Sea Change
发布时间 2022-12-14 00:09:16 来源
摘要
In his latest memo, Howard Marks writes that the investment world may be experiencing the third major sea change over the last 50 years. Events in recent years – especially the spike in inflation and the Federal Reserve’s response – appear to have caused a reversal of the market conditions that prevailed during the post-GFC (Global Financial Crisis) period and for much of the last four decades. Howard discusses what this potentially new era could mean for lenders, especially bargain hunters. The memo is read by LJ Ganser.You can read the memo here (https://www.oaktreecapital.com/insights/memo/sea-change).
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中英文字稿 
This is the memo by Howard Marx. C-Change. C-Change. Idiom. A complete transformation. A radical change of direction in attitude. Goals. Grammarist.
这是霍华德·马克斯的备忘录。C-Change，C-Change。习语，“一个完全的转变”，指的是态度上的彻底转变以及方向上的彻底改变。目标是要提高语法技能。Grammarist。
In my 53 years in the investment world, I've seen a number of economic cycles, pendulum swings, manias and panics, bubbles and crashes. But I remember only two real C-changes. I think we may be in the midst of a third one today.
在我投资业界的53年中，我见证了许多经济周期、摆动、热潮、恐慌、泡沫和崩溃。但我只记得两个真正的C转变。我认为今天我们可能正在经历第三个。
As I've recounted many times in my memos, when I joined the investment management industry in 1969, many banks, like the one I worked for at the time, focused their equity portfolios on the so-called nifty-fifty. The nifty-fifty comprised the stocks of companies that were considered the best and fastest growing. So good that nothing bad could ever happen to them. For these stocks, everyone was sure there was no price too high.
我在我的备忘录中已经多次讲述过，1969年我加入投资管理行业时，许多银行，包括当时我所工作的那家，将他们的股权投资组合集中在所谓的nifty-fifty上。 nifty-fifty包括被认为是最好和最快增长的公司的股票。这些股票很好，以至于永远不会发生任何不好的事情。对于这些股票，每个人都确信没有价格太高。
But if you bought the nifty-fifty when I started at the bank and held them until 1974, you were sitting on losses of more than 90 percent, from owning pieces of the best companies in America. It quality had turned out wasn't synonymous with safety or with successful investment.
但是，如果你在我入职银行时购买了Nifty-Fifty（一种股票组合），并一直持有到1974年，那么你持有的美国最佳公司的股份已亏损超过90％。它们的质量证明并不与安全或成功的投资同义。
Meanwhile, over in Bond Land, a security with a rating of single B was described by Moody's as failing to possess the characteristics of a desirable investment. Non-investment-grade bonds, those rated double B and below, were off limits to fiduciaries since proper financial behavior mandated the avoidance of risk.
与此同时，在债券市场中，一份评级为单一B的证券被穆迪评为不具备理想投资特征。评级为双B及以下的非投资级债券在规范的财务行为中被禁止被执事使用，因为这会带来风险。
For this reason, but soon became known as high yield bonds, couldn't be sold as new issues. But in the mid-1970s, Michael Milken and a few others have the idea that it should be possible to issue non-investment-grade bonds and to invest in them prudently, if the bonds offered enough interest to compensate for the risk of default. In 1978, I started investing in these securities. The bonds of perhaps America's riskiest public companies, and I was making money steadily and safely.
因此，但很快被称为高收益债券，不能作为新的发行品出售。但在1970年代中期，迈克尔·米尔肯和一些人有一个想法，即如果这些债券提供足够的利息来弥补违约的风险，那么发行非投资级债券并谨慎投资它们应该是可能的。 1978年，我开始投资于这些证券。这些可能是美国风险最高的上市公司的债券，而我正在稳定而安全地赚钱。
In other words, whereas prudent bond investing had previously consisted of buying only presumably safe investment-grade bonds, investment managers could now prudently buy bonds of almost any quality as long as they were adequately compensated for the attendant risk. The US high yield bond universe amounted to about $2 billion when I first got involved, and today it stands at roughly $1.2 trillion. This clearly represented a major change in direction for the business of investing.
换句话说，以往审慎的债券投资只涉及购买看似安全的投资级别债券，但现在投资经理可以审慎地购买几乎任何质量的债券，只要他们能得到足够的风险补偿。当我第一次参与时，美国高收益债券市场规模大约为20亿美元，而今天它已经增长到约1.2万亿美元。这显然代表了投资业务的一个重大转变。
But that's not the end of it. Prior to the inception of high yield bond issuance, companies could only be acquired by larger firms, those that were able to pay with cash on hand or borrow large amounts of money and still retain their investment-grade ratings. And with the ability to issue high yield bonds, smaller firms could now acquire larger ones by using heavy leverage since there was no longer a need to possess or maintain an investment-grade rating. This change permitted, in particular, the growth of leveraged buyouts, and what's now called the private equity industry.
但这并不是结束。在高收益债券发行出现之前，企业只能被更大的公司收购，这些公司能够用现金或借贷大量资金并仍保持其投资级信用评级。而有了发行高收益债券的能力，较小的公司现在可以使用重债务杠杆收购更大的公司，因为不再需要拥有或维持投资级信用评级。这种变化使特别是杠杆收购的增长成为可能，以及现在所谓的私募股权行业。
However, the most important aspect of this change didn't relate to high yield bonds, or to private equity, but rather to the adoption of a new investor mentality. Now risk wasn't necessarily avoided, but rather considered relative to return and hopefully born intelligently. This new risk return mindset was critical in the development of many new types of investment, such as distressed debt, mortgage-backed securities, structured credit, and private lending.
然而，这次变革中最重要的方面与高收益债券或私募股权无关，而是采纳了一种新的投资者心态。现在，风险不是必须避免的，而是相对于回报进行考虑，并有望明智地产生。这种新的风险回报心态在许多新类型的投资发展中至关重要，如困境债务、抵押支持证券、结构化信贷和私人放贷。
It's no exaggeration to say today's investment world bears almost no resemblance to that a 50 years ago. Young people joining the industry today would likely be shocked to learn that, back then, investors didn't think in risk return terms. Now, that's all we do. Here go a C-Change.
今天的投资世界与50年前几乎没有任何相似之处，这一点并非夸张。今天加入该行业的年轻人可能会惊讶地发现，当时投资者并不会用风险回报的方面来考虑。现在，这已经成为了我们所有人的标准。接下来是一次改变。
At roughly the same time, big changes were underway in the macroeconomic world. I think it all started with the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74, which caused the price of a barrel of oil to jump from roughly $24 to almost $65, in less than a year. This spike raised the cost of many goods and ignited rapid inflation.
大致在同一时期，宏观经济世界正在发生重大变化。我认为这一切始于1973-74年的OPEC石油禁运，导致原油价格在不到一年的时间内从大约24美元涨到近65美元。这一涨价增加了许多商品的成本，并引发了迅速的通货膨胀。
Because the US private sector in the 1970s was much more unionized than it is now, and many collected bargaining agreements contained automatic cost of living adjustments, rising inflation-triggered wage increases, which exacerbated inflation and led to yet more wage increases. This seemingly unstoppable upward spiral kindled strong inflationary expectations, which in many cases became self-fulfilling, as is their nature.
在20世纪70年代，美国的私营部门联合组织比现在多得多，许多集体谈判协议都包含自动调整生活费用的费用，因为通货膨胀不断上涨而导致工资增加，加剧了通货膨胀并导致更多的工资涨幅。这种貌似不可阻挡的上升螺旋激发了强烈的通货膨胀预期，在许多情况下成为自我实现的，这是其本质。
The year-over-year increase in the Consumer Price Index, which was 3.2%, in 1972, rose to 11% by 1974, receded to the range of 6% to 9% for four years, and then rebounded to 11.4% in 1979 and 13.5% in 1980. There was great despair.
1972年消费者价格指数的同比增长率为3.2%，但到了1974年升至11%，之后在6%至9%的范围内持续四年后再次反弹至1979年的11.4%和1980年的13.5%。人们感到非常绝望。
As no relief was forthcoming from inflation-fighting tools ranging from win, whip inflation now, buttons, to price controls, to a federal funds rate that reached 13% in 1974. It took the appointment to Paul Volker, as Fed chairman in 1979, and the determination he showed in raising the Fed funds rate to 20% in 1980 to get inflation under control and extinguish inflationary psychology. As a result, inflation was backed down to 3.2% by the end of 1983.
当时没有任何针对通货膨胀的工具能够带来缓解，这些工具包括：胜利，打压通货膨胀，按钮和价格管制，还有1974年达到13％的联邦基金利率。直到1979年保罗·沃尔克被任命为美联储主席并表现出的决心，才最终通过将联邦基金利率提高至20％来控制通货膨胀并消除价格上涨的心理影响。因此，到1983年年底时，通货膨胀率降至3.2％。
Volker's success in bringing inflation under control allowed the Fed to reduce the Fed funds rate to the high single digits, and keep it there, over the rest of the 1980s, before dropping it to the mid-single digits in the 90s. His actions ushered in a declining interest rate environment that prevailed for four decades, much more on this in the section that follows. I consider this the second sea change I've seen in my career.
沃尔克成功控制通货膨胀，使联邦储备委员会能够在整个80年代将联邦基金利率降至高单数字，并保持在该水平。在90年代，他将联邦基金利率降至中单数字。他的行动开启了一个持续四十年的降息环境，在下一章节中将进一步介绍。我认为这是我职业生涯中看到的第二个重大转变。
The long-term decline in interest rates began just a few years after the advent of risk return thinking. I view the combination of the two as having given rise to a, the rebirth of optimism among investors, b, the pursuit of profit through aggressive investment vehicles, and c, an incredible four decades for the stock market. The S&P 500 index rose from a low of 102 in August 1982 to 4796 at the beginning of 2022. For a compound annual return of 10.3% per year, what a period. There can be no greater financial and investment career luck than to have participated in it. An incredible tailwind.
风险回报思维刚出现几年后，长期利率开始下降。我认为这两者的结合催生了：a、投资者乐观情绪的重生；b、通过积极的投资工具追求利润；c、股市经历了令人难以置信的四十年。标普500指数从1982年8月的最低点102点，增长到2022年初的4796点，年复合回报率达10.3%，这真是美好的一个时期。参与其中，没有比这更好的金融和投资生涯的运气了。这是一股难以置信的顺风。
What are the factors that gave rise to investors' success over the last 40 years? We saw major contributions from a, the economic growth and preeminence of the US, b, the incredible performance of our greatest companies, c, gains in technology, productivity, and management techniques, and d, the benefits of globalization. However, I'd be surprised if 40 years of declining interest rates didn't play the greatest role of all.
在过去40年中，是什么因素导致了投资者的成功呢？我们看到了一些很重要的原因，包括：a，美国经济增长和卓越地位，b，最伟大公司的惊人表现，c，技术、生产力和管理技巧的提高，以及d，全球化的好处。然而，如果40年来下降的利率没有起到最重要的作用，我会感到惊讶。
In the 1970s, I had a loan from a Chicago bank with an interest rate of three quarters over prime. We don't hear much about the prime rate anymore, but it was the benchmark interest rate, the predecessor of LIBOR, at which the money center banks would lend to their best customers. I received a notice from the bank each time my rate changed, and I framed the one that marked the high point in December 1980. He told me the interest rate on my loan had risen to 22.25%. Four decades later, I was able to borrow at just 2.25% fixed for 10 years. This represented a decline of 2,000 basis points. Miraculous.
在二十世纪七十年代，我从芝加哥银行贷款，利率比标准利率高了四分之三。我们再也听不到多少有关标准利率的消息了，但它是衡量最佳客户贷款的基准利率，也是LIBOR的前身。每当我的利率改变时，我都会收到银行的通知，我还把1980年12月的利率高峰的通知装框收藏了起来。当时，他告诉我贷款利率已经上升到22.25%。四十年后，我能够以只有2.25%的固定利率贷款十年。这表示利率下降了2000个基点。真不可思议。
What are the effects of declining interest rates? They accelerate the growth of the economy by making it cheaper for consumers to buy on credit and for companies to invest in facilities, equipment and inventory. They provide a subsidy to borrowers at the expense of lenders and savers. They reduce businesses' cost of capital and thus increase their profitability. They increase the fair value of assets. The theoretical value of an asset is defined as the discounted present value of its future cash flows. The lower the discount rate, the higher the present value. Thus, as interest rates fall, valuation parameters such as PE ratios and enterprise values rise and cap rates on real estate decline. They reduce the perspective returns investors' demand from investments they're considering, thereby increasing the prices they'll pay. This can be seen most directly in the bond market. Everyone knows its rates down prices up, but it works throughout the investment world. By lifting asset prices, they create a wealth effect that makes people feel richer and thus more willing to spend.
降息会对经济有什么影响？它们会让消费者更便宜地通过信用购买商品，让企业更容易地投资设施、设备和库存，从而加速经济增长。它们为借款人提供补贴，而在储户和贷款人之间造成损失。它们降低企业资本成本，从而增加其盈利能力。它们还会提高资产的公允价值。一项资产的理论价值被定义为其未来现金流折现现值。折现率越低，现值就越高。因此，随着利率下降，估值参数如市盈率和企业价值上升，房地产的资本化率下降。它们降低了投资者从考虑的投资中所需的预期回报，从而提高他们愿意支付的价格。这最直接地可以在债券市场上看到。大家都知道利率降低价格上涨，但它们在整个投资世界中都有作用。通过提高资产价格，它们创造了一种财富效应，使人们感觉更富有，从而更愿意消费。
Finally, by simultaneously increasing asset values and reducing borrowing costs, they produce a bananza for those who buy assets using leverage. I want to spend more time on that last point. Think about a buyer who employs leverage in a declining rate environment. He analyzes a company, concludes that he can make 10% a year on it and decides to buy it. Then he asks his head of capital markets how much it would cost to borrow 75% of the money. When he's told it's 8%, it's full speed ahead. Earning 10% on 3-quarters of the capital that's borrowed at 8% would lever up the return on the other one quarter. He's equity to 16%. This competes to make the loan and the result is an interest rate of 7% instead of 8%, making the investment even more profitable a 19% levered return. The interest cost on his floating rate debt declines over time, and when his fixed rate debt matures, he finds he can roll it over at 5%. Now the deal is a home run, a 25% levered return, all else being equal.
最终，通过同时提高资产价值和降低借款成本，他们为那些利用杠杆购买资产的人产生了一个繁荣时期。我想花更多的时间谈谈最后一个观点。想象一下，在下降利率环境下使用杠杆的买家。他分析了一家公司，得出可以每年赚取10%的结论，并决定购买。然后他问他的资本市场负责人借75%的资金需要多少成本。当他被告知是8%时，他便全速前进。在借用以8%利率借来的3/4资金上赚取10%，将使得另外1/4的投资增加杠杆收益至16%。这将竞争性地使得贷款利率降至7%而不是8%，使得投资的收益更加丰厚，杠杆回报率达到了19%。他浮动利率债务的利息成本随着时间的推移而下降，当他的固定利率债务到期时，他发现他可以以5%的利率滚动它。现在，这个交易是一项主场得分，杠杆回报率达到了25%，其他一切都保持不变。
This narrative ignores the beneficial impact of declining interest rates on both the profitability of the company he bought and the market value of that company. Is it any wonder then that private equity and other levered strategies enjoyed great success over the last 40 years?
这篇叙述忽略了降低的利率对所购买公司的盈利能力和市值的有益影响。这就难怪私募股权和其他杠杆策略在过去40年大获成功了吧？
In a recent visit with clients, I came up with a bit of imagery to convey my view of the effect of the prolonged decline in interest rates. In some airports there's a moving walkway and standing on it makes life easier for the weary traveler. But if rather than stand still on it, you walk at your normal pace, you move ahead rapidly. That's because your rate of travel over the ground is the sum of the speed at which you're walking plus the speed at which the walkway is moving. That's what I think happened to investors over the last 40 years.
最近我拜访了一些客户，我想分享一个比喻，以表达我对长期利率下降的影响的看法。有些机场有一条自动步道，站在上面可以方便旅行者的疲惫。但如果你不站在上面，而是以你正常的步伐走，你会迅速前进。这是因为你在地面上的行进速度是你走路的速度加上自动步道的速度。我认为这就是过去40年中发生在投资者身上的事情。
They enjoyed the growth of the economy and the companies they invested in, as well as the resulting increase in the value of their ownership stakes. But in addition, they were on a moving walkway carried along by declining interest rates. The results have been great, but I doubt many people fully understand where they came from. It seems to me that a significant portion of all the money investors made over this period resulted from the tailwind generated by the massive drop in interest rates. I consider it nearly impossible to overstate the influence of declining rates over the last four decades.
他们享受着经济增长和投资公司带来的好处，还有由此带来的资产价值增长。但是，他们也享受着降息带来的加速效应。这一过程带来的好处是巨大的，但我怀疑很多人并没有真正理解这些好处的来源。我认为，在所有投资者在这段时间内获得的利润中，有很大一部分与利率下降带来的助力有关。在过去四十年中，利率下降对影响的重要性几乎不可能被过度强调。
The recent experience. The period between the end of the global financial crisis, GFC in late 2009 and the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 was marked by ultra low interest rates and the macroeconomic environment and its effects were highly unusual. An all-time low in interest rates was reached when the Fed cut the Fed funds rate to approximately zero in late 2008 in an effort to pull the economy out of the GFC.
最近的经验：从2009年末全球金融危机结束到2020年初疫情爆发期间，一直采取超低利率，宏观经济环境及其影响非常异常。由于美联储为了使经济走出全球金融危机而将联邦基金利率降至接近零的历史最低水平，利率达到了史上最低水平。
The low rates were accompanied by quantitative easing, purchases of bonds undertaken by the Fed to inject liquidity into the economy and perhaps to keep investors from panicking. The effects were dramatic. The low rates and vast amounts of liquidity stimulated the economy and triggered explosive gains in the markets.
低利率伴随着量化宽松，即由美联储进行的债券购买以注入流动性到经济中，可能是为了防止投资者恐慌。这些影响是戏剧性的。低利率和大量的流动性刺激了经济并引发了市场的爆炸性增长。
Strong economic growth and lower interest costs added to corporate profits. Valuation parameters rose as previously described lifting asset prices. Stocks increased non-stop from within ten years except for a handful of down drafts that each lasted a few months. From below of 6.67 in March 2009, the S&P reached a high of 3,386 in February 2020 for a compound return of 16% per year.
强劲的经济增长和较低的利息成本为公司利润增添了助力。估值参数如前所述上升，提升了资产价格。除了少数持续几个月的回落外，股票在接下来的十年间一直持续上涨。标普指数于2009年3月时处于6.67下方，到2020年2月达到了3386的高点，年复合收益率达16%。
The markets' strength encouraged investors to drop their crisis-inspired risk aversion and return to risk-taking much sooner than expected. It also made FOMO, the fear of missing out, the prevalent emotion among investors. Investors were eager to buy and holders weren't motivated to sell. Investors revived desire to buy caused the capital markets to reopen, making it cheap and easy for companies to obtain financing.
市场的强劲力量鼓励投资者摆脱危机引发的风险厌恶情绪，并比预期更早地重新开始承担风险。这也使得FOMO，即错失机会的恐惧，在投资者中变得普遍存在。投资者渴望购买，持有者没有动机卖出。投资者重新购买的愿望导致资本市场重新开放，使得公司获得融资变得便宜易得。
Lenders' eagerness to put money to work enabled borrowers to pay low interest rates under less restrictive documentation that reduced lender protections. The Paltry yields on safe investments drove investors to buy riskier assets. Thanks to economic growth and plentiful liquidity, there were few defaults and bankruptcies. The main exogenous influences were increasing globalization and the limited extent of armed conflict around the world. Both influences were clearly salutary.
"借款人渴望投资资金，使得在减少借方保护的不太严格的文件下，可以以较低的利率支付贷款。安全投资的微薄收益促使投资者购买更高风险的资产。由于经济增长和丰富的流动性，几乎没有违约和破产。主要的外部影响是全球化的增加和世界范围内有限的武装冲突。这两种影响显然都是有益的。"
As a result, in this period the US enjoyed its longest economic recovery in history, albeit also one of its slowest and longest bull market, exceeding 10 years in both cases. When the COVID-19 pandemic caused much of the world's economy to be shut down, the Fed dusted off the rescue plan that had taken months to formulate and implement during the GFC and put it into effect in a matter of weeks at a much larger scale than its earlier version.
因此，在这段时间内，美国经历了历史上最长的经济复苏，尽管同时也是最缓慢和最漫长的牛市之一，两种情况下均超过10年。当COVID-19大流行导致世界经济的大部分关闭时，联邦储备委员会重新制定和实施救援计划，并在比早期版本更大规模的数周内投入实施。请感觉舒适更改。
The US government chipped in with loans and vast relief payments on top of its customary deficit spending. The result in the period from March 2020 to the end of 2021 was a complete replay of the post-GFC developments enumerated previously, including a quick economic bounce and an even quicker market recovery.
美国政府加入了贷款和大量救济款，不仅进行了惯例的赤字支出。从2020年3月到2021年底的这段时间，结果是完全重复了之前列举的全球金融危机后的发展，包括快速经济反弹和更快的市场复苏。
The S&P 500 rose from its low of 2237 in March 2020 to 4796 on the first day of 2022, up 114% in less than two years. For what felt like eons from October 2012 to February 2020, my standard presentation was titled Investing in a Low Return World because that's what our circumstances were.
“标普 500 指数从 2020 年三月的最低点 2237 点上涨到 2022 年第一天的 4796 点，不到两年时间内涨了 114%。从 2012 年十月至 2020 年二月间，我们一直处于低回报世界的投资环境，这使得我的标准演讲题目都叫做《在低回报世界中投资》。”
With the perspective returns on many asset classes, especially credit at all time lows, I enumerated the principal options available to investors. Invest as you previously have and accept that your returns will be lower than they used to be. Reduce risk to prepare for a market correction and accept a return that is lower still. Go to cash and earn a return of zero, hoping the market will decline and thus offer higher returns and do it soon or ramp up your risk in pursuit of higher returns.
从许多资产类别的回报率的角度来看，特别是信贷处于历史低位，我列举了投资者可用的主要选择。像以前一样投资，并接受您的回报将会比以前低。减少风险以准备市场调整，接受仍然更低的回报。持有现金，赚取零回报，希望市场下跌，从而提供更高的回报并迅速行动或增加风险以追求更高的回报。
Each of these choices had serious flaws and there's a good reason for that. By definition, it's hard to achieve good returns dependably and safely in a low return world.
这些选择每一个都有严重的缺陷，这是有充分理由的。根据定义，在低收益的世界里，稳定而安全地获得好的回报是很困难的。
Regular listeners to my memos know that my observations regarding the investment environment are primarily based on impressions and inferences rather than data. Thus in recent meetings, I've been using the following list of properties to describe the period in question. Think about whether you agree with this description. I'll return to it later.
经常收听我的备忘录的听众都知道，我对于投资环境的观察主要是基于印象和推断，而不是数据。因此，在最近的会议中，我一直在使用以下属性列表来描述所讨论的时期。请思考一下您是否认同这个描述。稍后我会再回来谈论它。
From 2009 to 2021, Fed behavior, highly stimulative, inflation, dormant, economic outlook, positive, likelihood of distress, minimal, mood, optimistic, buyers, eager, holders, complacent, key worry, FOMO, fear of missing out, risk aversion, absent, credit window, wide open, financing, plantable, interest rates, lowest ever, yield spreads, modest, prospective returns, lowest ever.
从2009年到2021年，联邦行为高度刺激，通货膨胀状况稳定，经济前景乐观，困难情况可能很少，情绪乐观，买家渴望购买，持有人满足，主要担忧是错失机会，避险意识不强，信贷窗口开放，融资可行，利率史无前例地低，收益差距适度，潜在回报史无前例地低。
The overall period from 2009 through 2021, with the exception of a few months in 2020, was one in which optimism prevailed among investors and worry was minimal. Low inflation allowed central bankers to maintain generous monetary policies. These were golden times for corporations and asset owners thanks to good economic growth, cheap and easily accessible capital, and freedom from distress.
从2009年到2021年，除了2020年的几个月以外，投资者充满乐观，担忧很少。低通货膨胀允许央行维持慷慨的货币政策。由于经济增长良好、资本便宜且易于获得，以及没有困扰，这是公司和资产所有者的黄金时期。
This was an asset owners market and a borrowers market. With the risk-free rate at zero, fear of loss, absent, and people eager to make risky investments, it was a frustrating period for lenders and bargain hunters.
这是一个资产拥有者市场和借款人市场。由于无风险利率为零，没有了损失的恐惧，人们渴望进行高风险的投资，使得借款人和寻找便宜货的人们陷入了困境。
On recent visits with clients, I've been describing Oak Tree as having spent the years of 2009 through 2019 in the wilderness, given our focus on credit and our heavy emphasis on value investing and risk control. To illustrate, after raising our largest fund up to that time in 2007 to 2008 and putting most of it to work very successfully in the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, we thought it appropriate, given the investment environment, to cut the amount in half for its successor fund and have it again for the fund after that.
最近我在与客户交流时，描述橡树基金的经历，把2009年至2019年的这十年称作是我们在荒野中度过的时光，这是因为我们专注于信用投资，强调价值投资和风险控制。举个例子，当我们在2007年到2008年期间募集到迄今最大规模的基金后，将其大部分成功地投资于雷曼兄弟破产后的市场中，鉴于投资环境，我们认为其后继基金的规模应该减半，并在其下一只基金中再次减少规模。
Oak Tree's total assets under management grew relatively little during this period and the returns on most of our closed end funds, although fine, were moderate by our standards. It felt like a long slog. That was then, this is now.
橡树管理的总资产在这段时间里增长了比较少，我们大多数封闭式基金的回报虽然不错，但按我们的标准来看还是比较适中的。感觉像是一场漫长的挣扎。那时是那时，现在是现在。
Of course all of the above flipped in the last year or so. Most importantly, inflation began to rear its head in early 2021 when our emergence from isolation permitted too much money, savings amassed by people shut in at home, including distributions from massive COVID-19 relief programs to chase too few goods and services, with supply hampered by the uneven restart of manufacturing and transportation.
当然，以上所有情况在过去一年左右都发生了翻转。最重要的是，通货膨胀在2021年初开始显露端倪，由于我们从隔离中出来，许多人在家中积攒了太多的钱和储蓄，包括来自于大规模的 COVID-19 救助计划的分配，导致对少量商品和服务的需求过于追逐，而供应又受到制造业和运输业不平稳的重启的影响。
Because the Fed deemed the inflation transitory, it continued its policies of low interest rates and quantitative easing, keeping money loose. These policies further stimulated demand, especially for homes at a time when it didn't need stimulating. Inflation worsened as 2021 wore on and late in the year the Fed acknowledged that it wasn't likely to be short-lived.
由于美联储认为通货膨胀是暂时的，因此继续实施低利率和量化宽松政策，保持货币宽松。这些政策进一步刺激了需求，尤其是在不需要刺激的时候住房需求。随着2021年的推移，通货膨胀恶化，年底美联储承认通货膨胀不太可能是短暂的。
Thus the Fed started reducing its purchases of bonds in November and began raising interest rates in March 2022, kicking off one of the quickest rate-hiking cycles on record. The stock market which had ignored inflation and rising interest rates from most of 2021 began to fall around year end.
因此，美联储从2021年11月开始减少其债券购买，于2022年3月开始上调利率，开启了有记录以来最快的加息周期之一。股市在2021年的大部分时间忽视了通胀和上升的利率，但在年底开始下跌。
From there events followed a predictable course. As I wrote in the memo on the couch, January 2016, whereas events in the real world fluctuate between pretty good and not so hot, investor sentiment often carines from flawless to hopeless as events that were previously viewed as benign come to be interpreted as catastrophic.
从那里，事件按照可以预料的轨迹发展。正如我在2016年1月在沙发上写的备忘录中所述，尽管现实世界中的事件在相当好和不那么糟之间波动，但投资者情绪往往会从完美变得无望，因为之前被视为无害的事件现在被解释为灾难性。
Higher interest rates led to higher demanded returns. Thus stocks that had seemed fairly valued when interest rates were minimal fell to lower PE ratios that were commensurate with higher rates. Likewise, the massive increase in interest rates had its usual depressing effect on bond prices.
更高的利率导致需要更高的回报。因此，在利率很低时似乎相当估值的股票下跌到更低的PE比率，这跟更高的利率相符。同样，利率的巨大增长对债券价格产生了通常的压抑作用。
Signing stock and bond prices caused FOMO to dry up and fear of loss to replace it. The markets declined gathered steam and the things that had done best in 2020 and 2021 tech, software, SPACs and cryptocurrency now did the worst further dampening psychology.
签署股票和债券价格导致FOMO枯竭，恐惧损失取而代之。市场下跌势头增强，2020年和2021年表现最佳的技术、软件、SPAC和加密货币现在表现最差，进一步抑制了心理状态。
Exogenous events have the ability to undercut the markets mood, especially in tougher times and in 2022 the biggest such event was Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Ukraine conflict reduced supplies of grain and oil and gas adding to inflationary pressures.
外部事件有能力削弱市场的情绪，尤其是在困境中，而 2022 年最大的这种事件就是俄罗斯侵略乌克兰。乌克兰冲突减少了谷物和石油天然气的供应，增加了通货膨胀的压力。
Since the tighter monetary policies were designed to slow the economy, investors focused on the difficulty the Fed would likely have achieving a soft landing and thus the strong likelihood of a recession. The anticipated effect of that recession on earnings dampened investors' spirits.
由于较严格的货币政策旨在放慢经济的增长速度，投资者们开始关注美联储达成温和着陆的难度，因而导致了经济衰退的高概率。这种经济衰退将对企业收益产生影响，使得投资者们的情绪受到压抑。
Thus, the fall of the S&P 500 over the first nine months of 2022 rivaled the greatest full-year declines of the last century. It has now recovered a fair bet.
因此，2022年前9个月标普500指数的下跌与上个世纪最大的全年跌幅不相上下。现在，它已经有了一个公平的复苏机会。
The expectation of a recession also increased the fear of rising debt defaults. New security issuance became difficult. Having committed to fund buyouts in a lower interest rate environment, banks found themselves with many billions of dollars of hung bridge loans, unsalable at par. These loans have saddled the banks with big losses. These hung loans forced banks to reduce the amounts they could commit to new deals, making it harder for buyers to finance acquisitions.
经济衰退预期使债务违约风险加剧，新安全发行变得困难。银行们在低利率环境中承诺资助收购，但现在他们手头有着数十亿美元的悬桥贷款，无法以原价售出，这导致了巨大的损失。这些悬桥贷款迫使银行减少其承诺新交易的金额，使买家更难以融资收购。
The progression of events just ascribed caused pessimism to take over from optimism. The market characterized by easy money and upbeat borrowers and asset owners disappeared. Now, lenders and buyers held better cards. Credit investors became able to demand higher returns and better creditor protections. The list of candidates for distress, loans and bonds offering yield spreads of more than 1000 basis points over treasuries grew from dozens to hundreds.
前面所述的事件进展导致了乐观主义让位于悲观主义。那个以轻松的资金和积极的借款人和资产持有者为特点的市场已经消失了。现在，贷款人和购买者拥有更好的牌。信贷投资者得以要求更高的回报和更好的债权保护。面临困境的候选人名单，提供超过国债利差超过1000个基点的贷款和债券的候选人从几十人增加到数百人。
Here's how the change in the environment looks to me. Credit behavior from 2009 to 2021: highly stimulative. Today: tightening inflation. 09 to 21: dormant. Today: 40 year high economic outlook. 09 to 21: positive. Today: recession likely, likelihood of distress. 09 to 21: minimal. Today: rising mood. 09 to 21: optimistic. Today: guarded buyers. 09 to 21: eager. Today: hesitant holders. 09 to 21: complacent. Today: uncertain. Key worry 09 to 21: fear of missing out; today: investment losses, risk aversion. 09 to 21: absent. Today: rising credit window. 09 to 21: wide open. Today: constricted financing. 09 to 21: plentiful. Today: scarce interest rates. 09 to 21: lowest ever. Today: more normal yield spreads. 09 to 21: modest. Today: normal prospective returns. 09 to 21: lowest ever. Today: more than ample.
这是我看待环境变化的方式。信贷行为从2009年到2021年：高度刺激。今天：通胀压力加大。09年到21年：平静。今天：40年来的高经济前景。09年到21年：积极。今天：可能会出现衰退，出现风险。09年到21年：极小。今天：情绪上升。09年到21年：乐观。今天：谨慎买家。09年到21年：热情。今天：不确定的持有人。09年到21年：自满。今天：不确定。09年到21年的主要担忧：错失良机；今天：投资损失，风险规避。09年到21年：缺失。今天：信贷窗口正在上升。09年到21年：敞开的。今天：融资受限。09年到21年：丰富。今天：稀缺的利率。09年到21年：最低。今天：更为正常的收益率差。09年到21年：适度。今天：正常的预期回报。09年到21年：最低。今天：充足。
If I've accurately described today's environment as I believe I have, then we're witnessing a complete reversal of the conditions from 2009 to 21 which prevailed in 2021 and late 2020, throughout the 2009 to 19 period, and for much of the last 40 years.
如果我描述今天的环境如我所信的那样准确，那么我们正在见证2009年到2021年支配2021年末和2020年末的条件发生了完全逆转，这种情况持续了2009年到2019年的时期，以及过去40年的大部分时间。
How has this change manifested itself in investment options? Here's one example: In the low return world of just one year ago, high yield bonds offered yields of 4 to 5%. A lot of issuance was at yields in the threes, and at least one new bond came to the market with a handle of two. The usefulness of these bonds for institutions needing returns of 6 or 7% was quite limited. Today, these securities yield roughly 8%. Meaning even after allowing for some defaults, they're likely to deliver equity-like returns sourced from contractual cash flows on public securities. Credit instruments of all kinds are potentially poised to deliver performance that can help investors accomplish their goals.
这种变化如何在投资选择上体现呢？这里有一个例子：在仅仅一年前的低回报世界中，高收益债券提供了4到5%的收益率。很多发行量以3%的收益率发行，至少有一种新债券以2%的成交量进入了市场。对于需要实现6或7%收益的机构来说，这些债券的实用性非常有限。今天，这些证券的收益率大约为8%。这意味着即使考虑到一些违约的可能，它们仍然有可能产生类似于股票的回报，这些回报来自于公共证券的合同现金流。各种信用工具都有可能提供能够帮助投资者实现目标的表现。
The Outlook: Inflation and interest rates are highly likely to remain the dominant considerations influencing the investment environment for the next several years. While history shows that no one can predict inflation, it seems likely to remain higher than what we became used to after the GFC, at least for a while.
展望：通胀和利率高度可能仍将成为未来几年投资环境的主要考虑因素。尽管历史表明没有人能预测通胀，但它似乎会比全球金融危机后我们逐渐适应的水平更高，至少在一段时间内是这样。
The course of interest rates will largely be determined by the Fed's progress in bringing inflation under control. Intermediate rates go much higher in that process, they're likely to come back down afterward, but no one can predict the timing or the extent of the decrease. While everyone knows how little I think of macro forecasts, a number of clients have asked recently about my views regarding the future of interest rates. Thus, I'll provide a brief overview.
利率走势将主要由美联储在控制通货膨胀方面的进展所决定。在这个过程中，中间利率可能会上涨，之后有可能会回落，但没有人能够预测下降的时间或程度。虽然每个人都知道我对宏观预测的看法很低，但最近一些客户询问了我对利率未来的看法。因此，我将提供一个简要概述。
Oak tree investment philosophy doesn't prohibit having opinions, just acting as if they're right. In my view, the buyers who've driven the S&P 500's recent 10% rally from the October low have been motivated by their beliefs that: a) inflation is easing; b) the Fed will soon pivot from restrictive policy back toward stimulative; c) interest rates will return to lower levels; d) a recession will be averted or it will be modest and brief; and e) the economy and markets will return to Halcyon days.
Oak Tree投资哲学并不禁止拥有观点，只是不要表现得你的观点是正确的。在我看来，促使标普500指数从十月低点反弹10%的买家是因为他们相信：a）通胀正在缓和；b）美联储将很快从限制性政策转向刺激性政策；c）利率将回归较低水平；d）经济衰退将被避免或仅是轻微且短暂的; e）经济与市场将回归到美好的日子。
In contrast, here's what I think: the underlying causes of today's inflation will probably abate as relief swollen savings are spent, and as supply catches up with demand. While some recent inflation readings have been encouraging in this regard, the labor market is still very tight, wages are rising, and the economy is growing strongly. Globalization is slowing or reversing. If this trend continues, we will lose its significant deflationary influence. Importantly, consumer durables prices declined by 40% over the years 1995 to 2020, no doubt thanks to less expensive imports. I estimate that this took 0.6% per year off the rate of inflation.
相比之下，这是我的想法：今天通货膨胀的潜在原因可能会在缓解过度储蓄消费和供需平衡后减轻。尽管一些最近的通货膨胀数据在这方面令人鼓舞，但劳动力市场仍然非常紧张，工资正在上涨，经济也在强劲增长。全球化正在放缓或逆转。如果这种趋势继续下去，我们将失去其重要的通货紧缩影响。重要的是，消费耐用品价格在1995年至2020年间下降了40％，无疑得益于更便宜的进口。我估计这每年可以使通货膨胀率降低0.6％。
Before declaring victory on inflation, the Fed will need to be convinced not only that inflation has settled near the 2% target, but also that inflationary psychology has been extinguished. To accomplish this, the Fed will likely want to see a positive real Fed funds rate.
在宣布通胀已经控制在2%目标附近之前，美联储不仅需要确信通胀已经稳定，还需要确信通胀心理已经被消除。为了实现这一目标，美联储可能希望看到实际联邦基金利率呈正增长趋势。
At present, it's minus 2.2%. Thus while the Fed appears likely to slow the pace of its interest rate increases it's unlikely to return to stimulative policies anytime soon. The Fed has to maintain credibility or regain it after having claimed for too long that inflation was transitory thus it can't appear to be inconsistent by becoming stimulative too soon after having turned restrictive.
目前，它是负2.2％。因此，尽管联邦储备委员会似乎可能减缓其加息步伐，但不太可能在短期内返回刺激政策。联邦储备委员会必须维护其信誉或在过长时间声称通货膨胀是短暂的之后重新获得信誉，因此在收紧政策后不久过早地成为刺激措施会显得不一致。
The Fed faces the question of what to do about its balance sheet which grew from 4 trillion to almost 9 trillion dollars due to its purchases of bonds allowing its holdings of bonds to mature and roll off or somewhat less likely making sales would withdraw significant liquidity from the economy, restricting growth.
美联储面临一个问题，那就是如何处理其资产负债表。由于购买债券，其资产负债表从4万亿美元增长到了近9万亿美元，允许其持有的债券到期后自然减少或较少可能地出售债券将从经济中撤回大量流动性，限制增长。
Rather than be in a stimulative posture on a perpetual basis one might imagine the Fed would prefer to normally maintain a neutral interest rate which is defined as neither stimulative nor restrictive. I know I would. But recently last summer that rate was estimated at 2.5%.
与其长期保持刺激性姿态，我们可以想象美联储更愿意维持一个通常的中性利率，即不刺激也不限制。我知道我是这样想的。但最近去年夏天，这个利率被估计为2.5%。
Similarly although most of us believe the free market is the best allocator of economic resources we haven't had a free market in money for well over a decade. The Fed might prefer to reduce its role in capital allocation by being less active in controlling rates and holding mortgage bonds. There must be risks associated with the Fed keeping interest rates stimulative on a long term basis.
同样地，虽然我们大多数人相信自由市场是最好的经济资源分配者，但我们已经有十多年没有了自由的货币市场。美联储可能希望通过减少对利率的控制和持有抵押债券的活跃程度来减少其在资本配置中的角色。美联储长期保持刺激性利率可能存在风险。
Arguably, we've seen most recently that doing so can bring on inflation, though the inflation of the last two years can be attributed largely to one-off events related to the pandemic. The Fed would probably like to see normal interest rates high enough to provide it with room to cut if it needs to stimulate the economy in the future.
可以说，我们最近看到这样做可能会引发通货膨胀，尽管过去两年的通胀主要归因于与流行病有关的一次性事件。如果需要刺激经济，美联储可能希望看到正常的利率水平足够高，以便提供削减余地。
People who came into the business world after 2008 or veteran investors with short memories might think of today's interest rates as elevated. But they're not in the longer sweep of history, meaning there's no obvious reason why they should be lower. These are the reasons why I believe that the base interest rate over the next several years is more likely to average 2-4%. That is not far from where it is now, then 0-2%.
那些在2008年之后进入商业领域或记忆短暂的老投资者可能认为今天的利率很高。但从历史的更长远来看，它们并不高，因此没有明显的理由为什么它们应该更低。这就是我认为未来几年基准利率更有可能平均在2-4%的原因。这与现在的水平相差不远，即0-2%。
Of course there are counterarguments, but for me the bottom line is that highly stimulative rates are likely not in the cards for the next several years, borrowing a serious recession from which we need rescuing. And that would have ramifications of its own. But I assure you, Oak Tree isn't going to bet money on that belief.
当然有反对意见，但对我来说，最重要的是在接下来的几年里，高度刺激的利率可能不会成为现实，除非我们遭受需要救援的严重经济衰退，这将产生自己的后果。但是我向您保证，橡树不会在这种信念上投注资金。
What we do know is that inflation and interest rates are higher today than they've been for 40 and 13 years respectively. No one knows how long today's conditions described previously will continue to accurately describe the environment. They'll be influenced by economic growth, inflation and interest rates, as well as exogenous events, all of which are unpredictable.
我们所知道的是，通货膨胀和利率今天比过去40年和13年都高。没有人知道今天之前所描述的情况会持续多长时间来准确描述这个环境。它们将受到经济增长、通货膨胀和利率以及外部事件的影响，而所有这些都是难以预测的。
Regardless, I think things will generally be less rosy in the years immediately ahead. A recession in the next 12-18 months appears to be a foregone conclusion among economists and investors. That recession is likely to cause earnings and investor psychology to deteriorate.
无论如何，我认为未来几年的情况总体来说都不会那么乐观。经济学家和投资者普遍认为未来12-18个月将会陷入衰退，这似乎已成定局。这场衰退可能会导致收益和投资者心理恶化。
Net market conditions for new financings seem unlikely to soon become as accommodative as they were in recent years. No one can foretell how high the debt-to-fault rate will rise or how long it'll stay there. It's worth noting in this context that the annual default rate on high yield bonds averaged 3.6 percent from 1978 through 2009.
新融资的网络市场情况似乎不太可能很快像近年来那样宽松。没有人能预测债务违约率会上涨到什么程度，或者会持续多久。值得注意的是，在这种情况下，高收益债券的年度违约率平均为1978年至2009年的3.6％。
But an unusually low 2.1 percent under the just right conditions that prevailed for the decade 2010-19. In fact, there was only one year in that decade in which defaults reached the historical average. Lastly, there is a forecast I'm confident of.
在2010年到2019年这十年间，情况非常适宜，只有2.1% 的低不寻常的违约率。事实上，那十年只有一年的违约率达到了历史平均水平。最后，我有一个非常有信心的预测。
Interest rates aren't about to decline by another 2,000 basis points from here. As I've written many times about the economy and markets, we never know where we're going, but we ought to know where we are.
利率不会再从这里下降2,000个基点。正如我多次在经济和市场方面所写的，我们永远不知道我们要去哪里，但是我们应该知道我们现在在哪里。
The bottom line for me is that in many ways, conditions at this moment are overwhelmingly different from, and mostly less favorable than those of the post-GFC climate I described earlier. These changes may be long lasting, or they may wear off over time. But in my view, we're unlikely to quickly see the same optimism and ease that marked the post-GFC period.
对我而言，关键是此时此刻情况与我之前描述的全球金融危机后的氛围有着很大的不同，大部分的情况也比较不利。这些变化可能是长久的，也可能会随着时间消失。但我认为，我们不太可能快速看到那个充满乐观和轻松的全球金融危机后的时期。
We've gone from the low return world of 2009-21 to a full return world, and it may become more so in the near term. Investors can now potentially get solid returns from credit instruments, meaning they no longer have to rely as heavily on riskier investments to achieve their overall return targets.
我们已经从2009年至2021年低回报的环境转变为全面回报的环境，而这种趋势在近期可能会更加明显。投资者现在可以潜在地从信用工具中获得稳固的回报，这意味着他们不再必须如此依赖于风险更高的投资来实现他们的总体回报目标。
Lenders and bargain hunters face much better prospects in this changed environment than they did in 2009-21. And importantly, if you grant that the environment is and may continue to be very different from what it was over the last 13 years and most of the last 40 years, it should follow that the investment strategies that worked best over those periods may not be the ones that outperform in the years ahead. That's the sea change I'm talking about. December 13, 2022.
放贷者和捡便宜的人在这个变化的环境中面临比2009-21年更好的前景。而且重要的是，如果你承认环境与过去13年和大部分过去40年的环境非常不同，并可能继续如此，那么在未来几年中表现最佳的投资策略可能不是那些在这些时期表现最优秀的策略。这就是我所说的转变。2022年12月13日。
Thank you for listening to the memo by Howard Marx. To hear more episodes, be sure to subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts.
谢谢你收听 Howard Marx 的备忘录。如果想听更多集，记得在你听播客的平台上订阅。
This podcast expresses the views of the author as of the date indicated and such views are subject to change without notice. Oak Tree has no duty or obligation to update the information contained herein. Further, Oak Tree makes no representation and it should not be assumed that past investment performance is an indication of future results. Moreover, wherever there is a potential for profit, there is also the possibility of loss.
这个播客表达了作者在指定日期的观点，这些观点可能会在不提前通知的情况下发生改变。Oak Tree没有义务更新此处所包含的信息。此外，Oak Tree并不代表过去的投资表现就预示着未来的结果。同时，任何可能获得利润的地方，也都存在亏损的可能性。
This podcast is being made available for educational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. The information contained herein does not constitute and should not be construed as an offering of advisory services or an offer to sell or solicitation to buy any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction.
这个播客只为教育目的而提供，不应被用于其他任何目的。这里包含的信息不构成并不应被解释为提供咨询服务或出售或征求购买任何地区的证券或相关金融工具的要约。
That information contained herein concerning economic trends and performances based on or derived from information provided by independent third party sources. Oak Tree Capital Management LP, Oak Tree, believes that the sources from which such information has been obtained are reliable.
这里所包含的关于经济趋势和表现的信息，来自于独立第三方提供的信息。橡树资本管理有限合伙公司（Oak Tree Capital Management LP）认为，这样的信息的来源是可靠的。
However, it cannot guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based.
然而，它无法保证这些信息的准确性并且没有独立核实这些信息或这些信息基于的假设的准确性或完整性。
This podcast, including the information contained herein, may not be copied, reproduced, republished or posted in whole or in part in any form without the prior written consent of Oak Tree.
这个音频播客，包含了里面的所有信息，未经Oak Tree先前以书面方式同意，不得以任何形式复制、翻版、重新发表或者全部或部分地发布。