From Startup to Scaleup with Reid Hoffman and Sam Altman | The Scaleup Offsite 2017
发布时间 2017-06-01 00:57:54 来源
摘要
Silicon Valley is home to many of the fastest growing and most well known startups in the world. In this fireside, Reid Hoffman from Greylock Partners and Sam Altman from Y Combinator share their perspectives on how Silicon Valley companies effectively blitzscale, how to think about hiring when a startup is growing quickly, and why culture is so connected to the success of a company.
This fireside was recorded at The Scaleup Offsite, an event focused on scaling companies co-hosted by Greylock Partners and YC Continuity.
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中英文字稿 
Silicon Valley is home to many of the fastest growing and most well-known startups in the world. In this fireside, Reed Hoffman from Greylock Partners and Sam Altman from Y Combinator share their perspectives on how Silicon Valley companies effectively blitz scale, how to think about hiring when a startup is growing quickly, and Y culture is so connected to the success of a company.
硅谷是全球许多增长最快、最知名的初创企业的家园。在这次的火炉边聊天中，来自格雷洛克合伙公司的里德·霍夫曼和来自Y Combinator的萨姆·阿尔特曼分享了他们对于如何有效地快速扩张、在初创企业快速增长时如何考虑招聘以及Y文化如何与公司的成功息息相关的看法。
This presentation was recorded at the scale-up offsite, an event focused on scaling companies, hosted by Greylock Partners and Y continuity. Thank you all for coming here. Everyone here is an important part of our joint network.
这个演示是在一个专注于扩大规模的公司的活动——由Greylock Partners和Y continuity主办的“规模扩大离线会议”上录制的。非常感谢大家前来参加。你们每个人都是我们联合网络中的重要一员。
This event started with a kind of a funny set of accidents. First, Sam had this brilliant idea of teaching a startup class at Stanford and getting a bunch of founders to talk about the key elements. He got me to give some talk on how to be a great founder. I remember that one.
这件事情始于一连串有趣的意外。首先，萨姆有了一个精彩的想法，在斯坦福教授创业班，让一些创始人谈论关键要素。他让我谈如何成为一个优秀的创始人。我还记得那个演讲。
Then I went, wow, that's a really good idea. Part of how innovation I said, well, startups one part, scale-ups the other thing. We did a similar class with teaching blitz scaling, which is the theme of a book that I'm working on with Chris Ye, who's in the audience somewhere. We did a Stanford class as well, where we got a bunch of different folks.
然后我就说，哇，这真的是一个很好的想法。创新的一部分就是这样。我说，创业公司是其中一部分，成长型企业是另一部分。我们曾经开过一门类似的课程，讲的是加速成长模式，这也是我正在和克里斯·叶共同撰写一本书的主题。我们也在斯坦福开设过一门类似的课程，邀请了许多不同的人参与。
Sam and I started talking about this. We said, look, actually, in fact, this is not just a kind of a good Stanford topic, but this is actually a good topic for essentially our network and for the businesses, because you really only build something amazing if you hit the scale problem. It's not just a, hey, you invent. Then, hey, it's easy after that. We hit the oil and we just pump out the oil. There's actually, in fact, a lot of innovation, a lot of hard work, and a lot of skill and craft that goes into scaling. If you fail, you fail.
我和山姆开始谈论这个话题。我们说，实际上，这不仅是一个好的斯坦福话题，而且对于我们的网络和业务来说，这也是一个好话题，因为只有当你遇到规模问题时，才能创造出了不起的东西。这不仅仅是发明的问题，然后就变得容易了。我们会开采石油，就会轻松地抽取油。实际上，扩展规模需要很多创新、努力、技能和工艺。如果你失败了，你就失败了。
Then Sam called me and said, hey, we should do an event like this and we should start doing this as a regular basis. I said, oh, that's a great idea. Here we are. Here we are. I thought I would open a little bit with some of the blitz scaling stuff, and then we'll just kick back and forth.
然后Sam给我打了电话，说：嘿，我们应该举办这样的活动，并且应该将其作为常规活动开展。我说：哦，这是一个好主意。现在我们在这里。我们一开始来谈谈一些关于猛烈扩张的东西，然后我们就轻松聊天吧。
The other thing, by the way, actually one other little housekeeping thing. The stage conversation, including the Q&A, is essentially going to be published. It's public. So anticipate that being public. The hallway conversations are private. So don't tweet or otherwise publish anything in the hallway conversations unless you have permission from the person you're talking to.
顺便说一下，还有个小事情要交代。台上的对话，包括问答环节，将被公开发布，公众都可以看到。所以你要明白这是公开透明的活动。而在走廊里的对话则是私人的。所以如果你想发推特或其他媒体的话，请先得到你对话对象的允许。
With that, one of the key things that I think is interesting is you say, well, why is it that Silicon Valley produces so much of the technological impact in the world? We tend to tell ourselves still, classically, this kind of startup story of, well, we're inventive and we invent your capital and we import a ton of talent here. The venture capital stuff all works. But actually, in fact, it's the fact that we intersect technology invention with business invention, where that business invention includes such things as network effects, new business models and so forth.
关键的一点是，我认为有趣的是，你问：为什么硅谷在全球科技领域产生如此大的影响？我们仍然告诉自己那些经典的创业故事：我们有创造力、引进资本和大量人才。风险投资也是行之有效的。但实际上，事实是，我们将技术发明与商业发明相交汇，其中商业发明包括网络效应、新的商业模式等等。
And then in seeing those, we realize certain of those businesses are super important and we move really fast to establish that business model. And that's one of the reasons why you'll find that most people in the valley all say network effects as something super important. And one thing that actually, in fact, I think is a fun hobby in case any of you would like to do this is occasionally when I'm feeling impish, I will actually, in fact, ask people, well, what's network effects?
然后，在看到那些企业后，我们认识到其中某些企业是非常重要的，我们会迅速建立那种商业模式。这就是为什么你会发现，在硅谷，大多数人都认为网络效应非常重要的原因之一。实际上，有一件事，我认为这是一种有趣的爱好，如果你们中有任何人喜欢这样做，偶尔当我感到顽皮的时候，我会问人们，什么是网络效应？
Because a lot of people will use the term and actually don't actually, in fact, know what it is, don't know how to measure it, don't know the different kinds of network effects, don't know like when network effects and growth, network effects and engagement, network effects and revenue, network effects and a bunch of these sorts of things. And yet, the reason why we're obsessed with network effects is we know that's the kind of thing that causes us to scale.
因为很多人会使用这个术语，实际上却不知道它是什么，不知道如何衡量它，不知道不同种类的网络效应，也不知道网络效应和增长，网络效应和参与度，网络效应和营收以及一些类似的东西。然而，我们对网络效应着迷的原因是因为我们知道这是能让我们扩大规模的东西。
And so part of the whole thing is a whole set of different techniques. And I'll go through some of the different blitz scaling areas of kind of hiring. But maybe one of the things we should start with is how you've been scaling YC, actually, because the fellowship and the class, the MOOC and everything else, because it's not just we kind of advise the stuff and practice, you practice the stuff.
所以，整个事情的一部分是一整套不同的技术。我会介绍一些不同的blitz scaling领域，比如招聘。但或许我们应该从如何扩张YC开始，因为除了我们提供指导和实践，你实践这些事情之外，还有奖学金、课程以及其他方面的东西。
Well, you know, it gets super recursive because one of the things that we did was start our continuity fund because we realized this problem to scale ourselves. We realized that if we didn't start a growth fund that could help companies who have had their initial idea start to work, then we weren't going to be able to produce as many impact companies as we can, which is really why we started our own growth stage fund.
你知道，这个问题非常递归，因为我们做的一件事是启动了连续性基金，因为我们意识到要解决扩大的问题。我们意识到，如果我们不开始一个成长基金，帮助那些已经开始落实他们的初步想法的公司，那么我们就无法产生像我们一样的影响公司的数量，这也是我们开始自己成长阶段基金的真正原因。
It invests mostly in YC companies. We sometimes invest in non-YC companies, but the idea was, can we, to scale, we need to do two things.
它主要投资于 YC 公司。我们有时也会投资于非 YC 公司，但这个想法是，如果要扩大规模，我们需要做两件事。
One is fund a lot more companies, but two is build a practice that in the same way we work with founders to figure out their initial idea, teaches them how to scale companies.
第一件事是投资更多的公司，而第二件事则是建立一个实践计划，就像我们与创始人一起探讨他们最初的想法一样，教他们如何扩大公司规模。
So we've tried to build this thing basically to scale YC, we need to scale companies. And that, I think, has been one of the most important inventions we've had in the last year.
所以我们试图构建这个东西基本上是为了扩展YC规模，我们需要扩展公司规模。我认为，这是过去一年中最重要的发明之一。
We've also tried to go in the other direction. So right now we're teaching a MOOC, which is kind of the third version of that Stanford class, back at Stanford, where we are advising 3,000 startups at once.
我们还尝试朝另一个方向发展。现在，我们正在教授一门 MOOC 课程，这可以视为在斯坦福大学的那门课程的第三个版本，我们在斯坦福大学为3000个初创企业提供顾问服务。
I think this is probably a world record for a number of startups concurrently advised by one program. And next year we think we can scale at the 10,000. And this is teaching people a lot of the YC experience about how to start a company.
我觉得这可能是一个拥有同时受到一个项目指导的创业公司数量世界纪录。明年，我们认为我们可以扩大到10,000家公司。这将让人们学习到很多有关创业公司的Y Combinator经验。
And I think this is really important, right? That there are, well, as Reid said, not everyone knows what network effects are, but our version of the network effect is the bigger we can make our community, the more we can get people feeling loyalty to our community helping each other, that's our network effect.
我认为这真的很重要，对吧？就像Reid说的那样，不是每个人都知道网络效应是什么，但我们的网络效应是，我们可以使我们的社区更大，让更多的人感到忠诚并帮助彼此，这就是我们的网络效应。
And the thing that I really try to do in terms of scaling YC is make sure we don't have to compete with other firms. We manage to do very well, but most venture capitalists that have to compete have a tough time that it's spent a lot of time thinking about it.
我在扩展 YC 上真正努力做的事情是确保我们不必与其他公司竞争。我们做得非常好，但大多数必须竞争的风险投资家很困难，花费了很多时间来考虑这个问题。
And we like to be the only people that are sort of, that really matter in our own space. And so for us, scale is an answer to that problem. And the more we can scale, the more founders that can help the bigger we can make our network. That's really powerful.
我们喜欢成为我们自己领域中真正重要的唯一人物。因此，对我们来说，规模就是解决这个问题的答案。随着我们的规模越来越大，我们可以有更多创始人帮助我们扩大我们的网络。这真的很有力量。
We've done a lot of other things around the edges, but you know, kind of the big strategy is very simple.
我们在周边做了很多其他的事情，但是你知道，总的策略非常简单。
It's having a very big top of the funnel. Get to the most promising new founders at the very start of their career thinking about start-up, get the best ones of those into our program, build a program with real network effects, and then have this continuity fund to help invest in these companies and teach them to scale.
我们的策略是聚焦于潜在的创业者，尽可能早地接触最有前途的新创始人，挑选出最好的参与我们的计划，并建立一个真正具有网络效应的计划，然后通过这个持续性基金来帮助投资这些公司并教导他们如何扩展规模。这样我们就可以拥有更大的漏斗顶部。
And so one of the key things, I think, to understand about scale is kind of the what got you here won't get you there. And so classically, the too much of the advice that's given to entrepreneurs is, like for example, when you're 20 people, hire your scale executives so that when you're, you know, at thousands and so forth, you have all those people baked in place.
我认为，理解规模的关键是要明白“走到哪里，留下的脚印就在哪里”的道理。经典的说法是，对于企业家来说，大多数建议都太过于片面，例如当你有20个员工时，就应该雇用规模高管，以便在数千名员工时，有这些人已经准备好了。
And very rarely are the right people that when you're executives at 20 or 50 are the right people for executives when you're 1000 or 500. Some of them grow with it, but most often, actually in fact you need to trade around.
很少有人会在20或50岁时成为适合1000或500人行政人员的合适人选。有些人可以与之共同成长，但实际上大多数情况下，你需要不断地进行交替更换。
And so part of the thing about thinking about scale the right way is to think about dynamism, to think about the fact that you're refactoring your org as you're going, and that you need to be anticipating that you're refactoring your org.
所以，正确思考规模的一部分是要考虑动态性，考虑你正在重构你的组织，你需要预期你正在重构你的组织。如果有必要，你需要重新表达这个句子。
You need to be anticipating that. You know, for example, you're looking at your set of folks, hopefully if you've done it well, you've got a bunch of well cohesive strong A players, but A players at this stage are not necessarily the same as A players at the next stage.
你需要预料到这种情况。举个例子，你正在审视你的团队，希望你已经成功地招募了一群完美协调，强有力的一流员工。然而，现在的一流员工不一定会在下一个阶段依然是一流员工。
And you have to be one, managing your connectivity with those folks in a way that if like you're promising this person that they're going to be a head of product or a head of sales or head of marketing or head of engineering forever, and that goes away then when you break, you break them or you may actually still want them in the org, which you actually want to be promising as things like you will actually have a seriously important role in this organization forever.
你必须当一个好管理者，以某种方式管理你与那些人的互动，就好像你在向这个人承诺，说他们会永远成为产品、销售、市场或工程的负责人，那么如果这个承诺不再成立，当你破坏了这个承诺，你就会伤害到他们，或者你可能仍然想让他们留在组织中，那么你真正希望承诺的是，他们将永远在组织中拥有一个重要的角色。
You will be a major contributor, your job will increase, you will learn things, but not necessarily unless you're pretty sure there will be, you will be in charge of this function.
你会是一个很重要的贡献者，你的工作会变多，你会学到很多新东西，但只有当你相当确定这里面有机会时，你才会负责这个职能。
And so that changed because when you change the scale of an organization, you're moving from when you're 10, 20 people, you're all doers. A couple of you are managing too, but you're basically all doers.
所以这个改变发生了，因为当你改变组织的规模时，你从拥有10个、20个人的组织中移动出来，你们都是工作者。其中有一些人也在管理，但基本上你们都是工作者。
When you move to 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, you move from doers to manager doers to managers and doers to managers of managers, otherwise execs.
当你晋升到50，100，150，200，250这些职位时，你从执行者升级为经理执行者、经理和经理的经理，或者高管。
And that's changing the whole dynamic. And so you have to anticipate in scale that you're changing around the way that your company actually works is kind of a key thing and you need to be anticipating that that will be coming.
这改变了整个局势。因此，您必须预计您正在改变公司实际运作方式的规模，这是一个关键要素，您需要预计这将到来。
I had a funny example of this late last year, someone was writing a story about YC and they wrote something about how we just had our second major reorg in two years.
去年晚些时候，我有一个有趣的例子，有人正在写YC的故事，他们写了一些关于我们在两年内进行了第二次重组的东西。
And I read that as, oh, they're saying we're not moving fast enough and they meant it as way too chaotic. And I stand by my read of it.
我理解为，哦，他们在说我们没能快速前进，他们认为这样太混乱了。我坚定地认同我的理解。
But I think the amount of dynamism that the startups that really scale well have always looks a little chaotic on the outside, it's just because there's constant shuffling and new people in and people who aren't working out out.
但我认为真正扩张得很好的创业公司所具有的活力总是看起来有点混乱，这仅仅是因为不断地有人员调动，新人加入，还有不适应的员工被淘汰。
The very best founders that we've worked with, one of the things that they always evaluate their people on is how good have they been at training their replacements, how good are they at, you know, on a moment's notice being able to move to a next role. Because most founders are very bad at this. And most people are very bad at this.
我们与合作过的最优秀的创始人之一，总是会评估他们的员工培养接班人的能力如何，他们有没有能力在任何时候迅速转移到下一个角色。因为大部分创始人都不善于此，而且大部分人也不擅长此项工作。
You know, most executives will not do this. You know, there's a story at Facebook at one point that they tied like 50% of executive bonus to how good of a job they were doing at having replacements ready to go and being ready to move into a new role. And I think if you don't really incentivize that you never get enough of that culture in place and if you're going to be blood-scaling, you're going to just be moving people around and reorganizing constantly.
你知道吗，大部分高管不会这样做。有一个 Facebook 的故事，他们曾将 50% 的高管奖金绑定在准备好接班人和准备好转到新职位这个方面表现如何。我认为，如果你不给予这种激励，就永远无法建立起足够的这种文化。如果你要进行大规模扩展，你会一直在调整和重新组织人员。
Yep. And part of the two corollaries, which I was just illustrating on that dynamism. So one of them is that actually the chaos isn't just external. It's internal. And so, technically, what happens is people complain about the chaos internally, which, by the way, makes sense, operational efficiency and everything else.
是的。而我刚才在展示的两个推论中的一部分，其中之一是混乱不仅是外在的，而是内在的。因此，从技术上讲，人们会抱怨内部的混乱，这其实很有道理，因为这涉及到运营效率等方面。
And you have to condition the organization to say, when we're scaling really fast, there will be chaos. Right. We're trying to constantly manage it, but we don't manage to zero chaos until we're actually in a relatively stable place. And so expect that, work collaboratively with each other and make that happen. That's one part of the correlation.
你必须让组织有适应能力，当我们快速扩张的时候，会出现混乱，这是正常的。我们一直在尝试管理它，但只有当我们达到相对稳定的地步时，才能使混乱减少至最低。因此，要预料到这种情况，相互合作，让这种情况发生。这是相互关联的一部分。
So it's not just external looks at chaos. It's internal chaos. No, it really is chaotic. And you have to just, like, the wrong way to address that is to, like, say, okay, my team says they don't want chaos. I'm going to try to manage out all the chaos. Yes. You know, it's okay to have a little bit less, and that's a noble thing to shoot for.
所以，混乱不仅仅是外部表象，还有内在的混乱。不，它真的很混乱。你只需要像错误的方式一样去解决它，比如说，我的团队说他们不想要混乱。我要试着管理所有混乱。是的，拥有少一些混乱是可以的，这是一个崇高的目标。
But the trade-off, people that run these perfectly non-catholic organizations, somehow never build great companies. Yes. So, the trade-off is we're going to accept a little bit of chaos in exchange for a shot at one of these massive great companies. And founders just have to sell that to their teams. Yes. And it's a management dynamic.
但是，经营这些完全非天主教组织的人们，似乎从未建立过伟大的公司。是的。所以，我们要在一些混乱中寻求机会去获得这些巨大伟大的公司。创始人只需要向他们的团队推销这个观点。是的。这是一种管理动态。
Chaos will go up. You do some solidity. Chaos will go up. You do some solidity. It's that dynamic.
混乱将会增加。你必须做些稳定。混乱将会增加。你必须做些稳定。这是一种动态。
The second part, and this is one of the really key things that I learned from my first startup. This was kind of a classic entrepreneurial mistake. It's called social net.
第二个部分，这是我从第一次创业中真正学到的关键之一。 这是一个典型的企业家错误。 它被称为社交网络。
I kind of approached this with what you know, actually. I always kind of make vaguely and teasing comments of MBAs. It's a classic MBA thing, which is like, oh, hire the people who have the experience of that job, get the CV of it, put that CV in, make that happen. And so, I literally had like job description to history and was optimizing for that. And it's a total fail as you get to scale, because the real thing you need is to have the people who learn and who adjust.
其实我是用自己知道的方式去做的。我一直对MBA这个专业隐晦地开玩笑。这是MBA行为的经典特征，就是会去雇用那些已经有着工作经验的员工，看一下他们的简历，投递这些简历，然后让这些人来完成任务。所以，我当时只是将工作描述与历史完美契合，并在此作为重点进行优化。但是随着业务扩展规模的逐渐扩大，这样的做法是完全行不通的，因为真正需要的是那些能够学习和适应的人才。
One part of that is learning and adjusting through what's the needs of the business, what is your product, market fit, how is that working? The other parts of the learning and adjusting is the whole organization is going to change shape. And so, if you don't optimize for people who are learners, who will go into that, you're host.
其中一部分是要通过了解业务需求、产品市场适应度以及运作情况来学习和调整。学习和调整的另一部分涉及整个组织的形态变化。因此，如果你不优化针对那些有学习能力并能适应变化的人，你就注定要失败。
And so, this is actually part of when I got to PayPal and was kind of when Peter Max and I were going on walks about like how to first build what was first called field link, then infinity, then payvow. We were doing these walks and I said, no, no, don't look for, oh, I've got 10 years of experience QA, look for someone who learns fast. They need to have basic skills, because like learning it from scratch, too difficult.
所以，这实际上是我加入PayPal时的一部分，当时我和Peter Max一起散步，讨论如何首先构建最初被称为Field Link、然后是Infinity、然后是Payvow的东西。我们正在进行这些散步，我说不要寻找有10年经验QA的人，而要寻找能够快速学习的人。他们需要具备基本技能，因为从头开始学习太困难了。
But look for that learning curve and look for team sports and look for other kinds of things. And for those of you who know Peter, he was particularly irked at the team sports thing, but later turned out to be right. Right, libertarian, sorry. That was the individual achievement playing chess is what matters, not the interesting. Sorry, I just fried.
但要寻找那个学习曲线，寻找团体运动和其它各种事物。对于那些认识彼得的人，他对团体运动的事很反感，但后来证明他是正确的。对，他是自由主义者，抱歉。他认为个人的成就，比如下棋，才是最重要的，而不是团队协作的有趣性。抱歉，我刚才有点冲动。
No, it's an interesting point. My version of this is you want to hire for values first, apt to second, and skills third. And I think the problem with most executive recruiters is that they reverse that order. And so, if you say I need to hire a CFO, they will go bring you people with 20 years of experience as a CFO at vaguely similar companies.
不，那是一个很有意思的观点。我认为应该先考虑价值观，其次是能力，最后才是技能，这是我的版本。但大多数高管招聘人员的问题在于他们颠倒了这个顺序。所以，如果你说我需要雇用一位首席财务官，他们会为你带来在类似公司担任CFO达20年经验的人。
But unfortunately, it's usually like 20 years of the exact same year of experience over and over again, and they probably can't learn and adapt if something really changes. Things are really going to change. If you're trying to scale fast, you really need someone who is aligned with the values of the company so that when things change or when they have to make a decision, they'll make the one you would make if you can't be in there, or they will be a good team player and go do that thing.
但不幸的是，通常都是20年来一成不变的相同经验，他们可能无法适应和学习新的变化。事情真的将会有所改变。如果你试图快速扩张，你确实需要一个与公司价值观相一致的人，这样当事情变化或者需要做决定时，他们会做出与你一样的决定，如果你不能在场的话，或者他们会是一个优秀的团队成员并去做那件事。
You need someone who has high aptitude because the role is going to constantly shift. And the speed, the ability, the rate of learning, the rate of improvement dominates skills. And then, you know, specific skills experience obviously matter. But for me, it's third on the list. Speaking of YC continuity, Oli, who runs our continuity fund, had never had any venture job before. It's done a fabulous job. Same thing is true for a lot of the other people that we hire.
你需要找一个有高才能的人，因为这个角色会不断变动。学习速度、能力和提升速度在技能之前更重要。当然，具体的技能和经验也很重要，但对我来说，它排名第三。说到YC的连续性，负责我们连续性基金的Oli以前从未做过风险投资。他做得很棒。对我们雇用的许多其他人也是如此。
I think if you, for yourself, from the sort of the traditional model of how you hire executives in a non-growing, very static company and think that in a blitz scaling company, you have to flip the priority of skills. You end up, or the priority of attributes. You end up with a very different team, but it's the one that works. And the very best companies take this exceptionally far in how much they're willing to hire a non-traditional qualified executive. Yes.
我认为，如果你从那种在一个非成长、非常静态的公司雇佣高管的传统模式出发，为自己考虑，然后思考在一个猛烈扩张的公司里，你必须改变技能的优先级，或者是优先考虑特点属性。这样，你就会拥有一个非常不同的团队，但这样做是有效的。最好的公司把这一点推向了极致，他们愿意雇佣那些非传统的、没有资格认证的高管。是的。
And actually, I mean, there's a bunch of different parts of hacks on this. One of the things that I actually learned from when Sean Parker and Zuckerberg hired Collar from LinkedIn, and I was talking to Collar about this, the thing they put them in is he's his generalist, and they put him in a recruiting role first. And I was like, look, this is the most major thing. And so we're not hiring a traditional recruiter. We're hiring a really smart generalist. And that was actually one of the things that really helped set the initial talent team and culture as it scaled. And it was that kind of thing about thinking, which are the things that you most need to solve, and then getting the generalist into it. Because one of the things that you do need to eventually, as you scale, hire specialists, but the theme that you look at as you move from start-up to scale-up is you always have generalists.
实际上，我的意思是，黑客攻击有很多不同的部分。其中一件我从肖恩·帕克和扎克伯格聘请来自 LinkedIn 的 Collar 时学到的事情是，他们把Collar放在了一个招聘角色中作为他的全能人才，这是他们的初始人才团队成长的一部分。所以，我们不是雇佣传统的招聘人员，而是雇佣非常聪明的全面人才。这确实是一个非常重要的事情。这种思考方式真的有助于建立和发展团队和文化。因为在扩大规模的过程中，你需要最先解决的是哪些问题，哪些东西最需要全能人才在其中，虽然最终你也需要雇佣专家，但是从创业到扩大规模的过程中，你总是需要全面人才。
The generalist is important for learning, changing the organization, adapting, adapting product market fit, tackling new markets, going global, et cetera. But you very selectively add in the specialists. When you have someone who says, look, I am just a network engineer. You're like, OK, great. That's when we know that what we need from you is network engineering for the entire tour of duty, the entire length of time here. And that's fine. The rest of it, you're trying to have generalist as much as possible.
“在学习、改变组织、适应市场需求、进军新市场、全球化等方面，通才是很重要的。但是，您需要有选择地加入专家。当您有人说：‘我只是一个网络工程师’时，您可能会说：‘好的，非常好。那么我们需要您在此期间提供整个巡回活动的网络工程服务。’这没问题。其他事情，您要尽可能让人成为通才。”
And matter of fact, actually, another part of that was that I'm learning from social and another of the person who first did that role at LinkedIn as in the audience is Lee Howard was our first, like, OK, utility player. Make sure you can tackle any problem that we throw at you.
其实，另一个原因是我从社交媒体和Linkedin的首位扮演该角色的人那里学到了很多。在听众中有Lee Howard，他是我们的第一位通用球员，确保你可以解决我们提出的任何问题。
So I'm going to move to culture. We have a great talk from Jason Kylar, who will be up after us and is one of the world-class folks on culture. So I don't think we should go overland that, but I think it's worth touching quickly.
所以我即将谈论文化。我们将有来自Jason Kylar的精彩讲演，他是世界一流的文化专家之一。因此，我认为我们不应该过多谈论这个话题，但是我认为值得简要提及。
I recently did, I'm doing this podcast series on Masters of Scale with June Cohen. It's coming out. I think it's May 3rd. And it's kind of this heavily edited thing on these different themes of kind of what are the different theories of what it takes to scale. And I had a conversation with Reed Hastings where I asked him, I said, look, there's two theories of thought in Silicon Valley.
我最近在做一个关于《Masters of Scale》的播客系列，跟June Cohen合作。我们计划在5月3日发布。这个节目深度剪辑了有关如何扩展的不同主题。我向Reed Hastings请教了他的看法，他说，硅谷有两种思想流派。
One theory is that culture eats strategy and that culture is the dependent thing for how you really build great companies. And then the other theory is that actually culture is the historical explanation for successful companies, right? That when you have a successful company, you look back and say, you know, that culture, that was really great. And Reed looked at me and said something that I normally say to other people.
一种理论是文化比战略更重要，而文化是真正建立伟大公司的依赖因素。另一种理论是其实文化是成功公司的历史解释对吧? 当你有一个成功的公司时，回头看，你会说，“你知道吗，那种文化真是太棒了”。然后，里德看着我说了一些我通常对别人说的话。
So this is kind of fun, kind of a funny embarrassing moment in the interview, which was he says, well, both. He's like, duh. He was like, yeah, that's right. That's the right answer. Right. It was clever. I was asking the question, but wasn't so clever in terms of the answer. But I do think that the theory that's pro culture is that, again, when you look at the traits of you're going to be moving up at such a fast rate that you're going to be having chaos, you're going to be reorganizing fairly consistently.
这有点有趣，也有点尴尬的有趣瞬间是在面试中发生的。他说“两者都是”时的表现很有趣。他的语气是“嗯，当然啦”。听起来是正确答案。这很巧妙。当我提出这个问题时，我的回答并不那么聪明。但我确信赞成文化理论的观点是，当你考虑到你将会以如此快的速度向上发展，你会遇到混乱，你会不断地重新组织。
And as you reorganize, especially managerial roles, that resets a bunch of patterns and you'll have some chaos on that.
当你重新组织，特别是管理角色时，会重置一些模式，这将导致一些混乱。
How do you keep a high-performance, very strong company? And culture is, in part, the answer to that. Because if your only culture is top-down hierarchy and messaging and communications that comes from the top, that culture won't survive as you really balloon the organization.
你如何保持高效、非常强大的公司呢？文化在一定程度上是答案。因为如果你唯一的文化是自上而下的等级制度、信息传达和沟通，那么当你的组织真正膨胀时，这种文化就无法生存了。
Instead you want a horizontal accountability. You want it so that everybody is keeping everyone else accountable to the culture that we're in. And cultures are not like there is the good culture and the bad culture. Cultures are defined by an organization. Some cultures are engineering cultures. Some cultures are high-acute cultures. Some cultures are collaborative. Teamwork cultures. There's a different set of things you're emphasizing and that should be dependent on your organization, the problem you're solving.
你需要横向问责制，让每个人都对我们所在的文化负责。不同的组织定义不同的文化，没有好坏之分。有的文化是工程文化，有的是高度敏锐的文化，有的是协作的团队文化。你需要强调不同的事情，具体取决于你的组织和你要解决的问题。
The problem is, is that it doesn't just end there. You actually do have to play good strategy and everything else. The thing that when people frequently sell culture too much is they say, once you have good culture, everything else follows because you hire the right people, you play the right way together. And that's, of course, extremely important, but you don't get the business model and the strategy.
问题是，并不仅仅止步于此。你实际上需要制定好的策略和完成一切其他事项。人们经常过分强调文化的时候，他们会说，只要你有良好的文化，其他所有东西都会随之而来，因为你可以雇佣合适的人，一起玩得正确。当然，这非常重要，但你没法得到商业模式和策略。
How do you guys teach culture at YC? What's the particular way that you guys angle in this? I think there are so many different kinds of cultures that can work.
你们在YC如何教授文化？你们有什么特殊的方法来处理这个问题吗？我认为有很多种不同的文化可以适用。
And I'm certainly a believer that you have to have a great business and a great culture and they can be somewhat orthogonal. But also, if you take one business's culture and throw it into another successful business, it might be disastrous. They really do somehow have to fit together.
我相信，一个伟大的企业和一个伟大的文化同样重要，它们有时可能并不相关。但是，如果你将一个企业的文化扔进另一个成功的企业，可能会搞砸。它们确实必须相互契合。
The general framework that I think about when adding people to a team, which is I think what defines culture, is what is going to be this person's net effect on the output vector of the organization. And there are people who are brilliant and can get a lot of work done themselves and what add to the vector in that sense, but they piss everybody off so much. They have a net negative effect because they make other people less productive.
我在考虑加人进团队时，大致想的框架就是：这个人会对组织的产出向量产生什么样的净效应，这就是我认为定义文化的东西。有些人自己确实很聪明，可以完成很多工作，从这个意义上来看也增加了向量值，但他们会让其他人非常生气。他们的净负效应是因为他们让其他人的生产率降低了。
There are people who are moderately intelligent and moderately productive but have a hugely positive impact on what they get everybody else to do. And I think like one version of culture is, are you good at bringing in people that have a positive net effect on the output vector, which screens out sort of just looking at people in a vacuum?
有些人智力和产出都很一般，但他们对于激励其他人产出却有巨大的正面影响。我认为，文化的一个方面就是你是否擅长吸纳那些对产出向量有积极净效应的人，这样就可以避免仅仅将人看作一个孤立的实体。
I think though that in Silicon Valley, in the current environment, it's really easy to use culture as an excuse for underperformance. And so you have people say, you know, we drink a lot of green tea, we all go to yoga together, we're super nice to each other, and we have this wonderful culture. And they don't understand why people don't want to come work there or come and leave in our productive. And the answer is, the culture that matters, I think, to the best people is one way they can just come and be really productive and be around really other great people.
我认为，在当前环境下，在硅谷很容易将文化作为表现不佳的借口。有些人会说，你知道的，我们喝很多绿茶，一起练瑜伽，我们之间非常友好，我们有这种美妙的文化。但他们不明白为什么人们不想来这里工作或者很快就离开了。而最好的人们关心的文化，我认为，是一个让他们能够高效生产并与其他优秀人才交流的环境。
And if you have a culture which looks good on the surface, but somehow rejects super talented people or is just it's covering up for constant infighting, I think that can be a real problem. I think one of the things went on in the current 2017 Silicon Valley is it's very easy to get entitled employees. It's very easy to get entitled people out of company. Everyone wants to work with that guy. I want they want to be really rich right now. If the company is not going to get a good liquid next year, they're going to go somewhere else.
如果你所在的公司看上去文化良好，但是却拒绝了超级有才华的人，或者只是掩盖了内部不断的争斗，这可能会成为真正的问题。我认为当前的2017年硅谷发生的一件事是，很容易让员工产生优越感。很容易让公司里的人变得有点浮躁。每个人都想与那个人合作。我希望他们现在就变得非常富有。如果公司明年无法获得良好的流动性，他们会去别的地方。
We looked once at the average 10-year employees at companies in San Francisco. And I sort of couldn't believe it had been training down, down, down. I couldn't believe it was going to get any lower. And I managed to subsequently get lower. And so, you know, this idea of how important it is to have people that are going to join a company and stay there for five or ten years sounds like a crazy thing to say because no one does that anymore. And yet, somehow, at the best companies that does still happen. And I think if you think about what do we have to do to get the best people to stay at our company for five or ten years and then go make about the culture?
我们曾经研究过旧金山公司的平均十年员工，我简直不敢相信，培训一直在减少，减少，我不能相信它会更低，但事实上它确实变得更低了。因此，你知道，拥有那些愿意加入公司并在那里呆上五到十年的人是多么重要，虽然现在似乎没人这么做了，但最好的公司仍然能做到。如果你考虑我们需要做什么才能让最优秀的人留在我们公司五到十年，然后想想我们的文化，这听起来像是个疯狂的想法，但这确实很重要。
Which one of the things that is included in that is wild success for the company and the mission that people care about. That's really important. But getting people who are there for that and not there for the green tea, which is like an easy way people think about culture in the wrong way at the beginning is super important.
那个东西里面包括了公司的巨大成功和人们所关心的任务，这非常重要。但更重要的是，吸引那些真正关心公司使命，而不是只为绿茶而来的人，因为这是人们一开始对文化的错误认识，很容易被轻易忽略的问题。
You need to create an environment where really great people will want to come, work with each other and not have to deal with the crop that they do at most companies.
你需要创造一个环境，真正优秀的人才会想要来，在那里相互合作，而不必处理大多数公司所面对的挑战。
Just in case anyone's under illusions, I think very few people here, culture isn't benefits, culture isn't food, it isn't kombucha, right, etc. Unfortunately, that's what boards tell you when they come ask you how the culture is going. But it's not that. What it is is how are you holding each other accountable to the mission and to the way that you work and the way that you have high performance.
只是以防有人有错觉，我认为这里很少有人把文化视为好处，也不是食物，不是康普茶等等。不幸的是，当委员会来询问文化进展时，他们会告诉你这就是文化，但实际上不是这样的。文化是如何互相对于使命、工作方式和高绩效负责的。
One of the things that I think is super important for this is actually, in fact, I think two few organizations follow and what Hastings did in terms of creating a culture deck. The thing that's interesting is that the reason this deck got there and I actually think every company should do some version of that and some version of publishing it.
我认为非常重要的一件事情实际上是，我认为很少有组织像哈斯廷斯所做的那样，创建一份文化说明书。有趣的是，这份说明书的原因是，我认为每个公司都应该做出某种形式的文化说明书，并发布出来。
The reason Hastings did this is they first started with kind of studying how people bounce out. They interviewed and hired really good people and then they came in and they said, hey, we're not a family. We're not here forever. We're actually a team. We should basically kind of say if you have adequate performance, we give you a generous severance package and have you leave.
“Hastings这么做的原因是因为他们先开始研究人们是如何被辞退的。他们面试并聘请了非常优秀的员工，然后他们来了并说，嘿，我们不是一家人。我们不是永远在这里。我们实际上是一个团队。我们应该基本上说，如果你表现良好，我们会给你一个慷慨的解雇补偿，并让你离开。”
I do that immediately and people say, wait, wait, I always thought I was joining a family and I said, okay, well, let's define what it is. They wrote it and they said, well, how do we shape the funnel of people coming in? Let's publish it. Then, of course, after publishing it, it actually really helped a whole bunch of people understand like, oh, that's that kind of culture and should I work there and that's really, I really like the fact that they're shaped that way, that particular way of playing that particular sports team, that's the sports team, that's the right kind of thing for me.
我当时就立刻这样做了，人们就说，“等等，等等，我一直以为我是要加入一个家庭，我说，好的，那我们来定义一下它是什么。”他们写下来，然后说，“那我们该怎么塑造招募人才的漏斗呢？我们来发布一下。”当然，在发布之后，它真的帮助了很多人理解，像，“哦，原来是这种文化，我应该去那里工作，我真的很喜欢他们的玩法，这种运动队，那是我适合的类型。”
And I think many more organizations should actually be much more explicit about that because they don't talk about like, oh, we have cafeterias, we have volleyball court, that's not my culture deck as a way of doing this.
我认为许多更多的组织应该更加明确地表达这一点，因为他们不说我们有自助餐厅，我们有排球场，那不是我文化纲要实现这一点的方式。
The traditional problem, we see a lot of these value statements and culture decks and the problem is they're only valuable to the degree they're different from what other companies say. So, most of the ones we see, because we suggest that every company write this out and it's like, we value integrity, we value being a team player. Be excellent. Be excellent.
传统的问题是，我们看到很多这些价值观陈述和文化宣言，问题在于它们只有在与其他公司所说的不同程度有价值。因此，我们看到的大部分，因为我们建议每个公司写出这个，就像我们重视诚信，我们重视团队合作。要做得卓越。要做得卓越。
And so, I think this is a worthwhile exercise and it's good to do, but only to the extent that what you say is different from what other people would say. And trying to figure that out is really important. And what, honestly, what most companies find when they do this or what many companies find is that they have nothing to say that wouldn't be in sort of the macro-expanded template of what a culture is, what a good culture is. And that is often a wake up call and people go think about that.
因此，我认为这是一个有价值的练习，值得去做。但是，只有你所说的与其他人所说的不同才能称得上好。尝试弄清楚这一点非常重要。而大多数公司做这件事时，会发现他们没有什么可说的，因为这些内容已经被列入一个宏观、扩展的文化模板之中。这通常意味着需要一个警醒，引导人们去思考。
And when I talk to folks, I'm trying to get from the sharp in the mind is what filter would have A players working at other companies in yours? Which A players do not want working at your company? And what is that? And that shows you that you begin to have something that's kind of an edge in a culture and begins to approach the uniqueness.
当我与人交谈时，我试图理解的是哪些锋利的思维过滤器会让其他公司的A级员工想要加入你的公司？哪些A级员工不想要来你的公司？这是什么？这表明你开始在文化方面具有某种优势，并开始朝着独特性的方向发展。
Now, another part of scaling is hiring changes. So, classically, in your first 10, 20, 50, 150 people, founders, CEOs interview everybody. Right? Because part of the way that they try to help the culture say is they say they're doing that check. And in fact, you know, a Neil Busry, when I was talking to this, I think he and Dave Duffield interviewed everybody up to 500 because they were the final culture interview. They presume that everyone had done the skills and other kinds of things and they were the, are you the right fit? And that's super important. But your hiring changes as you scale.
现在，扩展企业的另一个部分是雇佣变化。所以，经典的做法是，在创业公司的前10、20、50、150人中，创始人和CEO都要面试每个人。对吧？因为他们试图帮助企业文化，并且通过这个方式来确保他们在适当的方向上。例如，当我与Neil Busry谈论此事时，他告诉我他和Dave Duffield面试了500个人，因为他们是最后一个文化面试者。他们假设每个人都具备了技能和其他方面的能力，而他们的任务就是确认，你是否适合我们。这一点非常重要。但是，随着企业规模扩大，您的雇佣方式也会发生变化。
That the process, again, what got you here doesn't get you there because now you need to start hiring a bunch more people. You need to be trusting people in the rest of your organization to hire well.
这个过程，再一次强调了让你到达这里的东西不能让你到达那里，因为现在你需要开始雇佣更多的人。你需要信任组织中其他的人来招聘合适的人选。
You need to be systemizing more like one thing as you begin to get from the, call it the hundreds into, you know, early hundreds into the late hundreds, you'll actually start having onboarding classes. Like when you, some say, okay, we hire people and then all 15 people start at the same day so that we train them on our company in the same pattern in order to make that efficient and so forth. And that's part of this whole kind of hiring process.
你需要更加系统化，就像当你从一两个人到几百人时，会开始有入职培训课程。像有些公司会在同一天雇用15个人作为新员工，来保持培训的高效性，让新员工都按照同样的方式来了解公司。这也是整个招聘过程的一部分。
So you also not only have to think about org but also how you're hiring, what's the way you're doing it and that itself is a scalable process, not just from sourcing and from interviewing but also all the way into integrating. Right, so that's another way to look at kind of the culture and hiring.
所以你不仅要考虑组织，还要考虑你是如何进行招聘的，采取何种方式，并且这本身是一个可扩展的过程，不仅限于搜寻和面试，还包括整合。对，这就是从文化和招聘的另一个角度来看的方式。
I'm going to shift topics to communications within the company. Classically when you're at an early stage, you're all in the same room. Communication's easy. Almost like on all hands is we just happen to all be in the same room at the same time and that's the way it works.
我要转换话题，谈谈公司内部的沟通。通常在早期，你们都在同一个房间。相互沟通很容易。就像大家都在同一房间里，所有人都可以随时交流，这就是工作方式。
Then you begin to build and part of that is that begins to shift to everyone has a complete dialogue to be on the same page and you have to start changing the pattern at which information is being both expected and communicated.
然后你开始建立，其中一部分是开始转变到每个人都有完整的对话来达成共识，你必须开始改变信息期望和沟通的模式。
And I actually found a Cheryl Sandberg anecdote to be particularly like it's not exactly of the communications pattern but it's the kind of communications pattern that shows you. Like when she started at Google, she celebrated everyone's birthday like on the day. And so everyone thought, oh, this is a really special place because we celebrate each of our birthdays.
我实际上发现 Cheryl Sandberg 的一个故事特别像，虽然不完全是沟通模式，但是它展现了一种沟通模式。比如她在 Google 开始工作时，每个人的生日都要在当天庆祝。所以每个人都认为，这是一个非常特别的地方，因为我们庆祝彼此的生日。
Well then you move to a 500 person organization and you're having birthday celebrations, you know, basically every day. Right. And that begins to get too much and so then they moved to selling birthday celebrations per month. Everyone whose birthday was in April, this is the birthday celebration and the whole thing and kind of doing that.
那么你加入了一个500人的组织，每天都会庆祝生日。这开始变得太多了，所以他们开始按月出售生日庆祝活动。每个人的生日在四月的时候，都会有庆祝活动，整个团队都会参与。
And then the people at the first part thought, this used to be special, it used to be personal, it used to be kind of closely connected. And now, right, it's not so special anymore. And so that's the kind of thing when you're planning for dinos and the same thing isn't true in terms of corporate communications because how you as leaders in the organization speak to folks, you're no longer going to be able to talk to everyone, no longer is everyone going to be able to ask you questions and you need to start figuring out.
然后，第一部分的人认为，这曾经是特殊的，是个人的，是紧密联系的。但现在，是吧，不再那么特别了。所以，当你计划dinosaurs时，这种情况就会发生，但在企业通信中，情况并非如此，因为作为组织领导者，你们与人们的交流方式将会改变，不再能与每个人谈话，也不再每个人都能问你问题，你需要开始思考解决方法。
And also by the way, there's now a whole bunch of inflation, certain key risks, executive decisions, not everyone's going to know. And you have to condition to, this is still a great place even as that's changing and then also the structure of those communications. And that's actually an important thing about thinking about the change of leadership. I don't know if there's anything on the comm stuff you want to add.
顺便提一下，现在有很多通货膨胀、一些关键风险、高管决策，不是所有人都会知道。你需要适应这个变化，同时也要注意这个地方仍然非常好，要考虑沟通结构的变化。这其实是思考领导变革的重要问题。不知道你有没有关于通讯方面要补充的内容。
Certainly when you get to the stage where people that were used to knowing everything, don't know everything. I think more early employees leave over that than anything else. And it's really tough to say what to do about that. It's people that have gone from being sort of absolutely in the inside to not. That leads to a huge amount of turnover. And I think it's worth thinking for actively. Is this someone's special enough that I'm going to somehow include them in the executive team? But that is, I don't think people talk about how much of an effect that has on early employees. But in my experience, when you really talk to someone about why they're leaving, you know, someone that joined this employee five of a super successful company now is 500 people, that's almost always a huge part of the reason.
当你到了那个阶段，那些习惯于知道一切的人，却不再知道每件事情时，肯定会出现问题。我认为，早期的员工由于这个原因而离开的人比其他任何原因都要多。但我也很难说该怎么做才好。因为这些人曾经处于公司内部的核心地位，现在却不再是了。这种变化导致了大量的人员流失。我认为这值得我们积极思考。这个人是否特别重要，值得我将他们纳入执行团队中？但我觉得人们很少谈论这对早期员工有多大的影响。但根据我的经验，当你真的和一个离开的人谈论为什么要离开时，比如一个从五个人的超级成功公司加入后，现在公司已经扩大到了500人的人，这几乎总是一个主要原因。
And I think sometimes you can address it sometimes you can't. I have a hack for that because it's important. And actually I hadn't realized I've actually not spoken about this hack before. I think it's an important thing. When I realized this in early days linked in, what I did is I arranged a regular lunch with some of those key contributors in kind of some different lunch groups. And just where we had lunch and could talk about the company. So they still felt that they had an inside conversation. Wouldn't be they know everything.
我有一个方法，因为这很重要，所以有时候你可以解决问题，有时候你却不能。事实上，我之前从未谈到过这个方法，但我认为这是一个很重要的事情。当我在领英早期意识到这一点时，我组织了一些关键贡献者的午餐会，并分成一些不同的午餐团体，让他们可以谈论公司。这样他们仍然感觉自己有内部的讨论，而不是一切都知道。
I wouldn't sit down and go, oh, come on, I'm a brief you about everything. But there's a conversation about how, like I'm thinking about the company, what the risk are, what kind of challenge was doing, what are they seeing, what's going on with the culture. And so, and that actually, I think, gave longer. Yeah. So, it's of the special thing, even as the organization got a lot bigger. I can't, I mean, not 100% sure who told me this. I think it was Brian Chesky. He used to spend, there still does spend like 20 of his 30 nights a month taking key Airbnb employees that don't report to him out to dinner. And it's just like, let's talk. I'll tell you about stuff. And he's super open. So he'll talk about a lot. And I think like that level of commitment, like, I'm going to take 20 of my 30 nights a month and use it to sort of keep close to early people who otherwise sometimes still out of the loop is huge.
我不会坐下来说“噢，来吧，我会给你介绍一切”的。而是会探讨公司的风险、挑战、他们正在看到什么，以及企业文化的现状。这实际上会占用更多时间。即使公司规模变得越来越大，这仍然是一件特别的事情。我不是100%确定是谁告诉我这件事，可能是布莱恩·切斯基。他通常每个月有30个晚上，会花费其中20个与那些不向他报告的关键Airbnb员工共进晚餐并交流，他非常开放地谈论各种事情。我认为这种承诺程度非常高，他会花费自己30个晚上中的20个来与早期的人保持亲密联系，否则他们可能有时还处于局外人的状态，这非常重要。
The other thing on communication that people get wrong as you scale, I wish I was supposed to go to questions, so I'll make this a short point, is how much time you have to spend repeating the same message? So a lot of people like want to say at one all hands, once here's the company's strategy, they assume everyone's going to remember that.
关于沟通，当你扩大规模时人们犯的另一个错误是，他们不清楚需要花费多少时间去重复同样的信息。很多人想在一个全员会议上宣布公司战略，然后就假设每个人都会记得这个信息。但事实上，这是不现实的。
And they don't want to keep talking about it. And every nervous laughter of acceptance all throughout the room. You just have to keep doing it. And one of the things that founders will often say to us is even though they knew that advice, it's like the rule on software. Like no matter how long you think it will take, it's going to take longer. Even if you know you're supposed to do this a lot, you won't do it enough.
他们不想继续谈论这件事。整个房间充满了紧张和接受的尴尬笑声。你只需要继续做下去。创始人们经常说的一件事是，即使他们知道这个建议，它就像软件的规则一样，无论你认为它需要多长时间，它都会需要更长时间。 即使你知道你应该经常这样做，你也不会做得够多。
All right. So I'm going to say one very quick thing and then we're going to go to questions, although we can keep talking if you like, but we have about eight and I meant for questions. The other key thing is to decide when you really need to hit the gas because part of what the blitz scaling stuff is you actually deploy capital in a fast and inefficient way in order to get to scale and or global scale.
好的，所以我要说一件非常快的事情，然后我们就转向问题了，尽管如果你们愿意的话我们还可以继续聊，但我预先安排了大约八个问题。另一个关键点是要决定何时真正需要加速，因为闪电扩张的一部分就是以快速而低效的方式投资，以便实现规模和/或全球规模。
And sometimes that's competition, sometimes that's market opportunity, sometimes that's critical mass, density, and networks. But one of the key things is what are the different judgment points at which you're hitting the accelerator on scale and then trying to anticipate that in good ways. And there's, you know, those tend to be the variables in which you think about it, but that's another thing to think about in the scale.
有时候这涉及竞争，有时候是市场机会，有时候是关键质量、密度和网络。但其中一个关键点是在什么不同的判断点上，你在扩展规模时加速，然后尝试以良好的方式预测它。你们思考的变量往往是涉及这方面的，但在扩展规模时还有其他需要考虑的事情。
Are we done? So with that, people are always tempted to do this halfway. And I think like you should, that the entire company should be aligned. Like, are we in the mode where we are testing? Are we in the mode where we're trying to make things work? Are we testing growth channels? In which case we can do some things, but we're still going to try to be really efficient to conserve capital higher, reasonably slowly?
我们做完了吗？因此，人们总是有些动摇，只做到一半。我认为，整个公司应该保持一致。例如，我们是在测试阶段吗？我们是在试图让事情起作用的阶段吗？我们正在测试增长渠道吗？在这种情况下，我们可以做一些事情，但仍然要高效地保留资本并慢慢稳健地发展。
Or are we in the mode where we got things to work and we know what to do? And we are now going to like spend money at an unreasonable rate because there's this time period. And I think it's really dangerous to be in the middle zone and it's also really dangerous to have some people in the company think you're on one or some people think you're on the other.
我们现在是处于做好了事情并知道该怎么做的模式吗？然后我们现在要花费不合理的速度来花钱，因为有这样的时间期限。我认为处于中间区域非常危险，也非常危险有些人在公司认为你是这样，或有些人认为你是另外一样的。
And it's the subset of this question. If you go around the company and ask everyone for their top three priorities, or to explain the company's mission, almost no company can do that. And have everyone say the same thing. But this like, are we in hyper scale mode or not? It's very rare that one company has a cohesive opinion on that and that they all flip at the same time. Thanks.
这其实是这个问题的一个子集。如果你走遍公司，问每个人他们的前三个优先事项，或者问他们解释公司的使命，几乎没有一家公司能够做到。而且所有人都会说同样的话。但这就像，我们是处于超级规模模式还是不是？很少有一家公司在这件事上有一个一致的意见，并且所有人都同时转变。谢谢。
So you talked about, we got to be prepared for change in chaos as we scale. But what are the key stabilizing elements for the invariance that keep the organization together as you scale?
所以你谈到了，我们必须准备好应对随着规模的扩大而带来的变化和混乱。但是在规模扩大的过程中，保持组织稳定的关键要素是什么？
Well so one as we mentioned is culture. Another is the question, generally speaking, changes of mission or really bad so the mission should also be there. So to some degree everyone is we're in service to the mission, not we have this role in the specific organization. And then generally speaking, changes to strategy are very expensive. They frequently happen, pivots, etc. But it tends to be the, this is the investment thesis and set of hypotheses that we're testing out.
好的，所以我们提到的一个是文化。另一个是问题，一般来说，使命变化或者真的很糟糕，那么使命也应该在那里。所以在某种程度上，每个人都是为了使命服务，而不是在特定组织中有这个角色。然后一般来说，策略的变化非常昂贵。它们经常发生，转折等等。但它往往是投资论点和我们正在测试的假设集。
What tends to not be as much as is like, okay, this is what the exact org structure is, these are what the exact team structure is. Sometimes you go to market may go from, like for example, if you're an enterprise business, may change from the, we're getting our initial customers to, we're really scaling out. Sometimes it may be the, like for example, one of the things that linked in it is we're virality but then we also move to SEO as a component, we add that in a strong thing and that will change but those are rare changes in terms of the chaos.
通常不太多的是，好的，这是确切的组织结构，这是确切的团队结构。有时市场营销会从一个阶段转变到另一个阶段，例如如果你是一个企业业务，可能会从获取我们的初始客户到真正扩大规模。有时，我们可能会加入某些元素，例如 LinkedIn之一是病毒式营销，但我们也将SEO作为一个组成部分，这是一个强项，并且这些变化很少会造成混乱。
I don't know what you, you know, people like winning, people like the lighting, customers, people like it if there's just this like masked man in this huge upward draft behind what you're doing. One of the reasons I think why trying to hyper scale a company that is not winning fails is because without that, then all of these problems of people having their turf stepped on and you know the occasional bad hire you have to get out.
我不知道你，你知道的，人们喜欢赢，人们喜欢灯光，客户，人们喜欢只有一个蒙面人在你做事情的背后有一个巨大的上升气流。我认为尝试对一家不赢利的公司进行超级规模扩张失败的原因之一是因为没有了这个，那么所有这些人们领地被侵犯的问题和你知道的偶尔的坏雇主你必须解雇都会出现。
People have a lot of time to like think about how unhappy those things make them. And if things just keep getting better and there's like more opportunity then you can possibly take on and that everyone's constantly has like new expanding roles and so they don't get caught up in these turf wars then it works.
人们有很多时间来思考那些让自己不开心的事情。如果事情不断变得更好，有更多的机会可以抓住，每个人不断扮演新的角色，并且不会陷入争夺领土的斗争中，那么就能够奏效。
But I think this is one of the reasons it's so important to not flip into hyper scaling mode until you're pretty sure the product is working because without this natural updraft of like a market that is desperate for your product and a feeling that like everyone is winning every day and the company is doing just fantastically well then all of the things that go wrong when you try to blitz scale can break the company. So I think the key thing for me is don't try to do this until you're confident you have this updraft.
我觉得这就是为什么在产品运作良好之前，不要过于追求超级扩张，因为如果没有这种完全需要你产品的市场的自然推动力，也没有人人都赢，公司运作得很好的感觉，那么当你试图一鼓作气地扩张规模时，所有的问题都会对公司造成破坏。所以对我来说，关键是在你有了这种推动力之前，不要试图去做这件事。
Yeah and I think by the way there's a slight softer mod which is obviously winning keeps a lot of focus on it which is really good. The possibility of playing the game to win is really what you must always have. Like if you lose that things begin to break. Just how you stop blitz scaling.
嗯，顺便说一下，我认为有一个稍微柔和一些的模式，显然是获胜，它能保持很多关注点，这真的很好。玩游戏赢得胜利的可能性确实是你必须一直拥有的。如果你输了，事情就开始瓦解了。就像你如何停止闪电扩张。
I feel like financial discipline is such a hallmark of some companies that to give it up for six months, 18 months however long it may be and then to come back to it seems like it might be hard. Brutal in fact. It's one of the things where you always have to know that ultimately you have to get to a rational comparable business where you're actually in fact working on efficiency. All companies ultimately get back to that in some way.
我感觉财务纪律是一些公司的代表，放弃它六个月、十八个月或更长时间，然后再回到它似乎可能很难。事实上是残酷的。这是一件你必须始终知道的事情，最终你必须达到一个理性可比的商业水平，真正地在效率上努力工作。所有公司最终都会以某种方式回到这一点。
Now you can have such a geyser of money that you can have many parts of your company that are not working efficiently. We all see a few of those iconic companies. But generally speaking you'll need to get back to efficiency. The question is that one of the key things I think in both startup and scale up is solve problems at the time.
你现在可以拥有这样一大笔钱，以至于你可以有许多公司部门运作不高效。我们都能看到一些具有代表性的公司的情况。但总的来说，你需要回归高效。问题是，我认为在初创和扩张过程中，关键的一点就是及时解决问题。
Don't try to pre-solve them. It's like the hiring thing. Don't try to hire that scale executive from that giant company X when you're 30 people because that scale executive probably doesn't know what to do in a 30 person organization unless the unique talent. Similarly we say we know we're going to need to be operational efficient. We know we're going to need to be, you know, focus on operating margins and how costs work and how scale works and everything else in a capital efficient model but not yet.
不要试图提前解决它们。就像招聘的事情。当你的公司只有30人时，不要试图从巨型公司X中聘请那些规模的高管，因为除非该高管有独特的才能，否则他可能不知道在30人组织中该如何做。同样，我们知道我们将需要提高运营效率。我们知道我们将需要关注运营利润率以及成本如何运作、规模如何运作等方面，并建立一个高效的资本模型，但现在还不行。
Right. You just be thinking about it. This piece, this piece, this is how we're fine to it. This is how I get to it. But you don't need to start that problem at the very beginning when you're in a blood scaling circumstance. And it's brutal to change though.
没错。你只需要考虑这个问题。这篇文章，这篇文章，这就是我们如何应对的方式。这就是我处理它的方式。但当你处于一个尴尬的局面时，你不需要从最开始解决这个问题。然而要改变这种情况是相当残酷的。
Yeah. I think it's important to say, you know, for the leader to say to the company what you're willing to overpay for and why. So it may be that, you know, it's really important to get to a network effect. It's really important to sort of, yeah, you know, turn up marketing enough so that you're in enough people's minds because you need people to sort of all at once decide this product is okay but that's for a short period of time.
是啊。我认为领导向公司表明他们愿意为何支付过多的东西是很重要的。这可能意味着，你知道，到达网络效应非常重要。它真的很重要，要足够推销，这样足够多的人会记住你的产品，因为你需要人们同时决定这个产品是可行的，但这只是在短时间内发生的。
The one mistake that I think companies really make in this is they decide that they need a lot of people. They can't get them and so they're going to just like double salaries or triple set. They're just going to like start way overpaying for people. And that's the one that seems impossible to turn back down in practice.
我认为公司在这方面一个真正的错误就是他们认为需要很多人。他们得不到这些人，所以他们决定要加倍或者三倍的工资待遇，他们就会开始给人们极高的薪水。但这个错误在实践中似乎很难挽回。
But if you can stay disciplined on that and just say for a short period of time we're going to overspend in these areas for this reason because we need to get to scale before the business starts to work. I think you can generally then unwind that or rein it in somewhat but it's very hard.
但如果你能保持纪律，只是为了一个短时间的目标，在这些领域超支，因为我们需要在业务开始运作之前达到规模。我认为你通常可以解决这个问题或在一定程度上严格控制它，但这很难。
And frequently one of the questions that can be in consumer internet especially enterprise needs to identify this earlier than consumer consumer. Sometimes we'll overly obsess with operating margins early when it's actually in fact get to scale then obsess with our operating margins because if you're not at scale your operating margins don't matter.
经常有一个问题在消费者互联网特别是企业需要早于消费者去识别，而有时我们会过分关注运营利润，而实际上只有在规模上达到后才应过分关注我们的运营利润，因为如果你还没有达到规模，你的运营利润就不会有太大的意义。
So scale first. Now it's not that you stop thinking about operating margins but you kind of go when do we actually affect take that as one of our primary projects that we're really actually working on. It's as you get to scale and by sequencing it out and getting people to know hey we will be working on this we will care about this it's not that it's irrelevant which is not working on it now then that can make the brutal change a little easier.
先让我们扩大规模。现在并不是说要停止考虑运营利润，而是要思考我们什么时候可以将这作为我们真正关注的主要项目来实现。随着规模的扩大，并且通过逐步推进，让人们知道我们将会关注这个问题，这并不是说现在不重要，而是让这个残酷的变革变得更加容易。
Right that's part of it.
对，这是其中的一部分。