Further Thoughts on "Sea Change"
发布时间 2023-10-11 14:37:12 来源
摘要
In his latest memo, Howard Marks provides a follow-up to Sea Change (https://www.oaktreecapital.com/insights/memo/sea-change), his thought-provoking memo published in December 2022. He argues that the trends he highlighted in the original memo collectively represent a sweeping alteration of the investment environment that calls for significant capital reallocation. Further Thoughts on Sea Change was originally sent exclusively to Oaktree clients on May 30, 2023. All market data cited in this memo is as of May 30, 2023.The memo is read by LJ Ganser.You can read the memo here (https://www.oaktreecapital.com/docs/default-source/memos/further-thoughts-on-sea-change3dda4540-569f-4415-9a5b-004fbabf06d4.pdf?sfvrsn=c3cc5166_3).
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This is the memo by Howard Marks. Further Thoughts on Sea Change. In May I wrote a follow-up memo to SeaChange, December 2022, that was shared exclusively with Oaktree clients. In further Thoughts on SeaChange, I argued that the trends I had highlighted in the original memo collectively represented a sweeping alteration of the investment environment that called for significant capital reallocation. This time it really might be different.
这是霍华德·马克斯的备忘录《对大变革的进一步思考》。去年五月，我写了一份跟进备忘录《大变革》（2022年12月份），仅与橡树客户分享。在《对大变革的进一步思考》中，我主张原备忘录中所突出的趋势共同代表着投资环境的彻底改变，需要进行重大资本重新配置。这一次，情况可能确实有所不同。
On October 11, 1987, I first came across the saying, this time it's different. According to an article in The New York Times by Anis C. Wallace, Sir John Templeton had warned that when investors say times are different, it's usually in an effort to rationalize valuations that appear high relative to history. And it's usually done to investors' ultimate detriment. In 1987 it was high equity prices in general. The article I cite was written just eight days before Black Monday, when the Dow Jones industrial average declined by 22.6% in a single day. A dozen years later, the new thing people were excited about was the prospect that the Internet would change the world. This belief served to justify ultra-high prices and PE ratios of infinity for digital and e-commerce stocks, many of which went on to lose more than 90% of their value over the next year or so. Importantly, however, Templeton allowed that things might really be different 20% of the time. On rare occasions, something fundamental does change, with significant implications for investing. Given the pace of developments these days, especially in technology, I imagine things might genuinely be different more often than they were in Templeton's day.
在1987年10月11日，我第一次听到了这句话，“这一次不同”。根据纽约时报上Anis C. Wallace的一篇文章，约翰·坦普尔顿爵士警告说，当投资者说“时代不同”时，通常是为了解释相对于历史来说估值高得出奇的理由。而这通常会对投资者造成最终的损害。在1987年，投资者普遍认为股票价格过高。我引用的这篇文章是在黑色星期一之前的八天写的，当天道琼斯工业平均指数在一天内下跌了22.6%。十二年后，人们对一个新事物非常兴奋，那就是互联网将改变世界的前景。这种信念为数字和电子商务股票的超高价格和无限市盈率提供了合理的理由，而其中许多股票在接下来的一年左右的时间里损失了超过90%的价值。然而，重要的是，坦普尔顿承认事情可能真的不同的概率是20%。在极少数情况下，某些基本的事情确实会发生变化，并对投资产生重大影响。考虑到如今的技术发展速度，尤其是在科技领域，我认为事情可能真的比坦普尔顿时代更加不同。
Anyway, that's all pre-emble. My reason for writing this memo is that, while most people I speak with seem to agree with many of my individual observations in sea change, few have expressly agreed with my overall conclusion and said, I think you're right. We might be seeing a significant and possibly lasting change in the investment environment. This memo's main message is that the changes I described in sea change aren't just usual cyclical fluctuations. Rather, taken together, they represent a sweeping alteration of the investment environment calling for significant capital reallocation.
无论如何，这就是所有的开场白。我写这份备忘录的原因是，虽然我和大多数人交谈时，他们似乎同意我在大变革中的许多个别观察，但很少有人明确同意我的总体结论，并表示“我认为你说得对”。本备忘录的主要信息是，我在大变革中所描述的变化不仅仅是通常的周期性波动。相反，从整体上看，它们代表了对投资环境的全面改变，需要进行重大的资本重新配置。
The backdrop. I'll start off by recapping my basic arguments from sea change. In late 2008, the Federal Reserve took the Fed funds rate to zero for the first time ever in order to rescue the economy from the effects of the global financial crisis. Since that didn't cause inflation to rise from its sub-2% level, the Fed felt comfortable maintaining accommodative policies, low interest rates and quantitative easing for essentially all of the next 13 years. As a result, we had the longest economic recovery on record, exceeding 10 years and easy times for businesses seeking to earn profits and secure financing. Even money losing businesses had little trouble going public, obtaining loans and avoiding default and bankruptcy. The low interest rates that prevailed in 2009 to 21 made it a great time for asset owners. Lower discount rates make future cash flows more valuable and for borrowers. This in turn made asset owners complacent and potential buyers eager. And FOMO became most people's main concern. The period was correspondingly challenging for bargain hunters and lenders.
背景。首先，我将回顾我在"转变之海"中的基本论点。2008年末，美联储首次将联邦基金利率降至零，以挽救经济受全球金融危机影响的局面。由于这并没有引起通胀从低于2%的水平上升，美联储感到放心维持宽松政策、低利率和量化宽松政策长达接下来的13年。因此，我们经历了有史以来最长的经济复苏，超过了10年，并为寻求盈利和获得融资的企业创造了良好的时机。即使是亏损企业也很少有困扰，在上市、获得贷款和避免违约和破产方面没有太多困难。2009年到2021年期间盛行的低利率使资产持有者受益。较低的折现率使未来的现金流更有价值，对于借款人来说也是如此。这反过来使得资产持有者感到自满，潜在的买家则渴望购买，恐惧错过成为大多数人的主要关注点。与此同时，对于寻找便宜货和贷款人来说，这段时期相应地具有挑战性。
The massive COVID-19 relief measures combined with supply chain snags resulted in too much money chasing too few goods, the classic condition for rising inflation. The higher inflation that arose in 2021 persisted into 2022, forcing the Fed to discontinue its accommodative stance. Thus, the Fed raised interest rates dramatically, its fastest tightening cycle in four decades and ended QE. For a number of reasons, ultra low or declining interest rates are unlikely to be the norm in the decade ahead. Thus, we are likely to see tougher times for corporate profits, for asset appreciation, for borrowing and for avoiding default.
大规模的COVID-19救济措施加上供应链问题导致了过多的货币追逐过少的商品，这是通胀上升的典型情况。2021年出现的更高通胀率持续到了2022年，迫使美联储放弃其宽松立场。因此，美联储大幅提高了利率，这是40年来最快的紧缩周期，并结束了量化宽松政策。由于多种原因，未来十年低利率或下降利率不太可能成为常态。因此，我们很可能会看到企业利润、资产升值、借款和避免违约等方面面临更为艰难的时期。
Bottom line, if this really is a sea change, meaning the investment environment has been fundamentally altered, you shouldn't assume the investment strategies that have served you best since 2009 will do so in the years ahead. Having supplied this summary, I'm going to put flesh on these bones and share some additional insights.
简单说，如果这真的是一次彻底的变革，意味着投资环境发生了根本性的改变，你不应该假设自2009年以来一直适用的投资策略在未来的几年里仍然有效。在提供了这个摘要之后，我将详细解释并分享一些额外的见解。
A Momentous Development
To promote discussion these days, I often start by asking people, what do you consider to have been the most important event in the financial world in recent decades? Some suggest the global financial crisis and bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, some the bursting of the tech bubble, and some the Fed government response to the pandemic-related woes. No one cites my candidate, the 2000 basis point decline in interest rates between 1980 and 2020. And yet, as I wrote in sea change, that decline was probably responsible for the lion's share of investment profits made over that period. How could it be overlooked?
在近几十年的金融界中，我经常询问人们，你认为最重要的事件是什么，以促进讨论。有些人认为是全球金融危机和雷曼兄弟的破产，有些人认为是科技泡沫的破裂，还有些人认为是联邦政府对与疫情相关的困境的应对。然而，没有人提到我认为最重要的事件，即1980年至2020年间利率下降2000个基点。然而，正如我在《变局》中所写的，这一下降可能是在那个时期内所获得的投资利润的大部分原因。为什么这一点被忽视了呢？
First I suggest a metaphor of boiling a frog. It's said that if you put a frog in a pot to boiling water, it'll jump out. But if you put it in cool water and turn on the stove, it'll just sit there, oblivious, until it boils to death. The frog doesn't detect the danger, just as people fail to perceive the significance of the interest rate decline because of its gradual, long-term nature. It's not an abrupt development, but rather a drawn-out, highly influential trend.
首先，我建议使用沸蛙的比喻来表达意思。据说，如果你把一只青蛙放入沸水中，它会跳出来。但是如果你把它放在凉水中然后打开炉子，它会无知地坐在那里，直到被煮死。青蛙不能察觉到危险，就像人们没有意识到利率下降的重要性，因为它是逐渐而长期发展的。这不是一个突然发展的情况，而是一个漫长而极具影响力的趋势。
Second, in sea change, I compared the 40-year interest rate decline to the moving walkway at an airport. If you stand still on the walkway, you'll move effortlessly. But if you walk at your normal pace, you'll move ahead rapidly, perhaps without being fully conscious of why. In fact, if everyone's walking on the moving walkway, doing so can easily go unnoted. And the walkers might conclude that their rapid progress is normal.
其次，在海运变革中，我将40年的利率下降比作机场的移动通道。如果你站在通道上不动，你将毫不费力地前进。但如果你以正常速度行走，你会迅速前进，可能没有充分意识到为什么会这样。实际上，如果每个人都在移动通道上行走，这种行为很容易被忽视。行走者们可能会得出结论，他们的快速进步是正常的。
Finally, there's what John Kenneth Galbraith called the extreme brevity of the financial memory. Relatively few investors today are old enough to remember a time when interest rates behaved differently. Everyone who has come into the business since 1980, in other words, the vast majority of today's investors, has, with relatively few exceptions, only seen interest rates that were either declining or ultra low or both. You have to have been working for more than 43 years, and thus, be over 65 to have seen a prolonged period that was otherwise. And since market conditions made it tough to find employment in our industry in the 1970s, you probably had to get your first job in the 1960s, like me, to have seen interest rates that were either higher and stable or rising. I believe the scarcity of veterans from the 70s has made it easy for people to conclude that the interest rate trends of 2009 to 21 were normal.
最后，还有一个约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷思所说的金融记忆的极度短暂。相对较少的投资者如今已经老到足够回忆起利率行为不同的时代。换句话说，除少数例外，自1980年以来，今天大多数投资者只见过利率下降或极低或二者兼而有之。你必须工作超过43年，并且年龄超过65岁才能看到一个持续时间相反的长期。而且由于市场状况使得在1970年代找到工作很困难，你可能需要像我一样在1960年代找到第一份工作才能见识到利率要么更高并保持稳定，要么上升。我相信70年代资深人才的稀缺使得人们容易得出2009年到2021年的利率趋势是正常的结论。
The Relevance of History
The 13-year period from the beginning of 2009 through the end of 2021 saw two rescues from financial crises, a generally favorable macro-environment, aggressively accommodative central bank policies, a lack of inflation worries, ultra low and declining interest rates, and generally uninterrupted investment gains. The question, of course, is whether investors should expect a continuation of those trends.
《历史的重要性》
自2009年初至2021年底的13年时间内，我们经历了两次金融危机的解救，宏观环境普遍良好，中央银行采取了积极的宽松政策，没有通胀担忧，利率极低且逐渐下降，并且投资收益一直保持稳定增长。当然，问题是投资者是否应该期待这些趋势的延续。
Recent events have shown that the risk of rising inflation can't be ignored in perpetuity. Moreover, the reawakening of inflationary psychology will probably make central banks less likely to conclude that they can engage in continuous monetary stimulation without consequences. Thus, interest rates can't be counted on to stay lower for longer and produce perpetual prosperity, as many thought was the case in late 2020. Also in late 2020, modern monetary theory was accepted by some as meaning deficits and national debt could be disregarded in countries with control of their currencies. We no longer hear anything about this notion.
最近的事件表明，通胀风险不能永远被忽视。此外，通胀预期的再度出现可能会让中央银行不太可能认为他们可以无限制地进行货币刺激而不会产生后果。因此，不能指望利率会长期保持较低水平并带来永恒的繁荣，就像许多人在2020年末所认为的那样。同样在2020年末，有人接受了现代货币理论，认为掌握货币政策的国家可以无视赤字和国债。现在我们已经很少听到这种观点了。
In sea change, I listed several reasons why I don't think interest rates are going back to that period's lows on a permanent basis, and I still find these arguments compelling. In particular, I find it hard to believe the Fed doesn't think it aired by sticking with ultra low interest rates for so long. As noted previously, to fight the GFC, the Fed took the Fed funds rate to roughly zero for the first time in late 2008. Macro conditions were frightening as a vicious cycle capable of undermining the entire financial system appeared to be underway. For this reason, aggressive action was certainly called for, but I was shocked when I looked at the data and saw that the Fed kept the rate near zero for nearly seven years. Having interest rates at zero is an emergency measure, and we certainly didn't have a continuous emergency through late 2015. To me, those sustained low rates stand out as a mistake not to be repeated.
在《海浪变迁》一书中，我列举了几个原因，解释为什么我认为利率不会永久回到那个时期的低点，而且我仍然觉得这些论点具有说服力。特别是，我很难相信美联储并没有认识到他们在长时间坚持超低利率政策时犯了错误。正如之前提到的那样，为了对抗全球金融危机，美联储在2008年末首次将联邦基金利率降至接近零的水平。当时的宏观条件令人担忧，一种似乎能够破坏整个金融系统的恶性循环正在进展中。正因为如此，肯定需要采取积极行动，但当我查看数据后发现美联储将利率维持在接近零的水平近七年，我感到震惊。将利率维持在零水平是一种紧急措施，而且在2015年底之前，我们肯定没有持续的紧急情况。对我来说，这种持续低利率是一个显著的错误，不应该重复。
Further by 2017 to 18, with the Fed funds rate around 1%, it had become clear to many that there wasn't room for the Fed to reduce rates if necessary to stimulate the economy during a recession. And when the Fed attempted to raise rates to create that room, it encountered pushback from investors. See the fourth quarter of 2018. I find it hard to believe the Fed would want to re-impose that limitation on its toolkit.
到2017年至2018年，随着联邦基金利率约为1%，很多人都明显意识到如果经济陷入衰退，联储局就无法再降低利率以刺激经济了。当联储局试图提高利率以创造空间时，却受到投资者的反对，可以看看2018年第四季度的情况。我很难相信联储局会希望重新对其工具进行这种限制。
A recurring theme of mine is that even though many people agree that free markets do the best job of allocating resources, we haven't had a free market in money in roughly the last two decades, a period of Fed activism.
我一直强调的一个主题是，尽管很多人都认为自由市场在资源配置方面表现最佳，但在过去的大约20年中，也就是联邦储备银行积极干预的时期里，我们没有一个自由的货币市场。
Instead, Fed policy has been accommodative almost the entire time, and interest rates have been kept artificially low. Rather than letting economic and market forces determine the rate of interest, the Fed has been unusually active in setting interest rates, greatly influencing the economy and the markets. Importantly, this distorts the behavior of economic and market participants. It causes things to be built that otherwise wouldn't have been built. It's to be made that otherwise wouldn't have been made and risks to be born that otherwise wouldn't have been accepted.
不过，美联储的货币政策几乎一直以来都是宽松的，利率被人为地保持在较低水平。与其让经济和市场力量决定利率水平，美联储一直以来在设定利率方面非常积极，对经济和市场产生了巨大的影响。重要的是，这扭曲了经济和市场参与者的行为。它导致一些本不应该建造的东西被建造出来，生产一些本不应该生产的产品，并接受一些本不应该承担的风险。
There's no doubt that this is true in general, and I'm convinced it accurately describes the period in question. Many articles about the problems at Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic Bank cite errors that were made in the preceding easy money period. Fed growth, unwise inducements to customers, and lax financial management were all encouraged in a climate with accommodative Fed policy, uniformly positive expectations and low levels of risk aversion.
毫无疑问，从总体上来说这是真实的，我相信它准确地描述了所讨论的时期。关于硅谷银行和第一共和银行问题的许多文章都引用了在之前的轻松货币期间所犯的错误。联邦储备增长、对客户不明智的诱导以及松懈的财务管理在一个支持性的联邦政策、普遍积极的预期和较低的风险厌恶程度的氛围下都得到了鼓励。
This is just one example of a time-worn adage in action. The worst of loans are made in the best of times. I don't think the Fed should return us to an environment that has been distorted to encourage universal optimism, belief in the existence of a Fed put, and thus a dearth of prudence.
这只是一个古老格言的实际例证。最糟糕的贷款往往出现在最好的时候。我不认为联邦储备系统应该让我们回到一个过度扭曲的环境中，以鼓励普遍乐观、相信存在联邦储备支持，并从而导致缺乏审慎。
If the declining and or ultra-low interest rates of the easy money period aren't going to be the rule in the years ahead, numerous consequences seem probable. Economic growth may be slower. Profit margins may erode. Default rates may head higher. Asset appreciation may not be as reliable. The cost of borrowing won't trend downward consistently, though interest rates raised to fight inflation likely will be permitted to recede somewhat once inflation eases. Investors' psychology may not be as uniformly positive, and businesses may not find it as easy to obtain financing.
如果在未来几年内，低迷或极低的利率不再是易货币时期的常态，那么很多后果可能会出现。经济增长可能会放缓，利润率可能会下降，违约率可能会上升，资产增值可能不再可靠。借款成本不会持续下降，但为了抑制通胀，利率可能会有所回落。投资者的心理状态可能不再一致积极，企业可能不再容易获得融资。
In other words, after a long period when everything was unusually easy in the world of investing, getting closer to normalcy is likely to set in. Please note that I'm not saying interest rates having declined by 2,000 basis points over the last 40 or so years are going back up to the levels seen in the 1980s. In fact, I see no reason why short-term interest rates five years from now should be appreciably higher than they are today. But still, I think the easy times and easy money are largely over.
换句话说，在投资世界一切异常轻松的长时期过后，逐渐回归正常很可能会到来。请注意，我并不是说过去40年左右利率下降了2,000个基点之后会回到上世纪80年代的水平。事实上，我认为短期利率五年后应该不会明显高于今天的水平。但是，我仍然觉得轻松的时代和易钱时代已经基本结束了。
How can I best communicate what I'm talking about? Try this. Five years ago, an investor went to the bank for a loan, and the banker said, will give you $800 million at 5%. Now, the loan has to be refinanced, and the banker says, will give you $500 million at 8%. That means the investor's cost of capital is up, his net return on the investment is down, or negative, and he has a $300 million hole to fill. What strategies will work best?
我应该如何最好地传达我正在谈论的内容？试试这个。五年前，一位投资者去银行贷款，银行家说，将以5%的利率给您800百万美元。现在，贷款需要再融资，银行家说，将以8%的利率给您500百万美元。这意味着投资者的资本成本提高了，他的投资净回报率下降，甚至出现了负值，并且他需要填补300百万美元的缺口。哪些策略最有效？
It seems obvious that if certain strategies were the best performers in a period with a given set of characteristics, it must be true that a starkly different environment will produce a dramatically altered list of winners. As mentioned previously in the recap of sea change, the 40 years of low and declining interest rates were hugely beneficial for asset owners. Declining discount rates and the associated reduction in the competitiveness of bond returns led to substantial asset appreciation. Thus, asset ownership, whether related to companies, pieces of companies, equities, or properties, was the place to be.
很明显，如果在某段时间内，特定的策略是最佳表现者，那么显然在一个截然不同的环境下，赢家名单会发生巨大的变化。正如在之前提到的变革总结中所提到的，40年的低利率和下降趋势对资产持有者来说是巨大的利好。下降的折现率以及债券回报竞争力的降低导致资产大幅增值。因此，无论是与公司、公司部分、股票还是房地产相关的资产所有权都是最佳选择的地方。
Growing interest rates brought down the cost of capital for borrowers. As this occurred, any borrowing automatically became more successful than originally contemplated. And as I also mentioned in sea change, the combined result of these factors for investors who bought assets on borrowed money was a double bonanza.
不断增长的利率降低了借款人的资本成本。随着这种情况的发生，任何借款自动地比最初预期的更成功。正如我在大变革中提到的，对于用借来的钱购买资产的投资者来说，这些因素的综合结果是一个双赢的机遇。
Think back to the first of the sea changes I mentioned in that memo, the advent of high yield bonds in 1977 and 78, which brought about the trend toward bearing risk for profit and the emergence of levered investment strategies. It is very notable that almost the entire history of levered investment strategies has been written during a period of declining and or ultra low interest rates.
回想一下我在备忘录中提到的第一个重大变革，高收益债券的出现，即1977年和1978年。这引发了为了获利而承担风险的趋势，以及杠杆投资策略的出现。非常值得注意的是，几乎整个杠杆投资策略的历史，都是在利率下降或超低利率时期书写的。
For example, I would venture that nearly 100% of capital for private equity investing has been put to work since interest rates began their downward move in 1980. Should it come as a surprise that levered investing thrived in such salutary conditions? At the same time, declining interest rates rendered lending or buying debt instruments less rewarding. Not only were prospective returns on debt low throughout the period, but investors who were eager to get away from the ultra-low yields on safer securities like treasuries and investment-grade corporates competed spiritedly to deploy capital in higher risk markets. And this caused many to accept lower returns and reduced lender protections. Finally, conditions in those halcyon days created tough times for bargain hunters. Where do the greatest bargains come from? The answer? The desperation of panicked holders. Sometimes our untroubled asset owners are complacent and buyers are eager. No one has any urgency to exit, making it very hard to score significant bargains.
举个例子，我敢说自1980年利率开始走低以来，几乎所有私募股权投资的资金都得到了利用。难道杠杆投资在这样有利的条件下成为繁荣的是令人惊讶的吗？与此同时，下降的利率使得贷款或购买债务工具的收益变得较低。在整个时期内，债务的潜在回报率不仅低，而且那些渴望摆脱像国债和投资级公司债券这样安全证券的超低收益的投资者也积极竞相将资金投入到更高风险的市场中。这导致很多人接受了较低的回报和减少的贷方保护。最后，那些黄金时代的情况给物美价廉的搜寻者带来了困难。最好的便宜货来自哪里？答案是：绝望的持有者的慌乱。有时我们的安稳的资产持有者过于自满，而买方则渴望购买，没有人急于退出，这使得很难找到重大的便宜货。
Investors who profited in this period from asset ownership and levered investment strategies may overlook the salutary effect of interest rates on asset values and borrowing costs. And instead, think the profits stemmed from the inherent merit of their strategies, perhaps with some help from their own skill and wisdom. That is, they may have violated a basic rule in investing. Never confuse brains and a bull market. Given the benefits of being on the moving walkway during this period, it seems to me it would have required really bad decision-making or really bad luck for a purchase of assets made with borrowed money to have been unsuccessful. Will asset ownership be as profitable in the years ahead as in the 2009-21 period? Will leverage add as much to returns if interest rates don't decline over time or if the cost of borrowing isn't much below the expected rate of return on the assets purchased? Whatever the intrinsic merits of asset ownership and levered investment, one would think the benefits will be reduced in the years ahead. And merely riding positive trends by buying and levering may no longer be sufficient to produce success.
在这个时期从资产所有权和杠杆投资策略中获利的投资者可能会忽视利率对资产价值和借款成本的有益影响。相反，他们可能认为利润源于他们的策略的内在功效，或许还得益于他们自己的技巧和智慧。也就是说，他们可能违反了投资中的一个基本规则：不要把聪明才智和牛市混为一谈。考虑到在这个时期处于运动通道上的好处，我认为只有做出非常糟糕的决策或非常倒霉，用借来的钱购买资产才会失败。在未来的几年里，资产所有权的盈利能力会像2009年至2021年这段时期一样吗？如果利率不会随时间下降，或者借款成本不会远低于所购资产的预期收益率，杠杆是否会为回报增加同样多？无论资产所有权和杠杆投资的内在价值如何，人们都会认为这些好处将在未来几年减少。仅仅通过购买和杠杆追逐积极趋势可能不再足以带来成功。
In the new environment, earning exceptional returns will likely once again require skill in making bargain purchases and in control strategies adding value to the assets owned. Lending, credit or fixed income investing should be correspondingly better off. As I mentioned in my December memo, the 13 years in question were a difficult, dreary, low return period for credit investors, including oak tree. Most of the asset classes we operate in were offering the lowest prospective returns any of us had ever seen. The options were to A, hold and accept the new lower returns, B, reduce risk to prepare for the correction that the demand for higher returns would eventually bring, or C, increase risk in pursuit of higher returns. Obviously all of these had drawbacks. The bottom line was that it was quite challenging to safely and dependably pursue high returns in a low return world like the one we were experiencing. But now higher prospective returns are here.
在这个新的环境下，赚取超凡回报很可能再次需要在购买低价资产和控制策略上具备技巧，增加所拥有资产的价值。借贷、信贷或固定收益投资应该相应地变得更加有利。正如我在十二月备忘录中提到的，过去的13年对于信用投资者来说是一个困难、沉闷、回报低的时期，包括橡树在内。我们所经营的大部分资产类别都提供了我们所见过的最低潜在回报。处理这种情况的选择是：A、持有并接受新的较低回报；B、降低风险以准备最终需求高回报的修正；或C、增加风险以追求更高回报。显然，所有这些选择都有缺点。关键是，在像我们所经历的低回报世界中，要安全可靠地追求高回报是相当具有挑战性的。但现在更高的潜在回报已经出现了。
In early 2022, high yield bonds, for example, yielded in the 4% range, not a very useful return. Today they yield more than 8%, meaning these bonds have the potential to make a great contribution to portfolio results. The same is generally true across the entire spectrum of non-investment grade credit. Asset allocation today. My thinking about the seed change materialized mostly as I was visiting clients last October and November. When I got home, I wrote the memo and began to discuss its thesis. And at the December meeting of a non-profit investment committee, I said the following. Sell off the big stocks, the small stocks, the value stocks, the growth stocks, the US stocks and the foreign stocks, sell the private equity along with the public equity, the real estate, the hedge funds and the venture capital. Sell it all and put the proceeds into high yield bonds at 9%. This institution needs to earn an annual return of 6% or so on its endowment. And I'm convinced that if it holds a competently assembled portfolio of 9% high yield bonds, it would be overwhelmingly likely to exceed that 6% target. But mine wasn't a serious suggestion. More a statement designed to evoke discussion of the fact that thanks to the changes over the last year and a half, investors today can get equity-like returns from investments in credit.
在2022年初，例如高收益债券的收益率约为4%，并不是很有用的回报。而如今，它们的收益率超过了8%，这意味着这些债券有潜力为投资组合的结果做出巨大贡献。整个非投资级信用范围通常也是如此。现在的资产配置要考虑到这一点。我对这种巨变的观念主要是在去年十月和十一月拜访客户时形成的。回到家后，我写了备忘录并开始讨论其论点。在非营利投资委员会的十二月会议上，我说了以下的话。清仓卖掉大股票、小股票、价值股、成长股、美国股票和外国股票，清仓卖掉私募股权和公募股权，清仓卖掉房地产、对冲基金和风险投资。全部卖掉，并将收益投入到9%的高收益债券中。该机构需要在其捐赠基金上获得大约6%的年回报。我相信，如果它持有一份构造合理的9%高收益债券投资组合，它很可能会超过6%的目标。但这并不是一个认真的建议，更多的是一种陈述，旨在引起关于如今投资者可以从信用投资中获得类似股权回报的讨论。
The Standard and Poor's 500 Index has returned just over 10% per year for almost a century. And everyone's very happy. 10% a year for 100 years turns $1 into almost $14,000.
标普500指数（Standard and Poor's 500 Index）在将近一个世纪的时间里年均回报率仅略超过10%。而且每个人都非常满意。100年间每年10%的回报率能将1美元变成近14000美元。
Nowadays, the ICE B of A US High Yield Constrained Index offers a yield of over 8.5%. The CS Leveraged Loan Index offers roughly 10.0% and private loans offer considerably more.
如今，ICE B美国高收益限制指数的收益率已经超过8.5%。而CS杠杆贷款指数大约为10.0%，而私人贷款提供的收益则更高。
In other words, expected pre-tax yields from non-investment grade debt investments now approach or exceed the historical returns from equity. And importantly, these are contractual returns.
换句话说，预计税前收益率接近或超过了历史股权回报率，这是指非投资级债券投资的预期收益。而且更重要的是，这些收益是合同约定的。
When I shifted from equities to bonds in 1978, I was struck by a major difference. With equities, the bulk of your return in the short or medium term depends on the behavior of the market. If Mr. Markets in a Good Mood, as Ben Graham put it, your return will benefit, and vice versa.
1978年我从股票转向债券时，我意识到了一个重要的不同之处。在股票市场上，短期或中期的大部分回报取决于市场的行为。正如本·格雷厄姆所说，如果股市情绪好的话，你的回报会受益，反之亦然。
With credit instruments, on the other hand, your return comes overwhelmingly from the contract between you and the borrowers. You give a borrower money upfront, they pay you interest every six months, and they give you your money back at the end. And to greatly oversimplify, if the borrower doesn't pay you as promised, you and the other creditors get ownership of the company via the bankruptcy process, a possibility that gives the borrower a lot of incentive to honor the contract.
与此相反，信用工具的回报主要来自您与借款人之间的合约。您预先给予借款人资金，他们每隔六个月支付您利息，并在最后偿还您的资金。简单来说，如果借款人不按照约定支付您，您和其他债权人将通过破产程序获得公司所有权，这种可能性大大激励借款人遵守合约。
The credit investor isn't dependent on the market for returns. If the market shuts down or becomes illiquid, the return for the long-term holder is unaffected. The difference between the sources of return on stocks and bonds is profound, something many investors may understand intellectually, but not fully appreciate.
信用投资者并不依赖市场获得回报。即使市场关闭或变得不流动，这些长期持有者的回报也不会受到影响。股票和债券回报来源的差异是深远的，这是很多投资者可能在理论上理解，但并没有完全认识到的。
It's been years since prospective returns on credit were competitive with those on equities. Now it's the case again. Under the non-profit whose board I sit on put all its money into credit instruments? Perhaps not. But Charlie Munger exhorts us to invert, or flip questions like this. To me, this means allocators should ask themselves, what are the arguments for not putting a significant portion of our capital into credit today?
自从有竞争力的信贷回报率超过股权已经过去了多年。现在情况再次如此。但是，是否应该将我所在的非营利组织的所有资金投入信用工具？也许不会。但查理·芒格敦促我们反转或翻转这样的问题。对我来说，这意味着资金配置者应该询问自己，为什么不将我们的资本的一大部分投入信贷市场呢？
Here, I'll mention that over the years, I've seen institutional investors pay lip service to developments in markets and make modest changes in their asset allocation in response. When the early index funds outperformed active management in the 1980s, they said, we've got that covered. We've moved 2% of our equities to an index fund. When emerging markets look attractive, the response is often to move another 2%. And from time to time, a client tells me they've put 2% in gold.
在这里，我要提到多年来，我见过机构投资者光说不做，在市场发展方面敷衍了事，并对他们的资产配置做出一些适度的调整。当早期的指数基金在20世纪80年代超越了主动管理时，他们说，我们已经完成了这个。我们将我们股票的2％转移到了指数基金。当新兴市场看起来有吸引力时，常常的反应是再次转移另外2％的资金。定时，有客户告诉我，他们投资了2％的黄金。
But if the developments I describe really constitute a sea change, as I believe, fundamental, significant and potentially long-lasting, credit instruments should probably represent a substantial portion of portfolios. Perhaps the majority. What's the downside? How could this be a mistake?
如果我所描述的发展真的构成了一次我所相信的海差，即基本的、重大的并且可能是长期的变革，那么信用工具很可能应该占据投资组合的相当大比例。也许是大多数。那么这有什么不利之处呢？这可能是一个错误吗？
这句话的意思是，如果我所描述的发展确实是一次重大而基本的变革，那么信用工具（例如债券和信贷）在投资组合中应该占据很大的比例，甚至可能占据大多数。然后作者提出问题，问这样做可能有什么坏处，为什么这样做可能是一个错误。
First, individual borrowers can default and fail to pay. It's the main job of the credit manager to weed out the non-payers, and history shows it can be done. Isolated defaults are unlikely to derail a well-selected and well-diversified portfolio. And if you're worried about a wave of defaults hitting your credit portfolio, think about what the implications of that environment would be for equities or other ownership assets.
首先，单个借款人可能会违约并未能偿还债务。筛选出不履行还款义务的借款人是信用经理的主要工作，历史数据表明这是可行的。孤立的违约情况不太可能对一个经过精选和多元化的投资组合产生严重影响。而如果你担心违约潮会冲击你的信贷投资组合，不妨考虑一下这种环境对股票或其他所有权资产会产生什么影响。
Second, by their nature, credit instruments don't have much potential for appreciation. Thus, it's entirely possible that equities and levered investment strategies will surprise on the upside and outperform in the years ahead. There's no denying this, but it should be borne in mind that the downside risk here consists of the opportunity cost of returns for gone, not failing to achieve the return one sought.
第二，信贷工具的本质上并不具备很大的升值潜力。因此，在未来的几年里，股票和杠杆投资策略完全有可能会出乎意料地取得较好的表现并超越其他投资方式。这一点不容否认，但需要记住的是，这里的下行风险仅仅包括放弃的回报机会成本，而不是未能实现预期回报。
Third, bonds and loans are subject to price fluctuations, meaning having to sell in a week period could cause losses to be realized. But credit instruments are far from alone in this regard, and the magnitude of the fluctuations on money-good bonds and loans is constrained significantly by the magnetic pull-to-par exerted by the promise of repayment upon maturity.
第三，债券和贷款受到价格波动的影响，这意味着在一周内出售可能会导致实际损失。但是，信用工具在这方面并不孤单，而且货币优质债券和贷款的波动幅度受到到期时偿还承诺的磁吸吸引力的显著限制。
Fourth, the returns I've been talking about are nominal returns. If inflation isn't brought under control, those nominal returns could lose significant value when they're converted into real returns, which are what some investors care about most. Of course, real returns on other investments could suffer as well. Many people think of stocks and real estate as potentially providing inflation protection. My recollection from the 1970s is that the protection typically takes hold only after prices have declined, so as to provide higher prospective returns.
其次，我所提到的回报是指名义回报。如果通胀不能得到控制，当这些名义回报转化为实际回报时，其价值可能会大幅缩水，而一些投资者最关心的就是实际回报。当然，其他投资的实际回报也可能受到影响。许多人认为股票和房地产有可能提供通胀保护。我对上世纪70年代的记忆是，这种保护通常只在价格下跌之后才生效，以提供更高的预期回报。
Finally, the seed change could end up being less long-lasting than I expect, meaning the Fed takes the Fed's funds rate back down to zero or 1%, and the yields on credit recede accordingly.
最后，种子变化可能不会持续太久，这意味着美联储将把联邦基金利率降至零或1％，信贷收益率相应下降。
Fortunately, by buying multi-year credit instruments, an investor can tie up the promised return for a meaningful period, assuming the investment provides some degree of call protection. Reinvesting will have to be dealt with upon maturity or call, but once you've made the credit investments I'm suggesting, you will at least have secured the promised yield, perhaps minus losses on defaults with the term of the instruments.
幸运的是，通过购买多年期债券，投资者可以将承诺的回报固定在一个有意义的期间内，前提是投资提供了一定程度的呼叫保护。再投资将在到期或呼叫时进行处理，但一旦你进行了我建议的信用投资，至少你已经确保了承诺的收益，也许减去了债券期限内违约的损失。
The overarching theme of my seed change thinking is that largely thanks to highly accommodative monetary policy, we went through unusually easy times in a number of important regards over a prolonged period, but that time is over. There clearly isn't much room for interest rate declines from today's levels, and I don't think short-term interest rates will be as low in the coming years as in the recent past. For these and other reasons, I believe the years ahead won't be as easy, but while my expectations may prove correct, there's no evidence yet on which I can hang my hat.
我对我的种子变革思维的总体主题是，由于高度宽松的货币政策，我们在一系列重要方面经历了异常轻松的时期，但这个时期已经结束。从现今的水平来看，很明显利率下降的空间有限，我认为短期利率在未来几年不会像近年来那么低。出于这些和其他原因，我认为未来几年将不会像过去那样轻松，但尽管我的预期可能是正确的，但至今还没有证据证明我是正确的。
Why not? My answer is that the economy and markets are in the early stages of a transition that's far from complete. Asset prices are established through a tug-of-war between buyers who think prices will rise and sellers who think they'll fall. There's been an active one over the last year or so as sentiment has waxed and waned regarding the outlook for inflation, recession, corporate profits, geopolitics, and especially a fed pivot back to accommodation. The tug-of-war is ongoing, and as a result, the S&P 500 is within a half percent of where it was a year ago.
为什么不呢？我的回答是，经济和市场正处于一个尚未完成的过渡阶段。资产价格的形成是由买家认为价格会上涨和卖家认为价格会下跌之间的拉锯战决定的。在过去的一年左右时间里，人们对通胀、衰退、企业利润、地缘政治，尤其是美联储重新宽松的前景持续表达着积极的和消极的情绪。这场拉锯战正在继续进行，因此标普500指数距离一年前仅仅相差半个百分点。
I've been thinking lately about the fact that being an investor requires a person to be somewhat of an optimist. Investors have to believe things will work out and that their skill will enable them to wisely position capital for the future. Equity investors have to be particularly optimistic, as they have to believe someone will come along who will buy their shares for more than they paid. My point here is that optimists surrender their optimism only grudgingly, and phenomena such as cognitive dissonance and self-delusion permit opinions to be held long after information to the contrary has arrived.
最近我一直在思考一个事实，那就是作为投资者，需要拥有一定程度的乐观主义。投资者必须相信事情会顺利进行，而且他们的技能将使他们能够明智地对未来进行资本布局。股权投资者需要特别乐观，因为他们必须相信会有人出现并以高于购买价的价格购买他们的股份。我的观点在于，乐观主义者只会不情愿地放弃自己的乐观态度，而且认知失调和自我欺骗等现象会导致即使相反的信息已经到达，人们依然坚持自己的观点。
This is among the reasons why they say of the stock market, things can take longer to happen than you thought they would, but then they happen faster than you thought they could. Today's sideways or range-bound market tells me investors possess a good amount of optimism despite the worries that have arisen. In the coming months, we'll find out if the optimism was warranted.
这就是为什么人们说股票市场上的事情可能比你认为的时间更久，但是却比你认为的速度更快。今天的盘整市场告诉我投资者对市场持有相当乐观的态度，尽管出现了一些担忧。在接下来的几个月里，我们将会看到这种乐观是不是合理的。
The positive forces that shaped the 2009-21 period began to change around 18 months ago. The higher inflation turned out not to be transitory. This brought on interest rate increases, concerned that a recession would result, some resurrection of worry over the possibility of loss, and thus, insistence on greater compensation for bearing risk. But while most people no longer see an outlook that's flawless, few think it's hopeless, just as optimism abetted a positive cycle in those 13 years, I believe a lessening of optimism will throw some sand into the financial gears in a variety of ways, some of which may be unforeseeable.
在2009-2021年期间塑造的积极因素开始在大约18个月前发生变化。更高的通货膨胀被证明并非暂时的。这导致了利率上涨，人们担心会导致经济衰退，对损失可能性的担忧重新出现，因此坚持要求更大的风险补偿。但尽管大多数人不再认为前景完美无缺，但很少有人认为是毫无希望的，就像乐观主义促成了这13年的积极循环一样，我认为乐观情绪的减少将以多种方式影响金融机制，其中一些可能不可预见。
In this latter regard, it's essential to acknowledge that since we haven't lived through times exactly like the years that lie ahead, and since changes in the economic financial environment limit the applicability of history, we're less likely to see the future of the future likely to encounter surprises. And if the environment is less favorable, the surprises are likely to be on the downside.
在这个后一方面，必须承认的是，由于我们没有经历过与未来年份完全一样的时期，并且经济金融环境的变化限制了历史的适用性，我们不太可能看到未来可能遭遇惊喜的未来。而且，如果环境不利的话，这些惊喜很可能是消极的。
Please note, as mentioned earlier, that I'm absolutely not saying interest rates are going back to the high levels from which they've come. I have no reason to believe that the recession most people believe lies ahead will be severe or long-lasting. And with valuations high, but not terribly so, I don't think a stock market collapse can reasonably be predicted. This isn't a call for dramatically increased defensiveness. Mostly, I'm just talking about a reallocation of capital away from ownership and leverage and toward lending. This is in a song I've sung often over the course of my career. This is the first sea change I've remarked on and one of the few calls I've made for substantially increasing investment in credit.
请注意，正如前面提到的，我绝对没有说利率会回到过去的高位。我没有理由相信大多数人认为即将到来的经济衰退会很严重或持久。鉴于估值已经高昂，但并不过分，我不认为股市会崩盘，这是不合理的预测。我并不是在呼吁大幅增加防守性，主要是讲资本从拥有和杠杆投资转向借贷。这是我在职业生涯中经常提到的话题。这是我首次谈到的重大转变之一，也是我为大幅增加信贷投资所做的少数倡议之一。
The bottom line I keep going back to is that credit investors can access returns today that are highly competitive versus the historical returns on equities, exceed many investors' required returns or actuarial assumptions and are much less uncertain than equity returns. Unless there are serious holes in my logic, I believe significant reallocation of capital toward credit is warranted.
我一直坚持的核心观点是，信用投资者可以获得与历史股票回报相比极具竞争力的回报，超过许多投资者的要求回报或保险假设回报，并且比股票回报更为确定。除非我的逻辑存在严重漏洞，否则我认为有理由将资本大规模重新配置到信用市场。
May 30, 2023.
2023年5月30日。
Thank you for listening to The Memo by Howard Marks. To hear more episodes, be sure to subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts.
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