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The Bank Panic Is Already Over (Here’s Why) | John Maxfield

发布时间 2023-04-04 15:17:00    来源

摘要

John Maxfield, banking specialist and author of the Maxfield on Banks Substack, joins Jack to discuss the history and future of the U.S. banking system. Drawing on his wide-ranging historical knowledge, Maxfield notes that when it comes to banks, failure is the norm, not the exception. Maxfield argues that the acute phase of the banking panic in the U.S. is likely over, as loan yields will rise and deposit flight will slow down. Maxfield makes the case that, paradoxically, a serious cause of bank failure is not just not enough liquidity: often banks fail because there was too much liquidity. Maxfield and Farley take an in-depth look at Silicon Valley Bank’s enormous influx in deposits, which more than tripled since the first quarter of 2020, which they used to buy an enormous amount of securities that lost value as the Fed raised rates. Filmed on April 3, 2023. ____ Follow John Maxfield on Twitter https://twitter.com/MaxfieldOnBanks “Maxfield on Banks” Substack: https://maxfieldonbanks.substack.com/ Follow Jack Farley on Twitter https://twitter.com/JackFarley96 Follow Forward Guidance on Twitter https://twitter.com/ForwardGuidance Follow Blockworks on Twitter https://twitter.com/Blockworks_ ____ Use code GUIDANCE10 to get 10% off Permissionless 2023 in Austin: https://blockworks.co/event/permissionless-2023 Research, news, data, governance and models – now, all in one place. As a listener of Forward Guidance, you can use code GUIDANCE10 for a 10% discount when signing up to Blockworks Research https://www.blockworksresearch.com/ ____ Get top market insights and the latest in crypto news. Subscribe to Blockworks Daily Newsletter: https://rb.gy/5weeyw Market commentary, charts, degen trade ideas, governance updates, token performance, can’t-miss-tweets and more. Subscribe to the Blockworks Research “Daily Debrief” Newsletter: https://rb.gy/feusos ____ Timestamps: (00:00) Intro (03:14) "Failure Is The Rule, Not The Exception" When It Comes To Banking (06:51) Diagnosing Silicon Valley Bank's (SVB) Collapse (16:45) Excess Liquidity Is The Problem, Not The Solution (22:58) "Interest Rate Risk Can Be As Deadly As Credit Risk" (27:04) Permissionless (28:08) Some Banks' Unrealized Losses Exceed Book Value (36:22) Is The Bank Panic Over? (John Says Yes) (39:51) "Banks Will Always Make Money" (44:33) Will Banks Decrease Their Lending? (52:17) Blockworks Research (53:15) How Did Banks' Manage Their Interest Rate Risk? (58:02) Assumptions About Deposit Duration Play A Key Role In Asset Liability (Mis)Matching (01:05:03) About The Maxfield On Banks Substack (01:07:40) Parallel To The Savings & Loan Crisis (01:10:55) Big Banks Get Bailed Out, Small Banks Don't (Unfair?) (01:11:47) Executive Compensation And Bank Performance (An Inverse Relationship) (01:13:27) Bank Insolvency Is Not Necessarily A Death Sentence (01:21:01) What Banks Need To Learn From SVB's Collapse ____ Disclaimer: Nothing discussed on Forward Guidance should be considered as investment advice. Please always do your own research & speak to a financial advisor before thinking about, thinking about putting your money into these crazy markets.

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I am joined by John Maxfield, banking expert and author at the Maxfield on banks substack. John, welcome to Forward Guidance. How are you doing? I'm doing great, Jack. Appreciate it. Glad to hear it.
我和银行专家、Maxfield on banks substack的作者John Maxfield在一起。约翰，欢迎来到Forward Guidance。你怎么样？我过得很好，杰克。谢谢。很高兴听到这个消息。

John, we're recording the afternoon of April 3rd. So it's been a few weeks since the fall of Silicon Valley bank. So we can sort of get out of the sort of, you know, fog of war, everything is happening at once and maybe have some longer term reflections. I first want to start out, I want to get you what, what do you think is going to happen next? But how would you, how have you made sense over the past month? You know, I know you focused a lot on history. Would you say this is more like 2008, more like 1990s or something that's more vanilla and not that big deal?
约翰，我们现在是四月三日下午正在录制。硅谷银行倒闭已经有几周了，现在情况已经慢慢明朗了，我们可以做一些更长远的反思。我首先想问问你，你认为接下来会发生什么？在过去的一个月里，你是如何理解事情的？我知道你关注历史，你认为这更像2008年，还是90年代，或者只是一些格外普通的事情，不值得大惊小怪？

It's a big deal, right? But like for the people who were involved, right? Anybody impacted it would be obviously a really big deal. But like stepping up, you know, a million miles from the perspective of like the banking industry and what this all means. And all of that, I would say that, you know, we've had nine major banking panics in the history of the United States.
这可是很大的事情吧？但对于涉及其中的人来说，肯定是非常重要的。任何受到影响的人都会感到非常重视。但是从银行业的角度来看，这距离很远，意义确实非常大。总的来说，我想说的是，美国历史上有九次重大银行恐慌。

So 1819, 37, 57 civil wars, a big panic, 73, 90, 18, 93, the Great Depression, the 80s, and then the financial crisis. Okay, so those are those are the big ones. And so what happens there is those are followed by long periods of time where the economy is depressed. There have been probably 20 smaller panics since the beginning of the country. And the ones that are best known are the panic of 1907 when JP Morgan locked a whole bunch of people in his library until like all these bankers decided to help the other banks in town. And then that took care of that. So like there's there's there's fewer issues for a few days than that dissipated the issues. And then there's a one in 1884.
1819年、1837年、1857年的内战、一场大恐慌、1873年、1890年、1918年、1933年的大萧条、1980年代以及金融危机。好的，这些都是大事件。接着，经济就会进入一段长时间的萧条期。自从国家成立以来，可能已经有20次较小的恐慌。而最为著名的，就是1907年的恐慌，当JP摩根把一大批人锁在他的图书馆里，直到所有银行家决定帮助镇上的其他银行，才解决了这个问题。这样就有几天问题少了，这些问题也就逐渐消失了。还有一个是1884年的。

And that one was predicated by the failure of a company called Grant and Ward. Grant Ward was like a brokerage company like a Wall Street kind of like investment bank brokerage company, but it was named after President Grant. Like he was literally a partner in this in this in this in this in this firm. So, but again, then the government came in with a whole bunch of stimulus took care of it. And then that kind of like dissipated the panic. And so, you know, if you where this will fall in the history of kind of panics and stuff like that is on that side like the 1884 one or the 1907 one. It's like, you know, they are the government was able to come in and take care of it before cause seems to be the case at least before causing significant economic damage.
那个事件是由一家名叫Grant and Ward的公司失败所引起的。Grant Ward是一家经纪公司，类似于华尔街的投资银行经纪公司，但它以格兰特总统的名字命名。事实上，他在这家公司中的确是一名合伙人。不过，后来政府介入并提供了大量刺激措施，解决了问题。这缓解了人们的恐慌情绪。所以，就像1884年或1907年那些历史上的恐慌事件一样，政府能够在经济遭受重大损失之前介入并解决问题。

So what's your outlook going forward? I mean, do you think that more banks will fail the they won't fail? I mean, you've got a great chart from Maxfield on banks showing just how the number of failure failed banks and how it really peaked into 1800s and even in 2008 to his 9th and 10. And we didn't get to you know, where we were into the 19th century, even one or two more failed banks would still be a huge deal. So what's just what I look going forward and why.
那么你对未来的前景有什么看法呢？你觉得更多的银行会失败还是不会失败？我的意思是，你有一张Maxfield提供的关于银行数量的图表，显示了失败银行的数量如何在1800年代达到峰值，甚至在2008年出现第9和第10个。即使我们没有回到19世纪的水平，一个或两个失败的银行仍然是个大问题。那么你未来的展望是什么，为什么呢？

The thing to know about banking is that failure is the rule not the exception. So, you know, I've kind of collected as much data as on this as I can I've kind of built out a data set going on the back the beginning of the country and what you what I found is that there's roughly like 18,000 banks that have failed. And that's super conservative because there's like voids in the data like in between the revolution in the Civil War, like there's certain states that didn't collect very good data all that kind of stuff. So this really conservative let's just call it 18,000 and then let's maybe I don't know another faith 7000 because there's 22,000 mergers. Let's call it say 7,000 of those are potentially mergers in lieu of failure.
银行业要知道的是，失败是常态不是例外。所以，你知道，我已经收集了尽可能多的数据，构建了一个数据集，从国家的开始到现在，我发现大约有18,000家银行破产了。这是非常保守的估计，因为数据中有空白，比如在革命和内战之间，有些州没有收集到很好的数据等等。所以，我们就保守估计为18,000家，并且再加上大约7,000家合并而非破产的银行。

So it's called 25,000 failures in the past, right. There's about there's less than 5,000 banks today. So that means that a bank is five times more likely to fail than it is to succeed. So that that's an important thing to keep in mind. So yes, you should always anticipate that there will be more bank failures. And the question is why, why are there bank failures, why are banks of prone to failure. I guess I was just laying this out like they are more prone to failure. They're about I think it's like 30 to 40% more prone to failure than your typical business. If you take an average through a full cycle.
所以说过去发生了25000次失败，对吧。现在大约只有不到5000家银行了。这意味着银行失败的可能性是成功的5倍。这是一个需要谨记的重要事情。所以，是的，你应该总是预计会有更多的银行失败。问题是为什么，为什么会有银行失败，银行为什么容易失败。我想我只是把它描述成它们更容易失败。如果你通过一个完整的周期计算平均值的话，它们的失败率大约是普通企业的30%到40%。

And the reason they are well, there's two kind of broad reasons one is that they are very, very vulnerable to errors that they commit to unforced errors really, really vulnerable and they're vulnerable because one they use a lot of leverage. So 10X leverage. Like Washington Mutual failed only 3.4% of its or I think a 3.4, 3.6% of its loans were on non performing. So it's got like a 96 and something on its test and it's still failed, right.
他们之所以很脆弱，有两个主要的原因。一个是他们非常非常容易犯错误，这些错误是无需迫使的，非常容易犯。他们之所以脆弱是因为他们使用大量的杠杆。例如，华盛顿互助银行只有3.4％或3.6％的贷款不良，所以它在考试中得到了96多分，但仍然失败了。

So that means that you're borrowing deposits, right. Your deposits, you're borrowing those, but those can be taken at any point in time. Right. And so if you, you're like, you never have all the cash on hand that you need to satisfy all your depositors. So if there's a run, I mean, there's a liquidity crisis. It just happens really quickly. So that's the second reason.
那么这意味着你在借贷存款，对吗？你的存款，你在借贷那些，但这些可以随时被取走。对。如果你，你从来没有手中所有需要满足所有存款人的现金。如果发生抢购，就会出现流动性危机。它发生得非常快。所以这是第二个原因。

Third reason is that when a bank, so when you look at a bank balance sheet, like, you know, whatever 60, 70% of it is made up of loans, right. Well, a loan is you mean to make the loan this period at this time and then it goes, goes, goes, goes, goes, goes. And then there's a hopefully payoff. Well, during this whole period of time, you have very little sense. I mean, you can, you have sense, but like, you don't know if the loan is good until it's paid off. And so you have this opacity in your cost of goods sold. And so you can like make a whole bunch of loans and you see this all the time, make a whole bunch of loans. They're all going just fine. And people like, oh, our loans are great. But then they're not. And so it's like a red herring almost it causes that. So there you have that vulnerability to the mistakes, do the consequences of mistakes.
第三个原因是，当银行贷款时，当你查看银行资产负债表，大约60%到70%都是贷款。贷款是指你打算在这段时间内进行贷款，然后贷款将会继续存在，持续不断直到最终收回本金为止。在这整个过程中，你几乎没有什么预测能力，也就是说，你是无法确知这笔贷款是否优质的，直到最后收回本金才会知道。因此，你的成本费用变得不透明。这样，你就会像往常一样进行大量贷款，当时所有的贷款都看起来正常良好。人们会很自豪地说，我们的贷款都很好。但最后结果却是不及时的。所以，这往往是一个诱人上当的机会，结果是对错误的后果非常脆弱。

And then the other major point part of this is that you're also very prone to make the mistakes in the first place. And that's because you can grow a bank as fast as you want, because there is literally an infinite demand for credit. And if there's something that we know about humans is that they want, you know, the rewards in the short term, not the long term. Right. Your point about credit bank loans right now on a credit basis look quite good because it's always backward looking. So even though we've had these outflows, it's the loans themselves, people are people are still paying them down. But as you mentioned, that can always change.
然后这个问题的另一个主要部分是你非常容易犯错误。这是因为你可以以任意速度发展银行，因为信贷的需求是无限的。而我们知道人类总是想要短期的回报而不是长期的。所以，现在从信贷基础上来看银行贷款还是比较好的，因为它总是回顾过去的。即使我们有了这些资金的流出，人们仍然在偿还贷款。但正如你所提到的，情况随时都可能发生改变。

And how would you characterize the fall of Silicon Valley bank signature bank. You mentioned three, four reasons why banks can fail. What reason was where those. I think it's easy to look at Silicon Valley bank and be like, that isn't an anomaly. Right. Cause like, like, off top of your head, Jack, do you know of any other banks that are failed like that? No, I mean signature bank. It's kind of kind of kind of signature bank. Yeah, I mean, right. The bank of the United States in the 1930s.
你会如何描述硅谷银行签名银行的倒闭？你提到了三四个银行破产的原因，其中哪一个就是签名银行的原因。我认为看硅谷银行就像是一个例外，并不是什么奇怪的事情。因为，想象一下，杰克，你知道有哪些其他的银行像它一样破产了吗？没有，我是说签名银行。这种银行的例子还有美国在20世纪30年代的银行。

So now you see now that's the New York in you see that's good. So that the best for every no.
现在你看到了，这就是纽约，你看到了，这很好。因此，这是每个人的最佳选择。

So the bank United States, it's failure is the thing that caused the great depression. That transfer transform a large recession into the great depression, because that's the thing that triggered all the bank or a lot of the bank, the major, major, major bank runs when it failed in December of 1930. And it was not a central bank, not the first bank or the second bank in the United States. It was, that was just a misnomer. Because maybe it says give people confidence that it was safe, because it's the bank of the US.
美国银行的失败是造成大萧条的原因。这种转移将一场大萧条变成了大萧条，因为这是导致所有银行或许多主要银行在 1930 年 12 月倒闭的原因。它不是美国的中央银行，也不是第一家或第二家银行。这只是一个误称。可能是因为它被称为美国银行，让人们相信它很安全。

But, but okay, John, let's go back to 2023. I have to remember the year there. Yeah. Yeah. You were, you were saying Jack had you know of any other banks that failed like that. And it was tough for me to come up. Yeah.
好的，好的，约翰，让我们回到2023年。我得记起那年。嗯，嗯。你说杰克是否知道还有哪些银行像那样倒闭。这对我来说很难想到。嗯。

And so, okay, keep this in mind. Remember, there's 18,000 failures that we know of, confirmed failures on the record. And there's like a dozen reasons the banks fail. So what does that mean? It means that like for every bank that fails today, there's probably hundreds. Maybe thousands of banks that are failed for the same damn reason in the past. Okay. And so, so you think about the buckets. You put probably all these different buckets and like the biggest bucket that causes bank there is commercial real estate.
那么，好的，记住这件事。记住，我们知道的已经有18,000个失败记录，这些失败已经得到确认。银行破产的原因可能有十几种。那这意味着什么呢？这意味着，今天每个破产的银行，大概有成百上千个银行因为同样的原因在过去已经破产了。所以，你要考虑到这些分类。将它们放入不同的分类中，而导致银行破产的最大分类是商业房地产。

Commercial real estate. I'm just like it gets, I mean, I don't know if it's 70% or 75% but we're talking like a healthy majority of bank voters that caused by commercial real estate. In fact, the first failures in the country because in the 18 or 90 or cause by commercial real estate. That's not what this was, right?
商业房地产。我想说的是，银行投票者中有70%或75%是由商业房地产引起的，这是一个相当大的数目。实际上，这个国家最早的倒闭事件是在18或90年代由商业房地产引起的。但这不是我们现在要谈论的吧？

What this was was you had a company that goes out and gets a ton of money. Okay. It's a ton of money that's floods in. And they say, what are we going to do with this money? Right. What are we going to do this money? Because they have to do presumably they have to do something with it because they are 60 billion and ask and deposits going into the going into 2020. Then they got they grew 130 billion just inflow of deposits. So they tripled in size as a result of that.
这是这样的，你有一家公司，去获得了大量的钱。好了，有大量的钱涌入了。他们说，我们要用这些钱干什么呢？对吧。因为他们必须做些什么，因为他们60亿的存款要流入2020年。然后，他们收到了1300亿的存款流入，因此规模扩大了三倍。

So if you just leave that money and do nothing with it, you leave it in cash. Well, you still have to service that money. You still have to service those customers. So you're still absorbing the cost of servicing them, but you're for going the revenue. Right. So what does that do? That causes your return on assets to drop precipitously. Right. And like, look, if you're a bank and you're a private bank and I say it's the John and Jack bank, we own 100% of the bank that doesn't matter. Like we can like, we'll just let it drop. It doesn't, you know, we'll still make money. We just not as much and like, we just got to get through this.
所以，如果你只是把钱留在那里，什么都不做，那你就把它放在现金里。嗯，你仍然必须为这些钱服务。你仍然必须为那些客户服务。所以你仍然会吸收服务成本，但是你会放弃收入。对。那么这会发生什么？这会导致你的资产回报急剧下降。对。就像，如果你是一家银行，而且你是一家私人银行，我说是约翰和杰克银行，我们拥有100%的银行股份，这并不重要。就像我们会让它掉价，这并不会影响我们的盈利，只是我们的盈利没那么高，我们只需要度过这个难关。

But if you're publicly traded bank and you're you do not own a controlling interest in that bank, you're kind of at the whims of like other people telling you what they think you should or shouldn't do. You know what I mean. And so, you know, that that's kind of an element of play.
如果你是一家上市银行，但你并不拥有该银行的控股权，那么你就有点像受制于别人的心情，他们告诉你应该或不应该做什么。你知道我的意思。所以，你知道，这就是一个潜在因素。

So what did it do? It went out and it bought. So in deposits. A lot of people think that like deposits are an example of borrowing short and lending long. They're borrowing short because it, you know, you have you, but the deposit can go get that money whenever they want it. They have the option to get it every time. But in many cases, they don't. In many cases, they keep that there for 10 years or 50 years. That's right.
那它做了什么呢？它走出去买了。所以存款。很多人觉得存款是短期借款和长线贷款的例子。他们是短期借债，因为存款人随时可以取钱，他们有这个选项。但在很多情况下，他们不会取。很多情况下，他们会把钱存在那里十年或五十年。没错。

And so a deposit is like a non-interesting deposit is actually one of the longest term, longest duration liabilities on the bank balance sheet. In fact, I made the longest duration liability on the bank balance sheet.
因此，存款就像银行资产负债表上最长期、最长时限的非利息负债之一。事实上，我在银行资产负债表上造成了最长期、最长时限的负债。

And so what do banks do? They match the duration of their liabilities with the duration of their assets. And so in Silicon Valley is sitting there thinking like, well, what are we going to do? Let's match the duration. So they go and they buy long term a whole bunch of less $70 billion or something like that long term mortgage back securities. Okay. And so what and then it got caught because the interest rates go up and the value of those things go down and then you have people valuing those and saying that bank is insolvent. And so let's run on it. Let's go get our money for everybody else does.
那么银行做什么呢？他们会将其负债与资产的期限匹配。所以在硅谷，人们会想，我们该怎么办呢？让我们匹配期限。他们会去购买长期、价值不到70亿美元的抵押贷款证券。好的，然后呢，当利率上升，这些证券的价值就会下降，人们会对其进行估值，说银行已经破产了。那么我们就让大家都去取款吧。

So what you have there, you have a mismatched type of like a failure as a result of duration, right? Because there are way too long interest rates go up. So you look in history and long hold.
所以你手头持有的是一种类型不匹配的失败，这是由于时间跨度过长导致的，对吧？因为利率上涨的时间太长了。所以你要研究历史并长期持有。

There's a bunch of banks that have failed for this very same reason. The 23rd largest bank in the country in 1980 was the biggest bank in Philadelphia was called first Pennsylvania bank. And it did the same thing in the late 70s is run by this guy named John Bunting. He was a real character.
有很多银行由于同样的原因而失败了。1980年全国第23大银行是费城最大的银行，名叫第一宾州银行。在70年代末它也做了同样的事情，由名叫约翰·邦廷的家伙运营。他是一个真正的人物。

Like their interest rates are going up because we're in their indigestrian crisis. So John Bunting is like let's see they can't go much further like let's buy a bunch of long bonds. And bet that they're going to go down. So he loaded up their balance sheet with these long bonds. They didn't go down because then Paul Volcker came in and jack him up up to nearly 20% that thing that thing that's it first Pennsylvania.
他们的利率上升了，因为我们处于他们的工业危机中。所以John Bunting说让我们看看它们不能再涨了，买一堆长期债券并赌它们会下跌。所以他用这些长期债券来填充他们的资产负债表。但它们并没有下跌，因为Paul Volcker进来后将它们抬升到近20％，这是第一宾夕法尼亚州的事情。

And then the arms of the FDIC and then again early early in the 70s. Same exact thing with the bank right outside of Detroit that did the same thing but with mean with municipal bonds. So again, you see these things over and over and over again in time. And first Republic owns some municipal bonds. So a lot of bank run is present at many instances of a bank failure.
然后是FDIC的武器，再次出现在70年代初期。底特律外的一家银行也做了同样的事情，但使用市政债券。所以你会发现这些事情一次又一次地出现在历史上。第一共和银行也拥有一些市政债券，所以许多银行崩盘的情况中都存在着银行运营问题。

That's on the liability side when you said the 12 13 reasons that banks fails. And then you talk about commercial real estate versus the securities. That's on the asset side important to draw a distinction there.
当你提到银行失败的12个13个原因时，那是在负债方面。然后你谈到了商业房地产和证券之间的区别，这在资产方面非常重要，需要加以区分。

And yeah, as you say Silicon Valley bank had a huge influx of deposits in 2020 2021, 2022 as the IPO initial public offering machine was getting worrying and a lot of tech companies who received that money they bank their venture capital money was flooding in. And these companies are unprofitable and this is sort of my theory and they you know they're going to be constantly withdrawing money unless new funding is coming in from venture capital and initial public offers that wasn't a problem in 2021 but it was in 2022.
是的，就像你所说，硅谷银行在2020、2021、2022年有大量存款涌入，因为首次公开募股机器开始让人担忧，很多科技公司拿到这些钱后，他们银行的风险投资资金也涌入了。而这些公司是无利可图的，这是我的一种理论，他们会不断取出钱，除非有新的风险投资和首次公开募股的资金进入，这在2021年并不是一个问题，但在2022年却是。

Okay, so this argument that this observation that rising interest rates, especially when they're very quick can hurt banks and cause bank failures. I decided several examples from the 70s and 80s and Silicon Valley bank that in some way contradicts or challenges the notion John that you know I've heard I've said I've heard on many TVs that rising rates are good for banks.
好的，这个论点认为当利率上升，特别是上涨非常快的时候会伤害银行并导致银行倒闭。我提出了七十年代和八十年代以及硅谷银行的几个例子，这些例子在某种程度上与约翰的想法相矛盾或挑战了这个想法，即我听过很多人在电视上说升息对银行有好处。

Are they well depends on your asset sensitive reliability sensitive if your asset sensitive that is great if your liability sensitive is horrible. And what I mean by that is that if it's assets sensitive the yield on your assets is going to outpace and rising rate environment yielding assets is going to outpace the yield on your liabilities. It's the opposite of your liability sensitive and so that's a bank can be a bank can be positioned however I want a bank wants to be positioned.
他们状态如何要看你资产敏感性和可靠性敏感性。如果你资产敏感，那太棒了，因为在升息环境下，收益率高的资产将超过负债收益率。反之亦然。这是一家银行可以根据自己的意愿定位的原因。

There's there's there's derivative instruments or I mean all is he whatever you want you can do the smart thing is to be neutral the smart thing is to be neutral because there's one thing we know it's that nobody can predict this stuff and see just you just stay neutral you earn a healthy return on equity and just move on down the road.
有衍生工具，或者说，你可以随意选择，但明智之举是保持中立。因为我们知道的一件事就是，没有人能够预测这些事情，所以你只需要保持中立，就能获得健康的股本回报，然后继续前行即可。

What is going on what is the what's the root cause of all of this what is the root cause of all this well how would you say the root cause is of all this rising rates large influx of liquidity in 2020 quantitative easing that caused banks. To then you increase deposit because they bought back the securities at the fed bought so m2 went up you know that's the chart that everyone's talking about and now I'm to use negative.
发生了什么？所有这一切的根本原因是什么？所有这一切的根本原因是什么？嗯，你如何说出这一切的根本原因是什么？2020年流动性大量涌入，央行的定量宽松政策导致银行增加存款，因为他们回购了央行购买的证券，因此M2上升，你知道这是每个人都在谈论的图表，现在我要使用否定语。

And the volatility you know this happened over 60 years maybe would be okay but over two years it's quite extreme am I am I close. The liquidity you're right on with the liquidity so if you go back to like 2001 2002 after September 11th what the Federal Reserve do drop the drop the the interest rate weight really low right and I'm really low compared back then I mean the high compared to what we were experiencing the last few years but like.
你懂的，这种波动性可能60年来没问题，但在两年内它就很极端了，我说的对吗？关于流动性，你说得没错，如果你回到2001年或2002年9·11事件之后，美联储采取了降息的措施，至少对当时的情况而言，它的水平非常低，虽然与最近几年相比还是高的。

And so then you see this OCC start issuing these bulletin and they're like it's basically telling the banks like we know we dropped it that they're interested to really low and where you started to notice a bunch of you guys doing silly stuff with your securities portfolios reaching for yield like don't do that you go back it's it you see this over and over and over and over again through history but the best story of this is that in 1836 when Andrew Jackson.
所以你看，这个 OCC开始发布这些公告，基本上告诉银行们，我们知道我们将它降到了非常低的水平，于是你开始注意到一堆人在玩他们的证券组合，寻求收益的方式很愚蠢，不要这样做，回去吧。这样的情况在历史上反复出现，但最好的故事是1836年的安德鲁·杰克逊。

Got rid of the second bank of the United States okay so it's like they basically central bank kind of like it was different but it's basically simple bank he is on a 20 year charter. The congress affirmed or voted in favor of its recharging with an Andrew Jackson vetoed that vote and got rid of that bank so what they did is they took on money in that bank and they distributed it to what they called pet banks.
把美国第二家银行给废除掉了，就像他们基本上是中央银行，有点不同但基本上就是普通银行，持续20年的特许证书。国会批准了或者赞成了它的续约，但是安德鲁·杰克逊否决了那个投票，并且废除了那个银行。所以他们把那个银行里的钱拿出来，分给了他们称之为宠物银行的银行。

And in New York City, the pet banks for mechanics bank bank of America, although a different bank of America than what we think of Bank of America today, and I can't remember the third bank was, but then you know what happened all two out of those three banks all done came with damn dear within failure and there's this great quote in this newspaper article about this from back in 18 1837 and it was that in it is oftentimes harder to bear prosperity than it is to bear adversity.
在纽约市，有三家银行，分别是为机械银行服务的宠物银行、不同于今天我门认为的美国银行的银行以及我记不起第三家银行是哪一家，但你知道发生了什么：这三家银行中两家走向了可怕的破产。在1837年的报纸文章中有这样一句伟大的引言，它告诉我们：繁荣往往比逆境更难承受。

And like that if there's one kind of contextual way to think about all of this stuff that's the way to think about it is that when there is a when there is the presence of abundance the presence of extreme or promise of extreme prosperity that is when the stupid stuff happens. And so the issue was not that liquidity was pulled rapidly that may have been the proximate issue, but the prime cause was the huge influx of liquidity there so liquidity itself is a problem too much liquidity.
如果要用一种上下文思考所有这些东西的方式，那么思考的方式就是当存在丰富、极端或极端繁荣的承诺时，愚蠢的事情就会发生。因此，问题并不是流动性被快速抽走了，这可能是直接的问题，但主要问题是流动性的大量流入，因此过多的流动性本身也是一个问题。

Yeah, I think what just Charlie Munger says like a little bit of liquidity is good but too much is bad for humanity or something that is detrimental to humanity. I mean yeah because you have all I mean you think about every system is a system that goes in and out of equilibrium in a sense right and so you think about society and then cash like we're it's always were kind of like moving towards equilibrium so you have you dump a whole bunch of stuff on top like you go out of equilibrium.
是的，我认为查理·芒格说的话，适度的流动性对人类有益，但过多则有害于人类。我的意思是，是的，因为你拥有所有的我，我的意思是，你想想每个系统都是在某种意义上进入和走出平衡的系统，所以你考虑社会和现金，我们总是向着平衡移动，所以如果你把一大堆东西倒在上面，就会失去平衡。

And so then you have to find your way back into equilibrium, and so when you think about like what just happened with Silicon Valley bank and signature and and and and silver gate like yeah that was a little thing but that was a little thing at the beginning of a much much bigger thing that that liquidity search that we had during the coronavirus pandemic that is going to be the thing that defines the next 50 years in in finance maybe longer 30 years 40 years 50 years 60 years 70 years.
所以，你必须找到回归平衡的方式。所以，当你想起硅谷银行、星河银行和银盛银行发生的事情，那只是一个小事，但那只是一个更大的事情的开端。在冠状病毒大流行期间的流动性危机将定义未来50年、甚至更长的金融业。因此，我们必须想方设法回归平衡。

You don't know, but these cycles can last the cycle before this lasted from seven 1973 until let's call it 2013 so that one lasted you know whatever that was that was 40 years the cycle before that lasted for 100 years. And so like we're at the very beginning of this new cycle and and and that's how significant that amount of liquidity was liquidity can be many different things but in this case it's just a huge rise in deposits for a variety of reasons and if you look at JP Morgan's.
你可能不知道，但是这些周期可以持续很长时间。上一个周期从1973年持续到2013年左右，持续时间长达40年，再往前一个周期则持续了100年。我们现在处于一个新周期的开端，而且这个时期的流动性非常显著。流动性有很多不同的含义，但在这种情况下，它指的是各种原因导致的存款大幅上升，如果您看一下JP摩根的数据。

All bank America all banks deposits pretty much every bank exploded higher in in 2020 and 2021 for a variety of reasons you can get into, but why is it itself that a problem when I have you know everyone's giving me money at 0% and so I have everyone's deposits and I can let it out at 2% 3% 4% 6% I can reach when you said reach for yield I can reach up for yield by taking credit risk or I can reach out for yield by taking duration risk.
所有的美国银行、几乎每个银行的存款在2020年和2021年都爆发了增长，原因千奇百怪，但是问题是当我告诉你每个人给我0%的钱，我有每个人的存款，我可以放出去2%、3%、4%、6%的利率，如果你说要追求收益，我可以通过承担信用风险或者持有时间的风险来获得更高的收益率。

It is the latter that Silicon Valley bank did and that was a very bad risk to take given that the Federal Reserve Jack interest rates up by 400 75 basis points in about a year which leads us to say very few people were expecting.
硅谷银行选择了后者，这是一个非常冒险的决定，因为联邦储备委员会在大约一年内将利率上调了400 75个基点，这导致我们说几乎没有人预料到这种情况。

That's right I mean so let me make a point about liquidity so it's not just so there's two as I have come to think about it there's two tight in this context there's the need to think about liquidity into two context okay to kind of two buckets okay there's liquidity that's already within the system that's like already within the US economy right it's already here it just sloshes around from you know from one place to another place to another place right that's fine I mean like that that is all that that's the aggregate amount is in the moving towards equilibrium.
没错，我的意思是，让我谈一下流动性的问题。这不仅仅是一个问题，我已经开始认为有两个问题需要考虑。在这个背景下，有两个方面需要考虑流动性——需要把流动性分成两个部分。第一个部分是已经存在于系统中的流动性，即已经存在于美国经济中的流动性。它已经在这里了，从一个地方到另一个地方到另一个地方流动，这是可以接受的，总量移向平衡状态。

Where you come into a situation like this where it like will define a new era is when you haven't the introduction of novel liquidity flows right so novel new so in in from another system so let's say Europe to the United States that's what has happened back in 1870s and that's what caused that that huge 100 year cycle or you can move out of the system and into another system that what happened in the 70s when the oil crisis caused the same.
当你遇到像这样定义一个新时代的情况时，其中一个关键因素是新的流动性来源的引入。比如说，从欧洲到美国的引入就是1870年代发生的事情，它引起了100年的变革周期。或者，你可以移出当前系统，进入另一个系统，就像在70年代发生的石油危机一样。

Indeed 90s when the oil crisis caught like totally switched around kind of the trade patterns in the in the global trade patterns and money sort of flowing out of the United States as opposed to in to the United States so that's what caused that second that that when from 73 to base was called 13 and so another type of novel liquidity.
90年代的时候，石油危机迎头赶上，彻底改变了全球贸易模式，资金流出美国而不是流入美国，这就是导致从1973年到1983年被称为13年基础期的第二个因素，形成了另一种新的流动性。

And that's the type I like to think about is it comes up through the ground like a geyser. And that's what like the Federal Reserve just creates out of thin air, like there's a monetary policy or deficit spending by the government, then that money is then immediately inserted into the economy. So like that is another type of powerful liquidity, a novel liquidity.
我喜欢的那种流动性就像间歇泉一样从地下冒出来。联邦储备系统创建出来的就像凭空产生的，就像货币政策或政府赤字支出，那些钱马上进入经济中。这是另一种有力、新颖的流动性。

And so that's what we have. And so that's the type that you need to think about when you're thinking about like what defines, you know kind of like, and that has a big impact on the economy.
所以这就是我们所拥有的。所以这就是你在考虑如何定义时需要考虑的类型，这对经济产生了很大的影响。

And now I've like gone off on my monologue and I've forgotten your question. My question is why is it a problem when there's a huge influx of liquidity?
现在我自言自语地说话，忘记了你的问题。我的问题是为什么流动性大量涌入会成为一个问题呢？

Oh, my the bank of John and Jack swelled by $100 billion, that sounds like a great problem to have. Why is that a problem?
哦，约翰和杰克的银行增加了1000亿美元，听起来像是一个很棒的问题。为什么会是个问题呢？

It's a problem because that money's got to go somewhere. The money has got to go somewhere, right? And so if your system is within equilibrium or close to equilibrium, then where's the money gonna go?
这是个问题，因为这笔钱必须去一个地方。这笔钱肯定要去一个地方，对吗？如果你的系统处于平衡或接近平衡状态，那么这笔钱会去哪里呢？

All that new money gonna go. You're gonna have to go out on the risk spectrum, right? And so you think about like, okay, the financial crisis, like so the financial crisis was the last hurrah of that liquidity research started in the early 70s, okay?
那么这些新资金将去往哪里呢？你必须冒更多的风险，对吧？因此，你会想到，好的，金融危机，就像金融危机是70年代初开始的流动性研究的最后一声欢呼，对吧？

What brought it about? Well, it was about what subprime mortgages, right? Subprime mortgages, why were subprime mortgages such a big deal? Well, some people had figured out how to secure type subprime mortgages. And so they thought they got rid of the risk because you get spread across the country.
是什么导致了这种情况？嗯，与次级抵押贷款有关，对吧？为什么次级抵押贷款成为了如此重要的问题？嗯，有些人已经想出了如何获得次级抵押贷款。所以他们认为，通过在全国范围内分散风险，可以消除风险。

And you have no concentration, all that kind of stuff. So you have the securitization. Well, why did the people making those securities, make those securities? They made those securities because they were so damn much money and it needed to go somewhere.
你没有专注力，这种事情都做不好。所以你有资产证券化。那么，为什么那些制作证券的人要制作证券呢？他们制作这些证券是因为有这么多该死的钱需要去某个地方。

And it was all this money that was in like the conference of Saudi Arabia and as well, all these oil producing countries that made all of that money when oil prices jacked up in the 70s and stayed there ever since, they needed that to go somewhere. And the US has the deepest and largest capital markets in the world. So that's where it came. So they needed to make securities to find that home.
所有这些钱都像沙特阿拉伯会议一样来自石油生产国，自从70年代油价飙升以来，它们一直保持在高位。它们需要将这些资金用于某些地方。美国拥有最深、最大的资本市场，所以它们就流入了那里。因此，它们需要创造证券来寻找它们的家。

So what it does is it just pushes you way out on the risk spectrum. Yes. But now the securities that were bought that were causing a lot of problem that are sitting on some bank balance sheets, they are not subprime mortgaged back securities, you're tied together into CDOs, not credit risk.
它的作用就是把你推向更高的风险范围。是的。但现在那些被购买的证券不是次级抵押贷款支持证券，而是被捆绑在CDO中，不涉及信用风险。

They are given to you by Jenny May, Fannie May, all of these government agencies. So the credit risk is not really a problem, really at all. It is interest rate risk. Is that significant?
这些是由珍妮梅、范妮梅和所有这些政府机构提供给你的。所以信用风险实际上并不是问题，真的不是问题。问题是利率风险，这个重要吗？

And you also tied it back to the 70s and 80s. Like what happened in the Volker era? I mean, first Pennsylvania failed. Yeah. Like duration risk or interest rate risk, like it can be as deadly as credit risk. You know what I mean? It can be as we saw. You know, it can be just as deadly.
你还把它与70年代和80年代联系起来。就像沃尔克时代发生的一样？我的意思是，宾夕法尼亚州首先失败了。是的，就像持续时间风险或利率风险一样，它可以像信用风险一样致命。你知道我的意思吗？正如我们看到的那样，它可以同样致命。

And so like, if anything, it'd be more so because on credit risk, you don't know how much money you lost, but actually people can't really, you know, it could be worse, but people don't know it. But in interest rate risk, it's like, you bought paper that yields 3%, and now interest rates are at 7%. Finance 101, I put it in my calculator, I know exactly how much money you lost.
所以如果有什么的话，它更是如此，因为在信用风险上，你不知道失去了多少钱，但事实上人们真的不知道，这可能会更糟，但人们不知道。但在利率风险方面，就像你买了3%的债券，现在利率是7%。金融101，我把它放进我的计算器，我知道你失去了多少钱。

Oh, the money that you lost is more than the book value or equity of your entire company, your insolvent bank run and so's.
哦，你损失的钱比你整个公司的账面价值或股权还要多，你的银行已经无法偿付了。

Well, and here's another kind of anecdotic kind of like to throw into the mix. So there was a bank that failed in January 16th, 2009, okay? Is the first failure of that year. And that year was the, that's when failure, the failures really jacked up.
好的，我这里还有一个有趣的趣闻想分享一下。2009年1月16日，有一家银行破产了，这是当年的第一宗倒闭案件。那一年，银行倒闭的数量开始激增。

I think they're 145 or something failures that year, and then the next year they're 1502 or something like that. Okay, so that's a heart of the failures of financial crisis, okay? And this was a really peculiar one because what it had done is in 2003, four, six and seven, it had said, you know what, interest rates are really low.
我觉得那年他们失败了大约145次，之后的一年失败了1502次左右。所以，那就是金融危机的失败核心，对吧？这是一次非常特殊的危机，因为在2003、2004、2006和2007年，它曾说过，你知道什么，利率真的很低。

Like I was saying, those bulletins at the OCC was releasing, like saying, like don't do stupid stuff with your portfolio. So one of the things that regulators like, well, why don't you just go buy preferred shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? I mean, there's an implicit government guarantee.
就像我刚才说的那样，OCC发布的那些公告，例如，不要在你的投资组合中做愚蠢的事情。所以监管机构喜欢的一件事情就是，你为什么不去购买房利美和房地美的优先股呢？因为有着隐含的政府担保。

I mean, like, what is it? John, I read that on Maxila Banks today in preparation for this interview. I didn't realize that the regulators encouraged them to buy that. The regulators encouraged them.
我是说，就是那个，约翰，我在准备面试时今天在马克西拉银行读到了这篇文章。我没有意识到监管机构鼓励他们购买。监管机构鼓励他们。

Yeah. And so whenever there's a failure, and remember the bank failure that will cost either the greater up, $25 million, or 2% of the banks, the failed banks assets, there needs to be what's called a material loss review.
是的。所以每当发生失败时，记住那个银行失败的事情，这将造成更大的损失，2500万美元，或者该银行失败的资产的2％，那么就需要进行所谓的实质损失评估。

And the material loss review isn't done by the FDIC, but it's instead done by the Office of the Inspector General of the Treasury Department. And so they go through and they look at why did this thing fail? And then they say, well, what did the regulators do and did the regulators act appropriately?
材料损失审查不是由FDIC完成的，而是由财政部的监察长办公室完成的。因此，他们会审查这个事情为什么失败了？然后他们会想，监管机构们做了什么，监管机构们是否适当地行事了？

So the idea is that you have this kind of neutral party in there kind of assessing everything that went on. And I've read, I don't know how many dozens or hundreds of material loss reviews, but it is the only one that's sympathetic to the individuals, because everybody was like, these things are safe. They're safe, they're safe, they're safe, they're safe.
所以这个想法是，在那里有一个中立的组织，评估发生的一切。我读过很多次的材料损失审查，但这是唯一一个对个人表示同情的审查，因为每个人都认为这些东西很安全。它们安全，安全，安全，安全。

So these guys are like, the interest rates have been dropped because green sand drop in September 11th, so they're looking for yield. That's the highest yield that they can get on what seemed to be super duper safe securities. So they get them, and here's what this, and then Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac are then, I'm gonna get promoted by the government on September 7th, I think, in 2008. And then when that happens, Hank Paulson has a joint press release with a guy named, I think, is a lock art, I think is this is the last name, Josh Lockhart or something like that. He's the head of this new thing that's gonna oversee Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
这些人说利率因9/11导致绿色沙的下降而降低，所以他们在寻找收益。这是他们在看似非常安全的证券上获得的最高收益。于是他们获得了这些证券，然后才出现了这种情况。接着，Fannie Mae和Freddie Mac在2008年9月7日被政府提拔，并且Hank Paulson与一个名叫洛卡特的人一起发表了联合新闻稿。我认为他姓洛卡特，名叫约书亚·洛卡特或类似的名字，他是这个新的机构的负责人，将监管菲尼梅和弗雷迪·马克。

And they come out and they say, look, basically, they don't say we're wiping out the equity, but they say, look, common comes last, preferred comes right before that. So we're just putting that out there, basically saying, they're saying, but not saying that we're wiping out the equity. And the next two sentences they say, we know a lot of community banks hold this stock.
他们出来说，基本上，他们没有说我们正在抹去股本，但他们说，普通股股东排在最后，而优先股股东排在其前面。因此，基本上，他们在说，但没有直言我们正在抹去股本。接下来他们说的两句话是，我们知道很多社区银行持有这些股票。

And there's only a couple of them that hold them in significant amount, but we're aware of that. And so I just think about, these guys who ran this bank, many women who ran this bank, we're probably watching that press release. And when they said that sentence, they must have been like, we're screwed, because they had, it was like 277% of their tangible common equity, that's the size of their position in Fannie and Freddie stock. I mean, it just obliterated that thing overnight. It's just like up and up and smoke.
只有几家银行拥有大量的房地产企业抵押资产支持证券，但我们已经注意到了这一点。我会想到，这些银行的管理者，包括许多女性，都在关注这则新闻发布。当他们听到那个句子时，一定感觉自己完了，因为他们手中持有的房地产企业抵押资产支持证券占了其实际共同股本的277％。这个新闻可能在一夜间让他们的头寸完全消失，就像烟雾一样。

Hey there, sorry to interrupt announcement. Blockworks is hosting an event called Permissionless in September. It's a crypto event. It's in Austin, Texas. We did permissionals in 2022. It was the biggest and best defy event in the world.
哎，对不起打扰一下。Blockworks将在九月份举办一个名为“无需许可”的加密货币活动，在德克萨斯州奥斯汀市。我们在2022年举办了“需许可”活动，它是目前世界上最大最好的 defy 活动。

And this year lightning will be striking twice. Historically, our ticket prices have gone up about 10 times from the day the tickets go live to the day before the event. If you're like me and bad at math, that's 900%. So it might be savvy for attendees to consider buying tickets now rather than later.
今年闪电将再次袭来。历史上，我们的门票价格从售票日到活动前一天大约涨了10倍。如果您像我一样数学不好，那就是900％。因此，与其等到后来再购买门票，参加者现在考虑购买可能更明智。

If you're listening to this and you're saying, hey Jack, I'm not really into this whole crypto thing. I wanna hear about the Fed, I wanna hear about the dollar Bretton Woods 345. I hear you. I'm not telling you to buy a ticket and the interview will resume momentarily.
如果你正在听这个，然后说，嗨Jack，我对加密货币这一整个事情并不是很感兴趣。我想听听联邦储备系统，我想听听布雷顿森林协议345关于美元的情况。我听到你了。我不是告诉你要买门票，采访马上就会继续。

However, if you are into the crypto thing and Permissionless is something you might want to attend, what I'm saying is there's no time like the present because tickets will go up and if history is any guide, prices will go up a ton. Anyway, the link is in the description and you can get an additional 10% off by using code guidance 10. Thanks, let's get back to the interview.
如果您对加密货币感兴趣，并且希望参加Permissionless活动，我想说的是，现在正是最好的时机，因为门票价格将会上涨，如果以往的历史是任何指引的话，价格将会涨得很高。无论如何，链接已在描述中，使用代码guidance10您可以额外获得10%的折扣。谢谢，让我们回到采访。

There are some pretty alarming charts out there if you put the data together as people have about the unrealized losses on banks balance sheet. It's not just Silicon Valley bank and as a percentage of book value equity, tangible book value, whatever you wanna say.
如果你将人们已经整理好的数据放在一起，关于银行负债表中的未实现损失，那么就会出现一些相当令人担忧的图表。这不仅仅是硅谷银行的问题，而且作为账面价值股本、有形账面价值的百分比，你可以说是任何银行。

And in some cases, it's true. Correct me if I'm wrong, and I'm not just talking about Silicon Valley bank that the unrealized losses exceed the book value, meaning that Mark to market if the bank had to be liquidated tomorrow, it would be your Mark to market insolvent. Is this true? How worried should we be about it? Are there a plethora of examples throughout history of, oh yeah, that bank was Mark to market insolvent, but it still is with us today.
有些情况下是真的。如果我说错了，请纠正我。我不仅仅是指硅谷银行，它的未实现损失超过了账面价值，这意味着如果这家银行明天需要清算，它将是你的按市场价值计算的无力偿还债务。这是真的吗？我们应该对此有多担忧？历史上是否有许多这样的例子，比如那个银行当时破产了，但是今天仍然与我们共存？

How big of a problem is this? So first of all, I'm not somebody who thinks that I wouldn't recommend anybody be worried. I just not gonna do anybody any good. So let's start with that. But yes, there are some banks that when you mark there, so important to know, and I know you know this distinction, but there's two, you can hold, you can designate securities in one of two ways.
这个问题有多大？首先，我不认为我会建议任何人不担心。这样做是无益的。我们从这里开始吧。但是，确实有一些银行，当你标记它们的时候，很重要知道，我知道你知道这个区别，但有两种方式可以持有或指定证券。

One is available for sale, and if you designate them available for sale, you're just constantly marking them to market, right? As you're coming out with your balance sheet. Or which means, oh, you know, interest rates went from zero to three percent, we're marking it down from a hundred cents in the dollar to 87 cents in the dollar. And that's reflected in, is that reflected in that income or in book value or both?
有一件物品可供售，你如果指定它们可供售，你就是不断地标示市场，对吧？当你在制定财务报表时。这意味着，哦，你知道，利率从零增加到三个百分点，我们将其从每百分之一百的价值降低到每百分之八十七的价值。这反映在收入中还是账面价值中，抑或两者都反映？

I'm not an accountant. But it's either gonna hit your tangible book value or it's gonna hit your net income. Okay, so it's gonna be one of those.
我不是会计师，但我可以简单解释一下。这可能会使你的有形账面价值或净收入受到影响。所以，情况可能是这两种情况之一。

It need the one of them is good. Yes. But in the other bucket, it's called whole to maturity. And those securities are, you do not mark, you do not change the value of those securities on your balance sheet, because the idea is that look, if these are riskless securities, IE like government, US government bonds, right? And you're gonna hold them until they mature, when you're gonna get the value of the bond when it matures. So you don't need to adjust it, you know?
需要的是其中一个好的。没错。但在另一个桶里，它被称为到期全额。那些证券，你不要标记，不要在你的资产负债表上改变这些证券的价值，因为这个想法是，如果这些是无风险的证券，比如美国政府债券，你会一直持有它们，直到它们到期时你会得到债券的价值。所以你不需要进行调整，知道吗？

And so, and that's where like, you know, your banks with big bond portfolios, that's where they'll put their bonds a lot of times, right? For that very reasons, because you don't want that volatility. And so this is what I would say about, should you be worried and all this kind of stuff? We don't want our banks, market their bond portfolios to market. We don't want our banks, market their loan books to market, because you go through these cyclical patterns. That's just part of humanity. You go through these cyclical patterns, and if you're market and market everything, they all fail every time. Every time, every time, every time.
所以，你知道的，银行有大量债券投资组合，这就是他们经常放置债券的地方，对吧？因为你不想要那种波动性。所以关于你是否应该担心之类的问题，我会说什么？我们不希望我们的银行将债券投资组合市场化。我们也不希望我们的银行将贷款组合市场化，因为你会经历这些周期性的模式。这只是人类的一部分。如果你将市场化的话，每次都会失败。每次，每次，每次。

You want your banks to fail, all the banks to fail every time. You know, you want the banks to fail every time. Like this is kind of an accounting fiction that they've created to like make it possible to run these highly leveraged institutions through kind of the vicious cycle that the United States financial system is. Right. So it needs to happen if hold a maturity, it wasn't happen, you know, very few banks would exist to you.
你希望所有的银行每次都破产。你知道，你希望每次都发生银行破产。这似乎是他们创造的会计虚构，旨在通过美国金融系统的恶性循环来管理这些高度杠杆化的机构。对的。因此，如果不发生这种情况，很少有银行能为您存在到到期。

1929, 1933 would be every single day. Sure, but you said it's a fiction. It is a fiction. I mean, it kind of, right? It kind of is, right? I mean, like, yeah. Yeah, I mean, because it gives, it's like if you sold it, you're marking it at $100. If you sold it now, you'd get $0.80 on the dollar.
1929年和1933年是每一天。当然，但你说它只是虚构。确实是虚构的。我的意思是，是有点虚构，对吧？就是说，是的。是的，我的意思是，因为如果你售出它，你标价100美元，但如果你现在售出，你只能得到80美分的收益。

And I'll note in non-financial corporations, including financial corporations, such as Berkshire Hathaway, if they hold equities, they have to mark those to market. You know, if there's a SPAC that has a warrant liability, they can mark those up and down every single quarter. So banks are giving, being given a special exemption, but you're an insurance company too, probably. You're saying that they need the exemption?
我会注明，对于非金融企业和包括金融企业在内的企业，例如Berkshire Hathaway，如果他们持有股票，那么他们必须将其标记到市场价值。如果有一个SPAC有担保责任，他们可以每个季度上调或下调它们的价值。因此，银行们得到了特殊的豁免，但你可能也是一个保险公司。你是说他们需要豁免？

I'm saying we need it. Yeah, okay. I'm saying the US economy needs it, okay? Because this is a country that like, these are not banking issues, okay? These are fundamental economic issues. These are what we think is important for the US, for the, for our country. And so one thing that we think is important is being safe, having a strong military, right? Like, that's really important. You have China coming up, like, you don't know, we don't know what they're right, what their plans are. You know, I mean, like, we want to be protected. Well, military's are not cheap, right?
我是说我们需要它。是的，好的。我是说美国经济需要它，好吗？因为这个国家的问题不仅仅是银行问题，而是基本经济问题。这是我们认为对美国、对我们的国家很重要的事情。所以，我们认为重要的一点是要安全，要有强大的军事力量，对吧？这非常重要。中国在崛起，我们不知道他们的计划是什么。你知道，我们想要得到保护。但是军队不便宜，对吧？

You got to have a strong economy is the key to a strong military, okay? So now what makes a strong economy, okay? Well, you just break down economic growth, right? Is it labor, capital, and productivity coefficient, okay? Like, we can only do so much with labor. You know, that's just like, we let so many in a year, and like we have birth rate and death rate, oh, that kind of stuff, right? Like, that's your labor. It's the capital where you can really juice your growth, right? And who is the primary provider of capital? It's banks. And why are banks the primary providers of capital? Because they use 10X leverage.
你要有一个强大的经济才能拥有一个强大的军队，明白吗？现在什么能构成一个强大的经济呢？好的，我们来分解一下经济增长，对吧？那是劳动力、资本和生产力系数，对吧？我们只能在有限劳动力的情况下做到这么多。你知道的，我们每年只让这么多人进来，我们有出生率和死亡率，那种东西，对吧？就像这就是你的劳动力。它是资本可以实质性推动增长的地方，对吧？谁是资本的主要提供者呢？是银行。为什么银行是资本的主要提供者呢？因为他们使用10倍杠杆。

And so like that, if as a country, we say, you know what, economic growth is not that important. A big powerful military is not that important. We'll take our chances. Yeah, I mean, like, let's not ignore these fictions. And let's like, let's punish all the banks like for like having so much leverage. But if I would suspect most people prefer this be safe, that I mean, I see your point, John, but just for the sake of argument, you could say if you we have these held to maturity conventions, banks can feel safe by parking the, you know, securities that would trade at $0.85 or $0.78 on the dollar at $100, banks feel safe.
那么，如果我们作为一个国家说：“你知道吗，经济增长并不那么重要。一个强大的军队也不那么重要。我们就看看运气吧。”，那么就不应该忽视这些虚构的东西。我们应该像对待银行的杠杆一样惩罚所有的银行。但我认为大多数人更喜欢保险一些。我理解你的观点，约翰，但就讨论的角度而言，如果我们遵循这些到期约定，银行可以把那些价值85或78美分的证券以100美分的价格卖出，并感到更安全。

And so they buy a lot of bonds. And so there's a moral hazard. I'm not the biggest fan of most moral hazard arguments, but I actually do see that could be a case, right? Oh, what's the problem? I'll just put it up market at $100. Yeah, but I mean, so would you say that should banks mark to market their loan books? If bank A has a tons of agency mortgage-backed securities that their value get 100 and then interest rates go from zero to 4.75, so interest rates go. So yeah, the calculation is, it's not easy, but it's to be done, but a mortgage book is so complicated because it's, you know, individual mortgage, individual mortgage, individual mortgage, but there are an interest rate component there, right?
所以，他们购买了大量的债券。因此存在道德风险。虽然我不是最大的道德风险支持者，但我确实认为这可能是个问题，是吗？哦，有什么问题吗？我只需要把它在市场上标价 $100 就好了。是的，但我的意思是，你认为银行们应该将其贷款账簿按市场价值核算吗？如果 A 银行拥有大量机构抵押债券，它们的价值为100，然后利率从零上升到4.75，这样利率上升了。所以，是的，计算并不容易，但必须要做，但是抵押贷款账簿非常复杂，因为它们是个人的抵押贷款，每个都不一样，但是其中有一个利率组成部分，对吧？

I mean, mortgage-backed securities built up at the same thing as mortgages, so maybe it makes sense. I don't know. I mean, I don't know, huh? A bond and a loan are the same thing. They're the same exact thing. It's the same thing, you know what I mean?
“我的意思是，以抵押物为基础的证券和抵押贷款是一回事，所以也许有道理，但我不确定。我的意思是，我不知道，对吧？一张债券和一笔贷款是一样的。它们完全一样。就是这个意思，你知道我说的是什么。”

So here's the alternatives. Like, if you think about, they say, okay, well, let's say we go down the market market road on everything or even just on all the securities, right? What would that mean? Well, banks would have to sit with a lot more capital. They'd have to sit with a lot more capital. And so what is that going to do? That's going to reduce your return on that capital. And you're also, there's going to be a transitionary period where it's kind of your level setting to having a much more capitalized banks and that is going to have an appreciable difference on your growth rate. And so everything, like anything can be done. This is a democracy, I mean, although like our politicians are kind of clownish, but like, you know, we, these are choices that we get to make.
这里有一些替代方案。比如说，如果你想想，他们说，好吧，假设我们在所有证券上或者仅仅在市场市场道路上走下去，那会意味着什么？银行们将不得不持有更多的资本。这将降低你的资本回报率。而且，会有一个过渡期，在这个时期，你的资本水平会被平衡到更多的资本化银行，并且这将对你的增长率产生明显的影响。所以，任何事情都能被完成。这是一个民主国家，虽然我们的政客们有点小丑，但是，你知道，这些是我们可以做出的选择。

So we say, are we willing to trade off these cyclical patterns in order to get accelerated growth in order to have all these other things? Or do we not have that mix right? And I think, I mean, it's like a more of a societal question. Right. Okay.
那么，我们说，我们愿意牺牲这些循环模式以获得加速增长，以拥有所有这些其他东西吗？或者我们的组合不正确吗？我想，这更像是一个社会问题。对吧。

Setting aside the issue of, should it be the case that banks are allowed to do that? That's a wormhole in itself. And you make a lot of good arguments. Earlier I asked, should people be worried about the fact that there are other banks who have unrealized losses on their securities? And in some cases that exceed tangible book value, I wasn't saying, you know, I agree that people, it's a good if people are not worried because crisis can feed on it as self as we saw with sort of the rumor-mongering and which is trying not to be correct, with Silicon Valley. And it could be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
暂且不谈是否允许银行这样做的问题，那本身就是个很棘手的问题。你提出了很多有说服力的论点。之前我问过，人们是否应该担心其他银行持有的证券实现不了盈利，而在某些情况下超过有形账面价值。我并不是说，你知道的，我同意人们不担心这件事，因为危机可以以自我为食，就像我们在硅谷看到的那种流言蜚语，我并不想就此发表什么观点，因为这会成为一个自我实现的预言。

But so setting aside, should people be worried? What is your view on while other banks feel, the, you know, meet the same fate as Silicon Valley bank, if they also have the unrealized losses, Twitter uses it, it's depend on the deposit outflows. And, you know, there are banks now where their common stocks have collapsed maybe 80, 90% in value for exactly this reason. And of course, the rumor-monger continues where if the stock goes down, people will draw more money. And then there's been liquidity injection from, you know, the big banks and then there's the bank, the bank term funding program. So a lot, a lot we haven't talked about, but yeah, you know, John, sticking to right now, I mean, what is your base case, except sort of how this thing evolves?
抛开以上所说的，人们应该担心吗？如果其他银行也有未实现损失，像硅谷银行一样，他们是否会遭遇同样的命运呢？而Twitter则依赖于存款流出情况。现在有一些银行的普通股正因为这个原因下跌了80%或90%。当然，一些谣言继续流传，如果股票下跌，人们会提取更多的钱。此外，大银行已经注入了流动性，还有银行临时资金融通计划等等。有很多我们没有讨论到的问题，但是，约翰，现在我们要说说什么呢？我的基准是什么，除了这件事会如何发展？

I mean, is the banking panic over? Is it just getting started or is it about to end? I mean, and obviously, no one has a crystal ball, but I just wanna hear your sort of high level thoughts. Okay, in my opinion, in my opinion, that's what I'm saying. Yeah, that's caveat. I think it's over. Okay, I think it's over. That doesn't mean everything is over, but we have been through the cute period. Like, I don't think we're gonna see another, one of those here bit. I mean, if here for a while. I think that the response, the government's response was powerful enough that it took care of that.
我是说，银行恐慌结束了吗？是刚刚开始还是即将结束？我是说，显然没有人能预知未来，但我只是想听听你的高层思考。好的，我认为，我认为那就是我的意见。是的，这是一个注释。我认为它结束了。好的，我认为它结束了。但这并不意味着一切都结束了，我们已经经历了一段艰难的时期。我不认为我们还会再次遇到这种情况。我是说，如果一段时间内没有发生。我认为政府的回应已经足够强大，已经解决了这个问题。

Now, that doesn't mean that there aren't gonna be other failures, but when you think back of those days, like when that was going on, it's so convoy, I mean, there was like, people were panic. I mean, I have friends who like the NBC world and like, they were trying to get their money out running, and then I knew people who were getting their money out of the British public. I think those days are over. Now, let's game out like what it could look like going forward. What if you look, and you to look forward, you have to look back.
现在，这并不意味着不会有其他失败，但是当你回想起那些日子，比如当那件事正在发生时，那时非常混乱，我的意思是，人们都惊慌失措。我有一些朋友在NBC世界里，他们试图把他们的资金取出来，而我也认识一些人正在把他们的钱从英国公共业务中取出。我认为那些日子已经结束了。现在，让我们来预测一下未来可能的情况。如果你想向前看，就必须回顾过去。

If you look at all these different crises, like you see that picture back there, the yellow and the blue, it's that's the panic of 18, that's the panic of 1837 or 1857. And what you see over and over again through history and all those major panics is these two spikes. The first spike is the market spike. So that's bank failures as percentage of all banks. You have an initial spike that's caused by the market response to like an over extension of credit.
如果你看看这些不同的危机，就像你们看到后面那张图片，黄色和蓝色表示的是18年，1837年或1857年的恐慌。而历史上反复发生的所有这些重大恐慌，你会看到这两个峰值。第一个峰值是市场峰值。这就是银行倒闭占所有银行比例的峰值。你会看到一开始就出现的这个峰值是由市场对信贷过度扩张的反应造成的。

But then the follow up spike is caused by the regulatory response and readjustment because the regulatory response in a highly competitive industry, where you're dealing with 100% bunch of product. It can change the equilibrium. Totally jacks the equilibrium off. So you got to get back into equilibrium. And so then that's that second spike. The question is, is like, well, what's the regulatory response going to be? And is that going to cause issues? I don't think that it will. But you don't know for sure.
然后，跟随的上升是由于监管响应和重新调整引起的，因为在高度竞争的行业中，你正在处理100％的产品。它可以改变平衡。完全打乱了平衡。因此，你必须回到平衡状态。然后那就是第二个峰值。问题是，监管响应将是什么？这会导致问题吗？我认为不会。但你不能确定。

So let's say like, I mean, you could say, you could see a situation where they say, okay, you're going to mark the market all your bond portfolios, right? And so that's going to make it harder to return a decent return on equity. And so what you have, there will be banks that in that scenario will go out and do stupid stuff with their loan books because they're trying to maintain, earn their cost capital. They're trying to maintain their positions the most profitable bank in the United States. Or that kind of stuff, you know what I mean? Like that's where the carry on effects that I think that you'd want to be looking out for. That makes sense.
所以就好比说，我是说，你可以看到这样的情况，他们说，好的，你要对你所有的债券组合进行市场标记，对吧？这将使得回报适当的回报率变得更加困难。因此，在这种情况下，有些银行将会出去用他们的贷款账本去做愚蠢的事情，因为他们试图维持他们的成本资金。他们试图成为美国最赚钱的银行之一。或者那种东西，你知道我的意思吧？这就是我认为你应该密切注意的连锁反应。明白了。

How do you think bank profitability will be affected by this? People are saying, oh, you know, banks used to be able to pay, you know, nothing on deposits and earn a spread on loans above the interest on reserve. And if they wanted to even park it at the Fed, they could get the 4.6% or 4.7% there. That was a great, juicy arbitrage. And that spread will narrow now because people are pulling money out of the banks. Oh, and this is what I want to ask you about. You know, people are pulling my hand out of banks deploying them into money market funds, buying treasuries. How does that affect bank profitability and bank liquidity?
你认为这会如何影响银行的盈利能力？人们说，银行以前可以支付很低的存款利率，并通过贷款利率的差异赚取收益。如果他们想把钱寄存在联邦储备银行，那里可以获得4.6%或4.7%的利率。那是一个非常棒、诱人的套利机会。而现在这个利差会缩小，因为人们正从银行中提取资金。还有，我想问你这个问题。你知道吗，人们正在从银行中提款，将资金用于货币市场基金、购买国债等，这会对银行的盈利能力和流动性产生影响吗？

The banks will always make money. And there will be years here and there and there, I don't think as much. But the banks will always make money. I mean, they are a central component of the ecosystem, central component of that equilibrium, right? So like, the equilibrium has got a part of that where it will settles is the banks. Like, they have their fingers on that scale. I don't mean that in some sort of like conspiracy oriented way. But in terms like, they've got to earn a cost of capital or like, capital won't be attracted to that place. And so like, things will just set. Like, they'll just set. Like, they're, you have these intervening time periods where like interest rates shot up real quickly. And so like, you know, it's now out of equilibrium. So, but it'll move back into equilibrium. You'll have banks that will be able to earn 12% on their equity, 14% on their equity, assuming they don't like jack up the capital rules, you know, really high. They'll just go back to how it was, you know, and you know, just that's the one thing. If you, the longer you can look out over time in your head, like the, if you, it just, everything goes back to normal. Everything goes back to normal always. And always has, and I think we should expect it to always do that in the future.
银行永远会赚钱。有时候可能会有几年，但不会很多。但是银行永远会赚钱。我的意思是，它们是生态系统的核心组成部分，平衡中不可或缺的一部分，对吧？就像平衡会在银行那里达到稳定状态一样，它们在那个平衡上有着很大的影响力。我并不是指某种阴谋论。但从成本利润角度来看，它们必须赚取资本成本，否则资本就不会吸引到那里。所以，一切就会回归平衡。有些时间会经历利率暴涨，现在已经失去平衡。但它会重新回到平衡点。银行将能够获得12%或14%的见本利润，假设它们不会提高资本规则的限制。它们只是回归过去，照旧进行，这是唯一的固定不变点。如果你能看得更长远一点，你会发现一切都会回归正常。一直以来都如此，未来也应该如此。

In the long term, definitely. But if so, if the cost of deposits is going to continue to rise and will even accelerate, how will banks make as much money? Will they be making more loans? Will the spread on those loans go up? Yeah, what you do is it's the spread. They make money from this, it doesn't matter where the interest rates are, as long as you can make a spread. And so that's, I mean, that's what they'll have to do. The lending rate, you know, what it will cost to borrow money will just go up. Or they'll like try to find some like, I mean, not interest income source, but like, they're just, he just can't, he's not like standing on the street corner of every street. So it's like, yeah, you just have to, you just have to raise the cost of borrow.
从长远来看，毫无疑问。但如果存款成本会继续上涨甚至加速上涨，银行如何赚更多的钱呢？他们会发放更多贷款吗？贷款利差会增加吗？是的，利差是关键。他们从中赚钱，不管利率在哪里，只要还能保持利差。因此，他们将不得不这样做。贷款利率会上升，借钱的成本也会增加。或者他们会寻找一些非利息收入来源，但这并不容易。所以，你只能提高借款成本。

What about, and I know this is an issue much more in residential, it's very cute and residential mortgages than may perhaps other sectors. But when interest rates are zero, everyone wants a mortgage. And when interest rates are at 7%, it's a lot harder. So when the bank wants to make a mortgage, there are fewer people who want a mortgage. And when the bank is like, you know, interest rates are at zero, I'm making a mortgage at 2.9%. I don't, I'm not really making much money. And I'm vulnerable to interest rate hikes as we've seen in the past year. That's when everyone wants a mortgage. So to what degree is that, is that a problem in other parts of lending, commercial real estate, you know, consumer banking, stuff like that?
关于这个问题，我知道这在住宅领域是一个更加重要的问题，它关系到非常可爱的住宅抵押贷款，而可能比其他领域更为突出。但是当利率为零时，每个人都想要抵押贷款。而当利率达到7％时，就困难得多了。所以当银行想要提供抵押贷款时，想要贷款的人会更少。当银行想要提供2.9％利率的贷款时，我并没有真正赚到很多钱。而且随着去年我们所看到的，我也很容易受到利率上涨的影响。这就是每个人都想要抵押贷款时的情况。那么在其他贷款领域，比如商业房地产和消费银行等，这是否也存在同样的问题呢？

Well, if you hold all else equal, higher rates will reduce demand for whatever that is, right? But this is not a world that you do hold all of us equal, right? When do you have high rates? You have high rates when the economy's going really well. Do you know what I mean? It's a counterbalance. When you have low rates, you have low rates when the economy's doing really horrible. So actually, if you actually think about it, it's actually reversed. The demand, there's an absence of demand when the rates are low. And there's too much demand when rates are high. It's like this counterintuitive reality about the demand of things that are balls credit. Right. But for residential mortgages over the past three or four years, I mean, demand really has fallen off cliff. Now that interests are higher than the shorter, but yeah. But in every aspect, I'm sure you're right, Jeff, generally.
嗯，假设所有其他条件相等，更高的利率会减少对任何东西的需求，对吗？但这并不是一个你把我们每个人都看作平等的世界，对吧？何时会有高利率？当经济非常好时，你才有高利率。你明白我的意思吗？这是一种平衡。当你有低利率时，经济表现真的很糟糕。所以实际上，如果你真的想想的话，实际上是反过来的。低利率时需求缺失，高利率时需求过多。这是关于购买信贷球的需求的反常规现实。没错。但对于过去三四年的住房抵押贷款来说，需求真的已经暴跌了。现在利率比较高，但是，总的来说，我肯定你说得对，杰夫。

Yeah, I mean, like there are periods of transition. There was like six months or eight months or like, there are these periods of transition where we're fighting our way back into equilibrium. Whereas everything is just like kind of wacky and like, and we're in that right now, we're in that right now. But we'll get back into equilibrium. Like we like we'll more closely approximate this idea of equilibrium. Right. And and that'll be like, like I said, I mean, just think about how many times this happened. It happened after the financial crisis, right. It happened after all that stuff in the 80s. I mean, there were like four crises at the same time in the 1980s. There was a great depression. I mean, it's just like, it's that historical context is like, it helps you be like, oh, just none of these things. And not always none of these things. It's a little one of these things. It's not a big one. Mm hmm.
嗯，我的意思是，有过一些过渡期。像是六个月或八个月，或者，有这些过渡期，我们正在为了回到平衡而奋斗。而现在一切都有点疯狂，我们正在经历这样的时期。但是我们会回到平衡，我们会更接近这种平衡的想法。就像我说的，想想这种情况发生了多少次。在金融危机之后，它发生了，对吧？在80年代的所有事情之后，它也发生了。我的意思是，80年代有四次危机同时发生。还有一个大萧条。它让你明白，这些事情中没有一件是一定会发生的。不总是不存在这些事情，但是它只是小事情而已。嗯。

To what degree do you think this will impact bank lending? And maybe take us back to, you know, how much are we going back in further? After the great financial crisis, we had all this quantitative easing assumption was, oh, banks are going to lend this money out. Of course, you don't really lend a specific part of money. It's like social security. But, you know, and the banks didn't, you know, lending was actually quite low. However, I didn't believe we had a sort of a lending boom in 2021 and even as 2022. Do you think this panic might make banks a little more cautious? What do you think? What do you say?
您认为这会对银行贷款产生怎样程度的影响？可能还需要回顾一下，我们过去又回到了什么地方？在大金融危机之后，我们有这样一个量化宽松的假设，即银行将放贷这些资金。当然，你不会真的借出具体的一部分资金。这就像社会保障一样。而且，银行并没有放款，实际上贷款额度很低。但是，我认为我们在2021年甚至2022年也可能会出现贷款繁荣。您觉得这次恐慌会让银行多些谨慎吗？您怎么看？

I mean, these things always increase or reduce risk appetite. The banks, the one point banks want to lend money. They want to lend money. If every good loan that walks in that door is going to go, and they're going to, they're going to make that loan. But if you don't have good loans walking in the door, you don't want us. We don't want our banks making those loans. It's just, that's just as simple as it is. Isn't it true that default rates, the link with C's net charge of credit reserve bills, however you want to put it in terms of people not paying banks back when they make loans. Has been extraordinarily low in 2020, 2021 and 2022. And even now, you know, default rates on auto loans, let's say are. Pretty much where they were in 2019 more, I mean mortgage link with C's are pretty close to the record level, lowest ever according to Federal Reserve. So if you have so few defaults, what's the, what's the problem? Why don't make them some loans?
我的意思是，这些事情总是会增加或减少风险偏好。银行，他们想要放贷。他们想要放贷。如果每一个好的贷款都能够做，他们就会做这个贷款。但如果没有好的贷款，你就不想要我们。我们不想让我们的银行做这些贷款。就是这么简单。难道不是吗？现在默认率和C的净信贷储备票据的联系，以及人们不偿还银行贷款的问题，在2020年、2021年和2022年都非常低。甚至现在，你知道，汽车贷款的违约率，比如说，几乎和2019年持平，我是指抵押贷款的违约率，根据联邦储备委员会的说法，已经接近创纪录的最低水平。所以如果违约的数量如此之少，问题在哪里？为什么不放贷呢？

And hey, if your net interest margins just got shook by, oh, we bought all these, you know, made loans at 2% and bought mortgages at more risk. I squeeze at 2%. What better way to increase the net interest margin by lending even more? You know, it's in that, and there will be banks that do that. Yeah. And you will pay for it doing that. But to, to, to, again, we, you don't know whether a loan, a loan isn't good until it's paid back. It's just, it's not good until it's paid back until then it's like, TBD, that's what it is. You know, I mean, it's like, you know, I just don't, you just don't know it. And so, so you, you, you, you, you got to keep that in mind.
嘿，如果你们的净利润收益率受到了影响，因为我们买入了所有这些更有风险的按揭贷款，并以2%的利率提供贷款。我将以2%的压榨方式进行。增加净利润收益率的更好方式是提供更多的贷款，这是毋庸置疑的。你知道，会有银行这样做的。是的。你会为此付出代价。但是再说一遍，你们不知道一笔贷款是否好坏，直到它得到偿还。在那之前它就像是待定的，就是这样。你们知道，我是说你们不知道它的情况。所以，你们必须记住这一点。

And so what the really good bankers, they're constantly worried about their loan books. It's the, it's the bankers and like, let's be clear. Like banking is like any, it's like, good, policeman is like garbage men. It's like, you know, the lunch ladies is like, whatever, right? There's, there is a spectrum of quality. And it's like the 10, 10, 80 rule, you know, like there's 10, really good 10% of the good. There's 2% that really bad. And evil. And then there's the ones in the middle that can kind of go either way, depending on the influence of the environment. Like the really good bankers that your, your, your Renee Jones is the Goggins, Aaron Graff down at Triumph, uh, Brent Beardall at, um, Washington federal, like, they are patient. They're patient. So you have like, let me give you an example. So Patrick Goggin at Hangem Institution for saving.
所以真正优秀的银行家，他们不断担心自己的贷款项目。银行家们都应该明确地说，银行业与任何行业一样，有优秀人员和普通人。这就好比警察和垃圾工人。午餐主管也是一样，有不同的质量。大众常说的“10-10-80法则”，10%是真正的好银行家，2%是定性对差的银行家，剩下的中间人物则取决于环境影响。比如像Renee Jones、Patrick Goggin、Aaron Graff和Brent Beardall这些优秀的银行家都很有耐心，比如Patrick Goggin所在的Hangem Institution for saving。

So this is a phenomenal, phenomenal bank. Okay. But one of the things that they do to, they have like their efficiency ratios, like 20 some percent. It's like, it's incredible. Um, I don't have unchecked it last couple of quarters. Explain for me.
这是一家非常非常出色的银行。但是，他们采用了一些效率比率，大约只有20%左右，这真的很难以置信。我最近几个季度没看过它们的财务报表，你能给我解释一下吗？

And the odds, what, what again, it's a efficiency ratio. So the efficiency ratio is the, the percentage of your revenue, that you're spending on expenses. So let's say you bring, you bring in $100 of revenue, and you have $60 of expenses, your efficiency ratio would be 60%. Right. So the bigger, the lower the efficiency ratio, the better, right? Because that means more money is being kept and just drop straight to the bottom line.
这个概率是什么啊，是效率比率。所以效率比率就是您的收入中，用于支出的百分比。比如说您收入了100美元，支出了60美元，那么您的效率比率就是60%。对吧。所以效率比率越小，就越好，是吧？因为这意味着更多的钱被保留下来，直接流入底线。

Okay. And so what the way it has a, one of the reasons it has such a low efficiency ratio, in addition to just their discipline around costs, is that they bought, they borrowed a lot of money from the federal home loan board. And then that kind of stuff. So you don't have to have as big of a branch network and branch networks are expensive.
好的，所以它的低效率比率的原因之一是他们在成本管控方面不够严格，另外一个原因是他们从联邦住房抵押贷款委员会借了很多钱，还有各种种种。所以，你不需要拥有很大的分支网络，因为分支网络是很昂贵的。

Well, when you're using that kind of financing structure, that your liability sensitive in situations like this. And so your, the cost your liability outpaces the cost of your assets. And so like their name gets, their name gets crushed. And so you say, okay, like you talked, you talked to me, say, well, what are you guys going to do? And this is basically what they say. So like, look, like, things are going to go back. Like the biggest mistake we can make right now is to go out and change everything. Just because of the short term things that are happening right now, because we know things will go back. And so you just got to stick to our guns, just ride this out. And everything will be just fine.
嗯，当你使用那种融资结构时，在这种情况下，你的负债敏感性会增加。因此，你的负债成本超过了资产成本。就像它们的名字一样，它们的名字被压垮了。所以你说，好吧，你跟我说说，你们打算怎么做？基本上，他们会这么说：看，事情会回来的。现在我们能犯的最大错误就是出去改变一切，仅仅因为眼下的短期情况，因为我们知道事情会回来。所以我们只需要坚守阵地，度过难关。一切都会好的。

What do you mean by go back? I mean, go, interest rates will go back to zero. No, no, but no, but it'll interest rates are always coming. Right. The story of interest rates is that they're always moving. You know what I mean? Will they go up to 20% like they did in the eight probably not, right? But they're always moving. And so what I mean is that we'll get back into a place for that spread for the banks is more of a kind of a normal spread. Right now, it's not because we had, because you're in such a dynamic environment where the rate shot up so fast, that it kind of like broke all of that.
你说“回去”是什么意思？我的意思是，会回到零利率。不，不，但不，但是利率总是在变化的。对的。利率的故事就是它们总是在变化。你知道我是什么意思吧？它们会像80年代那样上涨到20%吗？可能不会，对吧？但是它们总是在变化。所以我想说的是我们会回到一个对银行来说更正常的利差。现在不是因为我们处于一个这样动态的环境中，利率上涨得如此之快，导致这一切都破裂了。

Like the banks will get it back where there's a, there's a healthy spread. And we want that as society. Like we want our banks to earn money. Not too much money. But we want them to earn a respectable amount. Right.
就像银行会夺回他们的钱一样，有盈利的差距就好。我们作为一个社会需要这个。我们希望我们的银行能赚钱。不是太多钱，但我们希望他们能赚到一个体面的数量。对吧。

So if it's your base case that loan spread over cost of deposits have to return to something that is good for banks. And if cost of positive is going up, that means the loan yields will go up. There are two ways that could happen. I imagine one is a huge, you know, the demand for credit continues to be high. Or the supply of credit from banks goes down. If the, if supply of credit goes from banks goes down, that probably not very good for the economy. Whereas if people demand a lot of credit, that actually, you know, could be quite good. Do you have a view on which it is?
所以，如果您的基本前提是贷款利差和存款成本必须回到对银行有利的水平。而如果存款成本上涨，这意味着贷款收益将会上涨。这有两种可能性。我想其中一种是需求继续高涨。或者银行提供的信贷供应量下降。如果信贷供应量由银行提供，则可能对经济不是很有利。而如果人们需要大量信贷，实际上，这可能很不错。您对此有何看法？

Well, and to your point, yeah, because I mean, that's that there's an over supply of credit right now. Why is there over it? Because all that liquidity. Got all that liquidity, right? It's like. The time that it's still in the system. It is still there. A little bit went out to tiny bit went out from this, from this, that panic we had, right? Tiny bit, but it is still there. It's still there. And that's why like, there's all these people out there like, oh commercial real estate, that commercial real estate, this.
好的，回到你的问题，是这样的，现在信贷供应过剩。为什么会过剩呢？因为有太多流动性。你知道啊，当时间还停留在系统里时，这些流动性还是存在的。虽然在我们之前的那场恐慌里，有一点点的流失，但只是微不足道的。它还是存在的，这就是为什么很多人会说，哦，商业地产这个不行，那个不行。

You know, I mean, like, that's going to be the next big thing. Like, M and T bank, like, they have masterfully masterfully managed the liquidity situation. I mean, just like, what Ray Jones has done there over the past. I mean, just like, it's mind boggling how well they did that. Tell me, I know they have a really good reputation about it. I don't know the details.
你知道吗，我是说，像那样会是下一个大趋势。就像M&T银行，他们已经非常娴熟地管理了流动性情况。我是说，就像Ray Jones在那里做的那样，过去的一切。我是说，就像那样，他们所做的非常出色，让人惊叹。告诉我，我知道他们在这方面有很好的声誉，但我不知道具体的细节。

I'm telling you about how you manage a liquidity situation. And maybe we can also talk about hedging interest rate risk later. So, you know, the biggest thing is that so you're going to these conferences, right? René doesn't own a majority of that stock. Anyone's a very, very small, it's a huge bank. René knows very, very, very, very small percentage of it. So that means that he's got a, he's kind of at the whims to certain extent of the market, right?
我现在跟你聊聊如何管理流动性问题，或许后面还可以聊聊对冲利率风险的方法。你知道吗，最重要的是，你参加这些会议，对吧？René没有这些股票的大部分掌控权，它是一家庞大的银行。René的权益仅占极小的一部分，这就意味着他在某种程度上受市场支配的影响，对吧？

And so they go to these events, they get on these conference calls when they're in, and all the analysts are all the time. Are you going to protect your net interest margin? Are you going to protect your net interest income? Like, how are you going to do that? How are you going to do that? How are you going to do that?
所以他们参加这些活动，进入这些电话会议，分析师总是问：你会保护你的净利润率吗？你会保护你的净利息收入吗？像，你要怎么做？你要怎么做？你要怎么做？

What the analysts are saying is go by long bonds. That's basically what they're saying, okay? Because they're interested in this short term, okay? René is basically like, no, not going to do that. Like, we know that we're not, when you're, you do not buy bonds on the interest rate of 0%.
分析师们的建议是投入长期债券。他们基本上就是这个意思，明白吗？因为他们关注的是短期。而René基本上是表示不会这么做。我们都知道，在利率为0%时，是不会购买债券的。

He's, that's just like a fundamental, you just don't do that. It's just like, it's ludicrous. Like, he's like, we're just going to wait this out. We're going to, what we'll do in response is we will portfolio some of our mortgages as opposed to secure ties them. Okay? So you're retaining more of that yield and you are in control of that credit risk, right? So if you're comfortable with the loans that you're making, like, bring on your balance sheet, take the yield from that, then just sit out and hold it, hold it out until interest rates go up and just wait and cash. Cash, cash, cash, cash, cash. Interest rates go up.
他这样做就像是一个基本原则，而你就不应该那样做。这就是可笑的。他说，我们只是要等待这个时机。我们的回应是将一些抵押贷款列入资产组合，而不是将其证券化。好的，这样你就可以保留更多的收益，并且控制信用风险，对吧？如果你对你所放款项感到满意，那就把它们放到你的资产负债表上，把收益率拿到手，然后坐等利率上涨，只需等待并获得现金。就是这样，现金，现金，现金，利率上涨。

And so that's what they did. So they're, they're, they're bond portfolios are just naturally going through attrition and going to really, really low because these interest rates situation. And then the Fed jacked up interest rates to 5% in 2022. That's when they made their move and bought a whole bunch of mortgages or not more mortgages, but that's when they bought a whole bunch of bonds. So it's just like waiting it out.
所以他们就这么做了。他们的债券组合会因为利率情况自然地逐渐减少，降至非常低。然后联邦储备委员会在2022年将利率提高到5%。他们就在那时采取行动，买下了很多债券，就像在等待一样。

And so the heart of part is when everybody is telling you to do this one thing and you know what's wrong. The hardest part is like just sticking to your guns and doing the right thing.
因此，当每个人都告诉你做一件事情，而你知道这是错的时候，这就是问题的关键。最困难的部分就是要坚持自己的信念，做正确的事情。

Hey there, sorry to interrupt. A lot of forward guidance listeners are not into crypto. If that's you, please skip ahead, get back to the interview.
嘿，抱歉打扰了。很多向导听众并不对加密货币感兴趣。如果你也是这样的话，请直接跳过，回到采访的内容。

Some forward guidance listeners are into crypto, some own crypto, a smaller percentage only lots of crypto. And a much smaller percentage work at crypto hedge funds. If you're in those latter two categories, block works research might be a good fit for you.
听前瞻指引的一些人喜欢加密货币，一些人拥有加密货币，一小部分人拥有大量加密货币。而只有一小部分人在加密货币对冲基金工作。如果你属于这后两个类别之一，区块研究可能是一个适合你的选择。

Block works research is a research and data platform that analyzes governance, tokenomics and models of interesting crypto projects, including new protocols. There's a lot of edge that can be gained from reading these reports. You can check out a sample report at www.blockworksresearch.com slash research and hit the free report toggle. If that is of interest, full subscriptions can be purchased at www.blockworksresearch.com slash sign dash up.
Block Works Research 是一个研究和数据平台，分析了一些有趣的加密项目，包括新协议的治理、代币经济学和模型。阅读这些报告可以获得很多有用的信息。你可以在 www.blockworksresearch.com/research 查看样本报告，并点击免费报告按钮。如果您感兴趣，可以在 www.blockworksresearch.com/sign-up 上购买完整订阅。

You can also get 10% off using the discount code guidance 10. Thanks and let's get back to the interview.
你也可以使用折扣码guidance 10来获得10％的折扣。谢谢，继续我们的采访吧。

How many sort of M and T banks are there out there and how many Silicon Valley banks are out there and just because it's Silicon Valley bank doesn't mean it's going to fail out by Silicon Valley bank. I mean, didn't manage their interest rate risk appropriately. And maybe if you disagree with that, we can get into that we can get it to hedging and the duration of deposit, which is a very fascinating topic that I'm a little, little about. But the question is how many banks are there that manage their interest rate risk, frequently and how many did not. Not very many managed it well.
有多少M银行和T银行？有多少硅谷银行？仅仅因为是硅谷银行并不意味着它会由硅谷银行破产。我的意思是，他们没有适当地管理利率风险。如果您对此持不同意见，也许我们可以探讨一下对冲和存款期限的问题，这是一个非常有趣的话题，我只是有一点点了解。但问题是有多少银行经常管理他们的利率风险，有多少没有。很少有人管理得好。

But like that is not to be that's I'm not saying I would have done it any better. You know, I mean, like I probably went out. I would probably done it just the same. In fact, I think you can even take it a step further.
但事情就是这样，我说我不会做得更好。你知道，我的意思是，我大概也会去做同样的事情。事实上，我觉得你甚至可以更进一步。

Think about if you were the CFO of Silicon Valley bank. And you're sitting there and a hundred billion dollars in cash is dump on your head. What are you going to do? And so remember, and this is where everyone's talking lower for longer, lower for longer, lower for longer. That's what everyone's saying back then. We're not even thinking about thinking about raising rates. Not even thinking about thinking about raising rates exactly.
想象一下，如果你是硅谷银行的首席财务官。你坐在那里，突然有一百亿美元的现金倾泻在你的头上。你会怎么做呢？所以记住，这就是所有人谈论的“低利率长期化”的地方，“低利率长期化”、“低利率长期化”。那时每个人都在说这些话。我们甚至没有考虑到要考虑到加息。实际上，我们甚至没有考虑到考虑加息。

And then, well, oh, then we saw what happens then. And then, you see inflation go boot shoot up in 2021, right? It's like in I think it's April, it's like kind of close to the middle of 2021 inflation shoots up. So you think like, OK. They they still had a lot of cash. So they were there like, oh, well, now inflation is going up. So what does that mean?
然后，嗯，啊，我们看到接下来会发生什么了。然后，你看2021年通胀会像火箭般地上升，对吧？我想是在四月份左右，接近2021年中期，通胀猛增。所以你认为，好吧，他们还有很多现金。所以他们就说，哦，现在通胀上升了，那么这意味着什么呢？

Remember what the argument was then? Transitoring inflation is transitory. Transitoring. Transitoring. Transitoring. Right. Everybody thought inflation was transitory.
记得那时争论的是什么吗？通货膨胀的短期性是短暂的。短期性的。短期性的。短期性的。没错。每个人都认为通货膨胀是短暂的。

So if you think it's transitory, you don't need to continue on lower for longer. Right. Transitoring means it's going to go back to what it was before it was before it was before it's lower for longer. So you can see how that was made.
如果你认为这只是暂时的，你不需要继续降低更长时间。对的。暂时意味着它会回到之前它更低更长时间之前的状态。这样你就能看到它是如何形成的了。

And then the other mistake really that if there was one quote unquote mistake that they made that like maybe, maybe would have been caught. By others, it was that not all deposits should be treated equally in terms of duration.
还有另外一个错误，如果要说只有一个"所谓的"错误，那就是他们可能忽略了一个错。这个错可能会被其他人发现，就是在对待存款的时候不能平等对待存款的时间。

And so you have like you have somebody who goes somebody who grew up with no money and they win the lottery. And they put $10 million in the in the bank should the bank assume that that $10 million is going to stay in there for like 30 years, probably 90.
所以，你可以想象一下，有一个人从小没有钱，后来中了彩票，把1000万美元存入银行，这时银行是否应该假设这1000万美元将在里面存放30年，或者是90年呢？

Like it may last for two years and then you'd spent down to zero. So that you have a surge deposit scenario. And in those scenarios, what you do is you adjust the duration on those. And so if there's you use a coefficient to adjust the duration. So you know, if there's if there is an error of the errors that were committed, that was probably the principal one.
就好像它可能持续两年，然后你就会用光所有的钱。因此你会有一个高峰存款的情况。在那些情况下，你要调整持续时间。所以如果出现了误差，就要使用一个系数来调整持续时间。你知道，如果有错误的话，那么最主要的错误可能就是这个了。

And so they didn't adjust it for the search and it doesn't seem like they did. So deposits can be called overnight can demand deposits. But that doesn't mean they have a duration of one day because many instances they stay there for lifetime. It's about the optionality.
所以他们没有为搜索进行调整，看起来也没有这样做。因此存款可以被称为随时提取存款。但这并不意味着它们有一天的时间限制，因为许多情况下它们会一直保留在那里。这关乎期权。

So you said this Silicon Valley was assigning a duration of about seven years to its deposits. And I assume that's based on historical patterns based on oh, from 2013 to 2023, the average withdrawal rate was X. So the maturity was Y. The duration is Z.
你说过这个硅谷地区对它的存款分配了大约七年的期限。我猜想这是根据历史模式得出的，从2013年到2023年，平均提取率为X。因此成熟期为Y，期限为Z。

And I'm, you know, probably accurate. But is the mistake to assume that historical patterns would continue. And is that mistake, you know, something that's might be, you know, my words not yours, egregious given that the money came in last year. I mean, you can't say the money came in the money that came in last year is going to have a duration. It's it's been there for one year, you know.
我知道，我可能是准确的。但是假设历史模式会继续下去是一个错误。这个错误可能很严重，因为去年有很多资金投入。我是说，你不能说去年的资金会持续很长时间。它已经存在了一年了，你知道。

I mean, I wouldn't say any mistake that was made here was egregious. I would say all the mistakes you can, if you if you're willing to like give, if you're willing to be honest with yourself. I think all of us would say I could see myself making the same damn mistake. I mean, but the if you were the CEO of a bank that had their deposits go up by, you know, 180% yes.
我的意思是，我不会说这里发生的任何错误都是极其严重的。如果你愿意坦诚地面对自己，你可以说你犯了所有的错误。我认为我们所有人都可以说，我可以想象自己会犯同样的错误。但是，如果你是一个银行的CEO，他们的存款增长了180%，是的。

Yeah, and because the other thing is that like, you know, Renee and M. T. like they manage a mass fleet, but they had, it was nothing like the surge the Silicon Valley had. I mean, Silicon Valley was like, it was so far out on the spectrum in terms of like, I mean, it was like eight standard deviations. I mean, like, so much liquidity came into that.
是啊，另一个原因是，你知道，Renee和M.T.管理了一个庞大的车队，但是它跟硅谷的崛起相差甚远。我的意思是，硅谷在某种程度上已经达到了八个标准差的极端水平。大量的流动性涌入其中。

Like none of these other banks that have been criticizing it, none of them, none of them dealt with with that quantity. None of them tripled in size with cash dump on their head. None of them came close to that. So like Silicon Valley, it is, it is peculiar in the quantity that came in and again, banking fundamentally is about managing abundance. And the hardest and the hardest time to run a bank is in times of prosperity. And that's what liquidity. That's what that's what liquidity brings about.
和其它批评它的银行不同，它们中没有一家处理过那么多的数量。它们中没有一家像它一样在现金涌入的情况下扩张三倍。没有一家接近这样做到了。所以就像硅谷一样，它处理的数量是特别的，而银行基本上是管理丰富的资源。而最困难的时候，也是最难经营银行的时候，就是在繁荣的时期。这就是流动性，也就是它带来的。

Is it true that banks really should manage their interest rate risk in that in other words, so that the risk is zero and the duration of your liabilities is the same as duration of assets. This is the whole thing about banking borrowing law, borrowing short and lending long and, oh, okay, we want to hedge our rate.
银行真的需要管理其利率风险，换句话说，让风险为零，并且负债的期限与资产持续时间相同吗？这就是银行借贷法的全部内容，短期借款和长期放贷，并且，嗯，好的，我们想对利率进行对冲。

So we're going to do a swap or we're going to issue some long term bonds, you know, maybe buy some like mortgage servicing rates or something like that. But isn't, isn't making lending a borrowing short and willing to go.
所以我们要进行一次交换或发行一些长期债券，你知道，可能会购买一些像抵押贷款服务费之类的东西。但是，不是将借贷变得短期且愿意去吗？

Okay, so this is the, yeah yeah, so like this is a nuance, but it's important nuance that there's a difference between taking a directional bet on interest rates. And earning a spread on your, on the money, on the difference between your, but you borrowing and what you're, what you're, what you're selling that money at. That's a fundamental spread or difference and like it doesn't see, it seems like a nuance, it doesn't matter, but like when you think about how that impacts the decision making, which each incremental decision, it's really significant.
噢，这个，嗯嗯，就像这是一个微妙的细节，但它是一个重要的细节，在利率方面采取方向性赌注和在你的资产中赚取价差之间有区别，你是以你借款利率和你用卖出这笔资金的利率之间的差异来赚钱的。这是一个基本的利差或差异，看起来像一个微小的细节，似乎并不重要，但当你考虑它是如何影响决策的，每一个增量的决策都是非常重要的。

Right. And so it's all this, it's a series of incremental decisions that lead to everything, you know what I mean. And so like that in an environment where there's basically no margin for error, the quality of those decisions matter. And they've got to be made for the right reasons. So if you're making them for the wrong reason, because you want to do directional bets on interest rates or anything, like you're, you know, you can't see the future. So we know that's a crap shoot.
没错。因此，所有这一切都是一系列逐步决策的结果，这些决策导致了一切，你懂我的意思吧。在一个几乎没有错误余地的环境下，这些决策的质量很重要。它们必须基于正确的理由进行。如果你因为想对利率进行定向赌博等原因而做出错误的决策，那你是看不到未来的。我们知道那是赌博。

Maybe that work, but maybe they don't, you know what I mean. And so like that, that's, that's, that's the difference. Is the treating of deposits, assigning a duration to them that is, you know, longer than just very short term duration, is that something that's widespread without the industry not just Silicon Valley bank, because I and I presume you many people watching this who say they think of demand is borrowing short, you know, you can get it anytime.
可能这行得通，但也可能不行，你知道我的意思吧。所以这就是区别所在了。对于存款的处理，将它们分配一个持续时间比非常短的持续时间更长的期限，这种方式是否在整个行业都很普遍，而不仅仅是在硅谷银行等公司内呢？因为我认为，还有你们很多正在观看这个视频的人，他们认为需求是借款短期的，随时都可以拿到资金。

But is it widespread and you know among professional bankers and banks to say, oh, our deposit base has a duration of five or of two or of 10.
但是这种说法是否普遍流行在专业银行家和银行界中呢，比如说，“我们的存款基础有5年、2年或10年的期限”？

So the, it's called asset liability management is like what that whole like kind of the thing is that it's about matching the duration. And so that came that came about really in the 80s when you had that first search is basically similar to today, but it happened, you know, 40 some years ago. And so that's when people are like, whoa, we need to like match because that was with that caused the savings and loan crisis.
所以，资产负债管理的意思就像是匹配资产负债的期限。这个概念实际上是在80年代产生的，那时候出现了第一次类似于今天的金融危机，而这也导致了储蓄贷款危机的爆发。人们意识到，我们需要匹配资产和负债的期限，否则就会带来很多问题。

The savings and loan crisis that get all these thrifts, the savings and loan organs and associations that were all they could do all they could hold on their balance sheet was 30 year basically 30 year fixed rate mortgages and they are averaging like 8%. Okay.
这场储蓄贷款危机影响了所有的储蓄机构、储蓄协会和公会。他们的资产负债表基本上只有30年期固定利率按揭，平均利率约为8%。

The short term interest rate went up to like 18 19%. So they're paying they get I don't know how far they've got up, but like 14 15 16% to borrow money that then they're lending out at 8% doesn't work. So that's when everyone's like, okay, we need to like put some discipline around this this this duration risk, you know what I mean.
短期利率升至18%到19%左右。所以他们支付的利息不知道涨到了多少，但大约在14% 到15% 到16% 之间，借来的钱利率只有8%，这无法运作。因此，这就是每个人都认为需要对这种期限风险施加一些管制的时候，你知道我的意思。

And so that's when asset liability management came out. And so they answered your questions. Yeah, every bank does every single bank does it. Now the question is how formalized is the process your smaller banks can be less formalized right. The bank the bigger banks like JV Morgan is going to be really, really, really sophisticated.
所以，那时候资产负债管理就出来了。他们回答了你的问题。是的，每个银行都在做，每个银行都在做。现在的问题是，这个过程有多规范化，你们这些小银行可能没有那么规范化。像JP摩根这样的大银行会非常非常非常复杂。

But yeah, I mean, you want your banks doing that. It's a they need to do it or else they'll have what happened to sell a valid bank will happen to them. Right.
嗯，我的意思是，你希望你的银行这样做。他们需要这样做，否则他们就会遭遇像Valid Bank一样的情况。对的。

Do you think that the expected duration of deposits a year ago from banks not just looking at a bank. So does that compare to the sort of realized duration that we've seen right now and I guess duration interest rate sensitive, but also just how many people withdrawing their money because I think I was on Friday that I can pull this to six up.
你认为一年前预期存款的期限从银行而不仅仅是看银行，与我们现在看到的实际期限相比如何？我猜期限对利率敏感，但也要考虑有多少人提取了他们的钱，因为我想上周五我能把这个数字拉到六个。 你觉得之前预期的存款期限从银行（不仅仅是针对一个银行）和我们现在看到的实际期限相比如何？我猜这和期限与利率的敏感性有关，但也和有多少人提取了他们的钱有关。上周五，我将这个数字提高到了六个。

I mean, people are withdrawing their money from banks. And so does that rate of withdrawal match or exceed the rate of withdrawal that was anticipated by banks. Maybe let's say a year ago, given the sort of asset liability management that you just talked about.
我是说，现在有许多人正在从银行中提取他们的钱。银行原本预期的提款率是否与现在的相匹配或超过了？也许可以想象，一年前就像你所说的那样，考虑到负债资产管理。

And so like for example, sorry commercial bank deposits dropped by 125 billion dollars in the week ended March 22nd.
例如，在截至3月22日的一周内，商业银行存款下降了1250亿美元。抱歉，我在说话的时候可能需要改写一些句子。

The ninth straight period of declines. That's just the data points are. Okay, so my guess I don't know the I don't know for sure what the answer is, but my guess is that what happened to not match up with the models.
第九个连续下降期。这只是数据点。好的，我猜不知道确切的答案是什么，但我的猜测是发生了与模型不符的事情。

Because then you wouldn't that wouldn't have happened because the models would have associated it. I take care of it. So my guess is that the duration on the first republic. I'm sure they were like, maybe this is not as long as duration as we thought they were. Obviously. So, but like, you know, you still need to.
因为那样就不会发生了，因为模型会把它和其他相关因素联系起来。我会处理这个问题的。我猜那是因为第一个共和国的持续时间可能没有我们想象中那么长。显然，你仍然需要注意这个问题。

Like modeling is like, it's kind of like a monkey game. Yeah. And that's just the honest like modeling anything is kind of monkeyish because it's like nobody knows what's going to happen in the future. But at the same time, if you run an institution with like 40,000 employees or 200,000 employees, like, you can't just like wake up in the morning, be like, what are you going to do today? You know, you can't even have a plan.
像建模这样的东西，有点像猴子玩的游戏。是啊。说实话，建模任何东西都有点猴子气，因为谁也不知道未来会发生什么。但与此同时，如果你管理着有四万或二十万名员工的机构，你不能只是早上起床，像说：“今天你要做什么？”。你甚至不能有一个计划。

And so like models kind of that's the where they that's kind of the role that they play.
所以，就像模特一样，这就是他们扮演的角色。

And like I'm just picking JP Morgan as example of the long term bank that. That's why I think that was a lot of what happened. I'm not going to be thinking about this.
就像我只是以JP摩根作为长期银行的例子。这就是为什么我认为那就是发生的很多情况。我不会再考虑这个问题。

But by my examination and other people have corrupted this. Man, I'm sure interest rate quite well in terms of their size. They didn't take much duration risk had like shorter term duration, and they did a lot of hedging.
通过我的调查以及其他人的破坏，这已经被扭曲了。我确定利率问题在他们的规模方面是相当不错的。他们没有承担过多的时间风险，喜欢较短的期限，并且进行了许多对冲。

If in an opposite world, interest rates were still at 0. J Powell sort of kept to his word of not even thinking about thinking.
如果在一个完全相反的世界中，利率仍然为0。J Powell会按照他的承诺，不去考虑思考这个问题。

I'm not saying he's broke his word. He did he did give sort of ample evidence to people paying attention.
我不是说他违背了自己的承诺。但他确实向那些关注的人提供了相当充足的证据。

Oh my God, Jamie Diamond, he put on all these rate hedges. Jamie, why not take a little extension risk? I mean, you got Silicon Valley bank, they're buying all these 20 year mortgages. And you're buying this four year piece of garbage? What's going on? Jamie, I thought you were a good banker.
哦，天哪，杰米·戴蒙德，他做了很多的利率对冲。杰米，为什么不冒一点延期风险呢？我的意思是，你有硅谷银行，他们正在购买所有这些20年的抵押贷款。而你正在购买这个四年的垃圾？发生了什么事？杰米，我以为你是一个好银行家。

That's right. That's a, it's a Warren Buffett in his 1990 shareholder letter. And he's talking about, he's explaining why he bought 10% a Wells Fargo, okay?
没错，就是沃伦·巴菲特在他1990年的股东信中所说的话。他在解释为什么他买了10%的富国银行股份。

And it's like, I don't know how many words that section of the letter is, but it's, it's I couldn't be, it can't be more than 800 words. But it's like, it's like, I mean, like, it's the fun of, it's like, it is the, there's, there's the mother root of sophisticated modern banking philosophy, what, how he articulates it there.
就是说，我不知道那封信中那一段有多少个词，但我觉得那段应该不超过800个词。但就是像是，我觉得，就是那种有趣的感觉，就是，那段话展示了一个关于现代化金融理念的母体，他对此的表达方式非常深刻。

And it's all based on this idea that like, look, you know, banks with all this leverage, you know, so they're vulnerable to mistakes. Mistakes are the rule, not the exception. I mean, the reason mistakes of the rule, not are not the exception is because this concept of institutional imperative. And that is that basically the way Keynes defines institutional imperative is that it's better to, it's better to, to, to die a conventional death than it is to live an unconventional life. You know, and I mean, if there's one thing about banks, it's there's a herd mentality, herd mentality. And that there's a lot of reasons for that. They're understandable. But yeah.
这基于一个想法，就是银行使用了很多杠杆，所以他们容易犯错。错误是常态，而不是例外。我是说错误之所以是常态，而不是例外，是因为机构决定论。基本上凯恩斯定义的机构决定论是说死于传统的死亡比过着非传统的生活更好。你知道，银行有一种羊群心理，有很多原因，是可以理解的。

John, before I asked my final few questions, tell us a little bit about, your sub stack, why did you want to start it and how did sort of your prior work lead you to creating the sub stack? So I, I'm a study banking. I just try to figure out ways to get paid study banking. And I love it. I'm like, I'm fascinated by it. It's like a subject matter that like, I've really, I've been working to crack the nut and to reduce it to its essence, distill it, and distill it all the way down due to essence. And I've been working on that for a dozen years and like that.
约翰，在我问完最后几个问题之前，请告诉我们一些关于你的sub stack的信息，你为什么想要开始它，以及你之前的工作如何引导你创建sub stack？所以，我研究银行业。我试图找到支付银行业学习费用的方法。我非常喜欢这个领域。这是一个我着迷的主题。我一直在努力解开它的谜底，将其简化到本质，将其提炼到它的本质。我已经在这个领域工作了十几年。

And so at 12 years in, I couldn't, I wasn't able to distill it down to that thing. I'm like, what is going on? So like getting last year, I was like, I'm just going to give everything I got to this. And I spent the entire year, I'm like 18 hour days, every single day, Monday through Sunday, how holidays, everything, every single thing. Only thing I did is I gave myself an hour a day where I played past my boys. I've two, two and a 10 year old sons. I guess they're 11 now, but they just turned 11. So when I started in the 1790, I just read contemporary materials all the way through to today. And it was, I was making my way through that and I realized the mistake that had made, that made it, that had interfered with my ability to distill it all the way down. And it had to do with this constipated periodization where you break an industry down into, a history of an industry down into eras, which seems academic, but it's actually incredibly important because there's too much stuff there that's unorganized.
于是，12年后，我无法将它浓缩成那个东西。我就像，发生了什么？所以去年的时候，我就想我要把所有的精力都用在这上面。我整整一年都在这方面投入，每天都工作18个小时，七天无休，包括假日，所有的事情都是如此。我只给自己留了一个小时的休息时间，那时我会和我的儿子们一起玩游戏。我有两个孩子，一个10岁，一个现在11岁。当我从1790年开始阅读当代材料，一直阅读到今天，我意识到了一个错误，它干扰了我将所有东西浓缩的能力。这个错误涉及到了一种叫做“便秘时期化”的现象，它将一个行业的历史分为不同的时期。这似乎是学术性的，但实际上它很重要，因为里面有太多未组织的东西。

You have to have a way to organize it to understand how it works. So I saw where it was flawed and I went back to the beginning, started all over again, then figured out how to fix it. And then once I figured out how to fix it, then it put me in a position where like I done enormous amount of research and very little writing, very little sharing. And there was, I mean, I read from 1790 to 2020, contemporary materials all the way through in the course like three months and then I did it twice back to back.
你必须有一个组织方式来理解它的工作原理。所以我发现了它的缺陷，回到了起点，重新开始，然后解决了问题。然后，一旦我解决了问题，我就处于这样的一个位置：我做了大量的研究，很少写作，也很少分享。在三个月的课程中，我阅读了从1790年到2020年的所有现代资料，然后我连续做了两次。

And so you're sitting on all of this knowledge and you feel a duty to like to share it and it is valuable, valuable knowledge. I mean, these are insights that like our people, other people just don't have because they don't, they have jobs, they have responsibilities like I just kind of a clown who had all this time, you know? And so I'm going to use it and you'll see, I mean, you've started reading some of the Jack, like the quality of the content is very high and like it's original stuff. This is not stuff that you will read anywhere else about banking. And so it's the vehicle that I'm going to use to share all of that, all that stuff. And just max build on banks at sub deck. Yeah, it's original content.
所以你拥有所有这些知识，感到有责任分享它们，这些是有价值的知识。我的意思是，这些深刻见解是我们人民以外的其他人所没有的，因为他们有工作，有责任，而我只是一个有很多时间的小丑，你知道的。所以我会利用它，你会看到，我是说，你已经开始阅读一些杰克的东西，内容的质量非常高，而且是原创的。这不是关于银行业的你在任何其他地方都能读到的东西。所以这是我将用来分享所有那些东西的工具。并只是在银行的子标题上进行最大的构建。是的，这是原创内容。

I've really enjoyed reading the work filled with banking history. One of my questions for you, John is take us to the savings and loans crisis. Volker, Jack, that interest rates way more than Powell has and probably, probably. Like that was very bad for banks, but how bad was it for the economy? I think there was a con you have recession in 1980 and then one in 81, but I don't think of the sort of cascade of failures of banks as to what the later 80s and even the 90s. And how is it possible that banks were failing in the 90s because of interest rate hikes that happened in 1981?
我真的很喜欢阅读充满银行业历史的作品。约翰，我有一个问题想问你，那就是让我们了解一下储蓄贷款危机。沃尔克、杰克，他们的利率比鲍威尔高得多，很可能很可能。对银行来说这非常糟糕，但对经济来说有多糟糕呢？我想你们有一个衰退是在1980年，然后在81年有一个，但我觉得那种银行倒闭的连锁反应在80年代后期，甚至是90年代。而为什么银行因为1981年的利率上涨而在90年代遭遇失败呢？

So there's a series of events. So it starts with the interest rates. So the interest rates jack up, you have a mismatch crisis. So where the thrift is primarily thrift, so we're getting hit right there because thrift can't have variable rate mortgages or very, very variable rate loans commercial banks could. And so like the thrift's got hit, right? So then what happens then there's deregulation. And so they deregulate the liability side of the balance sheet. So what they tell us that regulation queue. Yeah, they got rid of regulation queue because regulation queue said you can only charge this much for your positive or you can only pay this much for deposits. They lifted that ceiling. So then the thrifts were pay, then they had to pay huge amounts to borrow money to service their portfolios.
所以这是一系列的事件。首先是利率。利率上涨就会出现不匹配的危机。由于储蓄银行最主要的储蓄方式是储蓄，所以我们就受到了影响，因为储蓄银行不能拥有可变利率抵押贷款，而商业银行可以。所以储蓄银行受到了冲击。然后发生的事情是去管制。他们解除了资产负债表中负债方的管制。他们告诉我们要解除规则队列。是的，他们取消了规则队列，因为规则队列规定了你只能收取这么多正数的费用，或者你只能支付这么多存款的费用。他们取消了上限。因此，储蓄银行必须支付巨额利息来借款来维持其投资组合。

Our earning half as much. So then what do they do? Then the policymakers are like, oh, we need to deregulate the asset side of the balance sheet too and let them go out and basically buy whatever they want on the asset side so they can earn higher yields to so they can pay for that money that they're borrowing, right? So they deregulate that. So what do they do? They go into commercial real estate. Okay. So they're going to surge of money into commercial real estate.
我们的收入减半了。那么他们该怎么办呢？政策制定者就会想，噢，我们需要去除资产负债表中资产方面的管制，让他们可以去购买任何他们想要的资产，这样他们可以获得更高的收益以支付他们借的钱，对吧？所以他们去除了管制。那么他们该干什么呢？他们进入商业房地产。好的。所以资金涌入商业房地产。

You also had a tax law change early in that decade where it promoted more money coming into real estate and you also have the energy crisis, right? So then you start taking these banks, these banks start taking and companies start taking losses on energy so they need to make those up. So then that money goes into commercial real estate. So you have all this money is flooded into commercial real estate and the second half of that decade is a commercial real estate crisis and into 91 and 92. That is a huge commercial real estate crisis.
你们在那个十年初也有一项税法变化，促进了更多的资金流入房地产，还有能源危机，对吧？所以这些银行和公司开始在能源方面亏本，需要弥补这些损失。然后这些钱流入商业房地产。所以大量的资金涌入商业房地产，这个十年的下半部分就是商业房地产危机，延续到91年和92年。那是一个巨大的商业房地产危机。

Like you go down to Dallas, I don't know if you've been to Dallas, but like you look at the skyline, all those buildings were built in the 80s. It's like they all were and like you see that Oklahoma city and like over and over and over again and so like that you had two, you had these fallen crisis and then in the middle of this crisis, in the middle of those two, you had the LDC crisis, the less developed loan crisis. Emerging markets. Emerging markets. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and what you have there was these.
就像你去达拉斯一样，我不知道你是否去过达拉斯，但是当你看到天际线时，所有的建筑都是80年代建造的。就好像它们都是那样的，你会看到俄克拉荷马城一样，一次又一次，所以你有两个，你有这些陷入危机中的国家，然后在这个危机的中间，在那两个之间，你有了LDC危机，即较不发达贷款危机。新兴市场。新兴市场。墨西哥、巴西、阿根廷，你会有这些。

So you had all that money, right? That was sitting in the coffers, Saudi Arabia and stuff like that, needed to go somewhere. So some of it went to mortgage back securities, right, for the subprime. With some of it went to like, it was then brought and made into government loans, right? And so then you have, but then you have the interest rates go up on those government loans. And what happens then, the government started faulting. So Mexico was the first to go and it defaulted. I think it was August 82 and they basically came up and said, we're not going to pay. We're not going to bear that. And so those loans had gone through American banks. And so all of those loans had to be basically in your head just written down to zero.
你们有很多钱吧，就是那些存放在沙特阿拉伯等地的基金池里，需要被投资出去。部分钱投资于次级抵押债券，对吧？另一部分用来购买成为政府贷款。但这些贷款的利率却上涨了，于是政府开始拖欠。墨西哥是第一个拖欠的国家，我想是1982年8月份，他们宣布不再偿还这些债务。这些贷款是通过美国银行贷出的，因此这些债务都要记为零。

So there was a for years in the 1980s, every single one of the biggest banks in this country were underwater. They were all insolvent for all intents and purposes. And so that brings up actually an even bigger point is that like, if there's something to be pissed about in banking, okay? If you want to be pissed about banks, something in banking, what you should be pissed about is the fact that we let these little banks fail all the time.
在20世纪80年代的几年间，这个国家最大的每一家银行都在亏损中。从实际来看，它们都破产了。这其实带来了一个更大的问题，如果你在银行业有什么不满，那么你应该关注的是我们一直在任由这些小银行破产。

And yet we let these big banks get away with this stuff, stupid stuff, harmful stuff to the economy. And when they get in trouble, we bail them out. And like, we should bail them out, okay? But then we need to do something on the little banks I too. Like, they can't get that disparate treatment.
然而，我们任由这些大银行做这种愚蠢、对经济有害的事情。当他们陷入困境时，我们就救助他们。我们应该救助他们，但是我们也需要对小银行采取相应的措施。他们不能受到不公平的待遇。

And I think it all reduces to compensation. I think it, I think it all, if you go through the full analysis of banking, like what makes an exceptional bank, what leads to stupid access is that the bad banks, I think you can draw it all down to compensation. Jamie Diamond is pretty highly paid. Banks very well run. That's, so that's maybe an exception. Yeah, I mean, Jamie Diamond is a savant. Brian Moynihan, he deserves to be highly paid, okay? I don't know if you guys do exceptional, but the problem is that you go throughout these regional banks of the country.
我认为这一切归结于薪酬。如果你进行银行完整分析，例如是什么让一家杰出的银行，是什么导致了愚蠢的行为，我认为这些问题的根源都是薪酬。Jamie Diamond的薪水很高，但是银行经营得很好，也许这是一个例外。我是说，Jamie Diamond是一个天才，Brian Moynihan理应获得高薪。但问题是，这些地区银行的情况可能与这些例外不同。

And so keep in mind a couple things. So the general rule is failure, not success. Number one, number two, even the banks that don't fail, it's a minority of them that earn their cost of capital. What do you mean by that? And also how do you square that with your prior comment that banks, it's always going to go back to normal, but banks, nims will be restored. How can both of those things be true?
所以请记住几件事。总的来说，规则是失败而不是成功。第一点，第二点，即使是那些没有失败的银行，也只有少数的银行能够赚取它们的资本成本。你是什么意思？还有，你如何将这个与你之前的评论相呼应，即银行的情况总是会回归正常，但净利差会恢复？这两件事怎么可能都是真的？

So the cost of capital is, okay, so. Nims is not interested in, sorry, go ahead. Right, so you're a capital provider. You have $100 million that you have to allocate, right? Where are you going to allocate it? You're going to allocate it on a risk of just a basis to the place that gives you a decent respect for return, right? That's basically your cost of capital, like then a amount that allows you to be competitive with, to track capital, right, as a bank, right? So you got to earn, you know, whatever it is. I think the general rule is a bank needs to earn around 12% to earn as cost of capital. That's general rule, although like each and each bank is slightly unique, but that's the general rule. 12% on its assets or 12% on its equity or return equity. So that would be 1.2% on assets, assuming that typical bank is leveraged by 10.
所以资本成本是这样的，好的，那么Nims对此不感兴趣，抱歉，请继续。那么你是一个资本提供者，你有1亿美元要分配，对吧？你会按照风险的程度分配它，以确保你有一个合理的回报，对吧？这基本上就是你的资本成本了，它让你可以与其他银行竞争，并跟踪资本，对吧？所以你需要赚取多少，大概就是12%左右，这是一般规定，虽然每家银行略有不同，但这是一般规定，它指的是银行资产的12％或股本回报率的12％。所以假设一家典型的银行杠杆率为10，那么这就相当于资产的1.2％。

So that's what your cost capital is. And John, it sounds like a really bad fact that you just said that so many banks, you said all the banks were marked, marked, and solvent, but that actually can perhaps elase some fears right now that just because on some bank balance sheets and perhaps a lot of bank balance sheets, the unrealized also securities, market to market, insolvent, that doesn't mean that people are going to pull their money. And that doesn't mean that they should. And if they're, if they're insured, they definitely should not pull their money.
那么这就是你的成本资本了。约翰，你刚才说的好像是一个很坏的事实，你说所有银行都被标记为不良和破产，但这实际上可能会减轻一些恐惧，因为在一些银行资产负债表上，以及许多银行资产负债表上，未实现证券市场价值可能是不良和破产的，但这并不意味着人们会撤回他们的钱。那也并不表示他们应该撤回他们的钱。如果他们受到保险保护，他们绝对不应该撤回他们的钱。

Oh, you talked about the community banks and I was going to ask you about, it wasn't Secretary Yellen before Congress asked by some senator from the middle of the country who said, my community banks are struggling. Are you going to bail out them? And she basically said no, but then she hinted, maybe it's yes, maybe it's no. And so this is the question of will the help extended by the FGIC and the Treasury to Silicon Valley bank depositors, uninsured depositors over a quarter of a million dollars and signature bank? Will that be extended to other banks if they fail?
啊，你提到了社区银行，我正想问一下，不是之前有一个中部国家的参议员问雅兰部长，“我的社区银行在挣扎，你会救助他们吗？”她基本上回答了“不会”，但之后又暗示可能会，可能不会。那么现在问题是，如果其他银行破产了，FGIC和财政部为硅谷银行存款者和签名银行提供的帮助，也会提供给其他银行吗？这些存款者的存款超过25万美元，属于未经保险的存款。

Your point about the 80s and all those banks being insolvent, sitting insolvent, like, I never connected that in my head, Jack. And like, when you're saying that, I'm like, oh my god, it's like, that's such a good point. But the forbearance was the way to deal with that. There's appropriate way to deal with that. Otherwise, you go into like the dark ages.
你所说的80年代那些破产的银行坐在那里破产，我之前从来没有想到过，杰克。当你说这个的时候，我感觉啊，我的天，这真是一个好观点。但是原谅是应对这种情况的方法。有适当的方式来处理这种情况。否则，我们将会进入黑暗时代。

What is forbearance? Yeah. Forbearance is when a bank or so let's say you are delinquent on your loan as opposed to the banks coming in and just for closing on you, they'll give you some time, try to work it out with you, you know, like make it possible, like maybe you want to have to for close, you know what I mean? Oh, that's what forbearance is. But on securities where there's no credit risk and it's all an interest rate risk for bearance would now. Well, it would be forbearance on the part of the society forbearance on the part of regulators.
什么是宽限期（forbearance）？好的，宽限期是指银行或其他机构允许你违约贷款而不是强制执行抵押品拍卖。他们会给你一些时间，并与你合作，以使你能够还款，避免贷款拍卖。这就是宽限期的意思。但对于没有信用风险, 只是利率风险的证券而言，则是社会和监管机构体现的宽限期策略。

Because that's in the 80s, those forbearance on the part of regulators, they're like, well, I mean, theoretically, y'all are, you know, insolvent, but like, we're not going to, we're not going to come into seize all of you, you know what I mean? So it's kind of forbearance in the broadest possible sense. But the other point about the, let me, so remember the 80s were a total shit show, okay, for in banking, all right? And the big ones in particular, they were all insolvent or like all the ones in Texas failed, all the big ones in or, or emerged in lieu of failure, okay?
因为那是上世纪八十年代的事情了，监管部门的宽容态度就像是，嗯，从理论上讲，你们都已经破产了，但我们不会来收割你们所有的资产，你懂我的意思吧？所以是在最广义上的宽容。但关于这一点，要记住八十年代银行业是一个彻底的烂摊子，好吗？尤其是大型银行，它们全部都是破产的，或者像德克萨斯州的全部都失败了，所有的大银行都是在失败的情况下合并的，好吗？

You go back and you look in the 1980s, you look at the highest, and I'm an Uber capitalist. Let me be very clear about this. I'm not against people getting rich, but you got to get rich the right way. That's the thing. You go back to the 80s and you look at, you get the list of the highest paid bankers every year. And I swear to God, every single one of their banks either failed or was insolvent for a significant period in that decade, and you say like, what are we compensating here? What are we compensating? Like, what is this all about?
你回到20世纪80年代，看看收入最高的人，我是一个极端资本主义者。让我非常明确地说，我不反对别人变得富有，但你必须用正确的方式变得富有。那是重点。你回到80年代，看看每年最高薪的银行家名单。我发誓，他们的银行在那十年里要么倒闭了，要么长期陷入破产状态。你问问，我们在这里赔偿什么？这一切是为了什么？

So then let's take it up to more modern times. You look at that you take every single public to trade a bank in America, okay? And you rank it by all time total shareholder return. The amount of value this thing has created since it went public. You just put on a chart and there you will see is that there are two that are way out, way above all the rest. There's like two that go up here and all the other even that the second or the third, fourth, fifth, they're down here, okay?
那么我们现在来看看更现代的情况。你看看美国的每家公共贸易银行，好吧？然后按照它们自公开上市以来的全部股东回报率进行排名。这个东西自上市以来创造的价值总量。你把它放在一个图表上，你会发现有两家银行远远超过其余所有银行。就像这里有两家银行，其他的即使是第二、第三、第四、第五名的银行，它们的位置是在这里，好吧？

What are those two? Glacier bank or open calisthenum antenna and imit bank up in Buffalo, New York. And then you say, well, God, those guys must have made a ton of money. You know what I mean? The CEOs. The CEOs must have made a ton of money. And they did. They did. But you look on a year to year basis, Mick Blanick, the guy who is responsible for that performance at Glacier. He earned that you take, you look at his peer group, he was the lowest paid in his peer group, not just the lowest paid, all right? He earned a third of as much as the second lowest paid, a third. This guy was making like $260,000 a year. There were other clowns in his peer group that were making like $4 million. And Mick blew them away. I mean, I mean, these guys weren't even in the same universe as Mick in terms of the performance and how rich his shareholders got. And it was the same thing with Bob Wilmer.
这两个是什么？冰川银行或布法罗的开放式卡利斯坦姆天线和限制性股票银行。然后你说，哇，这些人肯定挣了一大笔钱。你知道我说的是CEO。CEO们一定挣了一大笔钱。他们确实是这样。但是，如果你从年度收入来看，那个在冰川银行表现出色的米克·布兰尼克(Mick Blanick)是最低薪水的CEO。他不仅是最低薪水，他的薪水只有第二低薪水的三分之一。这个家伙每年只挣26万美元。他同辈中其他小丑都在挣400万美元之类的钱。而Mick的表现远超这些人。我是说，在表现和股东财富方面，这些人和Mick根本不在同一个世界。鲍勃·威尔默(Bob Wilmer)的情况也一样。

So you look at his lowest paid in his peer group. And you think like, is there something to this? Is there something to this? And I think there is. And this is what it is.
所以你看他同行中最低薪酬的情况。然后你会想，这是不是有什么含义？我认为的确有一定含义。具体来说，是这样的。

Banking is not rocket science. Okay. It is not complicated. It's not. You know, you don't have to be a genius to do it. But you cannot be too ambitious. You cannot be too ambitious. You cannot be going after all the money you can make as quickly as you can make it.
银行业不是火箭科学。好了，它不复杂。你知道的，你不必是个天才去做它。但你不能太雄心勃勃。你不能追求能够赚取所有的钱，以最快的速度赚取它。

And so what does that translate into corporate speak? It translates into corporate speak through the fiduciary duty against self-dealing. Now that requires you to do is you have to put yourself in the shoes of the principal. You're the agent and like in the shoes of your employer, not in your own shoes. They go before you do. They are more important than you are. They get the priority, right?
那么这要用公司的术语来表达怎么说呢？这可以通过依据不自私的受托人责任来表达。现在需要你做的是把自己置于委托人的角度，你是代理人，就像在你雇主的鞋子里，而不是在自己的鞋子里。他们在你之前。他们比你更重要。他们有优先权，对吧？

And that's what all these CEOs want their people to do. But yet they won't do it themselves where it matters the most. And it's in conversation.
所有这些CEO都希望他们的员工这样做。但是最关键的时候，他们自己却不会做到。这就是在对话中。

And so the best way to cap like this whole thing is that you think about it like this. In 1949, a guy by name of APG Neenie died. He was the guy who in 1904 founded a bank called Bank of Italy that eventually became Bank of America. That by 1949 was the biggest bank, I'm not an America, it was the biggest bank in the world. Okay. And so in the end of the year, he was the biggest bank in the world.
所以，归纳整个事件的最佳方式是这样思考。1949年，一个名叫APG Neenie的人去世了。他是1904年创立了一家名为意大利银行的银行的人，最终成为了美国银行。到1949年，这家银行成为了世界上最大的银行，我不是美国人，在世界上也是最大的银行。因此，在年底，他成为了世界上最大的银行。

And so he died. His estate was worth $550,000. Okay. Just that for inflation, that's about $6.5 million today or something like that. That's a lot of money, but a fraction of what the big bank CEOs make in a year right now. He could have had Vanderbilt wealth. He could have had Rockefeller wealth. And he started a separate company that was also a huge today is still Trans-America. You think that was really.
所以他最终去世了。他的遗产价值为55万美元。呃，要考虑通货膨胀，现在大概相当于650万美元左右。这是很多钱了，但相比目前一些大银行CEO的年薪只是一小部分。他本来可以有范德比尔特一样的财富，或是洛克菲勒一样的财富。他还创办了一家分离的公司，而今仍是Trans-America。你觉得这是真的吗？

Another separate company that he started laughing off. I mean, like, the guy was amazing.
他另外开的一家公司，他自己都笑话了。我的意思是，那个人太厉害了。

And then you go to 1998 and a guy by name of Dave Kulter becomes a CEO of Bank of America. This is what I was still in California. And he was CEO for two years. Okay. Two years. That's it. He sells that bank to Humacall, Nations Bank out in Charlotte. So Kulter sells that bank to Humacall. Kulter takes a $100 million Golden Parachute. $100 million Golden Parachute. And then he just almost like- They took the name so it's now called Bank of America now. Yeah. So it gets a better name, right? The nation's back. So it's like, yeah. But the bank from America, we think of things that's not Bank of America. That's a nation's bank. Yeah. You know what I mean? Like that's what that is. But it's like, so Dave Kulter, he monetized APG needs life work. And APG needing wanted to do the right thing and not monetize it.
然后你回到1998年，有个叫戴夫·卡尔特的人成为了美国银行的CEO。这时我还在加利福尼亚州。他担任了两年的CEO。好了，两年而已。然后他把这家银行卖给了夏洛特的HumaCall国民银行。所以卡尔特把这家银行卖给了HumaCall。卡尔特拿到了一笔1亿美元的金色降落伞。1亿美元的金色降落伞。然后他就是几乎像……他们把名字改了，所以现在它叫做美国银行。是的。所以它得到了一个更好的名字，对吧？国民银行。就像，是的。但是我们认为，美国银行的东西并不是由银行提供的，而是由国民银行提供的。是的。你知道我的意思吗？就像这就是它的实际情况。但是，戴夫·卡尔特把自己的一生工作变现了，而APG尼丁想做正确的事情，不想变现。

And so you think like two things. Like first, like that's just wrong. You know what I mean? That's just wrong. It's just, it's unethical in my opinion. But the second is that like you've all these people who think like who look back on history and they like degrade history and like all these people are back in the day where all just like bad money grubbers and stuff like that.
所以你的想法有两点。首先，那是错的。你知道我什么意思吧？那就是错的。在我看来，这是不道德的。但第二个是你有这些人回顾历史，贬低历史，而这些人都是那些贪财的人们。

Like that's not true. Like to a certain extent that's commitment to fiduciary duty in the banking industry. At least, and I think it's this case throughout corporate America has eroded. It's eroded and there was a time when the our executives took a much more seriously. Yes. I think that's particularly vivid in 2008 when you had people being, you know, having bonus package after a very, very bad risk management.
就像那不是真的。就某种程度上来说，这是银行业职责的承诺，至少在整个美国企业界，我认为这种承诺已经被削弱了。它已经被削弱了，曾经我们的高管们非常看重这一点。是的，我认为这在2008年特别鲜明，当时你有人们在非常糟糕的风险管理之后获得了奖金。

John, I got two more final questions, which is, do you think there is a learning for banks from this panic? Is it don't take too much interest rates, don't assume that certain deposits have a liabilities? Excuse me, I have a duration that's longer than they are. Is that a learning?
约翰，我还有两个最终问题，你认为银行能从这场恐慌中学到什么呢？是不要收取太高的利率，不要认为某些存款有负债吗？对不起，我的期限比他们长，这是一种学习吗？

And by learning, I don't just mean, oh, in retrospect, it's true, but it's going forward, we should keep this in our minds when we do risk management. Or is there is there no learning because banks fail all the time and this is just part of nature?
通过学习，我指的不仅仅是回顾过去然后说“原来如此”，而是在接下来的风险管理中牢记这一点。银行经常破产，这是自然的一部分，所以我们是否没有学到什么呢？

Always a learning. There's always a learning, right? And I would be more general about the learning in this case.
总是在学习中。总是在学习中，对吧？在这种情况下，我会更加一般地考虑学习。

And I would say that if you fail, you could, like, it may not be fair that you fail, right? Like there could be rumors, gossips, there's a study done of all these banks that failed in the 20s. And they just looked at why they failed and like 50% of them failed because of just like idol gossip, rumors, okay? Like you can fail for unfair reasons. But if you fail, it's on you.
我想说的是，如果你失败了，可能是不公平的，对吧？就像可能会有谣言、流言蜚语，有一个研究调查了所有在20年代倒闭的银行。他们只是看看为什么它们失败了，发现50%的原因是因为假话、谣言，好吧？你可能因为不公平的原因而失败。但是如果你失败了，那是你自己的原因。

It's on you. Like you are a highly leveraged institution. You use fraction of reserve banking, like you have got to be prepared for everything. It is your duty to protect that money. And so like all of these things you got to be prepared for, you know what I mean?
这是你的责任。就像你是一家高度杠杆化的机构。你使用储备银行的一部分，就像你必须为一切做好准备一样。保护那笔钱是你的职责。因此，你必须为所有这些事情做好准备，知道我的意思吗？

Paragraph 1: And what does that mean? The biggest risk is the risk you don't know, right? So that's some of the possibility. But like the biggest thing is that like you got to go out on the stream of the spectrum and say what is the least fair way we can fail? Like they start all these horrible things and none of them are true and like people believe it. How do we survive that? And so that's what I would think, you know, if I was running a bank, like that's where my head would be.
那是什么意思啊？最大的风险就是你不知道的风险，对吧？这就是其中一些可能性。但最大的问题是，你得走出去，在这个领域里找出最不公平的失败方式是什么？像他们开始讲这些可怕的事情，其实都不是真的，但人们还是相信。我们怎么才能生存下来呢？如果我经营一家银行，这就是我所思考的。

Paragraph 2: I think like we need to make sure that doesn't happen to us. Right. And it's kind of funny, ironic, sad that the one sector of the S&P 500, everyone gets hurts by raising rates, costs of capital, blah, blah, blah. But the one sector that benefits is banks. And then you have some things.
我觉得我们要确保这种情况不发生在我们身上。是的。有趣的是，讽刺，难过的是，标普500指数中，提高利率和资本成本会对所有行业造成伤害，但唯独银行受益。而且，还有一些其它的事情。

Paragraph 3: So it's three final question for you, John, is a lot of people out there are quite pessimistic they say this bank crisis is not over, you know, Domino one was to look at the big Domino two was signature bank. What's next? Who knows? You are sounds like much more optimistic. You said the banking crisis probably already over.
所以，John，我有三个最后的问题要问你。许多人非常悲观，他们说这场银行危机还没有结束。您知道，骨牌效应已经开始，大骨牌一个接一个地倒下，涵盖了许多银行，包括Signature Bank。下一步是什么？谁知道呢？但您听起来更加乐观。您说银行危机可能已经结束了。

Paragraph 4: There could be failures, but there's one piece of systemic. You give us many reasons to have this in every but just to summarize, this is the final question I promise. Summarize what is sort of the main reason if you had to pick one about why you think you know, everything's going to be all right.
可能会有失败，但有一个系统性的问题。您给我们许多理由来支持这一点，但是为了总结，这是我保证的最后一个问题。如果您必须选择一个主要原因来解释您为什么认为一切都会好起来，那么请总结一下。

Paragraph 5: I mean, it's because when you study this stuff, you see it over and over and over and over and over and over. It's like baking a pie. Like my mom can look at that. She like the pie is done or the pie is not done. I'll look at them and be like, I don't know idea of that pie is done. I just the up and on. And you know what I mean? Like, like the pie is done is in my opinion. It could be wrong, but the pie seems to be done.
我的意思是，当您研究这些东西时，您会一遍又一遍地看到它。就像烤馅饼一样。像我妈妈可以看看就知道馅饼是否烤好了。我会看看它们，然后说，“我不知道这个馅饼烤好了没有。我只是试试看。”你知道我的意思吧？就像馅饼烤好一样，这是我的想法。这可能是错的，但是馅饼似乎已经完成了。

Paragraph 6: I mean, in March, so in April 2009, not April 2023, what would you have said? Like, is the pie done? Like, why would you say the pie would not have been done then? Because the pie was not done. Yeah, the pie was not done. What was the risk that led to the pie not being done in terms of it failing that you don't see now? Because there are things, oh, unrealized losses, commercial real estate, which you know, some of which is speculation. Whereas in 2009 with the benefit of high state, we know that there were lots of issues that led to the problems continuing.
我的意思是，在2009年三月或四月，而不是2023年四月，你会说什么？比如说，馅饼做好了吗？为什么你会说馅饼那时候没有做好呢？因为那时候馅饼没有做好。是什么风险导致了馅饼不能做好，而你现在看不到呢？因为有些事情，比如未实现的损失和商业房地产，其中一些是投机的。但是在2009年，我们有更高的视角，知道许多问题导致了问题继续存在。

Paragraph 7: Here's why there's just too much money out there. Still. So 2009 was the end of that liquidity cycle. It was like the final, then you had the European debt crisis. That was the final hurrah, right? That was the final hurrah. We were like 2009, we were there. We were there. Like, there wasn't that much liquidity. So like things, but we are sitting under this giant mountain of money still. And like, it's looking for places to go, you know?
这就是为什么现在有太多的钱。从2009年开始，那个流动性周期就结束了。这就像最终的，然后你有了欧洲债务危机。那是最后的巅峰，不是吗？那是最后的巅峰。我们就像2009年一样，我们到了那个阶段。就像，当时并没有那么多的流动性。但是现在我们仍然坐在这个巨大的钱的山下。而且，它正在寻找去处，你知道的。

Paragraph 8: So like, I think that I think that that doesn't mean nobody fails. Doesn't mean there will be a recession. That's normal stuff. That's normal stuff. Yeah. But I would be shocked. And somebody like I studied the stuff right more than even in this country, like I would be shocked. And maybe that's famous last words. Also, yeah, and this was the other thing you learn. You know what I mean?
所以，我觉得我觉得那并不意味着没有人会失败。也不意味着会出现经济衰退，这是正常的事情。是很平常的事情。没错。但我会感到震惊。像我这样在这个国家以外更深入地研究这些事情的人，我会感到震惊。也许这就是那些臭名昭著的最后话。另外，就是你要学会的另一件事情。你知道我是什么意思吧？

Paragraph 9: I would be shocked if if if this wasn't good. If we weren't through the queue, the queue, the queue. You'd be shocked if another big one, let's say top 10 bank fails. You would be shocked. Oh, I would if you had top 10 bank. Yeah. Oh, I mean, I would that I think number 16, number 18 biggest bank. Yeah. That would be shocking. If if top 10 bank, yeah, that would be like my brain didn't even go there. I mean, like although city group, I mean, I feel like it's always on the like version of your.
如果这个不好，我会感到震惊。如果我们还没有排到队伍前面，排到队伍前面，排到队伍前面。如果另外一个大型银行失败了，比如说前十大银行之一，你也会感到震惊。如果你拥有前十大银行，我也会感到震惊。我觉得可能是第16、18大的银行，那真的是太震惊了。如果前十大银行失败了，我的大脑可能完全无法想象。虽然花旗集团，我觉得它总是处于你害怕的位置。

Paragraph 10: Well, John, it's been a pleasure getting to hear your insights, which are vast. You can check out your work on Twitter at max field on banks and your your sub stack is max field at banks. Thank you so much. Thanks for being generous with your time and thank you everyone for watching.
嗯，John，很高兴听到你广博的见解，真是一种愉悦。你可以在Twitter上查看你的工作，账户名是max field on banks，而你的SubStack账户是max field at banks。非常感谢你慷慨地分享你的时间，也感谢大家的收看。

Paragraph 11: I just want to say Jack real quick for you turn off. You do an excellent job. You do appreciate that. Appreciate what you do very much. Well, you do an excellent job.
我想要快速告诉Jack停掉，你做得非常好。你应该感到自豪。我非常感激你所做的一切。你的表现真的非常出色。

Paragraph 12: Hey, John, final question. How many of those books in the room behind you that we can see are about finance and banking specifically?
嘿，约翰，最后一个问题。我们能看到你身后房间里有多少本关于财务和银行业务的书籍？

Paragraph 13: No, those are all that's my finance and banking library. So 100% all right. Thank you.
不，那些都是我的金融和银行图书馆。所以完全没问题。谢谢。如果需要的话，可以重新表述第13段。

Paragraph 14: Forward guidance, the program you just enjoyed, hopefully can be viewed on YouTube at Blockworks macro or hurt as a podcast on Apple podcast and Spotify episodes are typically released on Apple and Spotify a few hours before they air on YouTube. Please leave a review on Apple podcast if you feel so inclined.
希望你刚才收听的 Forward guidance 节目能够在 Blockworks macro 的 YouTube 频道上观看，或者在 Apple Podcast 和 Spotify 上作为播客形式收听。一般来说，节目会在 YouTube 上播出之前几个小时在 Apple 和 Spotify 上发布。如果你愿意的话，请在 Apple Podcast 上留下评论。

Paragraph 15: Also you can get 10% off to permissionless 2023 and blockworks research using code guidance 10. Again, and be well.
另外，您可以使用代码"guidance10"获得允许2023和blockworks研究的10%折扣。再见，祝您健康。 第15段可能需要改写，因为没有上下文，难以翻译。