The Global Lithium Supply Chain and Tesla’s 50% Growth Rate I ~3 Month Project
发布时间 2023-10-25 21:52:07 来源
摘要
How will the Global Lithium Supply Chain evolve this decade and how will that affect Tesla's 50% Growth Rate target? I've spent ...
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中英文字稿 
Welcome back everyone, I'm Jordan Geisigee and this is The Limiting Factor.
大家好，欢迎回来！我是乔丹·盖斯齐，欢迎收听《突破瓶颈》。
At Tesla's 2023 annual meeting, Elon Musk said that lithium refining is the bottleneck for lithium-ion battery production and he doesn't expect there to be a bottleneck with lithium mining. In other words, he disagrees with lithium industry experts, which are all saying that mining will be the bottleneck. But he also said that he could be wrong.
在特斯拉2023年的年度会议上，埃隆·马斯克表示，锂精炼是锂离子电池生产的瓶颈，他并不认为锂矿山开采会成为瓶颈。换句话说，他与锂行业专家持不同意见，这些专家认为开采将成为瓶颈。不过，他也表示他可能是错误的。
So is Elon wrong or are the lithium industry forecast just a big nothing burger like the peak oil hysteria of 15 years ago? And more importantly, what does that mean for Tesla's ability to continue growing at 50% per year? These are critical questions because lithium is the lifeblood of Tesla and will underpin their growth for years to come.
埃隆是错的，还是锂行业预测只是像15年前的石油峰值恐慌一样毫无意义呢？更重要的是，对于特斯拉每年能否以50%的速度持续增长意味着什么？这些是非常重要的问题，因为锂是特斯拉的命脉，并且将为他们未来数年的增长提供支持。
Even though software will likely enable most of Tesla's profits for the next decade through products like Robotaxes and their robot Optimus, all of those products will run on batteries. Furthermore, Tesla's mission is to accelerate the world's transition to sustainable energy. And that takes batteries, most of which will be lithium based.
尽管软件可能在未来十年中通过像Robotaxes和他们的机器人Optimus这样的产品为特斯拉带来大部分利润，但所有这些产品都将依赖于电池。此外，特斯拉的使命是加速世界向可持续能源的转变。而这需要电池，其中大部分将是基于锂的。
There's really only one way to address the claims of Elon Musk and the lithium industry. And that's by looking at the constraints of both mining and refining, questioning the methodology of lithium supply and demand forecasting, going country by country to look at where lithium can be sourced from, taking into account the emergence of new chemistries like sodium ion, and what all of that means for Tesla's battery supply specifically.
要解决埃隆·马斯克和锂行业的索赔只有一种方法。那就是通过审视采矿和精炼的限制条件，并质疑锂供需预测的方法论，国家逐个地查看可以获取锂的地方，考虑新的化学元素如钠离子的涌现以及所有这些对特斯拉电池供应的影响，从而找到答案。
Usually, I break complex topics into separate videos, but this really needed to be one video. That's because too often people focus on one part of the supply chain and come to conclusions that ignore the rest of the supply chain. By putting it all in one video with time stamps, all the information is in one place and easily referenced to create a cohesive narrative thread. The result is what I think may be one of the most densely packed and longest informational videos on YouTube.
通常我会将复杂的主题分成多个视频，但这个主题就需要单独制作一个视频。原因是很多时候人们只关注供应链的一部分，从而得出忽略了其他供应链的结论。通过将所有信息放在一个视频中，并附上时间戳，所有的信息都汇集在一个地方，易于参考，形成一个连贯的叙述线索。结果可能是YouTube上最密集且最长的信息视频之一。
Even if my conclusions are wrong, you're going to gain in-depth knowledge of the lithium industry, forecasting and mining in general. The too long didn't watch of the video is that at a global level, a substantial bottleneck for battery supply is likely from the mid-2020s until the end of the decade, which appears to be due to mining capacity rather than refining capacity, and I'll explain why in detail later in the video.
即使我的结论是错误的，你也将获得关于锂行业、预测和矿业的深入知识。视频的简短总结是，从2020年中期到本十年结束，在全球范围内，电池供应方面可能会面临重大瓶颈，这似乎是由于采矿能力不足而非精炼能力，我将在视频的后部详细解释原因。
I say a substantial bottleneck because we already saw a small lithium shortage last year, which drove lithium prices to more than 300% above previous record highs before receding. The shortage later this decade could be more sustained and of a larger magnitude. That's because the investment in mining needed to head off a shortage later this decade hasn't materialized and it really needed to start years ago. More investment now would still increase lithium supply and therefore battery supply beyond what's forecast, but as far as I can tell, not nearly enough to get ahead of demand because it takes so long to spin up a new lithium mine.
我称之为重大瓶颈，因为去年我们已经见识到了小规模的锂短缺，导致锂价格达到了之前纪录高点的300%以上，然后回落。而本十年后期的短缺可能更加持久和规模更大。这是因为为了避免本十年后期的短缺，采矿方面的投资还没有实现，而且实际上该投资需要在几年前就开始了。现在增加投资仍会增加锂供应和因此电池供应，超出预期。但据我所知，这远远不足以满足需求，因为开发一座新的锂矿需要很长时间。
On that note, people often hear bottleneck or shortage and assume it means that battery production grinds to a halt. It doesn't. It just means growth becomes more linear rather than exponential. But it means rather than battery prices falling steadily year by year, prices remain more flat. That is, it's counterintuitive, but a shortage in this context means that growth continues. It's just that supply simply isn't keeping up with demand.
在这个情况下，人们经常听说瓶颈或短缺，就会以为电池生产会停滞不前。但事实并非如此。这只是意味着增长变得更为线性，而不是指数级的。这意味着电池价格不再稳定地每年下降，而是保持较为平稳。也就是说，这听起来有点反直觉，但在这种情况下，短缺意味着增长仍在持续进行。只是供应简单地无法跟上需求。
The question is, later in the decade, what would a substantial bottleneck in global battery supply mean for Tesla specifically? If Tesla continues to take a more passive role in lithium mining, they'll likely still fare better than any other electric vehicle maker. That's thanks to their industry-leading vehicle margins, which will allow them to absorb large premiums in the price of lithium while reducing vehicle prices to increase their market share.
问题是，这个十年后，全球电池供应的严重瓶颈对特斯拉来说意味着什么？如果特斯拉继续在锂采矿方面采取更被动的角色，他们可能仍然比任何其他电动车制造商表现得更好。这要归功于他们领先行业的车辆利润率，使他们能够吸收锂价格的大幅溢价，同时降低车辆价格以提高市场份额。
But if that's the approach Tesla takes, there are three potential implications worth considering. First, over the course of the next seven years, they'll be paying a king's ransom in margins to third-party suppliers. That means Tesla may leave billions of dollars of potential profit on the table, and it may reduce their ability to make their vehicles more affordable. Second, even if Tesla can afford the high lithium prices and thrive, it's unlikely they'll be able to secure more than a third of total global battery supply. That's because they may run up against protectionism or protectionist backlash by governments, or even before that, because they'll be competing for materials with other players in the EV and energy storage markets. Either way, if the size of the battery and battery materials pie doesn't expand beyond what I'm forecasting in this video, it would mean more linear growth for Tesla later in the decade rather than exponential growth.
然而，如果特斯拉采取这种方法，那么有三个值得考虑的潜在影响。首先，在接下来的七年里，他们将向第三方供应商支付巨额利润。这意味着特斯拉可能会损失数十亿美元的潜在利润，也可能减少他们提高车辆价格能力。其次，即使特斯拉可以负担得起高昂的锂价格并取得成功，他们很可能无法获得全球电池供应的三分之一以上。这是因为他们可能会遭遇到政府保护主义或者保护主义的反弹，或者在此之前，因为他们将与其他电动车和能源储存市场的参与者竞争原材料。无论如何，如果电池和电池材料的规模在这个视频中预测之外没有扩大，那将意味着特斯拉在未来十年的增长将更趋线性而不是指数级增长。
Third, if Tesla continues to take a more passive role in lithium mining, it'll have a negative impact not just on Tesla's battery supply, but also global battery supply. That's because if they just focus on making sure they get their slice of pie, it doesn't increase the size of the pie. Ideally, the goal should be to create an abundance of lithium at a global level, which kills three birds with one stone. Cost and pricing pressures, pressure from other companies and governments that could limit Tesla's growth and accelerating the world's transition to sustainable energy.
第三点，如果特斯拉继续在锂矿开采中采取更被动的角色，不仅会对特斯拉的电池供应产生负面影响，也会对全球电池供应产生负面影响。这是因为如果他们只关注确保自己能分得一杯羹，就不会增加整体饼的大小。理想情况下，目标应该是在全球范围内创造锂的丰富供应，这样就能一举三得。解决成本和定价压力，缓解来自其他公司和政府对特斯拉增长的压力，加速世界向可持续能源的转型。
To create that abundance, Tesla would need to take a more active role in lithium mining, whether that means partnering with a mining company or vertically integrating like they did with lithium refining. Although due to the long lead times involved with lithium mining, Tesla may not be able to completely address the supply gap by the end of the decade, they could still make a significant dent.
为了创造如此丰富的资源，特斯拉需要在锂矿开采方面扮演更加积极的角色，这可能意味着与一家矿业公司合作或者像它们在锂精炼方面所做的那样，垂直整合。虽然由于锂矿开采涉及的时间周期较长，特斯拉可能无法在本十年结束时完全填补供应缺口，但他们仍然可以有所作为。
With that quick video summary out of the way, for those ready to have their brains jam-packed with information, let's dive into it. Before we begin, for this video, a raft of credits and thanks are in order. I encourage watching this part of the video rather than skipping it because it's not just a thanks. It also lets you know the quality of my sources and peer review.
有了这个快速的视频摘要，对于那些准备好大脑充满信息的人来说，让我们深入了解一下。在开始之前，对于这个视频，需要列举一系列的致谢和感谢。我鼓励观看这一部分视频，而不是跳过它，因为它不仅是一种感谢，还可以让你了解我的资料来源和同行评审的质量。
First, Viva's Kumar reviewed the draft script. Viva's was directly involved with Tesla's battery supply chain for nearly three years, where he negotiated billions of dollars of material spend and also did strategic analysis and forecasting for battery materials. After that, he worked for benchmark mineral intelligence for nearly three years. He's now co-founder and CEO of Mitra Kim. If you'd like to know more about that, check out my interview with Viva's Anchiro.
首先，Viva的库马尔对初稿剧本进行了审查。Viva在特斯拉的电池供应链上直接参与了近三年的工作，在此期间，他进行了数十亿美元的物料采购谈判，并为电池材料进行了战略分析和预测。之后，他在Benchmark Mineral Intelligence工作了近三年。他目前是Mitra Kim的联合创始人兼首席执行官。如果你想了解更多相关信息，请查看我对Viva的安奇洛的采访。
Next, my sources. Rodney and Howard of Arc Equity, a Lithium Analysis and Advisory firm, spent several hours and long email threads answering detailed questions about mine development. If you're interested in their work, you can connect with them on Twitter with the details on screen or follow the Rockstock channel on YouTube. Cameron Perks of benchmark mineral intelligence walk me through how lithium supply and demand is evolving over time. I recommend following benchmark mineral intelligence and their CEO Simon Moore's on Twitter to keep up to date with the Lithium industry. Lars Lee's doll provided key data for this video around lithium refining capacity versus production, and beyond that, I've used a number of graphs from Ristad Energy over the years. You can also follow Lars on Twitter.
接下来是我的消息来源。琼·霍华德 (Howard of Arc Equity) 是一家锂分析和咨询公司的代表，他们花了数小时以及通过电子邮件回答了关于矿山开发的详细问题。如果你对他们的工作感兴趣，你可以通过屏幕上的联系方式在 Twitter 上与他们取得联系，或者关注 Rockstock 在 YouTube 上的频道。卡梅伦·派克斯 (Cameron Perks) 是 Benchmark Mineral Intelligence 的代表，他向我介绍了锂供应和需求的演变情况。我推荐关注 Benchmark Mineral Intelligence 和他们的首席执行官西蒙·摩尔 (Simon Moore) 在 Twitter 上，以便及时了解锂产业动态。拉斯·李 (Lars Lee) 提供了关于锂精炼能力与产量的关键数据，并且我多年来使用了 Ristad Energy 的许多图表。你也可以在 Twitter 上关注拉斯。
Austin Devaney helped me put a finer point on a few topics around hard rock lithium mining. Ryan was an executive at Alba moral and Rockwood Lithium for nearly 10 years, which is one of Tesla's largest lithium suppliers and now has been at Piedmont Lithium for the past three years, which has an agreement for future supply to Tesla. Bradford Ferguson and Matt Smith of Rebellionair.com reviewed the final release candidate of the video from an investor lens. Rebellionair specializes in helping investors manage concentrated positions. They can help with covered calls, risk management, and creating a financial master plan from your first principles. Bear in mind, this video is not investment advice and always do your own research.
奥斯汀·德瓦尼帮助我对硬岩锂矿开采的几个话题进行了更细致的讨论。瑞恩曾在Alba moral和Rockwood Lithium担任高管近10年，这两家公司是特斯拉最大的锂供应商之一，目前他已经在皮埃蒙特锂业工作了三年，该公司与特斯拉签订了未来供应协议。Rebellionair.com的布拉德福德·弗格森和马特·史密斯从投资者的角度对该视频的最终版本进行了审查。Rebellionair专门帮助投资者管理集中的持仓。他们可以提供备查电话、风险管理以及根据你的基本原理制定财务总体规划的帮助。请记住，该视频不是投资建议，始终要进行自己的研究。
Finally, despite all the input I received from some of the leading experts and information sources in the Lithium industry, all the opinions in this video are my own. There are differing views and forecasts within the Lithium industry that I had to reconcile and combine with my own insights and expectations. With regards to the peer review, it was for factual accuracy and a sanity check rather than for crafting the tone and conclusions of the video. Overall, my goal was to create the most comprehensive resource out there on how global lithium supply and battery supply will evolve this decade and how that relates to Tesla.
最后，尽管我从锂行业一些主要专家和信息来源获取了大量意见，但视频中的所有观点都是我个人的。在锂行业内存在不同的观点和预测，我必须将其与我自己的洞察力和期望相结合。至于同行评审，它是为了核实事实准确性和进行合理性检查，而不是为了塑造视频的语气和结论。总的来说，我旨在创建关于全球锂供应和电池供应在本十年内将如何发展以及与特斯拉的关系的最全面的资源。
So if you feel like I've hit the mark and get value from the video or my content in general, toss a coin to your witcher. Using a video like this takes months and generally, analysis like this would be packaged up by an analyst house and put in a report that costs thousands or even tens of thousands of dollars. Generally, I make about $2 to $600 per video in YouTube ad revenues. That is, it's the direct support that I get from less than 1% of subscribers through Patreon, YouTube, and Twitter that makes the channel possible. The details for support are in the description.
如果你觉得我在视频中达到了预期，并从视频或其他内容中获得了价值，就像把一枚硬币投给你的女巫一样。制作这样的视频需要几个月的时间，通常这样的分析会由分析机构打包成一份价值数千甚至数万美元的报告。通常情况下，我在YouTube广告收入中每个视频可以赚到2至600美元。也就是说，来自Patreon、YouTube和Twitter不到1%的订阅者的直接支持使得这个频道有可能存在。支持的详细信息请见描述。
A good place to start with the lithium supply chain is Elon's comment from the Q1 2022 earnings call, where he said that mining and refining will be a limiting factor for Tesla. Why is that? The image on screen shows how much of each metal is produced each year on a global level. I've labeled lithium in pink. As you can see, global lithium production is between one and four orders of magnitude smaller than the iron, copper, aluminum, and nickel industries. I mention those four metals because they're the other metals used in lithium ion batteries.
在开始讨论锂供应链之前，可以从埃隆在2022年第一季度盈利电话会议上的评论开始，他表示采矿和精炼将成为特斯拉的限制因素。为什么会这样呢？屏幕上显示的图像展示了全球每年生产的各种金属数量。我用粉色标注了锂。正如您所见，全球锂产量比铁、铜、铝和镍行业的产量小了三至四个数量级。我提到这四种金属，因为它们是锂离子电池中使用的其他金属。
The next closest bottleneck behind lithium is nickel, which is produced at 27 times greater volumes than lithium. While it's true that lithium only makes up about 2 to 3% of the weight of a nickel-based lithium ion battery cell compared to 15% for nickel, that nickel can be substituted for iron, which is hugely abundant. That's as opposed to lithium, which can't be substituted in a lithium ion battery. For those already eager to bring up sodium ion batteries, which will face fewer resource constraints than lithium ion batteries, I'll cover those later in the video. So just on the face of it, to transition the world to sustainable energy, lithium's going to be a bottleneck because it has to grow from a much smaller base than the other materials used in a battery cell.
在锂之后，下一个最严重的瓶颈是镍，其生产量比锂大27倍。尽管锂只占锂离子电池单元总重量的2至3％，而镍占15％，但可以将镍替代为大量丰富的铁。与此不同，锂离子电池中无法替代锂。对于那些已经迫切希望提出钠离子电池的人来说，钠离子电池将面临比锂离子电池更少的资源限制，我将在视频中介绍。所以光从表面上看，要将世界转向可持续能源，锂会成为一个瓶颈，因为它必须从比电池单元中使用的其他材料更小的基数中增长。
On an absolute basis, it's easier to scale an industry that's already large than it is to scale an industry that's small. It's not to say metals like copper and aluminum or chemicals like phosphate won't also pose a challenge, just that lithium will pose the greatest challenge.
就绝对基础来说，相对于规模较小的行业而言，扩大规模对于已经很大的行业来说更容易。这并不是说像铜和铝这样的金属或是像磷酸盐这样的化学物质也不会带来挑战，只是锂将会面临最大的挑战。
Let's move on to Elon's comment from the Q2 2022 earnings call, which is that mining is easy and lithium refining is harder. While it's true that lithium refining requires a high caliber technical skill set, it's easier than mining in other ways. For example, getting a mining permit is notoriously difficult in some jurisdictions like the US, where it can take 7-10 years. That is, both mining and refining are each hard in their own ways. Furthermore, in my view, it doesn't actually matter which industry is harder. That's because the technical skills and knowledge to do each are out there, it's just a matter of propagating them with investment. That means the relevant question for Tesla shouldn't be which industry is harder, it should be, how quickly can each mining and refining scale to meet Tesla's needs, and is Tesla paying higher margins to miners or refiners? The answers to those questions will let us know where Tesla should focus their resources, because if Tesla wants to accelerate the world's transition to sustainable energy, what they need is large volumes of lithium at a low price.
让我们继续讨论埃隆在2022年第二季度盈利电话会议上的评论，即采矿相对容易，而锂精炼更困难。虽然锂精炼确实需要高水平的技术技能，但在其他方面它比采矿更容易。例如，在一些地区（如美国），获得采矿许可证是非常困难的，可能需要7-10年的时间。也就是说，采矿和精炼都有各自的难点。此外，在我看来，哪个行业更困难实际上并不重要。因为进行这两项工作所需的技术技能和知识已经存在，只是需要通过投资来推广。这意味着特斯拉关心的问题不应该是哪个行业更困难，而应该是采矿和精炼能够多快地扩大规模以满足特斯拉的需求，以及特斯拉是向采矿商还是精炼商支付更高的利润率。这些问题的答案将告诉我们特斯拉应该把资源集中在哪里，因为如果特斯拉想要加速世界向可持续能源转变，他们需要大量低价的锂。
Let's start with margins. In the Q2 2022 earnings call, Elon said that at that time, lithium refining had software like margins. Is that true? And how do the margins for lithium refining compare to lithium mining? The image on screen shows the margin split for producing lithium from SC or spodumene concentrate from Australia that's been bought at spot prices on the open market and refined in China by an independent refiner into lithium hydroxide. Let's take a look at what that means.
让我们从利润率开始谈。在2022年第二季度的盈利电话会议中，埃隆（Elon）表示当时锂精炼的利润率与软件相似。这是真的吗？那么锂精炼的利润率与锂矿开采相比如何？屏幕上的图像显示了从澳大利亚以市场价格购买，并在中国由独立精炼商转化成羟化锂的SC或锂辉石浓缩物的利润分配。让我们来看看这意味着什么。
First, spot market pricing means buying a material on the open market rather than on contract. There's spot market pricing available for a number of materials that go into batteries and at different stages of the manufacturing process. This image shows the cost breakdown for producing lithium hydroxide, where all the transactions are done at spot market pricing.
首先，现货市场定价意味着在公开市场上购买材料，而不是根据合同购买。现货市场定价适用于用于电池生产以及制造过程的不同阶段中所需的许多材料。这张图片展示了生产氢氧化锂的成本分解情况，其中所有交易都采用了现货市场定价方式。
As a side note, spot market prices for lithium vary by country, the quality of the lithium and the type of lithium. Lithium carbonate spot prices in China often attract media attention because it's the largest and most liquid spot market for lithium. However, there's two reasons why the price on the Chinese spot market for lithium carbonate can sometimes lead people astray. First, the Chinese spot market makes up less than 10% of the total lithium market because most lithium is bought on contract at lower prices. Second, as you can see, under the same shipping terms, battery grade lithium carbonate costs about $10,000 less than lithium hydroxide. Both lithium carbonate and hydroxide are used in EV batteries and each chemical has its own market dynamics. Because lithium hydroxide will cost more than lithium carbonate and sometimes lithium carbonate will cost more than lithium hydroxide. That is, the single variable market pricing that often attracts people's attention is a blunt instrument. It doesn't take into account the country quality or type of lithium, let alone whether an EV maker is buying lithium on the spot market or through contract, which we'll get into later.
作为附注，锂的现货市场价格因国家、锂的质量和类型而异。中国的锂碳酸盐现货价格经常吸引媒体注意，因为它是最大且最具流动性的锂现货市场。然而，中国锂碳酸盐现货市场价格误导人的原因有两个。首先，中国锂现货市场占据了总锂市场的不到10%，因为大部分锂是以更低价格通过合同购买的。其次，正如你所见，在相同的运输条件下，电池级碳酸锂比氢氧化锂要便宜约1万美元。碳酸锂和氢氧化锂都用于电动汽车电池，每种化学物质都有其自身的市场动态。因为氢氧化锂的价格高于碳酸锂，有时碳酸锂的价格又高于氢氧化锂。也就是说，通常吸引人们注意的单一变量市场定价是一种粗糙的工具。它不考虑国家、锂的质量或类型，更不用说一个电动汽车生产商是通过现货市场还是通过合同购买锂了，这一点我们待会儿会详细讨论。
During the long, spodumine is a type of rock that contains about 1% lithium. Part of the mining process for spodumine involves concentrating the raw material to about 6% lithium, which is called spodumine concentrate. The spodumine concentrate is sent to a refinery in China where it's refined to greater than 99% pure lithium carbonate or hydroxide.
在采矿过程中，长石是一种含有约1%锂的岩石。采矿长石的过程之一是将原材料浓缩到约6%的锂含量，这被称为长石浓缩物。长石浓缩物会被送往中国的一家精炼厂，在那里它会被精炼成超过99%纯度的碳酸锂或氢氧化锂。
The Australian spodumine with Chinese refining pathway for lithium hydroxide is one of the major production pathways that Tesla relies on for their lithium. It probably makes up about a third of the lithium that goes into their batteries from all sources and three-quarters of the lithium Tesla uses to produce cells with Panasonic and for their own 4680 production. That's because lithium hydroxide is used for high nickel batteries, which is about half of Tesla cell consumption. The other half of Tesla cell consumption is LFP batteries from Chinese companies like CATL, which use lithium carbonate.
澳大利亚镁锂矿石经过中国的提炼路径，是特斯拉依赖的主要锂资源生产路径之一。这种路径大约占据了特斯拉电池所需锂资源的三分之一，以及特斯拉与松下合作生产电池和自家生产4680电池所需锂资源的四分之三。这是因为高镍电池使用锂氢氧化物，而这种电池约占特斯拉电池需求的一半。另一半特斯拉电池需求来源于中国企业如CATL的磷酸铁锂电池，其使用锂碳酸盐。
Although Tesla uses the Australian spodumine with Chinese refining pathway heavily, they buy most of their lithium through private contracts rather than through the spot market. More on that in a moment.
尽管特斯拉在很大程度上使用了澳大利亚的锂辉石矿石，并通过中国的精炼途径进行加工，但他们更多地通过私下合同购买锂，而不是通过现货市场购买。接下来将详细介绍这一情况。
With all that background about lithium markets and pricing out of the way, as you can see, for lithium hydroxide production, most of the margin is actually going to lithium miners, shown in orange, as opposed to lithium refiners, shown in green. Though this graph provides a good visualization, it doesn't provide as much detail as we need. That's because mining and refining production costs are lumped together as cost of production in blue. Let's dig deeper to tease out the production costs for each mining and refining to work out the profit margin percentages for each.
经过关于锂市场和定价的背景介绍，你可以看到，对于羟化锂的生产来说，大部分利润实际上是由矿商获得的，显示为橙色，而不是由精炼商获得的，显示为绿色。尽管这个图表提供了一个良好的可视化效果，但它并没有提供我们需要的太多细节。这是因为采矿和精炼的生产成本被归为蓝色的生产成本。让我们进一步挖掘，分析每个采矿和精炼的生产成本，以计算每个的利润率。
The production cost of spodumine concentrate for lithium miners is about $600 per ton. Around December of last year, they were able to turn around and sell that spodumine concentrate on the spot market for $7,000 per ton. It takes 7 tons of spodumine concentrate to make one ton of lithium hydroxide. That means in December, the mined material that went into one ton of lithium hydroxide had a production cost of $4,200 and a market price of $49,000. That led to a profit margin of about 91% for lithium miners.
锂矿工的角逐石英脉石精矿的生产成本大约为每吨600美元。去年12月左右，他们能够将这种石英脉石精矿以7000美元/吨的价格在现货市场上卖出。制造1吨氢氧化锂需要7吨石英脉石精矿。这意味着去年12月，生产1吨氢氧化锂的采矿材料的生产成本为4200美元，市场价格为49000美元。这导致锂矿工的利润率约为91%。
How about on the refining end? Rapping and transport to the refinery costs about $5,000 per ton. In December, the refiners were adding about $10,000 per ton of refining fees. That led to a profit margin of 67% at a sale price of $64,000. That is, on the spot market, both mining and refining offer software like margins. But in December, mining was offering margins 24 percentage points higher than refining. So Elon was correct in saying that refiners are getting huge margins, but at least on the spot market, miners are getting even larger margins. However, both are currently getting large margins because lithium demand is growing faster than both lithium refining and mining capacity. That is, a shortage.
在炼制方面呢？包括挖掘和运输到炼油厂的成本大约为每吨5000美元。在去年12月，炼油商每吨加收大约10000美元的炼制费用。这导致以64000美元的销售价格获得了67%的利润率。也就是说，在现货市场上，挖掘和炼制都提供了相当高的利润率。但是在去年12月，挖掘的利润率比炼制高出24个百分点。所以埃隆说炼油商的利润非常高是正确的，但至少在现货市场上，挖掘商的利润更高。然而，这两者当前都获得了较高的利润，因为锂需求增长速度超过了锂炼制和挖掘能力的增长速度。也就是说，出现了供应短缺。
But as I said a moment ago, Tesla buys their lithium hydroxide through private contracts rather than on the spot market. Unfortunately, because Tesla has a number of lithium contracts in place with different suppliers and the contracts are private, we don't know what Tesla is paying on average across all suppliers. With that said, we do know that around December, Tesla's all-in contract price was probably around $30,000 per ton for the Australian mine, Chinese refined pathway for lithium hydroxide. At the same time, of course, it was around $60,000 to $70,000 on the spot market. So Tesla was getting more than a $30,000 discount thanks to contract pricing.
但正如我刚才所说的，特斯拉通过私下签订合同而不是通过现货市场购买他们的氢氧化锂。不幸的是，由于特斯拉与多家不同供应商签订了锂合同，并且这些合同是保密的，所以我们不知道特斯拉在所有供应商中平均支付多少费用。尽管如此，我们知道大约在12月份时，特斯拉的全包合同价格可能大约为每吨3万美元，适用于澳大利亚矿山、中国经过精制的氢氧化锂路径。同时，当然，现货市场的价格大约为6万到7万美元。因此，特斯拉得到了超过3万美元的折扣，多亏了合同价格。
As a side note, most lithium contracts are partially indexed against the spot market with a 3-6 month rolling average. So movements in contract pricing typically lag 3-6 months behind the spot market. Taking into account the rolling average, Tesla was still probably seeing contract prices well above $30,000 per ton in the first and second quarter despite falling prices on the spot market. That's because prices didn't start coming back to earth until the first quarter, which was 3-6 months ago.
另外一点需要注意的是，大多数锂合同都部分地与现货市场挂钩，采用3-6个月滚动平均价。因此，合同价格的变动通常会滞后于现货市场3-6个月。考虑到滚动平均值，尽管现货市场价格下跌，特斯拉在第一季度和第二季度很可能仍然看到合同价格高于每吨3万美元。这是因为价格直到3-6个月前的第一季度才开始回落到正常水平。
But getting back on topic with margins, based on a $30,000 per ton lithium contract price in December, what would the margins look like for the miner and the refiner? Again, it's difficult to say because they're private contracts. However, let's assume that the refining margins remain the same as they were on the spot market and we only adjust the margin for the mined material. That is, like the previous scenario, we'll assume that the refiner still charges $15,000 per ton for refining and pockets $10,000 in profit. But for the mined material, instead of getting $7,000 per ton, the miner only gets around $2,100 per ton. The result is the same 67% margin for the refiner, but the miner still comes out ahead with a 72% margin. So even at contract pricing and giving the refiner the benefit of the doubt, the mining companies are still currently getting higher margins than the refiners.
但是，回到与利润率有关的话题上来，基于12月份每吨3万美元的锂合同价格，挖矿企业和精炼企业的利润率会是什么样呢？同样，很难说，因为这些是私人合同。然而，让我们假设精炼的利润率与现货市场上保持一致，我们只调整挖掘材料的利润率。也就是说，和之前的情况一样，我们假设精炼企业仍然每吨收取1.5万美元的精炼费用，并赚取1万美元的利润。但是对于挖掘材料而言，矿工每吨只能获得约2100美元，而不是每吨7000美元。结果是精炼企业仍然保持了67%的利润率，但是矿工的利润率达到了72%。因此，即使在合同定价时，给予精炼企业以怀疑的利益，矿业公司仍然获得比精炼企业更高的利润率。
That's not always the case and there have been times in the past when refiners saw larger margins than refiners, like in 2020. But currently, mining margins are higher because mining is the larger bottleneck. As a side note, some lithium miners integrate lithium refining into the mining operation, which is expected to become more commonplace over time as the industry matures. It's because it increases the end-to-end efficiency of lithium production and allows the miner to capture more profit. It also means whether mining or refining experience an over or under-supplied market in the future, integrated operations can generate a good profit margin in most scenarios. Furthermore, it means that the differentiation Elon highlighted between mining and refining may become less relevant over time because the miner and refiner will be the same company. Other way, currently, lithium miners are holding all the chips. Whether they sell their lithium on the open market at a high spot price to an independent refiner or sell it on contract and refine it themselves, they're scooping up a huge profit margin. And that'll continue as long as the demand for mined lithium continues to exceed supply, which will likely be the case for most of the decade.
这并不总是真实的情况，在过去的时间里，精炼商有时候比矿工赚取更高的利润，就像在2020年一样。但目前，矿业利润更高，因为矿业是更大的瓶颈。值得一提的是，一些锂矿矿商将锂精炼纳入采矿过程中，随着行业的成熟，这种做法预计将变得更加普遍。这是因为它提高了锂生产的端到端效率，使矿工能够获得更多的利润。这也意味着无论矿业还是精炼业将来遇到过剩或供应不足的市场，综合运营都能够在大多数场景中产生良好的利润率。此外，这意味着埃隆强调的矿业和精炼业之间的区别可能会随着时间的推移变得不那么重要，因为矿工和精炼商将是同一家公司。换句话说，目前，锂矿商掌握着所有的筹码。无论他们将锂以高现货价格出售给独立的精炼商，还是将其按合同出售并自行精炼，他们都能够获得巨额利润。只要对开采锂的需求继续超过供应，这种情况很可能会在大部分时间内持续下去，预计将持续到本十年的大部分时间。
While we're on the topic of lithium margins and pricing, as per Tesla's Q1 earnings call, in the past, they were able to take advantage of low lithium pricing and lock it in with fixed price contracts. Now that prices are coming back down to Earth, they again intend to lock in lithium prices into the latter half of the decade. The question is, will those again be fixed price contracts and how long are the contracts expected to last? There really isn't a clear answer because it depends on the lithium supplier. But we do know that Tesla's negotiating position isn't going to be as strong in this round of negotiations. That's because even though lithium prices have dropped, there's more competition in the lithium market now than there was at any time between 2018 and 2021, which would have been the last time many of these contracts were negotiated.
说到锂边际利润和定价，根据特斯拉的第一季度财报电话会议，过去他们能够利用低廉的锂价格并通过固定价格合约锁定价格。现在价格逐渐回归正常水平，他们再次打算将锂价格固定至本十年的后半段。问题是，这些合约是否再次为固定价格合约，并且预计合约的持续时间是多久？实际上并没有一个明确的答案，因为这取决于锂供应商。但我们知道特斯拉在这轮谈判中的议价地位将不如以前那么强大。因为尽管锂价格有所下降，但现在锂市场上的竞争比2018至2021年间的任何时候都要激烈，而这些合同很可能是在那个时期达成的。
With all that said, we can take some guidance from this slide from Alba-Marl, which is one of Tesla's largest suppliers. By the end of this year, Alba-Marl intends to sell more of their lithium on the spot market and completely eliminate long-term fixed price contracts in favor of long-term variable contracts, long-term meaning two to five years, which would carry these contracts into the latter half of the decade. Within those long-term variable contracts, companies like Alba-Marl and Tesla will build price floors and ceilings into the contract to protect both parties from large price swings. However, the fact that Alba-Marl is moving away from fixed price contracts gives us an indication of where they think lithium prices headed in the longer term, which is up. That is, Alba-Marl also expects lithium to remain in short supply for the rest of the decade and variable pricing gives them a chance to maximize their profits. They can negotiate that because their bargaining power is increasing.
在此充分说明的基础上，我们可以从Alba-Marl的幻灯片中获取一些指导。作为特斯拉最大的供应商之一，Alba-Marl计划在今年年底之前将更多的锂质产品销售到即期市场，并完全取消长期固定价格合同，取而代之的是长期浮动价格合同，长期意味着两到五年，并将这些合同延续到后半程。在这些长期浮动价格合同中，像Alba-Marl和特斯拉这样的公司会在合同中设立价格底线和价格上限，以保护双方免受价格大幅波动的影响。然而，Alba-Marl转向浮动价格合同的事实表明，他们认为锂价格在较长期内将会上涨。换句话说，Alba-Marl也预计锂供应在本十年的剩余时间内将保持短缺状态，而浮动定价使他们有机会最大化利润。他们之所以能够协商这一点是因为他们的议价能力正在增加。
So yes, although Tesla might be able to lock in some fixed price contracts with some suppliers to reduce their exposure to higher prices, an increasing portion of their lithium contracts will be exposed to spot market index pricing. That means even with contract pricing, they'll be paying a higher margin penalty for lithium than they ever have in the past.
是的，尽管特斯拉可能会与一些供应商签订一些固定价格合同，以减少他们对高价的风险，但越来越多的锂合同将受到现货市场指数定价的影响。这意味着即使有合同定价，他们购买锂的利润率也将比过去任何时候都要高。
Now that we've covered the margins for lithium refining versus mining, let's look at the potential for scaling. Rather than doing a deep dive on the players in the lithium refining industry and the technical challenges of lithium refining, all provide aggregate data and the timeframes involved.
既然我们已经讨论了锂提炼与矿采的利润率，让我们来看看其扩展潜力。与其深入研究锂提炼行业的参与者和锂提炼的技术挑战，我们提供聚合数据和时间范围的信息。
As with other topics in the video, if more depth is needed, I can follow up with a specific video on refining that walks through the gritty engineering details and scaling plans of each refiner.
和视频中的其他话题一样，如果需要更深入的了解，我可以制作一个具体的视频来完善，该视频将详细介绍每个精炼器的技术细节和扩展计划。
Onscreen is a forecast for global lithium processing capacity complements of riestat energy. The dark blue bars are announced nameplate capacity and the light blue bars are anticipated demand based on the 1.6 degree UN climate scenario.
在屏幕上，展示了根据riestat能源提供的数据对全球锂加工能力的预测。深蓝色条形图显示的是已公布的额定容量，浅蓝色条形图显示的是基于1.6度联合国气候情景下预计的需求。
The UN scenarios are a topic for another day, but as shown by this graph, based on that climate scenario, riestat is forecasting 6.4 terawatt hours of total battery demand by 2030, which is much more aggressive than most analyst houses. That is, they aren't softballing it on production demand for lithium refining on their lithium supply and demand graph.
联合国的情景设想是另一个话题，但正如这个图表所显示的那样，基于该气候情景，瑞斯塔公司预测到2030年总电池需求将达到6.4万亿瓦时，这比大多数分析机构更为激进。换句话说，他们在锂的供需图表中对锂精炼的生产需求并不保守。
Despite that, as you can see, announced nameplate capacity far exceeds demand. For example, in 2023, the announced nameplate capacity is equivalent to 2.1 million tons of lithium carbonate. That's against 880,000 tons of demand for an implicit utilization of 42%.
尽管如此，正如您所见，宣布的产能远远超过需求。例如，在2023年，宣布的产能相当于210万吨碳酸锂。这相比于88万吨需求仅利用了42%。
Implicit utilization is simply calculated by dividing production demand by capacity. The actual utilization will be higher. What do I mean by that? Nameplate capacity is the maximum potential output of a factory, but due to downtime, production ramps and yield losses, the actual utilization is much higher. Additionally, sometimes low quality lithium needs to be reprocessed to reach battery grade or converted from lithium carbonate to lithium hydroxide.
隐性利用率是通过将生产需求除以产能来简单计算的。实际利用率会更高。什么意思呢？铭牌产能是工厂的最大潜在产出，但由于停机时间、生产阶段和产量损失，实际利用率要高得多。此外，有时需要重新处理低品质的锂材料以达到电池级别，或者将碳酸锂转化为氢氧化锂。
So even though implicit utilization is around 42%, my understanding is that actual utilization is probably around 80-90%. With that said, it still leaves spare lithium refining capacity of about 10-20% this year and in the next several years.
所以尽管隐性利用率大约为42%，但我认为实际利用率可能在80-90%左右。话虽如此，今年和未来几年仍然会有约10-20%的剩余锂精炼产能。
What about later in the decade? The implicit utilization does creep upwards to the 50-60% range, but that likely won't be an issue for two reasons. First, it only takes about two years to build a lithium refinery and about four years to get from planning to volume production. That is, if refining capacity does look like it'll come up short later in the decade due to an unexpected volume of mined lithium, there's still plenty of time for more refining capacity to be announced and built.
那在这个十年之后呢？隐含的利用率确实会上升到50-60%的范围，但这可能不是一个问题，有两个原因。首先，建设锂精炼厂只需要大约两年时间，从规划到量产大约需要四年时间。也就是说，如果由于挖掘出的锂产量意外增加导致精炼能力在这个十年之后不够用，还有足够的时间来公布和建设更多的精炼能力。
Second, implicit utilization already reached 65% last year, so we already saw a worse lithium refining crunch last year than we're expecting to see later in the decade.
其次，隐性利用率去年已经达到了65%，因此去年我们已经看到了比我们在本十年后期预计要看到的更糟糕的锂提炼压力。
So if there appears to be plenty of refining capacity coming online at a global level, and there's still plenty of time to build more refining capacity before the end of the decade, why is Tesla pushing for more refining capacity? There are several potential reasons, but for me, three stick out as the most likely.
因此，如果全球似乎有足够的精炼能力上线，而在本十年结束之前还有足够的时间来建造更多的精炼能力，那么为什么特斯拉还在推动增加精炼能力呢？有几个潜在原因，但对我来说，最有可能的有三个。
First, Tesla has specific requirements that the market may not be able to meet at the supply levels and price that Tesla needs it. What do I mean by that? The rice stack graph shows aggregate demand for all lithium chemicals. As I said earlier, there are actually several spot markets for the different types and grades of lithium. High purity lithium hydroxide is the only chemical that can be used to produce the high nickel cathodes that are used in Tesla's 2170 and 4680 battery cells. Lithium hydroxide is more difficult to produce than lithium carbonate, so it tends to be more expensive and more difficult to source. So Tesla could be seeing a bottleneck in their specific supply mix that might not show up in the aggregate data. That bottleneck likely wouldn't affect their LFP battery supply, but could affect the roughly 50% of their vehicles that do use nickel-based battery cells. In fact, this may be one of the many reasons why Tesla is increasingly shifting to LFP battery cells.
首先，特斯拉对市场有特定的要求，供应水平和价格可能无法满足特斯拉的需求。我是什么意思呢？这份统计图显示了所有锂化学品的总需求。正如我之前所说，实际上有几个不同类型和等级的锂的现货市场。高纯度氢氧化锂是唯一可以用于特斯拉的2170和4680电池单元中使用的高镍正极材料的化学品。氢氧化锂的生产比碳酸锂更困难，因此它往往更昂贵且更难来源。因此，特斯拉可能在他们的特定供应组合中出现瓶颈，这可能在总体数据中不会显示出来。这种瓶颈可能不会影响他们的LFP电池供应，但可能会影响到使用镍基电池单元的大约50%的汽车。实际上，这可能是特斯拉越来越多地转向LFP电池单元的原因之一。
The second reason why Tesla may be pushing for lithium refining is that there's expected to be a large amount of mined lithium coming online around 2024 that could overwhelm refiners. However, that would require two things to happen. First, all of those lithium mines would have to come online on time, which is unlikely. Just like any production ramp, it's more likely that some of the project timelines slip, and they don't hit volume production until 2025 or even 2026. Second, at the same time, lithium refiners would have to experience huge setbacks to the 50% growth rate they expect to hit not just this year, but in 2024 and 2025 as well. That is, a sustained shortage of lithium refining capacity could happen, but it's unlikely. With that said, it is possible that refining sees occasional bottlenecks. That's because it's rare for everything in a supply chain to ramp perfectly in unison. With so many mines ramping production, there could be times where it catches the refiners off guard.
特斯拉推动锂矿石精炼的第二个原因是预计在2024年附近将会出现大量开采的锂矿石，这可能会给精炼厂带来压力。然而，这需要两个条件同时发生。首先，所有这些锂矿石项目必须按时开采，而这是不太可能的。就像任何生产提速一样，项目的时间表很可能会有所推迟，直到2025年甚至2026年才能达到大规模生产。其次，与此同时，锂精炼厂也必须面临巨大的挑战，以满足他们预期在今年以及2024年和2025年都达到50%的增长率。也就是说，锂精炼能力的持续短缺是有可能发生的，但不太可能。尽管如此，精炼过程可能偶尔会出现瓶颈。这是因为供应链中的所有事物很少会完全同步提速。由于有这么多矿山在扩大生产，可能会有时候锂精炼厂会措手不及。
The third reason why Tesla is pushing for more lithium refining may be related to regionalization. Besides aggregating lithium carbonate and hydroxide, the rice that graph doesn't break down refining capacity by region. Lithium chemicals can be shipped around the world for processing, but it's not ideal. At the groundbreaking for Tesla's new lithium refinery in Texas, Turner Caldwell said that the major focus of the refinery was regionalizing the lithium supply chain. Before that event, Ellie in Space contacted me and we worked shop some questions for Drew Baglino. Ellie did get a chance to speak with Drew and she posted the interview for her Twitter subscribers and gave me permission to share part of the interview here. For the rest, subscribe to Ellie on Twitter. Drew Baglino confirmed regionalization has several benefits for Tesla. First, it improves the feedback and learning loop for the lithium supply chain. Second, it reduces logistics costs. Lithium usually has to be shipped from Australia or South America to China and then back to other parts of the world for use in batteries, which is expensive and wasteful. Third, tax credits from the recently passed inflation reduction act will help drive down the cost of lithium production in the US. However, there are two other things that Drew didn't mention. First, the bulk of lithium refining capacity is in China. So if Tesla wants to be the master of their own destiny, they need to break that monopoly. If Tesla can establish a lithium refining beachhead in the US and in doing so encourage others to do the same, it'll help accomplish that. Second, the talent pool for lithium refining in the US is small. Tesla's lithium refinery will incubate a US-based talent pool for lithium refining. If some of those engineers are ambitious, they can start their own lithium refining companies in the US and take some of the load off of Tesla. With all that in mind, if Tesla wants more entrepreneurs to get into lithium refining, their words might have greater impact if they provided insights into which region that bottle neck is in and what type of lithium chemical. That's because there appears to be plenty of refining capacity in the pipeline and it can be brought online more quickly than lithium mines. More on that in a moment.
特斯拉推动更多锂矿精炼的第三个原因可能与地区化有关。除了聚集碳酸锂和氢氧化锂，该图表并没有按地区细分炼化能力。锂化学品可以运往世界各地进行加工，但这并不理想。在德州特斯拉新锂矿厂的奠基仪式上，特纳·科德威尔表示，该矿厂的主要重点是将锂供应链地区化。在此之前，"空间中的艾莉"联系到我，并为德鲁·巴格利诺提出了一些问题。艾莉确实有机会与德鲁交谈，并将采访发布给她的Twitter订阅者，并允许我在这里分享采访的一部分。有关其余内容，请订阅艾莉的Twitter。德鲁·巴格利诺确认了地区化对特斯拉的几个好处。首先，它改善了锂供应链的反馈和学习循环。其次，它降低了物流成本。锂通常需要从澳大利亚或南美运往中国，然后再返航至世界其他地区用于电池，这种方式既昂贵又浪费。第三，最近通过的通脱贬值法案的税收抵免将有助于降低美国锂生产成本。然而，德鲁没有提到两件事。首先，大部分锂精炼能力在中国。因此，如果特斯拉想要掌控自己的命运，就需要打破这个垄断。如果特斯拉能够在美国建立一个锂精炼据点，并鼓励其他人效仿，这将有助于实现这一目标。其次，美国的锂精炼人才库规模较小。特斯拉的锂矿厂将孵化出一个基于美国的锂精炼人才库。如果其中一些工程师野心勃勃，他们可以在美国创办自己的锂精炼公司，并减轻特斯拉的负担。考虑到所有这些，如果特斯拉希望更多的企业家参与锂精炼，他们的言辞可能会更有影响力，如果他们提供关于该瓶颈在哪个地区以及采用的是何种锂化学品的深入见解。这是因为目前似乎有足够的精炼能力在排队等待，并且可以比锂矿更快地上线。稍后会详细解释。
Although Tesla's comments do draw attention to lithium refining, and that's somewhat helpful in itself, money talks. So the one factor that's most likely to increase lithium production in the US is the Inflation Reduction Act tax credits for battery materials. Either way, if lithium refining capacity is tighter than the forecasts indicate and Tesla's force to build more in-house refining capacity, I view that as a positive. That's because it'll dramatically reduce logistics costs, give them access to Inflation Reduction Act tax credits, and reduce the software-like margins that they're paying to lithium refiners, all of which will reduce the bill of materials for battery cell production.
尽管特斯拉的评论确实引起了人们对锂精炼的关注，并且本身对此有所帮助，但金钱才是最有可能增加美国锂生产的因素。因此，最有可能增加美国锂生产的因素是《通胀减缓法案》针对电池材料的税收减免措施。无论如何，如果锂精炼产能比预测的更紧缺，并迫使特斯拉增加内部精炼产能，我将视其为积极的因素。这是因为这将大幅降低物流成本，使他们能够享受《通胀减缓法案》的税收减免，并减少他们支付给锂精炼商的软件式利润，所有这些都将降低电池电池生产的材料费用。
That's important because the bill of materials for battery cell production has increased from 40% to 70-80% of the cost of a battery cell since 2015 due to improvements in battery cell manufacturing, which will continue. And within the bill of materials in the last three years, the price of lithium alone made up between 9-44% of the total bill of materials. Telling that up, vertically integrating on lithium refining would save between 2-12% of the cost of a battery cell. Let's say 7% on average.
这很重要，因为自2015年以来，电池电芯生产所需的物料费用已从占总费用的40％增至70-80％，这归功于电池电芯制造技术的改进，并且这种趋势将继续下去。在过去三年的物料费用中，仅锂的价格就占据了总费用的9-44％。总结一下，垂直整合锂精炼业务将节省电池电芯成本的2-12％，平均来说大约为7％。
Battery cells this year will probably cost on average around 110-120 dollars per kilowatt hour. If Tesla gets their cells cheaper at around 100 dollars per kilowatt hour, that would mean a savings of around 7 dollars per kilowatt hour from refining alone, which would be costing Tesla over a billion dollars per year.
今年，电池单元的平均成本可能是每千瓦时约110-120美元。如果特斯拉能以约每千瓦时100美元的更低价格购买电池单元，那将意味着光通过精炼就能节省每千瓦时约7美元，这将使特斯拉每年节省十亿美元以上的费用。
Beyond that, Tesla's goal is to build at least one terawatt hour of in-house battery production in the US by 2030. At $7 a kilowatt hour, in-house lithium refining would be worth $7 billion per year, which at a PE ratio of 30 would be worth $210 billion of market cap or $70 per share. That is, vertically integrating on battery materials, even just lithium refining is a seriously worthwhile endeavor.
此外，特斯拉的目标是到2030年在美国内建立至少1兆瓦时的电池生产。以每千瓦时7美元的价格计算，内部锂精炼每年价值70亿美元，按照30倍市盈率计算，该价值相当于2100亿美元的市值，即每股70美元。也就是说，垂直整合电池材料，即使仅仅是锂精炼，对于特斯拉来说是一项非常值得投入的努力。
As an interim summary on lithium refining, although margins are high for lithium refining, the margins for lithium mining are higher. Furthermore, there appears to be enough lithium refining capacity on the market to maintain healthy supply growth well into the second half of the decade. Although there are several circumstances where there is a potential for lithium mining to outpace refining, it doesn't appear to be the fundamental bottleneck for the growth of lithium supply. Finally, regardless of whether the fundamental bottleneck is or isn't lithium refining, the financial benefits of vertically integrating into lithium refining is worth Tesla's time to say the least.
关于锂精炼的临时总结表明，尽管锂精炼的毛利润较高，但锂开采的毛利润更高。此外，市场上似乎已经有足够的锂精炼能力，以确保供应增长在本十年的后半段保持健康。虽然在某些情况下，锂开采有可能超过精炼，但这似乎并不是锂供应增长的基本瓶颈。最后，无论基本瓶颈是否是锂精炼，垂直整合进入锂精炼的财务收益对特斯拉来说是值得的，没有什么可以说的。
Now that we've covered the margins for refining versus mining and the forecast for lithium refining and its ability to scale, let's move on to the forecast for lithium mining and the ability of the mining industry to scale.
既然我们已经讨论了提炼与采矿的利润率以及锂提炼和其可扩展能力的预测，让我们继续讨论锂采矿和采矿业的可扩展能力的预测。
First, it's worth reviewing Tesla's claim from Investor Day that there's enough lithium in the ground to transition the world to sustainable energy. For those who watch the Investor Day presentation, this will be a brief recap, but I'll be adding some context and specific numbers to put some meat on the bones of Tesla's claim. The image on screen indicates that it'll take less than 30% of the world's lithium resources to transition the world to sustainable energy. However, a resource is an estimate of how much of an element might be in the ground. That is, the work hasn't been done to define how much of the element is actually there and whether it can be extracted profitably.
首先，值得回顾特斯拉在投资者日活动中提出的说法：地球上有足够的锂用于实现可持续能源转型。对于那些观看过投资者日活动演示的人来说，这将是一个简短的回顾，但我将加入一些背景和具体数字来支撑特斯拉的说法。屏幕上的图像显示，只需使用全球不到30％的锂资源即可实现世界的可持续能源转型。然而，资源只是对某种元素可能存在于地下的估计。也就是说，尚未完成工作以确定实际存在多少该元素，并且是否能够盈利提取。
For example, the ocean contains enormous amounts of lithium, but it's at such low concentration that currently it can't be extracted profitably. That's where this graph on lithium reserves comes in. Reserves are resources that are well defined. We know how much material they contain and generally whether the material can be extracted profitably. I say generally because profitability depends on both market price, which fluctuates, and extraction efficiency, which improves over time as technology improves. Although Tesla's graph on reserves is illustrative, it's normalized to the year 2000, meaning that it doesn't tell us how much material is in the ground. But rather, how much reserves have grown over the past two decades?
举个例子，海洋中含有大量的锂，但其浓度非常低，目前无法盈利性地提取。这就是锂储量图的用武之地。储量是指那些有明确定义的资源。我们知道它们包含多少物质，通常也知道这些物质是否可以盈利地提取。我说通常是因为盈利性取决于市场价格（波动）和提取效益的改善，随着技术的改进，效益会提高。尽管特斯拉的储量图是形象的，但它是以2000年为基准进行标准化的，这意味着它并不告诉我们地下有多少物质。而是过去20年储量增长了多少？
Is the eight times growth in lithium reserves enough to transition the world to sustainable energy? Let's look at US Geological Survey data for global lithium production and reserves. As of 2022, global lithium reserves were nearly 25 million tons of elemental lithium. That's enough for roughly 178 TWh of batteries. I'd like to emphasize that's a back of the napkin estimate, and it could be off by plus or minus 25%, depending on what type of battery cell is used.
锂储量增长了八倍，足以让世界转向可持续能源吗？让我们看看美国地质调查局的全球锂产量和储量数据。截至2022年，全球的锂储量接近2500万吨金属锂。这足够制造大约178 TWh的电池。我要强调一下，这只是一个粗略估计，具体数值可能高低误差达25%，这取决于所使用的电池电芯类型。
In Tesla's Master Plan Part 3, they call for about 198 TWh of battery cells, so the reserves come up a bit short. However, lithium reserves have grown by about 80% in the past five years, and I have no doubt that within the next three to five years, even taking into account that some of those reserves may be off limits due to political challenges will have all the lithium reserves we need to transition the world to sustainable energy.
在特斯拉的第三部“特斯拉大计划”中，他们呼吁使用大约198太瓦时的电池电芯，因此储备有点不足。然而，在过去五年中，锂储备增长了约80％，我毫不怀疑，在接下来的三到五年内，即使考虑到部分储备可能因政治挑战而受限，我们也会拥有所有需要的锂储备，以实现向可持续能源的全球过渡。
So if most of the work is done to find and to find lithium reserves, why do lithium forecasts show that lithium supply will come up increasingly short as the decade progresses? If all that's needed here is mining, and mining is just digging things up, what's the issue? In short, mining is a lot more complicated than just digging things up, and just like it'll take Tesla years to build enough factories to hit their goal of 20 million vehicles per year, it's going to take years to build the mines to supply those factories. However, the mines have to jump through more regulatory and technical hoops before they can even break ground, but we're getting ahead of ourselves.
那么，如果大部分工作都是为了找到和开采锂矿储量，为什么锂供应的预测显示，随着这个十年的进展，锂供应将越来越不足呢？如果所需的只是采矿，而采矿只是挖东西出来，问题出在哪里呢？简而言之，采矿要比仅仅挖东西出来复杂得多，就像特斯拉需要数年才能建设足够的工厂以达到每年2000万辆车的目标一样，建设矿山也需要数年时间来满足这些工厂的供应。然而，在矿山能够着手建设之前，它们必须通过更多的监管和技术审查，不过我们还可以继续讨论。
To fully understand why mining will likely be the bottleneck for lithium production, we first need to look at forecasts for lithium supply and demand. That's for three reasons. First, lithium supply tends to be the focus of most discussions I've seen about lithium, but despite being half the equation, lithium demand is often neglected. Second, we need to understand the assumptions behind the forecasts and what makes a good forecast. Along the way, we'll get a feel for some high and low end boundaries for lithium supply and demand. Third, that in turn is a good springboard to take a detailed look at where all the units of supply and demand will come from and why, and therefore where the forecasts could be wrong.
为了完全理解为什么采矿很可能成为锂生产的瓶颈，我们首先需要看一下锂供需的预测。这有三个原因。首先，大多数讨论锂的焦点是锂供应，但尽管它是方程的一半， 锂需求经常被忽视。其次，我们需要了解预测背后的假设和什么样的预测是可靠的。在此过程中，我们会对锂供需的高低极限有所了解。第三，从这个角度出发，我们可以详细研究供应和需求的各个单位来自于何处以及为什么，进一步了解预测可能存在的错误。
From there, we can build our own forecast. With that in mind, let's start by looking at three forecasts, from low to high quality. This graph from Lion Town Resources is based on data from Wood Mackenzie. The first thing I'd note about the graph is that it contains the wrong units. It should be in megatons rather than kilotons. That would be an easy mistake for most people to make, but it's a big mistake if you work in the industry. The next thing worth noting is that, in my opinion, the demand is below what's reasonable. They project 1.9 million tons of LCE demand by 2030. LCE stands for Lithium Carbonate Equivalent, which just tells you that they weren't referring to Pure Lithium, but rather a commonly traded Lithium chemical. Five LCE units are equivalent to about one unit of Pure Lithium, because Lithium Carbonate is about 80% carbonate by weight. However, 1.9 million tons LCE is fairly abstract. What does that mean in terms of battery production? It's roughly 2.7 TWh. For perspective, this year in 2023, there will likely be over one TWh of actual Lithium demand. That means the graph is forecasting an average annual growth rate of only 15%. That's as compared to the actual average demand growth for Lithium over the past six years, which was 40% per year. Furthermore, Tesla stated that just from their demand alone, they're targeting 3 TWh by 2030. That is, Tesla expects their own in-house usage to be more than Wood Mackenzie is forecasting for the entire world.
从那里，我们可以建立我们自己的预测。考虑到这一点，让我们先从低质量到高质量来看三个预测。这个来自狮城资源的图表基于伍德·麦肯齐的数据。关于这个图表，我要指出的第一件事是它包含了错误的单位。它应该是以兆吨为单位，而不是千吨。对大多数人来说，这可能是一个容易犯的错误，但如果你在这个行业工作，那就是一个大错误。接下来值得注意的是，我认为需求低于合理水平。他们预测到2030年锂碳酸盐当量需求量为190万吨。LCE代表锂碳酸盐当量，这告诉你他们指的不是纯锂，而是一种常用的锂化学品。五个LCE单位相当于一个纯锂单位，因为碳酸锂的碳酸盐含量约为80%。然而，190万吨LCE相当抽象。这在电池生产方面意味着什么？大致上是2.7太瓦时。为了有所了解，今年2023年，实际上的锂需求可能会超过1太瓦时。这意味着该图表预测的平均年增长率仅为15%。这与过去六年的实际锂需求增长率相比，后者为每年40%。此外，特斯拉表示，仅凭他们的需求，他们的目标是到2030年达到3太瓦时。也就是说，特斯拉预计他们自己的内部使用量将超过伍德·麦肯齐对整个世界的预测。
This graph from Lithium Americas, which is based on data from benchmark mineral intelligence from 2021, is a little better in a few ways. First, the LCE units are at the correct magnitude, megatons. Second, the 2030 demand forecast is for 2.4 megatons, which is enough for about 3.4 TWh of battery cells. That's getting a bit more realistic, but in my view, it's still too low and doesn't specify whether that's a bull, bear, or base case. Third, the supply data actually includes a rough split between increases in supply from mines that are already operating, brownfields mining projects, and greenfields mining projects that are probable or highly probable. Brownfields projects are expansions near existing mines that have already been surveyed, and greenfields projects are completely new mines. Overall, it appears that Lithium Americas used a simplified version of benchmark minerals data to good effect.
这张图是由Lithium Americas根据2021年benchmark mineral intelligence的数据制作的，从几个方面来说有所改进。首先，LCE单位以正确的数量级——百万吨示。其次，2030年的需求预测为2.4百万吨，足够提供约3.4 TWh的电池容量。这已经变得更加现实，但在我看来，它仍然过低，并且没有明确指出是看涨、看空还是基准情况。第三，在供应数据中，实际包括了来自已经运营的矿山、已经勘探过的旧矿区的扩展项目、以及有可能或极有可能的新绿地矿区的供应增加的大致分配情况。旧矿区的项目是在已经勘探过的现有矿山附近的扩建项目，而绿地矿区的项目则是完全新的矿山。总体来看，Lithium Americas利用benchmark minerals数据的简化版本取得了良好的效果。
However, let's look at a more up-to-date forecast directly from benchmark minerals that provides a greater level of detail. First, the 2030 demand forecast shows two primary pathways, a base case at 2.9 megatons LCE and a high case at 5.4 megatons LCE, which equate to roughly 4 TWh and 7.6 TWh. Could the demand in 2030 be up to 7.6 TWh? Absolutely. 7.6 TWh would be an average growth rate of 34% per year, which is less than the average growth rate over the last six years, so it's fairly reasonable. Furthermore, it's not just reasonable historically, but also backed up by the 8.5 TWh of Gigafactory capacity that's already been announced for 2030. 7.6 TWh of demand from 8.5 TWh of capacity would mean a fairly high utilization rate for those factories of 89%. That is, it doesn't accommodate much for things like downtime, yield loss, and production ramps. With that said, more Gigafactories are being announced each year. Last year, rather than 8.5 TWh of Gigafactory announcements, there was only about 6.7 TWh. That is, the desire and or need is there for a huge amount of battery cells later this decade, and it's growing every year. The question is, will there be enough lithium, other materials, capital, and talent to get those factories off the ground? More on that later in the video.
然而，我们来看一下来自Benchmark Minerals的更新的预测，提供更详细的信息。首先，2030年的需求预测显示两个主要途径，底线情况为2.9百万吨碳酸锂当量（LCE），高情况为5.4百万吨LCE，相当于大约4太瓦时（TWh）和7.6 TWh。2030年的需求可能高达7.6 TWh吗？完全可以。7.6 TWh的增长率为34%，低于过去六年的平均增长率，因此相当合理。此外，不仅从历史角度来看是合理的，而且还有8.5 TWh吉盖工厂容量的支持，该容量已经宣布将在2030年建成。8.5 TWh的需求来自8.5 TWh的产能，这意味着工厂的利用率相当高，达到89%。也就是说，这并没有考虑到停机时间、产量损失和生产增长等因素。与此同时，每年都会有更多的吉盖工厂被宣布建设。去年，吉盖工厂的宣布容量约为6.7 TWh，而不是8.5 TWh。换句话说，本十年后期将需要大量的电池电芯，这种需求每年都在增长。问题是，是否有足够的锂、其他材料、资本和人才来建设这些工厂呢？视频后面会详细说明。
Next, let's look at supply. Benchmark tracks every lithium mine in the world along with the plans of each mine, and then they assign a probability on the likelihood that each mine will go into production for a given year. There's seven categories of supply. Operating supply is production supply expansions at mines that are currently operating. Secondary supply is actually recycled material, which is often neglected in supply forecasts. Caron maintenance supply results from improvements to existing supply sources, and so it's so minimal that it doesn't really show on the graph.
接下来，让我们来看一下供应情况。Benchmark追踪全球的每个锂矿以及每个矿山的计划，并为每个矿山在给定年份内投产的可能性分配概率。供应有七个类别。运营供应是目前运营的矿山的生产供应扩张。次供应实际上是回收材料，这在供应预测中经常被忽视。卡伦维护供应是由于对现有供应来源进行改进而产生的，因此其量非常小，几乎在图表上不可见。
Brownfield supply expansion, which I mentioned briefly earlier, is expansion near existing mines. Beyond that, there's highly probable, probable, and possible expansions in supply from greenfield's mining projects, which are new mines. Now that we have a basic understanding of the two primary demand scenarios and the basic elements that make up supply, let's look at how the data is evolving over time. For the dashed gray line, I asked Cameron Perks at Benchmark to overlay their demand forecast from three years ago to get a feel for how the landscape has shifted over time. As you can see, the base case demand scenario has shifted upwards, and if my thinking is correct and demand is close to the high case demand scenario, then a manned curve is starting to look more like an S-curve. And that's exactly what we should expect from the key component of a new technology like EVs, the same adoption curve that many other technologies have followed. The question is, will this adoption curve be hampered by the supply of raw materials? More on that later.
我之前简要提到的布朗场供应扩大，是指在现有矿山附近进行扩展。除此之外，还有一些有很高可能性、可能性的矿产开发项目会进一步扩大供应。现在我们已经基本了解了两个主要需求情景和构成供应的基本要素，让我们来看看数据是如何随时间演变的。对于虚线灰线，我请Benchmark的Cameron Perks将他们三年前的需求预测叠加在上面，以了解这个领域随时间的变化。正如你所看到的，基本情景需求情景已经上升，如果我的想法是正确的，需求接近高情景需求情景，那么曲线就开始呈现出类似S型曲线的趋势。这正是我们对一门新技术如电动汽车的关键组成部分所期望的，与许多其他技术遵循的相同采用曲线。问题是，原材料供应是否会阻碍这种采用曲线的发展？稍后再继续讨论。
So if Benchmark's demand line has shifted upwards, has their supply forecast also shifted upwards? Yes. This graph from about three years ago shows that supply and demand are roughly aligned until about 2027, and then demand breaks away from supply around 2028 when supply is at around 1.4 megatons. The new graph with up-to-date data also shows supply and demand roughly aligned until about 2027, and demand also breaks away from supply around 2028. But it happens when demand is at about 2.2 megatons rather than 1.4 megatons. That is, the shapes of the graphs are nearly identical, but over the past three years, supply and demand have drifted upwards by over 50%, which is a pretty huge variance. What's going on here? Why did the lithium forecast change so much between 2020 and 2023? In my view, there's three primary factors. Let's take a look.
如果Benchmark的需求曲线上移了，他们的供应预测是否也上移了？是的。这张大约三年前的图表显示，供应和需求在2027年之前大致保持一致，然后在2028年左右，当供应达到约1.4兆吨时，需求开始超出供应。最新的图表使用最新数据也显示，供应和需求在2027年之前大致保持一致，然后需求在2028年左右超出供应。但是这次的超出发生在需求达到约2.2兆吨时，而不是1.4兆吨时。也就是说，这两张图的形状几乎相同，但在过去三年中，供应和需求的增长率都上升了50%以上，这是一个相当大的差异。这到底是怎么回事？为什么在2020年和2023年之间锂的预测发生了如此大的变化？在我看来，有三个主要因素。让我们来看一下。
First, as I'll explain later in the video, between 2018 and 2020 there was a demand crash for lithium, which caused surplus lithium supply to the point where some lithium miners idled some of their production capacity. When demand started returning in 2021, it was just a matter of cranking the dial to increase supply. That is, benchmark minerals 2020 supply forecast was hiding latent supply due to weak demand. Supply usually doesn't exceed demand because selling when demand is weak can mean selling at break-even or at a loss. That in turn means supply and demand tend to move in unison and only diverge when lithium supply comes up short, rather than vice versa.
首先，在视频中我将在稍后解释的是，在2018年至2020年期间，锂的需求暴跌，导致了锂供应过剩的情况，以至于一些锂矿商关闭了部分产能。当需求在2021年开始回升时，只需调整供应量，就可以增加供应。也就是说，由于需求疲软，Benchmark Minerals在2020年的供应预测隐藏了潜在的供应。通常情况下，供应不会超过需求，因为当需求疲软时出售可能意味着以保本或亏损的价格出售。这反过来意味着供应和需求往往是一致的，只有在锂供应不足时才会出现分歧，而不是相反。
The second factor that caused benchmark minerals forecast to be revised upwards is that the high lithium prices of the past two years have driven the development of new mining projects. As we'll see, a lot of that new supply contains fish hooks and includes caveats, but the market is responding. What all this means is that circumstances have changed for both supply and demand and the forecasts have had to adapt.
导致基准矿物预测上调的第二个原因是过去两年的高锂价格推动了新矿项目的开发。正如我们将会看到的，很多新供应包含风险因素和限制条件，但市场正在做出回应。所有这些意味着供应和需求的情况发生了变化，因此预测不得不进行调整。
The third factor that caused benchmark minerals forecast to be revised upwards was the forecasting methodology itself. As I said earlier, benchmark minerals tracks every lithium mine in the world along with the plans of each mine as well as gigafactory announcements. Their data set is robust. However, they don't build factors into their forecast that can't be predicted, like the effect of high prices on supply growth, how many new gigafactories will be announced, or the impact of rapidly emerging supply in regions like China and Africa that have shorter lead times. That means that so long as we're in a supply constrained environment, both supply and demand forecasts for lithium are likely to continue to undershoot actual supply and demand.
导致Benchmark Minerals预测上调的第三个因素是预测方法本身。正如我之前所说，Benchmark Minerals追踪全球每个锂矿以及每个矿山的计划和超级工厂的公告。他们的数据集非常完整。然而，他们的预测中没有考虑无法预测的因素，比如高价格对供应增长的影响，会有多少新的超级工厂的公告，以及中国和非洲等地快速崛起的供应对市场的影响，因为这些地区的产量上升的速度更快。这意味着只要我们处于供应紧张的环境中，锂的供应和需求预测很可能继续低估实际的供应和需求。
If that's the case, what's the point of forecast for lithium supply and demand? If you're a player in the lithium industry, it tells you what the future looks like based on all the information currently available. That is, it's a benchmark. It's a starting point for understanding an analysis, not the end game.
如果是这种情况，那么对于锂的供应和需求预测有何意义呢？如果你是锂行业的参与者，它会根据当前所有可用信息告诉你未来的情况。也就是说，它是一个基准。它是理解和分析的起点，而不是最终目标。
For example, the forecasting data can be combined with pricing data and cost of production data to develop growth, production and pricing strategies. What if you're a Tesla investor? We can use the forecast to frame up high and low end boundaries for lithium supply and then take a closer look at potential lithium supply from all sources to see where actual lithium supply might fall within that range. From there, we can factor in Tesla's plans and see where Tesla's plans start colliding with potential supply issues.
例如，可以将预测数据与定价数据和生产成本数据相结合，制定增长、生产和定价策略。如果你是特斯拉的投资者，我们可以利用预测结果构建锂供应的上下限，并仔细研究所有供应来源中潜在的锂供应，以确定实际锂供应可能在哪个范围内。然后，我们可以考虑特斯拉的计划，看特斯拉的计划何时开始与潜在供应问题发生冲突。
For the low end boundary, I've set global lithium supply in 2030 at 3.5 terawatt-hours, which is the current upper lithium supply target for benchmark minerals. I'm setting that as the bear case number because lithium supply forecasts have been creeping upward as lithium supply responds to demand.
对于低端界限，我已将2030年全球锂供应设定为3.5太瓦时，这是基准矿物锂供应的当前上限目标。我将其设定为悲观情况的数字，因为随着锂供应对需求的响应，锂供应预测一直在逐渐上升。
If the 3.5 terawatt-hour bear case came to pass, it would make life difficult for Tesla because their 3 terawatt-hour target for battery consumption in 2030 would be about 86% of the global market, which isn't realistic.
如果3.5太瓦时的最坏情况发生，这将给特斯拉带来困难，因为他们在2030年对电池消耗的3太瓦时目标将占据全球市场的约86％，这并不现实。
For the high end boundary, I've set global lithium supply in 2030 at 7.6 terawatt-hours, which is benchmark minerals high demand case forecast. I'm setting that as the bull case number because it's higher than any bull case I've seen, but still a reasonable 34% average annual growth rate.
对于高端边界情况，我将全球2030年的锂供应设置为7.6太瓦时，这是基准矿物公司对高需求情况的预测。我将这个数值作为看涨情况下的数值，因为它比我见过的任何看涨情况都要高，但仍然是一个合理的34%的年均增长率。
If the bull case came to pass, Tesla's 3 terawatt-hour target for battery consumption would be about 39% of the market, which would make Tesla's life a lot easier.
如果乐观情况发生，特斯拉的电池消耗目标将达到3太瓦时，这相当于市场的39%，这将使特斯拉的生活变得轻松许多。
Now that we have high and low end boundaries for global lithium supply, let's run through the recent history of lithium supply and demand. The reason I'm covering this is because there have been a few events over the past 8 years that could be construed as proof that lithium supply can ramp rather quickly in response to demand. I have to put those examples to bed so we can start with a clean slate as to what is and isn't possible when it comes to increasing lithium supply.
现在我们对全球锂供应有了高端和低端边界，让我们回顾一下最近的锂供需历史。我之所以要谈论这个是因为过去8年中有几个事件可以被解释为证明锂供应可以迅速增加以应对需求。我必须把这些例子搁置一边，以便我们在增加锂供应的可能性方面从空白状态开始。
There was a minor boom in lithium prices from 2015 to 2018. That's because the EV industry started to take off thanks to China and Tesla. That boom went bust from 2018 to 2020 when three things happened. First, lithium mining and refining started to catch up with demand about three years into the boom in 2018, which provided some price relief. However, most of that new supply came from existing operations in Australia, not new mining operations, which would have taken longer. Second, in March 2019, China's EV subsidies were reduced. It caused EV growth to stall in 2019, which in turn pushed the lithium market into oversupply and lithium prices crashed. Third, in 2020, COVID hit. 2020 was supposed to be a year that lithium demand strengthened and prices recovered, but instead prices continued to drop. That string of bad luck led to a lithium market in 2020, where lithium miners and refiners were operating at break even. Since despite the fact that from 2018 to 2020, large lithium producers in Australia had been throttling lithium supply by idling their mines and putting projects on hold in an attempt to increase prices.
2015年至2018年，锂价格出现了小幅增长。这是因为由于中国和特斯拉的推动，电动车行业开始蓬勃发展。然而，从2018年到2020年，这一增长繁荣结束了，原因有三个。首先，2018年开始，锂矿开采和精炼已经开始与需求保持平衡，从而使价格得到一些缓解。然而，大部分新供应来自于澳大利亚现有的运营项目，而非新的矿业开发项目，因此需要更长的时间。其次，在2019年3月，中国的电动车补贴有所减少，导致2019年电动车增长停滞，进而导致锂市场供应过剩，锂价格暴跌。第三，在2020年，新冠疫情爆发。本应是锂需求增强、价格回升的一年，但相反，价格持续下跌。这一系列不幸的事件导致2020年的锂市场，锂矿和精炼企业只能勉强保持运营。尽管事实上，从2018年到2020年，澳大利亚的大型锂生产企业一直在通过停产和暂停项目来限制供应，以期提高价格。
So in 2021 and 22, when demand and prices surged, there was reserve capacity in the system to satisfy the demand. However, that didn't last long. In 2022, lithium prices reached about four times the previous record high. Since then, lithium prices have moderated, but that's mainly due to a brief respite and demand from the US and Chinese auto markets that gave lithium supply a chance to catch up. Even then, prices still remain above historic highs and may already be rebounding.
所以在2021年和2022年，需求和价格激增时，系统中存在储备能力以满足需求。然而，这种情况没有持续太久。在2022年，锂价格达到了前一次历史最高价的四倍左右。此后，锂价格有所回落，但这主要是由于美国和中国汽车市场的需求短暂缓解，给了锂供应一个追赶的机会。即使如此，价格仍然高于历史高点，并且可能已经开始反弹。
With that in mind, we have two examples of how the lithium market responds to a large demand wave. In both the 2015 to 2018 bull run and the 2021 to 2022 bull run, lithium supply responded quickly. But a good portion of that was thanks to large existing mines in Australia rather than new mines. And in both bull runs, it was more a drop in demand that really ended the bull run rather than an increase in supply.
考虑到这一点，我们有两个例子展示锂市场如何应对大的需求浪潮。在2015年至2018年的牛市和2021年至2022年的牛市中，锂供应迅速回应。但这主要得益于澳大利亚现有的大型矿山，而不是新的矿山。而且在两次牛市中，真正结束牛市的是需求下降，而不是供应增加。
The fact that Australia came to the rescue pretty quickly in both bull runs might be part of the reason why Elon pointed to Australia when downplaying concerns about mined lithium.
澳大利亚在两次上涨行情中迅速提供帮助的事实，可能是埃隆在淡化有关挖掘锂的担忧时指向澳大利亚的原因之一。
If that is his logic, there's an issue. The Australian lithium mines that Tesla gets most of their lithium from are unique because they're large, historically they had room for expansion, and are in a region where permitting is relatively quick. However, those mines are now at their operational capacity and Australia is basically rummaging around in its pockets for 37% more lithium at a time when lithium supply should ideally quintuple in the next seven years.
如果这是他的逻辑，那就存在问题。特斯拉从澳大利亚获得的锂矿石非常独特，因为这些矿山规模庞大，并且历史上有扩张的空间，而且所在地区的许可相对较快。然而，这些矿山现在已经达到了运营能力的上限，而澳大利亚正在四处寻找37%更多的锂矿石，而在未来七年内，锂供应理论上应该增加五倍。
That is, it appears that Tesla can't rely on Australia for large increases in lithium supply later in the decade. To gain a deeper understanding of why that's the case, we need to take a closer look at how lithium mines are developed. Along the way, we'll gain insights into Australia's ability to exceed lithium forecasts over the short, medium, and long-term horizons. And of course, while we're at it, I'll walk you through every major lithium region. This is so we can find where there's wiggle room in global lithium supply for the rest of the decade to develop our own forecast.
换句话说，特斯拉似乎无法依赖澳大利亚在本十年后期大幅增加锂供应。为了更深入地了解其中的原因，我们需要更仔细地看一下锂矿的开发情况。在此过程中，我们将对澳大利亚在短期、中期和长期内超过锂预测能力的情况有更深入的了解。当然，在此过程中，我会向您介绍每个主要的锂矿区域。这样，我们就能找到全球锂供应在本十年其他时期存在的余地，从而制定我们自己的预测。
To kick things off, I'll start with Australian hard rock lithium on a two to three-year time frame. Australia is the largest producer of mined lithium in the world, coming in at about 61,000 tons of lithium in 2022. And it has reserves of 6.2 million tons. Note that that's elemental lithium rather than lithium carbonate equivalent, or LCE. Alumni supply elemental lithium by five to get a rough approximation of LCE.
首先，我将从澳大利亚的硬岩锂谈起，以两到三年的时间框架为基础。澳大利亚是世界上最大的锂矿生产国，在2022年产量大约为61,000吨锂。此外，澳大利亚还拥有6.2百万吨的储量。需要注意的是，这里提到的是元素锂而不是锂碳酸盐当量（LCE）。我们可以将元素锂乘以5来粗略估算LCE的数量。
It takes about two to three years to get a mining permit in Australia, which basically sets the minimum time frame to get a new mining operation up and running. But there's only two situations where that can happen. First, with a brownfields project where the lithium deposits are adjacent to existing mining infrastructure, brownfields projects are some of the fastest and cheapest to set up. So they're low-hanging fruit and at the top of the list for development by mining companies. Unfortunately, there aren't that many mining sites with untapped deposits that are close enough to use existing mining infrastructure. As benchmark minerals shows, globally, the brownfields opportunity is only about 100 kilotons or 140 gigawatt hours of lithium by 2030.
在澳大利亚获得采矿许可证大约需要两到三年的时间，这基本上确定了开展新采矿业务的最短时间。但只有两种情况可以实现这一目标。首先是在已有采矿基础设施相邻的棕地项目中，棕地项目是最快速和成本最低的建设方式。因此它们是最容易实现的目标，也是矿业公司发展计划中的首选项目。不幸的是，并没有那么多未开发矿床距离现有采矿基础设施足够近的采矿地点。根据 Benchmark Minerals 的数据，在全球范围内，到2030年，棕地机会仅有大约100千吨或140千兆瓦时的锂资源。
The second way that lithium production can be expanded within two to three years is by accelerating the extraction rate of existing mines. At the annual meeting, Elon said that three-quarters of Tesla's lithium supply comes from Australia and that you could increase the rate that those mines are operating at. By operating at, I'm assuming he means extraction rate. The life of a lithium mine is generally about 20 years, and it is technically true that the extraction rate of lithium mines can be accelerated. That is, instead of extracting the lithium in 20 years, it could be extracted in 10 years at double the yearly production volume, or five years at quadruple the yearly production volume.
在未来两到三年内，扩大锂生产的第二种方式是加快现有矿山的开采速度。在年度会议上，埃隆表示，特斯拉三分之三的锂供应来自澳大利亚，你可以增加这些矿山的开采速度。我认为他所说的开采速度是指提取速度。锂矿的寿命通常约为20年，从技术上讲，锂矿的开采速度确实可以加快。也就是说，可以在10年内以每年生产量的两倍提取锂，或者在五年内以每年生产量的四倍提取锂，而不是在20年内提取锂。
With that said, increasing the extraction rate is usually an on-starter. Why? First, whether a lithium mine is extracted in five years or 20 years, it still has the same value. But, extracting it in five years means more machines and manpower are required and therefore greater cost. For example, if the material in a mine is worth $20 billion, the mining company could spend $2.4 billion to extract it over the course of 20 years, or $4.8 billion to extract it over the course of five years. That's because you need to, for example, quadruple the grinding and crushing capacity, quadruple the filtration and flotation, and quadruple the earth-moving equipment. Yes, capital cost is only a portion of production cost, and my figures are just guesses here, but it illustrates the point.
话虽如此，但提高提取率通常是不可行的。为什么呢？首先，无论是在五年还是二十年内提取出锂矿，其价值是相同的。但是，在五年内提取它意味着需要更多的机器和人力，因此成本更高。例如，如果一个矿山里的材料价值为200亿美元，采矿公司可以花费24亿美元在20年内提取，或者花费48亿美元在5年内提取。这是因为你需要，例如，将磨碎和破碎能力增加四倍，将过滤和浮选能力增加四倍，以及四倍的土方移动设备。是的，资本成本只是生产成本的一部分，我的数字只是猜测，但它说明了这一点。
If you're a mining company, there's no financial incentive to increase the extraction rate. It costs money to increase the extraction rate, but doesn't change the total revenue. That in turn reduces profit margins and reduces return on capital. So, I don't see mines lining up to increase their extraction rate unless Tesla provides a big financial incentive. As a side note, the reason why mining companies don't do the opposite and stretch the life of the average mine beyond 20 years is that besides looking after profit margins and return on capital, they also need to maximize annual revenue. The quicker the extraction, the greater the annual revenues. So it's a balancing act between annual revenue and profit margins. And that was decided when the mine was designed in order to hit the optimal balance of not just financial considerations, but also environmental and technical considerations.
如果你是一家采矿公司，没有经济激励来增加采矿速度。增加采矿速度是需要花费资金的，但总收入不会改变。这反过来降低了利润率和资本回报率。因此，除非特斯拉提供了巨大的经济激励，否则我不认为矿山会纷纷增加采矿速度。另外，矿业公司不会延长平均矿山寿命超过20年的原因是，除了关注利润率和资本回报率之外，他们还需要最大化年度收入。采矿速度越快，年度收入就越大。因此，这是年度收入和利润率之间的一种平衡行为。而这种平衡是在设计矿山时决定的，以实现不仅考虑财务因素，还考虑到环境和技术因素的最佳平衡。
The second reason why increasing the extraction rate isn't pragmatic is because in a best case scenario, it takes 4 to 7 years to set up a mine. If a mining company extracts a mine in 5 to 10 years, and it takes roughly the same amount of time to set up the next mine, they'd basically be eating hand to mouth, which wouldn't be sustainable. To put that in perspective, if you're a long term Tesla investor, imagine if Tesla said that each Gigafactory they build would only be in production for about 5 years. It would mean Gigashang High, which entered production in 2019, would shut down next year in 2024. Such a short factory life would create persistent anxiety amongst investors. But even a 10 year factory life would feel like being on a gerbil wheel. It's no different for a lithium mine except lithium projects have a lead time 2 to 3 times longer than vehicle factories.
增加开采率不现实的第二个原因是，在最理想的情况下，建设一座矿山需要4到7年的时间。如果一家采矿公司以5到10年的时间开采一座矿山，并且建设下一座矿山大致需要同样长的时间，那么他们基本上就会过着勉强度日的生活，这是不可持续的。以特斯拉长期投资者的角度来看，假设特斯拉表示他们建造的每个超级工厂只能在生产中运行约5年，那会意味着于2019年投产的Gigashang High在2024年就会关闭。这样短暂的工厂寿命会给投资者带来持久的焦虑。但即使是10年的工厂寿命，也会感觉像是在走上转轮。对于锂矿来说，情况也没有什么不同，只不过锂项目的前期工期是汽车工厂的2到3倍长。
The third reason why increasing the extraction rate isn't pragmatic is because although it increases production volume, it doesn't increase the total amount of lithium reserves or extend the production runway deeper into the future. It's much better for a lithium company to spend an extra 2 years to explore new lithium reserves and start a new mining project than to tap out their existing reserves more quickly. Yes, a lithium mining company could extract their existing mines more quickly and explore for new resources at the same time, but that's easier said than done. Some companies don't have unlimited financial resources and have to make prudent financial decisions about where to explore and invest. It's the age old constraint of unlimited once and limited resources. That is, again, Tesla has deep pockets and could help out here.
第三个原因是为什么增加提取率不现实的是，虽然它能增加产量，但并不能增加锂储量的总量，也不能将产能在未来深入延伸。对于一个锂公司来说，比起快速耗尽现有储量，花费额外的两年时间来探索新的锂储量并启动新的采矿项目会更加明智。是的，锂矿公司可以同时快速开采现有的矿山并探索新资源，但这并不容易实现。一些公司并没有无限的财力资源，必须在探索和投资的地方做出谨慎的财务决策。这依然是无限需求与有限资源的年代老问题。也就是说，特斯拉在这里在财力资源方面非常充沛，可以提供帮助。
Fourth, there are technical reasons why increasing the extraction rate at a mine tends to be avoided. But I would consider those difficulties rather than showstoppers. For example, managing traffic at the mine where space is tight and the roads are dug or blasted out of bare rock. Or the fact that as the extraction rate of a mine increases, quality tends to suffer because precision mining goes by the wayside when there's pressure to move more rock more quickly. And of course, there are other factors like dust, water usage, and waste management. Again, not showstoppers, but increasing the extraction rate isn't as simple as just flipping a switch. That is, if Tesla wants to see the production rate from Australian mines increase, it's likely those mines aren't going to play ball unless Tesla kicks them several hundred million dollars in cash to make it worth their time. Alternatively, Tesla could buy a lithium mining company and crank the production dial up to eleven. More on that later in the video.
第四，有一些技术原因导致矿山提取速率增加往往被避免。但我认为这些困难只是困难，而不是无法克服的障碍。例如，在空间狭小且道路由裸露的岩石挖掘或爆破而成的矿山管理交通的问题。或者事实上，随着矿山的提取速率增加，质量往往会受到影响，因为在有压力迅速提取更多岩石时，精确采矿的方法会被忽视。当然，还有其他因素，如灰尘、用水量和废物处理。再次强调，并不是无法克服，但提高提取速率并不像只需按一个开关那么简单。也就是说，如果特斯拉希望看到澳大利亚矿山的生产速率增加，那么很可能这些矿山不会配合，除非特斯拉支付他们几亿美元的现金，以使他们感到值得投入时间。或者，特斯拉可以收购一家锂矿公司，并将生产规模扩大到极限。关于这方面的更多信息将在视频中介绍。
What all that means is, although Australia could technically bring more supply online in a two to three year time frame than what's forecast, it's unlikely. Some companies are already working on tapping into brownfield's resources, and there's no incentive to increase extraction rates at existing mines. There are two other ways that I can see Australian mining companies increasing production on a two to three year time frame, but they're even less likely. The first is to increase the efficiency and productivity of the mines, but the mining industry is conservative and tends not to change unless it has to. For example, it might take a company like Tesla entering the industry and forcing change, and even if that did happen, it would of course take years, and there's no indication that Tesla will get into lithium mining anytime soon. So it's not even on the horizon this side of 2026 or 2027. The second, low likely possibility for increasing lithium production on a two to three year time frame would be if governments took wartime measures to accelerate mining. That would mean throwing mining regulations out the door, steamrolling environmentalists and political resistance and dumping billions of dollars into the mining industry. I can only see that happening in the event of some kind of immediate and pressing global emergency, like a war between China and the West, but I wouldn't exactly call that a win for a sustainable future.
所有这一切意味着，虽然澳大利亚在两到三年的时间框架内从理论上可以增加更多的供应量，但这是不太可能的。一些公司已经开始利用既有资源，而且没有动力增加现有矿山的开采率。在我看来，澳大利亚矿业公司在两到三年的时间框架内增加产量的可能性还有两种，但它们更不太可能发生。第一种是提高矿山的效率和生产力，但矿业行业保守，往往不会改变，除非必须改变。例如，可能需要像特斯拉这样的公司进入该行业并迫使改变，即使发生这种情况，当然也需要几年时间，而且没有迹象表明特斯拉会很快进入锂矿业。因此，在2026年或2027年之前，这一点甚至不在视野范围内。第二个几乎不太可能在两到三年的时间框架内增加锂产量的可能性是，如果政府采取战时措施加快采矿速度。这将意味着抛弃采矿法规，无视环保主义者和政治阻力，并向采矿行业投入数十亿美元。我只能看到这种情况在某种紧急全球事件的情况下才会发生，比如中国与西方国家之间的战争，但我不认为这是可持续未来的胜利。
What about beyond two to three years? The next substantial time frame for Australia is four to seven years. That's the quickest that a greenfield's mining project can be brought online. By so long, let's again use Tesla Gigafactories as an example and go from there.
超过两到三年的时间怎么样？澳大利亚接下来重要的时间框架是四到七年。这是一个绿地采矿项目能够最快启动的时间。再次以特斯拉超级工厂为例，我们从那里开始讨论。
Three years ago in 2020, Tesla broke ground on Giga Austin. By 2021, most of the main structures were built, and then one year ago in 2022, the production ramp had begun, but it wasn't yet at a thousand vehicles per week. This year, it's finally hit volume production. That is, it took two years to go from groundbreaking to production and another year to hit production in earnest.
在2020年的三年前，特斯拉在奥斯汀动工。到2021年，大部分主体建筑已经建成，然后在2022年的一年前，生产已经开始，但每周的产量还没有达到一千辆车。今年，终于实现了大规模生产。也就是说，从动工到实际生产花了两年时间，又花了一年时间达到了真正的生产规模。
That two to three year time frame is roughly the same time that it takes a lithium mine to go from groundbreaking to initial production and volume production. However, the reason why a greenfield's lithium project takes four to seven years rather than two to three years is because of what needs to happen before groundbreaking occurs. Let's take a closer look.
这个两到三年的时间框架大致上和锂矿从开工到初期生产和量产所需的时间是一样的。然而，为什么一个绿地锂项目需要四到七年而不是两到三年，是因为在开工之前需要完成的事情。让我们仔细看一下。
Bear in mind, the timeline I'll be providing here is a grossly oversimplified view, and reality is more complex. Before a lithium mine can break ground, the mining company needs a detailed understanding of the shape of the lithium deposit along with the lithium concentration throughout the deposit. How is that done?
请注意，我在这里提供的时间线是一种极度简化的观点，现实情况更加复杂。在锂矿开始开采之前，采矿公司需要对锂矿床的形状以及整个床层中的锂浓度有一个详细的了解。那么这是如何做到的呢？
The first step of mapping the lithium deposit is exploration drilling to gather core samples, which takes about three to six months. Drilling sounds straightforward, but lithium mines are usually in the middle of nowhere and in rough terrain, so getting the equipment on and off site to the right locations takes time. Beyond that, it involves drilling not just one hole, but dozens. Those holes are sometimes hundreds of meters deep and often through solid rock, which is slow going.
绘制锂矿床的第一步是进行勘探钻探，以采集岩心样本，这通常需要三至六个月的时间。钻探听起来很简单，但锂矿通常位于偏远地区和崎岖的地形中，因此将设备运往正确的位置上下工地需要时间。除此之外，这还涉及到不仅仅是一个钻井孔，而是几十个。这些孔有时候达到数百米深，并且通常穿过坚硬的岩石，工作进展缓慢。
Then, the resulting drill core samples have to be logged and then promising sections are sent off to a lab for analysis. That means thousands of measurements and tests along the length of the hundreds of meters of core samples. A lot of the core samples will contain no lithium. Exploration drilling is hit and miss, like playing a game of battleship. It involves taking a guess as to where the ore body is based on things like observations of geologic formations. However, even if the drilling misses the ore body, it provides a data point for where the lithium deposit isn't, which is still helpful.
然后，所得到的钻孔岩心样本需要进行记录，然后将有希望的部分送往实验室进行分析。这意味着要在数百米长的岩心样本上进行成千上万次的测量和测试。很多岩心样本中将不含锂。勘探钻探就像打一场战舰游戏一样是靠瞎猜的。它基于对地质构造等观察结果，猜测矿体所在的位置。然而，即使钻探错过了矿体，它也提供了一个哪里没有锂矿床的数据点，这仍然是有帮助的。
When the exploration drilling and testing is complete, the lithium company should now have a low resolution view of the shape, size, and concentration of the lithium deposit. That low resolution view is used to plan the second step of mapping the lithium deposit, which is called step-out drilling. Step-out drilling is more intensive than exploration drilling, and it has two goals. First, to more clearly define the shape and composition of the lithium deposit. Second, to gather more material from the deposit for processing studies. Processing studies are a lab-scale test to work out how to economically separate the lithium from other materials like rock, clay, and brine.
当勘探钻探和测试完成时，锂公司现在应该对锂矿的形状、大小和浓度有一个低分辨率的视图。这个低分辨率的视图将用于规划锂矿的第二步，即称为步出钻探的步骤。步出钻探比勘探钻探更加密集，它有两个目标。第一，更清楚地定义锂矿的形状和成分。第二，从矿床中获取更多材料进行加工研究。加工研究是一个实验室规模的测试，旨在找出如何经济地将锂与岩石、黏土和卤水等其他材料分离开来的方法。
Although there are tried and trusted methods for different resources, the specific chemical makeup of a resource can have big impacts on the extraction process and the economics of the mine. The step-out drilling and processing studies take about 12 months and provide the mining company with a basic understanding of whether the lithium mine would be commercially viable.
虽然针对不同资源有经过验证的方法，但资源的特定化学组成对开采过程和矿山的经济影响巨大。走出井口钻探和处理研究需要大约12个月的时间，并为采矿公司提供基本了解，判断锂矿是否具有商业价值。
If the mine does look viable and with a detailed understanding of the lithium deposit in hand, there's still at least one more year of work required for detailed engineering. Detailed engineering includes designing all the infrastructure for the mining site, researching environmental concerns, calculating the ideal extraction rate, creating remediation plans, and more. That is, on a greenfield's mine with an aggressive timeline at least two and a half years of work needs to be done before breaking ground. Three to six months for exploration drilling, a year for step-out drilling and processing studies, and another year for detailed engineering.
如果矿井看起来是可行的，并且手头有有关锂矿石的详细了解，仍然需要至少一年的工作来进行详细工程。详细工程包括设计采矿场地的所有基础设施，研究环境问题，计算理想的开采速度，制定治理计划等等。这意味着，在一个野外矿井项目中，至少需要进行两年半的工作才能开始开工。其中，勘探钻探需要三到六个月，扩展钻探和加工研究需要一年，详细工程则需要另一年的时间。
Usually all of that takes six to seven years, but that's because mines are trying to be capital efficient and they have to build the case for further investment each step of the way. If Tesla got involved, they could compress the schedule by running all the development activities concurrently rather than sequentially.
通常情况下，所有这些所需的时间为六到七年，但这是因为矿山正试图提高资本效率，并且他们必须在每一个步骤中建立进一步投资的案例。如果特斯拉参与其中，他们可以通过同时进行所有开发活动而不是按顺序进行，从而压缩时间表。
So if we combine the roughly two and a half years of exploration and planning with the two years it takes to build the mine and get it into production, that's over four years to go from the first drill core to production for a greenfield's mining project. Bear in mind, that's just on the technical side and a best-case scenario, and it didn't take into account factors like the process for obtaining a mining permit, which varies by mining jurisdiction and can take years to work through.
如果我们将大约两年半的勘探和规划时间与建设矿井并投入生产需要的两年时间结合起来，从第一份钻孔样本到生产的时间就超过了四年。请注意，这仅仅是从技术层面上的最佳情况，并没有考虑到诸如获得采矿许可的程序等因素，这取决于采矿管辖权，可能需要数年时间才能完成。
That is, taking into account regulatory, technical and financial realities in a western country four to seven years is closer to reality for the quickest that a mine can be brought online, which is still faster than what we've seen historically. We'll talk about regions like China and Africa in a moment.
换句话说，考虑到西方国家的监管、技术和财务现实，从现实角度来看，将一个矿山投入运营通常需要4至7年的时间，这仍然比历史上我们所见过的更快。我们稍后会讨论中国和非洲等地区。
One of the implications of the long development timelines for lithium mines is that investing early is key. Unfortunately, there's been a drastic underinvestment in mining in general for the last decade, and as I covered briefly earlier, lithium is no different, and in Australia there's a shortage of greenfield sites being developed. Australia currently only has about a dozen J ORC compliant mines. J ORC is the Joint or Reserves Committee, which sets standards for reporting mineral exploration results. The top three largest mining projects in Australia are already in production, and the next two largest are under construction and coming online in the next couple of years. Those five mines make up 89% of Australia's J ORC compliant reserves. Then, on a timeline beyond three years, there's only three small mines that are planned. So in the next four to seven years, for Australia, we shouldn't expect large increases in lithium production beyond what's been forecast.
长时间的锂矿开发周期意味着早期投资至关重要。遗憾的是，在过去的十年里，矿业投资严重不足，正如我之前简要提到的，锂矿矿业也不例外，在澳大利亚正在开发的绿地项目短缺。目前，澳大利亚仅有约十几个符合J ORC（联合储量委员会）标准的矿场。J ORC是负责报告矿产勘探结果的标准制定机构。澳大利亚目前排名前三的最大矿业项目已经开始生产，接下来的两个最大项目正在建设中，并将在未来几年投产。这五个矿场占澳大利亚符合J ORC标准的储量的89%。然后，在三年以上的时间线上，只有三个小型矿场计划中。因此，在接下来的四到七年中，对于澳大利亚而言，我们不应该指望锂产量出现超出预期的大幅增长。
With Australia out of the way, let's move on to the next region and resource type, South American lithium brides. Chile produced 39,000 tons of lithium in 2022, and Argentina 6,200 tons. Between them, they have by far the largest reserves in the world at about 12 million tons, or 48% of global reserves. That's as compared to Australia, which has 24% of global reserves, but manages to produce about 36% more lithium. So if South America has such large reserves, why doesn't it produce more lithium? It's because South American lithium brides involve flooding large areas of desert ecosystem, which means water usage issues, environmental issues, and running up against the rights of indigenous communities. That means they're fraught with social and political pushback, so it generally takes about five to ten years to bring new lithium capacity online. That's in contrast to the two years that it takes to fully evaporate a lithium brine for processing. With that said, Chile is working on the political and environmental issues. They're developing a national lithium strategy and suggesting that new projects will reduce water usage by using only direct lithium extraction technologies. But it's too early to predict how that's going to affect their lithium production and when. In fact, government involvement may mean that the growth of South American lithium production actually slows down rather than accelerates. So just like Australia, in the next four to seven years, we shouldn't expect large increases in lithium production from South American lithium brides beyond what's been forecast.
澳大利亚已经完成了，现在我们来谈谈下一个地区和资源类型——南美锂资源。2022年，智利产出了3.9万吨锂，阿根廷产出了6,200吨。两国拥有全球迄今最大的储量，约为1,200万吨，占全球储量的48%。相比之下，澳大利亚拥有全球储量的24%，但生产的锂却多出了约36%。那么，既然南美有如此巨大的储量，为什么不生产更多锂呢？这是因为开发南美锂资源涉及到大面积的沙漠生态系统湿地，导致水资源使用问题、环境问题，并与土著社区的权益冲突。这意味着会遭遇社会和政治的阻力，因此通常需要五到十年的时间才能启动新的锂产能。相比之下，完全蒸发一潭锂卤水来进行处理只需要两年时间。话虽如此，智利正在解决政治和环境问题。他们正在制定一个国家级的锂战略，并认为新项目将通过使用直接锂提取技术来减少水资源使用。但现在还为时尚早，无法预测这将如何影响他们的锂产量和时间。事实上，政府介入可能意味着南美锂产量的增长实际上会放缓，而不是加速。因此，就像澳大利亚一样，在接下来的四到七年内，我们不应该期望南美锂资源能够超过预期的大幅增加。
The next largest lithium-producing region is China at 19,000 pounds per year. China produces lithium from both brides and hard rock sources, which includes spodumene and lapitolite. Lapitolite is a type of lithium-containing mica, and most of the future growth in China is expected to be from lapitolites in Jiangxi province. Lapitolites are a dark horse when it comes to lithium supply. Let's look at why. In response to the demand wave of the past couple of years, China now intends to roughly triple their 2022 production of lithium by 2025 by tapping into lapitolites. That is, their goal is to significantly increase global lithium supply within the space of about three to four years. So unlike Australia and South America, Chinese lapitolite appears to offer the promise of rapid growth on relatively short notice. That means China has a good chance of surprising to the upside for mined lithium supply later in the decade.
中国是全球产量第二大的锂生产地区，年产量达到19,000磅。中国通过矿山和硬岩石两种方式生产锂，包括透闪石和锂云母。锂云母是一种含锂的黑云母，预计中国未来的增长主要来自江西省的锂云母产地。锂云母在锂供应方面具有巨大潜力，让我们来看看原因。为了满足过去几年的需求增长，中国计划通过开发锂云母，在2025年前再次将2022年的锂产量增加大约三倍。也就是说，他们的目标是在大约三到四年内显著增加全球锂供应量。因此，与澳大利亚和南美洲不同，中国的锂云母似乎有望在相对较短的时间内快速增长。这意味着中国有很大的机会在本十年晚期挖掘到更多的锂供应，可能会带来惊喜。
However, there's two fish hooks that come with lapitolite mining. First, it's fraught with environmental concerns. Every ton of lithium carbonate produced through lapitolites produces 200 tons of waste that can end up in large tailings ponds which can leach into the surrounding environment. Furthermore, lithium produced from lapitolites has a large CO2 footprint due to the energy required for processing, which is exacerbated by China's tendency to use coal power. The environmental drawbacks mean that many EV companies will try to avoid the use of lapitolite-sourced lithium.
然而，与锂矿开采相关的问题主要有两个。首先，它存在着环境隐忧。每生产一吨锂碳酸盐，就会产生200吨废料，这些废料可能会最终进入大型尾矿池，渗入周围环境。此外，从锂云母矿中生产的锂具有较大的二氧化碳排放量，因为其加工过程需要大量能源，而中国倾向于使用煤炭发电，进一步加剧了二氧化碳的排放。这些环境问题意味着许多电动车公司将尽量避免使用从锂云母矿提取的锂。
Second, lapitolite production is so inefficient that it's generally only profitable when lithium prices are above $20,000 to $30,000 per ton, with more mines becoming more viable at higher prices. That means when lithium prices drop, miners shut down production. And in China, recently, some have. Given the lapitolite fish hooks, it's difficult to get a solid bead on how much China can increase the global supply of mined lithium beyond what's already been forecast. But here's my speculation.
其次，磷酸锂的生产效率非常低，一般只有当锂价格高于每吨2万至3万元时才能获利，随着价格的上涨，更多的矿山才能变得可行。这意味着当锂价格下跌时，矿工们会停止生产。最近在中国，一些矿山已经停产。考虑到磷酸锂的情况，很难确定中国能够在已经预测的基础上增加全球采矿锂供应的数量。但这只是我的猜测。
If China succeeds in tripling lithium production by 2025 and builds on the large amount of lithium already forecasted from Australian sources, we could see a supply glut and price crash for lithium in the middle of the decade. On a short-term basis, that would be great for the EV industry. However, a price crash in the mid-2020s could reduce investment in lapitolites because they're only viable at higher lithium prices, and miners use profit to drive investment. If that happened, it would mean that, despite the ability of lapitolites to scale within a three to four year lead time, they fail to meaningfully increase actual lithium supply against the forecast later in the decade.
如果中国能在2025年将锂产量提高三倍，并且建立在已经预测到的来自澳大利亚资源的大量锂基础上，那么我们可能会在本十年中看到供应过剩和锂价格暴跌的情况。从短期来看，这对电动汽车行业来说是好事。然而，在2020年代中期出现价格暴跌可能会减少对尖晶石的投资，因为它们只在较高的锂价格下具备可行性，并且矿工依靠利润来推动投资。如果这种情况发生，那么尽管尖晶石有能力在三到四年的时间内扩大规模，但它们在本十年晚期对实际锂供应的增加意义不大，与预测相比。
But what if I'm wrong, which there's a very good chance of? By 2025, even after China triples their production of mined lithium within the next few years, China will only make up 13% of global lithium supply. In absolute terms, that's 0.3 terawatts, which is in contrast to the potential 4.2 terawatt-hour demand gap later in the decade. So although some people are viewing lapitolites as some kind of Deus Ex machina for lithium supply later in the decade, it's unlikely that they can completely fill the potential supply gap. It's possible, but unlikely.
但是如果我错了呢，这种可能性非常大呢？到2025年，即使中国在未来几年内将采矿锂的生产量提高两倍，中国也只占全球锂供应的13%。就绝对值而言，这相当于0.3太瓦，而这与本十年后可能出现的4.2太瓦小时需求缺口形成鲜明对比。因此，尽管有些人把稀有矿物视为锂供应在本十年后的某种“神助攻”，但他们很可能无法完全填补潜在的供应缺口。这种可能性是存在的，但是不太可能发生。
That means for the forecast we'll build later in the video, I'm going to assume that China can contribute an additional one terawatt-hour of lithium supply by 2030 by continuing to grow their mined lithium production at about 40% per year.
这意味着在视频后面我们将进行的预测中，我将假设到2030年中国可以通过继续以每年约40%的速度增长其开采的锂产量，为锂供应增加额外的一兆瓦时。
The next region to cover is the United States, with only 900 tons of lithium production in 2022 and lithium reserves of 1 million tons. Most of the proposed lithium extraction in the US is in the form of direct lithium extraction from brines or from lithium clays, which are relatively unconventional ways of producing lithium.
下一个要涵盖的地区是美国，2022年仅产量为900吨，储量达到100万吨。美国提议的大部分锂萃取方式是从卤水或锂黏土中进行直接锂萃取，这些都是相对非传统的生产锂的方法。
As for permitting, the timeline for a mining permit in the US is typically 7 to 10 years, but it can happen more quickly. Lithium Americas is making great progress in Nevada and after 3 to 4 years they have permission to start construction. They don't yet have the mining permit in hand, but presumably they will by the time they start production in 2026. Overall, lithium Americas is expected to take about 9 years to get from exploration to production, which is actually a good pace for a new mine in the US. That is, it's not realistic to expect movement in lithium supply forecasts out of the US before the end of the decade.
就许可方面而言，美国的采矿许可一般需要7到10年的时间，但也可能更快获得。Lithium Americas在内华达州取得了很大进展，经过3到4年的时间，他们已经获得开始建设的许可。虽然他们目前还没有采矿许可证，但预计在2026年开始生产时应该会获得。总体来说，Lithium Americas预计需要大约9年的时间从勘探到开始生产，对于美国的一座新矿来说，这其实是一个不错的速度。也就是说，在本十年结束之前不太可能看到美国锂供应预测方面的变动。
However, what if the US changed its laws to allow for permitting to occur in 2 years? Even we might see some movement in US lithium supply forecasts by the end of the decade, but it would be late in the decade. What about Tesla's Lithium Clay Extraction technology, or if they developed an extraction technology for lithium brines? That's a big wildcard because there's no public confirmation that Tesla actually bought a lithium clay mine. But even if they have, and even with an update to the permitting process, any permitting would take at least 2 and a half years, and construction to commissioning would be another 2 and a half years, and that doesn't include the production ramp. That is, based on what we know currently, in a best case scenario, a Tesla Lithium extraction operation in the US would happen in 2027 to 2028 at the earliest. If they wait another year or two to pull the trigger, then they'll be lucky to get an operation off the ground this decade. So once again, in the next 4 to 7 years, we shouldn't expect large increases in lithium production from the US beyond what's been forecast.
然而，如果美国改变法律以允许在两年内获得许可，会怎么样呢？即使到本十年末我们可能会看到一些关于美国锂供应的变动，但那会是在本十年后期。那么特斯拉的锂泥提取技术呢？或者他们是否研发了用于锂卤水的提取技术？这是一个巨大的变数，因为没有公开确认特斯拉是否确实购买了锂泥矿。但即使他们购买了，并且即使许可流程有所更新，任何许可至少需要2年半，再加上2年半用于建设和投产，这还不包括生产增速。也就是说，基于我们目前所知，在最理想的情况下，特斯拉在美国的锂提取工厂最早也要在2027年至2028年之间才能开始运营。如果他们再等一两年才行动，那么他们在本十年内建设一座工厂的机会就会非常渺茫。因此，再过4到7年内，我们不应该期待美国的锂产量大幅增加超过已经预测的。
As a side note, many people point to direct lithium extraction, or DLE, as one potential avenue for massively increasing lithium supply by 2030. The basic process of DLE is pumping lithium brine through a filter that pulls out the lithium and returns the spent brine back to the source. That is, it doesn't involve moving huge amounts of raw material around and sorting through that material, but rather simply pumping a fluid through an extraction process and returning it to the reservoir. That should mean a lot less work, a smaller environmental impact, and therefore fewer issues getting a permit. However, the conceptual simplicity of the process is deceiving.
顺带一提，许多人指出，直接提取锂（DLE）是2030年大规模增加锂供应的一种可能途径。DLE的基本过程是将锂卤水通过带有过滤器的泵抽出锂，然后将已用的卤水返回到原源。也就是说，它不涉及大量原材料的搬运和分类，而只是通过一个提取过程将液体泵送并返回到储存地。这意味着工作量大大减少，环境影响较小，因此获得许可的问题也会减少。然而，这个过程看似概念简单，实际上是具有欺骗性的。
Every DLE process is different, and has strengths and weaknesses, and every lithium resource is different. That means just like a lithium mine, there's a number of technical challenges to work through, and it takes years to get a DLE project off the ground. Some brines contain few contaminants, and DLE is easier to set up at those sites, while other brines do contain contaminants like heavy metals and ore can reach temperatures of 600 degrees Fahrenheit or 300 degrees Celsius. Those harsh conditions can make the DLE process uneconomical or even destroy the equipment.
每个DLE（直接萃取锂）过程都是不同的，都有其优点和缺点，而每个锂资源也是不同的。这意味着就像一个锂矿一样，有一系列的技术挑战需要克服，并且需要几年时间才能启动一个DLE项目。有些卤水中几乎不含有污染物，对这些场地来说，设置DLE更加容易，而其他卤水中确实含有重金属和温度可达华氏600度或摄氏300度的矿石。这些恶劣条件可能使DLE过程不经济，甚至破坏设备。
Because of last year, DLE represented about 7% of global lithium production, so DLE isn't new. It's a proven technology that continues to develop and expand into new resources as technology improves. And looking to the future, Benchmark Minerals forecast is for DLE-sourced lithium to increase from about 55,000 tons LCE last year to about 650,000 tons by 2032. That'll increase the market share of DLE from about 7% last year to 15% by early next decade. That means the Benchmark Minerals forecast includes the growth of DLE, so it hasn't been forgotten or neglected. It's just not going to change the game and the timeframes that some people assume it will.
由于去年，DLE占全球锂生产的约7％，所以DLE并不是新技术。它是一种已被证实的技术，在科技改进的推动下，不断发展并拓展新资源。展望未来，Benchmark Minerals预测DLE的锂产量将从去年的约55,000吨锂碳酸盐增加到2032年的约650,000吨。这将使DLE的市场份额从去年的约7％增加到下个十年初的15％。这意味着Benchmark Minerals的预测包括DLE的增长，因此并没有被遗忘或忽视。它只是不会改变某些人所认为的游戏规则和时间框架。
The next lithium producing region to cover is Africa. Rather than using USGS data, which has very little information on Africa, I'll use this image from Ristad Energy. This year, Ristad expects that Africa as a whole will produce about 50,000 tons LCE. Again, like China, Africa is a black box, except for different reasons. In China, most of the question marks are around how pricing will affect long-term supply growth. For Africa, for me, the question centers around the reliability of the estimates in unstable countries. That's because 80% of the lithium in Africa is expected to come from four countries that are in the top 30 most unstable countries in the world. Beyond the political stability issues, there's also a potential for human rights issues. By that, I mean digging lithium out of the ground in hazardous working conditions like we've seen with cobalt in the Congo, sometimes with child labor. So EV companies will have to monitor their African lithium supply closely.
下一个要涵盖的锂生产地是非洲。与美国地质调查局数据相比，该数据对非洲的信息非常有限，因此我将使用Ristad Energy的这张图片。今年，Ristad预计整个非洲将产出约5万吨锂化学当量（LCE）。与中国一样，非洲是一个未知之地，只是原因不同。在中国，最大的疑问在于价格对长期供应增长的影响。对于非洲来说，对我来说，问题集中在对不稳定国家估计的可靠性上。这是因为预计非洲80%的锂将来自世界排名前30位最不稳定的四个国家。除了政治稳定性问题之外，还存在人权问题的潜在风险。我的意思是，在像刚果那样危险的工作环境中开采锂，有时可能会出现像钴那样的童工问题。因此，电动车公司将不得不密切监控其来自非洲的锂供应。
If the instability and human rights risks can be managed, lithium mining in Africa is likely to play a big role in the transition to sustainable energy. By Ristad's estimate, lithium production from Africa will grow by about six times 2023 production in the next three years, and then reach 400,000 tons of LCE by 2030. Benchmark Minerals forecast for Africa by 2030 is roughly 200,000 tons LCE, which means their estimate is half that of Ristad's. Why the discrepancy? Although Ristad and Benchmark are using similar base data, Ristad is building an additional growth that hasn't been announced yet, whereas Benchmark is providing a forecast grounded in what's actually been announced. In my view, that provides us with a base case and a bull case for lithium production in Africa. With that said, I'm going to push Ristad's bull case of 400,000 tons LCE for 2030 up to 500,000 tons LCE in 2030. Why? Because Africa seems to be the only lithium producing region in the world where we could see relatively unconstrained growth.
如果可以管理好不稳定性和人权风险，非洲的锂矿开采很可能在向可持续能源转变中发挥重要作用。根据里斯塔德的估计，非洲的锂产量在未来三年内将增长约六倍于2023年的产量，然后在2030年达到40万吨锂碳酸锂（LCE）。Benchmark Minerals预测到2030年非洲的锂产量约为20万吨LCE，意味着他们的预测是里斯塔德的一半。为什么存在差异？尽管里斯塔德和Benchmark使用了类似的基础数据，但里斯塔德正在构建一个尚未宣布的额外增长，而Benchmark提供的预测则基于实际已经宣布的情况。在我看来，这为非洲的锂产量提供了一个基础情景和一个乐观情景。因此，我将里斯塔德对2030年40万吨LCE的乐观情景上调至50万吨LCE。为什么？因为非洲似乎是世界上唯一一个可以看到相对不受限制增长的锂生产地区。
Could is the key word here, because in unstable countries a lot can go wrong. However, on the upside, if things go well, they could go very well. Africa has less regulation, high quality lithium deposits, plenty of Chinese investment, and potentially low production costs. That is, unlike China, the lithium from Africa won't just be something that can be tapped into in response to extreme market demands, but could sustain continuous growth on a long-term basis.
"关键词在于‘可能性’，因为在不稳定的国家，很多事情可能会出错。然而，好的一面是，如果事情进展顺利，可能会非常顺利。非洲的锂资源质量高，监管较少，并且得到了大量中国投资，潜在的生产成本也较低。与中国不同的是，非洲的锂资源不仅仅是在市场需求极大时可用，而且有可能在长期基础上持续增长。”
For those wondering how I arrived at the 500,000 tons LCE figure for 2030, I applied an average annual growth rate of 40% per year from this year's expected production base of around 50,000 tons LCE. I chose a 40% growth rate based on two precedents.
对于那些想知道我如何得出2030年的50万吨LCE（锂化学当量）的数字的人，我使用了从今年预计产量的基础上每年平均增长40%的增长率。我选择40%的增长率是基于两个先例。
The 40% growth rate global lithium supply sustained in the last six years, and China's expected burst growth rate of 44% in the next few years. It also makes for an even tenfold increase in lithium production in seven years, which on the face of it is clearly aggressive, and where I can I'm trying to be reasonably bullish. I'll explain why later in the video.
在过去的六年里，全球锂供应以40%的增长率持续增加，预计中国在未来几年内将以44%的爆发式增长率。这也意味着锂生产将在七年内增加十倍，从表面上看，这显然是一种积极进取的做法，而我尽量给出乐观的解释。我会在后面的视频中解释为什么。
For now, the takeaway is that we're going to add 420 gigawatt hours of lithium supply from Africa to the lithium supply forecast that we'll be collating in a moment.
目前来说，我们将在接下来的时期内向我们即将整理的锂供应预测中添加来自非洲的420吉瓦时的锂供应。
As a side note, some people might have noticed that Ristad is forecasting 3.4 megatons LCE by 2031, which is quite a bit more than benchmark minerals forecast of 2.6 megatons. That's because Ristad's supply forecast is based on UN climate goals rather than actual scouted supply. In other words, Ristad's working back from climate goals, and benchmark is once again providing actual market data from all sources.
作为一则旁注，一些人可能会注意到Ristad预测到2031年锂碳酸锂的产量为3.4兆吨，比benchmark minerals的2.6兆吨要多很多。这是因为Ristad的供应预测是基于联合国气候目标，而不是实际调查的供应数据。换句话说，Ristad的工作是基于气候目标的，而benchmark再次提供了来自各个来源的市场实际数据。
The next lithium-producing region to cover is Canada, with only 500 tons of lithium production in 2022, but lithium reserves of 930,000 tons. Canada's lithium resources are a mix of lithium-bearing rocks and lithium brines. Like Australia and Canada, it only takes about two years to permit a lithium mine. However, like the United States, Canada's working off a low base with little mining capacity. That means unlike Australia, there aren't opportunities to quickly expand production at or near existing mines. So all new production will have to come from new mining projects that have long lead times. That is, once again, in the next 4-7 years, we shouldn't expect large increases in lithium production from Canada beyond what's been forecast.
下一个要介绍的锂生产地是加拿大，2022年只产出500吨锂，但锂储量为93万吨。加拿大的锂资源包括含锂岩石和锂卤水。与澳大利亚和加拿大一样，批准一座锂矿只需要大约两年时间。然而，与美国一样，加拿大的基础较薄弱，矿务能力有限。这意味着与澳大利亚不同，没有机会在现有矿山附近快速扩大产量。因此，所有的新产量都必须来自于需要长时间投入的新采矿项目。因此，在接下来的4-7年内，我们不应期望加拿大的锂产量会大幅增加，超过之前的预测。
Finally, as for Brazil, Portugal, and other countries, I'm not going to do deep dives on each one. That's for several reasons. First, because on an individual basis, these countries have relatively small lithium reserves. Second, they're all already accounted for in Benchmark's forecast, and I don't expect significant revisions. Third, much of the reserves listed under other countries are in Africa, which we've already fully covered. And fourth, because they don't give us additional insights that haven't been covered in working through all the other regions.
最后，至于巴西、葡萄牙和其他国家，我不会对每一个进行详细分析。这是由于几个原因。首先，从个体基础上来看，这些国家的锂储量相对较小。其次，它们已经被包括在Benchmark的预测中，并且我不预计会有重大修订。第三，其他国家列出的大部分储量位于非洲地区，而我们已经对其进行了全面的覆盖。第四，因为它们没有为我们提供在处理所有其他地区时尚未涵盖的额外见解。
As an interim summary, I've made this table showing what I view as the realistic potential upside from Benchmark Mineral Supply Forecast data for each lithium-producing region in 2027 and 2030. The Benchmark forecast for lithium supply in 2030 is 3.5 TWh. Based on the country-by-country walkthrough we just did for mined lithium supply. I added 1 TWh from China, 0.4 TWh from Africa, and then 0.1 to 0.2 TWh each. For the rest of the regions. That means a total lithium supply of 5.4 TWh in 2030, versus the 3.5 TWh currently forecast by Benchmark, which is a 55% increase.
作为一个临时总结，我已制作了这张表格，展示了我对Benchmark Mineral Supply预测数据所显示的每个锂生产地区在2027年和2030年的现实潜在增长空间。Benchmark对2030年锂供应的预测值为3.5 TWh。根据我们刚刚进行的逐个国家的采矿锂供应情况的概述，我添加了1 TWh来自中国，0.4 TWh来自非洲，然后每个地区再增加0.1至0.2 TWh。对于其他地区来说。这意味着到2030年总共将有5.4 TWh的锂供应，而Benchmark目前预测为3.5 TWh，增长率为55%。
So by my estimate, global lithium supply comes up 29% short of Benchmark's 7.6 TWh high-case demand scenario in 2030. That's not the end of the world, because total lithium supply will still increase by about 4 times in the next 7 years. It just means that due to a lack of mining investment, we may not see the 5-6x growth that could have been possible.
据我的估计，到2030年，全球锂供应总量将比Benchmark公司对高产需求预期7.6 TWh短缺了29%。这并不是世界末日，因为在接下来的7年里，总的锂供应量仍将增加约4倍。这仅仅意味着由于缺乏采矿投资，我们可能无法看到本该可能实现的5-6倍增长。
Note that so far, we've only covered lithium-ion batteries, and a moment will factor in battery supply from sodium-ion batteries as well. After that, we'll look at what total global battery supply from all sources means for Tesla in the coming years.
请注意，到目前为止，我们仅讨论了锂离子电池，并且在接下来的一段时间中，我们还将考虑钠离子电池的电池供应。在此之后，我们将探讨全球从各个来源得到的电池供应对特斯拉接下来几年的意义。
Before we move on to that, it's worth pointing out some of the assumptions that went into this table beyond what was discussed in the country-by-country walkthrough. First, for Australia, South America, the United States, and Canada, I said that we shouldn't expect large increases in mined lithium supply in the next 4-7 years. I dealt with that by assuming that there would be no additional supply from those countries in 2027, and then 0.1 to 0.2 TWh each in 2030. That's because for those countries, the lead time for a new mine is at least 4 years, and we're already more than halfway through 2023. So there's not much opportunity for potential upside in 2027. But in 7 years by 2030, there's a pretty good chance we see some new capacity come online.
在我们继续讨论之前，值得指出的是，除了在国家逐个介绍中讨论过的内容外，这张表中还包含了一些假设。首先，对于澳大利亚、南美洲、美国和加拿大，我认为在未来4-7年内不应该期望矿业锂的供应大幅增加。我做出这个假设是因为我认为这些国家在2027年不会提供额外的供应量，而在2030年的供应量预计为0.1到0.2 TWh。这是因为对于这些国家来说，一座新矿的建设时间至少需要4年，而我们已经过了2023年的一半。所以在2027年，几乎没有机会获得潜在的增长机会。但是在7年后的2030年，很有可能会有一些新的产能投入使用。
Second, I set the 2027 numbers for China and Africa at half the 2030 numbers that we discussed in the country-by-country walkthrough. That's because I assume they'll see typical S curves for growth, where scaling becomes more difficult at higher material volumes.
其次，我将中国和非洲在2027年的数据设置为我们在逐个国家讨论中提到的2030年数据的一半。这是因为我假设它们将经历典型的S形增长曲线，即随着物质量的增加，扩展变得更加困难。
Third, the 7.6 TWh demand figure is just a guidepost. That's because there'll be actual demand for lithium and latent demand for lithium. What do I mean by that? The 7.6 TWh of demand is from factories that have already been announced. If I'm forecasting 5.4 TWh worth of lithium supply, that means some factories simply aren't going to be built because there won't be enough lithium to feed them. But beyond that, those factories will need a large amount of other materials, skilled workers, and machinery. So there'll be actual lithium demand from the factories that get built, and latent demand waiting in the wings when enough lithium, other materials, skilled workers, and machinery are available.
第三，760亿千瓦时的需求数字只是一个指导。这是因为锂的实际需求和潜在需求都存在。我指的是什么呢？760亿千瓦时的需求来自已经宣布的工厂。如果我预测供应了54亿千瓦时的锂，那意味着有些工厂根本无法建造，因为没有足够的锂供应。然而，除此之外，这些工厂还需要大量的其他材料、熟练工人和机械设备。因此，在工厂建成时，将有实际的锂需求，而当足够的锂、其他材料、熟练工人和机械设备可用时，将出现潜在的需求。
So although with further Gigafactory announcements, latent demand could be over 10 GW in 2030, I've adopted Benchmark's high demand case of 7.6 TWh for 2030 as a guidepost for actual demand. But all we really know is that demand will likely exceed supply. It could happen that skilled workers and machinery end up being the bottleneck instead of lithium, but in my view, that's unlikely for two reasons. First, because the lead times for upskilling workers and building machinery are shorter than the lead time for building a mine. Second, because the lead times to permit, build, and commission chemical processing, cathode production, and cell manufacturing are all shorter than mining. Other materials could be the bottleneck as well, but I covered that off earlier in the video. But if I'm wrong and lithium isn't the bottleneck, the net effect for Tesla and the transition to sustainable energy would be the same. A more linear, rather than exponential growth rate.
因此，尽管有进一步的超级工厂公告，潜在需求在2030年可能超过10 GW，但我选择Benchmark的高需求情景，即2030年需求为7.6 TWh，作为实际需求的参考。但我们真正知道的是需求可能超过供应。有可能出现熟练工人和机械成为瓶颈而不是锂的情况，但在我看来，有两个原因表示这种情况不太可能发生。首先，因为提高工人技能和建设机械的时间比建设矿山的时间更短。其次，因为许可、建设和投入化学加工、阴极生产和电池制造的时间都比采矿时间短。其他材料也可能成为瓶颈，但我在之前的视频中已经提到了。但如果我错了，锂不是瓶颈，那么对特斯拉和可持续能源转型的净效应将是相同的，即更线性而非指数级的增长率。
Before we move on, and while we're on the topic of the ways that I could be wrong, I'd like to emphasize that the odds of my forecast being correct here, or even within 5% of correct, is low. With that said, although my primary goal for this video is to make the best forecast I can, there's also two secondary goals. And they're the reason why the video ended up being so long. First, I laid out my thought process and sources in detail so that if you disagree, you can build on or tweak my thinking based on your own assumptions. I'm not handing down stone tablets here, but rather giving you the tools to make your own. Second, as much as possible, I've tried to offer useful information and insights to help you understand the lithium landscape. Which hopefully, if you've made it this far in the video, you've gotten.
在我们继续之前，并且在我可能错的方面上讨论时，我想强调一下，我预测准确的可能性很低，甚至可能不到正确的5%。话虽如此，虽然我这个视频的主要目标是做出我最好的预测，但也有两个次要目标。这也是为什么这个视频最后变得这么长的原因。首先，我详细介绍了我的思考过程和信息来源，这样你如果不同意，可以根据你自己的假设进行修正或补充。我并不是在这里发表铁板一块的论断，而是给你提供工具来进行自己的判断。其次，尽可能地，我试图提供有用的信息和观点，帮助你理解锂行业的格局。希望你在观看到这里时已经得到了这些。
However, we're not done yet. As I've said in past videos, I expect sodium ion batteries to hit the market in force in the late 2020s. There's no telling what the actual ramp could look like, but if sodium ion batteries are everything they're advertised to be, the ramp will be aggressive. Let's look at the production estimates that I've seen for sodium ion from lowest to highest, and then we'll look at my forecast, or more accurately, guesstimate, because everyone is just guessing at this point.
然而，我们还没有完成。正如我在之前的视频中所说的，我预计钠离子电池将在2020年代末大规模进入市场。现在还无法确定实际的增长情况，但如果钠离子电池能够达到广告中宣称的一切，增长将会是激烈的。让我们从我所看到的钠离子电池的产量估计最低至最高进行分析，然后再来看看我的预测，或者更准确地说是猜测，因为目前所有人都只是在猜测。
First, wood McKenzie, which estimates 40 gigawatt hours of sodium ion production in 2030 for their base case, with another 100 gigawatt hours possible if sodium ion has a good launch by 2025. In my view, that estimate is so low that it can be effectively thrown out. That's because there's already 80 gigawatt hours of production capacity planned by 2025, and about 150 gigawatt hours planned by 2030. Second is ICC Sino, which is expecting 165 gigawatt hours by 2026. I place the most trust in ICC Sino's estimate because it's directly from a Chinese analyst house that's keeping close tabs on announcements and developments in China.
首先，伍德·麦肯齐公司预测在他们的基准案例下，到2030年钠离子电池的生产量将达到40千兆瓦时，如果到2025年钠离子电池能够顺利发布，生产量有可能增加至100千兆瓦时。但在我看来，这个估计值过低以至于可以完全忽略。因为到2025年，已经有80千兆瓦时的生产能力计划，而到2030年还计划额外增加约150千兆瓦时的生产能力。
其次，国内投融资咨询公司ICC Sino预计到2026年将实现165千兆瓦时的产量。我对ICC Sino的估计最为信任，因为它直接来自一个对中国的公告和发展动态保持密切关注的中国分析机构。
The third estimate is from Frank Wanderlich, who's an active proponent of sodium ion. Frank is predicting a run rate of 100 gigawatt hours of sodium ion batteries by the end of next year, which is 18 months away, and by the end of 2025, he's predicting a production capacity of 300 to 400 gigawatt hours per year. However, he doesn't state what he expects the actual production rate to be, given that it'll take time for that capacity to ramp, I would assume the actual production rate would be about 50% of capacity by the end of 2025, meaning 150 to 200 gigawatt hour run rate if things go really well.
第三个估计来自弗兰克·旺德利希(Frank Wanderlich)，他是钠离子电池的积极支持者。弗兰克预测，到明年年底，也就是18个月后，钠离子电池的运营速率将达到100吉瓦时，而到2025年年底，他预计每年的生产能力将达到300到400吉瓦时。然而，他没有说明他预计的实际生产速率会是多少，考虑到需要时间来推进这种能力，我认为，如果事情进展顺利，到2025年年底，实际生产速率可能会是容量的50%，即每年150到200吉瓦时。
ICC Sino expects 66 gigawatt hours of total production in 2025, which would mean a production run rate of about 100 gigawatt hours at the end of the year. That is, Frank is predicting a production growth rate of roughly 50 to 100% greater than ICC Sino, 150 to 200 gigawatt hour run rate by the end of 2025 versus 100 gigawatt hours. In my view, given that the end of 2025 is only 30 months away and we're essentially working from a base of zero, 150 to 200 gigawatt hours is overly bullish. Unfortunately, neither ICC Sino nor Frank is providing an estimate for 2030.
ICC Sino预计到2025年总产量为66千兆瓦时，这意味着年底产量将达到约100千兆瓦时。也就是说，弗兰克预测的年产量增长率将比ICC Sino高出大约50%到100%，到2025年底将达到150千兆瓦时到200千兆瓦时。在我看来，考虑到2025年年底仅有30个月的时间，而我们基本上是从零开始的，150千兆瓦时到200千兆瓦时显得过于乐观。不幸的是，无论是ICC Sino还是弗兰克都没有提供2030年的估计数据。
For that, let's turn to my forecast slash guesstimate. My bowl case scenario is for 160 gigawatt hours of sodium ion in 2026. From there, I factor roughly 60% growth per year from 2027 to 2030 for a total of one terawatt hour of sodium ion battery supply in 2030.
为此，让我们来看一下我的预测和估计。我对2026年钠离子的功率量进行了最保守的预测，为160千兆瓦小时。从那里开始，我预计从2027年到2030年每年大致增长60%，预计2030年钠离子电池供应总量将达到1太瓦小时。
Given that sodium is available in huge quantities and therefore, sodium ion batteries don't have the same primary constraint as lithium ion batteries, why haven't I forecast a more aggressive ramp?
鉴于钠可大量获取，因此钠离子电池并不像锂离子电池那样受到主要约束，为什么我没有预测一个更为激进的增长趋势呢？
It's because although sodium ion batteries aren't as constrained by raw materials, their growth is still limited by the speed that the entire supply chain can be scaled. Sodium is plentiful, but it still needs to be refined into high-purity battery-grade sodium combined with other chemicals to form the cathode and then manufactured into a battery cell. And that's just on the cathode end. Supply chains are also required for the separator, electrolyte, anode, and electrode foils. All in all, each battery cell factory requires two to three dozen factories to support it and every one of those factories has to ramp in unison.
这是因为尽管钠离子电池的原材料不受限制，但其增长仍受限于整个供应链的扩展速度。钠很丰富，但仍需经过提纯成高纯度的电池级钠并与其他化学物质结合成阴极，然后制造成电池。而这仅仅是阴极端。供应链还需要用于分隔膜、电解质、阳极和电极箔的工厂。总而言之，每个电池单元工厂需要两到三十多个工厂来支持，而且所有这些工厂都必须同时扩能。
Furthermore, as I said earlier, all of the forecasts are dependent on sodium ion delivering on what's been promised by the industry hype. So far, it's untested and unproven at scale. That is, all the forecasts, including mine, are generously assuming that sodium ion will deliver on all the hype and there aren't any hidden drawbacks for the chemistry that would hamper its adoption.
此外，正如我之前所说，所有的预测都依赖于钠离子能否兑现行业炒作所承诺的承诺。到目前为止，钠离子在大规模应用上尚未经过测试和证明。也就是说，所有的预测，包括我的，都慷慨地假设钠离子能兑现所有的炒作，并且没有任何隐藏的化学问题会阻碍其使用。
Moving along, let's take my forecast of one terawatt hour of sodium ion battery production by 2030 and add it to the lithium ion forecast I showed earlier to arrive at battery supply from all sources. The result is 3.8 terawatt hours of total battery supply in 2027 and 6.4 terawatt hours of total battery supply in 2030. That means a relatively reasonable growth rate of about 30% per year for the rest of the decade. However, it still leaves a supply gap at the end of the decade of about 1.2 terawatt hours, despite some pretty aggressive assumptions.
继续往下看，让我们将我之前提到的2030年钠离子电池产量一兆瓦时的预测加到之前显示的锂离子电池预测中，以得出所有电池供应的总量。结果是2027年的总电池供应量为3.8兆瓦时，2030年的总电池供应量为6.4兆瓦时。这意味着在未来十年的剩余时间内，电池供应将以相对合理的年增长率约为30％增长。然而，尽管有一些相当激进的假设，但这仍然意味着在这十年末还存在着大约1.2兆瓦时的供应缺口。
Let's review those assumptions before moving on. First, the sodium ion industry has to grow from non-existent to the size of the current global lithium ion battery industry within 7 years. Second, companies from Australia, South America, and North America will have to announce 500 gigawatt hours worth of new, greenfield mining projects. In order to hit production by the end of the decade, on an aggressive timeline, all that mining capacity will have to be announced in the next 2 to 3 years. Third, China will have to build an additional 1 terawatt hour worth of mined lithium production by 2030. That means continuing to expand production at an average annual growth rate of around 40%, which will only happen if lithium prices are high enough for long enough to encourage aggressive growth of Chinese lapitolite production. Fourth, Africa has to go from producing about 70 gigawatt hours of lithium to about 700 gigawatt hours in 7 years. Given the instability and unique challenges of Africa, such as poor infrastructure, that would be impressive. Fifth, politicians, regulators, and the general public in each country will have to play ball. It's not uncommon for new mining projects to get caught up in red tape and public pushback for several years, or even blocked entirely. The odds of at least 2 or 3 of these assumptions playing out in support of the 6.4 terawatt hour supply forecast is decent, but the odds that all 5 will is possible but unlikely. That is, the 6.4 terawatt hour forecast is on the bullish side. However, the bullishness is intentional. It's to show that even with a bullish forecast, battery production from lithium, sodium, and recycled materials still appears to come up short against potential demand.
在继续之前，让我们复习一下这些假设。首先，钠离子行业需要在7年内从不存在的状态增长到目前全球锂离子电池行业的规模。其次，来自澳大利亚、南美和北美的公司将要宣布总价值500千兆瓦时的新的绿色采矿项目。为了在这十年结束时实现生产，按照紧凑的时间表，所有采矿能力都必须在接下来的2到3年内宣布。第三，中国将需要到2030年建设额外的1太瓦时的采矿锂生产能力。这意味着要以每年平均大约40%的增长率继续扩大生产，只有在足够长时间内锂价格高到足以鼓励中国榄长石生产的激进增长才会发生这种情况。第四，非洲的锂产量需要在7年内从约70千兆瓦时增加到约700千兆瓦时。考虑到非洲的不稳定性和独特挑战，比如基础设施差，这将是令人印象深刻的。第五，各个国家的政治家、监管机构和公众都必须合作。新的采矿项目常常会因为繁文缛节和公众抵制而被拖延数年，甚至被完全阻止。至少有2或3个假设能够支持6.4太瓦时供应预测的可能性较高，但所有5个假设都得到验证的可能性可能存在，但不太大。换句话说，6.4太瓦时的预测是相对乐观的。然而，这种乐观是有意带来的。它是为了显示即使是在乐观的预测下，锂、钠和回收材料的电池生产仍然似乎无法满足潜在需求。
Now that we've established a forecast for battery supply for the rest of the decade at a global level, let's specifically look at Tesla. What share of global battery supply can Tesla scoop up? And if they do face a crunch, when could that happen? Bear in mind, the goal here isn't to be highly precise because we're already dealing with so many unknowns, but to get a strategic view of the challenge that Tesla's facing and how they could respond to that challenge.
既然我们已经在全球范围内确立了未来十年电池供应的预测，现在让我们具体看一下特斯拉。特斯拉能够占据全球电池供应的份额有多大？如果他们面临压力，那么什么时候可能发生？请记住，这里的目标不是要非常精确，因为我们已经面临很多未知因素，而是要从战略的角度来看特斯拉面临的挑战，以及他们如何应对这个挑战。
To kick things off, I expect that Tesla will use between 150 to 200 gigawatt hours of battery cells this year from all sources for all products. Tesla stated that, on average, their goal is to grow 50% per year until 2030. If they hit that target in 2030, they'll be consuming 3 terawatt hours of battery cells per year. 3 terawatt hours is also the number that Tesla gave at Battery Day, so Tesla set firm expectations for a 3 terawatt hour consumption rate in 2030.
首先，我预计特斯拉今年将从各个来源使用150至200千兆瓦时的电池。特斯拉表示，他们的目标是平均每年增长50%，直到2030年。如果他们在2030年达到这个目标，他们每年将消耗3太瓦时的电池。3太瓦时也是特斯拉在电池日活动中提出的数字，所以特斯拉为2030年设定了3太瓦时的电池消耗率的明确预期。
If we take the cell supply data points for each year and divide them by the cell consumption data points for each year from Tesla's expected battery consumption, the result is the graph on screen. What we're seeing is Tesla's battery demand as a share of global battery supply for each year from now until 2030. It grows from 16% this year to 47% in 2030.
如果我们将每年的电池供应数据点除以每年特斯拉预期电池消费数据点，得到的结果就是屏幕上的图表。我们所看到的是特斯拉的电池需求在从现在到2030年的每年占全球电池供应的比例。从今年的16%增长到2030年的47%。
One big caveat with this graph is that it's backstop by one overriding assumption, which is that Tesla will continue to have the highest margin of any EV and grid storage company. That in turn will allow them to pay the highest price for batteries and battery materials, and gain greater access to battery supply than their competitors.
这个图表有一个重要的前提条件，即特斯拉将继续拥有所有电动车和电网储能公司中最高的利润率。这将使他们能够支付最高价格购买电池和电池材料，并比竞争对手获得更多电池供应的机会。
On that note, Tesla's battery supply is often viewed as black and white. That is, there's enough batteries or there isn't. But the reality's a bit more nuanced. Supply is somewhat variable to price. The more Tesla is willing or able to pay for batteries and lithium, the more they'll have access to. I say somewhat variable to price because most battery cell manufacturers prefer to diversify who they do business with, and because it's dependent on how well Tesla's planned out their battery supply for each product, which each have different requirements.
在这方面，特斯拉的电池供应常常被看作是非黑即白的。也就是说，要么有足够的电池，要么没有。但实际情况要更加微妙。供应在一定程度上与价格有关。如果特斯拉愿意或有能力为电池和锂付更多的钱，他们就能获得更多的供应。我说在一定程度上与价格相关，是因为大多数电池制造商更倾向于分散他们与谁做生意的合作对象，也因为这取决于特斯拉对每种产品所规划的电池供应情况，而每种产品都有不同的需求。
To say the quiet part out loud, if Tesla does manage to secure greater cell supply through greater buying power, it necessarily involves putting some competitors out of business that are already struggling to turn a profit. I'm not saying I want that to happen, just that it's the most logical outcome.
坦率地说，如果特斯拉通过更强大的购买力能够确保更多的电池供应，这必然会导致一些已经在努力实现盈利的竞争对手倒闭。我并不是说我希望这种情况发生，只是这是最合乎逻辑的结果。
So if Tesla can afford to pay the most and therefore buy all the batteries and battery materials they need, the sky is the limit until they're consuming all the batteries in the world, right? No.
如果特斯拉能够支付最高价格，并且购买所需的所有电池和电池材料，那么他们的潜力将无限扩大，直到他们消耗完全世界的电池，对吗？不对。
In my view, at some point in the latter half of the decade, Tesla will start bumping up against government pushback and or the market share displaced by other automakers and energy storage manufacturers that have successfully made the transition to renewable energy. For example, Tesla and BYD are currently the only major auto manufacturers that can turn a profit on EVs and their neck and neck in growth and sales volume. If that continued, even if no other company survived, Tesla would end up with a 50% market share in a best case scenario. But more than half a dozen auto manufacturers will likely survive.
在我看来，在这个十年的后半段，特斯拉将可能开始遭遇政府的抵制，或者受到其他汽车制造商和能源储存制造商抢占市场份额的影响，这些企业已成功实现了向可再生能源的过渡。例如，特斯拉和比亚迪目前是唯一能从电动汽车中获利的主要汽车制造商，并且它们的增长和销售量相当。如果这种趋势继续下去，即使没有其他公司幸存，特斯拉在最好的情况下也只能占据50%的市场份额。但可能会有超过半打的汽车制造商能够幸存下来。
That is, it'll be difficult for Tesla to consume more than a third of global battery supply, which will happen by around 2028 if they hit their growth targets. If you disagree with the 33% estimate and believe Tesla will max out at consuming, for example, 20 or 50% of global battery supply, you can run your finger along the X-axis to get an idea of when Tesla could start facing challenges.
也就是说，如果特斯拉实现其增长目标，到2028年左右，它很难消耗超过全球电池供应的三分之一。如果你不同意33%的估计，并认为特斯拉最多只消耗全球电池供应的20%或50%，你可以沿着X轴滑动手指，了解特斯拉可能开始面临挑战的时间。
As a side note, earlier, I said that my battery supply forecast was aggressive and on the bullish side. If we take that into account and assume a less bullish battery supply of 5TWh instead of 6.4T, Tesla would be consuming 33% of global battery supply a year earlier in 2027. Bear in mind that 5TWh is still 43% above Benchmark's 2030 supply forecast, so it's still bullish against the baseline.
补充一下，之前我说过我的电池供应预测非常乐观且偏向多头。如果我们考虑这一点，并假设电池供应量较为保守，为5兆瓦时而不是6.4兆瓦时，那么特斯拉将在2027年比预期更早地消耗掉全球电池供应的33%。请注意，5兆瓦时仍然比Benchmark在2030年的供应预测高出43%，因此仍然相对乐观。
After taking all that into account, if Tesla doesn't take a more active role in lithium mining, they'll start facing a lithium crunch as early as 2026 if there's fierce competition. But no later than 2028 if most of the competition goes bankrupt. We'll say 2027 as a base case.
在考虑了所有这些因素之后，如果特斯拉不在锂矿业中发挥更积极的作用，他们将在2026年之前面临锂资源紧缺问题，如果竞争激烈的话。但如果大多数竞争对手破产的话，最晚会在2028年。我们可以将2027年作为基本情况。
After 2027, Tesla might see their rate of battery consumption growth dropped from 50% in 2027 to 42% in 2028, 29% in 2029 and 22% in 2030. Again, that's if they don't take an active role. We'll talk more about what Tesla can do in a moment.
2027年之后，特斯拉可能会看到其电池消耗增长率从2027年的50％降至2028年的42％，2029年的29％和2030年的22％。再次强调，这是在特斯拉不采取积极行动的情况下。接下来，我们将更详细地探讨特斯拉可以采取的行动。
On a related note, I've seen people concerned that Tesla is being out-competed by companies like Ford and GM, which seem to be on a lithium-sourcing bonanza. Here's my view on that. Tesla tends to sign with the largest lithium producers in the world, but just doesn't advertise it. Tesla's never shared much about their lithium supply because there was no reason to, and so its business as usual. That is, the absence of information isn't necessarily a cause for concern. In fact, the argument could be flipped on its head. It could be that GM and Ford investors are concerned about competition from Tesla, and so GM and Ford are making announcements about locking in lithium supply to put investors at ease. Not saying that is the case, but rather we don't know the minds of the people involved and their strategy. And because we don't know, it becomes an exercise and imagination.
在相关的问题上，我看到有人担心特斯拉正在被像福特和通用这样的公司所超越，它们似乎正在进行一个锂供应的盛宴。以下是我的看法。特斯拉倾向于与全球最大的锂生产商签约，但并没有公开宣传这一点。特斯拉从来没有过多地分享他们的锂供应情况，因为没有理由这样做，所以一切都是照常进行。也就是说，信息的缺失不一定是一个令人担忧的原因。实际上，这个论点可以颠倒过来。可能是通用和福特的投资者对来自特斯拉的竞争感到担忧，因此通用和福特正在宣布锁定锂供应以安抚投资者。我不是说这是事实，而是我们不知道涉及人员的想法和战略。正因为我们不知道，所以这就成为了一种想象的过程。
Getting back on track, if Tesla's 50% growth rate is in jeopardy later in the decade and the primary cause is a shortage of mined lithium, what can they do about it? If Tesla took a more active role in the lithium mining industry now, with lead times of 4-7 years for a new mining project, there's still an opportunity to make an impact by the end of the decade. I'd be surprised if they could bring enough new mined lithium supply online to fully cover the supply gap, but even an increase of 10% would be enough for another 2 million vehicles per year by 2030.
回到正轨上，如果特斯拉在未来几年50%的增长率岌岌可危，主要原因是矿产锂的短缺，他们可以采取什么措施来解决这个问题呢？如果特斯拉现在在矿产锂行业中扮演更积极的角色，考虑到一个新的采矿项目需要4-7年的提前时间，他们仍然有机会在本十年末产生影响。我会对他们能够推动足够多的新开采锂资源上市以完全填补供应缺口感到惊讶，但即使增加10%的供应也足以在2030年前每年再增加200万辆电动车的产量。
But in my view, even if they weren't successful at increasing the supply of mined lithium, it would still be worth their time to become more active in the industry. Why? First, as I said earlier, Tesla's paying large amounts to both lithium miners and refiners. Not 4 years from now, but today. Those margin costs could be running over a billion dollars per year. Furthermore, the better the battery industry gets at manufacturing batteries, the greater their proportional cost of the raw materials. That is, the best way to reduce the cost of lithium-ion batteries is now to reduce the materials though. And the best way to do that is to cut out the third-party margins.
在我看来，即使他们无法成功增加开采到的锂的供应，他们更积极参与该行业仍然是值得的。为什么呢？首先，正如我之前所说，特斯拉向锂矿工和初级精炼商支付了大量的费用。不是在四年后，而是在今天。这些边际成本可能每年超过10亿美元。而且，电池行业在制造电池方面越进步，原材料的比例成本就会越高。也就是说，目前降低锂离子电池成本的最佳途径是减少原材料的使用。而最佳方式就是消除第三方的利润。
The second reason it would be worth Tesla's time to become more active in lithium mining is that the industry doesn't always share Tesla's goals. Tesla wants as much lithium as possible at the lowest cost to accelerate the transition to sustainable energy. Lithium miners are looking to maximize profits and minimize risk because lithium mining is a capital-intensive risky business. That means what's best for miners is to increase lithium supply, but not so much that it exceeds demand and creates thin or non-existent margins.
特斯拉花费更多时间参与锂矿业是值得的的第二个原因在于，该行业并非始终与特斯拉的目标相一致。特斯拉希望以尽可能低的成本获得尽可能多的锂，以加速向可持续能源的过渡。而锂矿工们则希望最大化利润并降低风险，因为锂矿业是一个需要大量资本的高风险行业。这意味着对矿工来说，最好的情况是增加锂供应，但同时也不能超过需求量，从而导致利润微薄甚至不存在。
So overall, if Tesla wants to be the master of their own destiny rather than be held captive by third parties, and one form or another, they may need to take a more active role in lithium mining. The logic here is the same logic that Tesla used for vertically integrating into battery cell manufacturing, cathode production, and lithium refining. Vertical integration can accelerate the speed that they scale, reduce margins paid to third parties, and de-risk the business. To be clear, I'm not suggesting Tesla necessarily has to vertically integrate into mining, but that they may need to take the supplier relationship one step further to form partnerships.
总体而言，如果特斯拉想要掌握自己的命运，而不是被第三方所束缚，他们可能需要在锂矿开采方面扮演更积极的角色。这里的逻辑与特斯拉垂直整合电池制造、阴极生产和锂精炼的逻辑相同。垂直整合可以加速公司的规模扩张，减少向第三方支付的利润率，并降低业务风险。需要明确的是，我并不是说特斯拉必须垂直整合矿业，而是他们可能需要进一步发展与供应商的伙伴关系。
On that note, if Tesla does decide to take a more active role in lithium mining, what are their options? First, they can finance or partner on mining projects that might be struggling for capital or need money to accelerate development or increase production. This is the best option in my view because it allows Tesla to keep some distance from some of the negative sentiment around mining. Second, Tesla could buy one of the major mining companies. Besides hitting the accelerator on the speed of extraction, Tesla could let the lithium contracts of their competitors expire and redirect that lithium supply to themselves. That is, a buyout would be the nuclear option and Tesla might come under fire for being monopolistic. Third, and finally, Tesla could become a miner themselves by buying, exploring for, and or developing mines. This is the worst option in my view because it carries the most technical and reputational risk without much additional benefit.
在这方面，如果特斯拉决定在锂矿开采中扮演更积极的角色，他们有哪些选择呢？首先，他们可以为资金紧缺或需要加快开发或增加产量的矿业项目提供融资或合作伙伴关系。我认为这是最好的选择，因为它可以让特斯拉保持与开采业负面情绪的一些距离。其次，特斯拉可以收购一家重要的矿业公司。除了加快提取速度外，特斯拉可以让其竞争对手的锂合同到期，并将锂供应重新定向到自己。也就是说，收购将是一个核选项，特斯拉可能因为垄断而受到指责。最后，特斯拉可以通过收购、探索或开发矿山来成为一家矿业公司。我认为这是最糟糕的选择，因为它带来了最大的技术和声誉风险，并没有太多其他好处。
If there's so many reasons for Tesla to get into lithium mining and so many ways to structure that, the question then becomes, why is Tesla said that they'll only get into lithium mining if they have to? I see five reasons, which aren't mutually exclusive. First, because lithium mining creates a lot of social and environmental headaches and Tesla's trying to avoid associating themselves with those issues. Second, on more than one occasion, Ford's CEO Jim Farley has said that they're securing lithium supply three years in advance. By this, I'm assuming he means confirming lithium production volumes and costs and signing the contracts. It could be that Tesla's looking three years down the road at lithium supply and it still looks pretty good up until 2026. That is, a shortage of mined lithium hasn't hit their radar yet and it's still a theoretical risk.
如果特斯拉有这么多理由参与锂矿开采，而且有很多方式可以进行结构安排，那么问题就变成了，为什么特斯拉说他们只有在必要的情况下才会参与锂矿开采？我看到了五个原因，它们并不是相互排斥的。首先，因为锂矿开采会产生许多社会和环境问题，而特斯拉试图避免与这些问题联系起来。其次，福特公司的首席执行官吉姆·法利在多次场合表示，他们会提前三年确保锂的供应。我理解这意味着确认锂生产数量和成本，并签订合同。特斯拉可能正在展望未来三年的锂供应情况，直到2026年，情况仍然相当不错。也就是说，挖掘锂矿的短缺尚未引起他们的关注，它仍然是一种理论上的风险。
Third, it could be that Tesla intends to buy a mining company and they're downplaying mining because they don't want to inflate the price of lithium mining stocks before making a purchase. Fourth, as Elon said, it could be that they're avoiding vertically integrating into mining because vertical integration diverts resources. That is, building or running a lithium mine could slow Tesla down on other projects like building vehicle factories. Fifth, and finally, it could be that Elon is being over-optimistic about lithium mining because it doesn't appear to be a technical challenge. That is, he may be underestimating the array of other non-technical challenges involved in lithium mining.
第三，特斯拉可能打算收购一家采矿公司，而他们对采矿业不予重视可能是因为他们不希望在购买之前抬高锂采矿股票的价格。第四，正如埃隆所说，他们可能避免在采矿业中进行垂直整合，因为垂直整合会分散资源。也就是说，建设或运营一个锂矿可能会拖慢特斯拉在其他项目上的进展，比如建设车辆工厂。第五，最后，埃隆对锂矿业持过于乐观的态度可能是因为它似乎并不是一个技术上的挑战。也就是说，他可能低估了锂采矿中涉及的其他非技术挑战的范围。
With all that said, despite all the reasons Tesla may not be considering or may not want to get into lithium mining, I think they eventually will. That's because although Elon tends to be over-optimistic, he's usually good at course correcting when reality makes itself apparent. If Tesla's locking down lithium supply three years into the future like most companies are and the assumptions in this video are correct, we might expect more aggressive action from Tesla in the next few years. As usual, I could very well be wrong and I'm looking forward to the feedback on this video. Maybe it'll bring something out of the woodwork that I've missed.
尽管有这么多原因，特斯拉可能不考虑或不想涉足锂矿业，但我认为他们最终会这样做。这是因为尽管埃隆倾向于过于乐观，但当现实显现时，他通常擅长调整方向。如果特斯拉像大多数公司一样在未来三年锁定锂供应，并且这个视频中的假设是正确的，我们可能预计在未来几年内特斯拉会采取更积极的行动。像往常一样，我可能完全错了，期待对这个视频的反馈。也许它会揭示出我忽视的某个问题。
Before we move on to the summary, it's worth addressing the dozens of other potential battery chemistries beyond lithium and sodium ion. There are a lot of promising technologies out there such as vanadium flow batteries and liquid metal batteries. However, in my view, they won't scale quickly enough to make a big impact by the end of the decade. Sodium ion batteries are evidence of that. They're ready for commercialization, comparatively easy to scale, and the materials are abundant. But even with all those things in their favor, they're unlikely to take more than a third of the market by the end of the decade, and likely much less. Beyond that, every battery chemistry has strengths and weaknesses. The implication of that is that each chemistry has specs and economics that lend those chemistries to specific use cases. These use cases might have no overlap with lithium or sodium ion batteries, or the use case could be so narrow that the market of the chemistry is 5 to 10% of the total battery market.
在我们继续总结之前，值得一提的是除了锂和钠离子之外，还存在着数十种其他可能的电池化学品种。目前有许多有前景的技术，如钒流电池和液态金属电池。然而，我认为它们无法在本十年末迅速扩大规模，从而产生重大影响。钠离子电池就是个例子。它们已准备商业化，相对容易扩展，而且材料也很丰富。但即使在这些优势的基础上，它们在本十年末的市场份额也不太可能超过三分之一，很可能低得多。除此之外，每种电池化学品种都有优势和劣势。这意味着每种电池化学品种都有适用于特定用例的规格和经济条件。这些用例可能与锂或钠离子电池没有重叠，或者用例可能如此狭窄，以至于该品种的市场只占总电池市场的5%到10%。
In summary, let's review the key points of the global lithium supply chain and how it could affect Tesla's 50% growth rate target. First, lithium mining and refining are both potential bottlenecks for lithium production in the next seven years. But all indications are that refining will be less of a bottleneck than mining. In my view, the reason why Elon's pushing for refining and why Tesla's building refining capacity in Texas is for all the benefits related to regionalization and potentially because Tesla may have a specific bottleneck for lithium hydroxide supply. But whatever the reason, it's good to see Tesla vertically integrating into lithium refining because it cuts out the margins of third party suppliers and it's one of the best ways to decrease the cost of their battery cells.
总结一下，我们来回顾一下全球锂供应链的关键要点以及它如何可能影响到特斯拉的50%增长率目标。首先，未来七年内，锂矿开采和精炼都是锂生产的潜在瓶颈。但所有迹象表明，相较于矿开采，精炼将成为较小的瓶颈。在我看来，埃隆推动精炼和特斯拉在德克萨斯州建立精炼能力的原因可能是与区域化相关，并且潜在原因可能是特斯拉在锂羟化合物供应方面存在特定瓶颈。无论原因如何，看到特斯拉在锂精炼方面实现垂直整合是件好事，因为它可以剔除第三方供应商的利润，并且这是降低电池单片成本的最佳途径之一。
Second, Elon said that there's enough lithium in the ground to transition the world to sustainable energy. Building on that, not only is there enough lithium in the ground or resources, but within the next few years we should have enough of those resources upgraded to reserves to transition the world to sustainable energy, which means not only is the lithium there will have confirmed that it can be extracted profitably. Third, the quality of lithium forecasts vary, but a good quality lithium forecast from the likes of benchmark mineral intelligence is an accurate representation of what's in the pipeline for lithium supply today. However, they don't build in any speculation for supply growth, so they tend to undershoot supply in the long term, but they also undershoot demand and potentially by a larger margin.
第二，埃隆说地下有足够的锂来实现世界可持续能源转型。除此之外，不仅地下或资源中有足够的锂，而且在接下来的几年内，我们将有足够的这些资源升级为储量，以便使世界向可持续能源转型，这意味着不仅锂存在，而且已经证实可以盈利性地提取锂。
第三，锂的质量预测各不相同，但像benchmark mineral intelligence这样的机构的良好质量锂预测是对今天锂供应情况的准确描述。然而，它们没有考虑供应增长的任何推测，因此在长期内往往低估了供应，但也低估了需求，而且可能低估得更多。
Overall, I expect lithium supply to respond strongly to market forces this decade, but likely not quickly enough to cover demand, let alone to keep prices low. So those who expect free market forces to kick in and increase lithium supply are right, and so are those who point out that there are limits to the speed that the lithium industry can scale on short notice. Fourth, I walked you through the primary regions where mined lithium can be produced, why it takes so long to bring lithium supply online, and why the regions that do have potential for scaling come with fish hooks. Chinese lithium sourced from lapitolite is only viable when prices are high, which may limit its growth, and it comes with a large environmental footprint. African lithium can scale rapidly if everything goes well, but it's starting from a low base and comes from unstable countries with poor infrastructure, which may complicate scaling plans.
总体而言，我预计在这个十年里锂供应将强烈地响应市场力量，但可能不够快地满足需求，更不用说维持低价格了。因此，那些期望自由市场力量介入并增加锂供应的人是对的，同时那些指出锂行业在短时间内扩展速度有限的人也是正确的。第四，我为您介绍了采矿锂可以产出的主要地区，为什么生产锂供应需要很长时间，以及为什么那些有潜力扩大规模的地区都存在问题。从绿泥石中获取的中国锂只有在价格高时才可行，这可能限制了其增长，并且其环境影响较大。如果一切顺利，非洲锂可能会迅速扩展，但它的起点较低，而且来自基础设施薄弱、不稳定的国家，这可能会使扩展计划变得复杂。
Fifth, sodium ion battery supply has the potential to scale like man, but because it's working from a low base, it likely won't fill the supply gap created by the lithium shortage that's expected later this decade. I forecast one terawatt hour of sodium ion battery production by 2030. Even if the lithium forecast isn't revised upwards, that means sodium ion battery supply would only make up about a third of the total battery market in 2030. Hitting more than one terawatt hour by 2030 is unlikely because although sodium ion batteries use highly abundant sodium as the active ion, the sodium still needs to be refined and manufactured and to highly specialized battery grade materials, which means like lithium ion batteries, it'll take time to build the supply chain for sodium ion batteries.
第五，钠离子电池的供应潜力与锂离子电池类似，但由于其基数较低，不太可能填补预计在本十年末出现的锂短缺所造成的供应缺口。我预计到2030年将生产出1太瓦时的钠离子电池。即使锂离子电池的预测不被上调，这意味着到2030年，钠离子电池供应仅将占总电池市场的三分之一左右。到2030年能够超过1太瓦时的情况不太可能发生，因为虽然钠离子电池使用了非常丰富的钠作为活性离子，但钠仍然需要经过精炼和制造，以及高度专业化的电池级材料，这意味着建立钠离子电池的供应链将需要时间，就像锂离子电池一样。
There are sodium ion bowls out there that expect sodium ion to dominate the market by 2030. But I haven't seen logic that can justify that, and what I'm forecasting is already unprecedented, which is a 60% growth rate after an aggressive launch from 2023 to 2026. The sixth key point of the video is that taking into account all battery supply from lithium ion, sodium ion, and recycled material, my forecast is for 6.4 terawatt hours of battery supply against demand of 7.6 terawatt hours from battery factories that are already planned. That makes my supply forecast about 36 to 54% higher than benchmark minerals forecast from 2027 to 2030. Demand is more difficult to pin down because although we know there's 8.5 terawatt hours of factories planned, in the face of shortages, we don't know which factories will be built.
有人预测，到2030年钠离子电池将主导市场。但我尚未看到能为此提供逻辑依据的论述。而我的预测已经是前所未有的，即从2023年到2026年的激烈推出后，将实现60%的增长率。视频的第六个要点是，考虑到所有锂离子、钠离子和回收材料的电池供应情况，我的预测是，从已经计划的电池厂提供的电池供应将达到6.4太瓦时，而需求为7.6太瓦时。这使得我的供应预测较基准矿物公司的预测高出36%至54%，时间跨度为2027年至2030年。需求更难以确定，因为尽管我们知道将有8.5太瓦时的电池厂计划建设，但面对短缺，我们不知道哪些电池厂将被建设。
Seventh, there's very little publicly available information on Tesla's lithium or battery supply chain. However, if we assume that due to Tesla's profit margins that they can outbid everyone on batteries, they can continue growing at 50% per year for at least a few years. Beyond that, if they continue to grow at 50% per year, they'll be consuming more than a third of total global battery supply, which means they'll start running up against other players in the market and potentially government protectionism that limits their growth rate. In my view, that means Tesla may find it a real struggle to continue growing at 50% per year beyond 2027 and may have to accept a slower growth rate.
首先，关于特斯拉的锂电池或电池供应链，公开可获取的信息非常有限。然而，如果我们假设由于特斯拉的利润率使其能够在电池方面胜过所有竞争对手，他们可以以每年50%的速度持续增长至少几年。然而，如果他们继续以每年50%的速度增长，他们将消耗超过全球总电池供应的三分之一，这意味着他们将开始与市场上的其他参与者以及可能限制其增长速度的政府保护主义进行竞争。在我看来，这意味着特斯拉在2027年后继续以每年50%的速度增长可能会面临巨大挑战，并且可能不得不接受较慢的增长速度。
Eighth, the only way that I can see Tesla mitigating the battery supply shortage is to take a more active role in lithium mining to increase the supply for both themselves and the global market. They could do that by financing or partnering on new mines, buying out one of the largest mining companies in the world or even getting into mining themselves. With that said, given the lead times for increasing the production of mined material, my concern is that Tesla may have already waited too long to completely solve the supply challenge. Although there's still an opportunity to impact lithium supply later in the decade, it may not be enough to guarantee growth of 50% per year. But as I said earlier, it may be that Tesla runs up against other limiting factors first, such as shortages of other materials, skilled workers, and machinery. The party has to end at some point. It's just a matter of understanding what the primary bottleneck will be so we can keep the party going as long as possible.
第八，我可以想到的唯一缓解特斯拉电池供应短缺的方法是更积极地参与锂矿开采，以增加他们自己和全球市场的供应。他们可以通过融资或合作开展新矿山，收购世界上最大的矿业公司，甚至自己参与开采。但是，考虑到增加采掘材料的生产周期，我担心特斯拉可能已经等待太久以完全解决供应挑战。虽然在未来几年仍有影响锂供应的机会，但可能无法保证年增长50%。但正如我之前提到的，特斯拉可能首先面临其他限制因素，例如其他材料、熟练工人和机械的短缺。派对总有结束的时候。关键是要理解主要的瓶颈将是什么，这样我们才能尽可能地延长派对的时间。
Ninth, my view is that Tesla should get into lithium mining for more reasons than just lithium supply. Lithium miners are careful about expanding supply because overproduction lowers prices, revenues, and profits. By taking a more active role in lithium mining, Tesla can not only gain access to more lithium, but also reduce the price they pay for their lithium. Currently, Tesla's paying billions of dollars per year in margins to lithium miners and refiners, and that will only grow as they go from consuming about 175 gigawatt-hours of cells this year to 3 terawatt-hours by 2030. So if Tesla gets into lithium mining, they could produce vehicles more cheaply or with higher margins.
我的观点是，特斯拉应该涉足锂矿业，原因不仅仅是为了锂供应。锂矿商在扩大供应方面持谨慎态度，因为过度产能会导致价格、收入和利润下降。通过更积极地参与锂矿业，特斯拉不仅可以获得更多的锂资源，还可以降低他们购买锂的价格。目前，特斯拉每年向锂矿商和精炼商支付数十亿美元的利润，随着到2030年其电池消耗量从今年的175千兆瓦时增长到3太瓦时，这个数字只会增加。因此，如果特斯拉涉足锂矿业，他们可以更便宜或者更高利润地生产车辆。
The tenth takeaway of the video is that there are a number of reasons why Tesla may be hesitant about getting into lithium mining. Those range from the fact that mining could create public relations issues to the fact that they're waiting until they must get into lithium mining, regardless what must be done will be done. And I think Tesla will eventually bite the bullet and take a more active role in lithium mining.
这段视频的第十个要点是特斯拉在进入锂矿业方面可能存在多种原因的犹豫。这些原因包括采矿可能会引发公共关系问题，以及他们正等待时机，直到他们必须进入锂矿业为止，无论必须做什么都将去做。我认为特斯拉最终会下定决心承担更积极的锂矿业角色。
To close out the video, let's address the open question that I left at the beginning of the video. Are lithium industry forecasts just a big nothing burger like the peak oil hysteria 15 years ago?
在视频的结尾，让我们回答一下我在视频开头提出的未解之谜。锂行业的预测是否只是像15年前的石油峰值恐慌一样无关紧要？
No, because peak oil was about supply slowly decreasing over time, and it was painted as some kind of herald for civilizational collapse. That's as opposed to lithium, where everyone in the lithium industry agrees that lithium supply will continue to grow, only that if no action is taken, that it's not expected to keep up with exponential demand growth.
不是的，因为峰值石油是指随着时间慢慢减少供应，而被描绘成某种文明崩溃的先兆。与之相反，锂产业中的所有人都认同锂供应将继续增长，只是如果不采取行动，预计无法跟上指数式需求增长。
So from the perspective of Tesla, it's not doom and gloom, but potentially a missed opportunity. For the lithium industry, it means huge demand, and therefore a huge opportunity for investment and profits, a situation they're not shy about advertising. But is that a reason to dismiss their narrative out of hand?
从特斯拉的角度来看，这并不是末日的悲观局面，而可能是一个错失的机会。对于锂行业来说，这意味着巨大的需求，因此也代表了投资和利润的巨大机会，他们并不不敢公开宣传这种情况。但这就是要完全否定他们的观点的理由吗？
In my view, no, because based on what we know today, despite the clear potential for bias, the narrative holds up discrutiny. Furthermore, it's driving much needed investment into the lithium industry. Elon Musk supports that view, but just disagrees on where money and entrepreneurship should be focused. The lithium industry says mining? Elon says refining.
在我看来，不会，因为根据我们今天所了解的，尽管存在明显的偏见可能性，这个故事仍经得起审查。此外，它正在为锂工业带来迫切需求的投资。埃隆·马斯克支持这个观点，只是对金融和创业应该集中在哪个领域持不同意见。锂工业强调采矿？埃隆则侧重于精炼。
That is, despite disagreements on priority, the lithium industry and Tesla both have an interest in increasing the lithium supply, and they're generally pulling the same direction. Either way, now that Tesla's gone one step further up the supply chain into refining, my question as a shareholder is, will they take the next step up the supply chain by partnering with a miner to maximize their own lithium supply, reduce costs, and increase the size of a global lithium pie to accelerate the world's transition to sustainable energy.
也就是说，尽管在优先顺序上存在分歧，锂产业和特斯拉都希望增加锂供应，并且它们一般都是朝着同一个方向努力。无论如何，既然特斯拉在供应链上进一步深入到精炼环节，作为股东的我的问题是，他们是否会向上游供应链迈进一步，与矿业公司合作，以最大化自己的锂供应，降低成本，并增加全球锂市场的规模，以加速世界向可持续能源的转型。
We should know within the next few years and all continue to provide updates as the situation evolves.
在接下来的几年中我们应该会知道，并且在情况发展时持续提供更新。
That's all for today, but before I close out the video, as I said at the beginning of the video, if you can, toss a coin to your witcher. The information I've provided today is, to my knowledge, the most comprehensive video on lithium supply out there. Other reports that are available on the market can cost thousands of dollars, and by comparison, if this video does well, I expect it to make less than $1,000 from YouTube ad revenues.
今天就这些了，但在我结束视频之前，就像我在视频开始时所说的，如果你能的话，向你的弗菲尔投掷一枚硬币。我今天所提供的信息在我所了解的范围内是关于锂供应最全面的视频。市场上其他可获得的报告可能要花费数千美元，而与之相比，如果这个视频表现良好，我预计它的YouTube广告收入将不到1000美元。
It's the supporters who contribute directly that make the channel possible. On that note, a special thanks to my YouTube members, Twitter subscribers, and all the patrons listed in the credits. I appreciate all your support, and thanks for tuning in.
正是直接贡献的支持者们使得这个频道能够存在。在此，特别感谢我的YouTube会员，Twitter订阅者以及所有在片尾名单中的资助者们。我非常感激你们的支持，谢谢你们的收看。