Lithium Supply by Country: Where are the Opportunities? // Part 3

Welcome back everyone, I'm Jordan Geisigee, and this is The Limiting Factor. This is the third section of a full 2-hour long video on the global lithium supply chain that's currently available for paid supporters on Patreon, YouTube, and Twitter.

大家好，欢迎回来。我是乔丹·盖西吉，这里是《极限因素》节目。这是一个长达2小时的全球锂供应链视频的第三个部分，目前只有在Patreon、YouTube和Twitter上付费支持者才可以观看。

In the last two videos I covered whether lithium mining or refining is the real bottleneck for lithium production later this decade, and the accuracy of lithium supply and demand forecasts. A quick recap of those videos is that lithium mining, rather than refining, appears to be the primary bottleneck for lithium production later this decade. And although lithium forecasts are an accurate reflection of what's currently in the pipeline for lithium supply, they don't speculate on potential future sources of lithium that haven't been announced.

在最近的两个视频中，我讨论了锂矿采掘和提炼对于后期锂生产的真正瓶颈问题，以及锂供需预测的准确性。简单回顾一下这些视频的内容，它们表明锂矿采掘似乎是本十年后期锂生产的主要瓶颈，而不是提炼环节。虽然锂供需预测准确地反映了当前锂供应链中的情况，但它们并不推测尚未公布的潜在未来锂资源。

So with that in mind, in this video, I'll walk you through all the potential regions and sources of mined lithium supply in the world today, and how much we might expect lithium supply to exceed the forecasts from each of those regions and sources. Then in the next video, I'll use that information to build a forecast for lithium supply and add potential battery supply from sodium ion batteries to arrive at a comprehensive forecast for global battery supply from all potential sources.

因此，考虑到这一点，在这个视频中，我将为您讲解当今世界上所有可能的锂矿供应地区和来源，以及我们可以预期锂供应量超过每个地区和来源预测的程度。然后在下一个视频中，我将利用这些信息来建立对锂供应的预测，并将钠离子电池的潜在电池供应加入其中，以得出对全球所有潜在来源的电池供应的全面预测。

Before we begin, a raft of credits and thanks are in order. Feel free to skip this part of the video and move to the next time stamp if you watched the previous video. I'm including the thanks and credits on each video in the series for the people who haven't seen the other videos. That's because it's not just a thanks, it lets viewers know the quality of my sources and peer review.

在我们开始之前，需要给出一系列的致谢和感谢。如果你已经观看了上一个视频，可以跳过这部分内容并跳到下一个时间点。我在这个系列的每个视频中都包含了致谢和感谢的内容，是为了那些还未观看其他视频的观众。这不仅仅是一种感谢，还能让观众了解我的信息来源和同行评审的质量。

First, Vivas Kumar reviewed the draft script. Vivas was directly involved with Tesla's battery supply chain for nearly three years, where he negotiated billions of dollars of material spend and also did strategic analysis and forecasting for battery materials. After that, he worked for benchmark mineral intelligence for nearly three years. He's now co-founder and CEO of Mitra-Kim. If you'd like to know more about that, check out my interview with Vivas and Chiro.

首先，Vivas Kumar对草稿剧本进行了回顾。Vivas在特斯拉的电池供应链中直接参与了近三年的时间，他在那里进行了价值数十亿美元的材料采购谈判，并为电池材料进行了战略分析和预测。之后，他在Benchmark Mineral Intelligence工作了近三年。他现在是Mitra-Kim的联合创始人兼首席执行官。如果你想了解更多信息，请查看我与Vivas和Chiro的专访。

First, my sources. Rodney and Howard of ArcAequity, a Lithium Analysis and Advisory firm, spent several hours and long email threads answering detailed questions about mind development. If you're interested in their work, you can connect with them on Twitter with the details on screen or follow the Rockstock channel on YouTube. Cameron Perks of benchmark mineral intelligence walk me through how lithium supply and demand is evolving over time. I recommend following benchmark mineral intelligence and their CEO Simon Moore's on Twitter to keep up to date with the Lithium industry. Lars Lee's doll provided key data for this video around lithium refining capacity versus production. And beyond that, I've used a number of graphs from Ristad Energy over the years. You can also follow Lars on Twitter. Austin Devaney helped me put a finer point on a few topics around hard rock lithium mining. Austin was an executive at Alba-Marl and Rockwood Lithium for nearly ten years, which is one of Tesla's largest lithium suppliers and now has been at Piedmont Lithium for the past three years, which has an agreement for future supply to Tesla. Bradford Ferguson and Matt Smith of RebellionAir.com reviewed the final release candidate of the video from an investor lens. RebellionAir specializes in helping investors manage concentrated positions. They can help with covered calls, risk management and creating a financial master plan from your first principles. Bear in mind, this video is not investment advice and always do your own research. Finally, despite all the input I received from some of the leading experts and information sources in the Lithium industry, all the opinions in this video are my own. There are differing views and forecasts within the Lithium industry that I had to reconcile and combine with my own insights and expectations. With regards to the peer review, it was for factual accuracy and a sanity check, rather than for crafting the tone and conclusions of the video. Overall, my goal was to create the most comprehensive resource out there on how global lithium supply and battery supply will evolve this decade and how that relates to Tesla.

首先是我的信息来源。Rodney和Howard来自ArcAequity，一家锂分析和咨询公司，他们花了几个小时和长篇电子邮件来回答关于锂发展的详细问题。如果你对他们的工作感兴趣，你可以通过屏幕上的详细信息与他们联系，或者关注他们在YouTube上的Rockstock频道。Cameron Perks来自benchmark mineral intelligence，他向我介绍了锂的供需如何随着时间发展。我建议关注benchmark mineral intelligence和他们的首席执行官Simon Moore在Twitter上的动态，以了解锂行业的最新动态。 Lars Lee's doll为这个视频提供了关于锂精炼能力与产量的关键数据。除此之外，我多年来还使用了Ristad Energy的一些图表。你也可以在Twitter上关注Lars。Austin Devaney帮助我在硬岩锂矿开采方面提供了一些进一步的见解。Austin在阿尔巴马尔和洛克伍德锂公司担任高管近十年，这是特斯拉最大的锂供应商之一，现在已经在皮德蒙特锂公司任职三年了，该公司与特斯拉达成了未来供应协议。Bradford Ferguson和Matt Smith来自RebellionAir.com，他们从投资者的角度审查了视频的最终版本。RebellionAir专门帮助投资者管理集中持仓，他们可以提供支持买入认购期权、风险管理以及根据你的首要原则创建财务总体规划。请记住，这个视频不是投资建议，请始终进行自己的研究。最后，尽管我从一些领先的专家和信息来源获得了许多建议，但视频中的所有观点都是我自己的观点。在锂行业内存在不同的观点和预测，我必须将它们与我自己的见解和预期相结合。至于同行评审，它是为了确保事实准确性和合理性，而不是用于塑造视频的语气和结论。总体而言，我的目标是创建一个关于全球锂供应和电池供应在本十年内如何发展以及与特斯拉的关系的最全面的资源。

So if you feel like I've hit the mark and get value from the video or my content in general, toss a coin to your witcher. Making a video like this takes months and generally, analysis like this would be packaged up by an analyst house and put in a report that costs thousands or even tens of thousands of dollars. Generally, I make about $200 to $600 per video in YouTube ad revenues. That is, it's the direct support that I get from less than 1% of subscribers through Patreon, YouTube and Twitter that makes the channel possible. The details for support are in the description.

如果你觉得我触动了你的心弦，从视频或者我一般的内容中获取了价值，就扔一枚硬币给你的猎魔人吧。制作这样的视频需要数月时间，而通常这样的分析会由一家分析机构整理并制作成一份价值数千甚至数万美元的报告。一般来说，我通过YouTube广告收入每个视频可以赚取大约200到600美元。即便如此，我实际上能持续运营这个频道，还要归功于少于1%的订阅者通过Patreon、YouTube和Twitter提供的直接支持。如何支持我的详细信息请见描述部分。

Let's start by running through a recent history of Lithium supply and demand. The reason I'm covering this is because there have been a few events over the past 8 years that could be construed as proof that lithium supply can ramp rather quickly in response to demand. I have to put those examples to bed so we can start with a clean slate as to what is and isn't possible when it comes to increasing lithium supply.

让我们先来回顾一下锂的最近供求历史。我之所以介绍这个是因为在过去的八年中发生了一些事件，可以被解释为锂供应能够迅速增加以应对需求的证据。我必须消除那些例子，这样我们才能从干净的板上开始，针对增加锂供应的可行性和不可行性做出评估。

There was a minor boom in lithium prices from 2015 to 2018. That's because the EV industry started to take off thanks to China and Tesla. That boom went bust from 2018 to 2020 when three things happened. First, lithium mining and refining started to catch up with demand about three years into the boom in 2018 which provided some price relief. However, most of that new supply came from existing operations in Australia, not new mining operations which would have taken longer. Second, in March 2019, China's EV subsidies were reduced. It caused EV growth to stall in 2019 which in turn pushed the lithium market into oversupply and lithium prices crashed. Third, in 2020, COVID hit. 2020 was supposed to be a year that lithium demand strengthened and prices recovered, but instead prices continued to drop.

2015年至2018年，锂价格出现了小幅的繁荣。这是因为由于中国和特斯拉的推动，电动汽车工业开始大力发展。从2018年到2020年，这种繁荣转为了萧条，原因有三个。首先，锂矿业和提炼矿石的能力在2018年的繁荣大约三年后开始逐渐迎合需求，从而提供了一些价格上的缓解。然而，大部分新供应来自于澳大利亚的现有业务，而非该领域的新采矿业务，这需要更长时间进行发展。其次，在2019年3月，中国的电动汽车补贴减少。这导致2019年电动汽车增长停滞不前，反过来使得锂市场供应过剩，锂价格暴跌。第三，2020年受到了COVID-19疫情的影响。原本2020年本应是锂需求增强、价格回升的一年，但相反价格持续下跌。

That string of bad luck led to a lithium market in 2020 where lithium miners and refiners were operating at break even. Just despite the fact that from 2018 to 2020, large lithium producers in Australia had been throttling lithium supply by idling their mines and putting projects on hold in an attempt to increase prices. So in 2021 and 22, when demand and prices surged, there was reserve capacity in the system to satisfy the demand. However, that didn't last long. In 2022, lithium prices reached about four times the previous record high. Since then, lithium prices have moderated, but that's mainly due to a brief respite and demand from the US and Chinese auto markets that gave lithium supply a chance to catch up. Even then, prices still remain above historic highs and may already be rebounding.

那一系列的不幸事件导致了2020年的锂市场，使得锂矿工和提炼厂只能维持收支平衡。然而，令人遗憾的是，尽管澳大利亚的大型锂生产商从2018年到2020年一直在通过停产矿山和搁置项目来缩减锂供应以期提高价格，但2021年和2022年需求和价格的激增表明，系统中仍存在储备产能以满足需求。然而，这种情况并没有持续很久。到2022年，锂价格达到了约是之前最高记录的四倍。此后，锂价格有所回落，但这主要是由于美国和中国汽车市场需求的暂时缓解，使得锂供应有机会赶上。即便如此，价格仍然高于历史最高水平，而且可能已经开始回升。

With that in mind, we have two examples of how the lithium market responds to a large demand wave. In both the 2015 to 2018 bull run and the 2021 to 2022 bull run, lithium supply responded quickly. But a good portion of that was thanks to large existing mines in Australia rather than new mines. And in both bull runs, it was more a drop in demand that really ended the bull run rather than an increase in supply. The fact that Australia came to the rescue pretty quickly in both bull runs might be part of the reason why Elon pointed to Australia when downplaying concerns about mined lithium. If that is his logic, there's an issue. The Australian lithium mines that Tesla gets most of their lithium from are unique because they're large, historically they had room for expansion, and are in a region where permitting is relatively quick. However, those mines are now at their operational capacity and Australia's basically rummaging around in its pockets for 37% more lithium at a time when lithium supply should ideally quintuple in the next seven years.

考虑到这一点，我们有两个例子可以说明锂市场对大需求浪潮的反应。无论是2015年至2018年的上涨行情还是2021年至2022年的上涨行情，锂供应都快速做出了回应。但其中相当大一部分要归功于澳大利亚的现有大型矿山，而不是新开采的矿山。而且在这两个上涨行情中，真正结束上涨行情的更多是需求下降，而不是供应增加。澳大利亚在这两个上涨行情中迅速帮助解决问题，可能是为什么埃隆在对开采锂的担忧进行贬低时指向了澳大利亚的部分原因。如果这是他的逻辑，那就有问题了。特斯拉从澳大利亚获取大部分锂的矿山独特之处在于它们规模庞大，历史上有扩展空间，并且所在地区的审批相对迅速。然而，这些矿山目前已经达到了运营能力的上限，而澳大利亚现在在寻找增加37%的锂，而在未来七年内，锂供应最好能够增加五倍。

That is, it appears that Tesla can't rely on Australia for large increases in lithium supply later in the decade. To gain a deeper understanding of why that's the case, we need to take a closer look at how lithium mines are developed. Along the way, we'll gain insights into Australia's ability to exceed lithium forecasts over the short, medium, and long-term horizons. And of course, while we're at it, I'll walk you through every major lithium region. This is so we can find where there's wiggle room in global lithium supply for the rest of the decade to develop our own forecast.

换言之，特斯拉似乎无法依赖澳大利亚在本十年后期获得大量锂供应的增加。为了更深入了解这个问题，我们需要仔细观察锂矿的开发情况。在此过程中，我们将了解澳大利亚在短期、中期和长期内超过锂预测的能力。当然，在此期间，我将为您介绍每个主要的锂产地。这样我们才能找到本十年其余时期全球锂供应的可发展空间，制定我们自己的预测。

To kick things off, I'll start with Australian hard-rock lithium on a two- to three-year time frame. Australia's the largest producer of mined lithium in the world, coming in at about 61,000 tons of lithium in 2022. And it has reserves of 6.2 million tons. Note that that's elemental lithium rather than lithium carbonate equivalent, or LCE. Supply elemental lithium by five to get a rough approximation of LCE. It takes about two to three years to get a mining permit in Australia, which basically sets the minimum time frame to get a new mining operation up and running. But there's only two situations where that can happen.

首先，我想谈谈澳大利亚的硬岩锂，预计在两到三年内。澳大利亚是全球最大的锂矿石生产国，2022年的矿石产量约为61,000吨，储量有6.2百万吨。请注意这是锂元素而不是相当于碳酸锂的量。通过将锂元素乘以五，可以大致得到相当于碳酸锂的近似值。在澳大利亚获取采矿许可证大约需要两到三年的时间，这基本上确定了建立新的采矿项目的最短时间。但只有两种情况下才能实现这一点。

First, with a brownfields project where the lithium deposits are adjacent to existing mining infrastructure, brownfields projects are some of the fastest and cheapest to set up. So they're low-hanging fruit and at the top of the list for development by mining companies. Unfortunately, there aren't that many mining sites with untapped deposits that are close enough to use existing mining infrastructure. As benchmark minerals shows, globally, the brownfields opportunity is only about 100 kilotons or 140 gigawatt hours of lithium by 2030.

首先，对于那些锂矿床与现有采矿设施相邻的棕地项目来说，它们是一些可以最快和最便宜建设的项目。因此，它们是低风险且开发速度最快的项目，是采矿公司开发的首选。不幸的是，没有那么多位于附近、尚未开发的矿区可使用现有的采矿设施。如同Benchmark Minerals所示，全球棕地机会到2030年只有约100千吨或140吉瓦小时的锂资源。

The second way that lithium production can be expanded within two to three years is by accelerating the extraction rate of existing mines. At the annual meeting, Elon said that three-quarters of Tesla's lithium supply comes from Australia and that you could increase the rate that those mines are operating at. By operating at, I'm assuming he means extraction rate.

在两到三年内扩大锂生产的第二种方法是加快现有矿山的开采速度。在年度会议上，埃隆表示，特斯拉的四分之三锂供应来自澳大利亚，可以增加这些矿山的开采速度。 "开采速度" 这里我理解为提取速率。

The life of a lithium mine is generally about 20 years, and it is technically true that the extraction rate of lithium mines can be accelerated. That is, instead of extracting the lithium in 20 years, it could be extracted in 10 years at double the yearly production volume, or five years at quadruple the yearly production volume.

锂矿的寿命通常约为20年，从技术上讲，锂矿开采速度是可以加快的。也就是说，可以通过每年产量翻倍的方式，在10年内提取完全，或者通过每年产量增加四倍的方式，在五年内提取完全。

With that said, increasing the extraction rate is usually an on-starter. Why? First, whether a lithium mine is extracted in five years or 20 years, it still has the same value. But extracting it in five years means more machines and manpower are required and therefore greater cost.

话虽如此，提高提取率通常并不容易。为什么？首先，无论锂矿在五年内还是二十年内提取，其价值仍然相同。但在五年内提取意味着需要更多的机械设备和人力，从而更高的成本。

For example, if the material in a mine is worth $20 billion, the mining company could spend $2.4 billion to extract it over the course of 20 years, or $4.8 billion to extract it over the course of five years. That's because you need to, for example, quadruple the grinding and crushing capacity, quadruple the filtration and flotation, and quadruple the earth-moving equipment.

例如，如果一座矿山中的矿产价值为200亿美元，采矿公司可以选择在20年的时间内花费24亿美元进行开采，或者选择在5年的时间内花费48亿美元进行开采。这是因为需要将研磨和碎石能力增加四倍，将过滤和浮选设备增加四倍，同时需要增加四倍的土石移动设备。

Yes, capital cost is only a portion of production cost, and my figures are just guesses here, but it illustrates the point. If you're a mining company, there's no financial incentive to increase the extraction rate. It costs money to increase the extraction rate, but doesn't change the total revenue. That in turn reduces profit margins and reduces return on capital. So I don't see mines lining up to increase their extraction rate unless Tesla provides a big financial incentive.

是的，资本成本只是生产成本的一部分，我的数据只是猜测，但它说明了这个观点。如果你是一家采矿公司，增加开采速度没有财务激励。增加开采速度需要花钱，但并不改变总收入。这反过来会降低利润率和资本回报率。因此，我认为除非特斯拉提供巨大的财务激励，否则不会有矿山争相增加开采速度。

As a side note, the reason why mining companies don't do the opposite and stretch the life of the average mine beyond 20 years is that besides looking after profit margins and return on capital, they also need to maximize annual revenue. The quicker the extraction, the greater the annual revenues. So it's a balancing act between annual revenue and profit margins. And that was decided when the mine was designed in order to hit the optimal balance of not just financial considerations, but also environmental and technical considerations.

顺便提一句，矿业公司不会延长平均矿山寿命超过20年的原因是，除了关注利润率和资本回报率外，他们还需要最大化年度收入。挖掘速度越快，年度收入就越大。因此，这是在设计矿山时决定的，以实现不仅考虑财务因素，还要考虑环境和技术因素的最佳平衡。

The second reason why increasing the extraction rate isn't pragmatic is because in a best case scenario, it takes 4 to 7 years to set up a mine. If a mining company extracts a mine in 5 to 10 years, and it takes roughly the same amount of time to set up the next mine, they'd basically be eating hand to mouth, which wouldn't be sustainable. To put that in perspective, if you're a long term Tesla investor, imagine if Tesla said that each Gigafactory they build would only be in production for about 5 years. That would mean Gigashang High, which entered production in 2019, would shut down next year in 2024. Such a short factory life would create persistent anxiety amongst investors. But even a 10 year factory life would feel like being on a durable wheel. It's no different for a lithium mine except lithium projects have a lead time 2 to 3 times longer than vehicle factories.

为什么增加开采率不现实的第二个原因是，即使情况最理想，建立一座矿场也需要4到7年的时间。如果一个矿业公司在5到10年内开采一座矿山，然后建立下一座矿山也需要大致相同的时间，那么他们基本上就是东挪西借，这是不可持续的。换个角度说，如果你是特斯拉的长期投资者，想象一下特斯拉表示每座他们建造的超级工厂只能生产大约5年时间。这意味着2019年开始投产的Gigashang High工厂将在明年的2024年停产。这样短暂的工厂寿命会给投资者带来持久的焦虑。但即使是10年的工厂寿命也会感觉像是一个持续运作的车轮。对于锂矿场来说，情况也是一样，只不过锂项目的前期时间比汽车工厂长2到3倍。

The third reason why increasing the extraction rate isn't pragmatic is because although it increases production volume, it doesn't increase the total amount of lithium reserves or extend the production runway deeper into the future. It's much better for a lithium company to spend an extra 2 years to explore new lithium reserves and start a new mining project than to tap out their existing reserves more quickly.

为什么提高提取率并不实用的第三个原因是，尽管这会增加产量，但无法增加锂储量的总量，也无法延长未来的生产期限。对于一个锂公司来说，花两年时间去探索新的锂储量并启动新的采矿项目要比更快地耗尽现有储量更好。

Yes, a lithium mining company could extract their existing mines more quickly and explore for new resources at the same time, but that's easier said than done. Mining companies don't have unlimited financial resources and have to make prudent financial decisions about where to explore and invest. It's the age old constraint of unlimited once and limited resources. That is, again, Tesla has deep pockets and could help out here.

是的，锂矿公司可以更快地提取他们现有的矿山资源，并同时探索新的资源，但实际操作要比说起来容易。矿业公司并没有无限的财力资源，必须在探索和投资的地方做出谨慎的财务决策。这是古老的限制，即一次性资源是无限的，但有限的资源存在。再说一遍，特斯拉有丰厚的资金实力，在这方面可以提供帮助。

Fourth, there are technical reasons why increasing the extraction rate at a mine tends to be avoided. But I would consider those difficulties rather than showstoppers. For example, managing traffic at the mine where space is tight and the roads are dug or blasted out of bare rock. Or the fact that as the extraction rate of a mine increases, quality tends to suffer because precision mining goes by the wayside when there's pressure to move more rock more quickly. And of course, there are other factors like dust, water usage, and waste management. Again, not showstoppers, but increasing the extraction rate isn't as simple as just flipping a switch.

第四，提高矿山的开采率往往会避免一些技术上的原因。但是我认为这些困难只是困难，而非不可逾越的障碍。例如，在空间有限、道路是由裸露的岩石挖掘或爆破出来的矿山管理交通的问题。或者，随着矿山的开采率增加，质量往往会下降，因为在需要更快地移动更多矿石的压力下，精准开采变得不实际。当然，还有其他因素，如尘埃、用水量和废物处理等。再次强调，这些并非不可逾越的障碍，但提高开采率不像简单地拧动一个开关那样简单。

That is, if Tesla wants to see the production rate from Australian mines increase, it's likely those mines aren't going to play ball unless Tesla kicks them several hundred million dollars in cash to make it worth their time. Alternatively, Tesla could buy a lithium mining company and crank the production dial up to eleven. More on that later in the video.

换句话说，如果特斯拉希望澳大利亚矿山的产量增加，那么除非特斯拉给予他们几亿美元的现金使得这项投入对他们有利，否则这些矿山可能不会与特斯拉合作。或者，特斯拉可以收购一家锂矿公司，并将产量调至最大。稍后视频会更详细介绍。

What all that means is, although Australia could technically bring more supply online in a two to three year time frame than what's forecast, it's unlikely. Mining companies are already working on tapping into brownfield's resources, and there's no incentive to increase extraction rates at existing mines.

所有这意味着，尽管澳大利亚在两到三年的时间框架内从技术上可以增加更多的供应，但这是不太可能的。采矿公司已经在开发潜力资源，而且没有动力来提高现有矿山的开采速度。

There are two other ways that I can see Australian mining companies increasing production on a two to three year time frame, but they're even less likely. The first is to increase the efficiency and productivity of the mines, but the mining industry is conservative and tends not to change unless it has to. For example, it might take a company like Tesla entering the industry and forcing change, but even if that did happen, it would of course take years, and there's no indication that Tesla will get into lithium mining anytime soon. So it's not even on the horizon this side of 2026 or 2027. The second, low likely possibility for increasing lithium production on a two to three year time frame would be if governments took wartime measures to accelerate mining. That would mean throwing mining regulations out the door, steamrolling environmentalists and political resistance and dumping billions of dollars into the mining industry. I can only see that happening in the event of some kind of immediate and pressing global emergency, like a war between China and the West, but I wouldn't exactly call that a win for a sustainable future.

有另外两种方式，我可以看到澳大利亚采矿公司在两到三年内增加产量，但它们的可能性甚至更低。第一种是提高矿山的效率和生产力，但采矿行业保守，不愿改变除非不得不改变。例如，这可能需要像特斯拉这样的公司进入该行业并迫使改变，但即使发生了这种情况，也需要几年的时间，并没有迹象表明特斯拉会很快进入锂矿业。所以在2026年或2027年之前，这根本没有在即。第二个不太可能的方式是在两到三年内通过政府采取战时措施加快采矿。这意味着放弃采矿规定，压制环保主义者和政治反抗，并向采矿业注入数十亿美元。我只能看到在发生某种即时和紧迫的全球紧急情况，比如中西之间的战争时，才会出现这种情况，但我不认为这是对可持续未来的胜利。

What about beyond two to three years? The next substantial time frame for Australia is four to seven years. That's the quickest that a greenfield's mining project can be brought online. By so long, let's again use Tesla Gigafactories as an example and go from there. Three years ago in 2020, Tesla broke ground on Giga Austin. By 2021, most of the main structures were built, and then one year ago in 2022, the production ramp had begun, but it wasn't yet at a thousand vehicles per week. This year, it's finally hit volume production. That is, it took two years to go from groundbreaking to production and another year to hit production in earnest. That two to three year time frame is roughly the same time that it takes a lithium mine to go from groundbreaking to initial production and volume production.

而对于两到三年之后呢？澳大利亚下一个重要的时间框架是四到七年。这是一个开垦矿业项目最快能够上线的时间。就像之前对特斯拉超级工厂的例子一样，让我们再从那里入手。三年前的2020年，特斯拉在奥斯汀市开工建设起了吉卡工厂。到2021年，大部分主要建筑已经建成，然后在2022年，生产逐渐开始，但每周生产的车辆数还没有达到一千辆。今年，终于达到了大规模生产。也就是说，从开工到投产花了两年的时间，又花了一年的时间才真正达到了大规模生产。这个两到三年的时间框架大致相当于一个锂矿从开工到初次生产和大规模生产所需要的时间。

However, the reason why a greenfield's lithium project takes four to seven years rather than two to three years is because of what needs to happen before groundbreaking occurs. Let's take a closer look. Bear in mind, the timeline I'll be providing here is a grossly oversimplified view, and reality is more complex. Before a lithium mine can break ground, the mining company needs a detailed understanding of the shape of the lithium deposit along with the lithium concentration throughout the deposit. How is that done? The first step of mapping the lithium deposit is exploration drilling to gather core samples, which takes about three to six months. Drilling sounds straightforward, but lithium mines are usually in the middle of nowhere and in rough terrain, so getting the equipment on and off site to the right locations takes time. On that, it involves drilling not just one hole, but dozens. Those holes are sometimes hundreds of meters deep and often through solid rock, which is slow going. Then, the resulting drill core samples have to be logged and then promising sections are sent off to a lab for analysis. That means thousands of measurements and tests along the length of the hundreds of meters of core samples. A lot of the core samples will contain no lithium.

然而，一个绿地锂项目需要4至7年而不是2至3年的原因是在开工之前需要进行的一系列工作。让我们仔细看一下。请注意，我将提供的时间表是过于简化的观点，实际情况更加复杂。在锂矿破土前，采矿公司需要对锂矿床的形状以及整个床层的锂浓度有一个详细的了解。如何完成这个任务？锂矿床勘探需要进行承插取样的勘探钻探，这需要大约3至6个月的时间。钻探听起来很简单，但锂矿通常位于偏远地区和崎岖的地形中，因此将设备运送到正确的位置需要时间。此外，这个过程不只是钻一个洞，通常需要钻数十个洞。这些钻洞有时会达到数百米深，并且通常需要贯穿坚硬的岩石，因此进展缓慢。然后，得到的承插样品需要被记录，然后有希望的部分会被送往实验室进行分析。这意味着需要对数百米长的承插样品进行数千次测量和测试。很多承插样品中都不含锂。

Exploration drilling is hit and miss, like playing a game of battleship. It involves taking a guess as to where the ore body is based on things like observations of geologic formations. However, even if the drilling misses the ore body, it provides a data point for where the lithium deposit isn't, which is still helpful.

勘探钻探就像玩一场战舰游戏一样，结果时而有所捷报，时而失之交臂。它涉及根据对地质构造的观察等因素来猜测矿体的位置。然而，即使钻探未能找到矿体，它也提供了一个数据点，指示出锂矿石的不在之处，这仍然是有帮助的。

When the exploration drilling and testing is complete, the lithium company should now have a low resolution view of the shape, size, and concentration of the lithium deposit. That low resolution view is used to plan the second step of mapping the lithium deposit, which is called step-out drilling.

当勘探钻探和测试完成时，锂公司现在应该对锂矿床的形状、大小和浓度具有低分辨率的了解。这个低分辨率的视图被用来规划锂矿床的第二步作业，也就是称为“扩展钻探”的步骤。

Step-out drilling is more intensive than exploration drilling, and it has two goals. First, to more clearly define the shape and composition of the lithium deposit. Second, to gather more material from the deposit for processing studies. Processing studies are a lab-scale test to work out how to economically separate the lithium from other materials like rock, clay, and brine. Although there are tried and trusted methods for different resources, the specific chemical makeup of a resource can have big impacts on the extraction process and the economics of the mine.

跨越钻探比勘探钻探更加密集，并且有两个目的。第一，更清楚地定义锂矿床的形状和组成。第二，从矿床中获取更多的物料用于加工研究。加工研究是一项实验室规模的测试，目的是找出如何经济地将锂与其他材料（如岩石、黏土和卤水）分离的方法。虽然对于不同资源有经试验和可信方法，但资源的具体化学组成可以对提取过程和矿山的经济情况产生重大影响。

The step-out drilling and processing studies take about 12 months and provide the mining company with a basic understanding of whether the lithium mine would be commercially viable. If the mine does look viable and with a detailed understanding of the lithium deposit in hand, there's still at least one more year of work required for detailed engineering. Detailed engineering includes designing all the infrastructure for the mining site, researching environmental concerns, calculating the ideal extraction rate, creating remediation plans, and more. That is, on a greenfield's mine with an aggressive timeline at least two and a half years of work needs to be done before breaking ground.

步出钻井和加工研究需要大约12个月的时间，为矿业公司提供了对锂矿是否具有商业可行性的基本了解。如果矿山看起来可行，并且有了对锂矿床的详细了解，仍然需要至少一年的工作来进行详细工程设计。详细工程设计包括为矿山设计所有基础设施、研究环境问题、计算理想的开采速率、创建补救计划等。也就是说，在一个有着紧迫时间表的新矿山项目中，至少需要两年半的工作才能开始开工。

Three to six months for exploration drilling, a year for step-out drilling and processing studies, and another year for detailed engineering. Usually all of that takes six to seven years, but that's because mines are trying to be capital efficient and they have to build the case for further investment each step of the way. If Tesla got involved, they could compress the schedule by running all the development activities concurrently rather than sequentially.

勘探钻探通常需要三至六个月，步进钻探和加工研究需要一年，详细工程需要另一年。通常来说，这一切需要六到七年的时间，因矿山在尽力提高资本效率，并且他们需要逐步为进一步的投资建立案例。如果特斯拉参与其中，他们可以通过同时进行所有开发活动，而不是按顺序进行，来压缩时间进度。

So if we combine the roughly two and a half years of exploration and planning with the two years it takes to build the mine and get it into production, that's over four years to go from the first drill core to production for a greenfield's mining project. Bear in mind, that's just on the technical side and a best-case scenario, and it didn't take into account factors like the process for obtaining a mining permit, which varies by mining jurisdiction and can take years to work through.

所以，如果我们将大约两年半的勘探和规划时间与两年的矿山建设和生产时间结合起来，从最早的钻探核心到开始生产需要超过四年的时间，这是针对矿业新项目的技术方面而言的最理想情况，并且没有考虑到获取采矿许可证的流程，这个流程因矿业管辖地的不同可能需要数年时间。

That is, taking into account regulatory, technical and financial realities in a western country four to seven years is closer to reality for the quickest that a mine can be brought online, which is still faster than what we've seen historically. We'll talk about regions like China and Africa in a moment.

那就是，在考虑到西方国家的监管、技术和财务现实的情况下，四到七年是让一个矿场投产的最快时间，尽管这比历史上我们所见到的速度更快。接下来我们将讨论中国和非洲等地区的情况。

One of the implications of the long development timelines for lithium mines is that investing early is key. Unfortunately, there's been a drastic underinvestment in mining in general for the last decade, and as I covered briefly earlier, lithium is no different, and in Australia there's a shortage of greenfield sites being developed. Australia currently only has about a dozen JORC compliant mines.

这个长时间的开发周期对锂矿的一个含义是，早期投资至关重要。不幸的是，过去十年矿业投资极度不足，正如我之前简单讲述的，锂也不例外，而在澳大利亚，新建开发地点的供应不足。目前澳大利亚仅有12座符合JORC规范的矿山。

JORC is the Joint or Reserves Committee, which sets standards for reporting mineral exploration results. The top three largest mining projects in Australia are already in production, and the next two largest are under construction and coming online in the next couple of years. Those five mines make up 89% of Australia's JORC compliant reserves. Then on a timeline beyond three years, there's only three small mines that are planned. So in the next four to seven years, for Australia, we shouldn't expect large increases in lithium production beyond what's been forecast.

JORC是联合资源委员会，负责制定矿产勘探结果报告的标准。澳大利亚目前已有三个最大的矿业项目正在生产中，而接下来的两个最大项目正在建设中，并将在未来几年内开始投产。这五个矿场占据了澳大利亚89%符合JORC标准的储量。然而在三年之后的时间轴上，只有三个小型矿场计划进行开发。因此，在接下来的四到七年内，澳大利亚的锂产量不应该出现超过已经预测的大幅增长。

With Australia out of the way, let's move on to the next region and resource type, South American lithium brides. Chile produced 39,000 tons of lithium in 2022, and Argentina 6,200 tons. Between them, they have by far the largest reserves in the world at about 12 million tons, or 48% of global reserves. That's as compared to Australia, which has 24% of global reserves, but manages to produce about 36% more lithium.

澳大利亚已经搞定，接下来我们转移到下一个地区和资源类型——南美的锂资源。2022年，智利生产了39,000吨锂，而阿根廷则生产了6,200吨。它们两国拥有迄今为止全球最大的储量，约为12,000,000吨，占全球储量的48%。相比之下，澳大利亚占全球储量的24％，但却能生产出大约多出36％的锂。

So if South America has such large reserves, why doesn't it produce more lithium? It's because South American lithium brides involve flooding large areas of desert ecosystem, which means water usage issues, environmental issues, and running up against the rights of indigenous communities. That means they're fraught with social and political pushback, so it generally takes about five to ten years to bring new lithium capacity online.

那么，如果南美拥有如此庞大的锂储量，为什么不生产更多锂呢？这是因为南美的锂开采涉及淹没大片沙漠生态系统，从而引发水资源使用、环境和原住民权益问题。这意味着会面临社会和政治抵制，因此通常需要五到十年的时间才能建立新的锂产能。

That's in contrast to the two years that it takes to fully evaporate a lithium brine for processing. With that said, Chile is working on the political and environmental issues. They're developing a national lithium strategy and suggesting that new projects will reduce water usage by using only direct lithium extraction technologies. But it's too early to predict how that's going to affect their lithium production and when. In fact, government involvement may mean that the growth of South American lithium production actually slows down rather than accelerates. So just like Australia, in the next four to seven years, we shouldn't expect large increases in lithium production from South American lithium brines beyond what's been forecast.

与需要两年时间完全蒸发用于加工的锂盐水相比，这种情况截然不同。尽管如此，智利正在解决政治和环境问题。他们正在制定国家锂战略，并建议利用直接锂提取技术降低用水量来开展新项目。但现在还为时过早来预测这将如何影响他们的锂产量以及何时发生。事实上，政府参与可能意味着南美锂生产的增长实际上会减缓而不是加快。因此，与澳大利亚类似，在接下来的四到七年内，我们不应该期望南美锂盐水的产量会大幅增加，超出预测范围。

The next largest lithium-producing region is China at 19,000 tons per year. China produces lithium from both brines and hard rock sources, which include spodumene and lapitolite. Lapitolite is a type of lithium-containing mica, and most of the future growth in China is expected to be from lapitolites in Jiangxi province. Lapitolites are a dark horse when it comes to lithium supply. Let's look at why.

中国是全球第二大锂产区，年产量为19,000吨。中国从盐湖和硬质岩石两种来源生产锂，其中包括榍石和云母石。云母石是一种含锂的云母石，预计中国未来的增长大部分将来自江西省的云母石。云母石在锂供应方面是个潜力巨大的黑马。接下来我们来看看为什么。

In response to the demand wave of the past couple of years, China now intends to roughly triple their 2022 production of lithium by 2025 by tapping into the lapitolites. That is, their goal is to significantly increase global lithium supply within the space of about three to four years. So unlike Australia and South America, Chinese lapitolite appears to offer the promise of rapid growth on relatively short notice. That means China has a good chance of surprising to the upside for mined lithium supply later in the decade.

作为对过去几年需求激增的回应，中国计划通过开发岩盐矿来在2025年前将2022年的锂产量扩大大约三倍。也就是说，他们的目标是在约三到四年的时间内显著增加全球锂供应。因此，与澳大利亚和南美洲不同，中国的岩盐矿似乎能够在相对短期内迅速增长。这意味着中国在本十年末期的采矿锂供应方面有很大机会超出预期。

However, there are two fish hooks that come with lapitolite mining. First, it's fraught with environmental concerns. Every ton of lithium carbonate produced through lapitolites produces 200 tons of waste that can end up in large tangling spawns which can leach into the surrounding environment. Furthermore, lithium produced from lapitolites has a large CO2 footprint due to the energy required for processing, which is exacerbated by China's tendency to use coal power. The environmental drawbacks mean that many EV companies will try to avoid the use of lapitolite-sourced lithium.

然而，锂辉石开采存在两个问题。首先，它充满了环境问题。每生产一吨锂碳酸盐就会产生200吨废物，这些废物可能进入周边环境，造成严重污染。此外，从锂辉石中提取的锂由于加工所需能量大，产生了大量的二氧化碳排放，而中国倾向于使用煤电，进一步加剧了二氧化碳排放。环境上的不利因素意味着很多电动车公司会尽量避免使用来自锂辉石的锂。

Second, lapitolite production is so inefficient that it's generally only profitable when lithium prices are above $20,000 to $30,000 per ton, with more mines becoming more viable at higher prices. That means when lithium prices drop, miners shut down production. And in China, recently, some have. In the lapitolite fish hooks, it's difficult to get a solid bead on how much China can increase the global supply of mined lithium beyond what's already been forecast. But here's my speculation. If China succeeds in tripling lithium production by 2025 and builds on the large amount of lithium already forecasted from Australian sources, we could see a supply glut and price crash for lithium in the middle of the decade.

其次，锂云母的生产效率很低，通常只有在锂价格高于每吨2万至3万美元时才具有盈利性，而在价格更高时有更多的矿山变得可行。这意味着当锂价格下降时，矿工会停止生产。最近在中国，确实有一些矿山已经关闭。关于中国能够超出已经预测的全球挖掘锂供应量增加多少，目前很难确定。但是这是我的猜测。如果中国在2025年前成功将锂产量增加两倍，并且在已经预测的大量澳大利亚来源基础上进一步增加，我们可能会在本十年中见到锂供应过剩和价格崩盘。

On a short-term basis, that would be great for the EV industry. However, a price crash in the mid-2020s could reduce investment in lapitolites because they're only viable at higher lithium prices, and miners use profit to drive investment. If that happened, it would mean that despite the ability of lapitolites to scale within a three to four year lead time, they fail to meaningfully increase actual lithium supply against the forecast later in the decade. But what if I'm wrong, which there's a very good chance of? By 2025, even after China triples their production of mined lithium within the next few years, China will only make up 13% of global lithium supply. In absolute terms, that's 0.3 terawatts, which is in contrast to the potential 4.2 terawatt-hour demand gap later in the decade. So although some people are viewing lapitolites as some kind of Deus Ex machina for lithium supply later in the decade, it's unlikely that they can completely fill the potential supply gap. It's possible, but unlikely.

从短期来看，这对于电动汽车行业来说是很好的。然而，到2020年代中期价格暴跌可能会减少对新产铁电石的投资，因为它们只在较高的锂价格下具备可行性，并且采矿商利润是推动投资的动力。如果发生这种情况，这意味着尽管铁电石有能力在三到四年的前期时间内扩大规模，但它们无法有效增加与十年后预测相比的实际锂供应。但如果我错了，这种可能性非常大呢？到2025年，即使中国在未来几年内将其采矿锂的产量增加两倍，中国在全球锂供应中仅占13%。就绝对数值而言，这相当于0.3太瓦，与十年后可能出现的42太瓦时需求缺口形成对比。因此，尽管一些人把铁电石视为解决十年后锂供应问题的某种奇迹，但它们很可能无法完全填补潜在的供应缺口。这是有可能的，但不太可能。

That means for the forecast, we'll build later in the video, I'm going to assume that China can contribute an additional one terawatt-hour of lithium supply by 2030 by continuing to grow their mined lithium production at about 40% per year.

这意味着对于下面视频中的预测，我假设中国能够在2030年之前额外提供一太瓦时的锂供应，这是通过继续以每年大约40%的速度增加其采矿锂产量而实现的。

The next region to cover is the United States, with only 900 tons of lithium production in 2022 and lithium reserves of 1 million tons. Most of the proposed lithium extraction in the US is in the form of direct lithium extraction from brines or from lithium clays, which are relatively unconventional ways of producing lithium. As for permitting, the timeline for a mining permit in the US is typically 7 to 10 years, but it can happen more quickly. Lithium Americas is making great progress in Nevada and after 3 to 4 years they have permission to start construction. They don't yet have the mining permit in hand, but presumably they will by the time they start production in 2026. Overall, lithium Americas is expected to take about 9 years to get from exploration to production, which is actually a good pace for a new mine in the US. That is, it's not realistic to expect movement in lithium supply forecasts out of the US before the end of the decade. However, what if the US changed its laws to allow for permitting to occur in 2 years? Then we might see some movement in US lithium supply forecasts by the end of the decade, but it would be late in the decade.

下一个需要覆盖的地区是美国，在2022年仅生产了900吨锂，储量为100万吨。美国提出的大部分锂提取方法是通过从卤水或锂黏土中直接提取锂，这是比较非常规的生产方式。至于许可方面，在美国申请采矿许可的时间通常是7到10年，但也有可能更快。Lithium Americas在内华达州取得了很大的进展，在经过3到4年后，他们获得了开始建设的许可。他们还没有获得采矿许可，但可以预期在2026年开始生产时会获得。总体而言，Lithium Americas预计需要大约9年的时间从勘探到生产，对于美国的一座新矿来说，这是一个相当良好的速度。换句话说，不太现实地预计在本十年结束之前美国的锂供应前景会有所变化。然而，如果美国改变法律以允许在2年内取得许可，那么我们可能会在本十年结束时看到一些美国锂供应前景的变化，但这将是十分晚期的。

What about Tesla's Lithium Clay Extraction technology, or if they developed an extraction technology for lithium brines? That's a big wildcard because there's no public confirmation that Tesla actually bought a lithium clay mine. But even if they have, and even with an update to the permitting process, any permitting would take at least 2 and a half years, and construction to commissioning would be another two and a half years, and that doesn't include the production ramp. That is, based on what we know currently, in a best case scenario, a Tesla Lithium extraction operation in the US would happen in 2027 to 2028 at the earliest. If they wait another year or two to pull the trigger, then they'll be lucky to get an operation off the ground this decade. So once again, in the next 4 to 7 years, we shouldn't expect large increases in lithium production from the US beyond what's been forecast.

特斯拉的锂黏土提取技术如何呢？或者他们是否开发了一种用于锂卤水的提取技术？这是一个很大的未知数，因为目前还没有公开确认特斯拉是否实际购买了一座锂黏土矿。即使他们购买了，并且即使在许可过程有所更新，任何许可都至少需要两年半的时间，兴建到投产还需要另外两年半的时间，这还不包括生产逐步增加的时间。根据目前所了解的情况，在最理想的情况下，特斯拉在美国进行锂提取作业最早也要在2027年至2028年之间。如果他们再等待一两年才采取行动，那么在本十年内能够成功开展这项业务就是很幸运的了。因此，在接下来的4至7年内，我们不应该期望美国的锂生产会有大幅增长超过预测的量。

As a side note, many people point to direct lithium extraction, or DLE, as one potential avenue for massively increasing lithium supply by 2030. The basic process of DLE is pumping lithium brine through a filter that pulls out the lithium and returns the spent brine back to the source. That is, it doesn't involve moving huge amounts of raw material around and sorting through that material, but rather simply pumping a fluid through an extraction process and returning it to the reservoir. That should mean a lot less work, a smaller environmental impact, and therefore fewer issues getting a permit. However, the conceptual simplicity of the process is deceiving. Every DLE process is different, and has strengths and weaknesses, and every lithium resource is different. That means just like a lithium mine, there's a number of technical challenges to work through, and it takes years to get a DLE project off the ground. Some brines contain few contaminants, and DLE is easier to set up at those sites, while other brines do contain contaminants like heavy metals and ore can reach temperatures of 600 degrees Fahrenheit or 300 degrees Celsius. Those harsh conditions can make the DLE process uneconomical or even destroy the equipment. Because of last year, DLE represented about 7% of global lithium production, so DLE isn't new. It's a proven technology that continues to develop and expand into new resources as technology improves. And looking to the future, Benchmark Minerals forecast is for DLE-sourced lithium to increase from about 55,000 tons LCE last year to about 650,000 tons by 2032. That'll increase the market share of DLE from about 7% last year to 15% by early next decade. That means the Benchmark Minerals forecast includes the growth of DLE, so it hasn't been forgotten or neglected. It's just not going to change the game in the timeframes that some people assume it will.

值得一提的是，许多人提到直接提取锂（DLE）作为到2030年大规模增加锂供应的一种潜在途径。DLE的基本工艺是将锂卤水泵送经过过滤器，将其中的锂提取出来，然后将废弃的卤水返回源头。也就是说，它不涉及大量原材料的运输和筛选，只需通过一个提取工艺泵送液体，并将其返回储集层。这应该意味着工作量减少，环境影响较小，因此申请许可的问题也会变少。然而，这个过程的概念上的简单是具有欺骗性的。每个DLE工艺都是不同的，都有其优势和劣势，并且每个锂资源也是不同的。这意味着就像一个锂矿一样，需要克服许多技术挑战，并且需要数年时间来启动一个DLE项目。一些卤水含有较少的污染物，而在这些地点上建立DLE工艺会更加容易，而其他卤水则含有重金属等污染物，并且温度可以达到华氏600度或摄氏300度。这样恶劣的条件可能使DLE工艺不经济，甚至破坏设备。由于去年，DLE占全球锂产量的大约7%，所以DLE并不是什么新技术。它是一种经过验证的技术，在技术进步的推动下不断发展和扩展到新的资源中。展望未来，Benchmark Minerals预测，由DLE提供的锂从去年的约55,000吨LCE增加到2032年的约650,000吨。这将使DLE的市场份额从去年的约7%增加到下一个十年初的15%。这意味着Benchmark Minerals的预测包括了DLE的增长，因此并没有被遗忘或忽视。只是在一些人所认为的时间范围内，它不会改变游戏规则。

The next lithium producing region to cover is Africa. Rather than using USGS data, which has very little information on Africa, I'll use this image from Ristad Energy. This year, Ristad expects that Africa as a whole will produce about 50,000 tons LCE. Again, like China, Africa is a black box, except for different reasons. In China, most of the question marks are around how pricing will affect long-term supply growth.

下一个要涵盖的锂生产地是非洲。因为美国地质调查局的数据在非洲方面信息很少，所以我将使用Ristad Energy的这张图片。根据Ristad的预测，今年整个非洲预计将生产约5万吨锂碳酸酯（LCE）。同样，像中国一样，非洲也是一个黑盒子，只是原因不同。在中国，大部分问题围绕着价格将如何影响长期供应增长。

For Africa, for me, the question centers around the reliability of the estimates in unstable countries. That's because 80% of the lithium in Africa is expected to come from four countries that are in the top 30 most unstable countries in the world. Beyond the political stability issues, there's also a potential for human rights issues. By that, I mean digging lithium out of the ground in hazardous working conditions like we've seen with cobalt in the Congo, sometimes with child labor. So EV companies will have to monitor their African lithium supply closely.

对于非洲而言，对我来说，问题集中在那些不稳定国家的估算可靠性上。这是因为预计非洲80%的锂将来自于世界前30个最不稳定的四个国家。除了政治稳定性问题，还存在潜在的人权问题。我的意思是，在类似刚果那样的危险工作环境下开采锂，有时还涉及童工劳动，就像我们在钴矿业中所见到的情况。因此，电动汽车公司将不得不密切监控他们从非洲获取的锂供应。

If the instability and human rights risks can be managed, lithium mining in Africa is likely to play a big role in the transition to sustainable energy. By Ristad's estimate, lithium production from Africa will grow by about six times 2023 production in the next three years, and then reach 400,000 tons of LCE by 2030. Benchmark Minerals forecast for Africa by 2030 is roughly 200,000 tons LCE, which means their estimate is half that of Ristad's. Why the discrepancy? Although Ristad and Benchmark are using similar base data, Ristad is building an additional growth that hasn't been announced yet, whereas Benchmark is providing a forecast grounded in what's actually been announced. In my view, that provides us with a base case and a bull case for lithium production in Africa.

如果可以管理不稳定性和人权风险，非洲的锂矿开采有望在可持续能源转型中发挥重要作用。根据Ristad的估计，未来三年非洲的锂产量将增长约六倍于2023年的产量，到2030年将达到40万吨锂碳酸酯（LCE）。Benchmark Minerals对非洲的预测到2030年大约为20万吨LCE，这意味着他们的估计只有Ristad的一半。为什么有这种差异？虽然Ristad和Benchmark在使用类似的基础数据，但Ristad正在构建一个尚未公布的额外增长，而Benchmark提供的预测是基于实际已公布的信息。在我看来，这为非洲的锂产量提供了一个基础情况和一个乐观情况。

With that said, I'm going to push Ristad's bull case of 400,000 tons LCE for 2030 up to 500,000 tons LCE in 2030. Why? Because Africa seems to be the only lithium producing region in the world where we could see relatively unconstrained growth. Could is the key word here, because in unstable countries a lot can go wrong. However, on the upside, if things go well, they could go very well. Africa has less regulation, high quality lithium deposits, plenty of Chinese investment, and potentially low production costs. That is, unlike China, the lithium from Africa won't just be something that can be tapped into in response to extreme market demands, but could sustain continuous growth on a long-term basis.

话虽如此，我将把Ristad对2030年400,000吨LCE的看涨情况调高到2030年的500,000吨LCE。为什么呢？因为非洲似乎是世界上唯一一个可能出现相对不受限制增长的锂生产地区。这里的“可能”是关键词，因为在不稳定的国家，很多事情可能会出错。然而，从积极的一面来看，如果事情进展顺利，可能会非常顺利。非洲拥有较少的监管、高质量的锂矿床、大量的中国投资以及潜在的低生产成本。也就是说，与中国不同，非洲的锂不仅仅是在市场需求极度紧张时可以开发的东西，而且可以在长期基础上持续增长。

For those wondering how I arrived at the 500,000 tons LCE figure for 2030, I applied an average annual growth rate of 40% per year from this year's expected production base of around 50,000 tons LCE. I chose a 40% growth rate based on two precedents. The 40% growth rate global lithium supply sustained in the last six years, and China's expected burst growth rate of 44% in the next few years. It also makes for an even tenfold increase in lithium production in seven years, which on the face of it is clearly aggressive, and where I can I'm trying to be reasonably bullish. I'll explain why later in the video. For now, the takeaway is that we're going to add 420 gigawatt hours of lithium supply from Africa to the lithium supply forecast that we'll be collating in a moment.

对于那些想知道我如何得出2030年50万吨LCE（锂化学当量）的数据的人，我采用了从今年预期产量约为5万吨LCE的基础上每年增长40%的平均年增长率。我选择了40%的增长率是基于两个前例。全球锂供应在过去六年中持续保持了40%的增长率，而中国在未来几年的预期增长率是44%。这还意味着在七年内，锂产量将增加十倍，从表面上看显然是积极进取的，而我尽量保持合理看涨。稍后我将在视频中解释原因。现在，我们将从非洲增加420千兆瓦小时的锂供应量，这将加入到我们即将整理的锂供应预测中。

As a side note, some people might have noticed that Ristad is forecasting 3.4 megatons LCE by 2031, which is quite a bit more than benchmark minerals forecast of 2.6 megatons. That's because Ristad's supply forecast is based on UN climate goals rather than actual scouted supply. In other words, Ristad's working back from climate goals, and benchmark is once again providing actual market data from all sources.

值得一提的是，有些人可能注意到Ristad预测2031年锂碳酸锂(LCE)的产量为3.4百万吨，比Benchmark Minerals预测的2.6百万吨要多得多。这是因为Ristad的供应预测是基于联合国的气候目标，而不是实际考察到的供应情况。换句话说，Ristad是从气候目标出发进行预测，而Benchmark则再次提供了来自各个来源的实际市场数据。

The next lithium-producing region to cover is Canada, with only 500 tons of lithium production in 2022, but lithium reserves of 930,000 tons. Canada's lithium resources are a mix of lithium-bearing rocks and lithium brines. Like Australia and Canada, it only takes about two years to permit a lithium mine. However, like the United States, Canada's working off a low base with little mining capacity. That means unlike Australia, there aren't opportunities to quickly expand production at or near existing mines. So all new production will have to come from new mining projects that have long lead times. That is, once again, in the next 4-7 years, we shouldn't expect large increases in lithium production from Canada beyond what's been forecast.

下一个要介绍的锂产地是加拿大，2022年的锂产量仅为500吨，但储量为93万吨。加拿大的锂资源是由含锂岩石和锂卤水组成的。和澳大利亚一样，加拿大只需要大约两年的时间来批准一个锂矿。然而，和美国一样，加拿大的基础较低，采矿能力有限。这意味着和澳大利亚不同，没有机会在现有矿山附近快速扩大产量。因此，所有新的产量都将来自具有较长前期时间的新矿项目。换句话说，在接下来的4-7年里，我们不应该指望加拿大的锂产量会大幅增加，超过已经预测的数量。

Finally, as for Brazil, Portugal, and other countries, I'm not going to do deep dives on each one. That's for several reasons. First, because on an individual basis, these countries have relatively small lithium reserves. Second, they're all already accounted for in Benchmark's forecast, and I don't expect significant revisions. Third, much of the reserves listed under other countries are in Africa, which we've already fully covered. And fourth, because they don't give us additional insights that haven't been covered in working through all the other regions.

最后，至于巴西、葡萄牙和其他国家，我不会对每个国家进行深入研究。这有几个原因。首先，因为就个体基础而言，这些国家的锂储量相对较小。其次，它们已经包含在Benchmark的预测中，我不认为会有重大修订。第三，其他国家列出的许多储量位于非洲，而我们已经对此做了全面覆盖。第四，因为它们并没有提供其他地区所涵盖的额外洞察。

In the next video of the series, I'll walk you through my global lithium supply forecast, and combine that with a forecast for sodium ion battery supply to arrive at a comprehensive supply and demand forecast for batteries to 2030. Then, in the final video, I'll walk you through what that could mean for Tesla's battery supply specifically.

在系列视频的下一个视频中，我将为您介绍我的全球锂供应预测，并将其与钠离子电池供应预测结合起来，得出2030年电池供需的全面预测。然后，在最后一个视频中，我将为您详细解释这对特斯拉电池供应可能意味着什么。

That's all for today, but before I close out the video, as I said at the beginning of the video, if you can, toss a coin to your witcher. The information I've provided today is, to my knowledge, the most comprehensive video on lithium supply out there. Other reports that are available on the market can cost thousands of dollars, and by comparison, if this video does well, I expect it to make less than $1,000 from YouTube ad revenues.

今天就说这些，但在结束视频之前，就像我在视频开始时说的一样，如果你能的话，请向你的猎魔人投一枚硬币。根据我所知，今天提供的信息是关于锂资源供应最详尽的视频。市场上其他可获得的报告可能要花费数千美元，相比之下，如果这个视频表现良好，我预计从YouTube的广告收入中赚到的金额将少于1000美元。

It's the supporters who contribute directly that make the channel possible. On that note, a special thanks to David Lang, Christoph Van Hurl, Create Good Sinks, and Paul and Patricia for your generous support of the channel, my YouTube members, Twitter subscribers, and all the patrons listed in the credits. I appreciate all your support, and thanks for tuning in.

正是直接贡献的支持者使这个频道得以存在。在此，特别感谢大卫·朗、克里斯托夫·范·赫尔、Create Good Sinks以及Paul和Patricia对该频道的慷慨支持，还有我的YouTube成员、推特订阅者以及所有列在片尾字幕中的赞助者们。感谢大家的支持，并感谢你们一直关注着。