Expertise, Incentives, and “Thin Political Markets”
发布时间 2021-01-15 08:00:07 来源
摘要
Thin political markets arise in areas where the issues have low salience to the general public and special interests have tacit knowledge that is relevant to policy. How might policy outcomes get distorted in these thin political markets? What are the incentives of experts, including those from academia, when they participate in policymaking? How can we mitigate special-interest capture?
Professor Paul Pfleiderer, of Stanford GSB moderates a panel discussion with Karthik Ramanna of the University of Oxford Blavatnik School of Government, the Honorable Sarah Bloom Raskin of Duke University School of Law, and Professor Tommaso Valletti of Imperial College London. The panelists are joined by additional discussants journalist Martin Wolf of the Financial Times and Professor Rebecca Henderson of Harvard Business School.
This is Session 3 of the Corporations and Democracy Conference, December 7-9, 2020. The full program and additional links are available here: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/events/conference-corporations-democracy
Watch the Introduction to the Conference: https://youtu.be/YhtkOfFdAiY
Watch Session 1 on Corporations and their Political Voice: https://youtu.be/cZbW6HShvg0
Watch Session 2 on Corporations and Money in Politics: https://youtu.be/apXwYOxilmg
Watch Session 4 on Corporations, Media, and Truth: https://youtu.be/BOLfg5mkBzY
Watch Session 5 on Corporations, Corruption and Democracy: https://youtu.be/jYKu8nsJseA
Watch Session 6 on Corporations and the Justice System: https://youtu.be/Hwqt4XW9YmQ
GPT-4正在为你翻译摘要中......
