Nixon in China: the trip that changed the Cold War
发布时间 2022-02-23 12:00:54 来源
摘要
Fifty years ago this month, US president Richard Nixon embarked on a trip to China – a visit that marked a key moment in the thawing of relations between the two nations. Rana Mitter talks to Matt Elton about the 1972 visit, and how it changed the course of the Cold War. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
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中英文字稿 
Hello and welcome to the History Extra Podcast from BBC History Magazine, Britain's bestselling history magazine. I'm Ellie Corporn.
大家好，欢迎来到BBC History Magazine的"历史Extra Podcast"。它是英国最畅销的历史杂志。我是Ellie Corporn。
50 years ago this month, in February 1972, US President Richard Nixon embarked on a trip to China and the meeting proved to be a key moment in the thawing of relations between the two nations. To mark the anniversary, Professor Ron Amitter, who specialises in the history of modern China, spoke to Deputy Editor Matt Elton. They spoke about the importance of Nixon's visit and the extent to which its legacy changed the course of the 20th century.
50年前的这个月，也就是1972年2月，美国总统理查德·尼克松开始了前往中国的旅程，这次会晤成为了缓和两国关系的一个关键时刻。为了纪念这个周年，专攻现代中国历史的罗恩·阿米特教授与编辑马特·埃尔顿进行了交谈。他们谈到了尼克松的访问的重要性，以及它的遗产对20世纪格局的影响程度。
Ranna, we're talking in the middle of February, which marks an anniversary that I think some people may not be that familiar with. Could you just outline what it is that we're talking about today, I suppose?
Ranna，我们正在二月中旬进行交谈，这个月份是一个纪念日，我认为有些人可能并不熟悉。你能大致概括一下今天我们正在谈论的是什么吗？
Pretty much exactly half a century ago, as we're speaking, in February 1972, a meeting took place in China that I think even now we could say probably was one of the most significant events of the 20th century. That was the meeting between the President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon and the leader, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong.
几乎正好半个世纪前，也就是1972年2月，发生了一次在中国的会议，我认为即使现在我们仍然可以说这可能是20世纪最重要的事件之一。那就是美国总统理查德·尼克松和中国共产党领导人毛泽东主席之间的会晤。
The reason that this was really so epochal is that these two countries, the most populous country in the world, China and the most powerful country in the world, the United States, had essentially not had any formal links with each other since the revolution of 1949 that had thrown the Chinese nationalist government at the time off China's mainland to the island of Taiwan and seen the ascendancy of the Chinese Communist Party. When the revolution in China had happened, the United States had essentially broken off diplomatic relations and then the two sides basically found themselves unable to find a way to restore them for the best part of more than two decades, in fact.
这件事之所以具有重大意义，是因为自1949年中国革命推翻当时在中国大陆的国民政府，使中国共产党得以上台以来，世界上人口最多的国家中国和世界上最强大的国家美国实质上从未有任何正式联系。在中国革命发生后，美国实际上断绝了外交关系，然后两个国家长达20多年都无法找到恢复关系的方式。
So the decision by a right-wing anti-communist American president to make the leap of visiting the world's most popular communist state was really a major milestone in its own right. But the reason it's so significant, as I say so, epochal and retrospect, is that it reset the Cold War, it meant the relationship between China, the United States and the Soviet Union changed profoundly and it also set the pathway out for where we are today, the story in which the United States is still the world's most powerful nation.
因此，右翼反共的美国总统决定访问世界上最受欢迎的共产主义国家，实际上是一个具有重大里程碑意义的决定。但它之所以如此重要，正如我所说的，具有划时代和回顾性的意义，是因为它重置了冷战，意味着中国、美国和苏联之间的关系发生了深刻变化，同时也为我们今天所处的道路奠定了基础，这个故事中，美国仍然是世界上最强大的国家。
But today, unlike 1972, the world's second biggest economy, second biggest military, and most important challenger nation to America's supremacy is that same China that was opened up to the Americans by that visit in 1972, so a really important moment half a century ago. And there's so much to unpack there.
与1972年不同的是，今天世界第二大经济体、第二大军事强国和最重要的挑战者国家是同样由那次1972年的访问向美国敞开门户的中国，因此这是半个世纪以来一个非常重要的时刻。这其中有很多值得探讨的事情。
I wanted to start by exploring something you just mentioned, which was, I suppose, Nixon's motivations for doing this might externally seem quite surprising. What was the background to him wanting to be the person who did this, who made this move?
我想先探讨一下你刚刚提到的事情，即尼克松的动机可能在外界看来相当令人惊讶。他想成为这个做出这种举措的人，背后有什么背景？
If you had to name the most obvious person in America to make a kind of gesture of outreach to communist China in the 1960s, I don't know who you would have picked on there, maybe John F Kennedy or someone, but I don't think which Nixon would have been anyone's choice. Because if you did have to pick the name of a politician who perhaps more than anyone else was associated with the fight against global communism, Nixon probably could have filled that particular slot. He wasn't quite as notorious as Joe McCarthy, whose name has become a synonym for red basing, but Nixon was actually much more powerful and became the vice president of the United States under Eisenhower. And part of essentially what the Eisenhower administration did with Nixon in the 50s, was sending around the world as Mr. Anti-Communism.
如果你必须命名1960年代向共产主义中国做出外交姿态的明显人物，我不知道你会选择谁，也许是约翰·肯尼迪或其他人，但我不认为任何人会选择尼克松。因为如果你必须选择与全球共产主义斗争有关的政治家，尼克松可能填补这个特定的缺口。他并不像乔·麦卡锡那样臭名昭著，其名字已成为“红色基地”的代名词，但尼克松实际上比麦卡锡更有权势，并成为艾森豪威尔政府的副总统。艾森豪威尔政府与尼克松在50年代所做的部分事情，就是向全世界派遣反共先生。
So that could be in the dictatorships of South America where he got sent, and he would essentially say words to the effect of even if this is a dictatorship, it's an anti-communist dictatorship, which is much better than the alternative, so he argued. And the iconic moment, the really kind of moment that summed this up, was when he was sent to Moscow and debated with the then Soviet leader, Khrushchev, about whether the lifestyles of the Soviet middle class or the American middle class were better.
这可以发生在他被送到南美独裁政权的时候，他实质上会说一些这样的话：即使这是独裁政权，也是反共的独裁政权，比起另一种情况要好得多。这就是他的辩论观点。而那个经典的时刻，真正地概括了这一点，是当他被派往莫斯科并与当时的苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫就苏联中产阶级或美国中产阶级的生活方式进行辩论。
He became a kitchen debate because showing the kind of typical items that an American family would have in their kitchen, you know, refrigerator, a kind of high quality other and really nice equipment just couldn't be matched in the Soviet Union. And so Nixon was said to have won the battle against communism in a sense by showing that the Americans had better kitchen appliances, probably a better way to win the battle than nuclear weapons, to be honest.
他因展示美国家庭厨房里典型的物品，如冰箱、高质量的厨具和漂亮的设备，而成为厨房辩论的话题。这些东西在苏联根本无法匹敌。因此，尼克松被认为在某种意义上赢得了反对共产主义的战斗，他展示美国拥有更好的厨房电器，这可能比核武器更好的赢得了这场战斗。
But in other words, Nixon's credentials as the man who could argue against communism were impeccable. And that of course is one of the reasons why he had the credibility in a way that other leaders might not have done in America to go to China.
换句话说，尼克松作为一个反对共产主义的人的资历是无可挑剔的。这当然是他在美国具备了其他领导者所没有的可信度的原因之一，可以去中国。
And how radical a stance was this for him to be taking at the time he did so?
这对他来说，在当时持这样激进的立场有多大的冒险？
这句话的意思是询问某人在某一特定时期持有激进立场的风险程度。“radical”的含义是“激进的”或“根本的”，“stance”意味着“立场”或“看法”。整个问题询问某人在某一具体时期采取激进立场的冒险程度。
It was a pretty radical move for Nixon to decide he was going to go to China, but he didn't come out of the blue. First of all, other politicians, including politicians in the predecessor, Lyndon Johnson administration, had debated whether or not it might be a good idea to open up to China. And Nixon himself had written in the journal Foreign Affairs, the effect of it's not possible permanently to keep China out of the family of nations. So he had sent out some signals. But that having been said, when he got elected in 1968 and a extremely contested, extremely bruising election at that time when America itself was, you know, rioting and up in flames and deeply divided politically.
对于尼克松来说决定前往中国是一个相当激进的举措，但这并非突如其来。首先，包括尼克松执政前任林登·约翰逊在内的其他政治家曾讨论过是否对中国开放。而且，尼克松本人在《外交事务》杂志上写道，不可能永远将中国排除在国际大家庭之外的影响力。因此，他已经发出了一些信号。但是，当他在1968年赢得选举时，那是一场极为激烈、严重损伤的选举，当时美国本身就处于动荡和分裂的局面中。
In that context, opening up to China didn't seem like the most public thing to be slightly to do. But the politics of America actually made it quite important for him to do so. And there was one particular reason, one word you might say that was absolutely only shoulders. And that word was Vietnam. It's worth remembering quite how much the division in American society of the 60s was based on the conscription of young men, some young women, mostly young men in terms of being forced to go, who fought in a land war in Asia, which fewer and fewer people could see was going to come to any kind of good end by the time that Nixon was elected.
在那种背景下，向中国开放似乎不是一个公众普遍认可的事情。但美国的政治实际上使得这一点变得非常重要。一个特定的原因，可以说是一个词，是绝对的重要性。这个词就是越南。值得记住的是，20世纪60年代美国社会的分裂很大程度上基于强制征兵年轻男性，有些年轻女性，大多数是年轻男性，在亚洲的陆地战争中作战，到尼克松当选的时候，越来越少的人能看到这场战争会有好的结果。
But it wasn't clear to him quite how he was going to end the war, get America out of it without in some way resetting the wider context of the Cold War. And making the decision that by bringing China back into his phrase, the family of nations by opening up to another communist power and showing an act of statesmanship by doing so. He would be in a better position also amongst other things to shut down the Vietnam war, at least in terms of the American participation, which a few years later, and it said to 233, to be fair, he would eventually manage to do even if in slightly murky circumstances.
他并不清楚如何结束战争并以某种方式推动冷战的整体环境，也没有确定如何使美国脱离战争。他做出决定，通过让中国重新加入世界国家家族，并表现出政治家的态度，从而在更好的位置上。他将能够做出更好的决策，包括关闭越南战争（至少在美国参与方面）。尽管几年后，他最终在稍微含糊的情况下做到了这一点（得到233位投票），但他并不确定如何做到。
So the opening to China was at least in part a way of dealing with one of America's most pressing geopolitical problems, which was the need to get out of Vietnam. We've talked about Nixon and about America. We should talk about the other side of this situation. What was China's background at this point and what did it stand to gain from this meeting?
因此，对中国的开放至少在一定程度上是应对美国最紧迫的地缘政治问题的一种方式，即需要摆脱越南的困境。我们已经谈到了尼克松和美国，现在应该谈谈这种局势的另一面。在这一时期，中国的背景是什么，它可以从这次会议中得到什么收益？
In some ways, 1972 and the months and years leading up to it were not the most obvious time for China to open up to the United States because it was a period right at the heart of the cultural revolution. We now know that the cultural revolution lasted essentially 10 very brutal years from 1966 to 1976, but nobody knew that at the time. There was no end point that was set for it. It was essentially a sort of ideological, but actually not just ideological, also military civil war. China's leader, Chairman Mao, had essentially declared war on his own Communist Party in 1966, arguing that it had become lazy and complacent. And he told, amongst others, China's youth, the famous red guards, to rise up and beat up their teachers, beat up their elders. And of course, it was a way of him purging some of his political rivals too.
在某些方面，1972年及其之前的几个月和几年并不是中国向美国开放的最明显的时期，因为这个时期正处于文化大革命的核心。现在我们知道，文化大革命持续了10年从1966年到1976年，但当时没有人知道。它没有设定一个结束的时间点。它本质上是一场意识形态斗争，但实际上也是一场军事内战。中国领导人毛泽东在1966年实际上宣布对自己的共产党开战，认为其已变得懒散和自满。他告诉中国的年轻人，特别是著名的红卫兵，要起来打他们的老师、打他们的长辈。当然，这也是他清除政治对手的一种手段。
So one time he gets to the early 70s, the leadership at the top has changed quite substantially, but also various really murky and disturbing things have gone on. One was the sudden deposition from power, departure from power at high speed of Mao's designated successor, a man named Lin Yao, who was supposed to, he was the minister of defense. Everyone thought he was going to succeed Mao and Mao finally died. And then shocking news in 1971 that Lin Yao had been apparently attempting to coo against Mao, he and his family had bundled into a plane which had then crashed in out of Mongolia, killing him and everyone on board.
有一次，他回到了70年代初期，最高层领导人已经发生了很大的变化，但也发生了各种混乱和令人不安的事情。其中一个是毛泽东指定的继任者、国防部长林耀突然被罢免下台，这让所有人都认为他会在毛泽东去世后继任。然而，令人震惊的是，在1971年，有消息称林耀试图把持政变反对毛泽东，他和他的家人被塞进了一架飞机，在蒙古上空坠毁，所有人都死了。
Even today, the story is one that isn't entirely transparent to put it to put it mildly. But what it meant was that internal politics in China became very fragile. There were essentially two factions, Joe and I, the relatively pragmatic premier of China, wanted to basically kickstart China's economy, which had been horribly damaged under the culture revolution. He knew the China needed for an investment and probably opening up to the outside world to do it. On the other side, the so-called Gang of Four, they weren't called out of the time, that was a later term that was used for them. But it's a good shorthand for the radical cultural revolution fanatics, including Mao's wife, Jiang Ting, who argued that no, America was this huge ideological enemy. There was no way that opening up to foreign capital, capitalism and capital could ever be permitted.
即使到今天，这个故事也可以说是不甚透明的。但它的意义在于中国的内部政治变得非常脆弱。基本上有两个派系，李先念和我是相对务实的中国总理，想要启动中国的经济，这在文化大革命期间受到了严重的破坏。他知道中国需要投资，可能要开放对外开放。另一方面，所谓的四人帮，当时没有这个称呼，这是后来用来形容他们的一个称呼。但这是一个简单的缩写，指的是激进的文化大革命狂热分子，包括毛泽东的妻子江青，他们认为美国是一个巨大的意识形态敌人，绝不允许开放外资、资本主义和资本主义。
So those factional battles were raging, the radicals versus the pragmatists, with Mao sort of sitting like kind of emperor quite ill by that stage on top of everything. And meanwhile, the pragmatists won in terms of the invitation being extended to the Americans. And the message being sent out that yes, if you ask for an invitation, we will be likely to accept it.
在那时，派系之间的战斗激烈进行着，激进派和实用派之间的冲突不断升级，而毛泽东一边病得很重，一边坐在高处，像一个皇帝一样。与此同时，实用派在向美国人发出邀请方面赢得了胜利，并传达出一个信息：是的，如果你要求邀请，我们很可能会接受它。
Yeah, that's really interesting. I'm interested particularly in the fact that China turned to America rather than say Russia, were there reasons that sort of pushed them away from choosing that route? Logically, it might seem that the two biggest communist powers in the world, the Soviet Union and China would find some kind of understanding. But in fact, by the late 1960s, the situation was ironically almost the opposite.
是的，这真的很有趣。我特别感兴趣的是中国选择了美国而不是俄罗斯，是否有一些原因，使他们不得不避免选择那条路？从逻辑上看，世界上两个最大的共产主义大国苏联和中国应该有一些相互理解的。但事实上，到了1960年代末，情况却往往相反。
China was much more worried about the Soviets than it was about the Americans. And the reason for that lay in the events of a decade earlier. During the 50s, China and Soviet Union had been very close to allied, lots of technical operation, ideological affinity, all of that. And then it started to go wrong.
中国比起美国更担心苏联。这是出于10年前的事件原因。在上世纪50年代，中国和苏联之间非常亲密，有很多技术操作和意识形态的亲和。但是之后，情况开始变坏了。
After the death of Stalin, Mao began to feel the Soviets under Christchurch and Stalin's successors were going soft. They were willing to accommodate the West too much. They weren't really true communists anymore. And the language and rhetoric between the two sides became more and more savage until essentially the two sides split. There was a split between the Soviets and the Chinese and the early 1960s.
在斯大林去世后，毛开始感到苏联在基督城和斯大林的继承者领导下变得软弱。他们愿意过多地迎合西方，不再真正是共产主义者。两边的语言和言辞变得越来越激烈，最终导致了两边的分裂。苏联和中国在60年代初期产生了分裂。
1960s is the sort of date that's usually given as the moment when joint cooperation in engineering projects stopped, for instance. It didn't mean a break in diplomatic relations. There were always sort of ambassadors between the two sides. But in terms of genuine cooperation, it was a very, very cold break. And that meant that China essentially found itself isolated from the outside world. Because of course, it wasn't friends with the Americans. It now was known as friends with the Soviets either. It didn't really have any other major ideological allies.
20世纪60年代通常被视作工程项目中合作停止的时刻。这并不意味着外交关系的中断。双方之间一直有类似大使的代表。但是在真正的合作方面，这是一个非常冷漠的断裂。这意味着中国基本上发现自己与外界隔绝了。因为当然，它不是美国的朋友。它也不是苏联的朋友。它实际上没有其他重要的意识形态盟友。
And during the proctor revolution, things got even worse. China basically recalled most of its ambassadors, except the ambassadors Egypt as it happened, kind of indoctrinated them and then sent them back out again. But as a sort of ideological warriors, they weren't really ambassadors in the classic sense of that phrasing.
在文化大革命期间，情况变得更加糟糕。中国基本上回收了大部分大使，除了埃及大使，他们被灌输了某种意识形态然后再次派往海外。但是作为一种意识形态的战士，他们并不是经典意义上的大使。
And at the same time, there was also increasingly strong and by no means unreasonable rumors that war might break out with a Soviet Union, particularly over disputed islands in the Suri River on the northeastern border area of China. So the prospect of a war war with the Soviet Union, which would have been potentially devastating, was yet another thing that concentrated minds in Beijing and made them think, well, in this context, weirdly enough, it may be better to talk to the capitalist Americans than those so-called communists in Moscow, who actually are rather more dangerous for our aims than the people in Washington.
与此同时，越来越强烈的传言表明，与苏联可能爆发战争，尤其是在中国东北边境的苏麦里江争议岛屿上。因此，与苏联的战争前景可能会带来毁灭性的后果，这是让北京方面很担忧的另一件事情，因此他们开始思考，在这种情况下，与资本主义的美国人谈判可能比与莫斯科的所谓共产主义者合作更好，因为后者实际上比华盛顿的人更为危险，与我们的目标相左。
So all the players are in place, if you like. How do you go about setting up a diplomatic mission like this? What are the mechanics of actually making this kind of thing happen? And what happened when the Americans did go to China?
所以，所有玩家都已经到位了。你如何设置这样一个外交任务？实际上，实现这样的事情的具体机制是什么？当美国人去中国时会发生什么？
So if you'd sum up in one word how this astonishing coup of the Nixon visit was set up, then the one word I'd choose would be skullduggery. And skullduggery might be combined with diplomacy. The two are often quite closely related. And you have to turn to the always intriguing figure of Henry Kissinger.
如果你用一个词来总结尼克松访问的惊人政变是如何安排的，那么我选择的这个词是“诡计”。而这些诡计可能与外交结合起来。这两者经常密切相关。你必须转向总是令人着迷的亨利·基辛格这个人物。
Henry Kissinger was the national security advisor who Nixon appointed when he been elected president. And it now turns out, you know, we now know from memoirs and recollections. In fact, very early on in Kissinger's time as national security advisor, he was given this task by Nixon of, okay, let's see what we can do about China. And essentially there's not so two and throw, you know, these kind of sort of underground conversations that have already been going on actually before Nixon came in through the embassies of the Americans and the Chinese in Warsaw, which is one of a few capital cities where the diplomats could actually go to meet each other without attracting too much attention.
当尼克松当选总统时，他任命了亨利·基辛格担任国家安全顾问。从回忆录和回忆中现在我们知道，在基辛格担任国家安全顾问的早期阶段，尼克松就交给了他一个任务：看看我们能在中国做些什么。实际上，这些类似地下谈话的对话已经在尼克松上任之前就已开始，通过美国和中国驻华沙的使领馆进行。华沙是少数几个使领馆可以在不引起太多注意的情况下会面的首都之一。
But once Kissinger got into into high gear, essentially, and a first set of meetings for him was arranged to take place in secret by the Pakistanis, because Pakistan is another country that had good relations with America and with China, mainly because both of them were not that keen on India, but that's a slightly different story.
但一旦基辛格进入高效运转状态，首要任务之一是安排秘密会面。会议组织方是巴基斯坦人，因为巴基斯坦和美国以及中国都保持着较好的关系，主要是因为三者都不太看好印度，但这是一个略微不同的故事。
So basically on a diplomatic visit to Pakistan, Kissinger announces one evening that, oh, he's got a dodgy tummy, he's got something odd, you know, the Islamabad dining table, and he needs to sort of go to bed and deal with the dodgy stomach, but not a bit of it. In fact, he's been whisked out the back into a plane for a secret mission to fly to Beijing.
基本上，基辛格在外交访问巴基斯坦时，某个晚上宣布他的胃不舒服，吃了伊斯兰堡餐桌上的一些奇怪东西，他需要上床处理胃不舒服，但实际上不是这样。事实上，他被带到了背后的飞机上，进行了秘密任务，飞往北京。
And essentially, that first undercover mission where he doesn't, he didn't meet Mal, but he did meet Joe Inly and some of the other top Chinese leaders, where they negotiate what the terms of a visit by Nixon to America to China would be, is the sort of starting point. And then after, you know, some diplomacy of that sort, some kind of signals on both sides, the announcement then comes in that essentially, in the summer of 1971, that Nixon will visit China essentially before the next presidential election, which of course he had his eye on in 1972.
基本上，那次最初的秘密任务中，他没有见到马尔，但是他见到了乔·英利和其他一些中国高层领导人，他们商定了尼克松访问中国的条件。然后，在双方进行了一些外交交流，并发出了某种信号之后，宣布尼克松将在1971年夏季之前访问中国，这显然是他在1972年总统选举中关注的事项的起点。
So behind the scenes actions by people like Joe Inly, people like Henry Kissinger and others were very much part of the mixture. And of course, it was one of the reasons why Kissinger was one of the key players who actually went on that visit to Beijing along with Nixon and the rest of the delegation.
在幕后，像乔·易林和亨利·基辛格等人的行动很大程度上参与了混合过程。当然，这也是为什么基辛格是真正与尼克松和其他代表团成员一起访问北京的关键人物之一的原因之一。
The visit itself was a week long, and Nixon himself with the kind of slightly hammy rhetoric that he became known for, but in this case, he could probably be forgiven, referred to it as the week that changed the world. And you know, there's something to that actually.
这次访问持续了一个星期，尼克松本人使用了他所熟知的略带煽情的修辞，但在这种情况下，他可能被原谅，将它称为改变世界的一个星期。你知道，实际上有一些道理。
The visit itself was a week that combined a certain amount as you'd expect of sort of ceremony with quite a lot of really hardcore negotiation. So the ceremonial was what the rest of the world tended to notice. And you know, Nixon was very insistent.
这次访问持续了一周，融合了一定数量的仪式活动（因为这是预料之中的），还有大量的真正的谈判。因此，外界主要注意到的是仪式活动。尽管如此，尼克松非常坚持。
There must be full TV cameras everywhere. So in his play in the spirit of 76 as in 1776, the American independence landed at the airport in Beijing. He was actually a bit disappointed because he hoped there'd be like crowds of, you know, thousands and thousands of Chinese waving American flags for something to meet a bit like the cultural revolution, but, you know, but not. But in fact, there was a small and significant honor guard to meet him, quite an honor, but at the same time, it was quite quiet. And they were driven through these empty streets in Beijing.
到处必须布满全程电视摄像机。如同他在1976精神与1776年（美国独立战争胜利之年）一样，美国独立精神降临到北京机场。他有点失望，因为他希望有成千上万拿着美国国旗的中国人群欢迎，像是文化大革命那样，然而并没有。事实上，有个小小的、意义重大的仪仗队来迎接他，这是相当荣耀的，但同时也非常安静。他们被开车穿过了这些空荡的北京街道。
But even the first meeting was symbolic because Nixon shook the hand of the Prime Minister, Jo and Li, who'd come to the airport to meet him. And that was very important because in 1954, less than 20 years before, when Jo and Li had visited Geneva to try and negotiate chords on an arrangement for Vietnam, the then Republican Secretary of State, who had been in the same administration as Nixon, of course. Nixon was Vice President, and the Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles.
甚至第一次会见也有象征意义，因为尼克松握了来机场接他的总理乔和李的手。这非常重要，因为1954年不到20年前，乔和李曾到日内瓦谈判越南事宜。当时的共和党国务卿就是尼克松同属一届政府下的约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯。尼克松当时是副总统。
And there was a sort of slightly staged attempt to get Jo and Li in a position where he could shake hands with John Foster Dulles. And John Foster Dulles very, you know, ought to slightly staged a way, very impromptuly refused to shake his hand because he didn't acknowledge that communist China was a legitimate state and didn't recognize the PRC. So by going stepping, coming down the gangway steps and then shaking the hand of Prime Minister Jo and Li, Nixon in a sense was making up for the snub that had been placed upon the encounter between Foster and Jo a couple of decades previously.
有一种稍微经过策划的尝试，让Jo和Li处于一个可以与约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯握手的位置。而约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯在一种略微经过策划的方式下，非常不情愿地拒绝了握手，因为他没有承认共产主义中国是合法的国家，也没有承认中华人民共和国。因此，通过走下舷梯并与总理Jo和Li握手，尼克松在某种程度上弥补了几十年前福斯特和Jo之间那次遭受轻视的遭遇。
And then the visit itself continued in fine style, you know, lots of opportunities to visit schools and farmers and say, of ortho and Pat Nixon, actually Mrs. Nixon was a big part of those those visits and we really got to talk to some relish, I think, you know, sort of this very, very bright red coat, which some might have thought was politically slightly pointed, which was where, but of course, February and China, North China is really cold. It's a very, very chilly place, no question of sunshine. And so it was necessary to be as as as wrapped up as possible.
然后这次访问本身以很好的方式继续进行，你知道，有很多机会参观学校和农民，还有正骨和帕特·尼克松，实际上尼克松夫人在这些访问中占据了很大的比重，我们确实有了一些兴致，你知道，有种非常非常鲜艳的红色外套，一些人可能认为这是有政治倾向的，但当然，在中国的二月，北方真的很冷。这是一个非常非常寒冷的地方，毫无疑问没有阳光。因此，尽可能地裹得暖和是必要的。
And there's sort of image of this American first lady in her prominent red coat at a sort of collective pig farm, and you know, a school, a school session where people are chanting it of English, the children are chanting English of her. All of these made for great television, which certainly helped boost Nixon's statesman image back at home, as it was, you know, relayed back on the news.
在一个集体猪场和一所学校里，美国第一夫人身穿显眼的红色外套，这样的形象总是浮现在我们的脑海中，孩子们正在追忆并高喊她的英语。这些情景都被拍成了电视节目，在新闻中播出，进而提升了尼克松的政治家形象，受到当地人的好评。
But behind the scenes, a whole bunch of lower level but very important negotiators were coming together and really putting forward some tough, you know, arguments of both sides. The end point was clear. They wanted to get to full diplomatic recognition of the PRC and United States, but there were many, many issues that had to be overcome. And you know, one of the ones that's still with us today is Taiwan.
在幕后，一群低层次但非常重要的谈判者正在汇聚在一起，真正提出了双方的一些棘手的论点。最终目标很明确，他们想要实现中美全面外交关系的承认，但是需要克服许多许多的问题。你知道的，其中一个到今天还存在的问题是台湾。
Taiwan was where the Nationalists and the Chiang Pei Shui, the Gourmiedang, had fled in 1949. They're still there. They had their own, you know, non-recognized but autonomous government there. And the question, so I say non-recognized, it was by that stage not recognized by the PRC, but technically at that point, the United States still recognized the Republic of China government on Taiwan as the government of all of China, even though most other Western countries had shifted their recognition by that stage, France, UK and Japan, which shifted that year as a watch, if moved to kind of full relations in that year as well. So the US was a bit of an outlier by that stage.
台湾是国共内战时期国民党和蒋介石、古柏宣逃亡的地方，他们至今还在那里。他们在那里组建了自己的非承认但具有自治权的政府。至于“非承认”，这个时期中华人民共和国并未承认该政府，但技术层面上说，美国在当时仍然承认台湾的中华民国政府是整个中国的政府，虽然其他大部分西方国家在当时已经转而对中华人民共和国政府表示承认，比如法国、英国和日本，这些国家在那一年也都开始与中华人民共和国建立全面关系。因此可以说美国在这个时期是有点特立独行的。
And eventually they got to the end point at the end of the visit with something called the Shanghai Communique, which is still very much seen as a turning point moment, in which it was stated that the intention was that the two nations would find ways to recognize each other. And that some issues with Taiwan was certainly amongst them.
最终，他们在访问结束时到达了终点，达成了一个称为《上海公报》的协议，这在很大程度上被视为一个转折点，其宣示了两国寻求承认彼此的意图，其中台湾问题无疑是其中之一。
There might be an agreement to disagree for the moment and find a way to accommodate the different views of both sides. So the Shanghai Communique was not the end of the process, but it was the end of the beginning, as Winston Churchill might have said, of that reconciliation that then took most of the 1970s before it actually came to fruition.
目前可能会达成“同意不同”的协议，并找到一种方式来容纳双方不同的意见。因此，上海公报并不是这一进程的终点，而是这个和解的开始的结束，就像温斯顿·丘吉尔可能会说的那样，它花了大部分的1970年代才真正取得成果。
So it was an important starting point, but it's sometimes regarded the Nixon visit was on the end of the process. In one sense it was, but it was the beginning of another one. Was it also the beginning of a broader cultural process of engagement between these two nations? Absolutely.
因此，这是一个重要的起点，但有时被认为尼克松的访问是这个过程的终点。在某种意义上，它确实是，但它也是另一个过程的开始。它是否也是这两个国家之间更广泛的文化接触过程的开始呢？完全是的。
The engagement between China and the US proceeded as much on kind of cultural and exchange terms in the next few years as it did diplomatically. In some ways the diplomacy was a bit stopped start. Nixon of course has had a couple of troubles within a few years and had to resign over Watergate. Henry Kissinger was promoted to Secretary of State and remained in that job under the successor president Gerald Ford. And Ford actually visited China as well.
在接下来的几年里，中美之间的接触在文化和交流层面上的发展与外交关系同样重要。在某种程度上，外交方面的进展有些停滞。尼克松在几年内遇到了一些麻烦，最终因为“水闸门事件”辞职了。亨利·基辛格晋升为国务卿，并在接替尼克松的总统杰拉尔德·福特任期内继续担任该职位。福特还曾经访问过中国。
They're Ford in China doesn't have quite the glamour of Nixon in China. Being the second president to go is never as good as the first as these things go. But in that context there was diplomacy continued. Norths on the Jimmy Carter came afterwards and eventually it came off but it was quite grinding and slow in various ways. So in between there were a whole variety of attempts to try and build up relations at kind of lower tier levels.
在中国，福特总统的访问没有尼克松总统的那么具有魅力。像这样的事情中，做第二位到访的总统永远不如第一位好。但在那个背景下，外交关系得以继续。接下来是卡特总统的朝鲜半岛问题，最终解决了，但过程艰辛而缓慢。因此，在这两个事件之间，有很多尝试在较低层面建立关系的努力。
And in that an organization called the US National Council on Relations with the PRC which was very very much led by people who were proper China experts. I mean a very significant figure called Jan Barris who you know still very much part of the organization and remembers as you know a younger official hosting Chinese communist allocations of you know cardraise coming to the US. And she's told the great stories and in fact I suppose you'd like to say BBC sounds podcast called Archive on For the Great Wall which have interviewed Jan and various other people involved with the US China relations in which they all tell fantastic stories about trying to build this relationship up.
在那个时候，有一个名为美国中美关系国务委员会的组织，由许多真正的中国专家领导。其中有一个非常重要的人物叫做Jan Barris，她仍然是该组织的一员，她回忆起一些年轻官员接待中国共产党代表团来到美国的故事。她讲了很多好听的故事，实际上BBC有一个名为《关于长城的档案》的播客节目，采访了Jan和其他涉及美国中国关系的人，他们都讲述了试图建立这种关系的奇妙故事。
And for Jan one of the best stories she tells is having to take Chinese communist officials to Disneyland which turned out to be one of the kind of top destinations that we wanted to go. One point there went a bit wrong because she took a pile one to them to the haunted house ride and was told sternly afterwards that in communist China you know ghosts were not committed because they were a feudal relic of a superstitious past that didn't exist in China. So after that Disneyland was always on the agenda but never in the haunted house. So that sort of encounter did quite a lot in a slightly weird way to build up a kind of network of relationships even when the very very top negotiators were sort of slowly but surely and slightly grudgingly and grindingly making their way towards that big diplomatic breakthrough that finally took place under under Jimmy Carter at the end of the 1970s.
珍妮最喜欢讲的故事之一是带中国共产党官员去迪士尼乐园，它成为我们想去的顶级旅游目的地之一。有一次她带他们去了鬼屋游乐设施，但后来被严厉告诫，在中国共产主义社会里，幽灵是封建迷信的产物，不存在的。因此，之后迪士尼乐园总在行程中，但鬼屋是永远不会去的。这种遭遇以一种略微奇怪的方式建立了一种关系网络，即使顶级谈判代表正在缓慢而稍稍不情愿地向着那个最终在1970年代末由吉米·卡特领导下发生的重大外交突破迈进。
And what was that big breakthrough? Well the breakthrough that really made the difference was the full declaration of diplomatic relations between the peoples of public of China and the United States of America which took effect from the 1st of January 1979. It wasn't smooth and it wasn't without controversy supporters of Taiwan in the US Congress as well as of course in Taiwan itself were pretty unhappy with the whole arrangement.
那个大的突破是什么呢？实际上是中华人民共和国和美利坚合众国之间完全宣布建立外交关系的突破，该关系于1979年1月1日生效。虽然过程不畅，也引起了不少争议，美国国会及台湾支持者自然对此都不太满意。
It's one of the reasons why something was passed through Congress called the Taiwan Relations Act still very much with us today in the 2020s which authorizes the US not to recognize Taiwan as the country doesn't do that but it does give the US the right to provide means for Taiwan to defend itself against attacks from whoever it might be but of course the suspicion is it would be the mainland of China. So you know that side of things remained quite controversial but overall particularly from the momentum that had been created since the Nixon visit in 1970, 1972 it was clear that the direction of travel was towards full recognition and at some level it clearly was a moment of logic because there was no way that a country the size and importance of China could continue to be an unrecognized state in the global community particularly since the United Nations have granted the PRC the China seat on the UN Security Council as early as 1971.
这是某个时候通过国会通过的《台湾关系法》的原因之一，该法案至今仍然存在于2020年，该法授权美国不承认台湾为国家，但确实赋予了美国为台湾提供自卫手段的权利，以抵御来自任何人的攻击，但当然这引起了对中国大陆的怀疑。因此，尽管某些方面仍然存在争议，但总体上，特别是自1970年和1972年尼克松访问以来所创造的势头，显然走向全面认可，在某种程度上显然是一种逻辑上的时刻，因为像中国这样大小和重要性的国家无法继续成为全球社区中未被承认的国家，特别是联合国于1971年早期授予中华人民共和国联合国安理会中国席位。
Still to come on the history extra podcast.
接下来在历史扩展播客中，我们将会播出以下内容。
I think one quite simple one which is that in the end the gains that were made from the Nixon visit came from dialogue in all its forms came from dialogue that meant that people had to meet and sit and eat and talk with each other whether it was presidents or chairman of parties or table tennis players or you know communist cardraids you know riding the rides at Disneyland they all had to meet and talk with each other they also learned at least at that point to find ways to disagree without coming to blows.
我认为其中一个很简单明了的原因在于，尼克松访华所取得的收获最终来自于各种形式的对话。这些对话要求人们相互会面、坐下、共进餐并交谈，不论是总统、党派主席、乒乓球选手还是共产主义者，他们都必须相互见面并对话。他们也至少在那时学会了如何在不引发冲突的情况下表达不同意见。
Do we get a sense of how the meeting and the process more generally changed the view of the two nations amongst the populations of both nations.
我们能否了解到这次会议以及整个过程是如何在两个国家的公众中改变了对彼此国家的看法。
The Nixon visit and the subsequent visits by diplomats and you know by a kind of civil society actors between both societies. I think did a lot to change perceptions of both countries amongst the population of each other.
尼克松访问以及随后的外交官和民间社会行为者的访问，我认为在两国人民中间改变了对彼此的看法，起到了很大作用。
In China one of the things that became much more commonplace was encouraging people to learn English and the opportunities that really emerged in the 1980s onwards for young Chinese women and men to go to America and actually study there became much more commonplace and this could be offered to study English but it could also be to learn in areas where China desperately needed to develop its own standing such as technology and science. And so the sense for instance in China which still you know has some standing I think that America was the found of the most globally significant science whether it was going to the moon or you know vaccines or you know by medicine that would change the world or computers that was all very much something that was hugely understood and admired in China at that time was made clearer by the ability of Chinese students to go back and forth between China and America at that time. And so one of the reasons why China today is so proud of the fact that in the last few years it too has become an innovatron technology in a way that was simply unimaginable in the 1970s and 80s.
在中国，鼓励人们学习英语变得越来越普遍，从1980年代开始，年轻的中国男女有机会去美国学习，这变得越来越普遍。这不仅是为了学习英语，也是为了学习中国急需发展自己实力的领域，如科技和科学。在当时，中国对美国在全球范围内最重要的科学贡献的认可和钦佩是非常强烈的（无论是登月，还是疫苗或改变世界的药物或计算机），这使得中国学生有能力在中美之间往返学习。因此，中国自己也成为技术创新的产生国之一是与此有关的。 这在20世纪70年代和80年代是不可想象的，现在是中国引以为傲的一点。
Now the other way round clearly it was not quite going to be the case that Americans at the 70s and 80s would look to China for technology but there was a stronger understanding of China as a major significant global power that of course we sometimes forget was also a sort of unstated friend against the Soviets in the 70s and 80s.
现在反过来看，显然在70年代和80年代，美国人并不会向中国寻求技术，但对于中国作为一个重要的全球大国的认识更加深入。当然，我们有时会忘记，中国在70年代和80年代也是一个不言而喻的反对苏联的朋友。
It's worth remembering the 70s and 80s in particular were a really really cold period of the cold war between the Soviets and the Americans you know Ronald Reagan's rhetoric about the evil empower was not about China it was about the Soviet Union and all of the debates of that era about Star Wars defense systems and so forth very much about Reagan's America and the Soviet Union pre-Gorba Chauve squaring up against each other often in a very dangerous way.
这段话的意思是，我们应该记住70年代和80年代特别是冷战期间非常冷的时期，那时苏联和美国之间的紧张关系非常高。罗纳德·里根关于“邪恶大国”的言论并不是指中国，而是指苏联。当时所有关于“星球大战”防御系统等辩论都非常关注里根的美国和苏联，两国之间经常出现非常危险的对抗。
So the irony became for many Americans both in terms of the top leadership and in wider society more broadly defined that China was seen as yes a communist country but it's the friendly communist country if you can imagine such a thing and perhaps a symbolic moment of that in 1984 was the Los Angeles Olympics. The Soviets boycotted it because of course the Americans had boycotted the Moscow Olympics of 1980 because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but the Chinese went to both and the Chinese presence at the LA Olympics was one of the milestones in terms of what we see today which is China becoming one of the one two or three greatest Olympic nations in the world and they did that in large part also by engaging with America rather than standing away from it.
对于许多美国人来说，讽刺的是，无论是在最高领导层还是在更广泛的社会中，中国都被看作是一种共产主义国家，但它是友好的共产主义国家，如果你能想象出这样的一种情况，或许1984年洛杉矶奥运会是其中一个象征性的时刻。苏联因为美国曾在1980年莫斯科奥运会上抵制了苏联的原因而抵制了这届奥运会，但中国人参加了这两个比赛。中国在洛杉矶奥运会上的表现是我们今天所看到的一些里程碑之一，即中国成为世界上一二三大奥林匹克强国之一，这在很大程度上也是通过与美国接触而非疏远实现的。
It's so interesting you mentioned the 84 Olympics there because as we're talking the Winter Olympics are happening at the moment and the situation globally is obviously quite different now from what it was then.
很有意思你提到了84年奥运会，因为我们正在谈论的是目前的冬季奥运会，而现在的全球情况显然与当时完全不同。
What do you think of the long-term legacies of this episode and do you think they've really stayed with us given how much more fraught I suppose things seem to be now?
你认为这个事件的长期遗产如何？考虑到现在的情况变得更加紧张，你认为这些遗产是否确实留给了我们？
There's good out the relationship between American China today is extremely problematic and hostile in many aspects.
如今美中关系存在很多问题和敌意，但也有一些好的方面。
In some ways that is the inheritance of what happened 50 years ago when Nix and visited China and the former Secretary of State of the US might Pompeo made a big speech in 2020 in the last year of the Trump presidency in California in which very politely but very firmly he basically said that you know Nixon and the others after him had got it wrong in terms of opening up to China as much as they had.
在某种程度上，这是50年前尼克松访问中国时发生的遗产，前美国国务卿蓬佩奥在2020年特朗普总统任期的最后一年在加利福尼亚发表了一篇重要演讲，他非常礼貌但非常坚定地基本上说，你知道，尼克松和他之后的人在开放对华关系方面犯了错误。
I have to say that that's a view that's been pushed back against both by Republicans and Democrats. People on both sides of the political spectrum in the US who feel that engagement with China was necessary in a sense unavoidable in that sense.
我必须说，这个观点不仅被共和党人和民主党人所反对。美国政治谱系两端的人都认为，与中国接触是必要的，从某种意义上来说也是不可避免的。
But I think that the legacy that we have today for good or real I think is just a fact of life is that the globalized China out today wouldn't exist how it not been for that opening because think about the places in the 2020s where China has either a major role or dominance. In technology much of which of course it drew on and has adapted from what it learned you know from all the student study in Silicon Valley or in terms of global capital you know China benefited hugely from the investment markets, the investment opportunities that came from being in the New York markets or indeed being able to export huge numbers of goods to an America that was willing to buy that of course you know help create the Chinese economic miracle that you all know about in that sense.
我认为，无论是好是坏，当今我们拥有的遗产不可避免地与全球化的中国有关，如果当初没有改革开放，今天的中国就不会存在。想想2020年代中国在哪些领域发挥了主导作用或占有重要地位，比如技术，很大程度上是从学习硅谷的经验中汲取并加以改进的；或者全球资本，中国受益于投资市场的机会，从纽约市场中获得了巨大的利益，也因为向愿意购买的美国出口大量商品而创造了中国的经济奇迹。
China's presence in the world trade organization you know very important act in there today that was done with American help and assistance people like Probezelec who became president of the World Bank but as the assistant secretary of state under the Bush administration, Bush number two, the public and of course was very much about completing the business that Clinton the Democrat had started of getting China as an actor in the world trade organization. Again many figures wouldn't have perhaps predicted that China would become in some ways a very confrontational actor in those international bodies but you then have to make a counter-argument that China being excluded and externalized from all these organizations would have made it a more compliant and benevolent actor and I'm not sure that that's an argument that can logically logically hold.
中国在世界贸易组织中的存在非常重要，这得益于美国的帮助和协助，像Probezelec这样的人成为了世界银行的总统，但他在布什政府二号任职助理国务卿时，公众当然非常关注的是完成民主党的克林顿所开创，让中国成为世界贸易组织成员的业务。再次许多人也许不会预测到中国会成为这些国际机构中非常对抗的角色，但你必须提出反对意见，即将中国排除在所有这些组织之外会使其成为更顺从而和善的角色，而我不确定这是一个逻辑上可以支持的论点。
So in a sense part of that story over 50 years is about a legacy of decisions that were made but I think it shouldn't be forgotten that there was a level at which which I think Nixon understood with his comment about having to bring China into the family of nations eventually that beyond a certain point it would have been impossible not to make such a gesture and that the bringing of China into the international community was by that stage probably long overdue rather than something that shouldn't have been attempted at all. Do you think that studying this episode changes or should change our impression of the politicians involve Nixon for instance? Do you think we need to have a different impression of him given his role in this?
因此，在某种意义上，50年来这个故事的一部分是关于已做出的决定的遗产，但我认为不应忘记的是，尼克松在他谈到最终必须将中国纳入全球国家大家庭的时候，他理解到了一个层面，即超过某个临界点，不做出这样的姿态将是不可能的。而将中国纳入国际社会在那个阶段可能已经过晚，而不是根本不应该尝试的事情。你认为研究这个事件会改变或者应该改变我们对牵涉其中的政治家（例如尼克松）的印象吗？你认为我们需要有一个不同的印象，考虑到他在其中的角色？
I don't know about different but I think it is important to note that one can look at people in the round. Some of the things that Nixon did particularly domestically still I think you know don't stand up to any kind of moral scrutiny the Watergate break-in being an example of that although again perhaps in recent years we've seen that other presidents also have their own flaws that are noticeable. I won't name names but I think everyone can guess where we might look for for some of that more than one president as well but at the same time and internationally you can also see areas like for instance the subversion of the Chilean government in 1973 and the overthrow of the LNDA government and essentially facilitating a military coup you know a bombing of Cambodia saying that we can know all sorts of things the mix of administration did that I think sit pretty badly to the present day.
我不确定是否完全正确，但我认为值得注意的是我们可以全面地审视人们。尼克松在国内所做的一些事情，尤其是水门事件，从道德的角度来看都不能承认。尽管最近我们也看到其他总统也有明显的缺陷，但我不想点名。在国际上，也可以看到例子，比如1973年颠覆智利政府，推翻LNDA政府并促成军事政变，还有轰炸柬埔寨等事情，这些混乱的行为直到现在都让人不安。
However you can also look at the big strategic gains that came from the height of Nixon's also undoubted capacity in a way that very few leaders even of America have managed to do to think genuinely geostrategically and I've point up to I think I think can still be flagged up on the positive side. One is the opening to China. One is absolutely the opening to China because as I say I think it was inevitable and I think the argument that a US president shouldn't have used the huge political capital he had as a right winner and used it to open up to communist China was not in some ways quite a bold act but also one that in the end sent the US-China relationship at least for a while in the right direction but the other one that links to it is state-owned.
然而，你也可以看到尼克松在战略上所取得的巨大胜利，也毫无疑问展现了他非常少有的能力，以一种真正地地缘战略的方式考虑问题。我认为，其中有两个仍然可以被视为积极的方面。其中之一是对中国的开放。这是完全必然的，我认为一个美国总统不应该浪费他获得的巨大政治资本（作为赢家），而是应该利用它来开放给共产主义中国，这个论点一定程度上是一种大胆的行为，但最终使得美中关系朝着正确的方向发展（至少在一段时间内是这样）。然而，与此相关的另一个方面是国有企业。
It is notable that the early to mid-1970s was a relatively less tense time in some ways in terms of the Soviet US confrontation certainly less so than the times very very cold cold war of the early 1980s that I mentioned and also of course many of the confrontations of the 60s that came miss our crisis the Soviet invasion of Czechs to Vakia a whole variety of other things that look like they might be the moment for you know real configurations now
值得注意的是，从早期到中期的1970年代在苏美对立方面是相对较少紧张的一段时间，当然比我提到的早期80年代非常非常的冷战时期要少得多，同时许多在60年代的冲突也不如克里姆林宫危机和苏联入侵捷克斯洛伐克等事件那么紧张，这些事件看起来可能是真正重大重构的时刻。
it's not that things were entirely all peace and light and happiness during the 70s certainly not but they thought was real the discussion with the Soviets of reducing nuclear arsenals during that period was real and I think that one of the reasons not the only reason but one of the reasons why Nixon and Kissinger and you know Bill Rogers and the other people involved had credibility in actually reducing tension with the Soviets was that they were a anti-communist enough that people believed that they they could do it with credibility but be that
在70年代，事情并非完全和平、光明和快乐，当然不是。但他们认为与苏联就减少核武库展开的讨论是真实的，我认为其中一个原因（不是唯一的原因，但是其中一个）为什么尼克松、基辛格、比尔·罗杰斯和其他相关人员在缓和与苏联的紧张关系方面具有可信度，是因为他们足够反对共产主义，以至于人们相信他们有可信度。
the other great threats the Vietnam War and the possibility of a hostile China basically you know coming up against the United States along with the Soviets were definitively defused at least for that decade or so and that opened up all of other opportunities such as such as data on so I think in retrospect that period does have some aspects that do look as if they were a genuine move forward in terms of the ultimate ending of the Cold War.
另外一些重大威胁，如越南战争和一种敌对中国的可能性，基本上是在与苏联来对抗的美国面前被解决了，至少这持续了那个十年左右的时间，并为其他机会如谈判开辟了道路。所以我认为从回顾的角度来看，那个时期确实有一些方面看上去像是对终结冷战的一个真正的前进。
Thank you so much finally are there any other lessons or I suppose legacies of this period that we should bear in mind today in 2022? I think one quite simple one which is that in the end the gains that were made from the Nixon visit came from dialogue in all its forms came from dialogue that meant that people had to meet and sit and eat and talk with each other whether it was presidents or chairman of parties or table tennis players or you know communist cardrails you know riding the rides at Disneyland they all had to meet and talk with each other they also learned at that point to find ways to disagree without coming to blows you know on Taiwan again it would be an example of that sort of question that was never really resolved but could be you know placed in a place where other things could be done.
非常感谢您最终有没有其他在2022年应该铭记于心的教训或遗产？我认为有一个非常简单的教训，就是最终从尼克松访问中获得的收获是通过各种形式的对话实现的。这意味着人们必须见面、坐下来、共进晚餐并彼此交流，无论是总统还是党派主席、乒乓球选手，还是一些公开游乐场上骑着游戏机的共产党信仰者。他们也学会了如何在不打架的情况下找到分歧的解决方法。例如，台湾问题就是这样一个从未真正解决的问题，但可以在其他领域找到解决方案。
There are signs that sometimes the capacity to create that sort of dialogue and forums in which both sides can understand where the other side is coming from have been less obvious in recent years I think there's been a bit more of a move back towards it in the last year or two but there is no doubt that US-China relations today are in a very fragile state so learning how one can actually have and move forward dialogue I think is one of the things that we should look back to the Nixon visit for half a century later we're in a very different situation and one which has a very different America as well as a different China but that having been said the basic principles of understanding that big powers have to learn how to talk to each other remains quite constant.
有迹象显示，近年来创建这种双方可以理解对方立场的对话和论坛的能力有所减弱。我认为在过去一两年中，有一些回归的趋势，但毫无疑问，美中关系今天处于非常脆弱的状态，因此学习如何实现并推进对话是我们应该回顾尼克松访华一事的原因之一-半个世纪以后我们处于一个非常不同的情况，并且美国和中国都与之前不同，但是，理解大国必须学习如何相互交流的基本原则依然保持不变。
That was Rana Mitter you can read more from Rana about Nixon's trip to China in the March issue of BBC History magazine which is on sale now thanks for listening this podcast was produced by Ben Ewitt Jack Bateman and Brushing E. Coli.
这是Rana Mitter，您可以在BBC历史杂志的三月版中了解更多有关尼克松访华的内容，该杂志现在已经出售。感谢您收听本播客，本期播客制作人为Ben Ewitt，Jack Bateman和Brushing E. Coli。