All-In Summit: In conversation with Graham Allison
发布时间 2023-09-20 08:52:48 来源
摘要
This talk was recorded live at the All-In Summit 2023 at Royce Hall on UCLA's campus in Los Angeles.
(0:00) Besties welcome national security expert Graham Allison to AIS!
(1:32) “Thucydides trap” defined
(4:00) China v. USA: “The fiercest rivalry the world has ever seen”
(6:09) Strategic imagination
(7:40) The rise of China
(12:16) America’s “period of great hubris”
(15:08) A history quiz for citizens of the “United States of Amnesia”
(17:10) India
(22:53) The weaknesses of autocracies
(28:00) Monroe Doctrine, American exceptionalism, and unnecessary wars
(33:44) “We live in an extremely dangerous world”
(35:50) America’s lack of preparedness for a “hot war” with China
Follow Graham:
https://twitter.com/GrahamTAllison
Follow the besties:
https://twitter.com/chamath
https://linktr.ee/calacanis
https://twitter.com/DavidSacks
https://twitter.com/friedberg
Follow the pod:
https://twitter.com/theallinpod
https://linktr.ee/allinpodcast
Intro Music Credit:
https://rb.gy/tppkzl
https://twitter.com/yung_spielburg
Intro Video Credit:
https://twitter.com/TheZachEffect
Relevant links:
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty/graham-allison
https://foreignpolicy.com/author/graham-allison/
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/authors/graham-allison
https://www.amazon.com/Destined-War-America-Escape-Thucydidess-ebook/dp/B01IAS9FZY
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中英文字稿 
Please join me in welcoming Graham Allison to the stage. Thank you. Really an honor to bring thanks for joining us and thanks for agreeing to follow that routine.
请加入我一起欢迎格雷厄姆·艾利森上台。谢谢你。真的很荣幸感谢你加入我们，并同意遵循那个程序。
Graham Allison was founding dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government and remains a professor of government. He's a leading analyst of U.S. National Security and Defense Policy with a special interest in nuclear weapons and terrorism. He's most famous as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans from 1993 to 1994 where he coordinated strategy and policy towards the state to the former Soviet Union. Bill Clinton awarded him the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service for reshaping relations with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan to reduce the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. He's since become the longest serving member of the Secretary of Defense's Defense Policy Board, having served for eight secretaries of defense. He's the only person to receive the Department of Defense's highest civilian award from both Reagan and Clinton administrations. Graham is one of the world's most cited experts on the bureaucratic analysis of decision-making, especially during crimes of crisis.
格雷厄姆·艾里森（Graham Allison）是哈佛大学约翰·F·肯尼迪政府学院的创院院长，并担任政府学教授。他是美国国家安全和国防政策的领先分析师，特别关注核武器和恐怖主义问题。他最著名的是在1993年至1994年担任国防部政策和计划助理部长，负责协调与苏联前身国家的战略和政策。克林顿授予他国防部杰出公共服务奖，以改变与俄罗斯、乌克兰、白俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦之间的关系，以减少前苏联的核武库。此后，他成为国防部长的国防政策委员会中任职时间最长的成员，曾服务于八任国防部长。他是唯一一位同时获得里根和克林顿政府颁发的国防部最高平民奖的人。格雷厄姆是世界上最多次被引用的官僚分析决策专家之一，尤其是在危机时刻的决策分析方面。
I read his book, Destin for War, Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap, which was published in 2018 and I think was very prescient about the moment that we're in today. A couple of weeks ago, Elon Musk tweeted out several times and everyone should read this book, so congrats, we get a little promotion from Elon as well. That must have helped sales, congrats on that.
我读了他的书《Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap》，这本书于2018年出版，我认为它对我们现在所处的时刻非常有预见性。几周前，埃隆·马斯克在推特上多次发文，说每个人都应该读这本书，所以可以恭喜你们，从埃隆那里得到了一点推广。这肯定有助于销售，恭喜你们。
The theory that when one great power threatens to displace another, war is almost always the result, is at the heart of his analysis on the US-China relationship. During the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides wrote, What Made War Inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta. Graham says the trap triggered nearly every war from the Peloponnesian War to World War I to the war of the Spanish Succession, the Thirty Years War, and now threatens to light the world on fire once again.
在他对中美关系的分析中，"一种大国威胁取代另一个大国时，战争几乎总是不可避免的"这个理论是核心。在伯罗奔尼撒战争期间，修昔底德写道，战争的必然性源于雅典实力的增长和这一实力对斯巴达引发的恐惧。格雷厄姆表示，这个陷阱几乎引发了从伯罗奔尼撒战争到第一次世界大战，从西班牙王位继承战争到三十年战争的每场战争，并再次威胁着点燃世界。
Graham, thanks for joining us today. If you wouldn't mind just framed for the audience and for us here on stage, the point that you make in your book about Thucydides Trap and where we find the relationship between China and the US taking us, and where it specifically sits in that evolution of, of, call it, tempering, temperament today. Yeah.
Graham，感谢您今天的加入。如果您不介意的话，请为观众和我们在现场的人们概述一下您在书中提到的修昔底德陷阱，以及中国和美国之间的关系走向，以及它在当今的演变过程中具体的位置，也可以称之为缓和，态度。是的。
Well, thank you very much and it's a pleasure and an honor to be here. I'm a fan of your podcast and I think how you've made this thing work. I don't quite understand, but I appreciate it. I appreciate it. We have a friend in the deep state. He's sitting over there. We're not going to name names, but he made the introduction and we appreciate it. In any case, it's a pleasure, a pleasure to be here.
非常感谢，能够在这里出席是一种荣幸和高兴。我是你的播客的粉丝，我很钦佩你是如何让这个节目取得成功的。虽然我不完全明白，但我非常赞赏。我们在深州（指政府内部）有一个朋友，就坐在那边。我们不会点名，但是他向我介绍了这个机会，我们很感激。无论如何，很高兴能够在这里。
So in the summary you gave, I think is a, is a very good place to start. Let me do four or five quick bottom lines. So first, I wrote in this book which was published just as Reagan, sorry, as Trump became president. In relations between US and China, expect things to get worse before they get worse. So that's exactly what I would say today. And why? What's driving that? This is a classic, Thucydides and rivaling. So as David said, Thucydides taught us, 2500 years ago, when a rapidly rising power seriously threatens to displace a ruling power, shit happens. That's normal. And in most cases, the outcome is war. So what we're seeing today and what we're going to see even more intensely tomorrow and a decade from now is the fiercest rivalry history has ever seen. China is not just another great power, but it's going to be the biggest power in the history of the world. The US is a colossal ruling power, which has been the architect and guardian of the international order that allows us to live today in the 78th year without great power war, a pretty amazing accomplishment. And so the US is not going to fade away comfortably.
在你给出的总结中，我认为这是一个非常好的起点。让我简明扼要地阐述一下。首先，在这本书中，我写道在特朗普成为总统之际出版。在美中关系中，预计情况会变得更糟之前会变得更糟。这就是今天我要说的。为什么会这样？这是一个典型的修昔底德陷阱。正如大卫所说，2500年前修昔底德教导我们，当一个迅速崛起的国家严重威胁到能够取代一个执掌权力的国家时，事情就会发生。这是正常的。在大多数情况下，结果就是战争。所以今天我们看到的，以及我们明天和未来十年将会更加激烈的对抗，将是历史上最激烈的竞争。中国不仅仅是另一个强大国家，而且将成为世界历史上最强大的国家。美国是一个巨大的执掌权力的国家，一直以来一直是国际秩序的建设者和守护者，让我们能够在过去78年里没有发生大国之间的战争，这是一个非常了不起的成就。因此，美国不会舒适地消逝。
With that confrontation occurs, most often the outcome is war. In the book I look at the last 500 years, there's 16 times we've seen a rapidly rising power threaten a colossal ruling power. Think of Germany's rise beginning of the 20th century and the challenge to Great Britain. That became World War I. So most often, of the 16 cases 12 in it in war, four in it in nowhere. So if we're just doing statistics, war's not inevitable, it's just structurally likely. And the cases in which war didn't occur were cases in which somehow the parties managed a degree of strategic imagination that bent otherwise trends or what you call the physics of the situation.
当这种对立发生时，最常见的结果就是战争。在我研究的这本书中，我看到过过去500年里出现了16次迅速崛起的力量威胁到庞大的统治力量。想想德国在20世纪初崛起，并对英国构成挑战的情况。这导致了第一次世界大战。所以，在这16个案例中，通常有12个结果是发生了战争，而另外4个则未导致战争爆发。所以如果我们只看统计数据，战争并非不可避免，而是在结构上很可能发生的。而那些没有发生战争的案例，都是因为各方设法通过一定的战略想象力来改变了情势趋势，或者说是改变了情境的物理规律。
So the Cold War, I'm an old Cold War year. In the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union that had dominated 40 years of American history, the US and the Soviet Union came to the edge of war multiple times, Cuban Missile Crisis, about which I've written the book The Most Dangerous. But there was ultimately no hot war. Well, that's a big deal. Had there been a hot war, we wouldn't be having this podcast. Los Angeles wouldn't be here. Boston wouldn't be here. So a real war, a real bloody war is catastrophic. It can be in today, absolutely catastrophic.
所以，冷战，我是一个老冷战年代的人。在美国历史上占据了40年的美苏之间的竞争中，美国和苏联多次陷入战争的边缘，其中包括我写过一本关于古巴导弹危机的书《最危险之地》。但最终并没有爆发热战。这是一件大事。如果爆发了热战，我们现在不会有这个播客。洛杉矶也不会存在。波士顿也不会存在。所以，一场真正的战争，一场真正血腥的战争是灾难性的。它在今天仍然是绝对的灾难。
So what I said to David when he invited me to come was you folks are in the business of strategic imagination. I mean, that's what you do. That's how you've come to have a degree of confidence in what you do. You imagine something that seems slightly crazy, it seems almost unimaginable. Somehow you put pieces together. Some of the time it works and lo and behold, yikes. Our life has got smartphones or it has the internet or it has AI or it has vaccines or it has, it has, it has. Amazing.
所以，当大卫邀请我来时，我对他说的是你们专注于战略想象。我的意思是，这就是你们所做的。这是你们在自己的工作上有些信心的原因。你们能够想象出一些稍微疯狂、几乎无法想象的东西。然后，你们把这些碎片组合在一起。有时候它奏效了，哇，不可思议。我们的生活拥有了智能手机，拥有了互联网，拥有了人工智能，拥有了疫苗，一个又一个的奇迹。
So I'm hoping that you'll devote some of those gray cells to the geopolitical challenge that poses to the US today, which will be the dominant geopolitical challenge for the rest of our lives. I don't think there's anything inevitable about the outcome. I think if we settle for diplomacy as usual or state's craft as usual or imagination as usual, then we should expect history as usual. But that's not, that's the trend. That's not inevitable.
所以我希望你能将一些脑细胞用于探讨这对美国今天所面临的地缘政治挑战，这将是我们生命中其余时间里主要的地缘政治挑战。我并不认为结果是不可避免的。我认为如果我们只满足于常规外交或常规国家智慧或常规想象力，那么我们应该预料到的就是常规的历史。但这只是一种趋势，并非不可避免的。
So if you ask me a question quickly, a war between the US and China in the year ahead, no, I'll give you 99% of that one. War between the US and China in the next four years, no, I'd say 90% no. Okay? War between the US and China over the decades ahead if both stay on the current paths. I don't like that.
所以如果你快速问我一个问题，关于美国和中国在未来一年内爆发战争的可能性，我会告诉你99%不会发生。关于美国和中国在接下来的四年内爆发战争的可能性，我会说90%不会发生。好吗？但是如果美国和中国在未来几十年保持现在的路线，那么战争可能性我不喜欢。
And we have, it seemed like three decades of incredible collaboration with China and the West and America specifically and just look at what happened with the iPhone and the number of people who rose out of poverty in China. And it seemed to be going really well. And it seemed like the NBA was playing games there and we were sending movies there. Everything seemed to be on the right track. And then something seems to have gone horribly wrong.
似乎我们与中国、西方以及特别是美国之间有了长达三十年的令人难以置信的合作，看看iPhone的发展以及中国脱贫人数的增加。一切似乎进展得非常顺利，NBA在那里举办比赛，我们也在那里推送电影。一切似乎都在朝着正确的方向发展。但突然间，似乎出了严重的问题。
And two part question, what has gone horribly wrong? Why has this happened so quickly? Because it seems like it's changed since COVID in such a rapid fashion that's caught us all by surprise how this has come apart. And what does China want that we don't seem to understand? Okay, two great questions that I'll try to be brief.
还有两个问题，发生了什么可怕的事情？为什么这一切发生得如此迅速？因为看起来自 COVID 以来，情况发生了如此快速的改变，这让我们都感到惊讶。而中国似乎有一些我们不太理解的东西，他们想要什么呢？好的，这是两个很好的问题，我尽量简短回答。
You know, maybe in your world a better way to think of it is to have an established entrenched company and a disruptive upstart. When the disruptive upstart is 1% of the business, welcome. 5% of the business, welcome. 10% of the business. Now it's moving faster and more rapidly. All of a sudden one begins to think, wait a minute, where is this going? Could I actually imagine it will displace me? So China was at the beginning of the century 10% of the US GDP. Today it's three quarters of the US GDP. So it's quite plausible that China will have a larger GDP even by market exchange rates than the US. Well, wait a minute, we're number one. That's part of who we are.
你知道，在你的世界里，也许更好的想法是有一个根深蒂固的老牌公司和一个具有颠覆性的新秀。当这个颠覆性的新秀占据企业的1%时，大家都欢迎。当它占据5%时，依然欢迎。当它占据10%时，事情就开始变得更快更迅猛。突然间，我们开始想，等一下，这究竟会怎样发展？难道我真的能想象得到它会取代我吗？所以，中国在本世纪初占据美国GDP的10%。如今，它已经达到了美国GDP的四分之三。所以，很有可能中国的GDP按照市场汇率甚至会超过美国。哦，等等，我们是第一名。那是我们的一部分身份。
So when a Thucydian dynamic, basically the seesaw of power begins to shift. Think of a seesaw on a kid's playground, trying with the book because on one end the little guy is on the other end, he begins bulking up, all of a sudden the seesaw begins moving. The dynamics of that is Thucydian's trap. So the perception changes. I used to look down on you now, having to look you in the eye and looking up. The psychology changes. Who the hell do you think you are? I forget the environment in which you grew up. You should be appreciative. You should take your space. Our normal place is to be running the show and your normal place is to take your seat at the table.
所以当修昔底德的动态开始转变时，权力的摇摆也开始变化。想象一下孩子游乐场上的跷跷板，一端是小个子，另一端是一个开始变得强壮的人，突然之间跷跷板开始移动。这种动态就是修昔底德的陷阱。因此，感知也会发生变化。我曾经瞧不起你，现在不得不与你平视并仰视你。心理状态也会改变。你以为你是谁？我忘记了你成长的环境。你应该感激。你应该找到你的位置。我们通常才是那个掌控一切的人，而你的正常位置就是坐在桌子旁边。
So many, many people imagine that China would just follow the path of Germany and Japan and take their place at the American-led international order. That was a pretty good idea except they hadn't thought very carefully about history. Germany and Japan were defeated by the US at a war and occupied by the US. And then we wrote their constitution and then we produced this kind of training school. China wants to be respected as China, not as an honorary member of the West.
很多人设想中国会像德国和日本一样，顺从美国主导的国际秩序并逐渐崭露头角。这个想法挺不错的，只是他们没有仔细考虑历史。德国和日本在战争中被美国击败并被美国占领。然后我们为他们制定了宪法，并建立了这种培训机构。中国希望被尊重为中国，而不是作为西方的荣誉成员。
What happened in the late 90s? I guess it started with Quentin where it seemed like a good idea to admit to the WTO and then Bush kind of just put the nail on the coffin and did it and actually supported it. We could have not supported it. Some people say it was a trade-off for China's support for the Iraq War. Who knows? But the point is it happened. But I'm sure you guys were sitting in the engine room scenario planning what happens if this happens. It's fair to say that from that context we didn't necessarily get it right.
在90年代末发生了什么事情呢？我猜起初是昆廷提出加入世界贸易组织(WTO)这个想法，似乎是个不错的主意，然后布什开始支持并付诸实施。我们本可以选择不支持的。有人说这是为了换取中国对伊拉克战争的支持。谁知道呢？但重点是这件事发生了。但我相信你们在引擎室中一定在进行情景规划，研究如果发生这种情况会有什么后果。可以说从那种背景出发，我们可能没有做出正确的决策。
So what did you get wrong? Again, it's good to go back to 2000 and just to remember, in 2000 China was somewhere between 5% and 10% of US is GDP. The people in 2000, 80% of the people in China were trying to live on $2 a day. So the place is a miserable, struggling mess. The US was in the business ever since World War II of trying to encourage economic development in countries. So Clinton and Bush together, Quentin said about the WTO, it's a win-win-win situation. It's going to be a win for everybody. China is going to be lifted up. That's what we would like to do because people's lives will be better. And actually, there's been an anti-poverty miracle in China that as human beings we have to admire. People that used to get a few calories now get enough calories to eat. That's got to be a good thing.
那么你犯了什么错误呢？再说一遍，回到2000年，回忆一下，2000年时中国的国内生产总值（GDP）位居美国的5%至10%之间。2000年时，中国80%的人口每天只能靠2美元维持生活，所以这个地方是一个悲惨、奋斗中的混乱局面。自二战以来，美国一直致力于鼓励其他国家的经济发展。所以克林顿和布什一起说，“对于世界贸易组织（WTO）来说，这是一个双赢的局面，每个人都会受益。中国将会提升，这正是我们所期望的，因为人们的生活会变得更好。实际上，中国发生了一场反贫困奇迹，作为人类，我们必须钦佩。曾经只能摄入极少的热量的人现在可以摄入足够的热量，这肯定是一件好事。”
The idea that this might work so successfully that China could have an economy as large as ours didn't occur to anybody at the time. You could see a few, few people as outliers. But that was just kind of not in the imagination. And then secondly, this was in a period of great hubris in the US. We had won the Cold War. We were living in this bubble, which the most famous thesis of the period was Frank Fukuyama's end of history. So everybody has become democracies and market economies. And if they have McDonald's, they can't have wars because people would prefer to get hamburgers than wars. You can hardly say that today without laughing. But that was well known, I was conventional wisdom at the time.
当时没有人能够想到这个想法可能会如此成功，以至于中国可能会有一个与我们一样大的经济体。你可以看到一些少数人是异常的存在，但这在当时的想象力中并不存在。其次，这是美国自大心态的时期。我们赢得了冷战。我们生活在这个泡沫中，而当时最著名的论点是弗兰克·福山提出的历史终结理论。因此，每个国家都会成为民主和市场经济国家。如果他们有麦当劳，就不会打仗，因为人们更愿意得到汉堡而不是打仗。现在很难说出这样的话而不发笑。但那时这种看法是众所周知的常识。
So if you had come along and said that, wait a minute. If China is very successful, it's going to come to have a GDP in the other side of the US. And then it's going to have, back to your question, it's going to have its own aspirations. The Chinese have a view, understandably, and Ray talked about this earlier today. Sorry, for four or 5,000 years, they were the predominant power in all the world they knew. So their story is the normal conditions of things is that we're at their confusion. So hierarchy, harmony and peace comes from hierarchy. They're at the top of the hierarchy. That's the normal place. They were displaced from this by Westerners with technology 150 years ago. They called that the century of humiliation. And their aspiration is to go back to normal. Normal, so them as China is the, quote, center of the universe. And as the sun around which the others, there's, you know, as you remember their thing about, you know, you can't have two tigers in the valley. There's the big one and the other one.
如果你提到这一点，稍等一下。如果中国非常成功，它的GDP将会超过美国的另一边。再回答你的问题，中国将会有自己的愿景。中国人有一个观点，可以理解，崔雷今天早些时候也谈到了这个。很抱歉，四五千年来，他们一直是他们所知的世界的主导力量。所以他们的故事是事物的正常状态是我们对他们感到困惑。所以等级制度、和谐与和平来自等级制度。他们处于等级制度的顶端，这是正常的位置。150年前，他们被西方人用技术抛弃了。他们把这称为屈辱的世纪。他们的愿望是回归正常状态。对他们来说，中国是宇宙的中心，是日子围绕的太阳，其他国家都围绕着它。就像你记得的那个关于“山谷里不能有两只老虎”的故事。
So I have two comments. The first is just a reaction to this. I'm sort of on the opposite side of you, which is that because of China's population woes and because of, I think, some of these technological things that are sort of on the horizon, I believe that we're sort of at the edge of an era of abundance. That will create a massive peace dividend because a lot of the justifications for war go away. That's my personal view. But I have taken the time to try to steal man your point of view, which is we go to war. And the best steel man that I can come up with is very practical. So I'd like you to try to dismantle it, which is you have massive youth unemployment in China and waning growth. And so the simplest and most reductive way for China to basically grow and to appease, you know, 25% of young people, mostly men, from not uprising, is to essentially create demand. And the best way to create demand is to essentially create a war machine. And that is why they go to war. Is that? I would say I appreciate that option.
所以我有两点评论。第一点是对此的反应。我有点与你相反，因为中国人口问题以及一些即将到来的技术问题，我认为我们正处在一个丰盛时代的边缘。这将会创造出巨大的和平红利，因为很多发动战争的理由都将消失。这是我个人的观点。但我花时间来偷换你的观点，也就是说我们会发动战争。我能想到的最好的观点是非常实际的。所以我想你来驳倒一下这个观点，它是：中国存在大规模的青年失业和经济增长放缓问题。为了让中国实现增长并使大约25%的年轻人，主要是男性，不产生起义，最简单和最简化的方法就是创造需求。创造需求的最佳途径就是建立一个战争机器。这就是他们发动战争的原因。这是对吗？我要说我理解这个选项。
I've worked very hard on the 12 scenarios for getting to war. If there's a war between the US and China in the next year or four years or decade, how was it going to happen in my view, the most likely, not this way? It's going to happen the same way the less war happened. If I would take a quiz here since I know we lived in the United States of Indonesia. Okay. But when was the last war between US and China? I'm not going to give you a quiz, but I'll tell you the answer was 1950. What? Okay. And what happened? In 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea, almost pushed them off the whole peninsula. The US had just won World War II. That's five years after the end of World War II. MacArthur and American troops were in Japan. They came to the rescue of South Korea. They pushed the North Koreans right back up to the peninsula. And 38th parallel, which had been the starting point, they pushed right across without even thinking and were pushing right towards the Chinese border, the Yalun. So, you're now one year, this is 1950, one year after Mao has just won the Chinese Civil War. He hasn't even consolidated his position.
我对12种引发战争的情景进行了非常艰苦的工作。如果在未来一年、四年或十年内，美国和中国之间发生战争，从我看来，最可能发生的方式不是这样。它将以战争较少发生的方式发生。如果我在这里进行问卷调查，因为我知道我们生活在印度尼西亚合众国。好吧。但是美国和中国的最后一次战争是什么时候？我不会给你一个问卷调查，但我告诉你答案是1950年。什么？好吧。发生了什么？1950年，朝鲜向韩国发动了进攻，几乎将他们推到了整个半岛之外。美国刚刚赢得了第二次世界大战，距离第二次世界大战结束只有五年。麦克阿瑟将军和美军驻扎在日本。他们前来援助韩国，将北朝鲜人推回了半岛，过了38度线，这一直是起点，他们甚至没有思考就向中国边境的鸭绿江推进。所以，现在是1950年，这是毛泽东刚刚赢得中国内战一年后的事情。他甚至还没有巩固自己的地位。
The US is Superman. We've just dropped two bombs next door in Japan, the end of World War II. And we've now put even nuclear power. The likely, the possibility that China would attack the US was unimaginable. It was certainly to MacArthur. But Mao, seeing the US coming up to his border and not knowing wherever he might stop, sent his peasant army to war with the US and beat the Americans right back down the peninsula to the 38th parallel. So wars happen often, not because anybody wants to war. At the beginning of 1950, if you'd gone to Mao and said, I got a good idea. Once you got to war with Superman, you're out of your mind. If you'd gone to Truman in 1950, say, how about we have a war with the Pacific? Forget about it. But so you don't have to have an intention of either of the parties.
美国就是超人。我们刚刚在日本邻国投下了两颗原子弹，结束了二战。而且我们如今甚至拥有核能力。中国攻击美国的可能性是无法想象的。对于麦克阿瑟来说肯定是这样的。但是毛泽东看到美国接近他的边境，不知道他们会停在哪里，于是派遣他的农民军与美国交战，并将美军打退到了38度线以下。所以战争经常发生，并不是因为谁想要战争。如果在1950年初你向毛泽东说，我有一个好主意，咱们跟超人开战吧，那简直疯了。如果你在1950年向杜鲁门说，我们来一场太平洋战争怎么样？别想了。所以，参与战争的各方并不一定有意图。
I think the most likely way war will happen in the US and China. Something happens in Taiwan, either we're unduly provocative or the Taiwanese provocative. I'm going to hand it to Saks, but I want to just make one comment to get your reaction. If that's the framing, what about India? Because now India's ascendant, it's got a growing population. It's got huge economic growth, and unlike China, who's not necessarily ever been subjugated in a war, the Indians have this memory of basically having Judeo-Christians that dominated that region of which we all have to get liberty, which is almost even worse, maybe. So just frame India in that context.
我认为发生战争的最有可能的方式是在美国和中国之间。在台湾发生了某件事情，要么是我们过分挑衅，要么是台湾挑衅。我打算把话题转移到印度，但我想发表一点评论，看看你的反应。如果这是背景，那么印度呢？因为现在印度正在崛起，人口正在增长。它拥有巨大的经济增长，而且与中国不同，印度在战争中并不一定被征服过，而这种记忆对于印度人来说可能更糟，因为他们曾经被犹太基督教徒统治，而我们所有人都必须争取自由，这可能更加糟糕。所以，用这种情景来看待印度。
Another great question. Again, nobody knows. But the Indian story, either theory one, India is about to become a serious rival to China. That's the fashionable story today. Theory two is India is the country of the future and will always be some. We've been through already five of these cycles before where we declared India was about the rise rapidly and low and low in India. It turns out to be India. So India has a lot of internal problems itself. It was mentioned earlier today about 20% of the population are Muslims. Modi is basically undermining the multiethnic democracy that Nehru had built by getting support from the majority by oppressing the minority. So that's a complicated problem within and a lot of other components.
另一个很有意义的问题。同样，没有人知道答案。但印度的故事，不论是第一种理论还是第二种理论，都认为印度即将成为中国的严重竞争对手。这是当今时尚的故事。第二种理论是印度是未来之国，将一直如此。在此之前，我们已经经历过5个这样的循环，我们曾宣称印度将迅速崛起，但结果是印度一直如此。因此，印度本身存在许多内部问题。今天早些时候提到过，大约20%的人口是穆斯林。莫迪基本上通过压制少数派而获得多数人的支持，从而破坏了尼赫鲁建立的多民族民主体制。所以这是一个复杂的内部问题，还有很多其他组成部分。
So if you look at the rivalry between the US and India in the 20th century and just graph it, you discover that low and the whole. And every year, virtually, and every decade for sure, the gap between them has grown in China's favor. Now, not this year. India is growing much faster than China this year and last year and maybe next year. So we can look at the trajectories. I think it's quite possible. And I think the American strategy, which I think is the right one, is that this is a long run game, a long game. So there's going to be a long rivalry between US and China. We believe that a more liberty-centered open democratic political system will perform better of a long run than at party-led autocracy. She has a different idea. He says, things are too chaotic. Information is too uncertain. You can't let people just, my God, let people vote and look and see what happens in the US.
如果你看一下上世纪美国和印度之间的竞争，并将其以图形表示出来，你会发现这个差距不断拉大。几乎每年，每十年，中国都在这场竞争中占据了优势。然而，今年不同。今年和去年以及可能明年，印度的增长速度比中国快得多。因此，我们可以看到这个趋势。我认为这是相当可能的。我认为美国的策略是正确的，即这是一场长期竞争。我们相信，在长期的比拼中，以自由为中心的开放民主政治体制会比党派领导的独裁体制表现得更好。她有不同的想法。他说，事情太混乱了，信息太不确定了。你不能让人们随便投票，看看美国会发生什么。
So we need to have order. And so our party-led autocracy, we believe in the United States. Where we play this out over time. If the US had to play this game, only US versus China, I think we lose. But if the US plays this game with a group of allied and aligned, of whom we now see in the Quad, India and Australia and Japan and in Ocus, we see Britain and Australia and the US and in the trilateral that we just saw with Japan and South Korea. So you're seeing a configuration, I call it more guys on our side of the seesaw, and that can go over a long period of time and it may turn out that democracies fail internally. I think it's a big challenge. There's no certainty about that. It may turn out that autocracies fail in the way autocracies have historically failed. I think it's an incredible framing because you have an autocracy in China and democracy here. And democratic is how we're describing India right now.
所以我们需要有秩序。因此，我们相信美国是一个以党派领导的专制国家。我们会随着时间的推移来实践这一点。如果美国必须与中国对峙，我认为我们会输。但是，如果美国与一群结盟的国家一起对峙，包括印度、澳大利亚、日本以及包括英国、澳大利亚、美国在内的Ocus国家，以及我们刚刚与日本和韩国见到的三边合作。所以你可以看到一个构架，我称之为在我们这一端的秋千上有更多的人，这可能会持续很长时间，而且民主国家有可能会内部失败。我认为这是一个巨大的挑战。对此并没有确定性。同时，专制国家有可能像历史上的专制国家一样失败。我认为这是一个不可思议的框架，因为中国是一个专制国家，而我们是一个民主国家。现在，我们是以民主方式描述印度的。
Is India the most important relationship for America to get right at this moment in time? Is that the relationship we really need to be focusing on since that seems like it's the lynch pin or the fulcrum? Well, I would say that's a good question and I'm not sure. I am probably unduly skeptical about Israel. I'm sorry about India because my impressions are overly shaped by Lee Kuanyu.
印度是美国目前最重要的关系吗？这是我们真正需要集中注意的关系，因为它似乎是支点或杠杆吗？嗯，我会说这是一个很好的问题，但我不确定。我可能对以色列有过度的怀疑。对于印度，我感到抱歉，因为我的印象受到李寬裕的过度影响。
Lee Kuanyu was the founder and builder of Singapore and his great hub was for India, but ultimately he became to be despairing of its internal complexities. Modi seems to be a different character. If you looked at the way you ran the province that he had run before, the state, he was very effective. He's very ambitious for India. So I'm hopeful about India.
李光宇是新加坡的创始人和建设者，他的伟大成就对印度来说具有重要意义，但最终他对于其内部的复杂性感到绝望。莫迪似乎是个不同的角色。如果你看他之前管理的那个省份，他非常有效率。他对印度充满雄心壮志。因此，我对印度抱有希望。
If India emerges, it has the potential alongside, I don't think only India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Australia, and even maybe the Europeans again, depending on what happens here. So you could have a group of a line and a line, not all agreeing on everything but agreeing on enough. That says we're trying to make, we're trying the complex problem of governing a society.
如果印度崛起，它将有潜力与日本、韩国、澳大利亚等国一起，甚至可能再次与欧洲国家合作，这取决于这里发生的事情。所以可能会形成一个由各国组成的阵线，他们并不在所有事情上完全达成一致，但在足够多的问题上达成共识。这表明我们正在尝试解决一个复杂的社会治理问题。
We believe that's the start with the freedom and liberty of people. That's what we think is, and we think that's essential for the dynamism of innovation and invention and lo and behold, there's a lot of evidence for that. And if we're the freest and most open society, lo and behold, a bunch of people come from other countries where they're not so free and they do their thing here. I'd say thank God for that.
我们相信这是人们自由和自由的起点。这是我们认为的，并且我们认为这对于创新和发明的活力至关重要。而且，不出所料，有大量证据支持这一点。如果我们是最自由和最开放的社会，不出所料，许多来自其他国家的人就会在这里发展自己的事业。我要感谢上帝。
So under those circumstances played out over a long run, you can imagine a story that turns out pretty well. In the case of the US and Soviet Union, just remember, it's hard to believe. But if you go back and read your economic textbook that was published in the 1960s, Samuelson was basically for economics. It says by the 70s, the Soviet Union will have overtaken the US economy. That was kind of a well-known fact. Why didn't that happen? Well, lo and behold, it didn't. Okay? The reason it didn't happen is because dictatorships have a hard time in the long term versus democracies. Well, there's about 10 reasons why there's weaknesses in the under-autocracy.
在这些情况下，可以想象出一个相当顺利的故事。以美国和苏联为例，只要记住，这很难相信。但如果你回去读一下在1960年代出版的经济教科书，基本上萨缪尔森是支持经济学的。它说到70年代，苏联将超过美国的经济。那是一个很有名的事实。为什么没发生呢？嘿，没想到，它没有发生。好吗？它没有发生的原因是因为独裁统治在长期对抗民主制度时很困难。好吧，有大约10个原因解释为什么独裁制度存在弱点。
And you're now seeing a lot of evidence of it in the Chinese system, particularly after she became even more autocratic in guaranteeing his lease on life with the recent coronation where he's got his third term unprecedented but without a term limit. So basically, if I'm the autocrat and especially if I come to think as he does, he's got the thought of Xi Jinping, they write this into the Constitution. So this contains all wisdom. But one of the problems the guys are having with their AI machines is you can't ask a question that doesn't, that has an answer inconsistent with the thought of Xi Jinping that declares what's true about this and that. He doesn't tell much about mathematics or science, so you can ask those questions.
现在你可以在中国制度中看到很多这种证据，尤其是在近期的加冕仪式上，她更加专制地担保了他的寿命，并获得了前所未有的第三个任期，但没有任期限制。所以基本上，如果我是这位专制者，特别是如果我开始像他一样思考，他已经有了习近平的思想，他们把这些写入了宪法中。所以这包含了所有的智慧。但是他们的AI机器遇到的问题之一是，你不能问一个与习近平思想不一致的问题，即宣布关于这个问题的真相。他在数学或科学方面并没有提供很多信息，所以你可以问这些问题。
Ten sets AI machine is a pretty good competitor for GPT-4. And the science are bad. But if you ask a question about how the Freedom Centered Societies perform, if candidates are that question because the thought of Xi Jinping says that's not computer.
十套AI机器是GPT-4的相当不错的竞争对手。而且科学是很糟糕的。但是，如果你问一个关于自由中心社会表现如何的问题，候选人会因为思维方式与习近平不同而否定计算机的答案。
One of the points you make in your book is that, and I think your book came out around the time that China and the US had achieved rough parity in terms of purchasing power parity, their GDP. Roughly, yeah. You're roughly. And I remember one of the points you made is that China has four times the population of the US, so it's per capita GDP was one quarter that of the US. If they merely got to the point of having half the per capita GDP of the US, then there are probably twice as big as ours. And China has a lot of really smart, hard-working people who are studying subjects that we aren't studying as much as we should in the US like engineering, like science and so forth. So there are reasons, I think, to believe that their incredible rise could derail. The demographics are a problem. Maybe the economy becomes too centrally controlled. But let's just assume that it does continue its rise.
你在你的书中提到的一个观点是，我记得你的书大约在中国和美国在购买力平价和GDP方面达到粗略均衡时出版的。大致是这样的，你说的也大致如此。我记得你提到的一个观点是，中国人口是美国的四倍，所以其人均GDP仅为美国的四分之一。如果他们仅仅达到美国人均GDP的一半，那么他们可能是我们的两倍大。而且中国有很多非常聪明、勤奋的人，他们正在学习我们美国在工程、科学等方面没有如此专攻的学科。因此，我相信有一些理由可以认为他们令人难以置信的崛起可能会受阻。人口结构是一个问题。也许经济过于中央控制。但让我们假设它继续上升。
I guess the question would be, will the US have to effectively recognize that they have a sphere of influence in Asia in order to avoid a war? I mean, is that what we're going to have to do? I think so.
我猜问题是，美国是否需要有效地承认他们在亚洲拥有影响力以避免战争？我的意思是，这是我们必须做的吗？我认为是的。
I appreciate your starting with the basics. And structural realities are harder than I. So again, there were a consultant like this, but just do the arithmetic.
我欣赏你从基础开始。而结构现实比我想象的要困难。所以，再说一遍，确实有像这样的顾问，但只需要进行简单的计算就可以了。
If Chinese are only, if their economy is only half as productive as ours, and these are pretty talented people and they work pretty hard, they'll have a GDP twice hours.
如果中国人的经济只有我们的一半那么有效率，并且这些人非常有才华并且工作非常努力，他们的国内生产总值将是我们的两倍。
I'll do it again. Wait a minute, twice hours, now you're in a rivalry between A and B and B has twice the GDP. So we can have twice the size of the defense budget. We can have twice the intelligence budget, right? It can have twice twice twice, okay? That's reality.
我会再次做这件事。等一下，两小时，你现在处于A和B之间的竞争，而B的GDP是A的两倍。所以我们可以将国防预算增加一倍。我们可以将情报预算增加一倍，对吧？可以增加一倍、再增加一倍、再增加一倍，明白吗？这就是现实。
Now, can I find enough a line and a line on my side to make up for some of that? Yeah, that seems right. So that's one way. So your line could be. We need an alliance strategy more than they do. We need it, okay?
现在，我能否找到足够的一个和一个来弥补一些不足？是的，这样看起来是对的。所以这是一种方式。因此，你的观点可能是，我们比他们更需要一个联盟策略。我们需要它，好吗？
But if you said over time in relationships like that, if you're going to avoid war, will there be a sphere of influence, again, there's a great abstract debate about this, but in reality, the sphere of influence is the shadow that power casts in some realm. So if you're more powerful, you have a sphere of influence. So in the South China Sea today, on Chinese border, they have more ships, they have more missiles on the mainland, so lo and behold, we don't care if we call that their sphere of influence, but if you're looking to see what happens in the area, we don't operate our ships the way we did when I was in the Pentagon in the Clinton administration.
但是如果你说在像这样的关系中随着时间的推移，如果你想避免战争，那么是否会存在势力范围，这是一个很抽象的争论，但实际上，势力范围是权力在某个领域所投射出的阴影。所以如果你更强大，你就有势力范围。所以在今天的南中国海，中国边境上，他们有更多的舰船，他们在大陆上有更多的导弹，所以不管我们如何称呼它们的势力范围，但如果你想看看在该地区发生了什么，我们不会以克林顿政府时期我在五角大楼时所操作舰船的方式来行动。
So if there were an event in Taiwan, which is 90 miles off their shore, like Cuba is on our shore, and halfway around the world for us, the likelihood we're going to have the ships and the planes and the other. Excuse me, you know, that just doesn't work that way. You can look at the geography and see the tyranny of it.
如果在台湾发生了一场事件，距离他们岸边的距离为90英里，就像古巴离我们岸边很近，对于我们来说则是世界的另一端，那么我们能够派遣舰船、飞机以及其他方面的援助的可能性是很低的。不好意思，你知道，事情并不是这么简单。通过地理位置，你可以看到其中的困难。
So will there come to be some degree of difference and accommodation, if it were to be avoided? Are there any other issues? Yes. Now then we. Then it becomes so good because you say, well, okay, well, in what respect? And I know you guys, I saw earlier did the question for Robert Kennedy about Taiwan. Okay, I think that's a good question not to answer, not to answer.
如果要避免一些程度的差异和适应，会有别的问题出现吗？是的。那么我们接下来，事情就变得好了，因为你说，嗯，好吧，在什么方面？我知道你们之前问过罗伯特·肯尼迪关于台湾的问题。好的，我认为这是一个不要回答的好问题。
Right. Yeah, I mean, this is where I worry about the confidence of our foreign policy establishment because I think it only has one gear, which is forward and double down.
是的，我的意思是，这是我对我们外交政策机构自信心的担忧，因为我觉得它只有一个模式，那就是一味地向前推进并加倍努力。
In the United States, we have a doctrine, the Monroe Doctrine, which says that no disengrate power can bring troops, weapons, or bases. And we have to do this to our hemisphere because we do not tolerate other great powers having security threats amassed on our border. But our foreign policy establishment cannot comprehend that other great powers want a similar Monroe Doctrine. I think that was a huge contributor to the war we have in Ukraine right now.
在美国，我们有一个原则，名为蒙罗主义（Monroe Doctrine），它规定不能有非友好大国向我们这个半球派遣军队、武器或设立军事基地。我们对此坚决反对，因为我们不允许其他大国在我们的边境上积聚安全威胁。但我们的外交政策建制派却无法理解其他大国也想要类似的蒙罗主义。我认为这在很大程度上导致了当前乌克兰战争的发生。
So we have this theory. I mean, I'm part of this establishment that you're talking about. And it's not. Why did you invade Ukraine? It's not such a gross application. It's not as uniform as you say. And it's not as always as unsuccessful as you say. But overall, I think you're more right than right.
所以我们有这个理论。我的意思是，我是你所谈论的这个机构的一部分。它并不是那么严重的应用。它并不像你说的那样统一。它并不总是像你说的那样失败。但总的来说，我认为你比对的更正确。
So basically, we say we're the exceptional nation. So what does that mean? That means we make the rules and you're supposed to obey the rules. But we don't obey the rules. So we say we're for the rule-based order. Excuse me, the rule-based order was the basis on which we invaded Iraq. I don't think so. That we occupied Afghanistan. I don't think so.
所以基本上，我们说我们是一个非凡的国家。那意味着什么呢？那意味着我们制定规则，而你们应该遵守这些规则。但我们自己并不遵守规则。所以我们说我们支持以规则为基础的秩序。对不起，以规则为基础的秩序是我们入侵伊拉克的基础。我不这么认为。我们占领阿富汗。我不这么认为。
So the US has made a lot of mistakes of unnecessary wars. And a lot of the unnecessary wars were because. People with wrong ideas dominated people with right ideas. But there was a debate and a discussion. So we need more people with the right ideas, you know, getting into the conversation in an active way.
因此，美国犯了许多不必要的战争错误。很多不必要的战争是因为那些持错误观念的人占据了主导地位。但是，我们进行了辩论和讨论。因此，我们需要更多持正确观念的人，以积极的方式参与对话。
But let me just do one other footnote here. So this. We have to remember, this is 9-11, okay? So this is a big day for me, okay? This day in which airplanes hijacked by terrorists killed 3,000 people at the World Security Center in the Pentagon, including many people that I know extremely well. What would a world be like in which that happened every day or every week or every month? We'd be totally intolerable. We wouldn't be doing what we're doing. Why is that not happening? So people did some right things.
但是让我再加一点注释。这件事。我们必须记住，这是9-11，好吗？所以对我来说这是一个重要的日子，好吗？就在这一天，恐怖分子劫持了飞机，在世界贸易中心和五角大楼造成了3000人死亡，其中包括我非常熟悉的很多人。如果这种事情每天、每周或每个月都发生，世界会变成怎样？我们将无法忍受。我们不会做我们现在在做的事情。为什么这样的事情没有发生？人们做了一些正确的事情。
So there's been a pretty active program by the US. Some of it with some mistakes, but overall, that's played a significant role in the fact that people who plan and train to conduct major terrorist attacks when the US are taken off the chessboard. Every day people go out hunting. Every day people find people. And I would say thank goodness for this. That's a good question.
所以美国一直有一个相当积极的计划。其中一些可能有一些错误，但总体来说，这在那些计划和训练在美国进行重大恐怖袭击的人被排除在外方面起到了重要作用。每天人们都出去打猎。每天人们都找到人。我想说谢天谢地。这是一个很好的问题。
So I think that's an interesting point. You know, certainly Al Qaeda hasn't been able to hit us again in that way. I do wonder whether there were two tragedies on 9-11. One was the 1,000 people who died. The other was the way that we reacted to it.
所以我认为这是一个有趣的观点。你知道，毫无疑问，基地组织再也无法以那种方式打击我们了。但是我不禁想知道，911那天是否发生了两次悲剧。一是那一千人的丧生，另一则是我们对此的反应方式。
Like you said, we went into Iraq, a total non-sequitur. Stupid, yes. Stupid and a non-sequitur. And then we stayed in Afghanistan for 20 years. And again, not necessary. Yeah, on sort of the nation building grounds. We then went into Syria that's still going on. There was Libya. So it's, and there was very little debate about all of these things. At the time we made these decisions.
就像你说的那样，我们进入了伊拉克，完全是一个无关的转折。愚蠢，是的。愚蠢又是一个无关的转折。然后我们在阿富汗待了20年。而且，这也是不必要的。是的，在所谓的国家建设的基础上。然后我们进入了仍在进行中的叙利亚战争。还有利比亚。所以，对于所有这些决定，在当时几乎没有什么辩论。
It's almost like the US foreign policy establishment in reaction to 9-11 became almost arranged. And I, you know, compared to say the 1990s where I think there were real foreign policy debates, there was a real foreign policy debate in the 90s on NATO expansion. It doesn't seem like we have that many debates. Not within the policy elite. Maybe we're having them. But it doesn't seem like the policy elite debates anything anymore. It's just this sort of bellicose hawkish rhetoric at all times. Do you agree with that, Brandon? From the inside.
好像美国对911事件做出的对外政策反应几乎是被安排好的。相比之下，我觉得上个世纪90年代还存在真正的外交政策争论，比如北约扩张等话题。现在似乎我们没有那么多的争论，至少在政策精英内部。也许我们正在进行这些争论，但似乎政策精英们不再进行任何辩论。他们似乎只是时刻以好战的鹰派言论示人。你同意吗，布兰登？从内部的观察来看。
Yeah, I mean, again, I live on the other side. I live on both sides of this curtain. And I would say inside there's much more debate, and there was much more debate than we take credit for.
是的，我的意思是，我住在对面。我同时住在这道帘子的两边。我要说的是，在里面有更多的争论，而我们所认可的争论却很少。
George Bush made a terrible, terrible, terrible mistake in invading Iraq in 2003. Who said that to him? His father's closest advisor, Brent Scowcroft, who was joined at the hip with the father, said to him, this is a terrible, dumb mistake. He even went so far as to write an op-ed about it after he had, now, he did not write an op-ed without talking to Bush's father. Would George H.W. Bush have done this? No. If Gore, if the Carol had gone right in Florida and Gore had been president, would we run into Iraq? No. So, electing the right president and having the right, so if it had been the Bush 41 team rather than the Bush 43 team, we wouldn't have made that mistake.
乔治·布什在2003年入侵伊拉克中犯下了一个非常、非常、非常严重的错误。是谁对他说的？他父亲最亲近的顾问布伦特·斯考克罗夫特，他与父亲如同一体，对他说，这是个可怕、愚蠢的错误。他甚至写了一篇评论文章来批评此事，而他写这篇文章之前，肯定是与布什的父亲进行了交谈的。乔治·H·W·布什会做这种事吗？不会。如果戈尔（2000年美国总统选举对手）在佛罗里达右转获胜并成为总统，我们会入侵伊拉克吗？不会。因此，选举正确的总统和拥有正确的团队，如果是布什老父子的团队，我们就不会犯下那个错误。
So, how do you manage? You mentioned this RFK quip. One of the things that he says is that we've gotten things backwards now where there's a military-industrial complex that essentially wants to maximize revenue. That's like logical in the capitalist system. But then what it's done is it's perverted the intelligence-cathering institutions to essentially be writing the justifications for these wars before these wars happen. Is that conspiracy theory or is that? I'd say it's complicated. But it's not a no. It's not a no is what you're saying. Why is it complicated?
那么，你是如何处理的呢？你提到了RFK（罗伯特·肯尼迪）的一句话。他说的其中一件事是，现在出现了一个军工复合体，它实际上想要最大化收入。在资本主义体系中，这是合理的逻辑。但问题在于，它操纵了情报收集机构，实际上是在这些战争发生之前为这些战争撰写辩解。这是阴谋论还是...？我会说这是复杂的。但并不是否定。你的意思是这并不是否定。为什么这个问题这么复杂呢？
We live in an extremely dangerous world. This year, do we really, though? Absolutely. Really? Had there not had thousands of people not been taken off the chess board, you would have to send many repeats of 9-11. And if you were living in a place and somebody I know was trying to make a last trade morning of 9-11 and a plane crashes there and the building is knocked down, all of a sudden the conversation changes. So there's that.
我们生活在一个极度危险的世界里。今年真的是这样吗？当然是。真的吗？如果没有成千上万的人被从棋盘上移走，你就不得不多次经历9-11事件的重复。如果你居住在某个地方，我认识的某人试图在9-11的最后一天进行一次交易，结果飞机在那里坠毁，建筑物倒塌，一下子话题就改变了。所以就有了这个问题。
That was the great second thing that we agreed. That's a terrorist piece. Let's take a war. This is the other big event. Most people don't realize this month is the anniversary of the end of World War II and the beginning of 78 years in which there's not been another great power war. Right. Seriously, in history, that's almost unheard of. Why is that? Answer. Well, a lot of good fortune, a lot of grace, but also lots of things that the US did successfully.
那是我们达成了的第二个伟大的共识。那是一段具有恐怖主义色彩的片段。我们来探讨一场战争。这是另一个重大事件。大多数人并没有意识到本月是二战结束和78年来没有发生其它大国战争的纪念日。没错，在历史上，这几乎是闻所未闻的。为什么会这样呢？答案是：幸运成分很多，恩典的存在，但美国也成功地做了很多事情。
So I think that the security dominates everything when you don't have security. And the geopolitics to provide security is very complicated. Now, the structures that do that often end up making big mistakes too. So I'm not trying to make an excuse for the mistakes, but I think the overall of it is that the security order that's been built in the past and survived for the last 70 years had been a big deal. I think that is the way you go back.
所以我认为在没有安全保障的情况下，安全问题至关重要。而提供安全保障的地缘政治非常复杂。现在，经常出现大错误的往往是那些致力于维护安全的结构。因此，我并不是为这些错误找借口，但我认为总体来说，过去建立并经受了70年的安全秩序非常重要。我认为这就是你应该回归的路。
The Wendy's about. And when you said that. And when you said that. Which is through the framing that Shumath has here, we have this military-industrial complex. We have this complicated relationship with China. And then we have Taiwan. And we have this incredible policy of ambiguity. And it seemed to be working really well. And now, are we having the proper debate on Taiwan? What is the debate we should be having on defending Taiwan, not defending Taiwan, providing them with arms? Because you seem to believe in the book that this is going to be what it's about.
温迪对此持有一种立场。当你说到那一点时。当你说到那一点时。通过Shumath在这里提出的框架，我们有了这个军工复合体。我们与中国有着复杂的关系。然后是台湾。我们有这个令人难以置信的模糊政策。而且它似乎一直运作得很好。现在，我们是否正在对台湾进行适当的辩论？关于保卫台湾，我们应该进行何种辩论？是不是应该向他们提供武器？因为在你的书里似乎认为这就是问题的关键。
Let me add to that question. And this is going to be our last question because we do need to move on. In your role in defense planning, you look at the Department of Defense today in the U.S. defense-industrial complex, are we equipped for a hot conflict with China? And if we're not, does that change the positioning and the strategy that China then has and how they think about what they're going to do next with the U.S.?
让我对这个问题补充一点。这将是我们的最后一个问题，因为我们需要继续进行。作为国防规划中的一员，您关注美国国防部及其国防工业体系，您认为我们是否能够应对与中国的热战冲突？如果我们不能，是否会改变中国的定位和战略，以及他们对接下来如何和美国相处的想法？
So the first one is no, we're not. And it certainly impacts China. In fact, I think if you were able to greenfield the defense department today for half the money, you could get twice the bang for the buck.
所以第一个是不，我们不会。这当然会对中国产生影响。事实上，我认为如果你今天有能力以一半的成本从零开始建立国防部，你能够获得两倍的效益。
So bureaucracies are complicated, difficult. The fact that we haven't had another great power war, I'm prepared to pay a little extra for it. But if you said how efficient is it, you know, not so much. And then to the, I think the big question we should ask ourselves is for rational actors in Washington, or here today us, and in Beijing, are there more reasons, more incentives, to compete between the U.S. and China, or alternatively, more incentives to cooperate?
如此官僚体系是复杂而困难的。事实上，我们并没有再次发生过大国间的战争，为此我愿意多付一点代价。但如果你问效率如何，恐怕并不高。而我认为我们应该问自己的一个重要问题是，对于华盛顿（或者对今天在这里的我们）、对于北京（或在此）的理性行为者来说，是更有理由、更有动机去竞争，还是更有动机去合作呢？
So we've been to all the ones that compete, but for cooperating, excuse me, if we have a war, we destroy ourselves. So we have a pretty powerful interest in survival in not having a war and not allowing us something happen in Taiwan or this or that or something. If we live in an enclosed biosphere on a small planet, either parties, greenhouse gas, emission can make the place unlivable for both of us. If we don't find a way to cooperate in dealing with that, we have a financial system that's so entangled that a financial crisis in one place can become a depression everywhere. So we don't find a way to do it.
所以我们已经参观了所有竞争对手，但是合作方面，如果我们发生战争，我们会自我毁灭。因此，对于不发生战争和不允许在台湾或其他地方发生类似事件的存活，我们有着非常强烈的利益。如果我们生活在一个封闭的生态系统中，这个小行星上，双方的温室气体排放都可能导致这个地方无法居住。如果我们不能找到一种合作的方式来处理这个问题，我们的金融系统纠结在一起，一个地方的金融危机可能会导致全球经济萧条。因此，我们必须找到一种解决办法。
So I would say, as a good assignment for everybody, make your list of the reasons incentives to compete and turn the sheet over incentives to cooperate. And we did a lot more strategic imagination in that space. And I'm hoping some of you guys and this and other folks will put some of their great selves under that problem. Instead of this de facto posturing that everyone seems to hold today that we're going to go to war, this is our enemy, and just be a little more thoughtful about the long-term relationship.
所以我想说，作为每个人的一个好任务，列出你们竞争的原因和鼓励合作的方式，然后把这份清单翻过来，思考更多战略想象。我希望你们中的一些人，以及其他人，能够为这个问题提出一些伟大的解决方案。与其像今天每个人似乎持有的那种逐渐地为敌人摆出姿态，准备打仗，我们应该在长期的关系中更加深思熟虑一些。
Graham Allison, thank you so much. Amazing. Thank you. Wow. Another chance of being a woman. We are our own neighbors to focus on inter bus lawyers. Love you guys. I sweet you can fly. I'm going to be the one to try. What, what, what are you trying? I'm going to try. Besties are all over. Besties are all over. That's why I thought you were a Christian right away. That's right. I'm going to be the one who's like this like sexual tension, but they just need to release that out. What, you're about to be what you're about to be. What, you're about to be what you're about to be. Besties are all over. I'm going all over.
Graham Allison，非常感谢你。太棒了，谢谢。哇，又有一次成为女人的机会。我们是我们自己的邻居，要关注国际商务律师。爱你们。我希望你们能飞翔。我要成为那个尝试的人。你在尝试什么？我要试试。最好的朋友都在身边。最好的朋友遍布各地。这就是为什么我一下子就认定你是一个基督徒了。没错。我要成为那个像这样的性紧张感，但他们只是需要释放出来。什么，你将要成为什么？什么，你将要成为什么？最好的朋友遍布各地。我即将四处旅行。