Why the World Order Is Collapsing and American Power Is Rising

讨论以美中竞争开场，将中国描绘成一个陆基大陆帝国，在没有政治自由主义的情况下，寻求技术和军事上的对等。演讲者沃尔特（Walter）将此与美国在尖端领域的长期主导地位形成对比，暗示中国在冲突中容易被切断原材料和市场供应。 沃尔特将当前的全球局势描述为“一个在崩溃中的世界体系中的动态国家”。虽然美国自身的力量并未陷入危机，但“美国治下的和平”（Pax Americana）及其机构网络（如世贸组织、北约、联合国）正在瓦解，部分原因是特朗普（Trump）总统任期的加剧。他将特朗普独特的行事方式描述为通过不可预测性、蔑视传统政治约束以及“耻辱只有在你让它发生时才重要”的态度，将名声和戏剧性转化为权力，并将他比作在通过大众传播时代掌握奇观的拿破仑（Napoleon）。这一转变标志着全球范围内“个人政治”的回归，莫迪（Modi）、安倍（Abe）、比比（Bibi）、埃尔多安（Erdogan）、普京（Putin）和习近平（Xi Jinping）等领导人即是例证。 沃尔特回顾了英国和后来的美国在历史上“一路凯歌”的进程，概述了一个“全球霸权的秘密五点计划”。该战略包括培养一个开放、充满活力的社会（如17世纪的荷兰），以促进创新并吸引知识分子。第二步是全球贸易，它能产生巨大的财富，从而促成全球思维。第三个“险恶的”步骤是邀请他国参与你的体系（与西班牙殖民模式不同）。这促进了经济融合，使其他国家变得富有和技术先进，但同时也依赖于这个体系。历史上，当法国、德国或苏联等大陆强国挑战这种海洋、商业、自由秩序时，它们对全球体系的依赖成为它们的覆灭之因，因为它们可能被切断重要的资源。沃尔特指出，今天的中国敏锐地意识到了这种脆弱性，正在囤积资源并寻求能源独立，以避免重蹈被美国设下的这种陷阱。 沃尔特对美国可能出现的孤立主义倾向表示担忧，认为全球参与对美国的国家安全和经济至关重要，因为美国生产者和科技公司仅靠国内市场和资源是远远不够的。他提到了美国外交政策的四种传统类型：汉密尔顿主义（Hamiltonian，强大的资本主义经济，亲商）、威尔逊主义（Wilsonian，促进民主和国际机构）、杰斐逊主义（Jeffersonian，优先考虑国内自由，避免外国纠葛）和杰克逊主义（Jacksonian，粉碎攻击或侮辱美国的敌人）。他认为特朗普的联盟是杰斐逊主义者和杰克逊主义者的混合体，这与之前威尔逊主义-汉密尔顿主义方法的“克林顿共识”（Clinton consensus）形成对比。一个新的“科技汉密尔顿主义”派系已经出现，其中科技公司意识到它们对国家安全和知识产权保护的依赖，正在“重新国有化”它们的关注焦点，这与传统的全球跨国公司不同。 展望美国和中国之外，沃尔特指出印度是一个有趣的崛起中的大国。印度拥有庞大的人口和不断增长的科技产业，它将自己视为一个“改革派”而非修正派大国，寻求改变全球治理结构，但又不采取专制模式。伊斯兰世界也是一股充满活力的力量，信息革命正在促进文化“分化”，使各国能够在其独特的身份基础上发展，而不是像工业革命所鼓励的那样趋同于西方模式。 沃尔特对信息革命所释放的社会压力深表担忧，将其比作导致世界大战和极权主义政权的工业革命。他强调了网络和生物武器军备竞赛加速的生存威胁，在这些领域，核查几乎不可能，导致战略信任的严重缺失。他指出乌克兰战争中军事技术的快速演变，无人机使得传统战争甚至医疗后送策略都已过时，这对拥有大量“遗产”军事资产（legacy military assets）的美国等国家构成了挑战。对于台湾，他预计中国将寻求“软封锁”策略，在不引发全面入侵的情况下改变现状，而日本的觉醒是一个关键的新因素。 在中东，他观察到阿拉伯民族主义的瓦解以及阿拉伯国家在伊朗面前的根本性弱点。他认为美国根本不愿意直接对抗伊朗，从而造成以色列无法填补的真空，并警告说，如果不加以威慑，伊朗可能对关键的石油资源形成霸权。在乌克兰和中东地区出现的威慑削弱，给全球和国内政治带来了严峻挑战。 尽管有这些担忧，沃尔特仍然保持着基本的乐观。他设想，信息革命所带来的“财富的聚宝盆”，尤其是在医学和医疗保健领域，可以解决许多当前的问题，包括福利保障计划。他希望美国能够管理好这种快速变化，保持其内部稳定，并有目的地推行一项外交政策，即防止欧洲和亚洲出现霸权，确保全球石油流，并促进其他国家的繁荣，从而在不不断提高国防预算的情况下，自然形成力量平衡。他总结说，最令人兴奋的是，我们正处于“人类转型、更新和发展独特时代”的开端。

The discussion opens with the US-China rivalry, framing China as a land-based continental empire aiming for technological and military parity without political liberalism. The speaker, Walter, contrasts this with America's long-standing dominance at the cutting edge, suggesting China's vulnerability to being cut off from raw materials and markets in a conflict. Walter characterizes the current global situation as a "dynamic country in a collapsing world system." While American power itself is not in crisis, the "Pax Americana" and its institutional networks (like the WTO, NATO, UN) are crumbling, partly exacerbated by the Trump presidency. He describes Trump's distinctive method as turning fame and drama into power through unpredictability, flouting traditional political constraints, and a "shame only matters if you let it" approach, likening him to Napoleon in his mastery of spectacle in the era of mass communications. This shift signifies a return to more "personal politics" globally, exemplified by leaders like Modi, Abe, Bibi, Erdogan, Putin, and Xi Jinping. Reflecting on the historical "sweep of winning" by the UK and then the US, Walter outlines a "secret five-point plan for global dominance." This strategy involves cultivating an open, dynamic society (like the 17th-century Dutch) that fosters innovation and attracts intellectuals. Step two is global trade, which generates immense wealth, enabling global thinking. The third, "treacherous" step, is inviting others to participate in your system (unlike the Spanish colonial model). This fosters economic integration, making other nations rich and technologically advanced, but also dependent on the system. Historically, when continental powers like France, Germany, or the Soviet Union challenged this maritime, commercial, liberal order, their dependence on the global system became their undoing, as they could be cut off from vital resources. China today, Walter notes, is acutely aware of this vulnerability, stockpiling resources and pursuing energy independence to avoid such a trap with the US. Walter expresses concern about a potential US trend toward isolationism, arguing that global engagement is crucial for American security and economy, as neither the domestic market nor resources alone suffice for American producers and tech companies. He touches upon the four traditional types of American foreign policy: Hamiltonian (strong capitalist economy, pro-business), Wilsonian (promoting democracy and international institutions), Jeffersonian (prioritizing domestic liberty, avoiding foreign entanglements), and Jacksonian (crushing enemies who attack or dishonor the US). He views Trump's coalition as a mix of Jeffersonians and Jacksonians, contrasting with the previous "Clinton consensus" of Wilsonian-Hamiltonian approaches. A new "tech Hamiltonian" faction has emerged, where tech companies, realizing their dependence on national security and intellectual property protection, are "renationalizing" their focus, differing from traditional global multinationals. Looking beyond the US and China, Walter points to India as an interesting emerging power. With its vast population and growing tech sector, India views itself as a "reformist" rather than revisionist power, seeking changes to global governance structures without adopting an autocratic model. The Islamic world is also a dynamic force, and the information revolution is fostering a "divergence" of cultures, allowing nations to build on their unique identities rather than converging toward a Western model as the industrial revolution encouraged. Walter expresses deep concern about the social stresses unleashed by the information revolution, likening them to those of the Industrial Revolution which led to world wars and totalitarian regimes. He highlights the existential threat of accelerating arms races in cyber and bio-weapons, where verifiability is almost impossible, leading to a profound lack of strategic trust. He notes the rapid evolution of military technology in the Ukraine war, where drones have rendered traditional warfare and even medical evacuation strategies obsolete, posing a challenge for nations like the US with significant legacy military assets. For Taiwan, he anticipates China will seek "soft blockade" strategies to alter the status quo without triggering a full-scale invasion, with Japan's awakening as a crucial new factor. In the Middle East, he observes the collapse of Arab nationalism and the underlying weakness of Arab states against Iran. He believes the US is fundamentally unwilling to confront Iran directly, creating a vacuum that Israel cannot fill, and warns of Iran's potential hegemony over critical oil resources if not deterred. The erosion of deterrence, seen in Ukraine and the Middle East, poses significant global and domestic political challenges. Despite these concerns, Walter maintains fundamental optimism. He envisions a future where the "cornucopia of wealth" from the information revolution, particularly in medicine and healthcare, can solve many current problems, including entitlement programs. He hopes America can manage this rapid change, maintain its internal stability, and purposefully pursue a foreign policy that prevents hegemony in Europe and Asia, secures global oil flow, and fosters prosperity for other nations, allowing a natural balance of power to emerge without constantly escalating defense budgets. He concludes that the most exciting aspect is being on the cusp of a "unique era of human transformation, renewal, and development."