Hard Lessons: Stan Druckenmiller: Invest, then investigate
发布时间 2026-02-27 16:10:54 来源
以下是内容的中文翻译：
斯坦·德鲁肯米勒（Stan Druckenmiller），这位传奇的宏观投资者，以其在1981年至2010年期间在杜肯资本（Duquesne Capital）实现30%的年化收益率和无亏损年份而闻名。在与摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）的伊利亚娜·布扎利（Ilyana Buzali）的对话中，他分享了自己独特的投资理念和“宝贵教训”。德鲁肯米勒现在管理着他的家族办公室，并通过慈善事业倡导教育和医学研究。
他首先通过近期对梯瓦制药（Teva Pharmaceutical）的交易来阐释自己的投资过程。2023年年中，当AI股票过热时，他的团队发现了梯瓦——一家市盈率仅为6倍的“无趣的仿制药公司”。在新任CEO理查德·弗朗西斯（Richard Francis）的领导下，梯瓦正在从仿制药转向高增长的生物类似药。市场，由价值投资者（因其向增长型策略转型而选择卖出）和成长型投资者（尚未买入）组成，有效地忽视了这一转型。德鲁肯米勒将此视为一个机会，他表示：“如果你只看当下，你赚不到钱。如果你尝试展望未来……”随着弗朗西斯证明了他的策略，梯瓦的股价从16美元翻倍至32美元。
德鲁肯米勒承认他并非每个领域的专家，尤其是生物技术。他严重依赖团队的判断和他“对市场将如何接纳这种变化的‘感觉’”。他坦率地说，他的优势不在于智商，而在于“果断决策”。他称自己为“白痴学者”（idiot savant），拥有一种狭隘的智力形式，强调不仅要筛选数据，还要筛选他信任的专家的热情。
回顾他的职业生涯，德鲁肯米勒将自己的成功部分归因于一种“天生具有复利赚钱的天赋”，但也归功于关键的指导。他的第一位导师教会了他基本原理，而与他共事的乔治·索罗斯（George Soros）则传授了关于“头寸管理”的宝贵经验。索罗斯教导他：“重要的不是你对或错。重要的是你对了时赚了多少，错了时亏了多少。”
关于当前市场，德鲁肯米勒认为美国经济强劲并将变得更强，美联储可能降息。然而，他指出估值偏高。他对“即将到来的巨大颠覆和巨大变革”感到兴奋，这预示着宏观投资的复苏。他目前的投资组合较少受AI驱动，包括在日本和韩国的头寸。他看跌美元，理由是海外对美元的过度敞口和贸易失衡。他做多铜，这是一个“巨大的共识交易”，原因在于供应有限以及AI/数据中心的需求，并持有一些黄金作为地缘政治对冲。为了平衡这些风险资产，他做空债券，预计它们将盈亏平衡，或在增长导致通胀时提供保护。
尽管他通常会为18个月到三年构思交易，但他很务实，承认曾在一个“三年期交易”中在五天内逆转。他认为“逆向投资被高估了”，指出索罗斯认为人群有80%的时间是对的。他重视极度信念，尤其是在独自一人时，但如果论点和趋势强劲，他也不回避拥挤的交易。
他关于英伟达（Nvidia）的交易就体现了这一点。2022年初，他的年轻团队以及他观察到斯坦福大学学生从加密货币转向AI，促使他买入了少量头寸。两周后ChatGPT的发布，以及随后摩根士丹利分析师的一份宏观报告证实，让他确信AI的巨大潜力，促使他将头寸翻倍，然后翻三倍。尽管他坚信该股会“至少两三年”飙升，但他却以800美元的价格卖出（该股此前已从150美元上涨），后来当它涨到1400美元时感到后悔。他承认违反了自己的长期观点，将其归因于对如此快速的收益感到不安。
德鲁肯米勒已经“摈弃”了技术分析和价格与新闻动态关系的高效性。他声称，这两者都“被过度使用了”。技术分析，曾经独特，现在“只有20%的效率”，因为每个人都在使用它。同样，坏消息发布后股票上涨这种曾经可靠的模式也消失了，因为“其他所有人都学会了这一点”。
他反思自己现在拥有更多的智慧和工具，但比年轻时更缺乏“勇气”，承认自己“临阵退缩”。他是一个“输不起的人”，被一种“渴望胜利的病态心理”驱动。他最惨痛的教训包括他“数百个错误”，比如完美卖出了1999年纳斯达克（NASDAQ）暴涨行情后，又在顶部买入。他花了15年时间与“冒名顶替综合症”（imposter syndrome）作斗争，并学会接受错误和情绪是过程的一部分。他最终的教训是：“接受现实，然后继续前进。”
Stan Druckenmiller, the legendary macro investor known for his 30% annualized returns and no losing years at Duquesne Capital from 1981 to 2010, shared his unique investment philosophy and "hard lessons" in a conversation with Morgan Stanley's Ilyana Buzali. Now managing his family office, Druckenmiller champions education and medical research through philanthropy.
He began by illustrating his process with a recent trade in Teva Pharmaceutical. In mid-2023, while AI stocks were overheating, his team identified Teva – a "boring generic drug company" trading at six times earnings. Under new CEO Richard Francis, Teva was transitioning from generics to higher-growth biosimilars. The market, comprised of value investors (selling due to growth strategy) and growth investors (not yet buying), effectively ignored this transformation. Druckenmiller saw this as an opportunity, stating, "If you look at today, you're not going to make any money. If you try and look ahead..." Teva's stock doubled from $16 to $32 as Francis proved his strategy.
Druckenmiller admits he isn't an expert in every field, particularly biotech. He relies heavily on his team's judgment and his "feel for how the market will embrace the change." He candidly states his advantage isn't IQ, but "trigger pulling." He refers to himself as an "idiot savant" with a narrow form of intelligence, emphasizing the importance of filtering not just data, but also the enthusiasm of his trusted experts.
Reflecting on his career, Druckenmiller attributes his success partly to an "innate gift for compounding money" but also to crucial mentorship. His first mentor taught him the fundamentals, while George Soros, with whom he worked, imparted the invaluable lesson of "sizing." Soros taught him, "It's not whether you're right or wrong. It's how much you make when you're right and how much you lose when you're wrong."
Regarding the current market, Druckenmiller believes the U.S. economy is strong and will get stronger, with the Fed likely to cut rates. However, he notes valuations are high. He's excited by the "massive disruption and massive change ahead," signaling a resurgence for macro investing. His current portfolio is less AI-driven, including positions in Japan and Korea. He's bearish on the U.S. dollar, citing foreign overexposure and trade imbalances. He's long copper, a "big consensus trade" due to limited supply and demand from AI/data centers, and holds some gold as a geopolitical hedge. To balance these risk assets, he's short bonds, expecting them to break even or offer protection if growth leads to inflation.
While he typically conceptualizes trades for 18 months to three years, he's pragmatic, admitting to reversing a "three-year trade" in five days. He finds "contrarianism overrated," noting Soros believed the crowd is right 80% of the time. He values extreme conviction, especially when alone, but doesn't shy away from crowded trades if the thesis and trend are strong.
His Nvidia trade exemplifies this. In early 2022, his young team and observation of Stanford students shifting from crypto to AI, led him to buy a small position. Chat GPT's release two weeks later, followed by a confirming macro call from a Morgan Stanley analyst, convinced him of AI's enormity, leading him to double, then triple his position. Despite his conviction that the stock would soar for "at least two or three years," he sold at $800 (from $150) and later regretted it when it hit $1,400. He confessed to violating his own long-term view, attributing it to discomfort with such rapid gains.
Druckenmiller has "unlearned" the high efficacy of technical analysis and the price-versus-news dynamic. Both, he claims, are "loved to death." Technical analysis, once unique, is now "20% as effective" because everyone uses it. Similarly, the once-reliable pattern of stocks rallying after bad news is gone because "everybody else has learned that."
He reflects on having more wisdom and tools now but less "courage" than in his younger days, admitting to "chickening out." He's a "sore loser" driven by a "sickness" to win. His hardest lessons involve his "hundreds of mistakes," like buying the top after perfectly selling the 1999 NASDAQ melt-up. He spent 15 years battling "imposter syndrome" and learning to accept that mistakes and emotions are part of the process. His ultimate lesson: "Just get over it and move on."
中英文字稿 
I think contrainism is overrated. I do like it when I have extreme conviction and no one else believes that it gives me even more conviction. For Morgan Stanley, this is hard lessons, where iconic investors reveal the critical moments that have shaped who they are today. Today on the show, the legendary macro investors Stan Druckenmiller, in conversation with Ilyana Buzali, Morgan Stanley's global head of derivatives, distribution and structuring. Druckenmiller ran decaying capital management with roughly 30% annualized returns and no losing years from 1981 to 2010. He now leads the decaying family office, managing his own capital, and as a philanthropist, championing education, medical research, and the fight against poverty.
我认为反向主义被高估了。不过当我有强烈信念而没人相信我时，我反而更加坚定。对于摩根士丹利来说，这是一堂严峻的课，标志性投资者们揭示了塑造他们今日成就的关键时刻。今天的节目中，传奇宏观投资者斯坦·德鲁肯米勒与摩根士丹利全球衍生品分销与结构化业务主管伊利亚娜·布扎里进行对话。德鲁肯米勒曾运营德凯资本管理公司，从1981年到2010年实现了约30%的年化收益率且没有亏损年份。他如今管理着德凯家庭办公室，运营自己的资本，同时作为慈善家，致力于推动教育、医学研究和抗击贫困的事业。
Stan, thank you very much for doing this. I'm thrilled to be here. I think the world of Morgan Stanley, so it's the least I can do. Oh, that's a privilege for us to have you here. I've been privy to some of your equity trades over the past year or so, where it did feel you were early. And I'm curious if you can maybe take us through one or two and how they came together. I'll pick one that might surprise you because it's not very sexy and it's not AI or anything, but I think it's a good example of our process at Dukeen.
Stan，非常感谢你做这件事。我很高兴能在这里。我对摩根士丹利非常推崇，因此我能做的至少就是这些。哦，我们很荣幸能有您在场。我了解到您在过去一年左右的一些股票交易，有些时候您似乎是提前进场的。我很好奇，是否可以请您分享一两个案例以及它们的形成经过。我会选择一个可能会让你感到意外的案例，因为它并不怎样引人注目，也不是关于人工智能或其他类似的热门话题，但我认为它很好地展示了我们在Dukeen的流程。
In the middle of last summer and toward the fall, the AI's things started to get, let me say, disturbingly heated and started at least have some rhyme with what I went through in 1999, 2000. And we were looking for other areas. The group brought in a company, Teva, Forma, Sutocals. So Teva was this apparently, if you didn't know what was going on, boring generic drug company out of Israel selling at six times earnings. So we met with a company, big transition going on, Richard Francis had come in who ran the same playbook at Santos, very impressed with him, knew how to take low-hanging food in terms of operating efficiency.
在去年夏天中期到秋季期间，人工智能的事情开始变得让我说，令人不安地升温，并且开始与我在1999年和2000年经历的事情有一些相似之处。我们在寻找其他领域。团队引入了一家公司，Teva、Forma、Sutocals。这时，Teva是一家看似无趣的以色列仿制药公司，其股价是盈利的六倍。如果你不知道背景的话，Teva的表现可能显得平淡无奇。我们和公司会面，他们正处于重大转型中，Richard Francis 加入了公司，他曾在Santos运用了同样的策略，我们对他印象深刻，他知道如何通过提升运营效率来充分利用简单的机会。
But much more importantly, he was taking them from a generic drug company to a growth company by embracing biosomers, replacing the generic drugs, which that's why they were at six times earnings, with biosomers and even some actual drugs. The amazing thing is the investor base were value investors, so they hated it. So the socks sat there at six times earnings while you could see this incredible management initiative going on. And no one really believed him. And again, growth investors didn't want it because hand made the transition yet. Value investors didn't want it. And we're actually selling it because he was going growth strategy.
更重要的是，他将公司从一家仿制药公司转型为一家成长型公司，方法是引入生物类似药，逐渐替代原有的仿制药。这也是为什么当时他们的市盈率只有六倍。他们用生物类似药，甚至包括一些真正的药品，来替换仿制药。令人惊讶的是，公司投资者主要是价值投资者，所以他们对此举并不支持。因此，尽管公司进行了令人难以置信的管理变革，但股票市盈率仍低至六倍。没有人真正相信他的战略。成长型投资者也不想介入，因为转型还未完全实现；价值投资者则因为公司采取了成长战略而选择卖出股票。
So that was about six or seven months ago. And the stock was 16. And today it's 32. And not much has happened other than he's proved biosomalers. They've come up with a drug that's not a generic. So it's re-rated from six times earnings to, I guess, 11 and a half or 12 times earnings. So it was a whole different set of circumstances. But in capitalized what we look at, if you look at today, you're not going to make any money. If you try and look ahead and what might change and how investors might perceive something ahead, this one happened a little more quicker than I thought. But that would be a recent name. Fascinating.
大约六七个月前，股票价格是16。今天是32。在此期间，除了他们推出了非仿制药的生物相似药以外，没有发生太多变化。所以市盈率从六倍上升到了大约十一倍半或十二倍。这完全是一种不同的情况。不过，在评估资本化的时候，我们要看的不是现在，因为这样不会赚钱。我们要尝试预见未来可能发生什么变化、投资者可能如何看待这种变化。在这个案例中，变化的速度比我预期的要快一些，但这也是一个最近值得关注的投资案例。真是令人着迷。
And very intriguing. I say it's intriguing because I think many people, maybe people nod in the market. But certainly many people, when they think of Stan Druckermudler, they think of huge macro investor. And I have seen you dabble more than double really going to areas of the market, especially in the equities that are much more niche, such as healthcare or biotech. And my question is, do you have to be an expert, an analyst, someone that understands the whole pipeline of drugs to get that right? Thank God the answer is an emphatic no. But I've got to have an expert at Duquesne who is entrusted his judgment.
这段话的中文翻译如下：
“而且非常有趣。我之所以说有趣，是因为我认为很多人，可能市场里的人都会点头。但毫无疑问，很多人在想到斯坦·德鲁肯米勒时，会认为他是一个宏观投资的大师。而我看到你不仅仅是涉猎，而是深入到市场的其他领域，尤其是在更小众的股票，比如医疗保健或生物技术。我想问的是，你是否需要成为一个专家、分析师，了解整个药物研发流程，才能做好这些投资？谢天谢地，答案是一个明确的‘不’。但我必须在杜肯信任一位专家的判断。”
And then I've got to have a feel for how the market will embrace the change he's describing. But we did make a big move into biotech. I could sense that there was a potential leadership change just because of the phobia around AI. And I knew, because I've been on the board of memorial for this long covering for 30 years, that probably the best use case out there of AI is biotech through drug discovery, diagnostics, monitoring everything. So biotech had been on its butt for like four years.
然后，我必须了解市场将如何接受他所描述的变化。不过，我们确实在生物技术领域进行了重大投入。我能够感受到，由于对人工智能的恐惧，有可能会出现领导层的变动。而我知道，因为我已经在纪念委员会工作了30年，可以说AI在生物技术中或许是最好的应用场景，尤其在药物研发、诊断和全面监测上。因此，生物技术已经萎靡了大约四年。
I also grew up with technical analysis and you could see the momentum changing. So that was the theory behind biotech. Honestly, when the analysts start talking about genetic sequencing and gene editing and proteins, it's going, shh, right over stands head. But I get later level of enthusiasm. We have a very good biotech team. That's really important because I trust them. And when they're really enthusiastic, that's as important to me as the actual facts. Because I'm not smart enough to understand a lot of the actual facts. So you filter not just the data, but the people that work for you.
我也是在技术分析的环境中成长的，所以能够看到市场动能的变化。这就是我对生物科技的看法。老实说，当分析师开始讨论基因测序、基因编辑和蛋白质时，这些内容对我来说简直像是在对牛弹琴。但是，我能够感受到大家的激情。我们有一支非常出色的生物科技团队，这一点非常重要，因为我信任他们。当他们非常热情时，这对我来说和事实本身一样重要，因为我没聪明到可以理解所有的事实。因此，你不仅要过滤数据，还要过滤为你工作的人。
My advantage is not IQ. It's trigger pulling. I admit it's some kind of intelligence. But Mother of Maw says, I'm an idiot, Savant. I wasn't in the top 10% of my class. A lot of people think I'm smarter than I am because I'm good at art business. But I have a very narrow form of intelligence but allows me to love and play the scan. I know many people who would love to get inside your head and understand your mental models spoke to us about your way of thinking. And I have a really honest, basic question. How much of it can be taught? And how much of it is innate? Look, I was given a gift. I don't know why I was given the gift, but I have this gift. And it's for compounding money.
我的优势不在于智商，而在于果断决策。我承认这也是一种智慧。但“贫瘠之母”说，我是一个白痴天才。我在班上甚至排不到前10%。很多人认为我比实际更聪明，因为我在艺术生意方面很出色。但我的智力很狭隘，只适合让我热爱并参与这项运动。我认识很多人，他们都希望能进入你的大脑，理解你的思维模型，并和我们谈谈你的思维方式。我有一个非常诚实且简单的问题：这其中有多少是可以传授的？又有多少是与生俱来的？听着，我是被赋予了一种天赋。我不知道为什么我有这个天赋，但这确实是我的能力，而这能力在于让钱不断增值。
Certainly part of us innate. You either have the skill set for this business or you don't. Having said that, I had a great mentor in Pittsburgh when I started out. And I find it very common that great investors have incredible mentors. So to me, it's a necessary condition that you have sort of this innate skill set or gift. But it's almost a necessary condition on top of it that you have a mentor. I'm sure there's some people out there that that's not true of. But for me, it was a combination. I was very lucky to have two mentors. One, I basically learned all the kind of stuff we're talking about. And then Soros, it's funny. When I went there, I thought I would learn what makes the end and the mark go up and move.
当然，我们的一部分能力是与生俱来的。要么你具备从事这行的技能，要么不具备。话虽如此，当我刚开始在匹兹堡工作时，我遇到了一位很好的导师。我发现，优秀的投资者通常都有出色的导师。因此，对我来说，具备一定的天赋或才能是一项必要条件。但是，在此基础上拥有一位导师也几乎是一个必要条件。我相信肯定有些人不需要导师就很成功，但对我而言，这是一个组合。我很幸运有两位导师。其中一位让我学会了我们谈论的各种东西。然后是索罗斯，挺有趣的。我去他那时，以为我会学到是什么让货币汇率变动的因素。
But modestly, I learned I knew much more about that than he did. What I learned from him was sizing. It's not whether you're right or wrong. It's how much you make when you're right and how much you lose when you're wrong. And that was an invaluable lesson. So you can have something innate. But if you don't have mentors and people to teach you, you're not going to maximize it as much as you do when you do have them. Should we turn to markets? Do we have to? It seems to be almost obligatory with you. OK. So when it comes to markets, it seems to me you treat them less like forecasts and more like systems that kind of reveal themselves.
谦虚地说，我发现自己对那个话题的了解比他更深入。我从他那里学到的是如何权衡。成功与否并不在于你是否正确，而在于当你正确时你赚了多少，以及当你错误时你损失了多少。这是一个非常宝贵的教训。所以，即便你有与生俱来的能力，但如果没有导师和其他人的指导，你就无法将其发挥到最大。我们要谈市场吗？非谈不可吗？看来和你聊，总少不了这个话题。好吧。对于市场，我觉得你更像是在观看一个逐渐揭示自身的系统，而不是单纯做预测。
So let's pretend you don't have a hedge fund. And you come down from Mars and you have to start a portfolio from scratch. How do you anchor it at this moment in time? What do you buy first? That's a hard question. Just a couple of principles before I would start. It appears to me the US economy is already strong and it's going to get much stronger because we're looking at the big, beautiful bill, looking a lot of stimulus. My guess is the Fed is certainly not going to hike and probably going to cut. So that's a backdrop. But against that backdrop, that would be wonderful if we were undervalued. We're not undervalued.
让我们假设你没有对冲基金。你来自火星，现在需要从零开始建立一个投资组合。在这个时间点，你如何定位这个投资组合？你首先买什么？这是一个难题。在开始之前，我想先谈几个原则。在我看来，美国经济已经很强劲，并且会变得更加强大，因为我们看到大规模、美好的法案，看到大量的刺激措施。我猜测美联储肯定不会加息，很可能会降息。这就是背景。但在这样一个背景下，这将是很美好的，如果我们的资产被低估。但事实是，我们的资产并没有被低估。
We're toward the top of the valuation range historically. What would be exciting about developing a hedge fund portfolio right now is the one thing I'm sure of. Is there's massive disruption and massive change ahead? So actually for the opportunities that for the next three or four years, I'm really excited. And macro has been dead for 10 or 15 years. I don't think that's the case anymore. If you know anything about me, I tend to change my mind every three weeks. But given the backdrop, we would probably be long more in eclectic basket of equities for until the fall or last three years.
在历史上，我们正处于估值范围的高点。现在，开发对冲基金组合让我感到兴奋的是，我确信未来将有重大的变革和颠覆。因此，对于未来三到四年的机会，我感到非常期待。在过去的10到15年里，宏观经济似乎没有什么大的变化。但我认为情况已经不同了。如果你了解我，你会知道我通常每三周就会改变想法。不过，鉴于当前的背景，我们可能会在未来三年多时间里，持有更多不同类型的股票，直到秋季。
Our portfolio was very much AI driven. We still have drips and drabs of AI around, but it's not driving the engine anymore. To some extent, we still have big positions in Japan and Korea. Some of them are AI, some of them are not. We're bearish on the US dollar, mainly because sort of the top of the historic range in church of purchasing power. And foreigners are way, way overloaded in dollars. And I don't know where they're. It's like a sell America trade because it's more like if they don't buy American assets on a net basis because of the trade balance and because of the position and the dollar will go down on its own.
我们的投资组合过去主要依赖于人工智能。目前，我们仍然有一些零星的人工智能应用，但它不再是主要推动力。在某种程度上，我们在日本和韩国仍然持有大量头寸，其中一些涉及人工智能，还有一些则没有。我们看空美元，主要是因为美元的购买力处于历史高位，外国投资者在美元上的配置过多。我不确定他们的情况如何。这有点像“卖掉美国”的交易，因为如果外国人不在净基础上购买美国资产，由于贸易平衡和美元的地位，美元会自然贬值。
And we think that is the most likely course here. And we own copper. It's not a genius trade. It's a big consensus trade. There's no supply coming on. A meaningful supply, very tight for the next eight years. And obviously you have a big add on from AI and data centers. We're not long copper equities as much as we are. The, we just keep rolling the front end. We have some gold that's mainly a geopolitical trade. It's not so much a monetary trade. And then because we're long all these risk assets, I just mentioned, we're short bonds.
我们认为这可能是最可能的发展方向。同时，我们持有铜。虽然这不是多么聪明的交易，但却是一个大多数人都在参与的交易。目前没有新的铜供应出现，未来八年的供应都非常紧张。此外，人工智能和数据中心的发展也会增加对铜的需求。我们并没有大量持有铜矿企业的股票，只是坚持在期货的短期合约上投入。另外，我们持有一些黄金，这主要出于地缘政治因素，而不是因货币政策而投资黄金。同时，由于我们持有这些高风险资产，我们就做空了债券。
I don't necessarily expect to make money short bonds. But I think we might make a lot if I'm right on the economy and it's a disinflationary growth. I probably break even I don't lose anything but it allows me to hold the other assets I mentioned. If I'm wrong and the strong growth creates inflation, it wouldn't be that unusual if the Fed were to cut into a booming economy from inflation to take off, particularly what's going on in commodities. So I'm open-minded of that. But we create a matrix and the bonds are helpful in both ways.
我并不一定指望通过做空债券赚钱。但如果我对经济的判断是对的，并且这是一个通缩增长，那么我觉得我们可能会赚很多。即使这样可能只是勉强持平但不亏损，但是这让我可以持有我提到的其他资产。如果我错了，而强劲的经济增长带来了通胀，那么很可能美联储会在经济繁荣时通过降息来抑制通胀，特别是在大宗商品方面的影响。所以我对此保持开放的态度。我们会创建一个矩阵，债券在这两种情况下都有帮助。
The equity market has changed a lot over the past decade. And you have all these new type of capital, whether it's multi-stretch hedge funds, retail investors, systematic players, ETFs. How has that changed the time horizon that you feel you have engine versus, let's say, 10 years ago? Are you more comfortable with one week, the one month, the one-year trade? Or maybe it's not prescriptive? How do you think about that? Most trades I put on, I think, in terms of 18 months to three years, that's how long I think they're probably going to evolve, not every trade, you know, some are a year, some are five years.
过去十年里，股票市场发生了很大变化。现在有各种类型的新资本进入市场，比如多策略对冲基金、散户投资者、系统化交易者和交易所交易基金（ETFs）。这对您的投资周期有什么影响，相比10年前有何不同？您现在对一周、一个月还是一年的交易周期更有信心吗？或者说这并不是固定的期限？您怎么考虑这个问题？我大多数的交易计划在18个月到三年内进行，我认为这段时间比较适合交易的发展。当然，并不是每笔交易都是这样，有些可能是一年，有些可能是五年。
But I will admit that I've put on a three-year trade that five days later I'm out of and I've reversed. But if you're talking about how I conceptualize it, all this noise about how much the system in the market has changed, that has not changed what I just said at all. And the violence that creates is more useful for entry points if it goes against what my belief over the given time frame is. So I think it's a lot of noise. It makes my life annoying because I'd rather just have nice, calm markets that move in the direction.
不过我承认，我曾经设定了一个为期三年的交易计划，但五天后我就退出了，并且反向操作了。不过如果你问我对这个问题的理解，所有关于市场系统变化的噪音，并没有改变我所说的观点。这种剧烈的变化更有助于找到入市的时机，尤其当它违背我在特定时间段内的观点时。所以，我认为这不过是很多噪音。这让我觉得很烦，因为我更希望市场能平稳地朝我预期的方向发展。
But also creates opportunities and you have to use the volatility as opposed to being abused by the volatility, other than mentally, which I'm going to be. But I mean, you can't let yourself be a victim of volatility and you can take advantage of it. It's just hard mentally. But you said I'd rather have trending markets fair. Am I wrong in sometimes thinking you're more comfortable being contrarian? Or do you embrace the consensus more? How do you think about that?
但这也创造了机会，你必须利用波动性，而不是被波动性所困扰，尽管这在心理上是很难的。但我的意思是，你不能让自己成为波动性的受害者，而是可以利用它。这在心理上确实很难。不过你说你更希望有趋势明显的市场。我是不是有时候觉得你在唱反调时更自在？还是你更倾向于接受共识？你是怎么考虑的呢？
I think contrarianism is overrated. Soar is used to say the crowds write 80% of the time. You just can't be caught in the other 20% because you can get your head hand into you. I get some intellectual satisfaction out of playing in the 20%. But as a concept, I think contrarianism is overrated. I do like it when I have extreme conviction and no one else believes that it gives me even more conviction. I don't care if a trade is crowded if I think the thesis is right and the trend is with me.
我认为逆向思维被高估了。有人说，大众观点在80%的时候是正确的。你只需要避免在那剩下的20%里踩坑，否则可能会惨败。我从在那20%里玩耍中获得了一些智力上的满足感。不过，作为一个概念，我觉得逆向思维是被高估的。当我对某件事情有极强的信念，而没人相信时，我会更加坚定地相信自己的想法。如果我认为交易的理论是对的，而且趋势对我有利，那么我不在乎这个交易是否被很多人参与。
I mean, for entry points, I care. But I don't really care in terms of the investment. It doesn't bother me. We had an investor Zoom call in December 2022. And we were discussing macro, rates, dollar, US, versus rest of the world. And after we spoke a little bit, I asked you what you think on rates. And I will quote essentially verbatim what you said. You said, I couldn't care less about rates. The only thing that matters is AI and Nvidia.
对于入场点，我是关心的。但就投资而言，我并不是特别在意。这对我没有太大影响。我们在2022年12月举行了一次投资者的Zoom电话会议。在会议中，我们讨论了宏观经济、利率、美元，美国与世界其他地区的对比等话题。在我们聊了一会儿之后，我问你对利率的看法。我几乎可以准确引用你当时的话，你说：“我对利率一点也不关心。唯一重要的事情是人工智能和英伟达。”
I don't remember that, but that's nice. What was going on? How did you see it? So the Nvidia story is quite interesting. And it's a perfect example of the process we spoke about earlier where I rely on other people. So I have some young superstars in my firm. And they had a network. And they started really talking about AI. This was in early to mid-22. And then I started noticing that the kids at Stanford were shifting from crypto, 50, 50 crypto, and 50, 50 AI to more going to AI.
我不记得这件事，但听起来不错。当时发生了什么？你是怎么看到的？关于英伟达的故事非常有趣。这正好是我们之前谈到的那个过程的一个完美例子，我依赖其他人。我公司里有一些年轻的明星，他们有人脉，他们开始大量讨论人工智能。这是在2022年的早中期。然后我开始注意到，斯坦福的学生从一半关注加密货币、一半关注人工智能，越来越多地转向人工智能。
And that's something we've always looked at in venture is where the kids are going. When we bought Palantir in 0809, it was because it was a cool company back then that all the kids wanted to go to. So my partner had in people from his AI network in their in Palo Alto. They came in and explained AI. Most of it went over my head. But I knew that this was really big. Why did you feel it was really big? It could have been a fad. You didn't feel this way for other fads.
在风险投资中，我们一直关注年轻人选择去哪些地方。我们在08-09年买入Palantir就是因为当时这个公司很酷，所有的年轻人都想去那里工作。我合伙人认识Palo Alto的人，他的人工智能网络里的一些人来为我们解释AI。很多内容我都没懂，但我知道这东西真的很重要。为什么你觉得它很重要？它可能只是一时的潮流。你对其他潮流就没有这种感觉。
Because I had total trust in my partner. And I thought I was grasping the enormity. It turns out I wasn't grasping the enormity, because I didn't know about large language models. But I knew about all the other conventional stuff that was going on in AI. So I said to my partner, what should I buy? He said, in video, that's the way to play AI. So just on this, about as much as you just heard, I bought a not big position in video, but enough to get hurt on or to make some money on.
因为我对我的合伙人完全信任。我以为我理解了事情的重大意义。结果证明我并没有完全理解，因为我不知道大型语言模型的存在。不过，我了解人工智能中所有其他常规的东西。所以我问我的合伙人，我应该买什么？他建议买NVIDIA的股票，说这是参与AI的方式。因此，仅凭我刚刚听到的这些信息，我买了一些NVIDIA的股票，虽然数量不多，但足以让我因此赚钱或亏损。
And then about two weeks later, Chatsgie PT happened, which had not mentioned our conversation. Well, even I understood the enormity of what that meant when I saw even the rudimentary things that was going back then. So then I doubled the position. And then one of the great services you and Morgan Stanley provide are these macro calls. And all the macro guys, including myself, luckily, I hadn't talked yet. We're espousing their views on the world, which are probably worth a nickel and a cup of coffee.
大约两周后，ChatGPT 出现了，但之前并没有提到我们的谈话。当我看到当时那些初步的成果时，我意识到了这件事的重大意义。所以我加倍了我的投入。摩根士丹利和你们提供的其中一项极为有价值的服务就是这些宏观分析电话会议。所有的宏观分析师，包括我自己在内，幸运的是我还没轮到发言，都在表达他们对世界经济的看法，不过这些看法可能也就值那么一文不值和一杯咖啡的钱。
And an analyst there who was from the tech world said, you guys are in the trees and you're missing the forest. There's something much bigger than anything you're talking about, even for macro. And he went on to amplify everything I had heard three weeks ago or four weeks ago about AI. But this time I had Chatsgie PT between that conversation and him. So then I doubled my position again.
有位来自科技领域的分析师说，你们只关注细节，却忽视了整体。有件比你们所谈论的任何事情都更重要的事情，甚至超过宏观层面的讨论。接着，他深入讨论了三到四周前我所听到的有关人工智能的信息。但这次我在与他谈话期间用上了ChatGPT。因此，我再次加倍了我的投资。
And literally, I don't think I knew how to spell Nvidia three months before. And when the sock took off, I knew through years of experience when you have massive, massive change, investors just can't make themselves keep up with it. And it was funny because the person who knew 10 times more than anybody at the table and probably 50 times more than me about AI, he sold his Nvidia shortly thereafter. But I knew that this stock would go up for at least two or three years and go up a lot.
三个月前，我甚至不知道Nvidia怎么拼写。当这只股票突然上涨时，根据多年的经验，我知道当出现巨大变化时，投资者往往难以跟上。滑稽的是，那个比桌上任何人都了解AI十倍，可能比我了解AI五十倍的人，在不久之后卖掉了他的Nvidia股票。但我知道这只股票至少会在接下来的两到三年内大幅上涨。
And I said publicly in an interview about five months later, I cannot possibly see myself selling Nvidia over the next two or three years because it had already gone from like 150 to 390 and this person couldn't believe. I still owned it. And I basically said not only to own it, the way these things evolve, this stock can't not go up for at least three years. So then the stock goes to 800.
大约五个月后，我在一次采访中公开说，我绝对不可能在接下来的两到三年间卖掉英伟达的股票，因为它的价格已经从大约150涨到了390。这位采访者难以置信我还持有这只股票。我表示，不仅要继续持有，根据这些事情的发展方式，这只股票至少三年内不可能不涨。结果，这只股票涨到了800。
And I violated everything I said in the interview, I couldn't stand success. It gone from 150 to 800. I was long term on it. I couldn't deal with it. And I sold it. And then it was 1,400, like five weeks later, and I was sick. But it's amazing how little I knew about Nvidia. I couldn't even tell you what the earnings were.
在这段话中，表达的意思是："我违背了访谈中说的话，我无法忍受成功。价格从150涨到800。我本来打算长期持有它，但我无法坚持住，所以卖掉了。结果五周后，它涨到了1400，我感到很沮丧。但让我惊讶的是，我对Nvidia的了解是多么地少，我甚至说不出来他们的收益情况。"
The sign of confidence. And it's because you're stand-druck emulator that you can be so blatantly honest about the way you think about these things. And I think it's very encouraging to portfolio managers that are coming up in the business. And they often feel like they need to be intellectually very much under game constantly. What I'm getting from this, the ability to filter, to manage instead of being wedded to a spreadsheet, is really unique and quite helpful.
这是自信的标志。因为你是Stand-Drunk（或类似的名称）模拟器，所以你可以如此直白地表达你对这些事情的看法。我认为这对刚进入这行的投资组合经理来说非常鼓舞人心。他们常常觉得自己需要时刻保持高度的智力竞争。我的理解是，拥有这种过滤和管理的能力，而不是死守在电子表格上，是非常独特且相当有帮助的。
You said something that you violated what you had said and sold at 800. Would you have done that 20 years ago? Is this a sign of a more mature way of trading now versus before? Probably not. I'm not used to making six times from my money in an equity in two years. And I'm not Warren Buffett. I think I would have screwed it up 20 years ago when I was good too.
你说了一些话，违反了你以前的承诺，以800的价格卖出。你会在20年前这样做吗？这是否意味着现在的交易方式比以前更成熟？可能不是。我不习惯在两年内从股市中赚到六倍的利润。而且我不是巴菲特。我想如果是20年前，当我也很优秀的时候，我可能会搞砸。
What are some things, if there are some things, that you have unlearned over the past 20, 30 years? Or you had to unlearn? I don't unlearn anything, because scars are something I always keep in mind, because they can help you out. But I will say, through a bunch of circumstances that I won't repeat, I was promoted way too early. I was made an analyst when I was 23. And I was made sort of the head portfolio guy by the time I was 26.
在过去的20到30年里，你有没有什么东西是你不再坚持的，或者是你不得不摒弃的？我没什么是不再坚持的，因为我一直把教训铭记于心，它们能给予我帮助。不过，我必须说，由于一系列我不再重复的原因，我升职得太快了。我在23岁时就被提拔为分析师，到26岁时就成为了主要的投资组合负责人。
And I didn't go to business school. So I never learned all the fundamentals I needed to learn in terms of analysis. So I relied heavily, and my mentor was really into it. And back then, nobody was doing technical analysis. And I learned all the intricate details of it. Okay, I can unequivocally tell you that technical analysis is about 20% as effective today as it was then, because no one was using it.
我没有去商学院学习，因此我没有学到所有需要掌握的分析基础知识。所以我非常依赖我的导师，而他对这方面非常在行。那时候，没有人做技术分析，而我学到了关于它的所有复杂细节。可以明确地说，如今的技术分析只有当时效果的20%左右，因为那时几乎没人使用它。
But when everybody's using it, it doesn't work anymore, because you don't have a unique thing to act against. So it's kind of sad, because it's easy, and you can be lazy, you don't have to work that hard. Just look at a chart instead of going into a 10-Q and all this other stuff. But technical analysis is a problem.
当每个人都在使用它时，它就不再有效了，因为你没有一个独特的方法来进行对抗。所以这有点悲哀，因为它很简单，你可以偷懒，不必那么努力工作。只需要看一下图表，而不是去深入研究10-Q报告和其他资料。但技术分析是个问题。
And in the same vein, price versus news was huge for me for 20 or 30 years. And if you had great news and a stock wasn't responding to the news, 90% of the time, the news was coming that was bad. Unfortunately, around 2000, a lot of smart people sort of came to our business. I was the only one in my class, I think, from Bowdoin, that went into the financial industry because we've been in a bear market for 10 years.
在同样的思路下，过去20或30年里，股价与新闻之间的关系对我来说非常重要。如果有利好的消息发布，但股价没有对应上涨，那么90%的情况下，会有不好的消息接踵而至。不幸的是，大约在2000年，有很多聪明的人加入了我们的行业。在我那个班级里，我好像是唯一一个从鲍登学院进入金融行业的人，因为我们已经经历了长达10年的熊市。
Well, then again, every wise guy learned what I'm just talking about, so it doesn't work anymore. So back then, the company reported horrible earnings, opened down in the aftermarket, and then was up 10% the next day, almost guaranteed to be higher six months later. That's not true anymore, because everybody else has learned that.
好吧，不过每一个聪明人都学会了我刚刚提到的东西，所以这一招现在已经不灵了。当时，公司公布了糟糕的收益报告，盘后交易价格下跌，但第二天却上涨了10%，几乎可以肯定六个月后会更高。现在这种情况不再真实了，因为其他人也都知道这个套路了。
So those would be the two big things. I haven't unlearned them, but I don't rely on them to the extent that I used to. They've been loved to death, basically. Are there any other signals that have been elevated in importance then, conversely, to signals that have been diminished? Not really. There's no silver bullet, and I'm the great beneficiary of 40 years of scars and successes that I can go back on in a lot of pattern recognition, because there's not much I haven't seen in this business. I'd say the biggest disappointment in my career has been, I think I have more wisdom and I have more tools of the trade than I had in my 30s and 40s, and I was a much better portfolio manager than because back then, I had courage.
所以，这就是两个主要的事情。我并没有完全放弃它们，只是不再像以前那样依赖它们了。基本上，它们已经被过度使用。那么，相对于那些重要性降低的信号，还有其他被提升重要性的信号吗？其实没有。没有什么灵丹妙药，我在这个行业里经过了40年的磨砺和成功，使我在很多方面都能够识别模式，因为在这个行业里几乎没有什么是我没见过的。我认为我职业生涯中最大的失望在于，我现在拥有比30岁和40岁时更多的智慧和专业工具，但那时我是一位更优秀的投资组合经理，因为在那时，我有勇气。
I would take bear convicted positions. I'm trying to regain some of my nerve, just because it's more fun. To your chickening out? Oh, for sure. I've been chickening out for a long time. I'm Mr. Taco. Except it's not T. It's Taco. Draco is chicken-sounding. In terms of other maybe experiences that you've had, or a chip on your shoulder, do you have a chip on your shoulder that makes you better at this? No, no. I just grew up my dad and my sisters played games with me all the time. I'm just a really sore loser. I love games, but I really hate to lose. So I'm just very driven. It's a sickness. I don't where it comes from. But I might as well channel it and make it productive instead of just disease because it is a little bit unsamely, but it's who I am. Embrace it.
我会采取坚定的立场。我在努力找回我的勇气，因为这样更有趣。你以前是不是有点胆怯？哦，当然有。我过去胆怯了很久。我是“塔可先生”。只是那个“T”不是。是塔可。德拉科听起来像鸡。在你以前的经历中，或者因为某种心结，有没有让你因此变得更好？没有，没有。我从小就跟爸爸和姐姐们一起玩游戏。我只是个输不起的人。我喜欢游戏，但特别讨厌输。所以我特别有动力。这是种病。我不知道它从哪来的。但不如把这种状态引导成有益的，而不是仅仅让它成为一种“病”，因为这有点不雅，但这是我个性的一部分。拥抱它吧。
Finally, this show is called Hard Lessons. Can you look back in your life or career and maybe take us through something that you had to learn the hard way? Let me just say, I have so many scars. You can't believe it. Everyone knows how I played the NASDAQ meltup in 99, sold it perfectly in January, then bought the exact top, and someone says, what did you learn from that? I said, nothing. I learned not to do that 20 years before, but I got emotional, which I fight every day. I would literally throw up once or twice a week, just from anxiety when I'd have a drawdown and so forth. And at some point in my career, I learned that you're going to continue to make mistakes. You're going to continue to get emotional.
这部节目叫《艰难的教训》。回顾你的人生或职业生涯，你能不能跟我们分享一下你曾经不得不通过艰难方式学习的东西？让我这么说吧，我满身是伤，令人难以置信。大家都知道我在1999年纳斯达克大涨时的操作表现，我在一月份完美抛售，然后在顶部完全买入。有人问我从中学到了什么？我说，什么也没学到。在这之前的20年我就知道不能这么做，但我变得情绪化，这是我每天都在抗争的事情。因为焦虑，每当出现亏损时，我每周都会吐一到两次。在我职业生涯的某个时候，我学到了一个道理，那就是你会不断犯错，你也会持续受到情绪的影响。
You're going to continue to have that happen from now on, then. But you've got a gift. And just stop torturing yourself for 48 hours or maybe longer over this because you've been doing this long enough and the record is there long enough that it's no longer like random accident, which I did not believe for like 15 years. So the hard lessons have been like hundreds of mistakes, but that they're just a moment in time. And when you have these drawdowns, and if there's a money manager's listening to this, and you're good, it's easier said than done. Just get over and move on.
从现在开始，这种情况会继续发生。但你有天赋。不要再因为这个自责48小时或更长时间，因为你已经这样做了足够久，而且记录也足够长，这已经不再像是随机的意外，我过去15年都不这样认为。这些艰难的教训包含了成百上千的错误，但它们只是时间里的瞬间。当你遭遇这些挫折时，如果有理财经理在听这段话，而且你足够优秀，那么说起来容易做起来难，但还是要放下并继续前进。
So Stan, Dracomillar had imposed her syndrome for 15 years? Yes. Maybe longer. Wow. Maybe longer. Incredible. As we're finishing, I want to say thank you for being here. I go to know you later in your career. And it's just been fascinating to see you think and trade, to see you in action. You've been very generous with your time. And on behalf of Morgan Stanley, thank you very much. As I said in the beginning, I wouldn't do this for many. I think the world of Morgan Stanley, so it was delightful to be here. Thank you, Stan. Thanks, Helio.
所以，斯坦，Dracomillar已经把她的综合症持续了15年吗？ 是的。可能更长时间。哇。可能更长时间。不可思议。我们要结束时，我想对你表示感谢。是在你职业生涯的后期才认识你的。看到你思考和交易，看到你行动的过程，真的很吸引人。你非常慷慨地提供了你的时间。代表摩根士丹利，非常感谢你。如我一开始所说，我不会为很多人做这件事。我对摩根士丹利评价很高，所以很高兴来到这里。谢谢你，斯坦。谢谢你，Helio。
You've been watching Hard Lessons, an original series from Morgan Stanley. You can listen to an extended audio version of this episode on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. For more information about the series, visit morganstainley.com slash Hard Lessons.
您刚刚观看了摩根士丹利原创系列《艰难的课题》。您可以在Apple、Spotify或任何可以收听播客的平台上收听本集的扩展音频版本。欲了解更多关于该系列的信息，请访问morganstanley.com/HardLessons。