The MOST Important Thing | BIGGEST Investing Lessons From Billionaire Howard Marks (TIP497)

发布时间 2022-11-22 07:45:00 来源

摘要

💰Click here to download your FREE guide to Stop Worrying About Your Finances In 4 Simple Steps: https://www.theinvestorspodcast.com/subscribe-youtube/ 🎧 Listen to our episodes here: https://link.chtbl.com/WSB Clay Finck studies the work of Howard Marks and shares his biggest takeaways from reading his book, The Most Important Thing. Howard Marks is the co-founder of Oaktree Capital which has $159 billion in assets under management. ▶️ RELATED EPISODES: - Investing Wisely In Times Of Uncertainty with Howard Marks: https://youtu.be/ljXI1vUbl6Q - 3 Ways To Increase Caution In Investing with Howard Marks: https://youtu.be/ZE-eyFI_axk - Mental Models For Investing & Life | The Worldly Wisdom of Charlie Munger: https://youtu.be/0RldYtkp1D4 - The BEST Investor You've NEVER Heard Of | Nick Sleep: https://youtu.be/YJQaKHnurpo IN THIS EPISODE, YOU’LL LEARN: 00:00:00 - Intro 00:01:47 - The Most Important Thing 00:03:18 - Second-Level Thinking 00:07:40 - Efficient Market Hypothesis 00:10:59 - Investing Risk 00:14:35 - Defining Risk 00:20:45 - Market Cycles 00:23:32 - Investing Mistakes 00:29:03 - How to Invest with Market Cycles 00:31:24 - Buying Bargains 00:35:10 - Investing in a Low Rate Environment 00:35:32 - Patient Opportunism 00:39:16 - Investing Defensively 00:45:00 - Why Macro Forecasts Are So Difficult 🖊️ Access the transcript and learn more about the guest here: https://www.theinvestorspodcast.com/episodes/lessons-from-billionaire-howard-marks 📖 BOOKS MENTIONED: - The Most Important Thing by Howard Marks: https://amzn.to/3g5Zd1N - Mastering The Market Cycle by Howard Marks: https://amzn.to/3AiMe3I - Richer, Wiser, Happier by William Green: https://amzn.to/3RX9gDp Disclosure: Some of the links above are affiliate links that we may earn commission from. This helps keep our show going! 😀 💡 OTHER RESOURCES - Howard’s article, The Illusion of Knowledge: https://www.oaktreecapital.com/insights/memo/the-illusion-of-knowledge - Seeking Alpha is a crowd-sourced content service for financial markets. Take control of your financial future — Use our link here for a 14-day free trial: https://www.sahg6dtr.com/59QC8Z/R74QP/ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ABOUT OUR SHOW 🎙 On We Study Billionaires, we interview and study famous financial billionaires including Warren Buffett, Bill Gates, and Ray Dalio. We teach you what we learn and how you can apply their investment strategies in the stock market. 🌍 Website: https://www.theinvestorspodcast.com/we-study-billionaires/ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ 📚OUR FREE INVESTING COURSES/RESOURCES https://www.theinvestorspodcast.com/tip-academy/ 📊TRY OUR STOCK INVESTING TOOL: TIP FINANCE https://www.theinvestorspodcast.com/tip-finance/ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ⏤ ❗ DISCLAIMER: This show is for entertainment purposes only. Before making any decisions consult a professional. This show is copyrighted by The Investor’s Podcast Network. Written permission must be granted before syndication or rebroadcasting.

GPT-4正在为你翻译摘要中......

中英文字稿

Greed can lead us to pursue strategies that lead us to hoping for high returns while overlooking any of the potential risks. It can also lead us to holding onto an asset that has appreciated tremendously well above its fair value, but we hold onto it because we have that greed that says, you know, further gains are to come.

贪婪会导致我们追求高回报的策略，而忽视任何潜在的风险。它还会导致我们持有已经大幅升值超过其公正价值的资产，但我们仍然保留它，因为贪婪在告诉我们，进一步的收益即将到来。

Hey everyone, welcome to the Investors Podcast. I'm your host, Clay Fink. And on today's episode, I'm going to be doing a deep dive on Howard Marks' book, The Most Important Thing. I'll be covering some of my biggest takeaways I had from going through his wonderful book. Howard Marks is the co-founder of Oaktree Capital, which has 159 billion in assets under management.

大家好，欢迎来到《投资者播客》。我是你们的主持人克雷·芬克。在今天的节目中，我将深入解读霍华德·马克斯的书《最重要的事情》。我将分享我在阅读这本精彩的书中获得的一些重要观点。霍华德·马克斯是橡树资本的联合创始人，该公司管理着1590亿美元的资产。

Studying from a fantastic investor like Howard reminds me of how much I don't know as an investor, in that the world is very uncertain and unpredictable. In a world that's ever-changing, it's important to have the humility to challenge your own beliefs and continually upgrade our level of thinking. During this episode, I'll be discussing some of the biggest lessons I learned from reading Howard's book, The Most Important Thing.

向像霍华德这样出色的投资者学习让我意识到作为一名投资者，我有多少不知道的东西，因为世界是非常不确定和难以预测的。在一个不断变化的世界里，重要的是要保持谦逊，质疑自己的信念，并不断提升我们的思维水平。在本期节目中，我将讨论我从读霍华德的书《最重要的事》中学到的一些重要教训。

More specifically, I'll be talking about the role of psychology in markets, how Howard thinks about the efficiency of markets, the role market cycles play in Howard's investment strategy, why he only looks for bargains when investing, how Howard thinks about investing in a low interest rate environment, why we should put an intense focus on investing defensively, and why trying to predict where the macro economy is heading is a fool's errand.

更具体地说，我将谈论心理学在市场中的作用，霍华德如何看待市场的效率，市场周期在霍华德的投资策略中扮演的角色，为什么他只在投资时寻找便宜货，霍华德如何看待低利率环境下的投资，为什么我们应该密切关注防御性投资，以及为什么试图预测宏观经济走向是愚人的行为。

I've really enjoyed reading Howard's book as I learned quite a bit from his thoughtful insights on investing intelligently. With that, I hope you enjoyed today's episode covering the investing wisdom of billionaire Howard Marks.

我非常喜欢阅读霍华德的书，因为从他对智慧投资的深入见解中我学到了很多东西。同时，我希望你们喜欢今天的节目，我们讨论了亿万富翁霍华德·马克思的投资智慧。

What is the most important thing in investing? This is the question that Howard Marks would be challenged with when investing for clients and developing a philosophy, except there is not just one thing when it comes to investing. There is a multitude of different things that are really important, and if we mississess any of them as investors, then we run the risk of having sub-optimal outcomes in the end.

投资中最重要的是什么？这是霍华德·马克斯面对为客户进行投资并制定投资理念时所面临的问题，除了投资之外还有很多因素都非常重要。如果我们作为投资者忽视了其中任何一个，那么最终我们就有可能取得次优的结果。

As Mark states, quote, successful investing requires thoughtful attention to many separate aspects, all at the same time. Omen, anyone, and the result is likely to be less than satisfactory, end quote. Marks also states that his book isn't a step-by-step guide for learning how to invest, but rather a book that covers the investment philosophies that he uses in his own process.

正如马克所说：“成功投资需要同时对许多不同方面进行深思熟虑。”如果我们掉以轻心，可能会得到不尽人意的结果。” 马克还提到，他的书不是一个逐步指南，教你如何投资，而是介绍他自己的投资理念的著作。

The ideas presented in his book are intended to be timeless in a world that is constantly changing. Ironically, Marks' goal isn't to simplify investing, but rather make it clear just how complex it actually is. Marks says that the most important key to his successful investment career has been an effective investment philosophy, developed and honed over time for more than four decades, and implemented consciously by highly skilled individuals who share his culture and values. He also outlines in the introduction the importance of experience in developing that philosophy.

这本书中提出的观点旨在在一个不断变化的世界中具有持久的意义。讽刺的是，马克斯的目标并不是简化投资，而是清楚地展示它实际上是多么复杂。马克斯表示，他在成功的投资职业生涯中最重要的关键是一种有效的投资理念，这种理念经过了四十多年的时间逐渐发展和完善，并由具备高度技能的个人以及与他分享相同文化和价值观的人有意识地实施。他还在引言中阐述了经验在发展这种理念中的重要性。

Experience is a poor teacher during the good times because we believe that investing is easy and that anybody can make a lot of money in the markets.

在好时期，经验是一个糟糕的教师，因为我们相信投资很容易，任何人都能在市场上赚大钱。在好时期，我们常常觉得投资很容易，所有人都能在市场上轻松赚大钱。因此，经验并不能真正教会我们如何应对市场的变化、风险和挑战。当市场繁荣时，我们的自信心可能过于高涨，容易对风险产生误判。因此，仅仅依赖经验在好时期的投资决策往往是不准确和不可靠的。

Now chapter one in his book is titled Second Level Thinking. I wanted to read the very beginning because I just don't think I could say this any better myself, so here it goes. Quote, few people have what it takes to be great investors. Some can be taught, but not everyone. And those who can be taught can't be taught everything. Valid approaches work some of the time, but not all. And investing can't be reduced to an algorithm and turned over to a computer. Even the best investors don't get it right every time. The reasons are simple. No rule always works. The environment isn't controllable and circumstances rarely repeat exactly. Psychology plays a major role in markets and because it's highly variable, cause and effect relationships aren't reliable. An investment approach may work for a while, but eventually the actions it calls for will change the environment, meaning a new approach is needed. And if others emulate an approach, that will blunt its effectiveness. Investing like economics is more art than science. And that means it can get a little messy. End quote.

现在他的书的第一章标题为“第二层思维”。我想读一读开头，因为我觉得自己无法用更好的方式来表达这个意思，所以就让我来介绍一下吧。引用：“很少有人具备成为优秀投资者的能力。有些人可以被教导，但并非人人都可以。而那些可以被教导的人也不能学到所有东西。一些有效的方法在某些时候会起作用，但并非总是如此。投资不能被简化为算法并交给计算机处理。即使最好的投资者也不会每次都做正确决策。原因很简单。没有规则永远适用。环境无法控制，情况很少会完全重复。心理因素在市场中起着重要作用，由于其高度的可变性，因果关系也不可靠。一种投资方法可能会在一段时间内有效，但最终其所需的行动将改变环境，意味着需要新的方法。如果他人效仿一种方法，那么其效力将会削弱。投资就像经济学更像是一门艺术而非科学。这意味着它可能会有点混乱。”引文结束。

Note that he said that investing is more of an art than a science. This is why he isn't going to outline a specific formula or specific method to being a successful investor. Because if the formula was so successful and easy that you could just put it into a book or put it into a podcast episode, it would become widely known and arbitrage by the overall market, thus making it ineffective.

请注意，他说投资更多是一门艺术而不是科学。这就是为什么他不打算详细列出如何成为成功投资者的具体公式或具体方法。因为如果这个公式非常成功且容易，你可以将其编写成书籍或制作成播客，它会被整个市场广泛知晓并通过套利从而变得无效。

To marks successful investing consists of receiving a return above that of the market, such as what is achieved through a low cost index fund, which is really available to anyone and requires no scale or particular insights to achieve that return. The way to outperform is either through luck or through insight. And since luck isn't something we can really rely on, we must develop superior insights relative to others. So superior insights are required to earn above average returns, and superior insights really come from what Marx calls second level thinking.

成功的投资意味着获得超过市场水平的回报，比如通过低成本指数基金所实现的回报，这对任何人来说都是真正可行且无需规模或特别洞见。要超越他人，要么靠运气，要么靠洞察力。而既然运气是我们不能依赖的，我们必须相对于他人发展出卓越的洞察力。因此，要获得高于平均水平的回报，需要卓越的洞察力，而这种卓越的洞察力来自马克思所说的二级思考。

First level thinking says that it's a good company, let's buy it. Second level thinking says that it's a good company, but the market thinks it's a great company and it's not. So the stock is overrated and overpriced. Let's sell it. First level thinking says that quote, the outlook calls for low growth in rising inflation. Let's dump our stocks and quote. Second level thinking says that outlook stinks, but everyone else is selling in panic. Bye. First level thinking is so simple, so everyone can do it. Anyone can have an opinion based on first level thinking. Second level thinking is deep, complex and convoluted. The second level thinker takes many big ideas into account, such as the range of likely potential outcomes, the most likely of the potential outcomes, the probability that I'm right, how my expectation differs from the consensus, how does the consensus think about the particular asset, etc.

第一级思考认为这家公司很好，我们应该买进。第二级思考认为这家公司不错，但市场认为它更好，事实并非如此。所以股票被高估且定价过高。我们应该卖出它。第一级思考认为，展望表明经济增长低而通胀上升。我们应该抛售我们的股票。第二级思考认为展望糟糕，但其他人都在恐慌中卖出。再见。第一级思考很简单，所以每个人都可以做到。任何人都可以根据第一级思考来发表意见。而第二级思考则深入、复杂且曲折。第二级思考者会考虑许多重要的观点，比如可能的潜在结果范围、最可能的潜在结果、我正确的概率、我的预期与共识的差异，以及共识如何看待特定资产等等。

Given how complex investing can be, anyone who tells you that it's very simple and that anyone can do it, you should just simply ignore. Those who believe investing is simple probably aren't using second level thinking. Luckily for us, the good news is that the prevalence of first level thinkers increases the returns available to second level thinkers.

鉴于投资问题十分复杂，任何声称投资非常简单，任何人都能够做到的人，你应该简单地将其忽略。那些认为投资简单的人可能没有采用二级思维。幸运的是，好消息是，初级思维者的普遍存在增加了二级思维者可以获得的回报。

Obviously, in order to beat the market average, we must deviate from the holdings the average person has. And Marx lays out a two by two matrix to help show how things shake out for unconventional investors. In the first column, it shows the two outcomes for the average and the conventional investor. For the average investor, a favorable outcome produces average good results, and an unfavorable outcome produces average bad results. Then in the second column, for the unconventional investor, it shows that for the favorable outcome, this leads to above average results, and for the unfavorable outcome, this leads to below-average results, which is very simple and straightforward.

显而易见，为了超越市场平均水平，我们必须偏离普通人所持有的资产。而马克思提出了一个二乘二的矩阵，以帮助展示非常规投资者的情况。在第一列中，它显示了普通和传统投资者的两种结果。对于普通投资者，有利的结果产生平均好的收益，而不利的结果则产生平均差的收益。然后在第二列中，对于非常规投资者，结果好的情况会导致超过平均水平的收益，而结果不好的情况则导致低于平均水平的收益，这非常简单明了。

The unconventional approach really comes down to buying something for less than it's worth, in the market eventually agreeing with you that the asset was undervalued at the time of the purchase. I'm going to be getting into this later when I discuss his thoughts on looking for bargains when buying a company.

这种非常规的方法实际上就是以低于其真实价值购买一样东西，市场最终也会认同你在购买时对该资产的低估。稍后当我谈论他对于购买公司时寻找便宜货的观点时，我将会涉及到这一点。

Marx does have a chapter on the efficient market hypothesis, so I did want to cover this as well. I didn't want to dive too much into the theory as I think the audience is fairly well-versed with what it means. It's not that markets are either fully efficient or fully inefficient. The truth is likely somewhere in the middle. Since the market is largely efficient, it makes investing really difficult, but there are so many efficiencies for us to have the opportunity to find them and have the opportunity to beat the market average as well.

马克思确实在他的著作中有一章关于有效市场假说的内容，所以我也想涉及这个话题。我并不想过多讨论这个理论，因为我认为观众对其含义已经相当熟悉了。市场不是完全有效或完全无效的。真相很可能介于两者之间。由于市场在很大程度上是有效的，这使得投资变得非常困难，但我们仍有很多机会发现市场的效率，并有机会超越市场平均水平。

Given that markets are widely efficient, when you make a purchase based on missed pricing in the market, we should consider the following questions. 1. Why should a bargain exist despite the presence of thousands of investors who stand ready and willing to bid up the price of anything that's cheap? 2. If the return appears so generous and proportion to the risk, might you be overlooking some hidden risk? 3. Why would the seller of this asset be willing to part with it at a price from which it will give you an excessive return? 4. Do you really know more about the asset than the seller does? 5. If it's such a great proposition, why hasn't someone else snapped it up?

鉴于市场普遍高效，当我们基于错过的市场定价进行购买时，我们应考虑以下问题： 1. 虽然存在成千上万准备和愿意竞标任何便宜东西的投资者，为什么会出现优惠的机会？ 2. 如果回报看起来如此丰厚且与风险相称，你是否忽视了一些隐藏的风险？ 3. 为什么卖方愿意以给你过高回报的价格出售该资产？ 4. 你是否真的比卖方更了解该资产？ 5. 如果这是一个如此好的投资机会，为什么没有其他人抢购？

Mark says that market inefficiencies are a necessary condition for superior investing, and that attempting to outperform in a perfectly efficient market is like flipping a fair coin. The best odds you can hope for is 50-50. Since markets are largely efficient and Mark's realizes that the advantages are to be gained when assets are mispriced and inefficient, this led him to want to put more focus on the relatively inefficient markets where hard work and skill would pay off best. When Mark's co-founded Oaktree in 1995, the firm largely focused on high yield debt, distressed debt, and private equity, which I'll be touching on a little bit later.

马克认为市场的低效是超凡投资的必要条件，并且在一个完全有效的市场中试图超越就像抛硬币一样。你能希望的最好胜算就是50-50。由于市场大部分是高效的，马克意识到了当资产定价错误和低效时可以获得优势，因此他希望将更多关注点放在相对低效的市场上，这样辛勤工作和技能就能获得最好的回报。1995年，马克联合创办了橡树资本，公司主要专注于高收益债务、困境债务和私募股权，稍后我会对此进行介绍。

I also think there is a happy medium we can find between thinking about these theories and hypotheses and utilizing them within our own frameworks. It makes sense that markets are largely efficient, but it's important to remember that markets are made up of humans that are largely driven by emotions such as fear, greed, and envy. And they're also driven by many psychological biases. Because of this, I believe there are times when markets are pretty inefficient and there are a lot of times where they are efficient. So I guess the point I'm trying to make is that markets are fluid and ever-changing. It's not really black and white.

我也认为我们可以在思考这些理论和假设的同时，在我们自己的框架内加以利用，找到一个合理的折中点。市场主要是高效的是有道理的，但重要的是要记住，市场是由人类组成的，而人类往往受到诸如恐惧、贪婪和嫉妒等情绪的驱使。他们也受到许多心理偏见的影响。因此，我认为市场有时是相当低效的，而且有很多时候它们是高效的。所以我想我要表达的观点是，市场是流动的，一直在变化中。它并不是非黑即白的。

In regards to the efficient market hypothesis, I love this short made-up story that Mark's tells where a finance professor that believes these theories takes a walk with a student. The student notices that there is a $10 bill on the ground and the professor says, that can't be a $10 bill because if it were, someone would have picked it up by now. The professor walks away and the student picks it up and goes to buy a beer. And the story reminds me so much of Buffett. He puts in so much work into understanding a great company, then when the market overreacts to bad news related to the company or the market is just largely ignoring it, he scoops up a bunch of shares to own while the efficient market people would rather state that it's simply impossible to beat the market and earn outsized returns.

关于有效市场假设，我喜欢马克讲的一个虚构的故事。故事中，一位相信这些理论的金融教授与一名学生一起散步。学生注意到地上有一张10美元的钞票，而教授却说：“那不可能是10美元的钞票，否则早就有人捡起来了。”教授走开了，学生捡起这张钞票去买了一杯啤酒。这个故事让我想起巴菲特。他花了很多时间来了解一家优秀公司，然后当市场对与这家公司相关的坏消息过度反应或者市场完全忽视时，他就大量购买该公司的股票，而那些坚持有效市场理论的人则更愿意说这根本就不可能击败市场并获得超额回报。

Next, I wanted to transition to talk about Mark's comments on risk. The essence of investing consists of dealing with the future. And because the future isn't certain at any point, then risk is inescapable. Thus, understanding risk and handling risk effectively is essential to being a successful investor. When you're considering an investment, you shouldn't just analyze the potential returns, but also the risk as well. Risk obviously isn't preferred, so if two investments have similar return profiles, but one has more risk, then we'd obviously prefer the investment that has less risk. On the same line of thinking, the return of a portfolio doesn't tell us whether the investment manager did a great job or not. If a fund manager achieved a 10% return, but only held two stocks, applied leverage, or only invested in microcaps, then a 10% return might not be sufficient for the level of risk that was taken. This would mean that the manager actually did a poor job of allocating capital when taking into consideration the risk that was taken.

接下来，我想谈谈马克关于风险的评论。投资的本质是与未来打交道。由于未来在任何时候都是不确定的，所以风险是无法避免的。因此，理解风险并有效地处理风险对于成为成功的投资者至关重要。当你考虑一个投资时，你不应该只分析潜在的回报，还要考虑风险。显然，风险并不受欢迎，所以如果两个投资具有类似的回报概况，但一个风险更大，那么我们显然会选择风险更小的投资。同样的思路，投资组合的回报并不能告诉我们投资经理是否做得很好。如果一个基金经理取得了10%的回报，但只持有两只股票，应用了杠杆，或者只投资于小市值股票，那么10%的回报可能不足以对应承担的风险水平。这意味着在考虑风险时，经理实际上在配置资本时做得很糟糕。

The theory behind risk and return for an investment is that for a riskier investment to be deemed investable, it must offer prospects of higher returns. So those that believe they don't mind taking on more risk may think that the secret to receiving higher returns is just to simply increase your risk, and that's really not the case either. If riskier investments reliably produce higher returns, then they wouldn't actually be riskier. A better way to think about it is that the future is far less certain for a riskier investment. A high-flying growth company that is growing at 50 or 100% per year, the bull case says that there is so much upside, it will be significantly larger many years down the road. That's what happened to a company like Amazon. They just really never quit growing. The bear case for a high-flying growth company is that because they are growing and there is a lot of money to be made, this encourages competition to come in and eat at those profits and try and steal market share. So eventually the growth slows and the optimistic prospect doesn't pan out and the stock price really suffers. The example here is a company like Peloton.

投资中风险和回报背后的理论是，为了使一个更加冒险的投资具有投资价值，它必须提供更高回报的前景。因此，那些认为他们不介意承担更多风险的人可能认为，获得更高回报的秘诀就是简单地增加风险，但实际情况并非如此。如果更冒险的投资能可靠地产生更高回报，那它们实际上就不会更冒险。更好的理解方式是，对于更冒险的投资来说，未来的不确定性要远远大于其他投资。一个高速增长的公司，年增长率达到50％或100％，看多的观点是，公司未来潜力巨大，多年后会显著增长。这就是亚马逊的例子，他们从未停止增长。对于一个高速增长的公司，悲观的观点是，由于其增长和可以创造的利润巨大，这会鼓励竞争者进入市场，侵蚀利润并试图夺取市场份额。因此，最终增长放缓，乐观的预期不成真，股价出现大幅下跌。这里的例子是Peloton这样的公司。

Now let's compare the high-flying growth company to something like a 10-year US Treasury. The US Treasury is perceived as less risky because it's extremely likely that you will get your coupon payments that you agree to over the length of that investment. The outcomes are very certain, whereas with the high-growth company, there is a wide range of potential outcomes. Either it does really, really well and grows for a long time, or the growth stalls and the stock price goes nowhere or way down or somewhere in the middle.

现在让我们将这家飞速增长的公司与美国10年期国债进行比较。美国国债被认为风险较低，因为你极有可能在你同意的投资期限内获得利息支付。其结果是非常确定的，而对于高增长公司来说，潜在的结果范围很广。它要么表现非常非常好，长时间增长，要么增长停滞，股价不涨不跌或者处于中间位置。

Now when looking at a spectrum of all investments we could put money in, you have the US Treasury on the very low risk, highly certain area, and then you have the high-flying growth company, which is higher risk and wide range of potential outcomes. And then you have all these investments in between where you have your value stocks, your deep value, and your regular growth stocks. So there's kind of a spectrum of risk and return and how certain we can be about the future for all these investments.

现在，当我们看待所有可以投资的资产组合时，你会发现美国国债是风险非常低、高度确定的领域，而高飞速增长的公司则具有较高的风险和多种潜在结果。然后，在这两者之间，还有一系列不同投资选择，例如价值股、深度价值股和普通增长股。所以，存在着一种风险和回报的连续谱，以及我们对所有这些投资未来表现的确定程度。

Mark states that when riskier investments are priced fairly, they should have higher expected returns, as well as a possibility of low returns, and in some cases the possibility of losses. I think a lot of people have been fooled on taking on more risk in their investments without recognizing the potential for really bad outcomes, such as what we've seen with many companies in 2022.

马克指出，当风险较高的投资被公平定价时，它们应有更高的预期收益，同时也存在低回报甚至亏损的可能性。我认为很多人在投资中承担更多风险时并没有意识到可能出现非常糟糕的结果，就像我们在2022年看到的很多公司一样，他们被愚弄了。

In actually defining risk, Mark's has the same view as Warren Buffett. While academics view risk purely as volatility, Mark's views it as the permanent loss of capital. If you're almost certain that a company is trading below its intrinsic value, then they don't really care too much about the volatility of the investment as long as you have a long time horizon, and you're certain that you won't lose any money if your thesis is correct. Now risk of loss does not necessarily come from weak fundamentals. Even the worst companies can make great investments as we know from studying the early days of Warren Buffett or Benjamin Graham.

实际上，Mark对风险的定义与沃伦·巴菲特一致。虽然学者们将风险纯粹视为波动性，但Mark认为风险是资本的永久损失。如果你几乎可以确定一家公司的交易价格低于其内在价值，那么只要你有较长的投资时间，且确信如果你的投资理念正确，你不会损失任何资金，那么对投资的波动性就不会太过关心。现在，资金损失的风险并不一定来自基本面较弱的公司。正如我们从研究沃伦·巴菲特或本杰明·格雷厄姆的早期经历中所了解的那样，即使是最糟糕的公司也可能成为出色的投资机会。

Another risk with investing is having psychological biases when making the decision to purchase a particular investment. For example, investors tend to believe that exciting stories and stocks that have performed well as of late will continue to be high performance of the future. Many times the investments that have had the best recent performance are actually the riskiest stocks or companies to own because of the potential irrational exuberance associated with the company or sector.

投资中的另一个风险是在决定购买某项投资时存在心理偏见。例如，投资者往往相信令人兴奋的故事和最近表现良好的股票将继续保持未来的高水平表现。然而，很多时候，过去表现最好的投资实际上是最具风险的股票或公司，因为它们可能存在与公司或行业相关的非理性狂热。

I think the most difficult thing when it comes to risk is how we quantify it. If you ask 10 people what the risk of a particular stock was, you probably get 10 different answers. I think this is a big reason why academia decided to define risk as volatility and it's because you can just put an actual number on it. While some investors might say risk is your chance of losing money over the holding period, that's practically impossible to quantify. Risk is subjective, hidden, and something we just can't quantify, which can make investing really difficult.

我认为在涉及风险问题时，最困难的是如何对其进行量化。如果你询问10个人某只股票的风险，可能会得到10个不同的答案。我认为这是学术界决定将风险定义为波动性的一个重要原因，因为你可以直接给它一个具体的数字。虽然一些投资者可能会说，风险是你在持有期间亏损的机会，但这几乎是不可能量化的。风险是主观的、隐藏的，我们无法量化，这可能使投资变得非常困难。

Marx says that, quote, skillful investors can get a sense for the risk present in a given situation. They make that judgment primarily based on A, the stability and dependability of value and B, the relationship between price and value. Other things will enter into their thinking, but most will be subsumed under these two, end quote. This reminds me of the example Naseem Taleb in his book, The Black Swan. He uses the example of a turkey that is out of farm. The turkey gets fed day after day. It probably doesn't think its life is very risky. It's got a fence around it, and it gets fed every day. And, you know, there's no predators to go out and eat it. Then Thanksgiving inevitably comes every year, and the turkeys are taken to the slaughterhouse. So the turkey situation was much riskier than it appeared. And, you know, the volatility of its day to day life wasn't very high, but the risk for its life was actually very high. So I wouldn't say you can necessarily look at past results to see how risky something truly is.

马克思说，熟练的投资者可以对特定情况中存在的风险有所把握。他们主要根据以下两个因素来进行判断：A.价值的稳定性和可靠性，以及B.价格和价值之间的关系。其他因素也会影响他们的思考，但大部分都归结在这两个因素之下。这让我想起了纳西姆·塔勒布在他的书《黑天鹅》中的一个例子。他以一只不在农场里的火鸡为例。这只火鸡每天都有饭吃，可能并不认为自己的生活有太大的风险。它被围着篱笆，每天都有人喂养。你知道，没有天敌会出来吃它。然而，感恩节每年都不可避免地到来，火鸡们被带到屠宰场。所以，火鸡的处境比看上去更加危险。你知道，它的日常生活的波动性并不很高，但它的生命风险实际上非常高。因此，我不会说你可以通过过去的结果来判断某件事情真正的风险有多大。

To put this into a real world example, like the stock market, I can't help but think of a company like Boeing. Prior to March 2020, Boeing stock was fairly stable and was probably perceived as not very risky to most investors. Then March 2020 hit, and the stock just drops off a cliff from $340 per share to under $100 per share, a drop of over 70% in just one month. These black swan type events like the coronavirus can show us just how risky some assets might be, and just how uncertain our world really is.

举个现实世界的例子来说，就像股票市场一样，我不禁想到像波音这样的公司。在2020年3月之前，波音的股票相当稳定，大多数投资者可能认为它并不很冒险。然而，2020年3月来临时，股票价格从每股340美元跌至每股不到100美元，仅一个月内下跌超过70%。这样的黑天鹅事件，如冠状病毒，向我们展示了某些资产可能有多大的风险，以及我们的世界有多么不确定。

This is one reason why I like to have a little bit of extra cash on the sidelines ready to be deployed. Odds are the cash won't end up doing well and gets devalued away slowly by inflation, but if a tail risk event happens, such as what happened in March 2020, then you have the cash available to buy when many people are just forsellers.

这是我喜欢留一些额外现金备用的一个原因之一。现金很可能不会表现出色，并且会慢慢地被通货膨胀所贬值，但如果发生风险事件，例如2020年3月发生的情况，那么你就有现金可以在许多人只是卖出时进行买入了。

In March 2020, people were selling assets because they had to, not because they wanted to. This was a liquidity crisis, and during liquidity crises, the dollar becomes extremely valuable, relative to financial assets that people are being forced to sell.

在2020年3月，人们出售资产并非出于自愿，而是被迫如此。这是一场流动性危机，在流动性危机期间，美元相对于人们被迫出售的金融资产变得非常有价值。

In addition to understanding risk, it's also really important to be able to recognize risk. Investment risk comes primarily from too high of prices, and too high of prices often come from excessive optimism and inadequate skepticism and risk aversion. As an investor, it is critical to be skeptical when analyzing a particular company. Prior to the great financial crisis, people believe that home prices only go up and that the mortgage-backed securities were very likely to pay off. Risk is the highest when people foolishly believe there is little to no risk.

除了理解风险之外，能够识别风险也非常重要。投资风险主要来自过高的价格，而过高的价格常常源自过度乐观和不足的怀疑和风险规避。作为一个投资者，在分析一个特定公司时保持怀疑态度是至关重要的。在大规模金融危机之前，人们相信房价只会上涨，并且认为抵押支持证券很有可能会兑付。当人们愚蠢地相信几乎没有风险时，风险就最高。

Buffett says that, quote, it's only when the tide goes out that you find out who's been swimming naked, and quote, in its only matter of time before the tide stops coming in. After an investor is able to recognize risk, it's critical that they're also able to control and manage risk. The greatest investors have a knack for selecting investments, but an adequate rate of return relative to the risk taken. This might bring them to a portfolio with higher expected returns with a similar level of risk to the market or similar expected returns to the market with lower risk.

巴菲特说过，“只有当潮水退去时，你才会发现谁在裸泳”，而且，“潮水停止进来只是时间问题”。投资者要能够识别风险，并且至关重要的是能够控制和管理风险。最伟大的投资者擅长选择投资，但要在承受风险的情况下获得适当的回报率。这可能使他们形成一个预期回报更高但风险水平与市场相似的投资组合，或者与市场相似的预期回报率但风险更低的投资组合。

I don't have much to add in regards to controlling risk. Other than that, risk is a necessary part of investing. If we wanted no risk for investing, we would all just go out and buy US Treasuries and call it a day. But we're here to receive an adequate return as well. I did want to mention one quote this discussion reminds me of and it's a George Soros quote. It's not whether you're right or wrong that's important, but how much money you make when you're right and how much you lose when you're wrong. So I just encourage the listeners to have a good idea of the probabilities and potential outcomes. If the thesis doesn't play out the way you'd expect, what does the downside look like? What do the other scenarios look like for you? If your thesis is correct, then what does the potential upside look like as well? So you're weighing the probabilities and looking at, okay, what's my best case? What's my most case scenario? And maybe what's a more middle of the road outcome.

在控制风险方面，我没有太多要补充的。除此之外，风险是投资的必要部分。如果我们想要零风险投资，我们都会选择购买美国国债然后结束一天。但我们在这里也希望得到适当的回报。我想提到一句这次讨论让我想起的乔治·索罗斯的名言。重要的不是你对还是错，而是你在判断对的时候能赚到多少钱，错的时候会亏损多少。因此，我鼓励听众们要对可能性和潜在结果有一个清晰的认识。如果你的论点发展不如预期，那么下行风险会是什么样的？其他情况对你来说又是怎样的呢？如果你的论点是正确的，那么潜在上行空间又是什么样的呢？因此，你需要权衡可能性，并考虑最佳情况、最坏情况以及可能的中间结果。

Next, I wanted to turn the topic to cycles. Cycles are so important to understand because when we recognize them, we'll be able to take advantage of them as investors. Eventually, I'm going to be covering Ray Dalio's work. Dalio's someone who popularized the idea of the long term debt cycle. Marx has a chapter in his book dedicated to cycles because of the big role cycles play in our overall economy.

接下来，我想把话题转到周期上。了解周期非常重要，因为一旦我们意识到它们，作为投资者，我们就能够利用它们。最终，我会介绍雷·达里奥的工作。达里奥是一个推广长期债务周期理念的人。马克思在他的书中专门有一个章节讲述周期，因为周期在我们整个经济中起着重要作用。

Markets don't move in a straight lineup or a straight line down. They move in cycles. Optimism is followed by pessimism. Companies rise and companies fall. People in human emotions are a big driver of cycles. When people are optimistic about the future, they spend more, they save less, they borrow more, and this all stimulates the economy. Thus, this can push up the prices of stocks, the price of homes, and the price of other assets. And this leads people to feeling wealthier. It's this idea of the wealth effect. And this can be a reinforcing cycle which pushes upwards and upwards and upwards and creates bubbles. Because things can't be perfect and good forever. Eventually, the cycle reverses the other way. People become cautious. They start to save more money, spend less, borrow less. This decrease in spending can lead to the economy contracting and potentially even to a flow of bankruptcies as the economy ends up not being as strong as some anticipated.

市场的波动并不是直线上升或直线下降。它们以周期性的方式波动。乐观之后是悲观。企业崛起和倒闭是常态。人类情绪在周期中起到了重要推动的作用。当人们对未来持乐观态度时，他们消费更多，储蓄更少，借贷更多，这都会刺激经济。因此，这可能会推高股票价格、房屋价格和其他资产价格。这使人们感到财富增加。这就是财富效应的概念。这可能会形成一种强化循环，推动价格不断上涨，最终导致泡沫产生。因为事物不能永远完美和良好。最终，周期会朝相反的方向逆转。人们变得谨慎起来。开始更多地储蓄，消费减少，借贷减少。消费减少可能导致经济收缩，甚至可能导致破产潮，因为经济的实力未能达到某些人的预期。

Marx states that cycles will never stop occurring. In that every decade or so, people will decide that cyclicality is over. They think either the good times will roll on without end or the negative trends can't be finished. At such times, they talk about virtuous cycles or vicious cycles, self-feeding developments that will go on forever in one direction or another. Where people will say this time is different, this bull market is not going to end for quite some time or this bear will never end. He also says that, quote, ignoring cycles and extrapolating trends is one of the most dangerous things an investor can do. People often act as if companies that are doing well will do well forever. Investments that are outperforming will outperform forever and vice versa. Instead, it's the opposite that's more likely to be true, end quote.

马克思认为循环将永远不会停止。每隔十年左右，人们会决定循环性已经结束。他们认为好时光会无休止地继续下去，或者消极趋势无法结束。在这样的时候，人们会谈论善性循环或恶性循环，自我滋养的发展会永远朝某个方向持续下去。人们会说这次不同了，这个牛市会持续相当长的一段时间，或者这次熊市将永远不会结束。他还说，引用一句话：忽视循环和推断趋势是投资者可以做的最危险的事情之一。人们往往表现得好公司将永远做得好。表现优异的投资将永远优于其他投资，反之亦然。相反，更有可能是相反的情况居多。

All of this reminds me so much of 2020 and 2021. Stocks went up so fast after the Federal Reserve provided a massive boost to the markets that many people just assumed that this could go on for quite some time and it really couldn't be further from the truth.

这一切让我太过于想起了2020年和2021年。在美联储对市场进行大规模刺激之后，股市迅速上涨，以至于很多人都认为这种情况可以持续相当长的时间，但实际上与事实相去甚远。

This isn't to say that we should have known that markets would decline after 2021. We just shouldn't be surprised when they do eventually cool off when things seem too good to be true. They usually are.

这并不是说我们应该早就知道市场在2021年之后会下滑。当事情看起来过于美好而让人难以置信时，当市场最终冷却时，我们不应该感到惊讶。通常情况下，事情并不如我们所愿。

Marx also covered six reasons that investors make mistakes and influence market cycles. He says that the biggest investing errors come not from factors that are informational or analytical, but from those that are psychological. He actually stated in his interview with William Green that emotion is the greatest enemy of superior investing.

马克思还提到了六个影响投资者犯错和影响市场周期的原因。他说，最大的投资错误并不是源于信息或分析因素，而是源于心理因素。在接受威廉·格林采访时，他实际上表示情绪是优秀投资的最大敌人。

The first emotion that serves to undermine investors efforts is greed. The desire for money is fine as it's a core driver of our economy, but greed can be a dangerous emotion as it can lead to us making irrational decisions. Greed can lead us to pursue strategies that lead us to hoping for high returns while overlooking any of the potential risks. It can also lead us to holding onto an asset that has appreciated tremendously well above its fair value, but we hold on to it because we have that greed that says, you know, further gains are to come.

第一个情绪会削弱投资者努力的是贪婪。对钱的渴望是可以理解的，因为它是我们经济的核心推动力，但贪婪是一种危险的情绪，因为它会导致我们做出非理性的决策。贪婪会导致我们追求高回报的策略，而忽视了潜在的风险。它还会导致我们持有一种资产，尽管其价值远远超过公平价值，但我们坚持持有它，因为我们贪婪地认为，进一步的收益即将到来。

During Howard's interview with William Green again, he says that when you start hearing people say there's no price too high for a particular investment, that is the hallmark of being a bubble, no price too high. That's when you know that the herd is getting greedy and they're likely overpaying for something they believe is so good that any price is justified.

霍华德再次与威廉·格林进行采访时，他表示，当你开始听到人们说无论怎么高都不嫌贵的时候，那就是泡沫的标志，无论多高价格也接受。这时你就知道群体正在变得贪婪，并且他们很可能对他们认为非常好的东西付出过高的代价，认为任何价格都是合理的。

The counterpart to greed is fear. Rather than selling when times are really good, fear is what keeps people from buying when things are really bad.

贪婪的对立面是恐惧。与其说在景气时期出售，恐惧使人们在事情真的很糟时不敢购买。

The third logic Marx mentions is the tendency to dismiss logic, which I believe is tied to both greed and fear. People will naturally dismiss the facts that are right in front of them because their emotions are just so strong they just can't seem to overcome them.

马克思所提到的第三种逻辑倾向是排斥逻辑的倾向，我认为这与贪婪和恐惧密切相关。由于情绪过于强烈，人们往往会自然而然地无视眼前的事实，因而无法克服这些情绪。

Fear and greed are what lead people to believing that no, this time is different than all of the previous times. The 2008 financial crisis was the end, people believed. And it wasn't the time to buy financial assets on the cheap. That's what people thought. In 2021, this was supposedly a new paradigm, you know, the bull market melts up where the COVID winners were only going to grow to the sky. This is what the herd believed.

恐惧和贪婪导致人们相信，这一次与以往所有的情况不同。人们认为2008年的金融危机是终结。人们认为现在不是买入低价金融资产的时候。这是人们的想法。到了2021年，据说这是一个新的范式，你知道，牛市融化了，其中COVID-19的赢家只会不断高涨。这就是群体所相信的。

The fourth psychological contributor is the tendency to conform to the view of the herd rather than resist, even when the herd's view is clearly misguided. Whether we like it or not, most people are heavily influenced by what the crowd is doing, especially those that are relatively new to investing. And it takes a tremendous amount of temperament to be able to shy away from the actions of others. The impact the herd can have on our actions really cannot be overstated, because it's likely we've all been influenced by the herd at some point in our journey. I know I certainly have and I've definitely learned from those experiences.

心理贡献因素之四是倾向于与大众观点保持一致，即使大众观点明显错误，也不会抵抗。不管我们喜不喜欢，大多数人都会受到人群行为的强烈影响，特别是那些相对新进的投资者。与他人的行动保持距离需要极大的心态。人群对我们行动的影响确实无法被高估，因为我们很可能在旅程中的某个时刻受到了人群的影响。我知道我肯定有受到过，并且从那些经历中学到了东西。

The fifth psychological influence is envy. Envy is what happens when we start comparing ourselves to others and people's natural desire is to want more in life. If someone keeps messaging you about the gains they're making in the hot stocks, it is incredibly difficult to simply stick to your own process and investment plan as your peers are buying into the hype, and for the time being, making a boatload of money. I know this is difficult to overcome because I was somewhat experiencing it myself after COVID. Funnily enough, I know a number of people who made a good amount of money simply by betting on meme stocks at the right time before they really exploded and then crashed to follow.

第五种心理影响是嫉妒。当我们开始将自己与他人进行比较时，嫉妒就会产生，而人们在生活中的本能是希望得到更多。如果有人不断向你发送关于热门股票涨幅的消息，就会非常难以仅仅坚持自己的投资计划，因为你的同行都在追捧炒作，并且暂时赚了一大笔钱。我知道这很难克服，因为我在COVID之后也有些体会到这种情况。有趣的是，在那之前，我认识的一些人就是靠在正确的时机押注“迷因股票”赚了一大笔钱，然后这些股票价格猛涨后又迅速崩盘了。

The sixth key influence is ego. Oftentimes, many of the best investors will slightly underperform in bull markets, but outperform in bear markets. This requires setting one's ego aside, knowing that it's unlikely for anyone to continuously beat the market year after year after year. Oftentimes, there will be a period of underperformance for the greatest investors.

第六个关键影响因素是自我。很多顶级投资者在牛市中可能会稍微表现不佳，但在熊市中表现出色。这需要将自我摒弃，明白很少有人能够连续数年击败市场。通常情况下，最优秀的投资者会经历一段表现不佳的时期。

Marx ended this section of his book by stating quote, the desire for more, the fear missing out, the tendency to compare against others, the influence of the crowd, and the dream of the sure thing. These factors are near universal. Most of us probably believe that we are immune to these forces and emotions, but remember that we are all human and we're all highly influenced by our emotions.

马克思在书中的这一部分以以下话语作为结尾：“对更多的渴望、错过的恐惧、与他人比较的倾向、群体的影响以及对确定事物的梦想。”这些因素几乎是普遍存在的。我们大多数人可能相信自己对这些力量和情感免疫，但请记住我们都是人类，我们都深受情感的影响。

If we see a giant crash in the months to come, it's easy to say now that we won't give in to the massive panic and fear, but actually feeling and experiencing that sort of downturn is entirely different. We may watch our portfolios drop and we buy more, and then the next month they fall further, and then the next month they fall further. This is what it was like during the great financial crisis. I believe it was Toby Carlisle on our podcast said that two-thirds of a bear markets drop, like what happened in the great financial crisis, two-thirds of the drop occurred in one-third of the time period.

如果我们在接下来的几个月内出现了一次巨大崩盘，现在说不会屈服于大规模恐慌和恐惧可能很容易，但实际上感受到和经历这种下滑完全是不同的。我们可能会看到我们的投资组合下跌，然后继续购买，然后下个月它们进一步下跌，再下个月它们又进一步下跌。这就是在大金融危机期间的情况。我相信是我们播客中的Toby Carlisle说过，熊市下跌的三分之二，就像在大金融危机中所发生的那样，三分之二的下跌发生在三分之一的时间段内。

For quite a long time period, it's just a slow grind downwards, and then there's just that capitulation where people just give up, they're just going to give up and just sell everything. Markets have a way of really defying logic and have us begin to really doubt ourselves. Being highly aware of your decisions psychologically when the pendulum swings to these extremes is very critical because that's when the emotions really kick in. I believe a lot of money is either made or lost at the extremes based on the decisions we end up making.

在相当长的一段时间里，市场的走势一直在缓慢下跌，直到人们彻底放弃，其中之一就是他们只会放弃并出售一切。市场总是有一种打破逻辑的方式，让我们开始怀疑自己。当市场情绪达到极端时，对自己的心理决策非常重要，因为这时情绪会真正参与进来。我认为，在这些极端点上，我们所做的决策会对赚钱或亏损产生很大影响。

Now with this discussion of cycles, this begs the question of what do investors do about cycles? We know that the vicious cycles up and down are truly inevitable, and that human emotions will always be part of the markets, and we know that timing the top and timing the bottom is nearly impossible. So what do we do? First, we have to accept the fact that we can't predict how long the ups will extend upwards and how long the downs will keep falling. The only thing we know for certain is their inevitability, and eventually they will turn.

现在我们讨论了周期，这就引发了一个问题，投资者应该如何应对周期？我们知道，上下的恶性循环是不可避免的，人类情绪将始终是市场的一部分，我们也知道，在市场顶部时机和市场底部时机几乎是不可预测的。所以我们该怎么办呢？首先，我们必须接受这样一个事实，我们无法预测上涨将持续多长时间，下跌将继续下滑多长时间。我们唯一能确定的是它们的必然性，最终它们会转变。

Now the buy and hold approach would just say to just to completely ignore the market cycles because they're unpredictable, but Marx takes a slightly different approach. His approach is to get a good idea of where we stand in terms of the cycle and react accordingly. For example, earlier he talked about the idea of there's no price to high to pay. Well, when people start saying that, that might be a good indication that we are getting into pretty frothy markets. We can't know how far a trend will go and when it will turn, but we do know that it will turn eventually because nothing goes up forever.

现在，买入并持有的方法会建议完全忽略市场周期，因为它们是不可预测的，但马克思采取了稍微不同的方法。他的方法是要充分了解我们在周期中处于什么位置，并相应地做出反应。例如，早些时候他提到了“没有价格太高无法支付”的观点。那么，当人们开始说这样的话时，这可能是一个很好的迹象，表明我们进入了相当冲动的市场。我们无法知道趋势会走多远和何时会转向，但我们确实知道它最终会转向，因为没有什么会一直上涨。

I do think there are times when we can see things are getting towards the extreme. When a major bank fails and the Fed has taken unprecedented action to prevent other banks from failing, that is probably a good sign that we are somewhere in the extreme of the downturn. When NFTs of a tweet are selling for millions and millions of dollars a year after the Fed printed all this money, that may be a sign that things are getting a bit frothy and start selling when everyone is excited about all their massive investment gains. Of course, NFTs were not the only signal that things were pretty frothy and overvalued. You could have looked at the stats on new IPOs, you could have looked at the meme stocks, the cryptocurrencies, exploding in value, SPACs, etc.

我确实认为有时我们可以看到事物走向极端的迹象。当一家大型银行倒闭，联邦储备系统采取了前所未有的行动以防止其他银行倒闭时，这可能是我们处在经济低谷的极端迹象。当一条推文的非同质化代币以数百万甚至上亿美元的价格售出，而此前联邦储备系统大量印制了货币，这可能是事物趋于泡沫化的迹象，此时如果每个人都对他们庞大的投资收益感到兴奋，你可能应该开始抛售了。当然，非同质化代币并不是唯一一个表明事物相当泡沫化和高估的信号。你可以看看新股发行的统计数据，观察迷因股票、加密货币、特殊目的收购公司等价值飙升的情况。

So it really comes down to this contrarian view in that the crowd is usually wrong. They are too enthusiastic when markets are particularly high and too pessimistic when markets are too low. Marx says that when others are recklessly confident in buying aggressively, we should be highly cautious. When others are frightened into inaction or panic selling, we should become aggressive. It's just like Buffett's quote where we want to be greedy when others are fearful and fearful when others are greedy.

所以，归根结底，这是一种与众不同的观点，即群众通常是错误的。当市场走得特别高涨时，他们太过热情，而当市场过低时，他们又过于悲观。马克思说，当其他人鲁莽自信地大举购买时，我们应该保持高度谨慎。当其他人感到恐惧而无所作为或者恐慌抛售时，我们应该变得积极主动。就像巴菲特的名言，我们希望在他人害怕时变得贪婪，在他人贪婪时变得害怕。

Now, when Marx invests, he's looking for things that he believes are bargains, meaning that the price is trading well below what he believes is the underlying value. He's never looking for something he believes is trading at simply a fair value. To find something that's underpriced in a bargain, here are the attributes in an investment that Marx is looking for.

现在，当马克思进行投资时，他寻找的是他认为便宜的东西，也就是价格远低于他所认为的基本价值的东西。他从不寻找他认为仅仅是公正价值交易的东西。为了找到一个被低估的便宜货，这是马克思在投资中寻找的特征。

One, it's little known and not fully understood. Two, it's fundamentally questionable on the surface. Three, it's controversial, unseemingly or scary. Four, it's deemed inappropriate for respectable portfolios. Five, it's unappreciated, unpopular, and unloved. Six, it has a trailing record of poor returns. And seven, it's recently the subject of disinvestment, not accumulation.

一，这个项目鲜为人知，且并未被完全理解。二，表面上这个项目存在根本性的问题。三，该项目存在争议，看似不正当或可怕。四，该项目被认为不适合体面的投资组合。五，该项目没有得到认可，不受欢迎且不受喜爱。六，该项目以长期低回报的记录而闻名。七，最近，该项目成为了撤资的对象，而不是资金积累的对象。

Like I just mentioned, finding these investments that are trading at bargain prices, by definition, it requires you to be a contrarian. You're one of the very few people that are purchasing that investment, while everyone else is selling or bearish on it. Large companies that come to mind today are companies like Facebook or Meta or Alibaba. These are down tremendously, and some well-known value investors are bullish on these companies, and they appear as contrarians to the overall market because most people aren't bullish on them because their stocks have done so poorly.

正如我刚才提到的，寻找这些以低价交易的投资品，它本质上要求你成为一个持异议者。当其他人都在抛售或看空时，你是为数不多的那些购买这种投资品的人。像Facebook、Meta或阿里巴巴这样的大公司就是今天我想到的例子。这些公司的股价大幅下跌，一些知名的价值投资者看好这些公司，并且在整个市场上表现出与众不同的观点，因为大多数人并不看好它们，原因是它们的股票表现糟糕。

Marx made a career out of investing in high yield and junk bonds, and he made a killing in this field. Most investing institutions had a minimum requirement of owning bonds that were investment grade or single-A grade or better. At a high level, this makes a little bit of sense why would someone like a pension fund or an endowment want to hold junk bonds if there is a high risk of default? That's looking at the risk side. Well, because junk bonds were highly overlooked at the time, Marx was able to buy bargains in this specific sector because he was able to get them at the right price, which reminds me a bit of Benjamin Graham's cigar-bet approach where he's buying these companies that were just in the doghouse and largely ignored by the overall market.

马克思以投资高收益和垃圾债券为生，并在这个领域获得了巨大的利润。大多数投资机构购买债券时都有最低的要求，要求购买投资级别或单A级别以上的债券。从高层次上看，这有点说得通，因为如果存在高违约风险，为什么养老基金或捐赠基金等机构要持有垃圾债券呢？这是从风险角度考虑的。然而，由于当时忽视了垃圾债券，马克思能够以适当的价格购买到这个特定领域的便宜货，这让我有些想起本杰明·格雷厄姆的雪茄赌注法，他购买了那些被市场整体忽视并备受冷落的公司。

Marx's big picture thesis was that if practically nobody wants to own these bonds, and even if they go from taboo to just slightly tolerated by the market, then they can perform quite well. In a way, this sort of flips Buffett's idea of buying quality companies on his head because the fact that these junk bonds aren't high quality really at all. Nobody wanted to touch them thus this is how they became really attractively priced in Marx's view. One of my favorite Howard Marx quotes is, quote, good investing comes from buying things well, not buying good things, end quote. And this quote ties directly to his approach on purchasing junk bonds. It's not about buying the highest quality assets, it's about purchasing at the right price in whatever field you're playing in.

马克思的整体论点是，如果实际上几乎没有人想要拥有这些债券，即使它们从禁忌变为市场上稍微被容忍，它们仍然能够表现得相当出色。从某种意义上说，这种方式颠覆了巴菲特以购买优质公司为基础的理念，因为事实上，这些垃圾债券并不是高质量的。没有人愿意碰触它们，所以在马克思看来，它们才会变得非常具有吸引力的价格。我最喜欢的霍华德·马克思的一句名言是：“好的投资来自于买得好，而不是买好的东西。”这句话与他购买垃圾债券的方法直接相关。关键不是购买最高质量的资产，而是在任何领域以正确的价格购买。

I think I'll also add that, you know, we as investors, we need to play a game that we believe we are well equipped to win. Just because somebody says that you should only purchase bargains, you shouldn't always make sure you're paying the right price. We should also be mindful that we want to play games that we feel that we are equipped to win. So I feel in my position, I am just more comfortable, you know, focusing on some quality companies when I do purchase individual stocks that, you know, I'm not equipped to win the junk bond market game, you know, it's not a game I want to play. It's not something I feel like I'm well equipped to win. So I feel like it's also being mindful of, you know, what your favorite approach is and, you know, learning from all these smart investors and just kind of applying what you believe what will work well for you. So that's just another comment I wanted to make.

我觉得我也要补充一点，你知道，作为投资者，我们需要玩一场我们相信自己有能力赢得的游戏。仅仅因为有人说你应该只购买便宜货，你并不总是要确保你付出了正确的价格。我们还应该意识到，我们想要玩的游戏是我们觉得自己有能力赢得的。所以我觉得在我购买个别股票时，我更喜欢聚焦一些优质公司，因为我觉得自己没有能力赢得垃圾债券市场的游戏，你知道，这不是我想玩的游戏。这是一种我觉得自己没有能力赢得的游戏。所以我觉得还要注意一下你最喜欢的方法，并且向所有这些聪明的投资者学习，然后应用你相信会对你有利的方法。这只是我想要补充的另一点意见。

Next, I wanted to transition to talk about investing in a low rate environment. One of the greatest challenges during my time as an investor is that interest rates have been suppressed so low, which in turn elevates the prices of all financial assets. In his book, Marx discusses how one should go about investing when they can't find opportunities. He personally recommends what he calls patience opportunism, in which you wait pitch after pitch until the right opportunity or right bargain comes along. Given the low rate environment we're in, I liked how in chapter 13, Marx outlined how we can approach investing in a low rate environment. One option is just to invest anyways, and almost be forced to accept slower expected returns because of the elevated prices. Because most of us aren't super sophisticated investors and don't do this full time, most of us probably fall into this camp, including myself. Another layer of this is that you recognize that we're in a low rate environment. So you just have to commit to having a long time horizon. And the long holding period will help make up for that low rate environment at the time of the purchase.

接下来，我想转而谈一谈在低利率环境中的投资。作为一名投资者，我所面临的其中一个最大的挑战是利率被压得很低，这反过来提高了所有金融资产的价格。在他的书中，马克斯讨论了当他们找不到机会时，应该如何进行投资。他个人推荐了他所称之为"耐心机会主义"的做法，即你等待合适的机会或合适的交易出现之后再行动。鉴于我们目前所处的低利率环境，我喜欢马克斯在第13章中概述了我们如何在这种环境中进行投资。其中一个选择就是继续投资，几乎被迫接受由于价格上涨而导致的较低预期收益。因为我们大多数人并非非常复杂的投资者，也不会全职从事投资，所以我们大多数人可能都属于这个阵营，包括我自己。另外一层含义是你要意识到我们处于低利率环境中。因此，你必须决心拥有一个很长的时间跨度。而长期持有的期限将有助于弥补购买时的低利率环境带来的影响。

Amazon might be an example of a company that is a great company trading at a fair price today in 2022. Although the price may be elevated currently because of the environment we're in, I believe that there might be some catalysts for Amazon to continue to grow their earnings power substantially far into the future. Say 10 to 20 years.

亚马逊可能是一个在2022年以公平价格交易的优秀公司的典型例子。尽管由于目前的市场环境，其股价可能有所上涨，但我相信亚马逊可能会有一些催化剂，使其在未来的很长一段时间内持续大幅增长利润能力，可以说是10到20年。

So today you pay a relatively high price because of the environment and the company successfully executes on that business strategy. So having that long term approach and buying quality can maybe make up for paying a high price at the time. This approach of just investing anyway also accepts the fact that market timing is incredibly difficult.

所以今天你因为环境和公司成功地执行了商业策略而付出了相对较高的价格。因此，采取长期的观点并购买优质产品可能可以弥补此时的高价。这种投资方式也接受了市场的时机选择非常困难的事实。

Alternatively, you could invest like Marx does and not be afraid to hold some cash on the sidelines while you wait for the right opportunities to come your way. He cautions against investors reaching for returns by investing in rescue assets, which is what a low rate environment leads most people to do. You want to take risk when others are fleeing from it, not when they're competing with you to do so. Preston Pish actually talked about the concept of four sellers on my interview with him on our millennial investing show. So I was glad that Marx covered this in his book as well.

作为另一种选择，你可以像马克思一样进行投资，并且在等待适当机会的同时不害怕保留一些现金。他警告投资者不要通过投资援救性资产来追求回报，而这正是低利率环境下大多数人倾向于做的事情。你应该在别人逃离风险时去冒险，而不是与他们竞争去冒险。在我们对千禧一代投资节目中，普雷斯顿·皮什实际上就提到了四位卖方的概念。所以我很高兴马克思在他的书中也涉及了这一点。

Every once in a while, like I mentioned, there will be a mass sell off in the markets and many large institutions with large positions are in a spot where they become for sellers. This is also known as a liquidity crisis. Liquidity crises are incredible buying opportunities in my opinion, because the entities that are forced to sell have to come up with the currency or US dollars. It's like they have no choice in the have a gun to their head and they just have to sell no matter the price. And Marx talked about this in his book.

偶尔，就像我之前提到的那样，市场会发生大规模的抛售，许多持有大量头寸的大型机构会陷入卖方的境地。这也被称为流动性危机。在我看来，流动性危机是难得的买入机会，因为被迫卖出的机构必须筹集到货币或美元。就像他们别无选择，头顶有枪，无论价格如何，他们只能卖出一样。马克思在他的书中也谈到了这一点。

And this liquidity crisis and foreselling can quickly become a reinforcing cycle where one round of selling leads to margin calls on some companies. And then that leads to more selling, which leads to more margin calls. And it's just reinforcing on the way down. Then this is exactly what happened in March 2020. And a similar event happened during the great financial crisis. When this type of event happens and there just isn't enough dollars to meet the demand, then the Federal Reserve is inevitably forced to step in to prevent many firms from failing. And then, you know, the potential total collapse of our economy.

这种流动性危机和抛售现象很快就会形成一种恶性循环，其中一轮抛售导致一些公司出现追加保证金的要求，进而引发更多抛售行为，继而导致更多的追加保证金要求，这种循环不断加强。这正是2020年3月发生的情况，类似的事件也发生在大型金融危机期间。当这种事件发生时，由于没有足够的美元满足需求，美联储无可避免地被迫介入，以防止许多公司破产，也就是防止我们经济的可能完全崩溃。

The key to successful investing in such a crisis is first to be insulated from the forces that might require selling. And second, to be positioned to be a buyer instead. And to satisfy that criteria, you need a strong understanding of value, little or no use of leverage, capital that's ready to be invested for a long period of time, and finally, a strong stomach to weather through the volatility. Marx states that quote, patient opportunism, buttress by a contrarian attitude and a strong balance sheet can yield amazing profits during meltdowns end quote.

在这样的危机中，成功投资的关键首先是与可能需要出售的力量相隔离。其次，要有购买的可能性。为了满足这些标准，你需要对价值有深刻的理解，减少或不使用杠杆，拥有可以长期投资的资金，并且需要有足够强大的心理承受能力来应对市场的震荡。马克思指出：“耐心的机会主义，搭配反向思维和强大的资产负债表，可以在危机中获得惊人的利润。”

Now, the last piece I wanted to cover from the book was chapter 17, which covered investing defensively. He says when friends ask him for personal investment advice, he tries to understand their attitude towards risk and return. If you ask most people if they care more about making money or avoiding losses, most would tell you they care quite a bit about both. The problem is that you can't chase profits without risking losses at some point in your investment timeline. So it's all about finding the right balance between the two targeting a reasonable rate of return with an acceptable amount of risk.

现在，我想要讲述书中的最后一个部分，即第17章，它介绍了防御性投资。作者认为，当朋友向他寻求个人投资建议时，他会试图了解他们对风险和回报的态度。如果你问大多数人，他们更关心赚钱还是避免亏损，大多数人会告诉你他们对两者都相当在乎。问题是，在你的投资时间线上，你无法追逐利润而不冒风险和亏损。因此，关键是在两者之间找到合适的平衡，以合理的回报率承担可接受的风险水平。

Oak tree puts a high priority on playing defense when they invest. In the good times, they just want to be able to keep up with the markets or the indexes during the bad times they are positioned to outperform. Many other investors might end up getting too aggressive, hoping they will make a lot on their winners and not give it back on their losers. Marx uses the analogy of soccer. Each team has 12 guys on the field. They can focus on being aggressive and scoring or they can put more focus on defense and ensuring that their opponent doesn't score. I'm no soccer expert, but this is the example that Marx uses in his book. So I'm just going to run with it.

橡树在投资时非常重视防守。在好的时候，他们只是想跟上市场或指数的步伐，而在经济不好的时候，他们的投资策略能够表现得更好。许多其他投资者可能会变得过于激进，希望能从赢家身上赚取很多，并不在输家身上亏损。马克斯使用了足球的比喻来解释这一点。每支球队在球场上有12个人。他们可以专注于攻击和得分，也可以更多地关注防守，确保对手无法得分。虽然我不是足球专家，但这是马克斯在他的书中使用的例子。所以我就用这个例子来继续说下去。

He says quote, what's more important to you scoring points or keeping your opponent from scoring on you and investing will you go for winners or try to avoid losers or how will you balance the two? Great danger lies in acting without having considered the consequences end quote with regards to investing.

他说：“对你来说，什么更重要，得分还是阻止对手得分？你会选择追求胜利者还是避免失败者？或者你会如何平衡二者？”他还警告说：“在投资中，盲目行动而不考虑后果是非常危险的。”

Offense consists of using aggressive tactics and increasing risk to try to achieve above average returns. Defense consists of putting a big emphasis on ensuring you're not doing the wrong thing or purchasing the wrong security. Playing defense and investing means ensuring you don't have any losing positions, which comes down to doing proper due diligence, applying high standards, demanding a low price and having a generous margin for error, as well as avoiding being too generous in your forecast of future growth due to the uncertainty of the future.

进攻指的是采用激进策略并增加风险，以试图实现高于平均收益。防守指的是非常重视确保自己不会做错事或购买错误的证券。在投资中玩防守意味着确保自己没有任何亏损的持仓，这需要进行适当的尽职调查、应用严格的标准、要求低价格以及具备较大的错误容忍空间，并且要避免在对未来增长预测时过于慷慨，因为未来的不确定性。

To add to that, Marx says that proper diversification is another element of playing a defense. Concentration in leverage are two levers that can be pulled on the offensive end. So it makes sense that being diversified is a form of playing defense. Concentration adds to your returns when you're right, but it's really harmful when you're not right. This essentially gives investors a potential for higher highs and lower lows.

此外，马克思还说适当的分散投资是踢反击的另一个要素。集中投资和杠杆是攻势时可以利用的两个手段。因此，多元化投资是一种防守的方式是合理的。当你的决策正确时，集中投资能够增加回报，但当你错误时，它会造成很大的损失。这基本上给投资者提供了更高的收益和更大的风险。

Marx says that the critical element of defensive investing is what Buffett would call the margin of safety or margin for error. It's not hard to make investments that will be successful if the future unfolds as expected. Certain targeted investments can be highly successful if the future turns out how you hoped. But we should also be aware of the possibility that the future might not play out as we expect. How will we fare in that scenario? What could our returns look like? It's a matter of considering the worst case scenario, as well as the best case.

马克思认为，保守投资的关键要素是巴菲特所说的安全边际或误差边际。如果未来的发展符合预期，很容易进行成功的投资。如果未来如你所希望的那样发展，某些有针对性的投资可能非常成功。但我们也应该意识到未来可能不会如我们所预期。在这种情况下我们会怎样？我们的回报可能会是怎样的？这涉及考虑最坏情况以及最好情况。

Marx states that quote, of the two ways to perform as an investor, racking up exceptional gains, or avoiding losses, I believe the latter is more dependable. Achieving gains usually has something to do with being right about events ahead, whereas losses can be minimized by asserting that tangible value is present. The herd's expectations are moderate and prices are low. My experience tells me the latter can be done with greater consistency. A conscious balance must be struck between driving for return and limiting risk, between offense and defense.

马克思认为，作为投资者，要在两种方式中选择一种，一是追求异常收益，二是避免亏损，而我认为后者更为可靠。获得收益常常与对未来事件的预测正确相关，然而亏损却可以通过确保有实际价值的存在来尽量减少。人们对市场的期望是温和的，价格也较低。我的经验告诉我，通过后者能够更加稳定地取得成功。在追求回报和限制风险之间，需要做到有意识地平衡，也要协调攻与守的关系。

So I think it all comes down to just finding that right balance between offense and defense, which really comes down to our temperament as an investor and really what our goals are.

所以我认为这一切都归结于在投资者内心中找到进攻与防守之间的恰好平衡，这实际上取决于我们的投资方式和我们的目标。

Investing is a game where a lot of people want to make big gains, and people want to be that one guy that found the next Amazon or found the next Tesla. Very few investors are able to have a good investment career over a long time period though. Some will find winners over a short time period, but finding those big winners isn't really a sustainable approach when you zoom out over a 30 or 40 year time period.

投资是一个很多人都希望获得巨额利润的游戏，人们希望成为找到下一个亚马逊或特斯拉的那个人。然而，很少有投资者能够在长时间内拥有良好的投资生涯。尽管有些人可以在短时间内找到成功的投资项目，但如果你将时间跨度放大到30年或40年，找到那些大赢家并不是一种可持续的方法。

You need an approach that is much more reliable, that applies some defense and a margin of safety to your approach. Constantly swinging for the fences on your investments inevitably leads people to having a portfolio full of losers because they're taking too much risk. They consistently try to hit home runs so they end up striking out and have lousy outcomes. They bet too much when they think they have a winning idea or believe they have the correct view. They're concentrating rather than diversifying. They incur excessive transaction costs and taxes through trading too much or trying to time the market. And they position themselves for the outcome they hope will happen rather than considering the possibility of being wrong or having a stroke of bad luck.

你需要一种更可靠的方法，为你的方法应用一些防御和安全裕度。在投资中不断寻求高回报必然会导致人们的投资组合充满失败者，因为他们承担了太多的风险。他们一直试图打出全垒打，结果却一直被三振出局，取得糟糕的结果。当他们认为自己有一个成功的想法或正确的观点时，他们押注过多。他们过于集中而不是多元化。他们通过过多交易或试图时机把握市场而产生过多的交易成本和税款。他们为希望发生的结果而定位自己，而不考虑可能出现的错误或厄运。

Remember that playing offense can be a double edged sword. There aren't any free lunches and investing so any potential benefits that playing offense gives also has potential pitfalls as well. And I think many people see this as a give and take sort of approach. I think it's important for people to understand that you can achieve good and reasonable results consistently over a long period of time with the right amount of defense, but playing too much offense and taking too much risk may lead to dreams that really never come to fruition, which may mean never achieving the destination you'd like to achieve or something like not living the comfortable retirement that you really want to live.

请记住，进攻也是一把双刃剑。没有免费午餐，投资进攻所带来的潜在益处也可能伴随潜在风险。我认为许多人将其看作一种权衡的方法。我认为人们应该明白，通过适当的防守策略，在长期的时间内可以始终获得良好合理的结果。但是，过多地采取进攻举措并承担过多风险可能导致梦想无法实现，这意味着可能无法达到你想要实现的目标，或者无法享受你真正想要过的舒适退休生活。

Now those are the main points I wanted to hit from Marx's book. I also went through his last few memos as well as they're more related to what's currently happening in the world of high inflation and stocks currently in a bear market. His September 2022 memo was titled the illusion of knowledge.

现在，这些是我想从马克思的书中强调的主要观点。我还翻阅了他最近的几张备忘录，因为它们更相关于目前高通胀和股市熊市的局势。他在2022年9月的备忘录标题是“知识的幻觉”。

This memo went into explaining why he believed that making helpful macro forecasts is just so difficult. He starts with a quote that says that quote, there are two kinds of forecasters, those who don't know, and those who don't know, they don't know, end quote. Marx states that he recently attended an investor event where people were asked on their opinions regarding the recession, inflation, the rescue, crayon war, Taiwan, China, everything going on, the US elections, each person on stage had their particular views, but Marx was sitting there thinking that nobody was an expert on foreign affairs, politics, macro, and he was convinced that none of them were capable of improving investment results based on what their view of the macro environment was. This is what led Marx to writing this particular memo.

这份备忘录详细解释了他为什么认为进行有用的宏观预测如此困难。他从一句名言开始说，有两种预测者，一种是不知道自己不知道的，另一种是更不知道的。马克思指出，最近他参加了一次投资者活动，人们被问及对于衰退、通胀、救助计划、蜡笔战争、台湾、中国以及美国选举等各个方面的看法，舞台上的每个人都有各自的观点，但马克思坐在那里想着，没有人是外交事务、政治、宏观经济方面的专家，他坚信他们中的任何人都不能根据自己对宏观环境的看法来提高投资结果。这就是马克思写这篇备忘录的原因。

And he adds a quote from Daniel Borsstein, the greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it is the illusion of knowledge. He says that quote, in order to produce something useful, be it in manufacturing, academia, or even arts, you must have a reliable process capable of converting the required inputs into the desired output. The problem in short is that I don't think there can be a process capable of consistently turning the large number of variables associated with economies and financial markets, the inputs into a useful macro forecast, the output, end quote.

他还引用了丹尼尔·博斯坦的一句话：“知识的最大敌人不是无知，而是自以为是的假象。”他引用这句话是为了说明，在制造业、学术界或者艺术领域，要想创造出有用的东西，必须有一个可靠的流程，能够将所需的输入转化为期望的输出。简单来说，问题在于我不认为有一个能够在不断变化的经济和金融市场中稳定转化大量变量为有用宏观预测的流程。

Anyone who forecasts our economy has no choice but to do so using some sort of model, whether that be a complex one, an informal mathematical or intuitive one, there's some sort of model going into it and models consist of assumptions if a happens, then be will happen. The problem is that the global economy is just so insanely complex. The US alone has 330 million people in the US economy consists of the individual actions of those 330 million people summed up. When you take that globally, you have billions of people and essentially countless interactions with companies, suppliers, consumers, and all these touch points.

任何预测我们经济的人都只能使用某种模型来进行，无论是复杂的模型、非正式的数学或直观的模型，都会有某种模型参与其中，模型建立在假设的基础上，即如果A发生，那么B就会发生。问题在于全球经济实在是太复杂了。仅美国一国就有3.3亿人口，美国经济由这3.3亿人的个体行为总结而成。如果考虑全球范围，人口将会数以亿计，与公司、供应商、消费者以及所有这些接触点之间的相互作用将是无数的。

What many macro analysts might do is look at the past to help determine what might happen in the future, which may work some time, but the world changes dramatically over time too. And when I think about an investor like Ray Dalio, he's looking at some events that happened centuries ago to determine how to invest in 2022. Mark states that quote, the unpredictability of behavior is a favorite topic of mine.

许多宏观分析师常常会回顾过去来帮助确定未来可能发生的事情，这在某些时候可能是有效的，但事实上世界也在不断剧烈变化。当我考虑像雷·达里奥这样的投资者时，他会研究几个世纪以前发生的事件，以决定如何在2022年进行投资。马克表示，“人类行为的不可预测性是我最喜欢的话题。”

Noted physicists Richard Feynman once said, imagine how much harder physics would be if electrons had feelings, end quote. The rules of physics are reliable because electrons always do what they're supposed to do. They never forget to perform. They never rebel. They never go on strike. They never innovate. They never behave in a contrary manner. But none of these things is true of the participants of an economy. And for that reason, their behavior is unpredictable. And if the participants behavior is unpredictable, how can the workings of an economy be modeled?

著名物理学家理查德·费曼曾经说过：“想象一下，如果电子有情感，那么物理学将会更难。”物理学的规则是可靠的，因为电子总是按照他们应该做的事情去做。他们从不忘记执行任务。他们从不反抗。他们从不罢工。他们从不创新。他们从不表现出相反的行为。但是，对于经济参与者来说，这些都不是真实的。因此，他们的行为是不可预测的。如果参与者的行为是不可预测的，那么经济的运作如何能被建模呢？

Honestly, I must say I'm quite surprised to see Howard Marks' opinion on this. I think of someone like Stanley drunken Miller, who's more than four decades into investing in his fund compounded capital at over 30% per year. So obviously, he's one of the best of the best in terms of predicting these macro forces. But I'm definitely not saying I can do what drunken Miller can do, but I'm just surprised to see Howard Marks say that it's very unlikely people can predict what's going to happen. Regardless, I also know that predicting the future and assigning probabilities to particular outcomes is also very difficult, but I digress.

老实说，看到霍华德·马克斯对此的观点，我感到相当惊讶。我想到了像斯坦利·醉酒的米勒这样的人，他已经在投资他的基金上超过四十年，年复合资本增长率超过30%。所以显然，他是在预测这些宏观力量方面最出色的人之一。但我绝对不是说我能做到像醉酒米勒那样，只是我很惊讶看到霍华德·马克斯说人们几乎不可能预测未来会发生什么。不管怎样，我也知道预测未来并给特定结果分配概率也非常困难，但我打岔了。

Marks adds that clearly economic relationships aren't hardwired and economies aren't governed by schematic diagrams, which models try to simulate. Thus, for me, the bottom line is that output for a model may point in the direction much of the time when the assumptions aren't violated. But it can't always be accurate, especially at critical moments such as inflection points. And that's when accurate predictions would be most valuable. Now, some models are going to be useful at times. So the economy isn't entirely unpredictable. But the bottom line from his point of view is that the forecasts aren't helpful. We don't really know which forecasts are going to be right and which forecasts are going to be wrong.

马克斯补充道，显然经济关系并非硬性规定，经济也不受模型试图模拟的纲要图表支配。因此，对我而言，最重要的是，当假设没有被违反时，模型的产出往往能指引出大致的方向。但它并不能始终准确，特别是在关键时刻，比如拐点。而这正是准确的预测最有价值的时候。现在，有些模型在某些时候是有用的。所以经济并非完全无法预测。但从他的观点来看，预测并没有什么帮助。我们实际上无法知道哪些预测是正确的，哪些预测是错误的。

To add to that belief that forecasts aren't reliable, he goes on to say that many of the forecasters are part of teams managing equity funds. And what we know for sure is that actively managed equity funds are underperforming the market relative to the market indexes. He highlighted that the HFRI hedge fund index had a average tenure return of 5.1% per year. And the HFRI macro total index had an average tenure return of 2.8%. Meanwhile, the S&P 500 averaged 13.8% over that study. So it's really not even comparable. And obviously, these forecasts don't help these funds outperform the market.

为了加深对预测不可靠的信念，他接着说，许多预测人员都是管理股票基金的团队成员。而我们可以确定的是，主动管理的股票基金相对于市场指数表现较差。他强调，HFRI对冲基金指数的平均收益率是每年5.1%。而HFRI宏观总指数的平均收益率是2.8%。与此同时，标普500指数在该研究期间的平均收益率为13.8%。所以根本无法相提并论。很明显，这些预测不会帮助这些基金超越市场。

In the end, Marx has the same view as Warren Buffett that the macro future isn't knowable, so it should be disregarded when making investment decisions. Now that concludes my episode covering Howard Marx. I can't help but admire Howard's intense focus on playing defense and ensuring you're not taking unnecessary risk. Because I feel like that message is somewhat lost in the investing landscape today with so many people trying to hit the next big winner.

最后，马克斯与沃伦·巴菲特持有相同观点，即宏观未来是无法预知的，因此在投资决策时应将其抛之脑后。现在，我结束了涵盖霍华德·马克斯的内容。我不禁对霍华德高度注重防守和确保不承担不必要风险的态度感到钦佩。因为我觉得这种信息在如今的投资领域中有些被忽视，因为有太多人试图追逐下一个大赢家。

Learning from someone like Howard, whose family experienced the tragedies of the Great Depression can give us a lot of insight to the potential downfalls of an overly aggressive portfolio. This is something I believe we can all learn from because the key to investing is ensuring we stay in the game for the long run and put us in a position to weather through any market environment. Also, what I really liked about all of this is that he doesn't give you the answer to investing success. Because he can't tell you what the right answer is because the game's always changing. He's essentially encouraging the readers to consider the principles he lays out in his books and his memos, and then come to your own conclusion.

从像霍华德这样家庭经历过大萧条悲剧的人身上学习，可以让我们对过度进取的投资组合可能出现的问题有更多的认识。我相信我们都可以从中学到东西，因为投资的关键是确保我们能够长期参与，并使我们在任何市场环境中都能够应对。此外，我真正喜欢的是，他并没有告诉你投资成功的答案。因为他无法告诉你正确答案，因为游戏总是在变化。他实际上鼓励读者考虑他在书籍和备忘录中提出的原则，然后得出自己的结论。

And that's really what TIP stands for. We do our best to bring the truth to light and then everyone can come to their own informed conclusions. And that's the beauty of it because it encourages continuous learning and being open to accepting new information when it arises. If you're interested in checking out more content related to Howard Marks, you can listen to William Green's interview with Howard, which was this year in 2022. I'll be sure to link that in the show notes. Trey Lockerby also interviewed Howard last year, so I'll be sure to link that as well. That is all I had for you for today's episode. Really hope you guys enjoyed it. You can connect with me on Twitter at clay underscore think c l a y underscore F I N C K. If you enjoyed this episode, I would love it if you shared it with just one friend who may enjoy this type of content with that. Thank you so much for tuning in and we'll see you again next week. So to your point, Hardy, I like the valuation. I don't like the company spoken like a true value investor, I guess.

这实际上就是TIP的含义。我们尽力将真相揭示出来，然后每个人可以根据自己的知情判断做出结论。这就是它的美妙之处，因为它鼓励持续学习和对新信息的接受。如果你对与霍华德·马克斯相关的更多内容感兴趣，你可以听威廉·格林与霍华德的采访，这是今年2022年的事。我会在节目注释中提供链接。特雷·洛克比去年也采访了霍华德，我也会提供链接。这就是我为今天的节目准备的全部内容了。真的希望你们喜欢。你可以在Twitter上与我联系，我的用户名是clay_think。如果你喜欢这一集，我希望你能和一个可能喜欢这种内容的朋友分享。谢谢你收听，我们下周再见。所以，哈迪，按你的观点，我喜欢估值，不喜欢这家公司，听起来像是一个真正的价值投资者。