Subscribe vs Own, Future of mobility, How Autonomy makes money, EV predictions | Scott Painter
发布时间 2023-06-09 16:00:14 来源
摘要
In this episode, I'm speaking with Scott Painter, Founder and CEO of Autonomy.
00:00 - Intro
02:03 - Elon's "thought exercise" for Scott
07:47 - Scott's entrepreneurial journey
15:12 - The Softbank Saga
23:06 - Inspiration & The Innovator's Dilemma
30:25 - Building Autonomy
39:46 - The economics of a subscription-based model
50:40 - Autonomy's ideal customer
57:22 - What does Scott drive?
01:00:53 - Wrapping up
Follow Scott:
Twitter (https://twitter.com/thescottpainter)
LinkedIn (https://www.linkedin.com/in/spainter)
Autonomy (https://autonomy.com)
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Fullpath (https://www.fullpath.com) – Discover Automotive's Leading Customer Data and Experience Platform
Turn your first-party data into customers for life with Fullpath.
Check out the website for more (https://dealershipguy.com) and follow me on Twitter! (https://twitter.com/GuyDealership)
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This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.
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中英文字稿 
Our lenders in particular came back and said, well, what we thought was about 10 million of positive equity as of today is about $10 million of negative equity. And how many Tesla's is a Japanese stock? Over 1200. Wow. And we were just a $20 million swing in equity overnight.
我们的放款人尤其反馈说，我们原本以为财务状况有10百万美元的正面股权，但实际上却是10百万美元的负面股权。日本股票Tesla的数量超过1200。哇，我们的股权在一夜之间下跌了2000万美元。
Yes. What's up, everyone? This is car dealership guy. You're listening to the car dealership guy podcast, which is my effort to give you access to the most unbiased and transparent insights into the car market. Let's get into today's episode.
大家好，这里是汽车经销商。欢迎收听汽车经销商的播客，我将尽力为您提供最客观透明的汽车市场见解。让我们开始今天的一集吧。
Scott Painter, founder and CEO of Autonomy, an electric vehicle subscription company that has created a way for people to get an electric car in a debt-free way. Prior to Autonomy, Scott founded a company called Fair, where he raised billions of dollars to pioneer used vehicle subscriptions. He also founded TrueCar, which he went on to take public as CEO and several other consumer focused companies in the auto sector.
Scott Painter是Autonomy公司的创始人兼首席执行官，该公司提供了一种无负债的方式，让人们拥有电动汽车订阅服务。在Autonomy之前，Scott创建了一家名为Fair的公司，他筹集了数十亿美元来开发二手车订阅服务。他还创立了TrueCar，并担任首席执行官将其上市，以及其他几家以汽车为重点的消费者公司。
In this conversation, we spoke about the time Elon Musk called Scott out of the blue, Scott's staggering prediction for electric cars, the time he lost $20 million overnight, how his company, Autonomy makes money, how the mobility landscape is going to change, and much more.
在这个谈话中，我们谈到了埃隆·马斯克突然打电话给斯科特的经历，斯科特对电动车的惊人预测，他一夜之间输掉2000万美元的经历，他的公司Autonomy如何赚钱，移动出行领域将会如何发展等等。
But before we get into the show, this episode is brought to you by full path. Wasted data is a serious issue in automotive, but data is the key to driving revenues, which means some dealers out there are just ignoring a goldmine that is staring them in the face. Let's face it. The dealerships are completely overrun with data silos. None of the data sources are integrated with each other, leaving the data as a jumbled mess instead of a clean set that could be turning into cash. Full path solves this by gathering, cleaning, and sorting your data into one platform so you can use it to speak to your customers' needs with killer AI-powered marketing campaigns. My friends over at Full Path are breaking barriers and I'm really excited to have them as a partner of the podcast. I believe in their product and more importantly, intermission to help dealers grow. The path can help you turn your data into dollars, find them at fullpath.com.
在我们开始节目之前，这一集由Full Path赞助。在汽车领域，数据浪费是一个严重的问题，但数据是推动收入的关键，这意味着有些经销商正在忽略一座摆在他们面前的金矿。让我们面对现实吧，汽车经销商完全被数据孤岛淹没了。所有的数据来源都没有被整合在一起，导致数据杂乱无章，而不是能够变成现金的干净数据集。Full Path通过收集、清洗和整理您的数据到一个平台上，帮您使用AI强力营销活动满足您客户的需求。我的Full Path朋友正在打破界限，我很高兴能够与他们合作做这个播客。我相信他们的产品，更重要的是，他们帮助经销商发展。Full Path可以帮助您将数据转化为收益，请访问fullpath.com。
The podcast is for informational purposes only.
这个播客只是为了提供信息而设立的。
I think that much of what's happening right now in the auto industry is both interesting and misunderstood at the same time. I was asked by Elon at the end of 2018 as he was really beginning to ramp up production for the Model 3. He does this thing where he asks people around him thought exercise. The thought exercise he gave me was how could Tesla sell half the cars in the US? At the time, I said, you're talking about 8 million cars. I don't think you can make 8 million cars. He says, okay, we'll assume that we could. That's really been his personal focus. He just thinks about manufacturing square footage and how many cars can he make per minute. He's been on a tear to just build as much production capacity as possible.
我认为汽车行业目前正在发生的很多事情既有趣又被误解。在2018年底，埃隆开始加速Model 3的生产时，他向我询问了一件事情，这是他一贯的思考方式。他给了我一个让人思考的问题，那就是特斯拉如何在美国销售一半的汽车。当时，我说，你说的是800万辆汽车，我认为你做不到。他说，好吧，我们假设我们可以这么做。这一直是他的个人关注点。他一直在考虑生产面积和每分钟能生产多少辆汽车。他一直在努力建立尽可能多的生产能力。
I said, let me think about it. I'm going to write you a really thoughtful response and it all came down to if you want to sell half the cars in the US, you've got to be priced below the median price point, which is a super geeky but very right on the money answer. He said, I agree. What's the median price point?
我说，让我想一想，我会写一封有思考的回信。关键在于，如果你想在美国销售一半的汽车，你的价格必须低于中位价格，这是一个超级极客但非常恰当的答案。他说，我同意。那中位价格点是多少？
I said, when I found a true car, we introduced transparency around what people paid for a car. This idea of transparency was about progressing everybody to the mean because in part, the person who paid the most for a car and the person who paid the least for a car varied by as much as about 30%. You could be buying the same exact configured car at the same dealership on the same day from the same salesperson. There is this massive disparity based on information asymmetry. When we introduced true car, those prices tended to narrow from 30% to 3% in about 90 days. That was a big source of friction between me and the auto industry.
当我找到了真实的汽车时，我说过我们要引入透明度，让人们知道他们支付的汽车价钱。这个透明度的想法是让每个人都朝着平均值发展，部分原因是，最多支付汽车价钱的人和最少支付汽车价钱的人之间相差大约30％。你可以在同一天在同一家经销商的同一销售员那里购买完全相同配置的汽车。由于信息不对称，存在着巨大的差异。当我们引入真实汽车时，这些价格趋向于在90天内从30％缩小到3％。这是我和汽车行业之间的一个巨大摩擦源。
I said, what's changed since we launched true car is the whole game was about price. Now, today, if you really think about how a car salesman sells a car, there's this methodology called the Four Square where you basically draw two lines on the page and you say, okay, it's going to be about the price of the car. It's going to be about the down payment or trade-in value of the car. How much money's in the deal? It's going to be about the interest rate. Then it's going to be about monthly payment. Ultimately, car salesman are trained. You can give the customer three of the Four Squares depending on how much they come to the deal knowing and what they don't know. At the end of the day, if you give up three of the Four Squares, you can still make your back end gross.
我说，自从我们推出真车网以来有什么改变是整个游戏都是关于价格。现在，如果你真正思考一下汽车销售员如何销售汽车，有一种叫做“四方形”的方法，基本上你在页面上画两条线，然后说，好的，这将与汽车价格有关。这将与汽车的首付或交易价值有关。交易中有多少钱？它将与利率有关。然后，它将与每月付款有关。最终，汽车销售员受过培训。您可以根据客户了解的程度和他们不知道的内容给客户3个方框。归根结底，如果您放弃四个方框中的三个，仍然可以使您的后端总收入。
Today, where we are at, just for listeners, you're saying back end gross, the added ancillary products, the Juicy Margin additional stuff that gets sold with the car. It's all of those things combined. Back end gross is how much money are you making on this customer when you clear everything away? A dealer doesn't need to make all the money on the sale of the car. They can make their money on either the trade-in or the down payment or the interest rate and actually doing indirect auto financing or packing the deal with all of these things that you're talking about.
现在，针对听众，您在说的是背面总额、附加的辅助产品、与汽车一起出售的有利润的额外材料。这些都是综合起来的。背面总额是指您在清除一切费用后从这个客户那里赚取的钱有多少？汽车经销商不需要从汽车销售中赚取所有的钱。他们可以从换车、首付款或利率、实际进行的间接汽车融资或打包您所说的所有这些事情中赚钱。
By thinking about how the game has changed, it really comes down to monthly payment. What we did at Fair, which was the first use vehicle leasing app and what we're doing at Autonomy, it's all about understanding the importance of monthly payment. My answer to him was, it's not about the price. It's about the monthly payment. He said, I agree, what is the monthly payment that we have to target? I said $500 a month. That was true at the time when we were speaking. Literally, a couple days later, they announced the Tesla Model 3 lease at $4.99 a month. That was the beginning of the scaling moment for the Model 3.
思考游戏行业的变化，根本就在于月付款。我们在Fair做的首个二手车租赁应用，以及我们在Autonomy所做的，都是要理解月付款的重要性。我对他的回答是，这不是关于价格，而是关于月付款。他说，我同意，我们必须达到什么样的月付款？我说是每月500美元。那时我们谈话的时候是确实如此。几天后，特斯拉发布了4.99美元每月的Model 3租赁，那是Model 3发展的开始。
Today, if we look at what happened over 2022, Model 3 pricing crept up, Model Y pricing crept up almost 20 to 25%. What's fascinating is that because the use car market for these electric cars is also supply constrained and Tesla now has taken the policy, do not. The cars go to auction and keep those cars in your bloodstream, control the secondary and the tertiary market. It was a fact that up until November, a used Tesla was more expensive than a new Tesla. That is a phenomenon that most people, if they don't understand what I'm talking about, just have no concept that's happening to them.
今天，如果我们看看2022年发生了什么，Model 3的定价上涨了，Model Y的定价上涨了近20到25%。有趣的是，由于这些电动汽车的二手市场也供应紧缺，而特斯拉现在已经采取了政策，不要将汽车送到拍卖会，并将这些汽车保留在您的血液中，控制二级和三级市场。事实上，直到11月份，一辆二手特斯拉比一辆新特斯拉更贵。这是一个现象，如果他们不明白我在说什么，大多数人只是没有意识到这种情况正在影响他们。
That does not persist anymore for Tesla because when they decided to discount, they also did something else very important. In September of 2022, Tesla decided to just make as many cars as the factories could produce. They switched not just from building to order and having an average nine month wait list, but to building to inventory. They just said, make as many cars, forget the fact that we have been a build to order company from inception and we're going to now sell from inventory. A Model 3, for example, only has five paint colors, two battery combinations, long range and regular and then you've got two tire and wheel combinations. You've only got 20 permutations of Model 3 and he overproduced 40,000 cars in the third quarter.
之前，特斯拉并不坚持这种策略了，因为当他们决定打折时，还做了一件非常重要的事情。2022年9月，特斯拉决定只生产工厂能够承受的车辆数量。他们不仅从按需建造转向了按库存建造，平均等待时间从之前的九个月缩短了。他们这样做就是为了生产尽可能多的车辆，不再考虑之前作为按需建造公司的事实，现在要开始销售存货。例如，Model 3 只有五种颜色，两种电池组合 ( 长续航和普通 )，再加上两个轮胎和轮毂组合。你只有 20 种 Model 3 的排列方式，但在第三季度，特斯拉多生产了 40,000 辆车。
What they did is went from a nine month wait to a five day wait. They basically just said, your car is available exactly the way you want it. What they did is they eliminated this dynamic where a customer who was looking for a new car would then say, I don't want to wait nine months. I'm going to go look for that car in the used car market. Because there were more people looking for a used car than there were used electric Tesla Model 3s, for example, the price was higher. In fact, it was about 18% higher. That is a super hard dynamic for most people to sort of get their head around.
他们所做的是将等待时间从九个月减少到五天。他们基本上只是说，你的汽车现在可以按照你想要的方式提供。他们消除了这样一种情况：顾客正在寻找一辆新车，但因为要等九个月才能买到，于是他们决定去二手车市场看看。由于想要购买二手电动特斯拉Model 3的人更多，而真正的二手车辆数量有限，价格就水涨船高，事实上涨了18%左右。这是一个对大多数人来说非常难理解的复杂情况。
You're working on a company now called Aponomy, which we'll get into shortly. Before we even start there, you're working on bringing subscription in a big way to the EV space. Explain how did you get here. You've had many different companies throughout the years. You've been a serial entrepreneur and you've been very focused in the consumer space. But just walk me through a brief rundown how you even got to this point.
你现在正在一家名为Aponomy的公司工作，我们马上会详细谈论这个。在我们开始之前，你正在努力将订阅服务引入到电动汽车领域。请说明一下你是如何到达这里的。这些年来，你创建了许多不同的公司。你一直是个连续创业者，并且专注于消费领域。但是请简要介绍一下你是如何走到这一步的。
Yeah, I think great entrepreneurs, great companies have to solve a problem. The problem that I've been focused on solving for my entire career is that I believe buying and owning a car should be amazing. It turns out that buying a car is one of the most high friction experiences that we all have to go through in modern life. It's not just the car. It's the car, the financing, the insurance. 90% of people do not pay cash for their car. They need a car loan or a car lease because the average automobile costs about a third of the average consumer's total net worth no matter where you live on planet Earth.
是啊，我认为伟大的企业家和企业必须解决问题。我一直专注于解决的问题是，我相信买车和拥有车应该是绝妙的体验。事实证明，购买汽车是我们在现代生活中必须经历的最高摩擦力的体验之一。这不仅仅是车子。它包括车子、融资和保险。90%的人不用现金购买汽车。他们需要车贷或汽车租赁，因为无论你在地球的哪个地方，平均汽车成本约占平均消费者总净资产的三分之一。
Optiote Finance is a super important part of the overall buyer's journey, if you will. I've been focused on trying to make that journey something that's easier using technology. I've done it now through over 15 companies in automotive. They've all had the same mission.
Optiote Finance 是整个买家旅程的非常重要的一部分。我一直专注于尝试使用技术使这个旅程变得更加容易。我在汽车行业已经通过15家公司实践过这个使命。它们都有同样的目标。
I'm sort of like that, what's the mission? What's the mission? I'm buying and owning a car easier using technology. Whether it was one of my first companies where we had this 1-800 car search and auto access where people were really looking to get automotive information, we were the first company to put an upfront price on a car on the internet. This was with carsdirect.com.
我有点像这样，任务是什么？任务是什么？我正在使用技术更轻松地购买和拥有汽车。无论是我最早的公司之一，在那里我们有这个1-800汽车搜索和汽车访问，人们真的在寻求获得汽车信息，我们是第一家在互联网上公布汽车价格的公司。这是在carsdirect.com上完成的。
I was an ideal app CEO. We ended up raising a lot of money for that company, almost $600 million. This was sort of in the web van era, 98, 99. Then that really ushered in a transition for how people went to market and how dealers went to market. Dealers were still at that point using the classifieds. Now the classifieds have totally digitized with cars.com and auto trader. Those didn't exist at the time. We were sort of in that transitional moment where dealers were going to market digitally.
我曾担任一家理想的应用程序公司的CEO。我们为该公司筹集了大量资金，接近6亿美元。那个时候大约是98至99年的“Web Van时代”。这真正开启了一个转变，改变了人们市场营销和经销商市场营销的方式。当时经销商仍在使用分类广告。现在，分类广告已完全数字化，有了cars.com和auto trader。当时这些都不存在。我们当时处于经销商数字化市场营销的过渡时期。
Then true car was about providing transparency by actually publishing what everybody else paid for their car. The whole concept was based on the fact that the freedom of information and that we could see registration data. It had about 90 days of latency. We could look back with perfect clarity and see all of the information about what people were paying for cars.
翻译：True Car旨在提供透明度，通过实际公布其他人为其购车所付的费用。整个概念基于信息自由，我们可以看到注册数据。它大约有90天的延迟。我们可以回顾以完美的清晰度看到所有有关人们购车支付的信息。
意思：True Car 的目的是通过公布其他人购车的真实花费来提供透明度。这个概念的基础是信息自由，即我们可以查看注册数据。该信息有约90天的延迟，我们可以回顾以完美的清晰度看到有关人们为购车所支付的所有信息。
It started with this concept that if we could provide transparency on a new car, which is a commodity, because every new car configured the same way, it should cost just as much as every other new car can figure the same way. We just started to understand that once you get to about 10% of the market reporting, you were statistically a high enough sample size to be very, very insightful, almost to the within $10 or $20 of what you should pay for a car.
它始于这样一个概念：如果我们能够对于一辆新车提供透明度（因为每个新车的配置都是相同的），那么它的价格应该和其他同配置的新车一样。我们开始了解到，一旦市场上有了约10%的报告，你就已经具备了足够高的统计样本规模，非常地精辟，几乎可以精确到你该为车支付多少钱，最多相差$10或$20。
The benefit of a true car was that somebody who was a first time car buyer, and I've got two little girls in my family. I've also got mother, sisters, so lots of females. I thought it was a sad state of affairs.
真正的汽车的好处在于，第一次购买汽车的人，比如我有两个女儿在家。我还有母亲和姐妹，所以女性在我的家庭中占了很大比例。我认为这是一个令人难过的状况。
The 75% of women felt they needed to take a man with them to go buy a car. This idea that you could help a disadvantaged buyer, and there's plenty of disadvantaged buyers. You could be older. You could just be less informed. You could be financially impaired. All of those things bring people to the table with a fear, an anxiety of going into a car dealership and trying to negotiate for something where a car salesman just has a lot more information.
75%的女性觉得她们需要找一个男人陪同去买车。这种想法是你可以帮助处于劣势的买家，而且有很多处于劣势的买家。你可能是年纪大了。你可能只是不了解情况。你可能财政上有困难。所有这些事情都会让人们带着恐惧和焦虑来到车行，试图为一些只有汽车销售员拥有更多信息的东西进行谈判。
True car was really about making people feel empowered and giving them the tools they needed and car dealers didn't like it because they felt we were forcing transparency and publishing the magician's handbook and forcing everybody to the bottom. In reality, we sort of progressed everybody to the mean because we didn't just have dealers that resisted it.
True Car的真正意义在于让消费者感受到赋权，给予他们所需的工具，但车商并不喜欢这种方法，因为他们觉得我们在强制透明度，公开魔法书，并强迫所有人降价。实际上，我们把每个人推进到了平均水平，因为不仅有车商反对这种方法。
We had some dealers that embraced it and used it as part of their sales process. They would introduce the true car report as a way of building trust and trust reduces friction and reduced friction reduces cost and creates more margin. There was good and bad. It was a very tough company to build and run as a CEO. I ultimately resigned from that.
我们有一些经销商接受了这一点，并将它作为销售过程的一部分。他们会介绍真实的汽车报告作为建立信任的方式，而信任可以减少摩擦，而减少摩擦会降低成本并创造更多的利润。好的和不好的都有。作为首席执行官，这是一个非常艰难的公司去建立和运营。最终，我从这个公司辞职了。
Then fair was- Why did you resign? Why did you resign from true car? There was tremendous pressure we're a public company. I had in particular one dealer, Mike Jackson, who was running AutoNation at the time. Mike really felt that the amount of information we had was unfair to car dealers. He took us on in public.
当时非常公正地问了一句：你为什么辞职了？为什么辞去True Car的职位？由于我们是一家上市公司，存在着巨大的压力。特别是我们拥有的信息量，让当时领导AutoNation的Mike Jackson经销商感觉不公平。他公开质疑我们，带来了很大的压力。
Much of it was just a perception issue, but dealers, the industry resisted. We were at that very important moment where if we were going to have a marketplace, we had to play by the same rules with everybody. If somebody wasn't going to give us information, then they couldn't stay there. TrueCar also had a very interesting business model.
很多只是审美问题，但商家和整个行业都反对。我们正处于非常重要的时刻，如果我们想要一个市场，我们必须按照相同的规则来运作。如果有人不愿给我们信息，那么他们不能留在这里。TrueCar也有一个非常有趣的商业模式。
We did not force car dealers to pay us up front for advertising. They would give us access to all their information, put prices on cars and have to honor those prices. Then when somebody bought a car, they paid us $300, not $30 per lead.
我们没有强迫汽车经销商提前支付广告费用。他们会提供我们所有的信息，对车辆进行价格标定，并必须遵守这些价格。然后，当有人购买汽车时，支付的是300美元，而不是每个潜在客户支付30美元。
So paper sale. Performance-based marketing. Yeah. Interesting. We had small- Why 300? What was the logic? Was it just the average cost per acquisition for a dealer or a wife or a hundred? According to the National Automobile Dealers Association, the average car dealer was spending closer to $1,000 per car sold.
销售纸张。基于绩效的营销。是的，很有趣。我们之前很小规模的——为什么要设置300美元的上限？这是仅仅因为车行或分销商的每辆汽车平均（Acquisition）成本吗？还是因为每辆车的平均成本是1百或者1千美元？根据美国国家汽车经销商协会的数据，平均汽车经销商的每辆售出汽车花费接近1000美元。
We felt $300 was really that sort of Goldilocks number. It turned out it was very true. A dealer paying $300 is clearly saving money over their traditional marketing. $300 is what we needed to be able to make it worth our while. When we started, we really got started as an affinity marketing channel.
我们感到300美元确实是适宜的数字。事实证明它是非常正确的。向经销商支付300美元显然比传统营销更省钱。300美元是我们需要的价值。当我们开始的时候，我们真正成为了亲和性营销渠道。
We worked with USAA and Capital One. Those two organizations has members and customers who are much more brand loyal. When we would bring those customers to the car dealer, they would buy a very high percentage of the time. It was just about migrating deeper in the funnel and talking to a customer who was closer to making a buying decision. Checking price was what you tend to do before you make that buying decision.
我们与USAA和Capital One合作。这两个机构的会员和客户更加忠诚于品牌。当我们把这些客户带到汽车经销商那里时，他们会购买非常高比例的时间。这只是关于更深入地迁移在漏斗中并与更接近购买决策的客户交谈。检查价格是你通常在做出购买决定之前要做的事情。
I've been on this almost crusade-like journey to make owning a car easier. There was one step further. At Fair, we said, what if we owned the car? What if we made it so that you don't actually have to buy a car at all? It really started with this recognition that leasing is a completely big departure from traditional auto finance. If you think about the last 110 years of the auto business, we've pushed almost all the risk to the people who can least afford it. All the depreciation risk goes to the person who's financing or buying a car. If you look across the spectrum of credit scores, the average credit score in buying a car is about 10%.
我一直在致力于让拥有汽车变得更容易，几乎像是一场十字军式的旅程。不止如此，我们还想更进一步，想象一下假如我们拥有这辆汽车，那该怎么办？如果我们让你根本不需要买车呢？实际上，这些想法的出现是因为我们认识到租赁从传统的汽车金融上是一个完全不同的转变。如果你考虑过去110年的汽车商业，我们已经把几乎所有的风险都推给了那些最贫穷的人。所有的折旧风险都承担在贷款或购买汽车的人身上。如果你看看信用评分的范围，购买一辆汽车的人的平均信用评分只有10%。
I'm sorry, the average customer who's buying a car gets about a 10% loan and the average term is about six years. They're paying more money to the bank to borrow the money than they are for the car. We felt that we had enough insight in terms of information about what a car is worth to sort of take that risk more institutionally. At Fair, we became a balance sheet buyer of the car. It was focused on used cars. We had to raise a lot of money. We raised a couple billion dollars of debt and equity to launch the business. SoftBank was one of our partners. We had a number of big OEMs in there.
很抱歉，一般购买车辆的客户得到的贷款利率大约为10%，平均期限约为六年。他们给银行付的借款利息高于他们为车付的费用。我们认为我们已经有足够的信息来了解车的价值，以更具机构化的方式承担这种风险。在Fair，我们成为了汽车资产的平衡表买家，重点是二手车。我们不得不筹集大量资金，筹集了几十亿美元的债务和股权来启动业务。SoftBank是我们的合作伙伴之一。我们有几个大型OEM厂商在其中。
What we were doing was buying the car and then effectively renting it back to the customer in the form of a subscription, but what we've learned is that nine out of 10 people have no idea what a subscription is. Technically speaking, subscription. Why didn't Fair last? Why didn't it make it? I'm not looking to get into 100 different technical reasons, but conceptually, what was it that the thesis just not play out or what happened?
我们当时做的是购买汽车，然后以订阅的形式有效地将它租回给客户，但我们学到的是，十个人中有九个不知道什么是订阅。从技术上讲，这被称为订阅业务。为什么费尔最终失败了？为什么它没有成功？我不想深入探讨100个技术原因，但概念上，这个理论为什么不能被执行，或者发生了什么？
No, it's sort of like marrying the wrong woman, I think. We brought in SoftBank as an investor. SoftBank is an interesting organization. They invested $380 million in the company through the Vision Fund, which is just a tremendous amount of capital. Their only interest was seeing if this could be a disruption. At the end of the day, SoftBank's objective investing in Fair was they wanted to provide cars into the rideshare business. They had a very broad bet globally on ridesharing. Not only were they big investors in Uber, but also Ola, Didi, Grab. From the world, almost a $50 billion investment in rideshare.
不，我觉得这有点像和错误的女人结婚。我们引进了SoftBank作为投资者。SoftBank是一个有趣的组织。他们通过愿景基金投入了3.8亿美元，这是一笔巨额资本。他们唯一的兴趣是看看这是否能够造成颠覆。最后，SoftBank在投资Fair时的目标是要为乘车共享业务提供汽车。他们在全球范围内对乘车共享做了非常广泛的赌注。他们不仅是Uber、Ola、Didi、Grab的大投资者，而且在全球乘车共享行业中投资了近500亿美元。
The rideshare equation is really not just drivers. It's drivers plus cars meeting customers and generating gross revenue from the Fair revenue, not Fair FAIR, but Fair FARE from the actual rider. As good as those economics are, drivers are the biggest expense in that equation. They wanted to make sure that the drivers who wanted to think of it as a side hustle and get out there on the road had a car that they could use because as they were scaling these businesses, they found that this concept of just using drivers who had cars wasn't going to scale enough. They wanted to open up the supply side because as excited as everybody was about rideshare, nobody knew how big it could be because it was always supply and stream.
共享乘车方程式不仅仅是指司机，还包括与顾客相遇并从实际乘客的费率中获得收入的汽车。尽管这些经济模式非常不错，但是在这个方程式中，司机是最大的开销。他们希望确保那些想把它当作副业并上路的司机有可以使用的汽车，因为当他们扩展这些业务时，他们发现仅使用有汽车的司机的概念不足以扩展。他们想要开放供应端，因为尽管每个人都对共享乘车兴奋，但由于始终存在供应和流量，所以没有人知道它可能有多大。
They came to us with this idea. They loved the idea that you didn't have to borrow money, you didn't have to buy the car. It seemed like a perfect product for their cohort of possible drivers. It turns out that no matter how you slice it, the low-end Uber driver is somebody who's got basically minimum wage income otherwise and they are in the 500 FICO range. So it's a very deep subprime credit cohort and the other fact is they drive the wheels off the car.
他们向我们提出了这个想法。他们很喜欢这个想法，即您不必借钱，也不必购买汽车。它似乎是他们可能的驾驶员群体的完美产品。结果发现，不管怎样，低端优步司机基本上是有最低工资收入的人，他们的信用得分在500分以下。因此，他们是一个非常深层次的次级信贷群体，而另一个事实是他们会把车开烂。
And so if you are basically owning the car and giving it to an Uber driver, you have to be prepared for that car to depreciate very heavily. And to get into that business, we bought Uber's Exchange Leasing business in 2018. We started advertising heavily and we grew the business from a brand that nobody knew to almost 100,000 cars out on the road in under 800 days. So by almost any measure, it was one of the fastest growing companies in history in terms of top line and in terms of actual monthly subscription revenue, it got to as high as $50 million a month in that first two-year period.
如果您基本上拥有汽车并将其交给Uber司机，您必须为汽车极度折旧而做好准备。因此，我们在2018年购买了Uber的Exchange Leasing业务以进入该领域。我们进行了大量广告宣传，使这个没有人知道的品牌从零到拥有近100,000辆汽车上路，不到800天就取得了巨大的增长。因此，从任何方面来衡量，这是历史上增长最快的公司之一，无论是在营收规模方面还是在每月实际订阅收入方面，它在前两年的期间内达到了每月高达5000万美元的水平。
So there's a lot of how long did the average customer keep a car? It turned out to be about 16 to 18 months. So one of the things we didn't know when we launched the business is if you let customers go month to month empirically, how long do they keep the car?
有很多问题是关于顾客平均保留汽车的时间有多长？结果发现大概是16到18个月。所以我们在推出业务时不知道的一件事是，如果让顾客按月付费，并且根据经验去看，他们会保留汽车多长时间？
And it turns out that Uber drivers had a different sort of behavior. They actually, people with bad credit aren't bad people, they just can't do a thing consistently over a long period of time. What we started to realize about the Uber driver population is they in particular needed the car from week to week, not month to month, but everybody else, which we were really building the business for, wanted month to month and they stayed for 16 to 18 months.
事实证明，Uber司机的行为有所不同。事实上，信用不好的人并不是坏人，他们只是不能在长时间内一直做一件事情。我们开始意识到，Uber司机群体尤其需要每周一辆汽车，而不是每月一辆。而对于我们真正建立业务的其他人来说，他们想要的是每月一辆车，并且他们会为此停留16到18个月。
The Uber drivers were willing to pay us almost $300 a week to have a car. And if you think about the sort of dynamics of generating somewhere in excess of $1,200 a month from an Uber driver who's making minimum wage, that's $8,000 a year, sort of a magic trick. But we did not launch fair to be a ride share supply system. That's what more what SoftBank wanted out of us.
Uber司机愿意每周支付我们近300美元以获得一辆汽车。如果你考虑一下这种动态，一个最低工资的Uber司机每月能够赚超过1200美元，每年就是8000美元，简直是魔术。但是我们推出fair并不是为了成为一个顺风车供应系统，这更多是软银想要我们实现的目标。
But that business developed a fleet of vehicles, almost a billion-dollar fleet of cars. They were 10 to $12,000 cars on average, we were buying used cars. What I would tell you about that business, it ultimately got taken over by SoftBank where they bought all of our debt at $0.00 on the dollar. They wanted to own that fleet. We had a lot of positive equity.
那家企业拥有一支庞大的车队，价值近十亿美元。平均每辆车造价在10到12,000美元之间，而我们只购买二手车。关于那家企业，我可以告诉你的是，它最终被软银收购了，软银以0美元的价格买下了我们所有的债务。他们想要拥有那支车队，而我们拥有很多积极的股本。
So we had $1 billion fleet of cars and only about a half a billion dollars of debt. One of the problems with a subscription business though is if it's out in the field, you can't recall those cars very easily. And so they wanted to disincentivize people to stay with it and literally two weeks before the pandemic, they went ahead and removed the insurance from all the cars. About 50,000 cars came home right into going into lockdown and the auctions were closed down as well. So a fleet of cars that was generating $50 million of revenue became a much smaller fleet of cars that was generating 10x less revenue.
我们拥有10亿美元的车队资产，但只有大约5亿美元的债务。但是，订阅业务的一个问题是，如果车辆在外面，你不能很容易地召回它们。因此，他们希望通过取消所有车辆的保险来让人们不再使用这项业务，并在疫情爆发前两周实际上这么做了。大约5万辆车在进入封锁状态之前回到了家，而拍卖也停止了。原本可以创造5000万美元收入的车队变为更少的车辆，创造的收入也减少了10倍。
So it really killed the business. And as they were sitting on these cars and the lockdown started to loosen up in their infinite wisdom, they decided to sell the fleet of cars to recoup some of the value that we trapped.
这真的让我们的业务受到了很大的损害。当他们坐在那些汽车上，禁令开始松动时，由于他们的无限智慧，他们决定出售整个汽车队伍，以恢复我们被困的价值的一部分。
So let me understand it. So you bring in SoftBank, right? This big investor and what? You lose control, total control of the company or what happens at this point? It's interesting. There's three sort of narratives around control and a startup.
让我来理解一下。你引进了SoftBank，对吧？这是一个大的投资者，那么会发生什么呢？你将失去公司的完全掌控权吗，还是会有其他后续事项？很有趣。有三种类型的故事与初创企业的控制有关。
You've got the shareholder vote. I had a superclass of voting stocks, so I actually owned the shareholder vote. They do have some protections. There's also the CEO job. I was the CEO and then you have the board and I controlled the board. I had five or seven seats. So you would think that I had the trifecta of power and control in that company.
你已经拿到了股东投票权。我拥有一类超级投票股票，所以我实际上拥有股东投票权。他们也有一些保护措施。还有CEO的职位。我曾经是CEO，然后你有董事会，而我控制董事会。我拥有五个或七个席位。所以你会认为我在公司中具有权力和控制的三重巅峰。
And in many ways I did, except for I did not understand how important capital is and or how capital could be used as a weapon. So as we got into the fall of 2019, this is after Uber went public. We were good news, bad news. We were growing very quickly, but we were providing over $100 million worth of cars on top of everything else to Uber every month.
在很多方面，我做得很好，但我不明白资本有多么重要，也不知道资本如何成为一种武器。所以当我们进入2019年秋季时，这是在优步上市之后，我们既有好消息又有坏消息。我们增长非常迅速，但每个月还要为优步提供超过1亿美元的汽车。
So I needed a lot of capital because when you go borrow money to raise a balance sheet to be able to buy those cars, it's about 10% of the value of the car has to come from equity. 90% comes from debt. We did not have a hard time raising the debt, believe it or not, but as SoftBank recognized that we needed more capital, they gave us a lot less than we needed. And then they went ahead and bought all of our debt.
所以我需要大量的资金，因为当你去借钱来增加资产负债表，以便购买那些汽车时，大约有10％的汽车价值必须来自股本。90％来自债务。令人惊讶的是，我们并没有遇到筹集债务的难题，但随着软银认识到我们需要更多资本，他们给了我们远远不够的资金。然后他们继续购买了我们所有的债务。
And in buying our debt, they controlled the capital stack. They controlled the equity side of the business with about a third of the vote, but I still had power there. And then they also ended up controlling the debt side of the business. And they became effectively the senior secured lender in arch as we go into the pandemic.
通过购买我们的债务，他们控制了资本结构。他们通过大约三分之一的投票权控制了企业的股权，但我仍然在那里有权力。然后，他们也最终控制了企业的债务方。随着我们步入疫情，他们成为了ArCH的事实上的高级担保贷款人。
Everybody asked for forbearance with lenders because nothing was moving and nobody could pay those bills. That became the beginning of the end for us with SoftBank. They had total control over the business. Ultimately, what they used the fleet for was to force the liquidation of cars to be able to pay themselves back first because debt gets paid before equity.
每个人都请求借款人宽容一些，因为没有任何进展，而且没有人能够支付那些账单。这成为我们与SoftBank的末日的开始。他们完全控制着业务。最终，他们利用车队来迫使汽车进行清算，以便能够先偿还债务，因为债务优先于股权。
I read something that you guys were going to buy a Walmart or a Kmart or something. What's that story about? Well, the business of supporting drivers and growing as fast as we were also meant that we had to be able to buy cars directly from consumers because consumers are the lowest cost market to buy cars.
我读到有关你们将要购买沃尔玛或Kmart之类的公司的消息。这是怎么回事？嗯，我们支持司机和快速增长的业务也意味着我们必须能够直接从消费者手中购买汽车，因为消费者是购买汽车最低成本的市场。
So you've got really directly from trade-ins, then you've got wholesale, then you've got the retail market, and then you've got the advertising market where customers are hoping to get a lot more for their car. We knew that if we could buy cars from consumers on a trade-in basis, that that would be the lowest source.
所以你从交易中直接得到了非常低价的车，然后是批发市场，接着是零售市场，最后是广告市场，顾客希望能够得到更多的钱出售他们的车。我们知道如果我们能够从消费者那里以交易方式购买车辆，那将是最低的成本来源。
So we needed to create a reconditioning muscle, very much like what Carvona did. In fact, I would argue that Carvona's core competency has always been the reconditioning of vehicles, and that is really their throttle in the business. They've been able to recondition cars and then distribute them more virtually. So we needed a footprint, and so we had rented a former Walmart store. It had enough footprint up in the Bay Area where we would then buy cars, recondition them locally, and then put them back into the market.
所以我们需要创建一个像Carvona一样的再造肌肉，实际上，我认为Carvona的核心竞争力一直是汽车再造，这是他们业务的真正油门。他们能够再造汽车，然后更有效地分销它们。因此，我们需要一个足迹，我们租了一个以前的沃尔玛商店。它在湾区有足够的足迹，我们会在本地购买汽车，再造它们，然后将它们重新投入市场。
You know, I'm thinking you've gone through so many different companies' ventures. It's inspiring you to keep going. I clearly see you live in a nice house in sunny California. What gets Scott Painter up in the morning and says, I want to start another subscription focused company. What is that for you? Well, I really have this existential angst about solving the problem, and I know it's solvable. This is not what Elon's doing with rockets. I mean, this is just blocking and tackling its business building.
你知道，我想你已经经历了很多不同公司的冒险。这激励你继续前进。我清楚地看到你住在加州阳光明媚的漂亮房子里。是什么让斯科特·佩恩特每天早上醒来，说：我想启动另一个以订阅为重点的公司?对于你来说，这是什么？
嗯，我真的有关于解决这个问题的存在焦虑，我知道这是可以解决的。这不是马斯克正在做的火箭。我的意思是，这只是阻挡和攻略它的业务建设。
I think entrepreneurs over time develop a core competency at a thing. I certainly am not going to be exposed to much of the early stage things that plague most CEOs or founders. I can get a client running pretty quickly. I can raise money. I've got a reputation. I've been able to turn investments into returns consistently. And so I think that that has given me a lot of credibility to go back into this space. And I'm 54 now. I've had well over 16 companies in the auto space all I think focused on this same mission. I'm a little bit frustrated that it has taken as long as it has.
我认为，创业者经过一段时间的发展，会在某一领域形成核心能力。我不会像大多数CEO或创始人那样接触到早期阶段的诸多问题。我可以快速使客户入门，筹集资金。我拥有声誉，并且能够始终将投资转化为回报。因此，我认为这使我在重新进入这个领域时拥有了很大的信誉。现在我已经54岁了，在汽车行业中已经创立了超过16家公司，全部都专注于同一目标。但我有些沮丧的是，这花费的时间比我想象中的要长。
I think the whole concept of being a visionary is that you have a vision for something that people don't otherwise see. And unfortunately, the problem with pioneering new stuff is that they often fail because customers aren't ready. I think timing is everything. Whether you look at Google or Uber or any of these really disruptive businesses, they were in the right place at the right time in terms of people's change in behavior. And I think that people are changing right now because of the electric car transformation in a very, very big way.
我认为作为一个有远见的人，整个概念就是你有一个人们原本看不到的愿景。不幸的是，推出新东西的问题在于它们往往会因为客户还没有准备好而失败。我认为时机非常重要。无论你是看谷歌或优步这类真正具有颠覆性的企业，它们都在合适的时间和地点，符合人们行为变化的需求。而我认为目前由于电动汽车的转型，人们正在以非常大的方式发生变化。
And what you're trying to do, do you really believe that? Or is that like a California thing? Do you really think that electric cars is having a societal change? Like, why do you think that? And I'm not saying I don't do or don't. I want to understand your perspective.
你在尝试做什么，你真的相信吗？还是这只是加州流行的一种观点呢？你真的认为电动汽车正在引发社会变革吗？你为什么会这么认为呢？我不是说我做不到或者不做。我想了解你的观点。
Why you think that? In order for us to do what we do, we have to believe a couple of things. I fundamentally do believe that we're all going to be driving an electric car. And I see that based on a number of different vectors, whether it's regulation, whether it's the will of the auto industry, which the incumbents for a long time resisted flipping over and saying we're going to build electric. They did everything to resist it. Now, just about everybody except Toyota has said they're all in on electric. Not just I'm going to build one or two, you've got literally hundreds of models scheduled for the next 18 to 24 months.
为什么你这么想呢？为了我们能够做我们想做的事情，我们必须信仰几件事情。我根本相信我们所有人都会开电动汽车。我之所以这么认为，是基于许多不同的因素，无论是法规还是汽车工业的意愿。长期以来，这些老牌企业一直在抵制转型并建造电动汽车，但现在除了丰田以外，几乎每个汽车公司都宣称他们会全力支持电动汽车。他们不仅仅表示要造一两个电动汽车，而且已计划在未来18至24个月内推出数百个电动汽车型号。
So I do believe that the industry, in part because of Tesla's success, right? They looked at Tesla and said, how did this guy come in here and just eat our lunch and create a trillion dollar enterprise value thing? And they are really studying that. I just got back from a conference with McKinsey where literally everything is about what did Elon do and what can we do and what won't we do and why? And I think it's just fascinating to see how Elon really wanted to force everybody to build electric cars so that we could save the planet and that we could create a sustainable future.
我认为，特斯拉的成功在一定程度上激发了整个行业，对不对？他们看着特斯拉，想知道这个家伙是怎么做到打败他们、创造价值一万亿美元的企业的？他们现在真的在研究这个。我刚从麦肯锡的一个会议回来，几乎所有的议题都是关于埃隆做了什么，我们能做什么，不能做什么，以及为什么？看到埃隆的力量想推动每个人都造电动汽车、拯救地球并创造一个可持续的未来，真的很有趣。
And I would say largely he has succeeded. If you're not building an electric car and building a business that is focused on electric, you're just not going to make it. There are way too many flywheels inside of what he's done, whether it's modular manufacturing, whether it's direct distribution, whether it's a completely electric sort of ground up system. Cars are going to become software with wheels versus hardware that has a very specific application.
我认为，从大部分方面来看，他已经成功了。如果你不打造一辆电动汽车并致力于电动业务，你就无法成功。他所做的事情涉及许多飞轮，无论是模块化制造、直接分销，还是完全电动的系统。车辆将变成具有轮子的软件，而不是具有特定应用的硬件。
I heard a really amazing sort of analogy this week where they say what Tesla has done is sort of like the iPhone versus the old Motorola flip phone. Everyone else is saying we're going to take Tesla on but we're going to not change our hardware architects here. We're going to still push people the Motorola flip phone and see how it goes. I think that the reality is that it's not just about understanding that we're all going to drive electric and that all this legislation and all of these incentives that are pretty historic, the inflation reduction act is really just the tip of the iceberg. People just don't understand on a state by state basis how many additional incentives, rebates and other things that are available to them. If you make below $75,000 a year in household income, you can actually qualify in California for another $9,500.
这周我听说了一个非常惊人的比喻，他们说特斯拉所做的就像iPhone与老式的摩托罗拉翻盖手机之间的区别。其他人都在说我们要与特斯拉竞争，但我们不会改变我们的硬件架构师，我们还是会推出摩托罗拉翻盖手机，看看会发生什么。我认为现实情况是，不仅需要理解我们都将开电动车，而且这些历史性的法规和激励措施仅仅是冰山一角。人们实际上并不了解每个州提供多少额外的激励、回扣和其他可用的东西。如果你家庭年收入低于75,000美元，你在加利福尼亚州还可以获得9,500美元的补贴。
So what happens when that goes away? That's the biggest can't last forever, right? Well, let's start with the inflation reduction act. Those are 20 year tax credits. I don't think they're going away. It is designed to really help in that transition.
那么当这种情况消失时会发生什么呢？这是最大的“不能持续太久了”，对吧？那么，让我们从通货膨胀减少税措施开始说起。这些是20年的税收优惠。我不认为它们会消失。它旨在在能源转型期间真正帮助人们。
I do believe that at some point it theoretically normalizes but you've got 300 plus million cars on American roads and only 3 million of them are electric. So there is a massive imbalance between new and used and electric versus non-electric. I think theoretically we'll find equilibrium but historically in the US we make somewhere between 14 and 18 million cars a year on the new car side. We sell another 50 million used cars. If you just think about that dynamic, even if 100% of new cars were made as electric cars, you wouldn't reach equilibrium in the car park which is 300 plus million cars for another 20 years. So there is going to be this great transformation.
我相信在某个时刻理论上会趋于平衡，但在美国公路上有3亿多辆汽车，只有300万辆是电动汽车，所以新旧车和电动车与非电动车之间存在巨大的不平衡。我认为在理论上我们会找到平衡，但从历史上看，在美国我们每年制造的新车介于14至18万辆之间。我们还销售了另外5000万辆二手车。如果你考虑一下这种动态的话，即使100％的新车是电动车，你也需要再过20年才能达到现有的3亿多辆汽车的平衡状态。因此，将会有一个巨大的变革。
I do think it's going to sort of come in waves. I think that there is still lingering resistance by the car business. They don't really want to do this because in part internal combustion engines and the infrastructure that supports producing internal combustion vehicles is sort of at that point in the arc where they're now making massive amounts of profit. These factories and all of these things have been amortized over 30 years and they're writing that sweet spot for profit.
我认为电动汽车的发展将会分阶段地进行。汽车业仍然存在着一些抵制情绪，他们不太愿意进行电动汽车的生产，这部分原因是由于内燃机和制造内燃汽车所需的基础设施正在盈利的阶段。这些工厂和相关设施已经使用了30年并且刚好处于盈利的最佳时期。
So take forward a General Motors or any of these incumbent car makers for example. They're losing tremendous amounts of money in their electric car side of the business and making massive amounts of money in their ice side of the car business. It's not very easy to say, I'm just going to stop making ice cars. It's where almost all of their throttle comes from in terms of profitability. And so I think that there's a serious innovator's dilemma here. I mean, I think car manufacturers, I do think that's a great point.
以通用汽车或任何这些现有车企为例，他们在电动汽车业务中损失了大量资金，而在传统燃油汽车业务中获得了大量利润。很难说：“我只是要停止生产传统燃油汽车。”因为这是他们盈利的主要来源。因此，我认为在这里存在着严重的创新者困境。我的意思是，汽车制造商确实面临很大的挑战，这是一个很好的观点。
I mean, you see how much money forward is losing on EVs being in their position and trying to make this transition. It's obviously extremely difficult when you have. I think Farley in particular though, has done a number of very provocative things. He said to car dealers, you know, we're going to do everything different with electric cars. It's almost as though he said, we should split off the electric car business as a totally separate division. Allow Ford as a main, you know, sort of the mothership to just be a disciplined profitable business and then come over here to the electric car business, do what Elon's done, break all the rules, be greenfield, think from the ground up. That's not so easily done. I don't think that anybody has necessarily gotten that right, but it is hard what he's done just from a product point of view. And it's not easy for incumbents. It is a true innovator's dilemma. They don't want to tip over their apple cart to get over to the other side.
我指的是，你看看Forward因为处于这个位置而试图进行电动汽车转型所损失的巨额资金。显然，当你拥有这个位置时，这是非常困难的。我认为，法利尤其做了很多具有挑战性的事情。他对汽车经销商说，你知道，我们将用电动汽车做一切不同的事情。他似乎是在说，我们应该将电动汽车业务拆分为一个完全独立的部门。允许福特作为一个主要的、母船般的角色，只是一个有纪律的盈利业务，然后来到电动汽车业务这边，做像伊隆所做的一样，打破所有的规则，从头开始思考。但这并不容易。我不认为任何人都做得完美，但从产品的角度来看，他所做的非常困难。对于现有企业来说，这不是一件容易的事情。它是真正的创新者困境。他们不想为了到达另一边而打翻了苹果车。
So give us an intro to autonomy. I want to dive deeper into autonomy and also just tell us here, give us the high level. How much funding, how big is the company right now? Where are you guys servicing? Yeah.
请向我们介绍一下自主性。我想深入了解一下自主性，同时也告诉我们一下高层次的情况。你们现在的资金规模和公司规模有多大？你们的服务领域是哪些？
So first of all, I think that, you know, your question about electric really is the beginning of autonomy. What we learned in doing fair is that we had a product market fit that was profound. I mean, fair went from nobody knew what we were and nobody really understood what a subscription was to having 4 million app installs in 800 days. Those 4 million app installs resulted in a fleet of cars that was nearly 100,000 in total in under two years.
首先，我想说，你对电动汽车的问题其实是自主驾驶的开始。我们从fair中学到的是，我们拥有了真正的产品市场适配性。我是说，fair从一开始无人知晓，也没有人真正了解订阅服务，到如今已经在800天内拥有了400万次的应用安装。这400万次的应用安装，使得我们在不到两年的时间内的出车队总数已经接近10万辆。
What I think really inspired my partner and I to say, you know, post soft bank, what do we believe? If you believe that we're going to be driving electric, the question was, what are the real big risks in the subscription business? Because you're basically taking the risk away from the consumer and you're financing a fleet of cars based on a sort of a particular point of view that you understand how that car is going to depreciate. It doesn't even matter if the car depreciates aggressively or not. As long as you get it right, the biggest cost in putting a car on the road is depreciation and interest expense. That's true of whether a customer is financing it with their own money or we're financing it more as an institutionally oriented thing.
我认为真正鼓舞我和我的合作伙伴产生思考的是，您知道，在软银之后，我们认为什么样的事情是有可能实现的。如果您认为我们未来将驾驶电动汽车，那么问题是，订阅业务中的真正大风险是什么？因为您实际上是从消费者那里减少了风险，并且基于某种特定的观点来融资一批汽车，以理解这些汽车会如何贬值。即使这些车辆贬值得很快或不那么快，其实并不重要。只要您做对了，投入一辆车上路的最大成本就是折旧和利息开支。无论客户是用自己的钱资助还是我们以一种机构化的方式资助，这都是一个事实。
The reason I like what we're focused on with electric and autonomy is an electric only subscription business that gives people access to an electric vehicle without having to buy the car or borrow money. What we're doing with electric is based on the fact that we think we're going to be driving electric. We think that companies like Tesla are going to produce enough of these cars. Everybody's making this shift. We know we study when things are all coming to market. It's happening again a little bit more slowly than when anybody thinks, but it is coming.
我喜欢我们关注电动和自动驾驶的原因是，一种电动车订阅服务业务，让人们可以无需购车或借贷就可以使用电动汽车。我们正在开展的电动技术基于一个事实，即我们认为我们将使用电动汽车出行。我们认为像特斯拉这样的公司将会生产出足够多的这些汽车。每个人都在进行这种转变。我们知道当事物来到市场时会进行研究。它正在以比任何人认为的更慢的速度发生，但它正在到来。
I think that there are these historic incentives, rebates, credits that we can sort of use to bring down the cap cost or selling price of the car.
我认为，有这些历史激励、回扣、抵扣可以用来降低车辆的上限成本或销售价格。
There's a lot of headwinds and there's a lot of tailwinds to this business, but the EV only focus is based on the fact that we think, and this is very simply, that there is going to be a shortage of late model electric cars in the used car market for at least a decade or more. Tell me more.
这个行业有很多阻力和推动力，但我们专注于电动汽车的原因是因为我们认为在未来至少10年左右的时间里，二手车市场上将会出现新电动车型的短缺，这是一个非常简单的观点。请继续说。
The theory here is that until there are as many used electric cars as there are used ice vehicles, that market will be out of equilibrium. If consumers on the new car side are more dominantly preferring an electric car, that persists into the used car argument as well. It just is at a lower price point.
这里的理论是，在使用的电动汽车数量与使用的燃油汽车数量相等之前，这个市场将处于不平衡状态。如果新车消费者更倾向于购买电动车，那么这种趋势也会持续到旧车市场。只是价格会更低。
The average new car in America today is approaching $50,000. The average used car in America today is approaching $30,000. Obviously, we've had a lot of volatility in that market over the last couple of years in sort of Black Swan events, but we just don't think there's going to be enough electric cars for the people who can't afford a brand new one. They're going to shift their focus to the electric car market.
美国现今的平均新车价格已接近5万美元，平均二手车价格接近3万美元。尽管过去几年这个市场经历了许多黑天鹅事件，但我们认为，购买不起全新电动车的消费者将会把目光转向电动汽车市场，因为他们需要这样的选择。当越来越多的人需要电动汽车时，市场将会发生改变。
For us, that's where we get liquidity on the car. If we're financing the car from the time we buy it to the time we sell it, it's important to understand how a subscription business works. We intend to own these cars for up to eight years. That car is going to see two, three, five subscribers over that period of time.
对于我们来说，那是我们获取汽车流动性的地方。如果我们从购买到出售都在融资这辆车，了解订阅业务的运作方式非常重要。我们打算拥有这些汽车长达八年。在这段时间内，这辆车将看到两个、三个甚至五个的订阅使用者。
Unlike a rental car company, we don't want to have a large fleet of cars out in the world. We want to have a very focused fleet of cars that are being utilized. We don't have a utilization curve like a rental car company would if we own the cars because it's out there working. In many ways, we look like a mobility REIT.
与租车公司不同，我们不想在世界上拥有庞大的汽车车队。我们想要一个非常专注的车队，这些车被充分利用。如果我们拥有这些汽车，我们就没有像租车公司那样的利用曲线，因为它们一直在工作。从许多方面来看，我们类似于一家移动房地产信托公司。
We borrow money. We buy a fleet of cars. Those cars generate revenue. The average car we're buying today is a $50,000 car. The Tesla Model 3 is the dominant vehicle in our fleet. We chose Tesla to launch in January of 2022 simply because they're the only at scale mass production electric car that was available.
我们借了钱，买了一批车。这些车为我们创造了收益。我们今天购买的平均车辆价格为5万美元。特斯拉Model 3是我们车队中主要的车型。我们选择了特斯拉，计划在2022年1月上线，因为他们是唯一可以大规模生产电动汽车的厂商。
So, you're buying, you're sourcing all your vehicles brand new from Tesla. Today we are. The idea, though, is to be sourcing vehicles from everybody who's making an electric car. We do have some bare minimums, for example.
所以，您正在购买和从特斯拉全新采购所有车辆。今天我们是这样的。不过，我们的想法是从制造电动汽车的每个人那里采购车辆。我们确实有一些最低要求，比如说……（下文缺失，无法翻译）
One of the things that we love about electric cars is that they all tend to be 5G connected cars. From a fleet and asset management point of view, knowing where your cars are is a game changer. At Fair, we had nearly 100,000 cars. These were 8 to 10, $12,000 cars. We only had GPS on some of them. We couldn't tell you. Oh, I know. We sold a lot of cars for Fair, so I know very well.
我们喜欢电动车的其中一个原因是它们通常都是5G连接的车辆。从车队和资产管理的角度来看，知道你的车在哪里是改变游戏规则的。在Fair，我们有近10万辆车，这些车的价格在8到10万美元之间，只有其中一些车上有GPS。我们不能告诉你这些车的位置。哦，我知道。我们为Fair卖了很多车，所以我很清楚这一点。
So that was probably one of the real pioneering blank sort of blind spots in that business. We had all these cars and traditionally fleet leasing companies or large lessors and lenders don't require that they know exactly where the car is at all times. With Autonomy, I can actually with a simple UI look and see where the entire fleet is, how it's being driven, where those cars are. If we need to collect those cars. It's a much different thing than with a loan or a lease because we own the car.
这可能是车队租赁行业中真正先驱性和盲点之一。我们拥有大量的汽车，传统上，车队租赁公司或大型出租方和贷方不需要知道汽车的确切位置。有了Autonomy，我可以通过一个简单的用户界面查看整个车队的位置，车辆的驾驶方式以及这些汽车的位置。如果我们需要收回这些汽车，这和贷款或租赁是完全不同的，因为我们拥有这些汽车。
Give me the simple stuff. How much am I paying per month? What's the deal over here? How do I do this? How quickly can I get it done? So back to the comment that I made to Elon. I think affordability is everything. I don't think that consumers necessarily in mass act on I want to drive that brand or that car. I think they act. I agree with that. They act rationally with their wallet. I think affordability is that key pivot point. To what I said to Elon, in November of 2018, the average car payment was at about $500. You got to be below that if you want to sell half the cars. Today, the average monthly payment on a car payment is about $650. No matter what you're doing. Even higher than that.
给我简单的东西。我每个月要付多少钱？这里有什么交易？我该怎么做？我能多快完成它？回到我对埃隆的评论。我认为价格是关键。我不认为消费者会大规模地想要开某个品牌或某个车型。他们会用钱包理性地行动。我认为价格是关键转折点。就我在2018年11月对埃隆所说，当时平均每月汽车贷款在500美元左右，如果你想卖掉一半的汽车，必须在这以下。而今天，无论你做什么，平均每月汽车贷款都在650美元左右，甚至更高。
Even higher. It's supposed to get $700 on a new car. There's a couple of things that are really interesting about the new car side of things with the new car. You've got to get a 720 FICO in order to get into a new car lease. It means that everybody who doesn't have a 720 FICO, which is about 70% of the market, is not really eligible for a traditional new car lease. Those customers are going to go and look for a loan. One of the real headwinds for lending today, and you see, and I've seen it on your Twitter feed, lenders are going out of business or pulling their business aligns altogether for indirect lending because interest rates are so volatile and so high, you're going to see exactly what we did in 2009. It doesn't make any sense to get a car loan.
更加高昂。新车本应该能够达到700美元。新车方面有几个非常有趣的事情。您必须获得720分的FICO才能租赁新汽车。这意味着所有没有720分FICO（大约市场的70%）的人不真正符合传统新车租赁的要求。这些客户将去寻找贷款。今天贷款的一个真正障碍是，您可以看到，我在您的Twitter feed上也看到了，放贷人正在破产或完全撤出间接放贷业务，因为利率非常波动和高，您将看到我们在2009年所做的完全相同的事情。贷车款是没有任何意义的。
Let's talk about if you wanted to get a Model 3, a Tesla Model 3, that car has gone through a wild ride as it relates to price point over the last year. It started at $42,000 in mid-2021 and rose over the course of 2021 into late 2022. It's almost $50,000. This affordability thing means that if you wanted to go out and get a Tesla Model 3, even if you're borrowing $40,000, you got to think about when you buy a car, you got to pay tax on that car. It's about 10%. You're really borrowing $44,000. Most loans come with a down payment requirement of 5% to 10%. You're coming out of pocket to get into a car loan, usually about $8,000 to $10,000, and you're spending $1,200 a month at a 10% interest rate on a $40,000 total car. The affordability of a Model 3, even with all of Tesla's discounts, is still out of reach for somebody getting a traditional car loan with near prime or not prime credit.
让我们谈一谈如果你想购买一辆Model 3，即特斯拉Model 3，这辆车在过去一年里价格经历了一场狂野的波动。它在2021年中期起售价为42,000美元，到了2021年底涨到了近50,000美元。这个价格可承受性意味着，如果你想买一辆特斯拉Model 3，即使你借了40,000美元，你也要考虑到当你购买汽车时，你得为这辆车交税，税率大约是10%。你实际上借了44,000美元。大多数贷款都需要付出5%至10%的首付款。你需要先掏腰包交几千美元的首付，才能进入汽车贷款。此外，你还需要以10%的利率向40,000美元的总车款支付每月1,200美元的贷款费用。即使考虑到特斯拉的各种优惠，Model 3的价格也远高于那些信用接近优良或不优良的传统汽车贷款买家的承受范围。
Again, going back to that monthly car payment, what is the average? It means that that sub $650, $700 a month car payment is eligible if you have really good credit, but only through a traditional lease. Tesla has always wanted to offer shorter terms. They went from a three-year lease. They also introduced now the two-year lease. Those leases are all heavily subsidized. If you look at the matrix of how Tesla has priced, it really tells you a story about how disciplined they are about delivering affordability. They have basically said, we will take a higher residual risk depending on those terms in the lease to be able to get people into that car. It's very, very telling when you back-solve all the numbers that Tesla has basically said, the most important thing is that our cars are affordable right now, going into a period of high interest rates and austerity, and they do that through their leases.
再次提到每月的汽车贷款，平均水平是多少？这意味着，如果你信用非常好，只有通过传统租赁才有资格享受每月不到650美元至700美元的车贷款。特斯拉一直希望提供更短期的租赁。他们从三年租赁开始，现在也推出了两年租赁。这些租赁都得到了重大的补贴。如果你看一下特斯拉的价格矩阵，它真的告诉了你一个关于他们交付负担得起的产品的纪律性的故事。他们基本上说，根据租赁条件，我们愿意承担更高的残值风险，以便让人们能够买到那辆车。当你通过倒推所有数字时，这非常有意义。特斯拉基本上表示，最重要的是我们的车现在是负担得起的，在经历高利率和紧缩政策的时期，他们通过租赁实现了这一点。
What we've seen is that for our business, if subscriptions are nothing more than an open ended lease, so it's a full-service lease where we bundle the car with title registration. We also have the customer pay tax monthly. We do not have to pay tax when we buy the car on the front end. That's about a 10% arbitrage for us on just the CapEx that we have to expend. We then can bundle the car with roadside assistance maintenance so the customer doesn't have to worry about tires, brakes, windshield wipers, which are really all part of the traditional ownership experience.
我们发现对于我们的业务来说，如果订阅只是一个开放式的租赁合同，那么这就是一个全面的服务租赁合同，我们将汽车与车辆登记绑定在一起。我们还让客户每月支付税费。当我们在前端购买汽车时，我们不必支付税费。这对我们来说是大约10%的套利。我们随后可以将汽车与道路救援维护捆绑在一起，这样顾客就不必担心轮胎、刹车、雨刮器等传统所有权体验的一切问题了。
What happens if—I would imagine investors and yourself, everyone has asked you this question, but what happens if Tesla introduces their own subscription? Does that crush your business? What happens? I've been trying to tell Elon to get into subscriptions for years. By the way, Elon is a friend of the pod, so he's listening. I think it just makes too much sense.
如果特斯拉推出了自己的订阅服务，会发生什么呢？我想投资者和你自己都问过这个问题，但如果这样做，会不会摧毁你的业务？会发生什么情况呢？我已经试着告诉埃隆要进入订阅领域多年了。顺便说一句，埃隆是我们这一系列播客的好友，所以他在听着。我认为这是太有意义了。
The big solve that subscriptions deliver is getting a car loan is a gnarly process. Not only are lenders going out of business because interest rates are so volatile and they can't make money, the inherent problem between a lender and a customer who borrows money as the customer is entering into a fixed rate contract. They borrow money at an X% interest rate over a long period of time, but if the lender is pulling down capital, they live in a floating rate world. You can never reconcile a floating rate source of capital with a fixed rate outflow of capital. This is what led to the collapse at SBB. It is a huge problem.
订阅服务提供的一个重要解决方案是，它能简化汽车贷款申请这一繁琐的过程。这是因为，不仅由于利率异常波动而导致许多贷款机构破产无法获利，而且贷款方和借款人之间存在固定利率合同与实际利率波动之间的 inherent problem。借款人在较长时间内以X%的利率借用资金，但如果贷款方的资本回收不足，则会面临一个不稳定利率的世界。金融机构中的固定利率现金流和浮动利率现金流之间是无法协调的。这也是SBB崩溃的原因。这是一个非常严重的问题。
What we've had to do, and this really hit us very hard at the end of last year, we had nearly a $100 million fleet of cars and Tesla dropped our prices. The day prior to Tesla dropping their prices, by the way, a used Tesla Model 3 that was two to three years old was selling for 20% more than a new one. A $49,000 MSRP brand new, 2022 Model 3, $49,000, a 2019 Model 3 with 50,000 miles, $57,000. I think that the big hit for us was the day that the discount occurred, they also stopped selling, billed to order. They sold from inventory. Those two things combined meant that when a customer who was thinking about getting a car didn't want to wait nine months, all of a sudden could get a car in five days, didn't go think about buying a used one.
去年年底，我们不得不采取行动，这对我们造成了非常沉重的打击，因为我们有近1亿美元的汽车车队和特斯拉降价了。特斯拉降价的前一天，值得一提的是，两到三年前的二手特斯拉Model 3车型的售价比全新车贵20%。一个全新的、2022年款的Model 3的建议零售价是49,000美元，而一个里程为50,000英里的2019年款Model 3的售价是57,000美元。对我们造成重大打击的是，当折扣出现时，他们也停止了按订单销售。他们从库存中销售。这两件事的结合意味着，当一个考虑购买汽车的客户不想等9个月时，突然之间可以在5天内拿到一辆车，就不会考虑购买二手车了。
All of the demand for used Model 3s was completely directed onto new ones. Those used Model 3s came down in price. Everybody in the car business started, this didn't just affect us, it affected lots of dealers across the country, smelling these cars. They took a bath on Model 3s. But our lenders in particular came back and said, well, what we thought was about 10 million of positive equity as of today is about $10 million of negative equity. How many Tesla is a Japanese stock? Over 1200. Wow. So we just took a $20 million swing in equity overnight. Yes.
所有对二手Model 3的需求都完全转向了新车。这些二手Model 3的价格下降了。汽车行业的所有人都开始感受到这种影响，不仅是我们，而且还影响了全国各地的许多经销商。他们在Model 3上蒙受了损失。但是我们的贷方回来说，据今天为止，我们原以为的约1,000万美元的正股权实际上是1,000万美元的负股权。特斯拉在日本的股票有多少？超过1200家。哇。所以我们在一夜之间就经历了2千万美元的股权变化。是的。
And we're a young company. I think company building starts with you raise your seed round and then you have a formal A round and you get some traction, some momentum, you start to see the business begin to build. At 1200 cars, we're the second largest Tesla fleet out there. And our goal is to get to 100,000 cars inside of four or five years. So I think that in 100,000 cars in a market where you are selling 55 or 60 million total cars is not a very big percentage. It is not a winner take all market. We can be a very big business.
我们是一家年轻的公司。我认为公司的建立开始于你筹集种子资本，然后您有正式的A轮融资，你获得了一些动力，一些势头，开始看到业务开始构建。在1200辆汽车方面，我们是第二大的特斯拉车队。我们的目标是在四五年内达到10万辆汽车。因此，在销售总量为55或60万辆汽车的市场中拥有10万辆车不是很大的百分比。这不是一个谁都能赢的市场。我们可以成为一个非常大的企业。
The economics of our business are that we buy a $50,000 car. We generate about 25% of the cap cost of the car in year one subscription revenue. And our revenue comes from not just monthly payments, but we also charge a start fee, which is very much akin to a tax tax.
我们企业的经济模式是购买一辆价值50000美元的汽车。我们在第一年的订阅收入中产生该汽车资本成本的约25%。我们的收入不仅来自月付款，还包括我们收取的起始费用，这非常类似于一项税金。
I can't explain that to me like I'm a third grader for a second. Okay. So it's a $100,000 car. What do you generate in year one? We're generating about $12,500 in year one. And that's a combination of monthly payments, which are on average between $400 and $600 a month and a start fee, a start fee in a lease. I always loved how you branded that a start fee. I always loved that. Even at fair, it's a really good way to brand that.
我需要你把这件事情讲得就像给一个小学三年级学生听一样简单明了。好的，这是一辆价值十万美元的汽车，第一年你将会收入多少？第一年我们会收到大约12,500美元，这包括了每月的付款，平均每月在400到600美元之间，以及租赁开始时的费用。我一直很喜欢你将这个费用称为“租赁开始费”，即使在公平的情况下，这是一个非常好的品牌推广方式。
Well, it is a true fee, right? I mean, it's not technically a cap cost reduction or a down payment. And so we needed to give it a name that was a reflection of what it really is. Makes sense. But in a traditional lease, if you have a $300 lease payment, you have a $3,000 cap cost reduction. And your total out the door price in a lease is misunderstood by most because everybody starting with Tesla has an order fee. They have an acquisition fee, a disposition fee. They have all sorts of fees. It's confusing. It's actual drive off costs. And they're nobody's really forced to be super transparent about these fees.
嗯，这是真正的费用，对吧？我的意思是，它并不是技术上的资本成本降低或首付款。因此，我们需要给它一个名字，反映它的实际情况。很有道理。但在传统的租赁中，如果你有一个300美元的租金，你会有一个3000美元的资本成本降低。而在租赁中，你的总出门价格被大多数人误解了，因为从特斯拉开始，每个人都有一个订单费用，有一个收购费用，一个处置费用。有各种各样的费用，很令人困惑。这是实际的开车成本。而且，没有人被迫非常透明地谈论这些费用。
But at the end of the day, if you want to get into a Tesla Model 3 lease, you're going to be at drive off looking at $6,000 to $7,000. Almost nobody understands that because Tesla says our cap cost reduction is $4,500. You can also go in there and slide her around and get your cap cost reduction to zero. There is no way to get a Tesla Model 3 in a lease from Tesla with zero drive off. And no matter what you do, if you floor your cap cost reduction to zero, you're going to much higher monthly payment and you're still going to be a couple grand out of pocket to get that car. You know, idle license registry.
但到最后，如果你想要租用一辆特斯拉Model 3，你必须支付6,000至7,000美元的首付款。几乎没有人意识到这一点，因为特斯拉说我们的资本成本降低是4,500美元。你也可以去那里滑动调整你的资本成本降低到零。从特斯拉那里租一辆Model 3车，没有办法不付首付款。无论你如何将你的资本成本降低到零，你的每月付款都会倍增，你仍然需要支付几千美元的现金来买这辆车。你知道，就像闲置的驾照登记一样。
So going back to the economics, right? How much are you making on an average customer? We see about a 20% contribution margin. So this is actually a profitable business, but that's to offset for the risk that we take in owning the car, right? And what's that 20% in actual dollar figures? What is that? You've got a $50,000 cap cost that we're putting out in the form of debt. We see about a 25% gross revenue off of that number. And then we have a 20% contribution margin off of that. So we see about $2,000 a year or about $200 a month in contribution coming back to us. When you amortize the start fee and the monthly.
关于经济方面的问题，你们每个客户平均能赚多少钱？我们看到大约有20%的贡献利润。因此，这实际上是一个有利可图的业务，但这是为了抵消我们拥有汽车所承担的风险，对吧？那么这20%实际的金额是多少呢？我们已经投资了50,000美元作为债务，预计可以获得25%的总收入。然后我们可以从中获得20%的贡献利润。因此，我们每年可以获得大约2,000美元，或每月约200美元的贡献回报。当你摊销起始费用和月付费用时考虑。
And how what's the break even point for a customer? Like how long do they need to keep that subscription for you to be profitable on a unit basis? Well, again, we don't think of customers as a fixed term. So because we are a subscription business, we don't mind churn. If a customer brings back a car, that car goes right into another contract. We've got a wait list of customers. And so we do not want to have cars sitting idle. The only time a car sits idle for us is if it's on its way into the fleet and getting prepped and ready for activation on the way out of the fleet and getting sold or in some kind of a reconditioning mode, about 4% of our fleet at any given time is idle in that way. They're on the shoulder. They're an asset that we own, but they're not generating revenue for us.
对于客户来说，何时能够达到成本平衡点呢？即他们需要保持多长时间的订阅才能使你每单位盈利呢？我们不会固定看待客户。 因为我们是一个订阅业务，我们不介意客户流失。 如果客户归还汽车，该汽车就会立即进入另一个合同。我们有一个等待客户的名单。 因此，我们不希望汽车闲置。 对我们而言，只有当汽车正在进入车队，经过准备和激活时，在车队外卖出或被重复加工时，汽车才会闲置，而我们任何给定时间的车队中约有4％的汽车是以这种方式闲置的。他们是我们拥有的资产，但它们不为我们产生收入。
But because we have this wait list function, wait lists are not something that the car business has really seen a lot of over its history. Wait lists have really emerged with electric cars. And a lot of what I'm doing on Twitter, for example, is sort of mansplaining what's going on with product market fit and wait list because companies like Rivian and these are all great companies, they got great product, but they are going to be relegated to being niche manufacturers. They're not going to achieve scale because they don't give a shit about affordability.
由于我们拥有等待列表功能，等待列表并不是汽车业历史上经常出现的事情。等待列表实际上是随着电动汽车的出现而出现的。例如，我在Twitter上所做的很多事情，就是对产品市场适应性和等待列表进行解释，因为像Rivian这样的公司都很棒，他们有很棒的产品，但他们会被限制在小众制造商的范围内。他们不会实现规模化，因为他们并不在乎价格的亲民性。
They do not qualify for any of these tax incentives or rebates or credits. They are well above sort of that sort of middle line of what people think people should pay for a car. They're not worried about affordability. They've got good fan clubs. And if you talk to any one of these founders, they're all very comfortable in the knowledge that they've got these big wait lists. They're like, no, I can't make enough cars. And my point to them, all of them is they're in the wrong business. They should not be manufacturing and retailing a car because that is a one and done mentality.
他们不符合任何一项税收优惠、折扣或信用补贴。他们远远超过人们认为应该为一辆汽车支付的中间线。他们不担心负担能力问题。他们拥有众多的狂热粉丝。如果你跟任何一个创始人交谈，他们都很自信地知道他们有一个庞大的等候名单。他们说：“我生产的汽车还不够，”我的观点是，他们都错了。他们不应该制造和销售汽车，因为这是一种一次性心态。
The two narrative they need to have is better asset utilization over time. And they should be generating revenue from every car they ever make, not the cars that they make. So I think that this sort of revenue for life notion started with a guy named Jim Sewell in Dallas, Texas, a car dealer who just basically said, never, ever lose your customer because the hardest thing in the car business to get is a new customer every time. And I think that Rivian's done, for example, just a phenomenal job of creating a brand following.
他们需要进行的两项叙述是随时间更好地利用资产。他们应该从他们生产的每一辆车中获取收入，而不是从生产的车中获得收入。因此，我认为这种终身收入的概念始于来自德克萨斯州达拉斯的一位叫做吉姆·锡维尔（Jim Sewell）的汽车经销商。他基本上说，永远不要失去你的客户，因为在汽车业中最难做到的就是每次都获得新客户。我认为，例如Rivian，他们在创造品牌追随者方面做得非常出色。
They've got a cool product. It's priced ridiculously high. They're not going to get to sort of scale in a mass market way at those price points. And the same thing with Lucid. And unfortunately, Fiskar, I think is going to be in the same box because Fiskar came out with a $35,000 ocean that they ultimately decided to make only the $70,000 version of. I think what's going to happen to their wait list of customers is it's going to evaporate as they get closer to pulling the trigger and saying, we're ready to go to market.
他们的产品很酷，但定价过高，无法在大众市场上实现规模化发展。同样，卢西德也是如此。令人遗憾的是，菲斯卡也可能会陷入同样的问题，因为菲斯卡推出了一款价值35,000美元的Ocean，但最终决定只生产价值70,000美元的版本。我认为，在他们接近市场推出时，客户的等待名单会消失。
I fully understand now. I see that, look, you're basically saying, hey, I'm offering one, two types of car, whatever it is, like the specific model. And so because of that, I just never have a car sitting idle, which was, I would assume a big issue that Faire had when it came to asset utilization and efficiency, because boom, that car comes back, gets put into the hands of another person, the car continues earning money and everyone's happy and you have profitable unit economics. That doesn't mean that we don't want to have a buffet of cars, right? We want to have a lot of choice. We think consumers are.
我现在完全明白了。你的意思是，你提供一种或两种汽车类型，无论是特定型号还是其他。因此，我就不会有闲置的汽车了。我认为，这是Faire在资产利用和效率方面面临的一个大问题。当汽车回来时，它会被交到另一个人手中，汽车会继续赚钱，每个人都会开心，你们也有盈利的单位经济效益。这并不意味着我们不想有多种多样的汽车供选择，对吧？我们希望有很多选择。我们认为消费者会这样想。
But we want to have a wait list for every single car that we have. Yeah, I would assume. Going into the Memorial Day holiday, we launched a partnership with American Express. American Express went out to their card holders in the five states that we operate and they offered them an opportunity to get $1,000 back for the first thousand that they spend with autonomy. Subscribe to our car. So this went out to 20 million card holders. It was a passive campaign, meaning the card holder had to find it in their member benefit area. It wasn't an email blast.
我们想要为我们所有的汽车设立等候名单。是的，我认为是这样的。在纪念日假期前，我们与美国运通建立了合作关系。美国运通向我们在五个州经营的信用卡持有人提供了一个机会，他们可以在使用Autonomy订阅我们的汽车时获得1000美元的返现。这个奖励向2000万持卡人推出，它是一次被动的推广活动，也就是说持卡人必须在会员福利区域找到它，而不是通过电子邮件广告。
That happened sort of mid month, but we took a thousand reservations for eight different cars. Many of these cars we know are coming. We don't have them yet. So the Chevy Silverado, the Ford Mach-E, the entire Mercedes EQ lineup. But are these real reservations? How much does someone have to put down? Or what's the commitment here? Yeah.
这件事发生在本月中旬，我们接到了八种不同车型的共计一千个订车预约。我们知道其中许多车型的库存尚未到货，比如雪佛兰Silverado、福特Mach-E和梅赛德斯EQ系列。但这些都是真实的订车预约吗？订车预约需要交多少定金？或者说这代表了怎样的承诺？是的。
So all we need for really sort of that early signal and I'm going to apply the same sort of reservation attrition math to what we do. But what we needed was an early signal of is their interest. So we need a name, contact information, phone number. And then they go ahead and make a reservation and tell us exactly what kind of car they want and what market. Once we do that, then we push those customers into installing the app. Once they install the app, that's where we get their driver's license and their credit card. They set up their account.
因此，对于我们真正需要的早期信号，我将应用相同的保留战术数学。但我们需要的是早期的兴趣信号。所以，我们需要一个名称、联系信息和电话号码。然后他们继续预订并告诉我们他们想要什么样的车和市场。一旦我们做到了这一点，我们就推动这些顾客安装应用程序。一旦他们安装了应用程序，我们就会得到他们的驾驶证和信用卡。他们设置自己的帐户。
So for us, a thousand reservations in five days is sort of an astounding avalanche of interest at the highest level. One level higher, which is how many people even go into the member benefit area and say they want to be eligible for this promotion. So we've got about 25,000 out of the 20 million that happened to do that in the first five days. Now we have to go back and find out how that funnel sort of shapes up. But it is about getting people closer and closer to an actual transaction. But I do think it's a valid demand signal for what percentage of our sort of upper funnel wanted to Tesla Model 3, for example. And it was about 40%. Not everybody though. We had a lot of customers from that American Express cohort who wanted to drive a Rivian event fast.
对我们来说，五天内获得一千个预定是一个令人惊讶的高水平兴趣浪潮。更高一级是有多少人进入会员福利区并表示希望享受此促销。所以在前五天内，我们有大约25000人出于2000万用户做了这件事。现在我们必须回头找出漏斗形状。但这意味着让更多的人逐渐接近实际交易。不过，我认为这是一个有效的需求信号，表明我们大约有40%的潜在客户想要特斯拉Model 3。这并不代表每一个人都有这种需求。我们也有许多美国运通队列的客户想要开快速的里维安活动。
So one second, who is the perfect customer for an autonomy subscription? And you know, it's interesting because fair, you were doing used cars, I sold cars through fair. You know, we did it on our dealership and I can only imagine it's a completely different type of customer than who you're focusing on with autonomy, especially you're telling me, you know, you promoted to AMEX card holders. It feels like two different dimensions.
那么，自动驾驶订阅的完美客户是谁呢？很有趣，因为你们之前在做二手车生意，我也曾通过你们的平台销售过汽车。我只能想象这个完美客户与你们在自动驾驶订阅中关注的客户是完全不同的两个维度，尤其是你告诉我，你们的目标客户是美国运通卡持有者。
It is. So, you know, partly because of the soft bank investment and the focus on rideshare, we started slipping very much to the subprime low FICO market, right? And I think that is in large part what sort of led fair to just a very tough day, right? Where if you were working only in that market, you're going to see a lot of delinquencies and defaults. Even though it's not credit and we're not lending you money, people take off with the car. We had people sleeping.
因为软银的投资和专注于共享乘车，我们开始在次贷低FICO市场中滑落。我认为这在很大程度上是导致FAIR度过了非常艰难的一天的原因之一，如果你只在这个市场上工作，你会看到很多的拖欠和违约。虽然我们不是提供信用或贷款，但是人们却拿走了汽车。我们有人睡在车里。
Whereas with a, you know, $50,000 on average electric car, you're just talking to a different cohort of customer, but there's a really big reason why we've chosen the credit card companies to focus because we navigate a thing called RegM. RegM is the federal law that governs leasing disclosures. And leasing disclosures are pretty gnarly. If you are a RegM lessor, you have to comply with not only the law that says you're going to have to disclose the cap cost of the car, the money factor, the residual forecast, you have to calculate all of those things to the penny and then put them into a certain type of form.
这句话的意思是，如果你想卖价值50000美元的电动汽车，你要面对不同的客户群体。但我们选择与信用卡公司合作，是因为我们需要遵守联邦法规RegM，这个法规管理租赁披露事项，这些事项非常复杂。如果你是RegM的出租者，你不仅要遵守规定要披露汽车的资本成本、货币因素和剩余预测等信息，还必须精确计算这些信息，并将其填写在特定的表格中。
It is intentionally a very high hurdle, high friction experience. And historically leasing was only really done for the tax arbitrage. But the big value proposition of a lease is that you pay less money because you're only financing depreciation, not the entire cap cost of the car. The downside is you don't own the car. But in most cases, this is a depreciating asset. This is not like a piece of property that appreciates. In fact, almost no new cars appreciate in value. The way that we think about owning electric cars, we think they will depreciate more slowly than their internal combustion engine counterpart.
这是一个有意的、非常高的门槛、高摩擦的体验。从历史上看，租赁实际上只是为了获得税收套利。但租赁的重要优点在于您只需支付折旧费用，而不是整个汽车的资本成本，因此您可以节省更多的资金。缺点是您不拥有该汽车。但在大多数情况下，这是一种贬值资产。这不像是一处增值的资产，实际上几乎没有新车会增值。我们关注电动车所有权方式的理念是，我们认为电动车的折旧速度比传统内燃机驱动车辆慢。
So it's a good asset to own generally. But I think that navigating RegM was a big, big sticking point to making this thing totally digital. So because we are not a fixed term financial contract of greater than four months, we're not lending you money. We do not have to disclose interest rate. We do not have to disclose money factor. We don't have to calculate it. We don't have to share with you the cap cost of the car because we're not selling you a car because we're not selling you a car and because we're not lending you money, the whole thing can happen on your phone. You can sign for a subscription with your finger on your phone. All you need is a credit card and a driver's license.
总的来说，它是一个好的资产拥有。但我认为，在将此事完全数字化方面，浏览RegM是一个非常棘手的问题。因此，因为我们不是超过四个月的固定期限的金融合同，我们不会借给你钱。我们不必披露利率。我们不必披露货币因子。我们不必计算它。我们不必与您分享汽车的封顶成本，因为我们不销售汽车，因为我们不借给您钱，整个过程可以在您的手机上完成。您可以用手指在手机上签署订阅。您只需要一张信用卡和一个驾驶执照。
It is a higher cohort of customer just based on the price point alone. But this is uniquely something you can pay for on your credit card. You cannot pay for a car lease or a car loan with your credit card. So because you can put this on your credit card, it is natural for us to market into large credit card audiences.
仅仅从价格点来看，它是更高层次的客户。但这是一种独特的服务，可以使用信用卡付款。您无法使用信用卡支付汽车租赁或汽车贷款。因此，由于您可以用信用卡支付此服务，我们自然而然地将其市场推向大规模信用卡用户。
And so it's not just AMEX. We've got three other national credit card providers that will be launching staggered over the course of the next 12 months. But these are what we've definitely seen with the AMEX promotion, for example, is that it is the perfect market for us because almost everybody who went ahead and reserved a car when they gave us their credit card is qualified just based on FICO alone. We're not marketing into a gene pool of people who are credit challenged.
因此，不仅仅是美国运通（AMEX）推出了这项服务。我们还有另外三家全国性信用卡提供商，它们将在接下来的12个月内分阶段推出服务。但我们已经清楚地看到，例如AMEX的促销就非常适合我们的市场，因为几乎每个使用信用卡预订汽车的人，仅基于FICO的评分就已经具备了资格。我们没有在信用糟糕的人群中进行营销。
We're marketing into specifically a gene pool of folks who have by definition good credit, good FICO's and are good payers. I mean, I think it's genius. Look, I think about this from a business perspective, I say, what were challenges with fair? And you mentioned skewing subprime. And then I say, okay, how do we solve that? Well, clearly, if you go if you go prime, that's one way to solve it. How can you go prime? You can go prime by attracting a better customer and with an electric vehicle.
我们正在针对具有良好信用、良好FICO和良好付款记录的人群进行市场营销。我认为这是天才的想法。从商业角度考虑，我思考起这个问题：公平面临了什么挑战？你提到了对次贷的偏见。那么，我们怎样解决这个问题呢？显然，如果您能吸引更好的客户群体，进而选择更优质的用电车，那么走向优质客户是一种解决方式。
Oh, and by the way, that better customer has an American Express makes total sense. Yeah, and I think that what we're going to learn and not just with AMEX and with all these other credit card partners is that this just becomes about removing as much confusion and friction as possible. You can get your entire automotive expense because when you get a subscription, you're not just getting the car. We're handling the car, the financing, tax, title, registration, maintenance, repair. You don't have to worry about any of those things.
顺便说一下，这个更好的顾客持有美国运通卡是完全有道理的。是的，我认为我们将学到的不仅仅是在美国运通和其他信用卡合作伙伴身上，而是这将变成尽可能消除混淆和摩擦的过程。当您订阅时，您可以获得所有汽车相关支出，不仅仅是车辆。我们会处理汽车、融资、税款、所有权、注册、维护、维修等方面。您不必担心这些事情。
So when you really look head to head, what are the true costs of automotive vehicle ownership? It's not just what's my monthly payment. Only half of what we spend on mobility actually goes to the car itself. For years, I've been playing this game with folks where you can pretty much guess what people drive based on their monthly car payment. And we spend in general somewhere between 12 and 13% of our gross income on mobility. And the mobility includes the car, title, tax, and registration, insurance, maintenance, repair, and either fuel or charging. Those expenses are true no matter how you look at it.
当你真正面对面地看待汽车车辆拥有的真正成本时，是什么？这不仅仅是我的每月付款。实际上，我们花费在移动上的开支只有一半用于购买汽车本身。多年来，我一直在和人们玩这个游戏，在月度车贷款基础上，就可以猜出人们开的车型。而我们通常在移动上花费我们收入的12%到13%，这个移动费用包括汽车、车托、税费、注册、保险、维护、修理，还包括燃料或充电。不管你如何看待，这些开支是真实存在的。
And we're putting people into generally high interest debt where they have to go finance that. It's absolutely inefficient. We no longer think, for example, that we're competing with car loans. Car loans cost twice or three times as much as a subscription. So what we're seeing in this implosion- So where are you taking a market share from?
我们现在把人们放进了通常的高利息债务中，他们必须进行融资，这是非常低效的。我们不再认为我们与汽车贷款竞争。汽车贷款的成本是订阅费用的两倍或三倍。因此，我们在这场崩溃中所看到的是——你们从哪里抢夺了市场份额？
简单来说，此段话的意思是：我们不应该让人们负担高利息债务，而且我们的服务（指某种订阅服务）比汽车贷款更划算。我们现在正在大规模获得市场份额，但我们并不会与汽车贷款争夺这些市场份额。
I think it's two things. We're taking market share from traditional leasing. But I think what we're doing is expanding the aperture to include a non-prime customer. Because almost all traditional OEM leases are focused on that prime customer with a 720 or better FICO. So we're just expanding access to a lower cohort of customers because everybody can afford a car. They can afford a different car payment.
我认为有两个方面。我们正在从传统租赁市场占据份额。但我认为我们所做的是扩大光圈，包括次级客户。因为几乎所有传统的原始设备制造商租赁都聚焦于具有720或更好的FICO的主要客户。因此，我们只是将对更低层次的客户的访问扩大，因为每个人都能负担得起一辆车，能够承担不同的车贷款。
But we're very, very focused on studying the OEM car lease programs that are out there. And in the case of Tesla, that requires just constant analysis of what they're doing. They change things almost every single day. But we're pretty much, I think, as nimble and studying things the same way. We now have a price point where you can get a car from us for $3.90 a month. And that $3.90 a month payment does require that you do some things that are a little bit different. We have an 18-month constraint on term.
我们非常非常专注于研究原装厂汽车租赁计划。在特斯拉的情况下，这要求我们不断分析他们正在做的事情。他们几乎每天都会改变一些东西。但我们几乎可以说是同样灵活和深入研究。现在我们有一个价格点，您可以从我们这里得到一辆车，每月只需支付3.90美元。这个3.90美元的月付款需要您做一些稍微不同的事情。我们有一个18个月的限制期。
Because the monthly contribution margin at $3.90 a month is so small. And we have a start fee that would be higher than we like, but it's still lower than Tesla. So we want to be able to say with absolute accuracy that we're the cheapest and easiest way to get access to an electric car. And to make that a true statement, we've got to be constantly sort of measuring that, right?
因为每个月的贡献利润只有3.90美元，所以我们的开始费用也比我们喜欢的更高，但仍然比特斯拉低。因此，我们想要绝对准确地说，我们是获得电动车的最便宜和最容易的方式。为了使这成为一个真实的陈述，我们必须不断地衡量它，对吗？
What car do you own? Or what car do you drive? Or do you subscribe? I've got three autonomy Tesla Model 3s. Two Model 3s and one Model Y in my family. I've been a Tesla driver almost from the very beginning. I got my first Roadster in 2009. I was one of the first here in LA. So I was a founder series car. And I've had every vintage of the Model S as it's come through.
你拥有什么车？或者你开什么车？或者你订阅了吗？我家里有三辆特斯拉Model 3自动驾驶汽车。两辆Model 3和一辆Model Y。我从几乎一开始就是特斯拉车主。我2009年购买了我的第一辆Roadster。我是洛杉矶的最早一批车主之一。所以我的车是创始人系列的。而且随着每一代Model S的推出，我都拥有了。
What did you do with that Roadster? Do you still have it? I've been bricked it three times. It was really frustrating because the early Roadster did not have some of the sort of technology in it to tell you when it needed to charge. And if I put the car away for a month or two and the car lost its charge, I had to go and replace the entire battery array.
你那辆跑车现在在哪？你还有它吗？我曾经被困在路上三次。这真的非常令人沮丧，因为早期的跑车没有某些技术来提示你何时需要充电。如果我把车放置一个月或两个月，而车电量不足，我必须去更换整个电池组。
So I tell me, you know, let's just zoom out for a second, right? Five to 10 years. What changes in the mobility landscape? Like realistically, what do you think this it looks like? I'm not even going 20 years out. I want to do just five to 10 years, given how much change we've seen in the last five years alone.
所以，我告诉你，我们现在来放大一下视角，对吧？五到十年之间，出行方式会有什么变化？实际上，你认为现实情况下会是怎么样的？我甚至不想往后看20年，因为过去五年中我们已经看到了如此多的变化。所以，我只想关注五到十年的时间范围。
Well, I think given how precise we can be about pricing and residual value forecasting today, I think that we're going to see the fleetification of electric cars. I don't think people are going to need to own them. You know, not only are we cheaper and easier. I think one of the big reasons why people are trying us is because they're a little bit hesitant about investing in the technology that's so new. They don't understand how range anxiety is going to affect them. They don't understand if charging is going to be a new pattern that they don't like or do like.
我认为由于当前我们可以对电动汽车的定价和残值进行非常精准的预测，因此我们将会看到电动汽车的车队化。我认为人们将不需要拥有它们，我们不仅更便宜，而且更容易使用。我认为人们尝试使用我们的一个重要原因是他们对这项新技术的投资有些犹豫。他们不明白续航焦虑会对他们产生什么影响，他们不明白充电是否会成为他们不喜欢或喜欢的新模式。
But there's a whole bunch of reasons why not committing to a car for a long period of time makes sense, especially as you're transferring from ICE to electric overall. So we've got a lot of curious users that are seeing if this is what they want over time. I do believe that nobody's going to really need to own a car, but especially an electric car. I believe these are going to be institutionally owned and managed. I think you're going to be able to pay for access for what you want when you want it. I do believe the end of typical ownership for cars is on the horizon.
但是有许多理由解释为什么长期不持有一辆车是明智的，特别是当你从传统车转向电动车。因此，我们有很多好奇的用户，看看是否长期拥有一辆车是否是他们想要的。我相信没有人真正需要拥有一辆车，尤其是一辆电动车。我相信这些将会被机构所拥有和管理。我认为你将能够按需支付所需的车辆使用。我确实相信，传统购车的时代已经接近尾声。
No matter how you use these cars, cars are a depreciating statement. Look, I've got four kids. The idea of telling one of my kids, getting into the workforce, go out and borrow a soul crushing amount of money to buy access to mobility. Three out of four Americans need a car to get to work. The argument that we're not going to have cars in our lives or that we don't need ownership, I've been very, very vocal about, and I remember when Logan and the guys at Lyft were getting started and the rise of ride sharing, I just said, this isn't going to slow down vehicle purchases at all.
无论你如何使用这些汽车，汽车都是一种贬值的声明。看，我有四个孩子。告诉他们中的一个，进入职场，借一大笔钱以购买移动性的机会，这样的想法就是毁灭性的。三分之二的美国人需要汽车去上班。我们将不再拥有汽车或我们不需要拥有汽车的论调，我一直非常非常有声音，我记得当洛根和Lyft的人们开始崛起，共享乘车的兴起，我只是说，这根本不会减缓车辆购买的速度。
And in fact, that was proven to be true. Ride sharing increased the size of the market in almost every respect because mobility became a thing that was more accessible. But I do think it's the end of drunk driving if you want to think about it that way. But I don't think the end of ownership, and I just think ownership is going to be changing. I don't think you're going to have to go into debt to buy a car. I don't think we're going to have to take the people who can least afford to pay the higher interest rate, the people who are younger in life and getting started, and put all of that cost on them.
实际上，这被证明是正确的。共享出行在几乎所有方面增加了市场规模，因为出行变得更加易于实现。但是我认为这是饮酒后驾驶的结束，如果你想那样想的话。但我不认为这是所有权的结束，我只是认为所有权会发生变化。我认为你不需要为购买车辆负债。我不认为我们需要让那些最无法承受更高利率、年轻人和初入社会的人去承担所有成本。
I believe that you're going to have access to what you need when you want it. And you'll be able to drive a new one if you want. All of our cars that autonomy started out as new cars were not a rental car fleet. We do not want you getting into the car and saying, well, this isn't new. Many of our customers who are getting cars that have 10,000, 20,000 miles think they're brand new cars. Our whole goal is to make sure that the car is fresh and like new every time you get in it. And we're going to deflate that car once it becomes viewed as a used car.
我相信你随时需要时都能获得所需的东西。而且如果你想要的话，你也能驾驶一辆全新的车。我们所有开始运营自动驾驶的车都不是租赁车队。我们不希望你上了车后会说，这不是新车。许多我们的客户得到的有1万、2万英里的车都认为它们是全新的车。我们的整个目标就是确保每次你上车时它都是新鲜的，就像全新的一样。一旦它被视为二手车，我们会把它贬值。
I do have one more question before we wrap it up. You started out as next car. You rebranded to autonomy. Tell me about that. Yeah. So we started out as next car because it was a good name that was available. And we were always thinking about, if you think about a longer- That's a good founder story. So my core competency has been about creating brands that have a lower customer acquisition cost. And whether it was carsdirect.com or TrueCar or Fair, these are clarion brands that really did lower the cost of acquisition, created trust through information.
在我们结束之前，我有一个问题。你最开始被称为“Next Car”，现在重新品牌为“Autonomy”。能告诉我这其中的原因吗？是的，我们最开始选择“Next Car”这个名字，因为它是一个可用的好名字。但我们总是在思考，如果考虑更长远的未来，我们需要更具代表性的品牌名称。这是一个很好的创始人故事。我的核心能力一直都是创造低客户获取成本的品牌。无论是 carsdirect.com、TrueCar 还是 Fair，这些都是清晰的品牌，通过信息流传播降低了获取成本，创造了信任。
And really a big part of our arbitrage has always been have a brand that people trust that they can go to without a lot of resistance. Autonomy really reflected where we think people were at coming out of the pandemic. It was synonym for freedom. But it was really an exercise of could we own it? So we were able to buy autonomy, which had been formerly operated by Hewlett Packard as a software division. How did you do that? I knew a former board member at Hewlett Packard. And they had sold that software division to a company in the UK called Microfocus. They had global trademarks. We ended up buying not just the domain name, autonomy.com, but we bought 24 country subdomains. We bought the 1-800 number. So we basically have at this point a global brand we can build that we own completely. It was just a couple million dollars.
我们的套利策略的很大一部分始终是拥有一个大众信任的品牌，人们可以毫不犹豫地去选择。Autonomy真正反映了我们认为人们在疫情之后的想法，它是自由的同义词。但真正的问题在于我们能否拥有它。所以，我们成功收购了Autonomy，这个曾经由惠普公司运营的软件部门。你是怎么做到的？我认识一位曾经在惠普公司任董事会成员的人。他们把这个软件部门卖给了一家叫做Microfocus的英国公司。他们拥有全球商标。我们最终购买了不仅是域名autonomy.com，还买下了24个国家子域名和1-800电话。所以，现在我们拥有一个完全属于我们的全球品牌，只需花费了几百万美元。
But I'm more proud of what we've done with the autonomy brand than almost anything else I've built. I think it's a brand that will help us to transfer trust and give people the ability to come in and feel good about what we're doing.
但是，我比我建立过的几乎任何其他事情更为自主品牌感到自豪。我认为这是一个能够帮助我们传递信任、让人们有能力参与且感觉良好的品牌。
But I do believe that the end of ownership is here. I think that cars still symbolize freedom. I've got a 16 year old who's just got his autonomy car. It's his avatar. It's his ticket to freedom. It's all the same things that a car was to me when I was 16. Incredible. But he doesn't need to own it. I love it.
我相信拥有的时代已经结束。我认为汽车仍然象征着自由。我有一个16岁的孩子，他刚刚有了他的独立汽车。这就是他的化身，是他自由的通行证。这对我而言就像当我16岁时的汽车一样。不可思议。但他不需要拥有它。我喜欢这一点。
And Scott, where can the audience learn more about you, learn more about autonomy? Give us the plug. Yeah, I think first of all, autonomy.com. 1-800-ATONOMY. And you have that too. You have 1-800-ATONOMY. Of course.
"Scott，观众们在哪里可以了解更多关于您和自主性的信息？请给我们推广一下。是的，首先可以去 autonomy.com，也可以拨打1-800-ATONOMY号码。当然，你也可以拨打1-800-ATONOMY号码。"
这段话表达的是在采访中，有人询问Scott的自主性相关信息并希望推广出去。Scott回答说可以去autonomy.com了解更多，也可以拨打1-800-ATONOMY号码。其中1-800-ATONOMY也是一个联系方式。
But I'm getting obviously a lot more vocal and a lot more active on Twitter. I'm going to continue to do that. I think there's just a lot of things that we have a deep understanding of. It's not just me, but also my partner, George Bauer, who was at Mercedes, BMW, and Tesla. So there's just a lot of wisdom. There's a lot of perspective that we have. And so we'll be pretty vocal about that.
但我在Twitter上变得更加活跃和口齿伶俐。我将继续这样做。我认为我们有很多深入的了解，不仅是我，还有我的伙伴George Bauer，他曾在梅赛德斯奔驰和特斯拉工作。因此，我们有很多智慧和观点。所以我们会非常直言不讳地表达这些。
I think Twitter is sort of the perfect place to be provocative. So a lot of the things we see out there, everybody's got a point of view. We're going to step into that debate.
我认为Twitter是表达挑衅言论的完美平台。因此，我们所看到的许多事物，每个人都有自己的观点。我们将踏入这场辩论之中。
Dude, this was awesome. Thanks so much, Scott. And sure, we'll talk soon. Great. Thank you so much for having me.
兄弟，这太棒了。非常感谢你，Scott。当然，我们很快就会聊天。太好了。非常感谢你的款待。
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