The Rewind: Ditto
发布时间 2023-02-02 13:00:00 来源
摘要
Howard is joined by Bruce Flatt, CEO of Brookfield, for a discussion of Ditto, which was originally published on January 7, 2013. They examine the distinction between price and value and consider how investors might gain a competitive advantage today. This episode was recorded in November 2022.The memo is read by LJ Ganser.
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中英文字稿 
This is The Memo by Howard Marx. Today, we are featuring another episode of The Rewind, in which Howard looks back on some of his memos over the years, discusses their origins, and considers their relevance to today's financial environment.
这是霍华德·马克斯的备忘录。今天，我们为您推荐《重温》的另一期节目，霍华德将回顾他多年来的备忘录，并讨论它们的起源及其在今天金融环境下的相关性。
In this episode, Howard will be discussing The Memo Ditto with Bruce Flat, the CEO of Brookfield. Howard and Bruce were interviewed by Anna Shamancki, Okshree's senior financial writer. Here's the conversation.
在这一集节目中，霍华德将与布鲁斯·弗拉特（Brookfield的首席执行官）讨论备忘录重复事项。霍华德和布鲁斯接受了Okshree的高级财务作家安娜·夏曼克（Anna Shamancki）的采访。下面是他们的谈话。
Bruce, thanks so much for coming on today. I think this is going to be a really great discussion, so we will dive right in.
布鲁斯，非常感谢你今天来参加。我认为这将是一个非常棒的讨论，所以我们将立即开始。
Great to be here. Thanks.
很高兴能来到这里。谢谢。
So Howard, start with you. This Memo Ditto, which was published in January 2013, it highlights many key themes that you've written about over the years. So I was hoping that you could explain what you were trying to achieve when you sat down to write this Memo.
那么 Howard，先请你开始。这份名称为 Memo Ditto 的备忘录于2013年1月发布，它强调了你多年来所写的许多关键主题。我希望你能解释一下，当你坐下来写这份备忘录时，你想要实现什么目标。
Well, I was trying to recap the things that I think are important. I was trying to be upfront about the fact that most of it was pure repetition, hopefully organizing things better than in the past, and then applying them to the then present.
嗯，我正在回顾我认为重要的事情。我试图坦白地说明大部分都是纯粹的重复，希望比过去更好地组织起来，然后将它们应用到当时的情况上。
And a very important thing was going on at that time. Remember we had had the tech media telecom bubble of 98, 99 and the first half of 2000. And then it collapsed and the S&P was down in 2001 and two, the first three year decline since 1939. People were really in a negative place. Many said I'll never invest again and so forth.
那时有一件非常重要的事情正在发生。大家还记得我们曾经经历过98年、99年和2000年上半年的科技媒体电信泡沫，随后它破裂了，标普指数在2001和2002年下跌，这是自1939年以来的首次连续三年下跌。人们的心情真的很消极，很多人说再也不投资了之类的话。
But then the Fed engineered a recovery by dropping rates. They dropped them so far that the low left hand part of the capital market line was unusable. Cash at zero and treasuries at one or two and so forth. So they forced people to the far right hand end of the line in higher aspiration but higher risk strategies. And that was really, I thought, the dominant consideration in the market at that time.
然后美联储通过降低利率来推动经济复苏。他们降得非常低，导致资本市场线的左下角不适用了。现金利率为零，国债利率为一或两个点等等。因此，他们迫使人们采取更高的期望和更高的风险策略，走向线的极右端。我认为，这是当时市场上的主流考虑因素。
I wouldn't say they eliminated risk aversion, but they overcame risk aversion. I like the markets when they're risk averse and when it disappears, the market does not play its role as a disciplinarian as it should and permits all kinds of deals to get done. And of course a few years later, we see the result.
我不会说他们消除了风险厌恶，但他们克服了风险厌恶。我喜欢市场在风险厌恶的时候，当它消失时，市场不会像它应该的那样扮演决策者的角色，容许各种各样的交易完成。当然，几年后，我们看到了结果。
And so Bruce, there are a number of recurring themes that Howard discusses in the memo that relate to everything he was just speaking about. So of some of these themes, what were some that really resonated with you?
Bruce，霍华德在备忘录中谈论了一些与他刚才所说的一切相关的经常出现的主题。因此，有一些主题是与你格外共鸣的吗？
Howard's memos I read all of them and they're incredibly insightful. But the one sentence that's in this memo that I really thought was good is it's on page seven. I'm going to read it because it's really important. It says in bad time securities can often be bought at prices that understate their merits. And in good time, securities can be sold at prices that overstate their potential. And yet most people are impelled to buy you forgly when the cycle drives prices up and to sell in panic when it drives prices down.
霍华德的备忘录我读了所有，非常有见地。但是我认为最好的一个句子在这个备忘录的第七页。我会读出来，因为它非常重要。它说，在不好的时候，证券经常可以以低于其真正价值的价格购买。在好的时候，证券可以以高于其潜力的价格出售。然而，大多数人在周期推动价格上涨时被迫盲目购买，在价格下跌时恐慌抛售。
Those three sentences encapsulate really the business plan of what we do in Brookfield is that we try to buy with great people, by great businesses and great places. But we try to buy them at times when it's different from what those sentences say. And I think for what we do, the most important thing you can do is at the entry point of when you buy something, if you look at the value of what you're buying, if you can get it right. You don't always get it perfect, but if you can buy it in the middle of the pack or in the lower part of the pack, then it starts your investment off on a good start.
这三个句子真正概括了我们在布鲁克菲尔德所做的业务计划，即我们试图以优秀的人才、优秀的企业和优秀的地点进行购买。但是我们试图在与这些句子所说的不同的时期进行购买。我认为对于我们所做的事情，你能做的最重要的事情就是在购买某些东西的时候看其价值，如果你能正确判断。你不总是能完美地做到这一点，但是如果你能在中间或下层水平购买，那么它将为你的投资打下一个良好的基础。
And I think those three sentences that Howard writes in the memo are incredibly important for long-term investing for real assets.
我认为霍华德在备忘录中写下的那三个句子，对于长期投资真实资产来说非常重要。
Well the interesting thing about Brookfield is that they manage a huge amount of money for third parties and a similarly huge amount of money for themselves, big balance sheet. And yet certainly they're not average buyers. They're very clever buyers. They do very big deals. Sometimes I think they benefit from the fact that there aren't many others who could do those deals, but they're very selective. And as Bruce says, they're not among the people who are falling over themselves to buy at the highs or dump at the lows.
Brookfield的有趣之处在于，他们为第三方管理着大量的资金，也同样为自己管理着大量的资金，规模很大。但是，他们绝对不是普通买家。他们是非常聪明的买家。他们达成了非常大的交易。有时，我认为他们受益于没有太多人能够做这些交易，但他们非常挑剔。正如布鲁斯所说，他们不是那些在市场高点抢购或市场低点抛售的人。
The most important thing is that markets are never in these sentences. Why like these sentences? These markets are never perfect. The efficient market theory does not exist for these type of assets that we buy. And when everyone's rushing in, prices are often too high. And when everyone's rushing out, they're too low. But the big difference is somebody has to understand what the difference of value in prices. And that's a very difficult thing. And also if you're an investor, when does price come about?
最重要的是这些句子里从来没有提到市场。为什么呢？因为这些市场从来不完美。针对我们购买的这类资产，有效市场理论不存在。当每个人都争先恐后地进入时，价格往往过高。而当每个人都急速撤离时，价格却太低。但最关键的是，某些人必须明白价格差异所代表的价值层次，而这是非常困难的事情。如果你是一位投资者，那么价格何时产生呢？
The difference for us is when we're taking companies' private, we're trying to capitalize on the inefficiencies of the market or what the people rushing in or out as Howard's points make. And we capitalize a lot on that by taking things private and then we can realize the value.
对于我们来说的区别在于，当我们将公司私有化时，我们试图利用市场的不能效率，或像霍华德所说的那样，人们的涌入或离去。我们通过私有化来大量获利，从而实现价值。
The difference is if you're in the public markets and you're just buying a security, you need to wait and there has to be an event in the market that changes that price. And those are two different things.
区别在于，如果您在公共市场购买证券，您需要等待市场发生事件并改变价格。这是两件不同的事情。
Yeah, this question of price and value, this is actually something Howard that you speak about in this memo. There's actually a section where you're talking about the relationship between price and risk and value in cycles. And you talk about the perversity of risk. And that's actually a great phrase. And I was hoping you could speak more about that.
是的，有关价格和价值的问题，实际上这是霍华德在这份备忘录中提到的话题。实际上，你谈到了价格、风险和价值之间的关系以及循环的问题。你还谈到了风险的反常现象。这实际上是一个很棒的词组。我希望你可以再多谈谈这个。
Well, Anna, it's important to realize that the riskiness in investing is not inherent in the companies or in the securities or in the exchanges. And you can't find it in the prospectuses of the annual reports. The risk in investing comes from the people in investing. They're the ones who make it risky or not risky.
嗯，安娜，重要的是要认识到投资的风险并非源于公司、证券或交易所本身，也无法在年度报告或招股说明书中找到。投资的风险来自于参与投资的人。他们决定着投资是有风险还是没有风险。
By the perversity of risk, what I mean is that the riskiest thing in the world is the belief that there's no risk because when people believe that risk has been banished as they did in the global financial crisis, that the mortgage-backed securities had been sliced and dice so finally and the risk distributed so broadly that there was none left. When they believe there's no risk, they'll do very risky things and eventually pay a price. So that is perverse. And of course, when people are afraid of risk because things have fallen so much and they desert the markets, they do so at a time when the risk is very little because prices are so low.
通过风险的反常现象，我的意思是这个世界上最冒险的事情就是相信没有风险。当人们相信风险已经被消除，例如在全球金融危机期间，认为抵押贷款支持证券已被切割得如此彻底，风险已被广泛分散，已经不存在风险。当他们认为没有风险时，他们会做出非常冒险的事情，最终付出代价。因此，这非常反常。当然，当人们害怕风险，因为大家都比较担心市场萎靡不振，他们在风险较低的时候离开市场。因为此时物价已经很低了。
Right. And Bruce just maybe jumping off of also what you were speaking about before and also what Howard was just talking about this difference between price and value. Why do you think it's so important for investors to understand the difference between those two things?
“对的。布鲁斯可能会跳到你之前谈到的和霍华德刚才讲的这个价值和价格的差异。你为什么认为投资者了解这两者的差异如此重要呢？”
Look, I think the most important thing in doing what we do and everybody has a different investment style or it makes different types of investments. But the most important thing for us is to understand the value of what an asset is worth. And the value of an asset of his worth has a number of assumptions that always get put into it.
嗯，我认为在我们所从事的领域里，最重要的事情是每个人都有不同的投资风格或不同类型的投资。但对我们而言最重要的事情是要明白一个资产的价值有多少。而一个资产的价值有很多假设因素，总是会被纳入其中。
But essentially, it's the long term discounted cash flow of the income or cash flow that you can create out of an asset over a long period of time. It's as simple as that. Now the complicated thing is that one needs to have knowledge of a market to be able to estimate what the cash flow stream will be and enough knowledge based on what's going on outside as to how to discount that back and what's the terminal value going to be. But if you have those three things, you know what value is.
基本上，它是利用资产产生的收入或现金流的长期折现现金流。就这么简单。现在，复杂的事情是我们需要了解市场，才能够估计现金流的流动，并且根据外部环境了解如何对其进行折现，并预测它的终值是多少。但如果你拥有这三个要素，你就会知道价值了。
What happens is people get confused between the value of something and when it's traded in the markets, the price. And we tend to think that the most distracting thing for investors is to be in the public markets because the price actually confuses investors as to what the value of a security is. And that is the discounted analysis of the cash flows of an asset that you can project into the future. And if you have enough information and you're knowledgeable enough, you can project that cash flow stream, maybe off a little bit, but you can project it. Price trading sometimes trades 50% higher and often trades 50% below. And that distracts from what the true value is.
人们往往会混淆一件事情的价值和在市场上交易时的价格。我们往往认为，对于投资者来说最令人分心的是参与公共市场，因为价格会让投资者混淆一件证券的价值。而证券的价值是基于现金流的折现分析，您可以将其投资未来。如果您拥有足够的信息并且足够了解，您可以投资现金流，即使有一点偏差，您也可以预测它。价格交易有时会高出50％，经常低于50％，这会分散对真正价值的关注。
And so the trick in investing in what we do may be a little different than what Oak tree specifically does Howard. But it's similar is that you know what the value is and the trick is, can you find is the price mispricing it up or down? I'd say on the up, it's difficult because sometimes you can't exit investments all to time when price is high, but you definitely know when price is low. And that's when you should be turning on the investing skills of all your people.
所以，在我们所投资的领域里，投资技巧可能跟Oak Tree Howard具体投资的略有不同。但是相似之处在于，你知道价值是什么，而投资技巧就是，你能否找到价格是否被高估或低估。我会说，在价格上升时，这很困难，因为有时你不能在价格高时退出投资，但你绝对知道价格低的时候。那就是你应该启动所有人的投资技能的时候。
Well, you know, there's an old saying that price is what you pay and value is what you get. And you have to bear in mind the difference. The interactive managers, both Oak tree and Brookfield and the raise on debture of the active manager is to find times when the price and value diverge. It's harder in the public securities market. It's harder still in the stock market. And there's a reason why the majority, for example, of mutual fund equity management has gone too passive. Not because passive is so great because active was so bad. People were emotional. They bought and sold for the wrong reasons. I believe they trade too much. All these things detracted from performance.
嗯，你知道，有一句老话说价格是你支付的，价值是你得到的。你必须记住这个区别。交互式管理者，无论是橡树还是布鲁克菲尔德，以及活跃管理者的债务增长，目的是寻找价格和价值背离的时机。在公共证券市场上，这是更加困难的。在股票市场上更加困难。而互惠基金股权管理的大部分原因，例如，已经变成了被动管理。这并不是因为被动很棒，而是因为活跃太差。人们情绪化，以错误的原因购买和出售。我认为他们交易过于频繁。这些事情都会减少表现。
But as Bruce says, it's all about, first of all, you have to know value, which means you have to know better than others because other people may be looking at the same assets for sale. You want to be the one who has the superior knowledge and then being able to figure out what that makes them worth. And then you say, okay, can I buy it for that price or less?
就像布鲁斯所说的那样，首先你得知道价值，这意味着你要比别人知道得更多，因为其他人可能也在看同样的出售资产。你想成为那个拥有优越知识并能够计算出它们价值的人。然后你就可以问自己，我能用那个价格或更少的价格买下它吗？
You know, and how are mentioned earlier our businesses and I'd say our business I weigh but Oak tree is the same is that our skill is being able to define the difference between value and price. And then we'll understand the underlying fundamentals of what you get.
你知道的，之前提到过我们的企业，我会说我们的企业和Oak tree的一样之处在于，我们的技能在于能够定义价值和价格之间的差异。然后，我们就会理解到所获得的基本事实。
I want to mention something, I know, this morning when I was working out, the S&P was up half a percent. And it's probably up or down a half a percent most days. Well, if there is 225 trading days in the year, that means that the S&P probably has cumulative changes, not net but growths of like 110 percent a year. But nothing's changing. The companies aren't changing. And nothing's changing in the game on the field. People are sitting in the stands making side bets and they're irrelevant to the value creation process.
我想提一件事，今天早上我在健身时注意到S&P上涨了半个百分点。大概每天都会涨跌半个百分点。如果一年有225个交易日，那么缩起来说，S&P每年可能会有110%的累计增长，而且没有什么改变。公司没有变化，场上的游戏没有变化。人们坐在看台上下注，与价值创造过程无关。
Those side bets don't make a company worth more or less. They don't change its long term prospects. You see the stock market goes up or down 50 percent. The prospects of the companies didn't change. So it's all the side betting activity which is motivated by mood, I would say. To which I would only add that if anyone that doesn't need money for liquidity purposes that they can have it in private assets, it means that they don't then get distracted.
那些附加赌注并不能让一家公司变得更有价值或更没有价值。它们不能改变公司的长期前景。你会发现股市波动上下50％，但公司的前景并没有变化。所以说这都是受情绪驱使的附加赌注活动。不过我想要补充的是，如果有任何人不需要流动资金，那么他们可以将资产保持私人化，这样就不会分心了。
If you own 100 percent of business, you run your business. You and your family have a business and it operates and it gives you cash flow or a growth. You don't check the price every morning to see what it is. The problem with the stock market is it confuses everybody as to what the goal is of investing.
如果你拥有一个企业的百分之百所有权，那么你要经营你的企业。你和你的家人拥有一家企业，它在运营并向你提供现金流或增长。你不会每天早上查看它的价格。股市的问题在于它让人们对投资的目标感到困惑。
Yeah, actually Howard in your recent memo, I know you actually kind of speak on this. Yeah. The recent memo is called what really matters and these daily price changes don't matter. Everybody looks at their stock prices every morning. Nobody does anything about it. Why do you look if it's down and makes you feel bad, it makes you feel good, but it doesn't really do anything. I think it's really is what Bruce calls a distraction.
是的，实际上霍华德在你最近的备忘录中，我知道你实际上在这个问题上说了些什么。是的。最近的备忘录叫做“真正重要的事情”，这些每天的价格变化并不重要。每个人早上都会看他们的股票价格，但是没有人会去采取行动。为什么要看它是否下跌会让你感到不好，它会让你感到好，但实际上它并没有做什么。我认为这真的是布鲁斯所说的分心。
I wonder what percentage of your assets price, very, very few, huh? Almost none. Yeah. And people look at us as a long term investor. Yeah. And part of the reason is because we don't have things getting priced every day and there's this big debate going on, I love your opinion on how it assets came down. Therefore private assets properly marked or not. And yes, there are some assets that are probably not marked properly because if bug markets came down 60% and they weren't real businesses because they were growth businesses and they had crazy multiples, it's possible private marks aren't at the right number yet.
我在想你的资产价值有多少百分之多少呢？非常非常少，对吧？几乎没有。是啊，人们把我们看作是长期投资者的一部分原因在于，我们的资产不会每天都变动价格。现在有一个很大的争论，关于私人资产的具体价值，不管有没有正确地打分。有些资产可能没有正确标记，因为如果大牛市下跌了60%，并且它们不是真正的企业，而是增长型企业，它们的倍率非常高，那么私人的标记可能还没到准确的数字。你对此有什么看法呢？
But for most things, this Howard said, if you hadn't asked that, you bought it at 10 times cash flow and it's private and the market traded at 18 before and you bought it at 10 and now the market trades at at 8. Well, is it only worth 8? Probably not. It's worth 10. You pay 10. It's growing its cash flows. It's doing just fine. Well, let's go back to what we talked about before. Didn't see value in price.
霍华德说，对于大部分事情来说，如果你没问这个问题，你以10倍现金流购买了它，这是私有的，而市场交易时的价格是18，你以10的价格购买，而现在市场交易时的价格是8。那么，它只值8吗? 可能不是。它值10。你支付10。它正在增加现金流。它做得很好。嗯，让我们回到之前的话题。不看价格看价值。
The price changes every day. Sometimes it changes by huge amounts. The value not so much. I don't know if the price of private assets isn't down enough this year. But I know that the prices of public assets fluctuate too much. The market is manic depressive. In real life, things fluctuate between pretty good and not so hot. But in the market, they go from flows to hopeless. And so my question is, are we supposed to emulate that when we price private asset?
每天价格都在变化，有时候变化得很大。但是价值并没有那么多变化。我不知道私有资产的价格今年降得不够。但我知道公共资产的价格波动太大。市场像是患有躁郁症一样。在现实生活中，事情在相当好和不太好之间波动。但在市场中，它们从波动到无望。因此我的问题是，我们是否应该在定价私有资产时效仿市场的这种情况？
Is it your job, Bruce, to reflect the psychological ups and downs of the guy who's checking his stock prices every morning? I think not. Look, I think that's true for us. But I think there were some businesses over the last two years that traded at extreme prices, Howard. Those ones came down a lot and therefore private marks probably need to get out more. But the things that we do, I think you're 100% right, which is we bought them at, we thought the right multiple, yes, interest rates have changed a little bit. Terminal value may change a little bit.
布鲁斯，你的工作是反映每天早上检查股票价格的人的心理起伏吗？我认为不是。看，我认为这对我们来说是正确的。但是，在过去的两年中，有些企业的股票价格交易得非常高，霍华德。那些价格下来了很多，因此私人市场价值可能需要更多地出现。但我们所做的事情，我认为你是100％正确的，那就是我们以正确的倍数购买了它们，是的，利率有一点变化，终值可能有一点变化。
But by the way, cash flows are going up more because inflation is increasing the cash flows in most businesses. Therefore, I don't think it's in the stuff that we do. But there may be some, if you traded at 100 multiple of revenue, maybe 100 multiple of revenue isn't the right number to. So I think the only caveat I'd make to your statement is that there are extreme points in the market to your oscillations. As I know, Howard, that's one thing you frequently talk about that idea of finding those extremes.
顺便说一下，现金流正在上涨，因为通货膨胀正在增加大多数企业的现金流量。因此，我认为这与我们所做的事情无关。但是，如果你以100倍营收的倍数进行交易，也许100倍营收的倍数就不是正确的数字。因此，我认为我要提出的唯一警告是，市场中存在极端波动的点。正如我所知，霍华德，你经常谈论寻找这些极端的想法。
Yes, well, that's Nirvana for the Active Manager. Let's discuss cycles because this is something that I think both of you have spoken about and in Howard, this is obviously something you've written about. You've literally wrote the book on cycles.
嗯，对积极经理来说，这就是涅磐之地。让我们来讨论循环，因为我认为你们两个都谈到了这个问题，而Howard，这显然是你所写的东西。你真的写了一本关于周期的书。
We've obviously seen a shift in cycles. So for both of you, what do you think you have learned about cycles this year?
我们显然看到了周期的变化。对于你们俩来说，你们认为今年你们学到了哪些关于周期的知识？
Well, and let's bear in mind that the events of 20 and 21 were not normal cycles. Normal cycles, according to the book that I wrote, occur because even though things have a trend line, people get excited and stock market. It increases above trend rate. And then people say it's too high and then it corrects back toward the trend line, but through it toward an excess on the downside and then it corrects back toward the trend line and an excess on the upside. And the economy does the same.
嗯，我们要记住，20和21的事件并不是常规周期。根据我写的书，常规周期是由于尽管事物有趋势线，人们会对股市感到兴奋。它超过了趋势线增长率。然后人们说它太高了，然后它会向趋势线纠正，但会超过趋势线向下的极点，然后它会向趋势线纠正并超过趋势线向上的一个过度。经济也是如此。
That is not what happened in 20 and 21. In 20, a meteor from outer space hit the earth in the form of the pandemic and it required that businesses be shut down. First time in history that we ever voluntarily closed the economy. And it was to prevent the spread, obviously, and that had nothing to do with the cycle. And then the fed and the treasury came to the rescue with loans and bond buying and interest rate cuts and so forth. That had nothing to do with the normal cycle.
在2020和2021年，情况不同。2020年，一颗外太空的流星以疫情的形式撞击了地球，这就需要关闭商业活动。这是历史上第一次我们自愿关闭经济。这当然是为了防止传播，与经济周期无关。然后，联邦储备和国库出手提供贷款和购买债券以及降低利率等等。这与正常周期无关。
So the recovery of the economy and the market was not a normal cyclical occurrence. Now maybe we're getting back to normal cycles. Although the involvement of the fed has been so dominant in the last 14 years that the word normal has questionable relevance.
所以经济和市场的复苏不是正常的周期性事件。现在可能我们正在回归正常的周期。虽然美联储在过去的14年中的介入非常占主导地位，以至于“正常”这个词的相关性值得质疑。
Well, I think the 21 was a positive cycle until the inflation reared its head. Again, the result of the fed intervention, not a cyclical development. But the fed is trying to cool it off with counter cyclical tools, which are interest rate increases and then quantitative tightening. They take liquidity out of circulation out of the economy. So that's where we are now.
我认为21年是一个积极的周期，直到通货膨胀出现。这是联邦干预导致的结果，不是周期性发展。但是，联邦正在试图用逆周期性工具来抑制它，即利率上涨和量化收紧。它们会将流动性从经济中拿走。所以这就是我们现在的情况。
I guess the lesson of these two years is that you can fight the fed in the short run. The fed will do what it wants and can pretty much to produce the result that wants in the economy. And that resonates in the markets. I happen to be of the opinion they can't do what they want forever. They can't levitate the market and keep it up there because they don't have enough ammunition. And as we're learning now through inflation, there are negative consequences to their doing so. But I think that's a very strong lesson.
我猜这两年的教训就是短期内你可以与美联储对抗。美联储会做它想做的事情，并且可以在经济中实现它想要的结果。这在市场上得到了体现。我认为他们不能永远做他们想做的事情。他们不能抬起市场并将其保持在那里，因为他们没有足够的弹药。并且通过通货膨胀，我们现在正在学习到这样做的负面后果。但我认为这是一个非常强烈的教训。
I guess the greatest lesson is that there are consequences to the feds actions. There was a theory called modern monetary theory, which said that deficits and debts don't matter to a country which is in control of its currency. Because if it runs deficits, it can just issue as much money as it wants. But now we're finding that printing too much money has an injurious effect through the inflation.
我想最重要的教训是联邦政府的行动会有后果。曾经有一种叫做现代货币理论的理论，它认为，赤字和债务对于掌控自己货币的国家来说并不重要。因为如果它产生赤字，就可以自由发行足够的货币。但现在我们发现，印制太多的钞票会通过通货膨胀产生不良影响。
So, Bruce, I know you've also spoken a bit about cycles. So I'm curious why you think it's so important for investors to understand and appreciate cycles.
所以，布鲁斯，我知道你也谈论过周期。我很好奇你认为投资者理解和欣赏周期很重要的原因是什么？
Cycles in our view, capital availability is one of the most important things to investing into the types of things that we do. We consume enormous amounts of capital, both equity and debt, to be able to build out the backbone of the global economy. If there's too much money chasing assets, prices go too high. If there's too little, they're often better.
在我们看来，循环是我们投资于我们所做的事情中的最重要的事情之一。我们消耗巨额的资本，包括股权和债务，以能够建立全球经济的支柱。如果有太多的资金追逐资产，价格就会过高。如果有太少，那么通常会更好。资本可用性在我们看来非常重要。
So we don't pay attention to cycles per se, but what we pay attention to is capital availability in the marketplace. 2020, everything went down. And then everything reflated. But today, you're starting to see that dispersion occurring. India is more positive today than many places. Brazil raised their interest rates way before everyone else. We're actually starting to come down in South America. You can see the different numbers. Europe is clearly in a recession. The U.S. may be coming to recession. And all those things impact capital flows and not necessarily the business value, but they affect the price by virtue of capital availability.
我们不是特别关注周期，而是非常关注市场上的资本可用性。2020年，所有的东西都下降了。然后一切都重新膨胀起来了。但今天，你会看到这种分散正在发生。印度比许多地方更积极。巴西比其他所有国家提前提高了利率。我们实际上正在南美洲开始下滑。你可以看到不同的数字。欧洲明显处于衰退之中。美国可能正在接近衰退。所有这些影响资本流动，而不是业务价值，但它们影响价格，因为有了资本可用性。
I would just say our view generally is, as I said earlier, by great assets and great places and have great people operate them. And if you do that, you can push all the way through cycles. And you will do very well if you just keep going. Just don't over leverage your assets and put too much debt on them. And to be able to support it and never be in a position to have to sell it at a point in time like that. And secondly, if you can widen out add to or add something else to your business, there are amazing opportunities and points in time when there's less capital available. Yeah, so that's cycle of capital availability creates those inefficiencies, as you said, where you see that difference between value and price.
我只是想说，我们的观点通常是，就像我之前说的那样，拥有伟大的资产、伟大的地点和优秀的人员经营它们。如果你这样做，你可以通过各种周期推进。如果你坚持不断地前进，你将获得很好的表现。只是不要过度利用你的资产并对它们负债太多。并且要能够支持它，并永远不会处于不得不在那个时候出售它的位置。其次，如果你能够拓展或添加其他业务，就会出现令人惊喜的机会和时机，当时有更少的资本可用。是的，资本可用周期的循环会产生这些效率低下的情况，正如你所说，你会看到价值和价格之间的差异。
And while we're talking about cycles, let's talk about one that I consider one of the most important in the short to medium term in rereading the memo diddo from 04 in preparation for this podcast. I had quite a shock. When I was writing the book on market cycles, I realized that there was a chapter missing and I put in what I considered one of the most important chapters in the book. And that is entitled the chapter, the cycle in attitudes towards risk. I thought that was really innovative. And as I say, I think it's a very important chapter. But in rereading diddo, there it is. Cycle in attitudes towards risk. So I thought it up. I imagined it twice. In other words, but I do think that the cycle in attitudes towards risk is very important.
我们现在谈到周期的话题，让我们谈论其中一个我认为在短中期内最重要的周期。在为这个播客准备的过程中，我重新阅读了2004年的备忘录，发现了让我很震惊的一点。当我写有关市场周期的书时，我意识到书中有一章缺失，于是我加入了一章我认为是整本书中最重要的章节。这一章叫做“风险态度周期”。我觉得这非常创新，也非常重要。但是在重新阅读备忘录时，我看到了同样的章节 - “风险态度周期”。也就是说，我想了两遍。但是我确实认为，风险态度周期非常重要。
Because as I say, people fluctuate wildly in their emotions and their attitudes. There are times when people say, oh, risk is my friend. The more risk you take, the more money you make. And anyway, I don't see anything to worry about. And when they feel that way, they'll obviously pay very high prices for risky assets because they have no risk aversion to hold them back. And then at other times, when things aren't going so well, then they say risk is just another way to lose money. I'll never bear risk again. Get me out at any price. And that's when they sell in despair. And that's when the great bargains are available.
因为，正如我所说，人们的情感和态度变幻莫测。有时人们会说：“风险是我的朋友。你冒的风险越大，挣的钱就越多。反正，我没看到有什么可担心的。”当他们有这种感觉时，他们显然会为高风险资产支付非常高的价格，因为他们没有任何风险厌恶倾向制约他们。而另一些时候，当事情不顺利的时候，他们会说风险只是另一种赔钱的方式。我永远不会再承担风险了。无论价格如何，都让我离开。这时他们就会因绝望而出售资产，而这正是买入大折扣的时机。
And when I look at the extremes of the market that I've lived through, and if we called them right and acted right as a consequence, I think those calls were always based on where did we stand in the cycle of attitudes towards risk? That along with what Bruce said before, the importance of the cycle of credit availability, those two things really dominate market positioning. Powered you at our board meeting last time, our Brookfield board meeting last time said to one of our team, they were projecting we're going to do something and we're waiting. And you said, why are you waiting? The returns seem to be on your target. And I think that's another thing you can never hit it. Perfect. Perfect is the enemy of the good.
当我看到市场的极端波动时，如果我们能够正确评估并做出相应的行动，我觉得我们的决策基本上都是基于我们所处的风险态度周期？就像布鲁斯之前所说的那样，信贷可用性的周期也非常重要，这两个因素真正主导着市场定位。我们在上次布鲁克菲尔德的董事会会议上听到你说的话，说我们的团队正在预测将要做什么，却在等待。你问他们，为什么要等待呢？收益似乎已经达到目标了。我认为这又是另外一个永远达不到完美的例子。完美是好的敌人。
One of the six tenants of Oak trees investment philosophies that were not market timers. We do adjust our tactics sometimes and our attitude and our eagerness. But the one thing we never do is we never say it's cheap today, but it'll be cheaper in six months, so we'll wait. If it's cheap, we buy it.
橡树投资哲学的六大原则之一是我们不是市场时间差。我们确实有时会调整策略、态度和热情。但我们从不说今天便宜，六个月后会更便宜，所以我们会等待。如果它很便宜，我们会买入。
Let's move on to contrarianism. Howard, I know this is something, again, you wrote about Indito partly because it's something you've written about quite a bit. So first, I'd just like you to defied. I know you've done this before, but again, really what you mean by contrarianism or intelligent contrarianism. The first level thinkers thinks contrarianism is doing the opposite of what others are doing. The second level thinker thinks that intelligent contrarianism is knowing what others are doing. And then why they're doing it, understanding what's wrong with what they're doing, understanding how that can be improved upon and then doing it. Obviously, a lot more complex, a lot more nuanced.
我们来谈谈"反潮流"（contrarianism）。霍华德，我知道你之前写过一些关于Indito的文章，其中就有讨论"反潮流"的部分。所以首先，我希望你能解释一下你所说的"反潮流"或者"智慧反潮流"（intelligent contrarianism）的具体含义。浅层思考者认为"反潮流"就是做与其他人相反的事情。而深层思考者则认为"智慧反潮流"是知道别人在做什么，以及为什么要这么做，然后理解他们的错误之处，思考如何改进并付诸实践。显然，这要比简单地反其道而行更加复杂、更加微妙。
My first book, the most important thing, had a chapter on contrarianism. Then there was an illuminated edition a couple years later with people making commentary and my friend, Joel Greenblatt, who was one of the great equity investors. His comment on contrarianism is just because five other people refused to stand in the path of an oncoming truck doesn't mean you should.
我的第一本书，最重要的一章是有关反向思考的。几年后出版了一本精装版，其中有人作出评论，还有我的朋友乔尔·格林布莱特，他是一位杰出的股票投资者。他对反向思考的评论是，仅仅因为其他五个人不肯站在即将来临的卡车前，不意味着你也不该站。
So the point is you can't make a living and you may not even live if all you do is do the opposite of what everybody else does. A lot of the time, the things that other people do are okay. You have to find the error. All of active management is about finding error. All of active management is about taking advantage of other people's mistakes.
所以问题在于，如果你只是反其道而行之，你不能谋生，甚至可能无法生存。很多时候，其他人做的事情是可以的。你必须找到错误。所有主动管理都是关于找到错误的。所有主动管理都是关于利用他人的错误。
We say our primary goal is to buy things for less than their worth, which sounds like a noble and reasonable objective. There's only one problem. It requires cooperation from somebody who's willing to sell things for less than their worth. But we obviously become more active when we think more people are making that mistake.
我们说我们的主要目标是以少于物品本身价值的价格购买它们，这听起来是一个高尚而合理的目标。只有一个问题，那就是需要有人愿意以低于物品价值的价格出售物品，这需要合作。但是如果有更多的人犯这个错误，我们显然会变得更加积极。
And Bruce, how does contrarianism play into what you do at Brookfield? Look, the greatest thing you can do in owning the type of assets that we own is to understand the values of what you have and to buy value when you can get it inexpensively. And to the point of contrarianism, it's not that other people aren't doing it. That affords you the opportunity.
布鲁斯，对于您在布鲁克菲尔德所做的事情，反常经营如何发挥作用？看，拥有我们拥有的类型的资产所能做的最伟大的事情就是理解你所拥有的价值，当你可以以低廉的价格买到它时就会买它。至于反常经营，不是说其他人没有这么做。这为您提供了机会。
The question really is, has something changed in the thinking of the world that you are missing? What I would say is what's really important about understanding the operating businesses you're in and especially not deviating from those businesses at the bottom of the market is because to make good long-term investments, you need to really know what you're doing.
问题实际上是，你是否忽略了全球思维中发生了什么变化？我认为，真正重要的是要理解你所经营的企业，并特别注意不要偏离底层市场的那些企业，因为要进行良好的长期投资，你需要真正了解自己在做什么。
And if you do, you can have that hard cause with second level thinking. You can have the second level thinking lots of people are leaving office buildings at this point in time, but many are coming back and they want new space and therefore they're paying higher rents for great space. The news says people are leaving office buildings. What they don't pick up is that the great buildings have higher rents than they've ever had before. If you're not in the business, you don't understand that.
如果你这样做，你就能够做到有第二层思考的难题。很多人现在都离开了办公楼，但是很多人也会回来，他们需要新的空间，因此他们会为了好的空间支付更高的租金。新闻报道说人们正在离开办公楼。但他们没有注意到，那些好的建筑比以往任何时候都要高昂的租金。如果你不在这个行业，你就无法理解这一点。
I think that's the fundamental difference in contrarian thinking is to differentiate between something was high there or for I should buy. Between something should high, what has changed in the fundamental analysis to the long-term future? Not often to things change other than technological advancement that affects increasingly more and more businesses, but that can fundamentally change a business.
我认为唱反调思考的根本区别在于区分某个东西是否高估以及我应该购买它。在某些东西应该高估时，长期未来的基本分析发生了什么变化？除了影响越来越多企业的技术进步外，很少有其他事情会发生根本性的变化，但这可能从根本上改变一个企业。
So it's that idea that as Howard mentions in, I beg to differ that it's not enough to be different. You also have to be right. Right at the right time. Yeah. If you're thinking about second level thinking or contrarianism, being different for differences sake is not what this is about. You diverge from the pack when you're thinking is better and not if it's not.
所以，正如霍华德提到的那样，我不同意仅仅是不同就足够了这个想法。你还必须是正确的，而且要在正确的时间。是的，如果你在考虑第二层思维或反潮流思想，仅仅为了与众不同而不同并不是本质。当你的思考更好而不是更差时，你就与其他人不同了。
I guess knowing other thing I'd add is it comes down to the fundamental analysis of information. And why I say it's important not to go into new things at the bottom of the market is, if you haven't been in a business before, you really don't understand the fundamental analysis of that business. And therefore you shouldn't try at the bottom of the market.
我觉得，如果我要加上别的什么，那就是需要进行基本信息的分析。为什么我说在市场底部不要尝试新事物很重要呢？因为如果你之前从未经营过这个业务，你就真的不明白该企业的基本分析。因此，你不应该在市场底部尝试。
Everyone thinks it's great. It's cheap. Let's buy. But if you don't fundamentally understand the business, it's very difficult to figure it out at the bottom. Which is why adding to businesses you have is really fantastic at the bottom of the market because often you can combine things in by your basis down if you want to call it that and truly come out the other side of a recessionary period with an enhanced business that you have. It's attempting to really find where you can gain an advantage.
大家都觉得这很好，它很便宜，我们买它吧。但如果你不从本质上理解这项业务，那么在底部就很难弄清楚了。这就是为什么在市场底部增加你拥有的业务真的非常棒，因为通常你可以把它们结合起来，如果你想这样称呼的话，基础下降，从而真正经历一个衰退期，拥有一个增强的企业。它试图真正找到你可以获得优势的地方。
Well, it all comes down to an advantage, Anna. You have to have a knowledge advantage. If active investing consists of taking advantage of other people's mistakes, you have to have a knowledge advantage to be able to recognize those mistakes. And if you're trading with someone to be not the person who's making the mistake but the person who's taking advantage of it.
嗯，安娜，这一切都是关于优势的。你必须拥有知识优势。如果积极投资意味着利用他人的错误，你必须拥有知识优势才能识别这些错误。如果你和别人交易，你要成为那个利用别人错误的人，而不是那个犯错误的人。
Specialization, Brookfield practices a high level of specialization. They go very deeply into a few fields. Howard, one of the things you've written about a bit this year or something your son mentioned about how it's increasingly becoming difficult to find ways to gain advantages. That as more people have more access to more information, you need to find other ways.
专业化方面，布鲁克菲尔德非常专注。他们会深入研究几个领域。霍华德，你今年写过一些关于这方面的文章，或者你的儿子提到了一个问题，即现在越来越难找到获取优势的方法。因为越来越多的人可以获取更多的信息，你需要找到其他方式。
Right. We are talking about the efficient market hypothesis. And it should be presumed in most areas that there is a tendency towards efficiency because inefficiencies come from ignorance and prejudice. Well, ignorance tends to go away over time, knowledge is cumulative. And I think prejudice is to the walls come down.
好的。我们正在谈论有效市场假说。在大部分领域，应该认为存在向效率的趋势，因为效率低下来自于无知和偏见。嗯，随着时间的推移，无知往往会消失，知识是累积的。我认为偏见会随着墙倒塌而消失。
You know, back in 1978 when I started with high yield bonds, Moody's defined a berated bond as saying that it fails to possess the characteristics of a desirable investment. That was a prejudice. If 95% of the people wouldn't buy them and you would buy them, maybe you can get a special bargain that way. But today, I think that those prejudices are going, if not gone.
你知道吗，1978年我开始投资高收益债券时，穆迪（Moody's）将不良债券定义为无法拥有理想投资特征的债券。那是一种偏见。如果有95%的人不买它们而你买它们，也许你可以通过这种方式获得特殊的便宜。但今天，我认为这些偏见正在消失，或已经消失了。
And maybe one area where you can gain an advantage that others don't have is being able to have a long-term focus. And I know this is something that you share.
也许你可以在一个领域获得别人没有的优势，那就是拥有长期视野。我知道这是你也推崇的东西。
Yeah, absolutely. Well, when I'm traveling around, especially in Europe and people find out that I'm in investment business, they say, oh, what are you to trade? My ears perk up because I say, we're not traders. Traders are somebody who bet on the next price move, tomorrow's price move. We're not traders. We're investors. Well, since we deal in securities and they go up and down the way they do, where I would say, short a term, then Brookfield. Brookfield buys big chunks of essentially a liquid assets and holds them for a long period of time. But this is the advantage.
是的，完全赞同。当我在旅行时，尤其是在欧洲，人们发现我从事投资业务时，他们会问，哦，你是做什么交易的呢？我就会听得更加专注，因为我会说，我们不是交易员。交易员是那些下注于市场未来价格走势的人，而我们不是交易员，我们是投资者。由于我们交易证券，其价格会随着市场波动波动起伏，所以我们比布鲁克菲尔德要偏短期。布鲁克菲尔德购买大量基本上是非流动的资产，并且长期持有它们。但是这是它的优势之一。
The memo, what really matters? First, starts off talking about things that don't matter. Short-term events, short-term focus, short-term trading, short-term performance. It's hard to get an edge on those things. And, Bruce, if you could speak a little bit about this importance of having a long-term focus.
这个备忘录到底在说什么呢？它一开始谈论了一些不重要的事情，比如短期事件、短暂的关注、短期交易和短期表现。这些事情很难取得优势。而且，布鲁斯，您能谈谈拥有长期眼光的重要性吗？
So, start off by saying, how it started, Oak Tree 27 years ago. And I came to Brookfield 32 years ago. Both of us are still invested in this business and we're not going anywhere else. So I would say, these are just long-term investments. Oak Tree shares traded before they don't trade now. But Howard doesn't look at the day-to-day price of what Oak Tree is. And I don't look at the day-to-day price of what Brookfield is.
嗯，我们先从说说27年前 Oak Tree 开始说起，那时我来到 Brookfield 工作已经有32年了。我们俩都一直投资在这个公司，没有离开的打算。我觉得这都只是长期投资罢了。Oak Tree 的股票以前交易过，现在已经不再交易了。但 Howard 不会过于纠结 Oak Tree 的日日股价，而我也不会过于注重 Brookfield 的日日股价。
So I think of it as, that's the fundamental analysis. We own a business. We've been building a business for a long period of time. And the value of what we create is the discounted cash flow analysis over a long period of time. And we continue to grow it for 25 years. And not straight, but upward.
所以我认为，这就是基本分析。我们拥有一家企业。我们已经建立了企业很长一段时间。我们创造的价值是长期贴现现金流分析的价值。我们将继续成长25年。不是直线的，而是向上的。
And this memo, what does matter? One of the things is an ownership mentality. You would do better in the markets to say, I want to own a piece of that company. As Bruce says, you don't wake up the next morning. Look at the prices. No, I changed them. I'm done. As an owner, you go for the long ball. And you can compound for five, six, seven years and really accomplish something big financially. Not day trading.
那么这个备忘录到底有什么重要性呢？其中之一是拥有所有权的心态。在市场中，你最好说：我想拥有那家公司的一部分。就像布鲁斯所说的，你不会在第二天醒来后看看价格，然后说：不，我改变了。我做完了。作为持有者，你要追求长期的利益。你可以连续五、六、七年，实现财务上的重大成就。这不是日间交易。
But the problem is Howard. And I go back to what I said it earlier about our repeatics. I think it's really important is we buy private businesses. And therefore, we don't have to get distracted. We buy a company. We take it private. We keep compounding away maybe five, 10, 15 years from now or maybe never. We sell it. We keep just growing and spitting up cash. If you're in the stock markets and you buy a share of Brookfield or any other company in the trades, the market confuses you every day. You're not sure.
但问题在于霍华德。我之前说过我们的重点是重复性的，我认为购买私人企业非常重要。这样我们就不会受到干扰。我们购买一家公司，将其私有化，然后五年、十年、十五年、甚至永远都在用复利增长。如果你投资股市，买入布鲁克菲尔德或其他任何交易的公司，市场会每天对你造成困惑。你不确定接下来该怎么做。
And I think the lucky thing of being on the inside of a company is you treat it like it's yours. Do you understand these are businesses and you own them and you can sell them or trade them or you know what the cash flows are. But if people can put themselves into the mindset of owning a company, a share is owning a company for the longer term and it's an incredibly beneficial thing to their long-term wealth.
我觉得，身处公司内部的幸运之处在于，你可以把它当作自己的事业来经营。你知道这些公司是生意，你拥有它们，可以卖掉或交换它们，或者你知道现金流量是多少。但是，如果人们能够进入拥有一个公司的心态，持有股票对于他们的长期财富来说是非常有益的。因为股票就是持有一家公司的一种方式，它可以带来长期财富的好处。
And we try to, I guess within everything we do, even though we have some funds or many funds that have life on them and we have to sell assets. At periods of time, we try to be very, very long-term in our thinking with respect to investments because the greatest way to compound wealth is to not pay taxes at intervals along the way every three years when you sell something or whatever that is. And to keep growing a business in its cash flows over a very long period of time. And that is an extremely good way to success in the investment business.
我們在做任何事情時，都會盡力長期考量，即使我們有一些基金或許多基金在存續，也需要出售資產。在某些時期，我們會非常、非常長期地考慮投資，因為最好的財富累積方法是不必每三年賣掉某些東西或其他類似的繳稅。而是在業務現金流長時間內持續增長。這是投資業務非常成功的方法。
One of the best things that Bruce has said today is when he keeps calling price fluctuations distractions. And they are. In my memo, I guess it was earlier this year selling out, I said, why do people sell? They sell basically for two reasons because things are up and they're afraid that the profit will disappear or because they're down and they're afraid the profit will worsen. They're just responding to changes in the price.
布鲁斯今天所讲的最好的事情之一，就是他一直把价格波动称为干扰。而实际上也确实是。在我的备忘录中，我猜是在今年早些时候的时候，我曾经问过：为什么人们会卖出？他们基本上有两个原因，一是因为价格上涨，他们担心利润会消失，或者因为价格下跌，他们担心利润会恶化。他们只是在响应价格的变化。
What should dominate your thinking and your behavior is changes in the value. So on that note, I would just say any final thoughts about what we've discussed today?
你应该主要关注价值的变化，不管是在你的思维还是行为上。所以，就这个问题而言，我只想问一下今天我们讨论的最后一些想法？
No, I think that the memo did, oh, talks about the things that are important and the things to keep in mind, long-term value, cycles, tendency of investors to go to excess, the importance of not being with them, the shortness of financial memory, which is extremely important, it's really summed up in understanding investor psychology, certainly not succumbing to it, ignoring it is better, profiting from the error of it is the best.
不，我认为这份备忘录谈到了很重要的事情以及需要记住的事情，比如长期价值、循环、投资者倾向于过度追求的倾向，不跟随他们的重要性，财务记忆的短暂性非常重要，这实际上是理解投资者心理的总结，当然不是屈服于它，忽视它是更好的，从其错误中获利是最好的。
My summary is howard always says it's better than I do, so I'm going to end with that. Thank you, Anna. Thank you guys so much for coming up. Pleasure.
我的总结是霍华德总是比我说得更好，所以我就这样结束了。谢谢你，安娜。非常感谢你们来参加。很高兴。
So before we go, I just like everyone to know that Brookfield has recently launched its own podcast, Brookfield Perspectives. In the first episode, Brookfield Vice Chair Mark Carney discusses the transition to a net zero economy with Connor Tuske, the head of Brookfield's renewable power and transition group. Everybody please check it out.
在我们出发之前，我想让大家知道，Brookfield最近推出了自己的播客——Brookfield Perspectives。在第一集中，Brookfield的副主席马克·卡尼和可再生能源和转型团队的负责人康纳·塔斯克一起讨论了迈向净零经济的转型。大家一定要去听听。
And now here's Ditto by Howard Marx. Here's how I started, what do you know in March 2003. I always ask Nancy to read my memos before I send them out. She seems to think being my wife gives her license to be brutally frank. They're all the same, she says, like your ties. They all talk about the importance of a high batting average, the need to avoid losers, and how much there is that no one can know.
现在是霍华德·马尔克斯的《Ditto》，我是这样开始的，你知道吗，是在2003年的三月。每次我发备忘录之前，我总是让南希先读一遍。她好像认为作为我妻子的权利就是要毫不客气地说实话。都一个样的，她说，就像你的领带一样。它们都谈论高打击率的重要性，避免输家的必要性，以及还有很多没人能够知道的东西。
The truth is, anyone who reads my memos of the last 23 years will see I return often to a few topics. This is due to the frequency with which themes tend to recur in the investment world. Humans often fail to learn. Today forget the lessons of history, repeat patterns of behavior, and make the same mistakes. As a result, certain themes arise over and over. Mark Twain had it right.
事实是，任何阅读我过去23年备忘录的人都会发现，我经常重复几个主题。这是由于投资世界中主题往往会不断重复。人类经常会失败，今天忘记历史的教训，重复行为模式，并犯同样的错误。因此，某些主题会不断浮现。马克·吐温说得对。
History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme. The details of the events may vary greatly from occurrence to occurrence, but the themes giving rise to the events tend not to change. What are some of my key repeating themes? There are a few, the importance of risk and risk control, the repetitiveness of behavior patterns and mistakes, the role of cycles and pendulums, the volatility of credit market conditions, the brevity of financial memory, the errors of the herd, the importance of gauging investor psychology, the desirability of contrarianism and counter-cyclicality, the futility of macro forecasting.
历史不会重复，但会发生相似的情况。事件的细节可能会因时间不同而有所变化，但导致事件发生的主题往往不会改变。我在哪些方面有一些关键的重复主题呢？有几个，如风险和风险控制的重要性、行为模式和错误的反复、周期和摆动的作用、信贷市场条件的波动性、金融记忆的短暂性、群体错误的产生、评估投资者心理的重要性、反向思维和逆周期行为的可取性、宏观预测的无用性。
Most are all of these have to do with behavior that's observed in the markets over and over. When I see it recur and want to comment, I'm often tempted to dust off an old memo, update the details and just insert the word, get out. But I don't, because there's usually something worth adding.
大部分或全部都与市场中一再观察到的行为有关。每当我看到这种情况重演并想做评论时，我经常会想起一个旧备忘录，更新细节，并插入“走人”这个词。但我不这样做，因为通常有一些值得添加的东西。
**Cycles**
One of the most important themes in investing, and when I often find worthy of discussion, relates to cycles. One is a cycle. Dictionaries define it as a series of events that are regularly repeated in the same order, or any complete round or series of occurrences that repeats or is repeated. And here's the definition of the term business cycle.
在投资中最重要的主题之一，也是我经常觉得值得讨论的，与周期有关。一个周期，字典将其定义为一系列事件，这些事件按照相同的顺序定期重复发生，或是重复发生的任何完整回合或序列。以下是“商业周期”这一术语的定义。
They're occurring and fluctuating levels of economic activity that in economy experiences over a long period of time. As you can see, the common thread is the concept of a series of events that is repeated. Many people think of a cycle as a continuous pattern in which a rise is followed by a fall, followed by another rise, and another fall, and so forth.
经济发展中会出现和波动的不同水平，而这些会在长时间内发生。你会发现，这些事件都有一个共同的特点——重复出现。许多人认为经济循环是一种连续的模式，其中上升后会跟着下降，再跟着另一个上升，再下降，依此类推。
These definitions are fine as far as they go. But I think they all miss something very important. The sense that each of the events in a cycle not only follows the one preceding it but is a result of the one preceding it. I think in the economic, investment, and credit arenas, a cycle is usually best viewed not merely as a progression through a standard sequence of positive and negative events, but as a chain reaction.
这些定义总体来说还不错，但我认为它们都忽略了非常重要的一点。就是每个周期中的事件不仅是前一个事件的后续，还是前一个事件的结果。在经济、投资和信贷领域，我认为一个周期通常最好被视为一连串连锁反应，而不是简单的正面和负面事件的标准顺序。
Before I launch into the discussion of cycles that will follow, I want to make the point that it's hard to know where to start. It's tough to say the cycle started with Y, since usually Y was caused by X. X and X by W, but we have to start someplace.
在我开始接下来的周期讨论之前，我想要强调的一点是很难知道从哪里开始。很难说这个周期是从Y开始的，因为通常Y是由X引起的。X由W引起，但我们必须要从某个地方开始。
**The real estate cycle**
I'll use the cycle in real estate as an example. In my view, it's usually clear, simple, and regularly recurring. Bad times cause the level of building activity to be low and the availability of capital for building to be constrained. In a while the times become less bad and eventually even good. Better economic times cause the demand for premises to rise.
我以房地产周期为例来谈一下。在我看来，这个周期通常很明显、简单而且有规律。糟糕的时期会导致建筑活动水平低，建筑资金的可用性也受到限制。过了一段时间，情况会变得不那么糟糕，最终变得好起来。经济情况好转会导致场所需求上升。
With few buildings having been started during the soft period and now coming on stream, this additional demand for space causes the supply demand picture to tighten and thus prices and rents to rise. This improves the economics of real estate ownership, reawakening developers' eagerness to build. The better times and improved economics also make lenders and investors more optimistic.
由于在疫情期间没有开始建造太多建筑，现在这些建筑正在陆续上市，因此对空间的需求增加，导致供需形势趋紧，价格和租金因此上涨。这改善了房地产拥有者的经济状况，使开发商重新燃起建造的热情。更好的时代和经济状况也让贷款人和投资者更加乐观。
They're improved state of mind causes financing to become more readily available. Shieper, easier financing raises the pro-former returns of potential projects, adding to their attractiveness and increasing developer's desire to pursue them. Higher projected returns, more optimistic developers and more generous providers of capital combined for a ramp up in building starts.
他们改善的心态使得融资变得更加容易。更加简便的融资提高了潜在项目的预期回报，进一步增加了项目的吸引力，也增加了开发者追求它们的渴望。更高的预期回报、更加乐观的开发者以及更加慷慨的资本提供者共同为建筑项目的启动提供了动力。
The first completed projects encounter strong pent-up demand. They lease up or sell out quickly, giving their developers good returns. Those good returns, plus each day's increasingly positive headlines, cause additional buildings to be planned, financed, and green-lighted. Cranes fill the sky and additional cranes are ordered from the factory, but that's a different cycle. It takes years for the buildings started later to reach completion. In the interim, the first ones to open eat into the unmet demand.
第一批完成的项目遇到了强烈的压抑需求。它们很快租完或卖完，为开发商带来了良好的回报。这些回报加上每天日益积极的头条新闻，导致计划、融资和获得绿灯的建筑数量增加。起重机填满了天空，并订购了额外的起重机，但这是一个不同的周期。后来启动的建筑物需要几年时间才能完成。在此期间，首批开业的建筑物侵蚀了未满足的需求。
The period between the start of planning to the opening of a building is often long enough for the economy to transition from boom to bust. Projects started in good times often open and bad, meaning their space adds to vacancies, putting downward pressure on rents and sale prices, unfilled space hangs over the market. Bad times cause the level of building activity to be low and the availability of capital for building to be constrained. Or as we said in computer programming in the 1960s, go to top and begin again. This process is highly illustrative of the cyclical chain reaction I'm talking about. Each step in the progression doesn't merely follow the one that preceded it, it is caused by the one that preceded it.
从规划开始到建筑开放之间的时间往往足够长，使得经济周期从繁荣转向萧条。在好时期启动的项目常常在不景气时开放，这意味着它们的空间增加了闲置物业，对租金和销售价格施加了压力，未被填满的空间悬挂在市场上。不景气导致建筑活动水平低，建筑资本的可用性受到限制。或者像我们在20世纪60年代的计算机编程中所说的那样，回到顶部并重新开始。这个过程高度说明了我所说的循环连锁反应。每一步的进展不仅仅是前一步所跟随的，而是由前一步引起的。
Cycles and Risk This memo is devoted to the cycle in attitudes toward risk. Economies rise and fall quite moderately. Think about it, a 5% drop in GDP is considered massive. Companies see their profits fluctuate considerably more because of their operating and financial leverage. But market gyrations make the fluctuations in company profits look mild. Securities prices rise and fall much more than profits, introducing considerable investment risk.
这份备忘录专门探讨了人们对风险态度的周期性变化。经济起伏相当中度。想想看，国内生产总值下降5%就被视为巨大的影响。由于运营和金融杠杆作用，企业看到其利润波动幅度更大。但市场波动使公司利润的波动看起来较小。证券价格上涨和下跌比利润大得多，引入了相当大的投资风险。
Why is that so? Primarily I think because of the dramatic ups and downs in investor psychology. The economic cycle is constrained in its fluctuations by the existence of long term contracts and the fact that people will always eat, pay rent, buy gasoline and engage in many other activities. The quantities involved will rise and fall but not without limitation. Likewise for most companies, cost reductions can mitigate the impact of sales declines on earnings. And there's often some base level below which sales are unlikely to go. In other words, there are limits on these cycles. But there are no checks on the swings of investor psychology.
为什么会这样呢？我主要认为是由于投资者心理的戏剧性波动。经济周期的波动受到长期合同的限制，以及人们总是必须吃饭、付房租、买汽油和从事许多其他活动的事实所限制。这些数量会上升和下降，但是有限度。同样，对于大多数公司来说，成本的降低可以缓解销售下降对收益的影响。而且通常存在一些基础水平，低于该水平销售不太可能下降。换句话说，这些周期是受限制的。但是，投资者心理的波动没有任何限制。
At times, investors get crazily bullish and can imagine no limits on prosperity, growth and appreciation. They assume trees will grow to the sky. Nothing's too good to be true. And on other occasions, or respondingly, despondent investors can't think of any limits to how bad things can get. People conclude that the worst case scenario they prepared for isn't negative enough. Highly disastrous outcomes are considered plausible, even likely. Over the years, I've become convinced that fluctuations in investor attitudes toward risk contribute more to major market movements than anything else. I don't expect this to ever change.
有时候，投资者会过度乐观，想象财富、增长和升值没有极限。他们认为树会长到天上。没有任何事物过于美好而不真实。而在其他时候，或者说是因此，沮丧的投资者无法想象事情会变得多糟。人们得出结论，他们为最坏情况所做的准备还不够负面。高度灾难性的结果被认为是有可能的，甚至是有可能的。多年来，我越来越相信投资者对风险的态度波动对大市场运动的影响大于其他任何因素。我不指望这会改变。
The source of investment risk. Much perhaps most of the risk in investing comes not from the company's institutions or securities involved. It comes from the behavior of investors. Back in the dark ages of investing, people connected investment safety with high quality assets and risk with low quality assets. Bonds were assumed to be safer than stocks. Stocks of leading companies were considered safer than stocks of lesser companies. Giltedge or investment grade bonds were considered safe. And speculative grade bonds were considered risky.
投资风险的来源很大程度上并不是由于公司机构或所涉及到的证券，而是由于投资者的行为。在早期的投资中，人们认为高质量资产能够保证安全，而低质量资产则带有风险。债券被认为比股票更安全。领先公司的股票被认为比次级公司的股票更安全。国库券或投资级别的债券被认为是安全的，而投机级别的债券则被认为是有风险的。
I'll never forget Moody's definition of a B-rated bond. Fails to possess the characteristics of a desirable investment. All of these propositions were accepted at face value, but they often failed to hold up. When I joined First National City Bank in the late 1960s, the bank built its investment approach around the nifty-fifty. Companies were considered to be the 50 best and fastest growing companies in America. Most of them turned out to be great companies, just not great investments. In the early 1970s, their PE ratios went from 80 or 90 to 8 or 9. And investors in these top-quality companies lost roughly 90% of their money.
我永远不会忘记穆迪对B级债券的定义。它缺乏一个理想投资的特点。所有这些命题都被当作表面价值被接受了，但它们常常不能保持下去。当我在60年代末加入第一城市银行时，银行的投资方法是基于50强。这些公司被认为是美国最好和最快增长的50家公司。其中大部分都是伟大的公司，只是不是伟大的投资。在70年代初期，它们的市盈率从80或90下降到8或9。并且投资这些顶级品质公司的投资者失去了大约90%的资金。
Then in 1978, I was asked to start a fund to invest in high yield bonds. They were commonly called junk bonds, but a few investors invested nevertheless, lured by their high interest rates. Anyone who put $1 into the high yield bond index at the end of 1979 would have more than $23 today, and they were never in the red.
1978年，有人请我开始设立一只基金，用于投资高收益债券，通常被称为垃圾债券。尽管如此，还是有一些投资者被它们高额的利率所吸引而投资了进去。如果有人在1979年底将1美元投向高收益债券指数，现在他们将获得超过23美元的回报，而且从未亏本。
Let's think about that. You can invest in the best companies in America and have a bad experience. Or you can invest in the worst companies in America and have a good experience. So the lesson is clear. It's not asset quality that determines investment risk.
让我们思考一下。你可以投资于美国最好的公司却有糟糕的经历。或者你可以投资于美国最差的公司却有好的经历。因此，教训很明显。不是资产质量决定了投资风险。
The precariousness of the nifty-fifty in 1969 and the safety of high yield bonds in 1978 stemmed from how they were priced. A too high price can make something risky, whereas a too low price can make it safe. Price isn't the only factor in play, of course. The deterioration of an asset can cause a loss, as can its failure to produce profits as expected. But, all other things being equal. The price of an asset is the principal determinant of its riskiness.
"Nifty-fifty"在1969年的不稳定性和1978年的高收益债券安全性来源于它们的价格定价形式。价格过高可能会使某物变得有风险，而价格过低则可能会使其变得安全。当然，价格不是唯一的因素。资产的恶化以及未能按预期产生利润也可能导致损失。但是，其他因素相同的情况下，资产的价格是其风险程度的主要决定因素。
The bottom line on this is simple. No asset is so good that it can't be bit up to the point where it's overpriced and thus dangerous. And few assets are so bad that they can't become underpriced and thus safe. Not to mention potentially lucrative. Since participants set security prices, it's their behavior that creates most of the risk in investing.
这件事的底线很简单。没有任何资产可以保持如此优秀，以至于它不能被推高到过高的价格，这样就变得危险。而且很少有资产是如此糟糕，以至于它们不能变得低估，从而安全。更不用说可能会有收益了。由于参与者设定安全价格，因此是他们的行为在投资中造成了大部分风险。
This is true in many other activities as well, the common thread being the involvement of humans. Jill Fredstin, an expert on avalanches, has observed that better safety gear can entice climbers to take more risk, making them in fact less safe. Cansions and investments. When all traffic controls were removed from the town of Drachten-Hulland, traffic flow doubled and fatal accidents fell to zero, presumably because people drove more carefully. Dylan Greiss, Societe General. So improvements in safety equipment can be neutralized by human behavior and driving can become safer despite the removal of safety equipment. It all depends on how the participants behave.
在许多其他活动中也是如此，共同点就是涉及人类的参与。雪崩专家吉尔·弗德斯汀观察到，更好的安全装备可能会引诱攀登者冒更多风险，实际上让他们更加不安全。关于资金和投资。当德拉赫滕-赫兰德小镇上所有交通管制都被取消时，交通流量增加了一倍，致命事故数量却下降到了零，大概是因为人们更加小心地开车。因此，安全装备的改进可能会被人类行为所抵消，尽管安全装备被移除，开车也可能变得更加安全。一切都取决于参与者的行为。
The cycle and attitudes toward risk. The riskiest thing in the investment world is the belief that there's no risk. On the other hand, a high level of risk consciousness tends to mitigate risk. I call this the perversity of risk. It's the reason for Warren Buffett's dictum that the less prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs.
在投资世界中，最冒险的事情是相信没有风险。另一方面，高度的风险意识往往会缓解风险。我把这叫做风险的反常现象。这就是沃伦·巴菲特的格言的原因，他说别人处理自己事务的谨慎程度越低，我们处理自己事务的谨慎程度就要越高。
When other people love investments, we should be cautious. But what others hate them, we should turn aggressive. It is essential to observe that investor attitudes in this regard are far more constant.
当其他人热衷于投资时，我们应该保持谨慎。但当其他人对它们感到厌恶时，我们应该变得积极。需要注意的是，投资者的态度在这方面要更为恒定。
A memo called the Happy Medium, July 21, 2004 said that while it would be good for most investors, the ones not suited to be contrairions, to always hold a moderate position that balances risk aversion and risk tolerance, and thus the fear of losing money and the fear of missing opportunities, this is something very few people can do. Rather, attitudes toward risk cycle up and down, usually counterproductively.
一份名为“中庸”的备忘录，于2004年7月21日发布，指出虽然让大多数投资者保持稳健的立场，即平衡风险规避和风险容忍，从而避免损失和错失机会，是一个好主意。但事实上，只有很少数人能够做到。风险态度通常会反复循环，往往事与愿违。
Becoming more and less risk averse at the right time is a great way to enhance investment performance. Doing it at the wrong time, like most people do, can have a terrible effect on results. How does the up cycle in risk taking develop?
在适当的时间增加或减少风险厌恶感是提高投资表现的好方法。但如果在错误的时间这样做，像大多数人一样，会对结果产生可怕的影响。风险承担的增长周期是如何发展的？
When economic growth is slow or negative and markets are weak, most people worry about losing money and disregard the risk of missing opportunities. Only a few stout-hearted contrairions are capable of imagining that improvement is possible. Then, the economy shows some signs of life and corporate earnings begin to move up rather than down. Even later, economic growth takes hold visibly and earnings show surprising gains.
当经济增长缓慢或负面并且市场疲软时，许多人担心失去钱财，忽略错过机会的风险。只有少数勇于反其道而行之的人有能力想象改善是可能的。然后，经济显示出一些生命迹象，企业收益开始上升而不是下降。过了一段时间，经济增长明显扎根，收益显示出惊人的增长。
This excess of reality over expectations causes security prices to start moving up. Because of those gains, along with the improving economic and corporate news, the average investor realizes that improvement is actually underway. Confidence rises. Investors feel richer and smarter. Check their prior bad experience and extrapolate the recent progress.
这种现实超出了期望，导致股票价格开始上涨。由于这些收益以及经济和企业新闻的改善，普通投资者意识到实际上正在取得进展。信心提高了。投资者感觉更富有和更聪明了。检查他们之前的不良经验并推断最近的进步。
Skepticism and caution abate, optimism and aggressiveness take their place. Anyone who's been sitting out the dance experiences the pain of watching from the sidelines as assets appreciate. The bystanders feel regret and are gradually sucked in. The longer this process goes on, the more enthusiasm for investments rises and resistance subsides.
怀疑和谨慎消退，乐观和进攻取而代之。任何一个一直坐在一旁的人都会感受到看着资产升值而痛苦的经历。旁观者感到遗憾然后逐渐被吸引。这个过程持续的时间越长，对投资的热情就会越高，而抵抗力就会减弱。
People worry less about losing money and more about missing opportunities. Risk aversion evaporates and investors behave more aggressively. People begin to have difficulty imagining how losses could ever occur. Financial institutions subject to the same influences become willing to provide increased financing. In the words of Citibank's Chuck Prince, when the music's playing, they see no choice but to dance. Thus, they compete for market share by reducing the return they demand and by being willing to finance riskier deals.
人们不太担心失去钱，而更担心错过机会。风险规避减少，投资者变得更加积极。人们开始难以想象损失如何可能发生。受相同影响的金融机构愿意提供增加的融资。用花旗银行的Chuck Prince的话来说，当音乐响起时，他们别无选择，只能跳舞。因此，他们通过降低要求的回报率和愿意融资风险更大的交易来竞争市场份额。
See the race to the bottom, February 14, 2007. Easier financing, along with the recent gains, encourages investors to make greater use of leverage. Barrowed capital increases their buying power and they move to put it to work. Reached investors report the greatest gains, consistent with the old Las Vegas Maxim, the more you bet, the more you win when you win. This causes others to emulate them. The market takes on the appearance of a perpetual motion machine.
看看这场比拼跌价，它发生于2007年2月14日。更容易的融资方式加上最近的收益，鼓励投资者更多地使用杠杆。借来的资本增加了他们的购买能力，他们开始投入使用。到手的投资者报告最大的收益，符合老的拉斯维加斯格言：“你下注越多，赢得越多”。这引起了其他人的效仿。市场变得像一个永动机。
Appreciation accelerates, possibly leading to a mania or bubble. Everyone concludes that things can only get better forever. They forget about the risk of losing money and fixate on not missing opportunities. Leveraged buyers become convinced that the things they buy with borrowed money are certain to appreciate at a rate above their borrowing cost.
感激之情加速，可能导致狂热或泡沫。每个人都得出结论，事物只会变得更好。他们忘记了失去金钱的风险，只关注不错过机会。杠杆买家变得确信他们用借来的钱购买的物品必定会以高于借款成本的速度升值。
Eventually things get as good as they can get, the last skeptic capitulates and the last potential buyer buys. That's the way the cycle of attitudes toward risk ascends. The skeptic, in times of moderation, becomes a true believer at the top. But as Herb Stein brilliantly observed, if something cannot go on forever, it will stop.
最终，事情会变得尽可能好，最后的怀疑者会投降，最后的潜在购买者会买下。这就是对风险态度的循环逐渐升高的方式。怀疑者在温和的时候会成为顶端的坚定信徒。但正如赫伯特·斯坦所观察到的那样，如果某件事情不能永远持续下去，它就会停止。
Applying the thought here, I'd say when things are as good as they can get, they can't get any better. That suggests eventually they'll get worse. It always turns out that investors' hopes to the contrary, economies, profits and asset prices can't rise forever. Or at a minimum, they can't keep pace with investors' ever-rising hopes, and thus the down cycle begins.
使用我自己的话来说，当事情达到最好的状态时，它们就无法再变得更好了。这表明它们最终会变得更糟。总是会出现这样的情况——投资者抱有反对意见，经济、利润和资产价格无法永远上涨。或者至少，它们无法跟上投资者不断上涨的期望，因此下行周期开始了。
Once the last potential buyer has bought, there's nobody left to take prices higher. A few unemotional, disciplined and foresighted investors conclude that things have gone too far, and a correction is in the cards. Effectivity and corporate earnings turn down, or they begin to fall short to people's irrationally expanded expectations. The error of those expectations becomes obvious, causing security prices to start declining. Perhaps someone is daring enough to point out publicly that the emperor of limitless growth has no clothes.
一旦最后一个潜在的买家购买后，就没有人能够抬高价格了。一些理智、自律且有远见的投资者得出结论，事情已经走得太远，必须进行修正。有效性和企业收益下降，或开始未能达到人们的非理性扩大的期望。这些期望错误成为显而易见，导致证券价格开始下降。也许有人大胆地公开指出，无限增长的皇帝是赤身裸体的。
Sometimes there's a catalyzing event, or sometimes, see early 2000, security prices begin to fall of their own accord simply because they had moved too high. The first price declines cause investors to rethink their analysis, conclusions, commitment to the market and risk tolerance. It becomes clear that appreciation will not go on ad infinitum. I'd buy at any price is replaced by, how can I know what the right price is? Week economic news takes the place of positive reports.
有时候会有一个催化事件，或者就像早在2000年，证券价格开始下跌，纯粹是因为它们已经涨得太高了。第一轮价格下跌使投资者重新思考他们的分析、结论、对市场的承诺和风险承受能力。很明显，升值将不会一直持续下去。“我任意价格购买”被“我怎么知道正确的价格是多少？”所取代。经济疲软的消息取代了好消息。
The average investor realizes that things are getting worse. Interest in investing declines, selling, replaces buying. Investors who sat out the dance, or who just underweighted the depreciating assets, are lionized for their wisdom, and holders start to feel stupid. Gidey enthusiasm is replaced by sober skepticism.
一般投资者意识到形势正在恶化。对投资的兴趣下降，卖出代替了买入。那些旁观者或只是轻估贬值资产的投资者因其智慧而备受赞誉，而持有者开始感到愚蠢。热闹的热情被冷静的怀疑所取代。
Risk tolerance declines, and risk aversion is on the upswing. People switch from worrying about missing opportunity to worrying about losing money. Financial institutions become less willing to extend credit to investors. At the extremes, investors receive margin calls. Investors who borrow to buy are heavily penalized, and the media report on leveraged entities' spectacular meltdowns.
风险容忍度下降，风险规避正在上升。人们从担心错过机会转为担心失去钱。金融机构不愿意向投资者提供信贷。在极端情况下，投资者会收到保证金追加通知。那些借钱买入的投资者会遭到严厉惩罚，媒体报道了杠杆实体的惊人崩溃。
Invests selling in response to margin calls and covenant violations causes price declines to accelerate. Eventually we hear some familiar refrain. I wouldn't buy at any price. There's no negative case that can't be exceeded on the downside, and I don't care if I ever make another penny in the market. I just don't want to lose anymore. The last believer loses faith in the market, selling accelerates, and prices reach their nature.
投资者因为保证金追加和公约违规而出售投资，导致价格下降加速。最终我们会听到一些熟悉的话语：“我不会用任何价格购买。没有任何负面情况可以比跌幅更大，我不在乎是否能从市场中再赚到一分钱。我只是不想再失去了。”最后一个相信市场的人失去了信心，卖压加速，价格达到它们的自然水平。
The important conclusions from observing the pattern just mentioned are these. Over time, conditions in the real world, the economy and business cycle from better to worse and back again. Investor psychology responds to these ups and downs in a highly exaggerated fashion.
从刚才提到的模式观察中得出的重要结论是，随着时间的推移，现实世界中的条件、经济和商业周期会从好转变为坏、再变好。投资者心理对这些波动做出高度夸张的反应。
Things are going well, investors swing to excessive euphoria, under the assumption that everything's good and can only get better. And when things are bad, they swing toward depression and panic, viewing everything negatively and assuming it can only get worse. When the outlook is good and their mood is abulliant, investors take security prices to levels that greatly overstate the positives from which a correction is inevitable.
事情进行得很顺利，投资者开始过度狂热，认为一切都很好，只会越来越好。当事情变糟时，他们会陷入沮丧和恐慌，把一切看成是负面的，并认为情况只会变得更糟。当前景看好，他们情绪高涨时，投资者会把安全价格推到非常高的水平，这会极大地夸大利好因素，导致必然会发生调整。
When the outlook is bad and they're depressed, investors reduce prices to levels that overstate the negatives, from which great gains are possible and the risk of further declines is limited. The excessive nature of these swings in psychology and thus security prices dependably creates opportunities of over and undervaluation.
当市场前景不好时，投资者会感到沮丧，他们将股价降至高估当前局的水平，但这会产生巨大的收益机会，同时也限制了进一步下跌的风险。这种情绪和证券价格的过度波动可靠地创造了超买和超卖的机会。
In bad times, securities can often be bought at prices that understate their merits, and in good times, securities can be sold at prices that overstate their potential. And yet, most people are impelled to buy euphorically when the cycle drives prices up and to sell in panic when it drives prices down.
在经济低迷时期，证券通常以低于其真实价值的价格被购买，而在经济景气时期，证券则以高估潜力的价格售出。然而，大多数人在市场周期推动价格上涨时会兴高采烈地购买，而在价格走低时却会惊慌失措地抛售。
Buy and hold used to be a popular approach among investors, and it performed admirably when the markets rose almost nonstop from 1960 to 1972 and from 1982 to 1999. But thanks to the lackluster results of the last 13 years, it has nearly disappeared. Nowadays, investors are much more likely to trade in an effort to profit from or at least avoid losses connected to economic, corporate and market developments.
“买进并持有”曾经是投资者中的一种流行方法，当股市在1960年至1972年和1982年至1999年间几乎不间断地上涨时，这种方法效果良好。但由于过去13年市场表现不佳，这种方法几乎不再使用。如今，投资者更有可能通过交易来获利或至少避免与经济、公司和市场发展相关的损失。
However, when most investors unite behind a macro trading decision, they're usually wrong in the ways just described. This is the reason why contrarianism often pays off big. In order to be a successful contrarian, you have to do the opposite of what the herd does. And to do that, you have to diverge from the conventional cycle in attitudes toward risk.
然而，当大多数投资者在宏观交易决策上团结一致时，通常会以刚才描述的方式出错。这就是为什么违反常规常常能够获得巨大收益的原因。要成为成功的“反向操作者”，你必须做与群体相反的事情。为了达到这一点，你必须与传统的风险态度周期不同。
Everyone would like to profitably resist this error prone and thus costly cycle. The fact that most people succumb anyway shows how strong its power is, and that most people are not above average in this regard. Of course. This move in response to decisions made by the majority of investors. Most investors are guilty of the sin of overreacting and even worse. This sin of moving in the wrong direction, demonstrating that the ability to resist the cycle is uncommon.
每个人都希望能够有效地抵制这种易于出错而昂贵的循环。但事实上，大多数人仍然会屈服，这表明它的力量非常强大，而大多数人在这方面并不出众。当然，这是针对大多数投资者做出的决定所做出的举动。大多数投资者都有过度反应的罪行，甚至更糟。这种朝错误方向移动的罪孽，证明了抵制这种循环的能力是不常见的。
To be a successful contrarian, you have to be able to see what most people are doing, understand what's wrong about most people's behavior, possess a strong sense for intrinsic value which most people ignore at the extremes. Resist the psychological pressures that make most people air and thus buy when most people are selling and sell when most people are buying.
成为一名成功的反向投资者，你需要能够看到大多数人在做什么，理解大多数人行为上的错误，拥有强大的内在价值感，而这一点大多数人在极端情况下都会忽略。抵制心理压力，让大多数人追风逐势，并在大多数人卖出时买入，在大多数人买入时卖出。
And one other thing, you have to be willing to look wrong for a while. If the herd is doing the wrong thing and if you're capable of seeing that and doing the opposite, it's still highly unlikely that the wisdom of what you do will become apparent immediately. Usually the crowd's irrational euphoria will continue to take prices higher for a while, possibly a long while, or its excessive negativism will continue to take prices lower.
还有一件事，你必须有心理准备暂时显得错误。如果群众正在做错的事情，而你有能力看到这一点并采取相反的行动，你所做的明智之举很可能不会立刻显现出来。通常，人群的非理性狂喜会继续使价格上涨一段时间，可能是很长一段时间，或者它的过度消极会继续抑制价格下降。
The contrarian will appear wrong and the fact that his error comes in acting differently from most people will make him look like nothing but an oddball loser. Thus, in addition to the five requirements just listed, successful contrarianism requires the ability to stick with losing positions that, as David Swenson has written, frequently appeared downright imprudent in the eyes of conventional wisdom.
那些想唱反调的人往往会被视为错了，而他的失误正是因为他和大部分人的行为不同，使他看起来像一个不成功的怪人。因此，要想成功唱反调还需要具备另外五个要求，其中包括坚持不放弃失败的立场，正如David Swenson所写的那样，这些立场在常规智慧眼中常常显得相当不明智。
If you can't stand living with the embarrassment of being unconventional and wrong, contrarianism may not be for you. Rather than trying to do the difficult opposite of what the crowd is doing, you might have to settle for merely refusing to join in its errors. That would be a very good thing. But even that is not easy.
如果你无法忍受与非传统和错误的特点共同生活的尴尬，持异议可能不适合你。你可能无法像群众所做的相反而努力，相反你可能只能拒绝加入它的错误。那将是非常好的事情。但即使如此，也并不容易。
Risk and Return Today 2004 version. The name of this section served as the title of a memo in October 2004. It was one of my first cautionary responses to the vertiginous market ascent that would be exposed by the subprime mortgage collapse in 2007 and would culminate in the global financial crisis in 2008.
这一部分的名字是2004年10月一份备忘录的标题。这是我对那时市场的险象环生做出的警告性回应之一。这种局面在2007年次贷危机时被揭示，最终在2008年全球金融危机中达到了顶峰。
In the memo, I observed that the capital market line connecting risk and return had become lower and flatter. The loan is meant that the line started off with low returns on low-risk assets, due to the Fed's efforts to stimulate the economy through low interest rates. And as one moved out the risk curve, even riskier investments offered low potential returns.
在备忘录中，我观察到风险和回报相连的资本市场线变得更低、更平。这意味着，由于美联储通过低利率刺激经济，导致线的起点是低风险资产的低回报。而当投资风险增加时，即使更高风险的投资也提供了低潜在回报。
Due to the low interest rates, I said, the bar for each successively riskier investment has been set lower than at any time in my career. The flatness of the line was a result of sanguine attitudes toward risk. Here are excerpts from my explanation.
我说，由于低利率，对于每次投资风险更高的门槛都低于我职业生涯中的任何时期。曲线的平坦是风险乐观态度的结果。以下是我解释的摘录。
First, investors have fallen over themselves in their effort to get away from low-risk, low-return investments. When you're especially eager not to make safe investment A, it takes less compensation than usual in terms of prospective return to get you to accept risky investment B. Second, risky investments have been very rewarding for more than 20 years and did particularly well in 2003.
首先，投资者们在努力远离低风险、低回报的投资方面，甚至都疯狂地想要避开安全投资方案A。这样一来，如果你非常渴望不选择安全的投资方案A，即使是相对于预期回报而言回报较低的冒险投资方案B，也会显得更加有吸引力。第二，20年多来，冒险投资颇受青睐，并在2003年特别出色。
Thus, investors are attracted more or repelled less by risky investments than perhaps might otherwise be the case and require less risk compensation to move to them. Third, investors perceive a risk as being quite limited today. Because rising inflation isn't seen as a significant risk, bond investors don't require much of a premium to extend maturity.
因此，投资者被风险投资所吸引的程度可能比通常情况下更高，或被排斥的程度可能更少，并且需要更少的风险补偿来进行投资。第三，投资者认为风险在今天是相当有限的。由于通货膨胀的上升并不被视为显著的风险，债券投资者不需要太多的溢价来延长到期期限。
Because the combination of a recovering economy and an accommodating capital market has brought default rates to record lows, investors are unconcerned about credit risk and thus are willing to accept below average credit spreads. Prospective return exists to compensate for perceived risk and when there isn't much perceived risk, there isn't likely to be much prospective return.
因为复苏的经济和容纳的资本市场使得违约率降至历史最低水平，投资者对信用风险毫不担忧，因此愿意接受低于平均的信用价差。投资者期望通过赔偿感知风险来获得回报，当没有太多感知风险时，就不太可能会有太多未来回报。
One summary to use the word of the quants, risk a version is down, would be buyers are optimistic, unafraid, undemanding in terms of return and moving on mass to small asset classes. Holders of assets who play a part in setting market prices by deciding where they'll sell also are optimistic. The result is an unappetizing risk tolerant high-priced investment landscape.
用量化金融术语概括，风险版本下跌，预期购买者乐观、无畏、对回报不苛求，大量涌向小型资产类别。参与定价决策并决定何时出售的资产持有人也持乐观态度。结果是一个不受青睐、风险容忍度较高、投资景观价格昂贵的市场。
There are times when the investing errors are of omission. The things you should have done but didn't. Today I think the errors are probably of commission. The things you shouldn't have done but did. There are times for aggressiveness. I think this is a time for caution.
有时投资错误是因为遗漏了该做的事情。你本应该做但没做。今天我认为错误可能是因为多做了一些本不该做的事情。有时需要积极进取，但我认为现在需要谨慎。
In other words, everything seemed positive. Attitudes toward risk bearing were on the upswing and security prices moved higher, bringing down potential returns. That memo may have been too early, but it wasn't wrong. There was a fair bit of money to be made in the next few years, but its pursuit brought investors close to the peril that lay ahead.
换句话说，一切似乎都很积极。对承担风险的态度趋势向好，证券价格也上涨了，这降低了潜在回报。那份备忘录可能有点过早了，但也没有错。接下来的几年里可以赚到相当多的钱，但追求这些收益也让投资者接近了前方的危险。
Risk and return today, 2013 version. For about a year from the middle of 2011 to the middle of 2012, I was thinking and saying that given the many problems and uncertainties afflicting the investment environment, the biggest plus I could find was the near total lack of optimism on the part of investors. And I thought it was a major plus. There's little that says helpful for the availability of bargains as widespread low expectations.
风险和回报今天已更新至2013版本。从2011年中期到2012年中期大约一年的时间里，我一直在思考并说出，鉴于众多问题和不确定性困扰着投资环境，我能找到的最大优势就是投资者几乎完全缺乏乐观心态。我认为这是一个重要的优势。很少有什么能像广泛的低预期那样有利于便宜货物的供应。
Arguably the eight pages of this memo leading up to this point are there for the sole purpose of establishing that when investors are sanguine, risk is high and when investors are afraid, risk is low. Today, there's no question about it. Investors are highly aware of the uncertainties attaching to the sluggish recovery, fiscal imbalance and political dysfunction in the US. The same or worse in Europe, lack of growth in Japan, slow down in China, resulting problems in the emerging markets and geopolitical tensions.
可以认为，这篇备忘录前八页的目的是为了阐述一个观点，那就是当投资者心态积极时，风险高，而当投资者感到恐慌时，风险就降低了。今天，这已经不是问题了。投资者高度关注美国经济复苏缓慢、财政不平衡和政治机制失灵所带来的不确定性。欧洲情况同样或更糟，日本缺乏增长，中国经济放缓，导致新兴市场出现问题，还有地缘政治紧张局势。
If the global crisis was largely the product of obliviousness to risk, as I'm sure it was, it's reassuring that there is little risk obliviousness today. Sober attitudes on the part of investors should be a source of comfort, since in normal times we would expect them to bring down asset prices to the point where they're attractive. The problem, however, is that while few people are thinking bullish today, many are acting bullish. Their pro-risk behavior is having its normal, dangerous impact on the markets, even in the absence of pro-risk thinking.
如果全球危机主要是由于对风险的忽视而引起的，我相信是这样的，那么现在几乎没有人忽视风险，这是令人欣慰的。投资者的冷静态度应该是一种安慰，因为在正常的时候，我们期望他们会将资产价格降至具有吸引力的程度。然而，问题在于，虽然今天很少有人持乐观态度，但许多人的行为却是持乐观态度的。他们的高风险行为即使在没有高风险思维的情况下，也会对市场产生正常而危险的影响。
I've become increasingly conscious of this inconsistency in recent months, and I think it is the most important issue that today's investors have to confront. What's the reason for this seeming inconsistency between thoughts and actions? The answer is simple. These people aren't buying because they want to, but because they feel they have to.
最近几个月我越来越意识到这种不一致性，并且我认为这是当今投资者不得不面对的最重要的问题。这种看似矛盾的思想与行动之间的不一致性是什么原因呢？答案很简单。这些人购买并不是因为他们想要，而是因为他们感到不得不这样做。
In the past, I've referred to them as hand-cuff volunteers. The normal response of investors to uncertain times is to say, because of the risks that are present, I'm going to shy away from risky investments and stick with a very safe portfolio. Such views would tend to depress prices of risky assets. But thanks to the actions of the world's central banks to keep rates near zero, that very safe portfolio, especially in the credit markets, will produce little if any return today.
过去，我曾把他们称为手铐志愿者。投资者对不确定时期的普遍反应是，由于存在风险，我会回避高风险投资，保持一个非常安全的投资组合。这样的观点往往会压低高风险资产的价格。但由于世界中央银行采取行动让利率接近于零，那个非常安全的投资组合，特别是在信贷市场上，今天将会产生很少甚至没有回报。
Many investors have sought the safety of money market and T-bill funds yielding zero. Treasury notes that plus or minus 1% and high-grade bonds at 3%. But some can't or won't. The retiree, living on his savings, may not be able to abide the 90% reduction in short Treasury note returns. I imagine him picking up the phone, calling the 800 number and telling his mutual fund company, get me out of that fund yielding zero and get me into one yielding 6%. I have to replace the income I used to get from intermediate treasuries. And thus, he becomes a high yield bond investor, whether consciously or not.
许多投资者寻求货币市场和T-bill基金的安全，尽管它们的收益为零。国债的收益率在加减1%之间，高级债券为3%。但是有些人不能或不愿意这样做。退休人员靠储蓄生活，可能无法接受短期国债收益减少90%的情况。我想象他拿起电话，拨打800号码，告诉他的共同基金公司，把我从零收益的基金中拿出来，放到一个收益为6%的基金里。我必须替代以前从中间国债中获得的收入。因此，他无论有意识还是无意识，都成为了高收益债券投资者。
A similar process can affect a pension fund or endowment that needs a return of 7 to 8% and doesn't want to bet its future on the ultra low yields on high-grade bonds and treasuries, or the 6% that the institutional consensus expects stocks to return, especially given how badly stocks performed in 2000 to 2002 and 2008, and their overall lack of gains since 1999.
类似的过程可能会影响需要回报率为7%至8%的养老基金或捐赠基金，它们不想把未来寄托在高级债券和国债的超低收益率，或机构共识预计股票的6%回报率上，特别是考虑到股票自2000年至2002年和2008年表现不佳以及自1999年以来整体缺乏收益。
Take high yield bonds, for example. They provide some of the highest contractual returns and greatest current income. They are attracting considerable capital. Some capital flows into a market, the resulting buying brings down the prospective returns. And when offered returns go down, investors' desires of maintaining income turn to progressively riskier investments. In the bond world that's called chasing yield or stretching for yield.
以高收益债券为例。它们提供了一些最高的合同回报和最大的现金收入。它们吸引了相当大的资本流动。一些资本流入市场，引发的买盘将推低预期的回报。当提供的回报下降时，投资者为了维持收入的愿望逐渐转向更加冒险的投资。在债券界，这被称为追求收益或者扩大收益。
Do it if you want, but do it consciously and with full recognition of the risks involved, and even if you refuse to stretch for yield, be alert to the effect on the markets of those who do.
如果你想要这么做，就去做，但要有意识地认识到风险，并且即使你不想冒着延长期限去追求收益，也要警惕那些这样做可能对市场产生影响的人。
Getting rid of money. It's relatively easy to make good investments when capital is in short supply relative to the opportunities and investors are reticent. But when there's too much money chasing too few deals, investors compete to put it to work in ways that are injurious to everyone's financial health.
摆脱资金。当资本相对短缺而投资机会和投资者保持沉默时，进行好的投资相对容易。但当有过多的资金追逐过少的交易时，投资者竞争以有害于每个人的财务健康的方式投资。
I've written often about the tendency of people to accept lower returns. Higher risk and weaker terms in order to deploy their capital in hot times. Again, as described in the race to the bottom. The deals they do get worse, and that makes investing riskier and less profitable for everyone.
我经常谈论人们在繁荣时期为了投资资金而接受较低的回报、更高的风险和较差的条款的倾向。正如《向底部冲刺》中所描述的那样，他们所达成的交易越来越差，这使得投资对每个人来说都变得更加冒险和不赚钱了。
Because the returns on safe investments are so low today, people are moving further out on the risk curve to pursue returns that meet their needs and are close to what they used to get. And the weight of their capital is bringing down prospective returns and making riskier deals doable.
因为安全投资的回报率如今非常低，人们正在冒更高的风险去追求满足他们需求的回报率，接近他们过去所得到的回报率。他们的资本量承载着压力，使得潜在回报率降低，同时也使得更高风险的交易变得可行。
As noted earlier, I wrote in 2004's Risk and Return Today that the result is an unappetizing risk-tolerant high-priced investment landscape. At that time, it happened because of excessive bullishness and a positive risk aversion. This time around, it's occurring despite the absence of bullishness, mainly because interest rates have been rendered artificially low by the Fed and other central banks. Regardless of the reason, things are happening again today, especially in the credit world that are indicative of an elevated risk-prone market.
就像之前提到的，在2004年的《风险与回报今日》一书中，我写道结果是一个不太吸引人、冒险承受能力很高、价格也很高的投资环境。那个时候，这是由于过度的乐观和积极的风险规避策略造成的。这一次，虽然没有乐观情绪，但仍然出现了这种情况，主要是因为美联储和其他中央银行将利率人为压低。无论原因如何，今天又发生了事情，特别是在信贷领域，表明市场存在较高的风险倾向。
Total new issue-leveraged finance volume, loans and high-yield bonds reached a new high of $812 billion in 2012, according to Standard & Pours, surpassing by 20 percent the previous record set in pre-crisis 2007. The yields on fixed income securities have declined markedly, and in many cases they're the lowest they've ever been in our nation's history.
标准普尔公司称，2012年的新发行杠杆融资总额，包括贷款和高收益债券，达到了8120亿美元的新高，比危机前的2007年高出20%。固定收益证券的收益率明显下降，在许多情况下，它们是我们国家历史上最低的。
Yield spreads or credit risk premiums are fair to full, meaning the relative returns on riskier securities are attractive, but the absolute returns are minimal. I find it remarkable that the average high-yield bond offers only about 6 percent today. Daily, I see my partner Sheldon Stone selling callable bonds at prices of 110 and 115, because they're yields to call or yields to worst start with numbers, handles of 3 or 4 percent.
收益率差或信用风险溢价处于合理到充分的水平，这意味着更高风险证券的相对收益令人心动，但绝对收益较为有限。我发现令人惊讶的是，现在平均高收益债券的收益率只有约6％。每天，我看到我的伙伴谢尔顿·斯通以110和115的价格出售可赎回债券，因为它们针对到期或最差收益率的收益率以3或4％的数字开始。
The yields are down to those levels because of strong demand for short paper with prospective returns in that range. I've never seen anything like it.
收益率之所以下降到那个水平，是因为对那个范围内有前景的短期债券的强烈需求。我从未见过这样的情况。
As was the case in the years leading up to the onset of the crisis, the ability to execute aggressive transactions indicates the presence of risk tolerance in the markets. Triple C bonds can be issued readily. Companies can borrow money for the purpose of paying dividends to their shareholders, and CLOs are again being formed to buy leveraged loans with heavy leverage.
就像危机爆发前几年一样，执行激进交易的能力表明市场有风险承受能力。三倍 CCC 级债券很容易发行。公司可以借钱支付股东分红，再次组建 CLO 来购买高杠杆的杠杆贷款。
The amount of leverage being applied in today's private equity deals also indicates a return to risk-taking, as the Wall Street Journal reported on December 17. Since the beginning of 2008, private equity firms have paid an average of 42 percent of the cost of large buyouts with their own money, also known as equity, while borrowing the rest. During the past six months, the percentage has fallen to 33 percent, according to Thompson Reuters, close to the 31 percent average in 2006, and the 30 percent average in 2007.
「华尔街日报」在12月17日的报道中指出，今天的私募股权交易中所应用的杠杆比率表明正在回归风险承担。自2008年初以来，私募股权公司平均使用自有资金支付大型收购成本的42％，也称为股权，其余部分则通过借款获得。在过去六个月中，根据汤普森路透社的统计，这一比例已降至33％，接近2006年平均31％和2007年平均30％。
Other measures also suggest that debt loads are hovering around pre-crisis levels. The average debt put on companies acquired in leveraged buyout deals from July to December amounted to 5.5 times the company's annual earnings, defined as earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization. That is higher than any two consecutive quarters since the beginning of 2008, according to S&P Capital IQ LCD. The average deal leverage was 5.4 times earnings in 2006 and 6.2 times earnings in 2007.
还有其他措施表明债务负担已经接近危机前的水平。据标普资本智慧LCD数据显示，2018年7月至12月被收购的公司的平均债务量是其年收益的5.5倍，收益被定义为利息、税、折旧和摊销之前的收益。这是自2008年初以来任何连续两个季度的债务负担都最高的。而在2006年，平均杠杆率为5.4倍，2007年为6.2倍。
The good news is that today's investors are painfully aware of the many uncertainties. The bad news is that, regardless, they are being forced by the low interest rates to bear substantial risk out returns that have been bid down. Their scramble for return has brought elements of pre-crisis behavior very much back to life.
好消息是，今天的投资者痛苦地意识到许多不确定性。坏消息是，尽管如此，由于低利率的压力，他们被迫承担巨大的风险，以获取被出价降低的回报。他们为了回报而奋斗，使得危机前的行为元素很大程度上重现了。
Please note that my comments are directed more at fixed income securities than equities. Fixed income is the subject of investors' order today since it's there that investors are looking for the income they need. These are still being disrespected and equity allocations reduced. Thus, they are not being lifted by comparable income driven buying.
请注意，我的评论更针对债券类证券而不是股票。固定收益是投资者当今的主题，因为他们正在寻找所需的收入。这些仍然被忽视，股票配额也被减少。因此，它们没有被同样的因为追求收入而购买的需求所推动。
In 2004, as just cited, I stated the following conclusion. There are times for aggressiveness. I think this is a time for caution. Here as 2013 begins, I have only one word to add. Ditto. The greatest of all investment adages states that what the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end. The wise man invested aggressively in late 2008 and early 2009. I believe only the fool is doing so now.
在2004年，正如先前所引用的，我提出了以下结论。有时需要采取进攻行动，但我认为现在是谨慎的时候。随着2013年的开始，我只想加一个字：同上。 最伟大的投资格言之一是：明智者在最初做的事情，愚蠢者在最后才做。明智的人在2008年末和2009年初积极投资。我相信现在只有愚蠢的人才会这样做。
Today in place of aggressiveness, the challenging search for return should incorporate goodly doses of risk control, caution, discipline, and selectivity. January 7, 2013.
今天，在寻求回报的艰难过程中，应该充分运用适当的风险控制、谨慎、纪律和选择性，而不是采取过于挑衅的态度。 2013年1月7日。
Thank you for listening to the memo by Howard Marx. To hear more episodes, be sure to subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts.
谢谢您听 Howard Marx 的备忘录。如果您想听更多的剧集，请确保在任何您听播客的地方订阅。
More over, wherever there is a potential for profit, there is also the possibility of loss. This podcast is being made available for educational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. The information contained herein does not constitute and should not be construed as an offering of advisory services or an offer to sell or solicitation to buy any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction.
此外，无论何时存在盈利的潜力，也必然伴随着风险的可能。本播客仅供教育目的，不得用于其他用途。这里所包含的信息不构成提供咨询服务的建议或关于在任何司法辖区出售或购买任何证券或相关金融工具的要约或邀请。
Certain information contained herein concerning economic trends and performances based on or derived from information provided by independent third party sources. Oak Tree Capital Management LP Oak Tree believes that the sources from which such information has been obtained are reliable. However, it cannot guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based.
里面的某些信息涉及经济趋势和表现，根据或从独立第三方来源提供的信息派生。橡树资本管理有限合伙企业（橡树）认为这些信息来源是可靠的。然而，它不能保证这些信息的准确性，并且没有独立验证这些信息或这些信息基于的假设的准确性或完整性。
This podcast, including the information contained herein may not be copied, reproduced, republished, or posted in whole or in part in any form without the prior written consent of Oak Tree.
这个播客，包括其中所含的信息，未经橡树事先书面同意，不得以任何形式全部或部分复制、再制、再版或张贴。