would Toyota ever want to defend the least profitable part of the business when they have the privilege of competing with Mercedes in luxury cars? And then Cherry comes from China next. And seriously, we don't have to worry about it. Who's killing Oracle? Salesforce. And it's exactly the same thing going on there. And Sisko disrupted Lucent. And now Huawei is coming underneath Sisko. And it just happens all the time. Last question about this. If you go back to the biggest of the integrated steel companies, US Steel or Bethlehem Steel, who decided that they were going to go out and get killed? What happened? Did the executives pull into the board and put together a plan for going off the cliff into bankruptcy? Seriously, who made the decision? Actually, the answer was nobody. But collectively, it was individual people making decisions which, when they were made, seemed to be tactical and inconsequential. I think today I'm not going to sell rebar. I think I'm going to sell sheet steel to somebody.
通用汽车和福特为大个子制造了大车。在70年代和80年代，他们看到丰田崛起。他们会说，我们应该去抓住那些人。于是，他们设计了被称为雪勇或品拓的小型汽车。但他们会将小型汽车与制造更大SUV和更大皮卡车的利润率进行比较。这毫无道理。因此，丰田颠覆了底特律。底特律基本上消失了。谁在打败丰田？现代和起亚，韩国人从丰田那里夺走了市场底端的份额，不是因为丰田在疏忽。但丰田为什么要保护业务中最不赚钱的部分，当他们有幸与奔驰在豪华车领域竞争呢？接下来是中国的奇瑞。真的，我们不用担心。是谁在打败甲骨文？Salesforce。那里的情况完全相同。思科颠覆了朗讯。现在华为要在思科的基础上发展。情况总是发生。关于这个问题的最后一个问题。如果回到美国钢铁公司中最大的那些，美国钢铁或伯利恒钢铁，谁决定他们要走出去被杀？发生了什么？高管们召集董事会，制定了一个让公司走向破产的计划吗？说真的，是谁做决定的？实际上，答案是没有人。但综合来看，是个体在做出看似战术和微不足道的决定。比如今天我不卖钢筋，我想要卖板钢给某人。
Or I'm the scheduler in a plant. I don't think we'll schedule rebar this week. We'll do something else. And all of these individual decisions were made in a way that seemed to be logical. But then in the end, it sums up to implementing a strategy that nobody intended to pursue. And for the companies that we just listed that are now being disrupted, it's happening even though the senior managers would never say that they want to be killed. But doing what the right thing is actually doesn't make sense if you look over the longer term. So if we turn it around to try to examine what happens in our lives, you notice that the way these guys were measuring goodness on the vertical axis was gross margins.
我是一个工厂的排程员。我不认为这周我们会安排钢筋的生产。我们会做其他事情。所有这些个体决策似乎都是合理的方式做出的。但最终，实施起来却总结出了一种没有人想要追求的策略。对于那些正在被打乱的公司来说，情况正在发生，尽管高级管理人员从来不会说他们想要被淘汰。但看起来正确之举实际上在长期看来并不明智。因此，如果我们试着审视我们生活中发生的事情，你会注意到这些人将垂直轴上的善行度衡量为毛利润。
If I go after higher gross margins, our profitability improved. And how you measure the company makes a huge difference in what you will prioritize and what you don't. Now you think about this in America, the last President Bush articulated that we will leave no children behind. And within about a year, they had to articulate, how will we measure leaving people behind? And as soon as they had this metric, the districts around America just went and started to teach to the test so that they would be measured as having not leaving people behind, irregardless of whether that was the right metric or not, everybody always tries to follow on whatever metric life they're being measured. And so the choice of gross margins actually caused these people to get out of the low end and focus on the high end because gross margin percentage went up as they got out.
如果我追求更高的毛利率，我们的盈利能力会提高。而你如何衡量公司会对你的优先次序有很大的影响，你会优先考虑什么，会放弃什么。美国前总统布什曾经表达过，我们不会让任何孩子掉队。大约一年后，他们不得不明确如何衡量谁被落在了后面。一旦制定了这个衡量标准，全美各地的地区就开始按照这个标准来教学，以便能够被衡量为没有让人掉队，无论这是否是正确的衡量标准，每个人都总是试图按照被衡量的指标来行事。因此，选择毛利率实际上促使这些人摆脱低端，专注于高端，因为随着他们摆脱低端，毛利率百分比也随之上升。
So how do we measure our life? Well, I think that this is roughly true. That people who have a high need for achievement, which includes at least 100% of the people in this room. When we have an extra ounce of energy or 30 minutes of time, we will deploy those resources into whatever activity gives us the most tangible and immediate evidence of achievement. And what brings us this sense of achievement are our careers. Every day, we finish a project, ship a product, close a sale, get promoted, get paid. And our lives in our profession provides tangible, immediate evidence almost every day that we're achieving something.
那么我们如何衡量我们的生活呢？我认为这大致是正确的。那些拥有高成就需求的人，至少包括在座的每个人。当我们多出一点精力或30分钟的时间时，我们会把这些资源投入到能给我们最直观和立竿见影的成就感的活动中。而给予我们这种成就感的是我们的职业。每天，我们完成一个项目，发货一个产品，完成一笔销售，晋升了，得到了报酬。我们在职业中的生活几乎每天都提供了有形、即时的证据，证明我们正在取得成就。
On the other hand, intimate relationships with our children and our spouses and close friends don't pay off on a day-to-day basis. In fact, those of you who have children observe this, that on a day-to-day basis, your children misbehave every day. And it really isn't until 20 years down the road that you can look at them and put your hands on your hips and say, we raised a great woman. But on a day-to-day basis, it just doesn't give us immediate evidence of achievement. And so when we have this extra ounce of energy or 30 minutes of time, our inclination is to invest on more time in our professions and plan that tomorrow I'll start to spend more time with my family. And it's the mechanism. It's the very same way these guys were deciding to invest in this rather than that.
另一方面，我们与孩子、配偶和亲密朋友之间的亲密关系并不是每天都会得到回报。事实上，你们中有孩子的人会观察到，孩子每天都会调皮捣蛋。直到20年后，你才能看着他们，双手叉腰说，“我们把一个了不起的人培养出来了。”但是每天看来，它真的无法立即给我们带来成就的证据。因此，当我们有额外的一点精力或30分钟的时间时，我们更倾向于将时间投资在工作上，并计划明天开始花更多时间与家人在一起。这是一种机制。这就如同这些人决定投资于这个而不是那个的方式一样。
They implemented a strategy that they don't plan to implement in our lives. A great many people find themselves in unhappy families. Even though they didn't plan it that way because of the way they implemented their resources. This is a more general level way to think about that problem. That almost everybody, when we start a company, we have a strategy. In order to implement the strategy, we need resources. And so we get it funded. And then we decide what to invest in and what not to invest in. And that deployment of resources determines the type of products and services and processes and acquisitions. And that defines what our strategy is.
他们实施了一项在我们生活中并不打算实施的策略。许多人发现自己身处不幸的家庭中。尽管他们并没有计划这样做，但由于他们实施资源的方式，他们却处在这种状况中。这是一种更通用的思考这个问题的方式。几乎每个人，在创办公司时都有一项策略。为了实施这项策略，我们需要资源。因此我们寻找资金。然后我们决定投资什么以及不投资什么。资源的运用决定了产品、服务、流程和收购的类型。而这些定义了我们的策略是什么。
And sometimes the strategy that we actually pursue is what we intended to do. But a lot of times what happens is unanticipated problems and opportunities just erupt in our lives. And we call those emerging initiatives. And the emergency initiatives start to compete with the intended strategy for resources. And what you decide you will implement depends on what you invest in in the resource allocation process. And as you succeed in the market, then you learn a lot more about what works and doesn't work.
有时，我们实际追求的策略就是我们打算采取的。但很多时候，意想不到的问题和机会突然出现在我们的生活中。我们把这些称为新兴倡议。紧急倡议开始与预期战略竞争资源。你决定要实施什么取决于你在资源分配过程中投资了什么。当你在市场取得成功时，你会更多地了解什么有效，什么无效。
So for most companies, strategy is not an analytical event followed by implementation. But strategy actually emerges 24-7 as people decide in an incremental basis, individual by individual, what we will prioritize and what we won't. And this is a kind of a generalized summary of what happened in this steel company. Ultimately, as you decide what you invest in in the resource allocation process, priorities get embedded in the company's profit formula. And so the reason why the steel companies measured profitability by gross margin percentage is everybody inside and outside the company measured profitability in this way. And that then determined what you can priorities and what you can't prioritize.
对于大多数公司来说，战略并不是在实施之后才进行的分析事件。实际上，战略是在人们逐步决定的基础上不断出现的，每个个体决定我们将优先考虑什么，不优先考虑什么。这是钢铁公司所发生的一般情况的概括总结。最终，当你决定在资源分配过程中投资什么时，优先事项就被嵌入到了公司的利润公式中。所以钢铁公司以毛利率百分比衡量盈利的原因是，公司内外的每个人都以这种方式衡量盈利。这决定了你可以或不能优先考虑什么。
So how do you deal with this problem? This is the way Clay Christensen decided to do it. In my first job with a consulting firm in Boston called the Boston Consulting Group, about a month after I started with the company, the project leader that I was working for came to me on Micah Tuesday and said, Clay, just so you can plan on this, on Sunday at 2 p.m., we've got a big team meeting. Because we've got to put together everything we have for a big meeting next Monday with the client. And this is your assignment. And I said, oh, man, Micah, I got a problem here.
那么你是如何处理这个问题的呢？这正是克莱·克里斯滕森决定做的方式。在我在波士顿咨询公司波士顿咨询集团的第一份工作中，大约在我加入公司一个月后，我所在项目组的领导前来找我，说：“克雷，为了让你提前计划，周日下午2点，我们有一次重要的团队会议。因为我们必须准备好所有材料，以便在下周一与客户开会。这是你的任务。”我说：“哦，麦卡，我遇到了一个问题。”
And that is I made a commitment to God when I was 16 that I wouldn't work on Sundays. And just I'm a religious guy. And that was just what I wanted to do with my life. And Mic just went bonkers. And he said, this is a company where everybody, if they have to, works when they have to work. And I said, well, I observe that, but I don't want to be that kind of person. And if I can't take my Sundays for my faith, I just don't want to work here. He was so mad. And he went off, came back about an hour later, calmed down a little bit. And he said, look, I talked to everybody else. And we'll do it on Saturday at 2 p.m.
这是我16岁时向上帝做出的承诺，我不会在周日工作。我是一个宗教信仰者。这是我想要为生活做的事情。米克就发疯了。他说，这是一个每个人都必须在需要时工作的公司。我说，我理解这一点，但我不想成为那种人。如果我不能为我的信仰保留周日，我就不想在这里工作。他非常生气。他离开了，一个小时后回来，情绪冷静了一些。他说，我和其他人谈过了。我们可以在星期六下午2点安排。
And I said, oh, Micah. I got a problem because I made a commitment to my wife that I wasn't going to work on Saturday. That was a focus on our family. And Mic went off the deep end on that one. And he said, if you're married and you take a job with this company, you've got to know what goes first. And I said, well, the reason I'm in trouble is because I know what has to come through first. And I can't come to this meeting on Saturday. He said, everybody works on Saturday. And I said, but I can't. Anyway, he went off even matter, came back an hour later. And he said, do you, by chance, work on Fridays? And anyway, so it worked, just fine. And I've thought about this a lot because if I had been, if I had just that one time, said just this once in this particular extenuating circumstance, I'm going to break my standard and do it. The problem with that logic is my whole life has been an unending stream of extenuating circumstances. And I realized that I need to stand for myself.
我说，“哦，迈克。我有麻烦了，因为我曾经对我妻子承诺过不在周六工作，那是我们家庭的重心。”迈克对此非常生气。他说，如果你结婚了，接受了这家公司的工作，你必须知道什么是最重要的。我说，问题是我知道什么是最重要的，我不能在周六来开会。他说，每个人都在周六工作。我说，但我不能。无论如何，他生气地走了，一个小时后回来了。他问我，你碰巧星期五工作吗？总之，这样也行。我想了很多，因为如果我只有那一次，曾经在这种特殊情况下说这一次，我会打破我的准则并做。这种逻辑的问题是，我的整个生活都是一连串的特殊情况。我意识到我需要为自己站起来。
Whatever my standards are, it's easier to keep that commitment 100% of the time than 98% of the time. And that has been, although those were just silly little meetings 30 years ago, they have proven to be two of the most important decisions I've ever made. And it became known in that company that if Clay Christensen is on your team, he doesn't work on Saturday. He doesn't work on Sunday. He's gone out of here by 6 PM. And nobody ever asked me to work on Saturday or Sundays or evenings after that. And I also believe that, again, this is from a perspective of my faith in God, that if we do things that God wants us to do, because he wants us to be happy, he will magnify us so that in our profession, we can actually do more. That he can magnify us to do more than we otherwise would able to do. Anyway, that's one set of thoughts about how you will measure your life. I've got a few more thoughts. But any questions or criticisms or comments or cannonballs? Are you doing OK?
无论我的标准是什么，始终保持100%的承诺要比98%的时间更容易。尽管30年前那些只是些愚蠢的小会议，但它们已被证明是我做过的最重要的两个决定。在那家公司中人们知道，如果克莱·克里斯滕森在你的团队中，他不会在周六工作，也不会在周日工作。他在下午6点之前就会离开。以后再也没有人让我在周六或周日或晚上工作。我也相信，再次强调从我的对上帝的信仰的角度来看，如果我们做上帝想我们做的事情，因为他希望我们快乐，他会使我们成功，这样在我们的专业领域，我们实际上可以做得更多。他会使我们有能力做比我们本来能做的更多。总之，这是有关如何衡量你的人生的一系列想法。我还有一些想法。但有问题、批评、评论还是炮弹吗？你还好吗？
The next one is, you notice I made a point in the diagram of steel that their choice of how they will measure profitability, gross margin percentage, really defined what they would and wouldn't do. So it raised the question with me and my students about how will we measure our lives. And I got an insight that, for me, has been very useful. And one day I was driving to work early, and I just got this feeling. I don't know where it came from, but it was a feeling inside that I was going to be given a big responsibility professionally. And it was very exciting. And it was so clear to me that this was coming, that I started to think about how I'll put the team together and everything. And then a couple of months later, they announced that, in fact, the person that was there was going, and they appointed a different person than Clay Christians.
接下来是，你们可以看到，我在钢铁的图表中特别指出了他们选择如何衡量盈利能力，毛利率百分比，这确实定义了他们将做什么和不会做什么。因此，这激发了我和我的学生关于如何衡量我们的生活的问题。我得到了一个对我来说非常有用的洞察。有一天，我早早地开车上班，我突然有了一种感觉。我不知道它从哪来，但它是一个内心的感觉，我即将在职业上被赋予一项重大责任。这让我非常兴奋。我如此清楚地意识到这一点，以至于我开始考虑怎样组建团队等等。几个月后，他们宣布，事实上，那个人将离职，并任命了一个名叫克雷·克里斯钦的不同的人。
And I just thought, I was so certain this was going to come to me. And I kind of predicated my whole next plan of that portion of my life around this. And I started to wonder, I look at my resume versus hers, and my resume was much better. And what's wrong with me? Why would they not have done this? So I had all of these thoughts. And then I got an idiot simple insight about how to assess what had just happened there, which kind of seems stupid to some of you probably. But the conclusion was that God doesn't hire accountants. And what I mean by this is we, because we have finite minds, in order to understand what's going on, we have to aggregate the phenomena into numbers.
我突然意识到，我曾经毫无疑问地认为这件事会发生在我身上。我在生活中的下一个计划，基本上是围绕这个部分展开的。我开始考虑，我看了看我的简历和她的简历，我的简历要好得多。那么问题出在哪里？为什么他们不选择我？所以我有了所有这些想法。然后，我得到一个很简单的洞察，关于如何评估刚发生的事情，对于一些人来说可能看起来很蠢。但结论是，上帝不会雇用会计师。我所说的是，因为我们有有限的思维，为了理解正在发生的事情，我们必须把现象综合成数字。
And so you guys, you can't keep track of all the individual customers who give you an order. You just, your brain can't keep all of them in view. And so we have to aggregate that in terms of orders and revenues. And they can't keep track of all your individual pieces of cost. And so you aggregate that. And then you subtract costs from revenues. And if the bottom line is a bigger number than last year, then you're doing well. And if it's smaller than you're screwing up. But because we have infinite minds, we have to aggregate in order to know what's going on. And it also gives us a sense of hierarchy. So people who preside over bigger numbers are higher than people who are responsible for smaller numbers in one way or another.
因此，你们无法追踪所有给你们下订单的个别客户。你们的大脑无法同时关注所有这些客户。所以我们必须以订单和收入的形式进行总合。你们也无法追踪所有个别成本。因此，你们也要进行总合。然后你们将成本从收入中减去。如果底线比去年更高，那么你们做得很好。如果比去年更少，那么你就搞砸了。但由于我们的头脑是有限的，我们必须进行总合才能知道发生了什么。这也让我们了解了一个等级制度。负责更大数字的人比负责更小数字的人在某种程度上高级。
And so we get this sense that if we go up the ladder faster than other people, we're being more successful than other people. And if we get richer than other people, that's a number. And so we begin to believe that this will is how we will measure our lives. But then I realized the difference is that God has an infinite mind. And that means that he doesn't have to aggregate above the level of individual people to have a complete understanding of everything that's going on in the world. And because he doesn't have to aggregate above the level of individual people, that's why I say he doesn't hire accountants. When I have my interview with God at the end of my life, he's not going to want to even come up in the conversation that I was a professor at the Harvard Business School or that I started a company that's been very successful. It's not going to come up.
因此，我们会产生这样的感觉，如果我们比别人更快地爬上阶梯，我们就比别人更成功。如果我们比别人更富有，那就是一个数字。所以，我们开始相信这就是我们衡量生活的方式。但后来我意识到，上帝是具有无限智慧的。这意味着他不需要将个人进行整合，就能完全了解世界上所发生的一切。由于他不需要将个人整合在一起，这就是为什么我会说他不会雇佣会计师。当我在生命的最后一刻与上帝进行面对面的交流时，他甚至都不会想要谈论我是哈佛商学院的教授，或者我创办的公司取得了很大的成功。这都不会成为谈论的重点。
And all he's going to do is say, all right, Clay, I stuck you in this position. Let's just talk about the individual people whose lives you blessed using your talents to make them become more successful and better people. And then I stuck you in this situation. And let's talk about the individual people whose lives you help to become better people and so on. And that's what we will talk about. The numbers actually will never come up in that conversation. And once I realized that this is the way God will measure my life, is by the individual people whose lives I help to become better people. Oh my gosh, the influence that has had on my life in terms of what I try to accomplish every day just changed completely.
他要说的只是，好吧，Clay，我把你放在了这个位置上。让我们谈谈那些你用你的才能祝福过的人的生活，让他们变得更成功、更优秀。然后我又把你放在了这个情境中。我们再谈谈那些你帮助变得更好的人。以此类推。这就是我们将要说的。实际上，在那个对话中数字永远不会出现。当我意识到这就是上帝衡量我的生命的方式，是通过我帮助变得更好的每个人的生活时，哦天啊，这对我的生活产生的影响，以及我每天努力实现的目标，完全改变了。
And every day I just pray that there will be somebody in my circle who I can become to be a better person. And I tell you, I feel so much more important to society because of this way I have decided to measure my life. And I thought I'd just offer that to you to figure out what is the purpose of your life and how will you measure it? Because understanding the measure will make a very big impact on what you do. Should I keep going to have questions or comments? Okay, I'm sorry to. I want to come back to another theory that I think is important both in business and in our personal life. And it's a. what do I call it? A pox on humanity that I will call marginal cost thinking. And those of you who have taken courses in finance or economics, remember what is a law or a principle that you should ignore sunk and fixed costs.
每天我只是祈祷在我的圈子里会有人让我成为一个更好的人。我告诉你，因为我决定衡量我的生活的方式，我觉得自己在社会中更加重要了。我想把这个方法分享给你，让你想想你的生命目的是什么，你会如何衡量它呢？因为理解衡量会对你的行为产生很大影响。我应该继续提问题或评论吗？好的，抱歉打断您。我想回到另一个我认为在商业和个人生活中都很重要的理论。那就是一个我称之为“边际成本思维”的人类之痛。那些上过金融或经济课程的人，记得你们应该忽视沉没成本和固定成本的法则或原则。
And just look at the marginal cost and the marginal revenue associated with a particular activity. And the reason why that's so critical is that if you're an established company like LinkedIn and you're looking at the starting of a new business, maybe something that would be disruptive to yourselves, if you use the logic of marginal cost thinking, it causes you not to do what you should do. So let me go back to the history of steel and describe how this happens. So we have a case in our course about US steel, which is one of these people.
只需看一下与特定活动相关的边际成本和边际收益。这样做的原因是非常关键的，因为如果你是像LinkedIn这样的一家成熟公司，正在考虑开始一项新业务，也许是对自己具有颠覆性影响的业务，如果你使用边际成本思维的逻辑，它会导致你不去做你应该做的事情。让我回顾一下钢铁的历史，并描述这是如何发生的。我们在课程中有一个关于美国钢铁公司的案例，他们之中就有这样的人。
And it happened in 1989. The Minimills had driven US steel out of these three tiers of the market and all that they were making was sheet steel. And there was an announcement in the paper that the biggest Minimill Newcor had just announced that they were going to go from here to here by making the world's first Minimill that made sheet. And the head of a group of engineers pulled the team together and said, ladies and gentlemen, we're dead. Because to this point, whenever the Minimills had taken a piece, we have fled. And now there is no place to go. Newcor has announced they're coming in.
这发生在1989年。迷你钢厂已经将美国钢铁挤出了市场的这三个层面，他们所生产的全部是薄钢板。报纸上刊登了一则消息，最大的迷你钢厂Newcor刚刚宣布他们将通过制造世界上第一家生产薄钢板的迷你钢铁厂，从这个地方扩展到那个地方。一个工程师团队的负责人召集团队成员，说道，女士们，先生们，我们完了。因为迄今为止，每当迷你钢厂占据一块市场，我们就逃之夭夭。现在再也没有地方可去了，Newcor已经宣布他们要进入市场。
And we either have to shut down or we have to build a Minimill. And so they looked at what the economics looked like. And at the time, US steel could produce commodity steel by at $340. They sold for $350. And so they're just hanging on with their fingernails. If they built a Minimill, you could make it at so much lower a cost that the net per ton improved by 6x. And that was very attractive in the steel industry. And so the proposition just sailed through the process. And until it came to the CFO.
我们要么关闭，要么建立一个小型钢厂。于是他们看了经济情况。当时，美国钢铁公司可以以每吨$340的成本生产商品钢，售价为$350。所以他们只是勉强维持。如果建立一个小型钢厂，你可以以更低的成本生产，每吨净利润提高了6倍。这在钢铁行业非常有吸引力。所以这个建议在流程中迅速通过。直到财务总监出现。
And the CFO looked at this and said, wait a minute. I can't believe you're even thinking about building a new mill to roll sheet. We have 30% excess capacity in our existing mills. If you want to run another sheet of steel, do it in our existing mills because the marginal cost of producing that is only $15. And you could sell it for $350. So you do the math. Does it make sense to create something new or just to use what we have? And the engineers looked at it and they were just so ashamed that this had never occurred to them. And so they just decided not to do it.
首席财务官看了看这个情况，说，等一下。我简直无法相信你们居然在考虑要建设一个新的轧钢厂。我们现有的轧钢厂产能有30%的过剩。如果你们想要再生产一片钢板，就在现有的轧钢厂里生产吧，因为生产成本仅为15美元。而你们可以卖到350美元。所以你们来算算。是创造新东西有意义，还是只是利用我们已有的资源？工程师们看了看，感到羞愧，他们从未意识到这一点。所以他们决定不这么做。
Well, then, subsequently what happened is none of the salespeople wanted to sell this low-end sheet. And if you cut the price on one ton in order to fill the excess capacity, you had to drop the cost on every ton. And it just made no sense to do it. And so they ended up without a new Minimill. It turns out that had they built the Minimill, which cost about $300 million. Over the subsequent two decades, that would have generated free cash of $3 billion. It played itself over 10x, even though it made no sense to do it. And this really helped me in my life because when I've seen companies that are being disrupted, and I'd say, you know, your sales force that's really good at this is actually no good at this disruptive stuff. You need to build a new sales force to do that. And always they come back, Clay, you're so academic. You have no idea how costly it is to deploy a new sales force. We've got to use the existing ones. Or I would say, you know your brand that's really good on that sustaining trajectory?
然后，接着发生的事情是，所有销售人员都不想销售这种低端产品。如果你降低一吨价格来填补过剩产能，那你必须降低每吨的成本。这样做毫无意义。因此他们最终没有建造新的迷你钢厂。事实证明，如果他们建造了这个成本大约为3亿美元的迷你钢厂，那在随后的两个十年中就会产生30亿美元的自由现金流。即使这做起来毫无意义，但回报是超过十倍的。这对我的人生有很大的帮助，因为当我看到受到颠覆的公司时，我会说，你们的销售团队在某方面很擅长，但在颠覆性事物上却不擅长。你们需要建立一个新的销售团队来应对。而他们总是回答，克莱，你太学术化了。你不知道部署一个新的销售团队有多么昂贵。我们必须使用现有的团队。或者我会说，你们的品牌在持续增长轨道上做得很好。
The brand won't work down here. You've got to build a new brand. And always the reaction is Clay. You have no idea how expensive it is to build a new brand. We've got to use our existing structure. And a startup company will say, guys, I guess we need to build a sales force, don't we? And they just do it. Or we need a brand and they just do it. And the question is why is it that the big companies that have all the capital find it so expensive to build new things? Whereas the startups just do it. And I realized that it's all behind this marginal cost thinking. So every time a senior executive needs to make a decision or an investment, there are two items on the menu. The full cost of making something new versus the marginal cost of using what we have in place. And always the marginal cost trumps the full cost. But in a startup company, they don't have anything established to leverage.
这个品牌在这里行不通。你必须打造一个全新的品牌。而且反应总是“克莱”（Clay）。你不知道建立一个新品牌有多贵。我们必须利用我们现有的结构。一个初创公司会说，伙计们，我想我们需要建立一个销售团队，对吗？然后他们就去做了。或者我们需要一个品牌，他们也立马去做了。问题在于，为什么那些资本充足的大公司在建立新东西时会觉得如此昂贵？而初创公司却能轻松做到。我意识到，这都是基于边际成本思维的结果。每当高层管理人员需要做出决策或投资时，菜单上有两个选项。制造新东西的全部成本与利用我们现有设施的边际成本。而边际成本总是胜过全部成本。但在一个初创公司，他们没有任何已建立好的东西可以利用。
And so they just do it. And that marginal cost thinking causes successful company after successful company to decide that it makes most sense to continue to do what they have built rather than creating something new. And that was the same marginal cost thinking that I described when Mike wanted me to meet on Saturday or Sunday. Because if the language was just this once in this particular circumstances, it's okay to do it. I'm thinking about the marginal cost is low and the marginal benefit is high. But over time, the full cost is what I almost always have to pay. And this language of marginal cost thinking when we get confronted with pornography, you look at that and you say the marginal cost of engaging in this is very small, especially if I can keep it quiet. But piece by piece, it adds up to divorce and awful things. And so this is just another way of thinking about how it's actually quite important that we use these principles to examine our lives. I'll do just one last one if that's okay. Any questions or criticisms? All right.
因此，他们就这样做了。这种边际成本思维导致一个又一个成功的公司决定继续做他们已建立起来的事情，而不是创造新的东西。这就是当Mike想让我在周六或周日见面时我描述的边际成本思维。因为如果这种情况只发生一次，那么去做也是可以的。我考虑的是边际成本很低，而边际效益很高。但随着时间的推移，我几乎总是要付出全额成本。当我们面对色情时，我们也会思考这种边际成本思维，你看到它，说自己参与其中的边际成本很低，尤其是如果能保持秘密。但一点一点地，这会积累导致离婚等可怕的事情发生。因此，这只是另一种思考方式，考虑到我们使用这些原则审视我们的生活是非常重要的。如果可以的话，我可以再讲一个。有任何问题或批评吗？好的。
This is one that has been fun for me. So here I am, Clay, and I have characteristics. Unfortunately, I just turned 60 years old. We have five kids, live in suburbs, got advanced degrees, whatever. But the fact that I have these characteristics has not caused me to go out and buy the Wall Street Journal. There might be a correlation between my characteristics and the propensity that I'll buy the Wall Street Journal. But the characteristics don't cause me to do that. What causes me to do it is, you know, stuff happens to us every day. Jobs arise in our lives that we need to get done. And we reach out and hire products or services or people to get the jobs done for us. And what the implication of it is that in marketing, understanding the customer is the wrong unit of analysis. You got to understand the job that they're trying to get done. That's what is critical. And to illustrate that, I want to quickly tell a funny story about milkshakes.
这是一个对我来说很有趣的事情。所以在这里，我是克雷，我有自己的特点。不幸的是，我刚刚迈入60岁。我们有五个孩子，住在郊区，拥有高级学位，总之什么的。但是我有这些特点并没有导致我去买《华尔街日报》。也许我的特点和我是否会购买《华尔街日报》之间存在某种相关性。但是这些特点并不能让我这么做。让我这么做的原因是，你知道，我们每天都会遇到各种事情。生活中会出现我们需要完成的工作。我们会寻找产品、服务或者人来帮助我们完成这些工作。在营销中，了解客户并不是正确的分析单位。你必须了解他们试图完成的工作。这才是至关重要的。为了说明这一点，我想快速讲一个有趣的关于奶昔的故事。
So one of the big fast food restaurant chains was trying to goose up their sales of their milkshakes. And so they brought our customers in who bought milkshakes and they'd say, how could we improve the milkshakes so you buy more of them? They give very clear feedback. They would then improve the milkshake on those dimensions. And it had no impact on sales or profits whatsoever. So we convinced them that that's the wrong way to think about the world. You need to understand what's the job that they're trying to get done that caused them to come here to hire a milkshake. So a colleague and I stood in a restaurant for 18 hours one day. And just took very careful notes on what time was he, did he buy it, these are almost all males. What was he wearing? Did he buy other food with it? Was he alone? Did he eat it in the restaurant or go off with it?
有一家大型快餐连锁店试图提升他们奶昔的销量。他们请来购买奶昔的顾客，询问如何改进奶昔以吸引更多购买。顾客们提供了清晰的反馈，然后店家根据这些维度改进奶昔，但并没有对销量或利润产生任何影响。我们说服他们，这种思维方式是错误的。你需要了解他们想要完成的任务，才能理解他们来这里购买奶昔的原因。我们的同事和我在一天内站在餐厅里18个小时，仔细记录他们购买的时间、他们的性别，几乎都是男性、他们穿着什么衣服，他们是否还买了其他食物，他们是独自一人还是和其他人一起，他们是在餐厅里吃还是带走了。
And it turned out that nearly half of the milkshakes were sold before 8.30 in the morning. They were always alone. It was the only thing they bought and they always got in the car and went off with it. So to figure out what the job was that they were trying to do that early in the morning, we came back the next day and stood ourselves outside the restaurant so that we could confront these people as they emerged with their milkshake. And in language that they could understand, essentially it's a excuse me, please. I got a problem. What job were you trying to do that caused you to come here at this awful hour to hire a milkshake? And as they would struggle to answer, I'd say, well, look, think about the last time you were in the same situation needing to get the same job done, but you didn't come here to hire a milkshake. What did you hire?
结果表明，几乎有一半的奶昔在早上8点半之前就被卖出去了。它们总是独自一人购买，是他们买的唯一东西，然后他们总是拿着奶昔上车走了。所以为了弄清楚他们早上那么早来这里要做什么工作，我们第二天回来了，站在餐厅外面，以便与那些拿着奶昔出来的人面对面。用他们能理解的语言，基本上就是：“对不起，请问。我有问题。您早上来这里买奶昔是要做什么工作？”当他们努力回答时，我会说：“好吧，想想上次你处于同样的情况，需要完成同样的工作，但你没有到这里来买奶昔。那时你买的是什么东西？”
And it turned out that they all had the same job in the early morning and that is they had a long and boring drive to work. And they just needed something to do while they were driving to keep themselves from falling asleep. One hand had to be on the wheel, but somebody gave me another hand and there wasn't anything in it. And I just needed something to do while I'm driving. And I'm not hungry yet, but I know I'd be hungry by 10 o'clock, so I also need something that would just thunk down in my stomach and stay there for the morning. Good question. What do I hire when I have this job to do? You know, I never thought about it before, but last Friday I hired a banana to do the job. Take my word for it. Never hire bananas. They're gone in three minutes. You're hungry by 7.30? If you promise not to tell my wife, I hire donuts a lot. But actually, they don't do the job either. Come to think of it. They crumb all over my clothes. They mean my fingers gooey. They're gone too fast. Yeah, I do bagels. Man, they're so dry and tasteless. I have to steer the car with my knees while I put the jammed grain cheese on. And once the phone rang and I was in big trouble, I hired a Snickers bar once, but I felt so guilty. I never hired Snickers again.
事实证明, 他们早上都有相同的工作，那就是他们要开着车去工作。他们只是需要在开车时做些事情来保持清醒。一只手必须握在方向盘上，但有人给了我另一只手却什么也没有。我只是需要在开车时做些事情。现在我还不饿，但我知道到了十点我会饿的，所以我也需要一些在早上吞下去就留在胃里的东西。好问题。当我有这个任务要完成时，我应该雇什么呢？你知道，我以前从来没有想过，但上周五我雇了一个香蕉来完成这个任务。相信我。永远别雇香蕉。它们在三分钟内就消失了。你七点半就饿了？如果你答应不告诉我妻子，我经常雇甜甜圈。但实际上，它们也没什么作用。想想看，它们弄脏了我的衣服，弄乱了我的手指。它们消失得太快了。对了，我吃百吉饼。天哪，它们太干、太无味了。我得用膝盖控制着车，一边往上加果酱和奶酪。有一次电话响了，我遇到大麻烦，我有次雇了一个士力架，但我感到很内疚。我再也不雇士力架了。
But let let me tell you, when I come here and hire this milkshake, it is so viscous. It takes me 25 minutes to suck it up, this thin straw. Who know what the ingredients are? I don't care. I just know that I'm full all morning. And it fits right here in my cup holder. And I can actually turn it sideways and it doesn't fall out. It's just perfect. And it turns out that the milkshake does the job better than any of the competitors. And the competitors are not Burger King milkshakes, but it's bananas, donuts, bagels, Snickers bars, coffee, and so on. And then the afternoon is hired for a totally different job. But once you understood what the job was, then they realized, oh my gosh, we have been improving the milkshake on dimensions of performance that are irrelevant to the job. And what is critical, we weren't even aware of them.
但是让我告诉你，当我来到这里买这杯奶昔时，它是如此粘稠。我要花25分钟才能用这根细吸管把它喝完。谁知道里面的成分是什么？我不在意。我只知道我整个早上都感觉饱腹。而且它正好适合我的杯架。我甚至可以把它横过来，它也不会掉出来。这太完美了。结果发现，这杯奶昔比任何竞争对手都做得更好。而竞争对手不是汉堡王的奶昔，而是香蕉、甜甜圈、贝果、士力架、咖啡等等。那么下午再来一份完全不同的工作。但一旦你明白了任务是什么，他们就意识到，哦天哪，我们一直在改进奶昔在工作上无关紧要的性能方面。关键是，我们甚至没有意识到它们存在。
So understanding that, how would you improve the morning milkshake? Well, you make it even thicker to take longer to suck it up. You would stir tiny chunks of fruit in it and make it different every day, not to help them become healthy, because they don't hire it to become healthy. But you're just driving along and going. And it brings unpredictability to a normal routine. And then you move the dispensing machine from behind the counter to the front of the counter and install a prepaid swipe card so you could just dash in, gas up, and go and never get caught in the line. And that becomes obvious only if you understand the job to be done. So one of our students on the last day of class asked to the other class members, if you ever thought it was a guy, if you ever wondered what job your wife hired you to do, and as we thought about it, I'd started to think about in my own life, do I understand what's the jobs in Christine's life for which she might hire a husband? And I realized very quickly that I really have, honestly, have tried to be an unselfish man. And I spend much of my life doing things for Christine, which I am certain she needs.
那么，了解了这一点，你会如何改进早晨的奶昔呢？嗯，你可以把它做得更浓稠一点，这样喝起来会花更长时间。你可以在奶昔中搅拌一些小果块，并每天都做出不同口味的奶昔，不是为了帮助他们保持健康，因为他们并不是为了健康而购买奶昔。而是为了迅速地享受。这样一来，会给平淡的日常带来一些不可预测性。然后，把售卖机从柜台后面移到柜台前面，并安装一张预付卡，这样你可以随时进来、加油、离开，而不会被排队拖延。这些只有在了解需要完成的工作时才会显而易见。因此，我们班上的一名学生在上课的最后一天向其他同学提问，如果你曾想过你的妻子雇佣你做什么工作，我想了一下，在我自己的生活中，我是否了解克里斯汀生活中雇佣一个丈夫的需求是什么？很快我就意识到，我真的曾试图成为一个无私的人。我大部分时间都在为克里斯汀做事，我确信她需要。
And I work so hard to be the kind of husband that I'm certain that she needs. And then when she doesn't appreciate what I'm trying to give her, I get mad because I'm trying to give you what I know you need. And then when the student said, no, Clay, you need to sit in her chair and understand, don't try to understand Christine, you need to understand what are the jobs that are arising in Christine's life for which a husband might be useful. Because just like the milkshake competed against Burger King, you know, other products and not milkshakes, most things you have options for what you can get the job done beside your spouse. And I realized that, oh my gosh, it's frustrating to thinking like most marketers do, I'm certain you need our product. I'm certain you want what I want to give to you as opposed to understanding what's the job and then try to become the kind of husband that can do the job perfectly. And I'm still in process, but it has been a wonderful way for me to think about what might be the source of even a happier marriage. We've been at it for 36 years, but a lot more to go. Anyway, there are a few more things, but I've taken your time. Any other comments or questions that I could help with? Yes, could you use that? Unless it's not an important question. We better maybe just have these two.
我努力成为我确信她需要的那种丈夫。然后当她不欣赏我努力给她的时候，我会生气，因为我正在努力给你我知道你需要的东西。然后有一次有人说，克莱，你需要坐在她的位置上理解，不要试图理解克里斯汀，你需要理解是克里斯汀生活中所涌现出的工作，需要一个丈夫的帮助。因为就像奶昔要面对汉堡王，你知道，其他产品和不是奶昔的东西，大多数情况下，在你可以选择除了配偶之外的选项来完成工作。我意识到，天哪，像大多数市场营销人员一样去想是令人沮丧的，我很确定你需要我们的产品。我很确定你想要我想给你的东西，而不是理解是什么工作，然后努力成为能够完美执行这份工作的丈夫。我仍在努力中，但这对我来说是一个考虑如何让婚姻更幸福的美妙方式。我们已经走过36年了，但还有更多要走。无论如何，还有一些事情，但我已经占用了您的时间。您还有其他评论或问题需要帮助吗？是的，您可以使用那个问题，除非那不是一个重要问题。也许我们应该只讨论这两个问题。
Yeah, so I was wondering if you've thought about countries, the way that you've articulated the differences between startups and established companies. Some countries have a lot of investment that's already happened, a lot of infrastructure that they've built out. And they're trying to expand that in some kind of way to optimize their marginal costs. Other countries, startup countries, countries that don't have a lot of infrastructure are looking at available technology and building something new. And they don't really have to worry about marginal costs. And that gives them an advantage. That's right. You can roll out entirely cellular based telephone system. You can build all of your trains, the sides meet rails, etc. Yeah. I was wondering if you could speak to that issue with that. Boy, it's a very important insight and you're exactly right. So in the competition amongst nations, there are two things going on. One is truly disruption. So if you look at why Japan's economy was so robust through the 70s and 80s and then died in the 90s and in our century, the reason is that Japan's companies disrupted America's manufacturing base. It wasn't just Toyota, but one after another, they disrupted us. And then Korea, Taiwan and Singapore came in at the bottom of the market and disrupted Japan as their products hit the high end. And then comes China and India and now Vietnam is already doing it to those guys.
是的，我在想你是否考虑过国家之间的差异，以及你如何表达初创公司和成熟公司之间的区别。一些国家已经进行了大量的投资，建设了大量的基础设施。他们试图以某种方式扩大这些基础设施，以优化他们的边际成本。另一些国家，初创国家，即没有很多基础设施的国家，正在研究现有技术并建立一些新的东西。他们实际上不必担心边际成本。这给了他们一个优势。没错。你可以完全采用基于蜂窝的电话系统。你可以建造所有的火车，铁路等。我在想你是否能就这个问题谈谈你的看法。天哪，这是一个非常重要的洞察力，你说得完全正确。在国家之间的竞争中，有两个事情在进行中。一个是真正的颠覆。所以如果你看一下为什么日本的经济在70年代和80年代如此强劲，然后在90年代以及我们这个世纪倒下的原因是，日本的公司颠覆了美国的制造业基础。不仅是丰田，而是一个接一个地颠覆了我们。然后韩国、台湾和新加坡进入市场底部，颠覆了日本，因为他们的产品占据了高端市场。然后是中国和印度，现在越南已经开始对这些国家进行颠覆。
So that's one explanation of the macroeconomic impact of microeconomic disruption. But then the other one is very important because if you're growing, then you have to keep adding capacity and every time you add capacity, you implement whatever is the latest technology. And if you're not growing and there's a new technology, the calculus is that the marginal cost wants you to stay with what you have. And so it's a very punishing reality that we think that growth is the consequence of good technology and smart people. But in reality, growth is an input to being able to sustain success because of the marginal cost thinking. It's a magnificent summary. So thanks. Thank you. Hi.
这是关于微观扰动对宏观经济影响的一个解释。另一方面，如果你在增长，那么你必须不断增加产能，每次增加产能都要实施最新的技术。如果你不在增长，而且有一种新技术出现，那么边际成本会让你选择保持现有技术。所以我们认为增长是良好技术和聪明人的结果，但实际上，增长是维持成功所必须的一个输入，因为有边际成本思维。这是一个很好的总结。所以谢谢你。谢谢。嗨。
Question about, you were talking about the, and when you're thinking about developing products and services, the job that they serve, how do you resolve the inherent conflict that you often see particularly in larger or more established companies where a product or service may be addressing a customer job, but they may also be serving a job that the company itself needs to address. People talk about it in terms of a strategy tax, that there is a, you know, Microsoft often encounters this. I think there are other, there are times, even with our own products where we talk about these issues where there may be different jobs that something tries to address, whether it's an internal job and goal versus an customer goal.
在谈论产品和服务的开发时，您提到了关于产品和服务所服务的工作。在大型或更成熟的公司中，您经常会看到产品或服务既在解决客户需求，但同时也可能在解决公司自身需要解决的问题上存在冲突。人们常常用“战略税”来描述这种情况，微软经常遇到这种情况。我想还有其他时候，甚至是我们自己的产品，我们在讨论这些问题时可能会发现有不同的工作目标，一方面是内部目标，另一方面是客户目标。
Yeah. Well, this is a great question. I think you want to just separate the two jobs. As a general rule, I don't mean to be disparaging of, but there's a, there's a class of humanities that we call marketers. I don't know if you've ever met them, but they exist when you're developing a new product that doesn't do what the customer needs to do. And so you hire marketing people to convince the customer after the fact that they need what you've decided they need. It is much more, marketing is, is done much more productively if they're part of the development of the product, inputting to that decide, you know, what the job is. And if you do that well, you don't need marketing. Sorry, I think there's just a potentially difference between sort of things you want to do to drive network effects versus things that are good for the individual. So this may not be something that's good for the individual, but if the individual does it, it's good for the whole. So that conflict, more than a, oh, I don't understand the cost.
是的。这是一个很好的问题。我认为你只是想要将这两个工作分开。一般来说，我并不是在贬低，但有一类我们称之为市场营销人员的人。我不知道你是否见过他们，但当你开发一个新产品，这个产品不能满足客户的需求时，他们就存在了。所以你雇佣市场营销人员来说服客户他们需要你决定他们需要的东西。如果他们参与产品的开发，为产品提供建议，市场营销的效果会更好。如果你做得很好，你就不需要市场营销。对不起，我认为驱动网络效应的事情和对个人有利的事情之间可能存在潜在的差异。这可能不利于个人，但如果个人这样做，对整个团队就有好处。因此，这种冲突并不是因为我不理解成本。
Yeah. Well, this is the way I try to think about it as separate questions because if you do something for the network effects, in all likelihood, it will never have that impact if it doesn't do the job of the person who is the customer who has to buy it. And then once you understand that, then you could add characteristics to the product or service to have the second level effect provided that it doesn't compromise in any way its job to be done. I think that that's correct, that it has to be a serial decision and not a parallel decision. That's a great question. Last one, and then we better let you go back. Thank you very much for coming here first of all.
是的。嗯，这是我试图思考的方式，将其作为单独的问题，因为如果你为了网络效应而做某事，在大多数情况下，如果它不能完成顾客必须购买的任务，它很可能永远不会产生那种影响。一旦你明白了这一点，你就可以为产品或服务增加特征，以产生第二层效果，前提是它不会以任何方式影响它所要完成的任务。我认为这是正确的，它必须是一个顺序决策，而不是并行决策。这是一个很好的问题。最后一个问题，然后我们最好让你回去了。非常感谢你首先来到这里。
I have a question about what you are saying about the personal level of the company level. It seems like a lot of what you are talking about is about essentially managing change in a certain way. We have all those disruptions coming in, both at the personal level and in organizations. Are there, in your experience, things that companies do and individuals do that make them better at foreseeing what's going to happen at managing situations like, for example, the steel situation and don't allow themselves to get there?
我有一个关于你所说的公司层面和个人层面的问题。你讨论的大部分内容似乎都是关于如何在某种程度上有效管理变化。我们都面临着个人层面和组织层面的各种干扰。根据你的经验，你认为有哪些公司和个人做得更好，可以更好地预见未来可能发生的情况，有效处理像钢铁行业这种情况，避免自己陷入其中？
Yeah. That's a great question. I don't know the answer yet. I'll tell you where my mind is at this point in time. That is, in my personal life, by actually allocating chunks of my energy and time to my family and to God and to my profession, is the best solution that I can find. A secondary one is I try never to work alone, but to anything that I do do with my children. Rather than buy nice homes, we've bought run-down homes that we have to fix up ourselves. Every time I do something, I do it with the kids. And working together, we've had wonderful times together. So in trying to organize my life, I've tried to put the job to be done all on the same field, if that makes any sense.
是的。这是一个很棒的问题。我还不知道答案。我会告诉你我当前的想法。在我的个人生活中，通过将我的精力和时间分配给家人、上帝和专业工作，是我能找到的最好的解决方案。另一个解决方案是我从不独自工作，而是和孩子们一起做任何事情。我们并不买漂亮的房子，而是购买旧房子，自己动手修缮。每次我做某事，都和孩子们一起完成。一起工作，我们度过了很美好的时光。因此，在努力组织我的生活时，我试图把所有事情都放在同一个领域进行，如果这有意义的话。
In a corporation, the evidence is very strong that if you try to disrupt yourself from within the mainstream organization, the probability that you can succeed at the next wave is zero. It has never happened. The only way you could do it is you have to set up a completely independent business unit because it needs a different business model. And it's critical because you will never get an email from the people at the top saying, guys, last Friday we got disrupted. It's a process, not an event.
在一家公司里，有很强的证据表明，如果你试图在主流组织内部挑战自己，成功的可能性为零。这种情况从未发生过。唯一的方法是你必须设置一个完全独立的业务部门，因为它需要不同的商业模式。这很关键，因为你永远不会收到高层人员的邮件说：“伙计们，上周五我们被颠覆了。”这是一个过程，而不是一个事件。
And if you, the new one begins and really becomes defined while the core business is at the top of its game. If you wait until this is in trouble, then this game is over. And that's why you need to do it in parallel. So I hope that's useful. Well, you guys, you've wasted a good hour on an important afternoon, but I'm grateful that you take the time to spend this with me. And if I could be useful, I just work at HBS. And so let me help in whatever we can.
如果你是新人，开始并真正定义自己，而核心业务正处于巅峰状态。如果你等到出现问题再采取行动，那就太迟了。这就是为什么你需要并行进行。所以我希望这对你有用。嗯，你们，你们浪费了一个重要的下午，但我很感激你们抽出时间和我共度时光。如果我能有所帮助，我只是在HBS工作而已。所以让我尽我所能来帮助你们。
It's a great company and you're wonderful. Well, thanks so much.
这是一个很棒的公司，你很棒。嗯，非常感谢。