Sir Chris Hohn | Podcast | In Good Company | Norges Bank Investment Management

发布时间 2025-05-14 05:00:19 来源

以下是内容的中文翻译：欧洲最成功的基金之一TCI的创始人，以及一家大型慈善基金的创办者Chris Hohn，与Nikola Tangan探讨了投资哲学和慈善事业。 Hohn强调了良好投资中“高进入壁垒”或“护城河”的重要性。这些护城河使得竞争对手难以进入市场并侵蚀利润。Hohn将其与仅仅关注增长或新颖性区分开来。虽然不良资产或廉价、低质量的资产如果以大幅折扣交易可能是好的投资，但他更喜欢具有可持续竞争优势的企业。这些护城河可以采取多种形式：不可替代的实物资产（如机场、收费公路、电信铁塔）、知识产权（飞机引擎）、已安装基础、规模、网络效应（Visa、Meta）、强大的品牌（麦当劳）以及高客户转换成本（关键任务软件）。至关重要的是，Hohn重视具有多层防御的可持续护城河。他强调竞争会摧毁利润，而替代品可能会消灭一家企业。虽然经常性收入流很重要，但Hohn优先考虑必需产品和服务而非可自由支配的产品和服务。他以评级机构为例，他们的服务最终是必不可少的。他强调了由销量驱动的增长与由价格驱动的增长之间的区别，突出了定价权——即高于通货膨胀的价格上涨能力——的巨大价值。即使销量适度增长，具有定价能力的公司也能获得显著的利润增长。 Hohn讨论了监管的双刃剑。虽然低进入壁垒会引来竞争和替代，但极高的壁垒可能会引起监管审查。理想的情况是存在微弱且理性的竞争。他避开了他认为本质上风险高或无利可图的某些行业，包括银行（由于杠杆、不透明性和潜在的管理不善）、汽车制造业、零售业、保险业、商品制造业、烟草业、传统资产管理公司、化石燃料公用事业公司、航空公司、无线电信公司和媒体（由于竞争和颠覆）。他以微软为例，分析了一家因捆绑销售和客户转换成本而拥有强大护城河的科技公司。在投资Alphabet的同时，他也承认搜索领域竞争日益激烈。他认为人工智能总体上将提高生产力，但将极大地颠覆某些行业，如呼叫中心和印度外包。 Hohn解释说，他的团队首先评估一家公司护城河的强度和可持续性，然后再考虑估值指标。他们专注于使用现金流量折现 (DCF) 分析进行长期估值。投资期限越长，具有持久竞争优势和复合盈利能力的公司价值就越大。他认为，最好的企业会随着时间的推移而表现出色，而且短期市场往往围绕长期趋势波动。 Hohn认为，公共市场中最好的企业通常优于私募股权领域的企业，因为私募股权公司通常局限于规模较小、不占主导地位的公司。他认为，当对内在价值的看法不如其他情况，以及当信心开始减弱时，就会发生出售。关于他的投资方法，Hohn强调谦逊、愿意承认错误、专注于公司基本面而非市场投机、长期主义（平均持有期为八年）、集中投资于少数高信念投资以及使用直觉。他将直觉定义为“不思考的思考”，一种超越纯粹智力的模式识别形式。 Hohn谈到了他从激进的积极分子到参与型所有者的转变，发现需要与企业进行建设性的讨论。他强调良好的治理很重要。 Hohn描述了他做空 Wirecard 的经历，强调了做空的危险。做空很难，因为风险和回报不对称。而且因为你可能是正确的，但最终必须平仓。 TCI 的企业文化是小型的、合作的，并且基于无形的信任。 Hohn 将文化契合度和长期团队动态置于原始才能之上。 TCI 的很大一部分利润被用于慈善事业，重点关注气候变化以及非洲和印度的儿童健康。 Hohn 将慈善事业视为源于服务人类愿望的“灵魂冲动”。 Hohn谈到了对 ESG 的强烈反对，特别是“E”（环境），他感叹那种优先考虑短期利润而不是地球和子孙后代福祉的心态。他强调，为了有效地应对全球挑战，必须转变意识。最后，他建议走精神道路的年轻人拥抱精神世界的现实，并将自己与灵魂连接起来，将其视为真正目标、意义和喜悦的源泉。

Chris Hohn, founder of TCI, one of Europe's most successful funds and a major charitable foundation, joins Nikola Tangan to discuss investment philosophy and philanthropy. Hohn emphasizes the importance of "high barriers to entry" or "moats" in good investments. These moats make it difficult for competitors to enter the market and erode profits. Hohn distinguishes this from simply focusing on growth or newness. While distressed assets or cheap, low-quality assets can be good investments if trading at significant discounts, he prefers businesses with sustainable competitive advantages. These moats can take various forms: irreplaceable physical assets (like airports, toll roads, telecom towers), intellectual property (aircraft engines), installed base, scale, network effects (Visa, Meta), strong brands (McDonald's), and high customer switching costs (mission-critical software). Crucially, Hohn values sustainable moats with multiple layers of defense. He underscores that competition destroys profits, and substitution can eliminate a business. While recurring revenue streams are important, Hohn prioritizes essential products and services over discretionary ones. He uses the example of rating agencies whose services are ultimately essential. He stresses the distinction between growth driven by volume versus price, highlighting the immense value of pricing power – the ability to raise prices above inflation. Companies with pricing power can experience significant profit growth even with moderate volume increases. Hohn discusses the double-edged sword of regulation. While low barriers to entry invite competition and substitution, extremely high barriers can attract regulatory scrutiny. The ideal situation involves weak and rational competition. He steers clear of certain industries he deems inherently risky or unprofitable, including banks (due to leverage, opacity, and potential for mismanagement), auto manufacturing, retail, insurance, commodity manufacturing, tobacco, traditional asset managers, fossil fuel utilities, airlines, wireless telecom, and media (due to competition and disruption). He analyzes Microsoft as an example of a tech company with a strong moat due to bundling and customer switching costs. While investing in Alphabet, he acknowledges the increasing competition in search. He believes that AI will generally increase productivity but will dramatically disrupt certain sectors like call centers and Indian outsourcing. Hohn explains that his team first evaluates the strength and sustainability of a company's moats before considering valuation metrics. They focus on long-term valuations using discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. The longer the investment horizon, the greater the value of companies with durable competitive advantages and compounding earnings power. He argues the best businesses outperform over time and often the short term market fluctuates around that long term trend. Hohn posits that the best businesses in the public market are often superior to those in the private equity space because private equity firms are typically limited to smaller, less-dominant companies. He believes sales occur when views of intrinsic value are not as good as other things and when faith begins to wane. Regarding his approach to investing, Hohn emphasizes humility, a willingness to acknowledge errors, a focus on company fundamentals rather than market speculation, long-termism (with an average holding period of eight years), concentration in a few high-conviction investments, and the use of intuition. He defines intuition as "thinking without thinking," a form of pattern recognition operating beyond pure intellect. Hohn touches on his journey from aggressive activist to engaged owner, finding the need for constructive discussion with businesses. He emphasizes good governance matters. Hohn describes his experiences shorting Wirecard, emphasizing the danger of shorting. It is difficult to short because the asymmetric risk and reward. And because you can be correct but have to eventually cover. The TCI corporate culture is small, collegiate, and based on intangible trust. Hohn prioritizes cultural fit and long-term team dynamics over raw talent. A significant portion of TCI's profits are channeled to charitable causes, with a focus on climate change and children's health in Africa and India. Hohn sees philanthropy as a "soul urge" rooted in a desire to serve humanity. Hohn addresses the backlash against ESG, particularly the "E" (environmental), lamenting the mindset that prioritizes short-term profits over the well-being of the planet and future generations. He emphasizes the necessity of a shift in consciousness to address global challenges effectively. Finally, he advises young people on a spiritual path to embrace the reality of the spiritual world and connect to their souls, seeing it as the source of real purpose, meaning, and joy.

摘要

Sir Chris Hohn: Strategic Investing, Long-Term Value and Purposeful Philanthropy In this episode, Nicolai Tangen sits down with ...

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中英文字稿

Hi everyone, I'm Nikola Tangan and today we are joined by one of the best investors of all time actually. So Chris Horn, not only is his fund TCI one of the best and most successful funds that Europe has ever seen but also the charity is one now one of the largest in the world. So Chris you continue to have a immense positive impact on the world thanks for coming. Big life. Let's start with the investment world. What makes a good investment? I think this is something a lot of people get wrong. They think it's about growth often. Or something new. Neither of those things in themselves are to us matter by themselves. The most important thing and without which it's let's say the types of investing that we do is high barriers to entry. The most that Warren Buffett has talked about.

大家好，我是尼古拉·坦根，今天我们邀请到了一位被誉为有史以来最优秀的投资者之一。克里斯·霍恩，他的基金TCI不仅是欧洲最成功的基金之一，他创立的慈善机构现在也成为全球最大的慈善机构之一。克里斯，你持续对世界产生着巨大的积极影响，谢谢你的到来。人生很精彩。那么，我们从投资世界开始聊聊。什么才是好的投资？我认为很多人对此都有误解。他们往往认为这与增长或创新有关。事实上，这两者本身并不是我们所看重的。最关键的一点，也是缺之不可的，就是高进入门槛。这也是沃伦·巴菲特曾经提到的一个重要因素。

Now can we dig into that the can a distressed asset of a piece of real estate that selling at half price because of a liquidation also be a good investment? Yes. So can there be a role for cheap average assets? Yeah, let's call them low quality assets which are trading at big discounts to replacement cost. Yes, that's the type of investing that can work that I've done in my time. Yeah, cheap average businesses or cheap bad businesses. But I don't feel that I can have any confidence in that type of investing because the earnings power of those averages businesses is unpredictable.

现在我们来探讨一下，一个因为清算而以半价出售的不良房地产资产是否也可以被视为一个好的投资？可以。那么，看似普通但廉价的资产是否也有其作用呢？可以称它们为“低质量资产”，因为它们的交易价格大大低于重置成本。没错，这是一种能够奏效的投资方法，我也曾在我的职业生涯中实践过。像廉价的普通公司或低价的劣质公司。但我对这种投资方式没有信心，因为这些普通公司的盈利能力是不可预测的。

So what are good modes? The most important answer is ones that are sustainable. And ideally you would have multiple modes, multiple pieces of defense. And your sense of it, modes is basically something that means that the business is difficult to replace. Difficult to compete with. Yes, and replace. Substitution, risk and competition risk. Those long-term become very difficult because why is this so important? Competition kills profits. Yeah, that's as simple as that. Substitution eliminates your business.

那么，什么是好的商业护城河呢？最重要的答案是那些可持续的护城河。理想情况下，你应该拥有多种护城河，多重防御措施。护城河基本上意味着一个业务很难被取代，很难与之竞争。是的，还包括取代。替代风险和竞争风险。在长期来看，这些风险会变得非常困难，因为这为什么如此重要呢？竞争会削弱利润，没错，就是这么简单。而替代则会使你的业务消失。

So we look at, there are many, many modes. One, which most people don't look at, most of us don't really look at actually, interestingly, is irreplaceable physical assets. Okay, we're in a world where people just look at earnings. They don't look at asset value or physical assets. And so we like quite a bit of infrastructure. Airports, for example, one of our investments, which has been the airport group in Spain where they got private data, ASIena. And you just can never, they'll never build a second airport at Madrid or any of the places. These are natural monopolies.

我们来看，有许多不同的模式。其中有一个大多数人没有注意到的，或者说我们大多数人实际上并没有真正关注的，这就是不可替代的实物资产。现在我们生活在一个只看收益的世界里，人们很少关注资产价值或实物资产。因此，我们非常看好基础设施，比如机场，这是我们的一项投资，比如西班牙的某机场集团。他们获得了私人数据 ASIena。在马德里或其他任何地方，你不可能看到第二个机场建立起来，这些都是天然的垄断。

And so that also applies to toll roads and railroads and telecom towers. So there are many forms of infrastructure, transmission towers that are hard to compete with because then natural monopolies where of course, some of these things can be overbuilt like cable. So there's a form of infrastructure. But it's usually, and you have to look at the details of case by case, very unusual to try to and usually don't get the planning to build a second airport. So no economic case to it. I can't remember how long it has struggled to get an extra runway and hit for it. Right. So planning, exactly. Planning and then roads is no economic case to build a second road or you don't have the land. So for different, literally no, so infrastructure is, physical assets is one.

因此，这也适用于收费公路、铁路和电信塔。这些都是不同形式的基础设施，比如传输塔，这些设施通常很难与之竞争，因为它们是自然垄断的。当然，有些东西，比如有线电视，可以有重复建设的可能性。但通常情况下，尤其需要具体情况具体分析，很少会有计划建第二个机场，因为没有经济上的可行性。我记不清楚他们为了在希思罗机场增加一条跑道奋斗了多久，对吧。所以规划就是这样。规划上来说，道路也没有经济理由去建第二条公路，或者根本没有足够的土地资源。因此，从不同角度来看，基础设施是实际的资产的一种。

A second is IP. intellectual property. That's right. And which is so advanced. Okay. That is very difficult to replicate. So what kind of intellectual property are you thinking? One space we like is aircraft engines. And there is a very complicated product because the materials complexity, the engines run at such high temperatures that metals melt. And so many different things have to come together. Thousands and thousands of complex parts. So that's one where that's a business where there are only two players in narrow body engines and two in wide body. And there'd be no new entrance for more than 50 years. The last new entrance was and so that tells you something.

第二个是知识产权。对，就是知识产权。而且这个技术非常先进，以至于很难复制。那么你在想什么样的知识产权呢？我们关注的一个领域是航空发动机。这是一种非常复杂的产品，因为材料的复杂性，发动机在高温下运行，金属会融化，需要许多不同的因素结合在一起。成千上万个复杂的部件组成了这样的产品。在窄体飞机发动机领域只有两家企业，宽体飞机发动机领域也只有两家，并且在过去50多年里没有新的竞争者。这说明了一些问题。

Yeah. It's a big industry. But it's so complex. Very hard to enter. Another barrier to entry is installed base. Okay. Which applies to the aircraft engine business. Once those engines are there, they for various reasons, you get the spare parts business on it. And another of their barriers to entry is scale. Although that's that's not a guarantee of competitive mode. Network effects is another important barrier to entry. You can see this in assets like visa, meta, two examples of network effects. And brands are another barrier to entry. But I'm not saying every brand is powerful. But you think about a McDonald's, it has a value.

是的，这是一个庞大的行业，但它非常复杂，很难进入。另一个进入壁垒是现有的设备基础。这适用于飞机发动机业务。一旦这些发动机投入使用，由于各种原因，企业可以从中获得备件业务。另一个进入壁垒是规模，尽管这并不能保证形成竞争优势。网络效应是另一个重要的进入壁垒。你可以在像Visa和Meta这样的资产中看到这种效应的例子。品牌也是一个进入壁垒，但并不是说所有品牌都很有影响力。想想麦当劳，它就有其价值。

Some brands which are powerful and sustainable, but not all. And I'll mention one more mode, which is customer switching costs. Take mission critical software. Once it's installed, companies are very reluctant to mess with it and switch because of the complexity. How important are recurring revenue streams for you when you look at businesses? It is important. But the predictability of when they recur is not.

有一些品牌既强大又可持续，但并不是全部。我还要提到另一个因素，就是客户转换成本。以关键任务软件为例。一旦安装，公司由于其复杂性，通常不愿意更换。看企业时，持续性收入流对你有多重要？重要的是有持续性收入，但这些收入何时会再次出现的可预测性并不重要。

Okay. Let me give you an example. So what's most important for us is something slightly different, which is essential product or service. We don't like things which are discretionary. Okay. So one space we've invested in for a long time is rating agencies. And here, these are the people who basically give kind of character to different type of forms. Yeah, they say, is it good or bad? The people who invest in bonds, they say, is it investment grade, non investment grade, to give for research? And if you like, bless it. And there, you can actually defer an issue of pace for the rating, but they don't have to refinance their bonds, which is a big part of it in any given year.

好的，让我给你举个例子。对我们来说，最重要的是一些略有不同的事物，也就是那些必要的产品或服务。我们不太喜欢那些可有可无的东西。好，我们长期投资的一个领域是评级机构。在这里，这些机构基本上给不同类型的形式做评价，他们会说，这个好还是不好。投资债券的人，他们会根据评级来判断是否是投资级，还是非投资级，以便做研究。如果愿意，他们可以在评级上盖个“章”表示批准。在这种情况下，你实际上可以推迟支付评级费用，但他们不需要在任何特定年份为债券再融资，这是其中很重要的一部分。

They can delay and defer. But eventually, the debt has to be refinanced and rated. So there's a, and so I think essential need is the bigger point. But usually our companies have recurring and predictable revenue streams of essential products. Yeah. And so do they have to grow depending on valuation, not necessarily. And that's not necessarily the fast rate.

他们可以推迟和延期。但最终，债务还是需要进行再融资和评级。因此，我认为关键点在于基本需求。通常，我们的公司都有重复和可预测的必需品收入来源。那么，他们是否必须根据估值来增长呢？不一定，也不一定要以快速的速度增长。

Okay. And growth can come from two forms, volume and price. So you have to break it down. Now, why is growth as important as people, investors usually assume it to be? Because you can have profitless growth. The airline industry over 100 years has had a lot of growth. Airline travel has grown at 5% a year. Yeah. It continues to grow consistently. But airlines as a business, humanatively and collectively have made almost minimal profits. Despite growth, because the very low barriers to entry.

好的。增长可以来自两种形式：数量和价格。因此，你需要细分。现在，为什么增长被认为像人们和投资者通常预期的那样重要呢？因为你可能会遇到无利润增长的情况。航空业在过去一百年里经历了大量的增长。航空旅行每年以5%的速度增长。是的，它持续稳定地增长。但航空公司作为一个整体业务，累计起来几乎没有取得可观的利润。尽管有增长，但由于进入门槛非常低的原因，利润却很少。

And so, so I would say growth without barriers to entry is, is not a combination that you want. Some of these businesses are quite capital intensive. Like it's not cheap to build an airport. Yeah. Does that matter for you? Well, you have to look like everything into the detail. And some airports, all airports have a regulation on landing charges. But some, the non-landing charges are unregulated. The shops, the advertising, the VIP lounges, the parking. Yep.

所以，我想说的是，没有进入壁垒的增长并不是一种你想要的组合。有些业务是相当资本密集的，比如建造一个机场并不便宜。是的，这对你来说重要吗？你需要仔细研究所有细节。各个机场都有关于降落费用的规定。但非降落费用，例如商店、广告、贵宾休息室、停车场的收费，有的机场则没有受到管制。对的。

And the so-called dual-till regulation. One till is regulated, one till is unregulated. And those are very low capital in intensity. Yep. It's in effect. Yep. And high returns on capital. And they grow because there's more and more demand for travel. And so, and again, capital intensity by itself, it's part of the equation. Okay. But it still, it tells you how valuable growth is.

所谓的“双通道”监管，一个通道受监管，另一个通道不受监管。这些通道的资本密集度很低。是的，它已经在实施。而且资本回报率很高。它们的发展得益于对旅行需求的不断增长。此外，资本密集度本身只是方程式的一部分，但它仍可以告诉你增长有多有价值。

Okay. But what Trump's, if you don't mind that, to me, expression. What Trump's the, the all of this is still a valid expression. Yes. Trump's all of this is the the the the the the Barry century.

好的。但如果你不介意，我想说的是，"特朗普"对我来说，是一种表达方式。尽管如此，"特朗普"这一表达方式仍然是有效的。是的，"特朗普"之所以重要，是因为他是巴里的世纪。

Okay. What about regulation? You've been, you've been big things. Yeah. I'll go into that. But I want to go back to the, the point about growth can come from two forms price and volume. Yeah. Okay. And most companies don't have pricing power. They can only price if they're lucky at inflation. And that's why people don't focus on it. They don't even look at where growth comes or they just assume it's volume plus inflation.

好的。那么关于监管呢？你一直在做大事。是的，我会谈到这一点。但我想回到关于增长的观点上，增长可以来自价格和数量两种形式。是的。大多数公司没有定价权。如果运气好的话，他们只能根据通货膨胀来定价。这就是为什么人们不关注它的原因。他们甚至不去研究增长的来源，而只是认为增长是数量加上通货膨胀。

But there is a special group of super companies that can price above inflation. And that's, as Buffett taught, the test of whether you have the vote. Okay. And this real pricing power above inflation can be very valuable. Because if you can price one percent above inflation and you have a 20 percent profit margin, your profits will go five percent faster than revenue. And people don't go into it or analyze it because there's so few companies that have it.

有一类特别的超级公司，它们能够定价超过通货膨胀。这就是巴菲特所说的"是否拥有投票权"的考验。能够超越通货膨胀进行定价是非常有价值的。因为如果你的定价能比通胀高出1%，而你的利润率是20%，那么你的利润增长速度将会比收入增长快5%。很多人没有深入研究这一点，因为拥有这种能力的公司实在是太少了。

But, but, but, this is something we have a lot of investments. Have this. Because incremental pricing is pretty much all profits. That's right. And it's very potent if you have the lower your margin is. So this is why you asked about growth. And is it, how important? If you're asking about volume growth, but I and I have low volume growth, but I have a lot of pricing growth, that's actually more important. Because of the leverage defect of there's no cost associated with it.

但是，但是，但是，这是一项我们投入了大量资金的事情。要注意这一点。因为增量定价几乎全部是利润。没错。如果你的利润率较低，这会非常有效。这就是为什么你会问关于增长的问题。那么增长有多重要呢？如果你问的是销量增长，而我销量增长不大，但我在价格上的增长很大，那其实更重要。因为在价格增长中没有额外成本，这具有杠杆效应。

Regulation. Yes. You have been in a lot of regular businesses. So you mentioned airports, but you've been in Red Electric, which is like a electricity transmission company. Don't quite a few of these things. Yes, I have. And actually it's a general risk. Because if you have barriers too low, competition or substitution eliminates your business and your investment, barriers too high.

监管。是的。你曾参与过许多常规的业务。你提到了机场，但你也参与过像电力传输公司“Red Electric”这样的行业。你做过相当多这样的事情。是的，我确实有参与。实际上，这涉及到一个普遍的风险。因为如果进入壁垒太低，竞争或替代可能会摧毁你的业务和投资；而如果进入壁垒太高，就......

Regulators make come knocking on your door. Yeah. Every case is different. Yeah. And the ideal case is you that there is competition, but weak competition. And the parent competition. Okay. So tell me what is the parent's competition? Yeah. Well, it's really weak competition and rational competition. Okay. So the take some water examples. Pratt and Whitney competes with G and Safran. It has a 25% share of new orders. It can, it has a product, but it's not nearly as good. Yeah. It's not 35% of its engines grounded. Multiple technical problems. There's lots of trust, but it's there competing and for new engines. Yeah. But prices isn't the most important thing in this industry. Reliability is. And so you, and so, and as it struggles, it has to raise prices because it's got a very, you know, lots of difficulties.

监管机构可能会找上门来。是的，每个案例都不同。理想的情况是，市场上存在竞争，但竞争不是很激烈，存在母公司的竞争。那么，什么是母公司的竞争呢？实际上，这是非常轻微的竞争和理性的竞争。举个例子，普惠公司（Pratt and Whitney）与通用电气（GE）和赛峰集团（Safran）竞争。普惠占有25%的新订单份额，有产品，但产品性能不如竞争对手强。其发动机中有35%因技术问题停飞。虽然有一定的信任基础，他们仍在为新发动机进行竞争。然而，在这个行业中，价格不是最重要的，可靠性才是。因此，由于面临很多困难，普惠公司不得不提高价格。

And sometimes where there is competition, that competition chooses not to compete, you know, generally speaking, not a specific industry, decides to be rational. Yeah. And compete on, you know, non-priced based approach. Okay. And then the detail matters. So you might have looked at Heathrow Airport and say, oh, that airport is fully regulated. Airports can't be good. But if you look into the detail of Aina, it's a different animal. It has a piece that's regulated and a much bigger piece, 70% of the value, maybe more, which is unregulated. Yeah.

有时候，在竞争存在的情况下，竞争对手选择不去竞争。一般来说，不是特定行业，而是选择一种理性的方式，不通过价格竞争。而细节就变得很重要。比如，你可能会认为希思罗机场是完全受监管的，可能会觉得这种情况下机场表现不好。但是，如果你仔细研究Aina，会发现情况不同。Aina有部分是受监管的，但更大的一部分，大约70%的价值，甚至更多，是不受监管的。

And so maybe the unregulated business, the regulated business will give you a bond like return, 7% for the unregulated, give you a much higher return. Do you see? Do you know the airport businesses you've been very big in has been the stock exchange. And all you both Deutsche Berzer, Deutsche Exchange and so on. In the past, yes. Yes. Why were they so good? In the case of Deutsche Borcer, starting with that, they had a derivative business called Eurex, which was a natural monopoly.

所以，也许无监管业务会给你一个类似债券的回报，比如说7%，而无监管业务可能会带来更高的回报。你明白吗？你知道吗？你一直以来参与的机场业务，其实一直就像是股票交易所一样。而所有这些交易所，比如德意志交易所等，过去都是很不错的。为什么它们那么好呢？以德意志交易所为例，他们有一个叫做 Eurex 的衍生品业务，这是一个自然垄断。

It was a network effect. This was the barrier to entry that liquidity of a marketplace for training bond futures, European bond futures. The network could affect of getting best prices in the most liquid market meant it became what it's term to win it takes all or natural monopoly. And once you have that liquidity, very hard to move people away. Price, you can never compete on best price. And on the stock exchange has that for a LCH clean it business, a clearing business.

这是一个网络效应。这种效应成为了进入市场的壁垒，特别是在培训债券期货和欧洲债券期货的市场流动性方面。网络效应使得在流动性最强的市场中获得最佳价格，因此形成了所谓的“赢者通吃”或自然垄断的局面。一旦市场具有这种流动性，很难让人们转移到其他地方。在最佳价格方面，你永远无法竞争。而股票交易所拥有这样的一个清算业务（LCH 清算业务），这就是这种网络效应的典型例子。

And so where an exchange can see me has it on US futures, establish this natural monopoly by being the first mover. The winner takes all. Then these exchanges can be very good. But of course, they've changed now. On stock exchanges in many different businesses sells data and half their earnings are from data. And that's non-proprietory data, reselling non-proprietory data. So it has a vulnerability on that piece. They're no longer just what they used to be.

所以，当一个交易所在美国期货市场中占据领先地位并形成自然垄断时，它可能会非常成功。先到者得天下。这些交易所可能会表现得非常好。但当然，现在情况已经发生了变化。许多股票交易所涉足了不同行业，其中一半的收益来自于数据销售，而这些数据并不是专有数据，而是转售非专有数据。这使得它们在这一方面具有一定的脆弱性。它们已经不再是过去的样子了。

And then there was a lot of growth without capital. As people came and traded more as capital markets grew, you grew without capital, which was very valuable. One of the type of companies you would never invest in. Type of industry. Yeah, that's a good question. We have a long list of companies we don't invest in. We're very focused. And we call them the risky and bad industries. And I have invested in some of these in the past, but I've learned banks. Sorry for that.

然后，有很多不需要资本的增长。随着更多的人来交易，资本市场增长，你在没有资本的情况下成长，这非常有价值。这是一种你不会投资的公司类型。行业类型。对，这是个好问题。我们有一长串不投资的公司。我们非常专注，并称其为风险高、不好的行业。我过去曾投资过其中一些，但我学到了教训，比如银行。对此我感到抱歉。

That is a bank. No, the central bank. Central bank is good. Yes, we don't like banks. We don't like banks. And why not? The low quality of earnings because they're very leveraged. And much more than people think. Because people look at equity, they're risk weighted assets, but equity to total assets. Many banks have run at a hundred times. And so two, they're opaque. You can't look into the book. You can't, Leah, you can't.

那是一家银行。不，是中央银行。中央银行很好。是的，我们不喜欢普通银行。我们不喜欢银行。为什么不喜欢呢？因为银行的盈利质量很低，因为他们的杠杆率很高，甚至比人们想象的要高得多。人们通常只看银行的股权、风险加权资产，但实际上是股权对比总资产。许多银行的杠杆率达到一百倍。另外，它们不透明。你无法一窥其账本，真的无法做到。

I remember pre-financial crisis. I had a look at credit twists and I sat down with the then CEO, Rady Dugan, and said, put his balance sheet in front of him from the annual accounts, and said, you have a multi-trillion dollar balance sheet. Can we walk through the line items? Because I don't understand it. He said, I don't either. Very honest guy. I really like them. Very honest. Okay, so banks you don't do. What else do you do?

我记得在金融危机之前，我查看了一些信贷变化，然后和当时的首席执行官雷迪·杜根坐下来，把年度财务报表放在他面前，说：“你有一个数万亿美元的资产负债表。我们能一起过一下每一项吗？因为我不太明白。” 他说：“我也不明白。” 他是个非常诚实的人，我非常喜欢他。非常诚实。那么，银行这部分你不涉及，你还做些什么呢？

And the other reason for banks is very important. You know, that sooner or later, you may find someone without a lot of intelligence comes to run them. And then it could be toxic. Yeah, people going for growth, Anglo-Irish bank, if you remember that one. They just can destroy the shareholders by getting bonuses, you know, best-earns, you know, and non-alignment of interest with leverage and opacity. So what are the other things?

另一种原因对银行来说也非常重要。你知道，迟早可能会有一个不太聪明的人来管理它们。这可能会带来很大的风险。是的，大家追求增长，比如安格罗-爱尔兰银行，你还记得那个吗？他们可以通过拿奖金来破坏股东的利益，赚取高薪，但他们的利益与公司杠杆率和透明度不一致。那么，还有哪些其他问题呢？

Well, the other is, oh, many, the auto industry is obviously a commodity, retail, you know, insurance, the commodities, the commodity manufacturing, tobacco, the truth is, yeah, anything in most things in manufacturing. Okay. So, so most industries. Most industries are bad industries. So Chris, it doesn't leave a big universe. Correct. We say maybe there's 200 companies that we consider to be high quality and investable. And I mean, I'll let you a couple more. Traditional asset managers, bad businesses, yeah. Speaking as one, fossil fuel utilities, bad businesses, airlines, bad businesses, wireless telecom, bad businesses, we think media is bad, advertising agencies, you know, it's a very long list. Why? Because it's competitive. And with existing players and new technologies, and the one important thing that I've learned in my time in investing is investors underestimate the forces of competition and disruption.

好的，另一个是，很多行业，比如汽车行业，很明显就是一种商品，零售业、保险业、商品制造业、烟草业，其实，大多数制造行业都是这样的。所以，大多数行业并不是好的行业。这样看来，可供选择的好企业并不多。我们认为可能有大约200家公司被认为是高质量且值得投资的。我再多说几个例子，传统资产管理公司也是不好的行业，我自己就是其中一员。化石燃料公共事业公司、航空公司、无线电信公司，这些都是不好的行业。我们还认为媒体业不好，广告公司也是。这个清单很长。为什么呢？因为竞争激烈。不仅有现有的竞争者，还有新的技术。根据我在投资领域的经验，我发现投资者往往低估了竞争和颠覆的力量。

Because they just look today, maybe there's a new company which has a first mover advantage. But then competition comes in, yeah, substitution and and where is it? Where does it leave the big US tech companies? Yeah. So a lot of power of incompetency. Yes. It's another important point. So let's take a company, the Microsoft. Okay, which we've invested in. And one of their barriers to entry is bundling. Okay. Or maybe because it creates a customer switching cost. What do I mean by this? So the office franchise, which we're all familiar with, has many products in it. You know, your applications, processing, Excel, your email, security, different things. And they sell it as a bundle. Yep, they don't disaggregate it. And when a new product or a potential competitor enters, they can add it to the bundle.

因为他们今天只是观察，可能出现了一家具有先发优势的新公司。但随后竞争开始进入，是的，替代产品也出现了，那这让美国大的科技公司处于什么位置呢？是的，这暗示了很多无能的力量。这是另一个重要的观点。来谈谈一个公司，比如微软。我们对它进行了投资。它的一个进入壁垒就是捆绑销售。或者说这可能是因为它创造了客户的转换成本。我的意思是，我们都熟悉的Office套装中有很多产品，比如各种应用程序、Excel、电子邮件、安全等，他们把这些作为一个组合来销售。是的，他们不会拆分这些产品。当有新的产品或潜在竞争对手出现时，他们可以把它添加到这套产品组合中。

So Zoom came out with video conferencing. And they could have potentially, you know, added all the things Microsoft does to that. So Microsoft had to respond and they launched Teams. And they were able to distribute it through the bundle. Yeah, free to everybody. And even though Zoom, some people believe it was a better product, or as a better product, Microsoft won that battle because they had the installed base, the incompetency, which we talked about and high switching costs because once people are using their office software, they don't want to switch. And so people started using Teams. Okay. Something given to you free. Why? Because it was good enough. Yeah, it didn't have to be the best if I if it's free.

Zoom推出了视频会议功能，他们本可以在此基础上添加微软提供的所有功能。因此，微软必须做出回应，他们推出了Teams。微软通过捆绑的方式进行分发，对所有人免费开放。尽管有些人认为Zoom是一个更好的产品，但微软赢得了这场竞争，因为他们拥有庞大的用户基础和高切换成本。一旦人们使用了他们的办公软件，他们就不愿意切换。所以大家开始使用Teams。为什么要提供免费服务呢？因为它已经够用了，即使不是最好的，但如果是免费的，人们也愿意用。

Yeah. What about the other tech companies? We have a position in alphabet, and which is maybe a most risky investment, where they're clearly the company, and it's the smallest investments as a result. And where we have some level of protection because there are businesses like YouTube and their cloud business, which represent half the market cap. Today and the cash and another thing. So it isn't all search, but search is critical. And so can they out innovate competition? Yeah, there's a risk of search fragmenting, you know, as competitors come in and try to, but it's a question mark. We don't think so. We think they have a lot of advantages of their data that have to offer higher quality search results. But competition is increasing.

好的。那么其他科技公司呢？我们在Alphabet上有投资，这可能是一个风险较大的投资，因为显然这家公司在我们的投资组合中占比最小。不过我们有一定的保护措施，比如他们的YouTube和云业务，这两个业务占了总市值的一半。今天还有现金和其他因素。所以他们不全靠搜索业务，但搜索业务仍然至关重要。至于他们能否在创新中超越竞争对手？嗯，搜索业务有被分化的风险，因为竞争者会进入市场并尝试抢占份额，但这仍然是个未知数。我们不这样认为。我们认为他们拥有的数据优势能够提供更高质量的搜索结果。然而，竞争正在加剧。

Talking of which, how do you think AI will change the investment landscape here? It's going to increase disruption in ways we can't even predict, but there are things like call centers. We'll go bankrupt. And another segment is Indian outsourcing companies. Who do coding and things like that. Demand for those services could collapse because AI can do coding. You know, with half the people, yeah. Yeah. So there are, but AI will increase the productivity and lower the cost base of all companies. And so if you have a company with these barriers entry, it's going to be worth more. I think for generally competitive businesses, if you don't lead, you could become uncompetitive and be disrupted here.

说到这个，你认为人工智能会如何改变这里的投资环境？它将以我们无法预见的方式增加行业的颠覆性变化。例如，像呼叫中心这样的行业可能会面临破产。还有印度的一些外包公司，它们主要负责编码和类似的工作。因为人工智能可以进行编程，这类服务的需求可能会大幅下降，只需要一半的人力，没错，没错。但是，人工智能会提高所有公司的生产力并降低成本基础。因此，如果你的公司有这些进入壁垒，它将变得更有价值。我认为对于那些一般性竞争的企业来说，如果你不引领潮流，可能会变得没有竞争力并在这里被颠覆。

So now we have identified one of these companies. Let's say, I don't know, I know, or Roslois or Microsoft, how do you value these companies? What is your valuation tool? We don't even look at that until we get comfortable that the barriers are so strong, it will be around. Yeah. Okay. So yeah, yeah. We think it will be around. Yeah, we think it'll be around. We think that we'll continue to be on our board in Madrid. But we'll do reference checks on relevant people. Okay. So and see if we're missing something. So we, when we were looking at investing in aircraft engines, we spoke to the CEO of a former CEO of one of the competitive companies.

好的，现在我们已经确定了其中一家公司。就比如说，我不知道，也许是Roslois或微软。那么，你该如何对这些公司进行估值呢？你使用的估值工具是什么？在我们确信这些公司的竞争壁垒非常强大，能够长期存在之前，我们甚至都不会去考虑估值的问题。是的，所以我们相信它们会长期存在。我们认为它们将继续出现在我们位于马德里的董事会上。但我们会对相关人员进行背景调查，以确保我们没有遗漏任何重要信息。例如，当我们考虑投资航空发动机时，我们与其中一家竞争公司的前CEO进行过交流。

And he confirmed their thesis and actually said the margins should be much, much higher. Okay. And over time, they will go there. So that's one of the pieces of diligence. We will assess management where I think it's important, but not critical if you have the right assets through ideally through meeting them. The talk to competitors, get their view. And look at competitive companies, look at the track record of the company. And usually you don't understand everything. And usually the things you find out are bad things. And I think we'll discuss it with our team and we want to hear competing views.

他确认了他们的观点，并表示利润率实际上应该高得多。好的。随着时间的推移，利润率将会上升。因此，这部分工作是我们对管理层进行评估的一环，我认为这是很重要的，但如果你有合适的资产，这不算是至关紧要的。最好通过与他们会面来实现，此外还可以与竞争对手交谈，了解对方的看法。同时也要关注竞争公司和公司的过往表现。通常情况下，你不能完全理解所有事情，通常你发现的问题都是负面的。我认为我们需要与团队讨论这些问题，并希望听到不同的意见。

Yeah, we have some members of the team are just inherently bearish. And they're good for testing the back case. We always want to hear how could technology disrupt? Yeah. And they'll just walk competition. And are you a bearish guy? Not particularly. No. I have, yeah. What kind of valuation metrics do you look at? Peace, cash flows, do you do DCFs? You have like 50 pages, right?

是的，我们团队中有些成员天生就比较悲观。但他们对于检验最坏情况非常有用。我们总想知道技术如何可能带来颠覆。他们也会看看竞争情况。你是个悲观的人吗？不是特别悲观。我会看哪些估值指标呢？市盈率、现金流量，你会做折现现金流分析（DCF）吗？你有像50页那么多的分析吗？

Yeah. All of those, right. All of those, but not 50 pages. So you know, that sets but a very, but really honestly, one of the things we learned is there's a really important point is that we can have an advantage through long-termism.

是啊，没错，所有这些都对。但我们不是在谈论50页的长篇幅。你知道的，这些观点确实重要，但说实话，我们学到了一个非常重要的点，就是我们可以通过长期主义获得优势。

Which is the average stock is held by an institutional investor by under a year or the stock market in the US. How long do you hold it? Average holding period of our current portfolio is eight years. Eight years. Yeah, that's eight years. I'm not saying that's the limit. It's just the, we've on average, some we've held for 13 years, some new investments like G.A.R.A.R.A. Space, two years, for the average, way to the average holding period is eight years.

在美国，机构投资者持有股票的平均时间通常不到一年。你持有多久呢？我们目前投资组合的平均持有期是八年。八年，是的，就是八年。我并不是说这是限制，只是平均而言。有些我们已经持有了十三年，而一些新的投资，比如G.A.R.A.R.A. Space，我们持有了两年，总体来说，平均持有期是八年。

Yeah. So, but it could be 10. It could be 20. Yeah. I love long-term, right? But how do you install that type of thinking into your organization? I mean, we don't do, so we really care about business school. You want to, hey, I mean, you know, went to Harvard like you did or whatever it is. Just like, hey, let's do some stuff. Come on, let's do some stuff.

好的。但是可能是十年，也可能是二十年。我喜欢长期思考，对吧？但是你怎样才能把这种思维方式植入到你的组织中呢？我们不这样做，所以我们真的很重视商学院。你想，比如说去哈佛或者类似的学校。就像，嘿，我们来做点事情吧。来吧，做点事情。

Yeah. And it's just like, okay, let's buy something and hold it for eight years. Right? You come home to your partner every day. It's just like they do nothing. They do see, we really, you know, if you are in the private equity world, that's normal. Yeah. A private equity fund would hold an investment for their 10-year life funds normally, or longer, 12 years, yeah.

好的。这就像，好吧，我们买了某个东西，然后持有八年，对吧？你每天回家见到你的伴侣，就觉得像是什么也没做。他们真的没什么动作。如果你身处私募股权的世界，这很正常。私募股权基金通常会持有一个投资长达10年，甚至更久，比如12年。

As you know. And so, we, as an overused expression for some or misused, we take a private equity approach, i.e. that we have to hold the company forever. Because you, the stock market may be at a very bad price, when you want to sell.

正如你所知。我们采用了一种可能被某些人过度使用或误用的表达方式，即采取私募股权的方式。这意味着我们必须长期持有公司，因为当你想卖出时，股市的价格可能非常不理想。

Yeah. If you need to sell, and so I really think you need to have that approach. And so the way we really like our long-term valuations DCF, the most important things. And here's the DCF. You take the cash flow and you discount it after today. Yeah.

好的。如果你需要出售，我真的认为你需要有这种方法。我们非常看重长期估值，DCF（现金流贴现）是最重要的。DCF就是你拿未来的现金流，并把它折现回今天的价值。

But here's the thing is, the longer you can look out, if you've got a great company, the more valuable value there is. Take a company we own Moody's. Moody's. I raise it. It's a crazy energy. So it's been around a hundred years. What do you think the average, I can ask you a question, make it fun? What do you think the average revenue growth over that hundred years has been?

但是事情是这样的：如果你有一家优秀的公司，那么你能看到的前景越长远，公司就越有价值。拿我们所拥有的穆迪公司来说。穆迪，我提到它是因为它有一种独特的活力。这个公司已经存在了100年。你觉得在这100年里，它的平均收入增长率是多少？我可以问你这个问题，让它变得有趣一点？

I'm going to look like a total full. But 100 is a long time. Seven percent? Ten. Wow. After you know that very, that's a very unusual number, or a very long time period. And so investors have always underestimated its value, including myself.

我要看起来像个完全的傻瓜了。但100是个很长的时间。七个百分点？十个百分点。哇。你知道后，这真是个不寻常的数字，或者是一个很长的时间段。因此，投资者总是低估它的价值，包括我自己。

Yeah. And I bought the stock during the financial crisis at ten time's earnings and then even bought shares more and Buffett was selling and he reduced his stake from 25% to I think he's got 15% and built share. And the, are you kind of secretive please having bought something but then I sold it.

好的。我在金融危机期间以市盈率十倍的价格买入了这只股票，然后在巴菲特开始卖出的时候我又加了仓，他从持有25%的股份减少到我记得是15%。而对于这件事，你是不是有点神秘，虽然买了但后来我又卖掉了。

I doubled it. I doubled my money. I went from ten times earnings in 20 and I sold it at a hundred dollars, bought it at 50, sold it at 100. I thought it was clever. Then by the earnings kept compounding. So you can buy back. I bought it back at a hundred and fifty dollars. And now it's, we're recently five hundred now, four hundred dollars.

我把它翻一倍了。我让我的钱翻倍了。我本来以为我很聪明，最初是以50美元买进，那时投资收益是10倍，然后在100美元时卖出。结果，利润一直在增长，所以我又买了回来，这次是在150美元时买的。现在它的价格已经涨到四百或者五百美元了。

So it's, because actually the intrinsic value compounding matters more than the top price. If you have a great company, it will grow intrinsic value. Absolutely. And the multiple, here's the thing about the multiples, they matter less than the growth when you look at it over a longer period.

其实，内在价值的增长比最高股价更重要。如果你有一家优秀的公司，它的内在价值会增长。这是肯定的。在谈到倍数时，需要注意的是，从长期来看，倍数比增长的重要性要小。

But most investors are unwilling or unable to invest on a long-term high, high horizon because either, they don't know what they're doing, which interestingly goes back to what were, they think it's risky, which goes back to what Warren Buffett was when he was asked what the definition of risk was.

但是，大多数投资者不愿意或无法在长期中高点进行投资，因为他们可能不知道自己在做什么，这实际上与过去的情况相关联。他们认为这很有风险，这又可以追溯到沃伦·巴菲特被问及风险定义时的观点。

You know what he said? Not knowing what you're doing. So really good nugget here is that if you buy something which is really good, it doesn't quite matter what you pay for it because it will grow. Secondary over a long, well I say, let's just say it like this, the multiple to a point, yeah, whether you buy it, if it's growing, it's all maths. You've got to look at the growth rate, the terminal multiple, all the multi things. But if it's increasing intrinsic value at a good rate, you will undervaluate if you look at it over a short horizon. Yep, it's going to be saying it like that.

你知道他说了什么吗？“你不知道自己在做什么。”这里有一个很好的点子：如果你买了一样非常好的东西，那么你为它付出的价格就没那么重要了，因为它会增长。长期来看，不妨这么说，增值的倍数是有限的，但关键是如果它在增长，那就是数学问题。你得看增长率、终端倍数等等所有这些因素。但如果它以一个很好的速度在增加内在价值，你会低估它的价值，尤其是当你只用短期的眼光来看的时候。是的，就这么说。

And if you're willing to hold it for a long-term and extract that intrinsic value growth, it'll be worth to meet more to you than other people. I've heard you say that there are more good companies in the public market than in the private market. Yes, why do you say that? Because the companies that are sold to private equity are the ones that aren't as good. How do you say that? What about your base? Well, I'm saying to a couple of things. Let's think into why do you say that?

如果你愿意长期持有并提取其内在价值增长，这对你来说可能比对其他人更有意义。我曾听你说过，公开市场上有比私募市场更多的好公司。是的，为什么你这么说呢？因为那些被卖给私募股权的公司往往不那么好。你怎么会这么说呢？那你的依据是什么呢？嗯，我是基于几个方面来这么说的。让我们深入探讨一下，你为什么这样认为呢？

I know it upsets people who are private equity. I mean, we actually, I'm pretty pragmatic about this, but why do you get that? I have been to think that large companies are more likely to beat small companies in an industry. They have more money to compete. And in R&D, yep. And scale, we talked earlier about scale being key and in competency being key and switching costs. So, yeah, we think it's a small company that invents something new, we talked about Zoom, it can be crushed by a large company reasonably easily.

我知道这会让从事私募股权的人感到不安。我其实挺务实的，但为什么会这样呢？我一直认为，大公司在行业中更可能击败小公司。因为它们有更多的资金来参与竞争。在研发方面也是如此。我们之前谈到过，规模和能力是关键，还有那些转换成本。所以，我们认为，即使是像Zoom那样的小公司发明了新东西，也可能很容易就被大公司压垮。

They can copy. And large companies are usually too big for private equity. Private equity can't buy visa, it's too big for them. That's size excludes private equity from large companies. And if a public company is selling something to private equity, usually they're selling their best businesses. And I'd say private equity, like all asset management, is prone to the principal agency problem where they incentivize to gather assets.

它们可以模仿。而大型公司通常对于私募股权来说规模过大。私募股权基金无法收购像Visa这样的大公司，因为它们的规模太大了。规模的限制使得私募股权无法介入大型企业。而如果一家上市公司将其部分业务出售给私募股权基金，通常是因为他们在出售自己最好的业务。此外，我认为私募股权基金，像所有资产管理行业一样，容易受到代理问题的影响，因为他们会被激励去不断聚集资产。

Let's just say, say it like this, the very best businesses in the public markets, I believe are better than the top 100 companies, are better than the top 100 companies in private equity. When do you sell a company? When it's a view of intrinsic value is not as good as other things. Not just value, but conviction. So, philosophy, two components to it, if you like intrinsic value, so the price still has to be at or above, at or below intrinsic value.

可以这么说，我相信在公开市场上表现最好的企业比私募股权中的前100家公司还要好。什么时候应该卖掉一家企业呢？当你认为它的内在价值不如其他东西的时候。不仅是价值，还有信念。所以哲学上有两个要素：如果你喜欢内在价值，那么价格必须在内在价值之下或之上。

But there's a second point, which isn't really focused on by many investors, which is conviction. So, you lose faith in them. No, I'm saying you need to have conviction when you invest in something at all times, yeah. And what does that mean? You could call it confidence, what does that word mean? Because there's a saying, talk is cheap. You can say you can be wrong.

但是，还有第二个要点，很多投资者并没有真正关注，那就是信念。也就是说，你对他们失去了信心。不，我的意思是，你在任何时候投资某个项目时都需要有坚定的信念。那么，这意味着什么呢？你可以称之为信心，那这个词意味着什么？因为有句俗话说，"说话容易。" 你可能会说你会犯错。

One of my first investments when I worked in New York for a hedge fund before starting TCI was in an Italian media company. And being capital block control, it was like a billion Euro valuation. And it went to a 50 billion Euro valuation and then went to zero. It was a yellow pages company. Say it, yeah, you remember it. And when I first invested, the internet didn't exist.

当我在纽约一家对冲基金工作，开始创办TCI之前，我的第一个投资之一是投了一家意大利的媒体公司。这家公司由少数股东控制，起初估值为十亿欧元。后来，估值涨到了五百亿欧元，但最后却跌到了零。这家公司是一家电话号码簿公司。是的，你还记得它。当我第一次投资时，互联网还不存在。

And people thought yellow pages were a monopoly and they were. And so the point is you can be wrong. And certain industries, your risk of being wrong are higher. Technology is one of those areas. Absolutely. But if I own an airport, that is a toll road. Let's take a toll roads that are unregulated, which there are some that we own. I'm less likely to be wrong than if I own a retailer.

人们认为黄页是一个垄断行业，其实它确实是。重点是你可能会犯错。在某些行业中，犯错的风险更高，科技行业就是其中之一，绝对是这样。但如果我拥有一个机场，那就像是拥有一个收费公路。假如我们拥有一些不受监管的收费公路，那么犯错的可能性就比拥有一家零售商要小。

My chances of being wrong are less because I have physical asset backing, substitution risk. So the thesis is much more obvious. Because so the and so this concept of conviction is very important. One investor said to me, I have to be able to sleep at night. That's to be sufficiently obvious. But you always have sounds contradictory to saying that you can be wrong because what kills you as an investor is permanent loss of capital.

由于我有实物资产的支持和替代风险，我出错的可能性较小。因此，这个投资论点更显而易见。所以，坚信的概念非常重要。一位投资者曾对我说：“我必须能够安然入睡。”这意味着投资需要足够明确。但这听起来似乎与可以出错的说法相矛盾，因为作为投资者，让你致命的是资本的永久性损失。

Absolutely. I got a bit of a problem with the concept of intrinsic value as if there were some kind of objective truth. Yeah. You're right. You're right. We can't tell the forecast the future. So to a high degree of accuracy, you can just say, which is why you can and the longer you look out, the harder it is.

当然没问题。我对"内在价值"这个概念有些困惑，因为它似乎被视为某种客观真实。是的，你说得对。我们无法精准预测未来。因此，正是因为这样，你可以说预测未来是困难的，而且你看的时间越长，预测也就越难。

And so we look at more simplest, sometimes will the business be around? Yep. Will we still fly airplanes in 30 years and and you know, will we want airline travel? Will there be demand for it? And so once, you know, so I agree with you. So I think that valuation is just approximate. We can just say in truth with confidence we have a good or great business.

翻译如下：所以我们关注更简单的问题，比如这个业务能持续存在吗？是的。我们在30年后还会坐飞机吗？我们还会需要航空旅行吗？对它会有需求吗？一旦你理解了这些问题，我就同意你的看法。因此，我认为估值只是一个大致的数字。我们可以很有信心地说，我们拥有一个良好或优秀的业务。

Okay. And as I'm saying, only a small subset of businesses can be predicted, which are the most powerful ones. But exactly how they grow and you know, unexpected events, you're right. There's no certainty. Let's move on to from companies to investors. And in terms of what makes a good investor, why are you a good investor? Well, it's your words. It's important to have humility. But there was someone I knew who took me aside once and he said, Chris, you and I, he did reasonably well. He said, we weren't the best investors. We just took the most risk. So I just, which is not true. Yeah, it was, he was, it was an interesting comment that makes you sometimes when people say a joke, you or scum, you wonder, is it true?

好的，就像我所说的，只有少数的企业能被预测出来，而这些企业通常是最有实力的。不过，企业如何成长以及面对意外事件时会发生什么，这些都是不确定的。让我们从公司转向投资者，谈谈什么成就一个优秀的投资者。为什么你是一个优秀的投资者？嗯，要有谦逊的态度是很重要的。我认识一个人，他曾经私下对我说：“克里斯，你和我都不是最优秀的投资者，我们只是承担了更多的风险。”我觉得这不完全正确。不过他的话很有趣，有时候当人们开玩笑时，会让你思考：这是真的吗？

But I was always willing to look at the company fundamentals and not them try to guess the stop market. Okay. And focus on macro or trading. Yeah. So I was always fundamental. Most investors are not fundamental. They trade actively, they look at data points, they say, what's the catalyst? They don't really know what the company does. So I think the fundamental approach has been key. Long termism is key. Okay. Another thing we've done is concentration. We've owned a few things. Yeah, we may have 10% type holdings, 10, 10 stocks, you know, 15 stocks. We don't own 100 things. And I think another key point is intuition. We work with intuition, which is something that is how strange, how do you use intuition?

好的，我一直愿意关注公司的基本面，而不是试图去猜测股市的走势和关注宏观经济或交易。因此，我一直是基本面投资者。大多数投资者并不注重基本面，他们活跃交易，关注数据点，询问什么是催化剂，但他们并不真正了解公司在做什么。所以，我认为基本面的方法至关重要。长期主义也是关键。我们采取的另一个策略是集中投资。我们持有的投资项目较少，可能有10%左右的持股比例，比如10或15只股票，而不是持有100种不同的投资。我认为另一个关键点是直觉，我们依靠直觉进行投资，这似乎有些奇怪，但我们确实使用直觉。

It's been defined as thinking without thinking, which is the Buddhist would call a co-an, something that doesn't make sense. We will come back to your Buddhist, I thought that's a strange one. But it's a lot of people don't understand what intuition is. It's sort of opposite. I happen to have written my master's dissertation on this exact topic. Okay. So you're one who does it. Then it's sort of the opposite of intellect. And so what is pattern recognition in a way? Yeah, that's a word for it, knowing. Okay. It's all of the opposite of intellect. So of course, we'll do analysis. But then it's a higher level of intelligence than just intellect.

这句话的意思是：这被定义为“无意识的思考”，就像佛教中所说的公案，看似无意义。有些人对于直觉的理解比较模糊，它在某种程度上与理性思考相对。恰巧我在硕士论文中正好研究过这个主题，所以我对它有一定的了解。直觉与理智有些对立。那么，什么是模式识别呢？在某种程度上，这就是“洞察”。它在某种意义上是与理智相对立的。当然，我们会做分析，不过直觉是一种比单纯理智更高层次的智慧。

But what do you have intuition about? Do you have the intuition about the people, the situation? What is it? All of it. Okay. All of it is someone trustworthy or not trustworthy. And the patterns, patterns are another thing. And so we don't do really short, but we were short wire cut. Yeah, I know. We're coming back to that. Yeah. But is your intuition now better than it was when you were younger? Yeah, it was not in intuition so much before the last five to ten years that you've been a change. But I think I always operated with at an intuitive level. And it's not just stop picking, but I decided to start my own fund.

那么，你对什么有直觉呢？你对人还是对情况有直觉？究竟是什么引发你的直觉？所有的。对，所有的都是关于某人是否可信。还有模式，模式是另一回事。我们不做短期的，但我们确实做过短期剪线。是的，我知道。我们会回到这个问题上。那么，现在你的直觉比年轻时更好了吗？是的，以前的五到十年里，我并没有太多的直觉转变。但我想我一直在凭直觉行事。这不仅是在选择股票上，我还决定开设自己的基金。

21 years ago, I just had this intuition that I was in the wrong place and not doing what I was meant to do. And it wasn't about money or anything, but it's when you know what I met my wife Kylie, you know, you're just, there's a point where you just know, yeah, it isn't an intellectual thing. You know, there, Chris, this is called love, this is something else. Well, yeah, love is not of the mind, but love should be intuitive. Yeah, it's an example. Yeah, do you believe in, so if I, if I'm your colleague, so I work now for you, I'm a junior analyst, I came to you and I say, Hey, Chris, I got this intuition. I think this looks really good. Will you believe me?

21年前，我就有一种直觉，觉得自己在错误的地方做着不适合自己的事情。当时这跟钱没有关系，只是当我遇到了我的妻子凯莉时，我就知道，是的，这个感觉不是理智上的，而是一种内心的认知。这就是所谓的爱，这不是其他东西。爱不是来自头脑，而应该是直觉的。这是一个例子。所以，如果我是你的同事，也就是说我现在为你工作，是一名初级分析师，我来找你说：“嘿，克里斯，我有一种直觉，我觉得这个看起来真的不错。” 你会相信我吗？

No, I'll, because the thing is that people have to do, we don't work like, here's the differences. I've been a stock picker. So a lot of portfolio managers aren't portfolio managers. They're managers of managers. And they say people like that say to me, there's only two truths, which is not the story that I hear, but the PNL and the stop loss. Because they can't analyze the company themselves. So no, we never take anything from anybody at face value. And we work in a team. That's something we didn't mention earlier, but the point is just a story is just a story. What you have to focus on what matters.

不，我这么说，因为问题在于，人们必须做的事情是，我们的工作方式不一样。这里的区别在于，我一直是一个选股者。许多投资组合经理其实并不是真正的投资组合经理，他们只是经理的经理。这类人会对我说，只有两种真理，这和我听到的故事不一样，那就是盈亏和止损，因为他们自己无法分析公司。所以我们从不轻信任何人的话，我们是团队合作。这是我们之前没提到的，但重点是，故事只是故事，你必须专注于真正重要的东西。

Because there was a spiritual teacher actually, it said something that applies to investing. He said very few things matter. And most things don't matter at all. Okay, so you could, and investing, it's actually similar. You can, you need to get out of the noise and just focus on the handful of things that matter. Is it talent or can it be trained to become a good investor? I think it can be trained. Yeah. There's a judgment element of it. I think it can be trained for sure. No, we both have taken inspiration from some of the same people. One of them is John Amtich, who I worked with.

因为有一位灵性导师曾说过一句话，这句话也适用于投资。他说，只有很少的事情是重要的，大多数事情根本不重要。在投资中也是如此，你需要跳出噪音，只专注于那少数重要的事情。那么，投资的能力是天赋还是可以通过训练获得的呢？我认为是可以训练出来的。这其中有判断力的成分，我相信通过训练是可以掌握的。而且，我们俩都曾从一些相同的人身上获得过启发，其中一个就是我曾经共事过的约翰·阿姆蒂奇。

Yes, I love John. I love John, is I consider my friend. Yeah. I was just starting out. He really is a great investor. And he took me under his wing a little bit and I can I know anything. And we had the same couple of same stocks. The energy group was one. And I didn't have the experience to know and say you would probably say that knowing an intuition comes with experience. Too, too. But yeah, and so yeah, I'm a fan of John's. Yeah. Cause most of the things I know about investment, I learned from him and his partner, Bill Bullinger. So we have some of the, we have some of the same teachers here. Maybe one of it.

是的，我喜欢约翰。我把约翰看作我的朋友。对，我当时刚刚开始接触投资，他真的是一位出色的投资者。他有点像我的导师，在我毫无头绪的时候给了我很多指导。我们投资了一些相同的股票，其中一个是能源集团。我当时没有足够的经验去判断他说的对不对，而这些直觉和判断力都是随着经验的积累而来的。不过没错，所以我确实是约翰的粉丝。因为我关于投资的大部分知识都是从他和他的合伙人比尔·布林格那里学到的。我们有一些相同的老师，可能可以这么说。

So you are, or you were in perhaps more considered an activist investor. Yes. So in your, in your view, what is an activist investor doing? It's a spectrum. And from full blown hardcore removing boards and CEOs and demanding the sale of a company to call it a soft activism, softer activism of trying to have relationship and dialogue with the company at a professional level and where you understand their mindset and their thinking of the business. So, and and engage. Okay. And that could mean many things. It doesn't. And I'd say today our relationships are very generally very constructive with companies. But it wasn't always the way.

所以你或者曾经可能被认为是一个激进的投资者。是的。那么在你看来，什么是激进投资者呢？这其实是一个范围。从极端的激进方式，比如撤换董事会和CEO以及要求出售公司，到所谓的温和激进方式，也就是在专业层面上与公司建立关系和对话，并理解他们对业务的思维方式。进行这种互动可以意味着很多事情。我可以说，如今我们与公司的关系通常是非常建设性的，但过去并不总是这样。

Yeah, it wasn't. I love you gone kind of from having been an aggressive tiger to becoming a bit more of a big lion. Yeah. Though no one thought like that when we started the fund, when we named it the Children's Investment Fund, we thought how are we going to compete with tiger and Viking and progressive named funds. But yeah, it is true. I've learned that actually activism, hardcore activism is not a great thing. Why not? Yeah. It's very difficult to succeed because the vast proponents of today's investor base are passive, who don't actually to get them to vote for something is very difficult and all the power, you know, the and so active management is dying.

是的，那时候情况并不是这样。我喜欢你从一只积极进取的老虎变成了一头更沉稳的大狮子。是的。尽管当我们开始这个基金时，没有人这样想。当我们把它命名为儿童投资基金的时候，我们想，我们要如何与那些名为“猛虎”、“维京”和其他积极进取的基金竞争呢？但没错，我确实学到了事实是，积极主义，特别是强硬的积极主义，其实不是件好事。为什么呢？因为很难成功，因为当今大部分投资者都是被动的，要让他们投票很困难，而且所有的力量都在...，所以主动管理正在走向衰落。

And so when I started, there was very little indexation. And so there was a more engaged active shareholder base. And now indexation has limited the power of shareholders. But I mean, you were one of the most fared people in Europe. Yeah. I mean, it was like, there was a terrible, bad businesses that long ago, like ABN Amro, putting up for sale through putting on the AGM of O2 to sell the company. And we made a lot of money. We made a billion dollars forcing the sale of it. But in truth, the company was worthless, but was bought for a hundred billion from three companies who all went bankrupt, Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis and on Venator.

当我刚开始时，指数化投资还很少见，所以股东们更加积极地参与公司事务。如今，指数化限制了股东的影响力。不过，你是当时欧洲最有影响力的人之一。过去有一些非常糟糕的企业案例，比如荷兰银行（ABN Amro）被出售，或在O2公司的年度股东大会上提议出售公司。我们通过强迫出售这些公司赚了很多钱，比如说我们在出售中赚了十亿美元。其实，这些公司本身并不值钱，但最终却被苏格兰皇家银行、富通银行和Venator这三家最终都破产的公司以一千亿美元的代价买下了。

So they didn't know what they were doing. We didn't know what we were doing. And it was all, you know, a madness. It was a, but it made money. But for those who sold. But in truth, the fundamentals were, were, were, were, would trump everything. So a lot of activists end up being activists in bad businesses. Yeah. But are you, have you stopped being an activist because you are more attracted to good companies? Because you can't take the business. The business always wins. Okay. So it's pointless being an activist in a, in a B, B business.

所以他们不知道自己在做什么，我们也不知道自己在做什么。这一切，可以说，是一种疯狂。但它确实赚钱了，不过只是对那些卖掉的人来说。但实际上，基本面最终会胜出。所以，许多活动者最后在糟糕的企业中成为了活动者。是的。但是你是否因为更喜欢好公司而停止当活动者了呢？因为你无法改变企业的本质。企业总是会胜出。所以在糟糕的企业中当活动者是毫无意义的。

And that said, we, we, we still engage in it. In, in hard core activism, we're, we're, we're an investment where we, we went on the board and you know, pushed out, you know, chairman and some directors and, and, and, and the, and the companies doing much better now. And, but that's an exception. And I'd say, that was a result of, of a disastrous case in the company where we, we, we went on the board and they couldn't appoint a CEO. The board was divided and it was a real mess. What kind of personal told us to take on you to be in this fight? You'll be giving an example.

尽管如此，我们依然参与其中。我们积极参与核心激进主义，我们投资了一家公司，进入了董事会，成功推动了变革，撤换了董事长和一些董事，现在这家公司经营得好多了。不过，这是个例外。当时，公司遇到了严重的问题，我们加入董事会，他们无法任命CEO，董事会内部严重分裂，局面一团糟。你能举个例子，说明这种斗争对你个人有什么影响吗？

A few years ago, we, yeah, I don't know, it was six years or, or so, we own shares in Safran, where we still own them. We've held them for 13 years and it's a great company, craft engines and joint venture with G, G, aerospace. And they announced they were buying a company called Zodiac. And we filled a French aerospace, you thought the price was ridiculous, 10 billion euros and they wanted to pay in shares and we thought that we believe the shares were half price. So they were paying four, five times the intrinsic value.

几年前，大概六年左右吧，我们拥有赛峰集团的股份，我们现在仍持有这些股份。我们已经持有这些股份13年了，赛峰是一家优秀的公司，生产航空发动机，并且与G, G, 航空有合资项目。后来他们宣布要收购一家名为Zodiac的公司。我们觉得法国航空航天领域的这项收购出价很荒唐，高达100亿欧元，并且他们想用股票支付，而我们认为这些股票的价值只有一半。因此，他们支付的金额是内在价值的四到五倍。

And we, and took a very aggressive campaign and threatened the litigation and demanded a vote. And in the, in the end, the, the target was adding multiple profit warnings and it became clear that we were right. And Safran went to Zodiac and said, we have to cut the price in half and pay in cash because TCI are forcing us. Okay. And so, and that's what happened. Sox doubled and, and, and, but we were sued by the seller for a hundred million euros. Both me and my general counsel separately. He said, Chris, it's a, I'm not really sleeping much at night. You can afford it. I, I, I, I can't.

我们展开了一场非常激进的行动，威胁要进行诉讼并要求进行投票。最终，目标公司多次发出利润预警，结果显然证明我们是对的。赛峰集团（Safran）找到了Zodiac公司，说由于TCI的压力，我们必须将价格减半，并用现金支付。于是事情就如同预期的发展，而且股票价格翻倍。然而，我们被卖方起诉，索赔一亿欧元，我和我的首席法律顾问分别被起诉。他告诉我：“克里斯，因为这件事情，我晚上几乎都睡不好。你或许承担得起，但我承担不起。”

And so, yeah, I went into a Paris court and you, it's not for the faint hearted to do this. And do you enjoy a good argument? No, I don't really enjoy fighting people anymore. I never really did. It was, it was a, it was a, something we began with Deutsche Borser. And now, really, I'd say what people call activism is is really an exception to us. So it's like, why did we get involved in that Zodiac? We were already a shareholder and something bad came out of the blue. It's like you walk home and someone attacks you, yeah, to try to take your, your wallet and you fight back. And I say, do you enjoy a fight, Nikolai? No, but I'm not sure I would fight back. Should you choose to? Yeah, I, I'll ask you that question. Is you, you would say, no, I don't enjoy fighting. It's just I had no choice. I was fighting for my life.

所以，是的，我去了一趟巴黎法院，要做这种事情确实需要胆量。你是否喜欢争论呢？不，我不太喜欢和人争斗。其实我从来也不是很喜欢。这一切开始于我们和德意志证券的对抗。现在我会说，人们所谓的激进，实际上对我们而言是个例外。那么，为什么我们会参与那件事呢？我们已经是那家公司的股东，然后突然爆出了一些问题。这就像你回家的路上被人袭击，他们想抢你的钱包，而你不得不反击。有人问我，尼古拉，你喜欢打架吗？不喜欢，但我不确定如果遇到类似情况我会不会反击。如果你愿意选择的话，我问你这个问题。你会说，不，我不喜欢打架，只是当时我别无选择，我是在为自己的生命而战。

Yeah. So I put it like this, we act as owners. We're always act as owners. What does that mean? We, we, we, we interested, we're engaged. We think we have a right to appoint directors, we're legal right to it. And, and we'll, yeah. And so we, one thing we have learned is governance does matter, which brings us to kind of the opposite. Why a card? Which is a bad company, which you shorted. And shorting just for those people who don't know, it's you borrow shares, you sell it. The goal is that the shareholder should go down and you buy them back cheaper and hand them back, right? And make a profit.

好的，我这样理解这个意思：我们以所有者的身份行事。我们总是以所有者的身份行事。那是什么意思呢？我们很感兴趣，我们很投入。我们认为自己有权任命董事，也有法律权利这样做。而且，我们了解到，治理是非常重要的。这就引出了相反的情况：为什么一家公司会成为“坏公司”？这就是你做空的公司。对于不太了解的人来说，做空就是借入股票，然后卖出，目的是等股价下跌后，以更低的价格买回股票并归还，从中赚取利润。

So what's the, what was, I mean, in a few words, why a card? What? Yeah. That's not just me. He's a very long company. Yeah, no, high level. We learned that shorting isn't a great business because you're going to be right, but not be able to hold it or fund the losses. Okay. So, but why a card? Which is a short and the shepherd goes up, you basically unlimited downside. Yeah. And you have to fund the losses. This is what people, but realize you're going to be eventually right. So the first guy to short why a card 20 years ago was a guy from Vonti Capital. And the stock went up 20, 30 times and went to zero, but he was when that happened. He was interviewed by the media and they said, congratulations. You were right. But he said, no, I had to cover 19 years ago. I couldn't afford to fund those losses.

为什么选择做空这家公司？用简单的话来说，这不是一个好生意，因为即使你预测正确，但可能承受不起资金损失，无法坚持到底。做空的风险在于，如果股价持续上涨，你可能会面临无限的损失，并且需要不断填补这些损失。许多人意识到自己最终可能是对的，但在此过程中却承受不起。比如说，有个人在20年前第一次做空这家公司，并且最终证明是正确的，因为股价从上涨了20到30倍最终崩盘归零。但他在被媒体采访时无奈地表示，其实在19年前就已经被迫回补仓位，因为负担不起那些损失。

And so it's, you have to understand investor psychology. Yeah, it's tough. Very tough. And I had a dinner once with Warren Buffett. And he said, he and Charlie looked at it shorting. You know, they studied it. And they just said it was too hard because of that point of understanding investor psychology and the asymmetric risk and award. And so is an exceptional thing. But we looked at why a card and all the accounting games and then the financial times came out with all these articles. And I called the journalist. Good guy. And I said, you're writing all this stuff and he said, it's all true. I said, no one will listen to you. He said, everything's true. We stand by every word and you could literally read it in the paper.

这段话的大意是：你必须理解投资者的心理，这很难。我曾经和沃伦·巴菲特共进晚餐，他说他和查理研究过做空。他们发现，因为需要理解投资者心理以及不对称的风险与收益，所以做空太难了。这是一项与众不同的挑战。我们研究了一家公司的会计技巧，之后《金融时报》发表了一系列文章。我给那位记者打电话，他是个不错的人。我说你写了这些东西，他回答说这些都是事实。我说没人会听你的，他则坚称每个字都是真实的，你可以在报纸上读到全部内容。

And I recall the whole German establishment to end in and support in the company. That's right. That's right. In fact, the chairman was a former CEO of Deutsche Bolser. But there was a bit of pattern recognition where I remember at Harvard Business School an accounting course I took and there were red flags when you do this small auditor. No cash flow. Yeah. And things like all their Asian businesses, the office was empty. Yeah. But I think to be a good investor, you need a certain independence of thought. Totally. And probably to be a good journalist as well.

我想起整个德国机构都结束并支持这家公司的情况。没错，没错。事实上，该公司的董事长曾是德意志证交所的前首席执行官。但我在哈佛商学院上的一门会计课程中记得一些模式识别，当时我注意到了做小型审计时的一些风险信号，比如没有现金流，是的，还有他们所有亚洲业务的办公室都是空的。不过，我认为要成为一个好的投资者，你需要有一定的独立思考能力。而我想，要成为一个好的记者也需要这种能力。

And that's why the funny thing is that the fraud was there in plain sight. And I think I learned to be an independent investor. And so we went to see the CEO, actually, I sent two of my team to meet him and came back incredulous at this like pathetic demonstrations of technology and they were shown. And interestingly, there was a potential catalyst, which was the report about their accounting. And in the end, they just said it's garbage.

这就是为什么有趣的地方在于，欺诈行为就明摆在眼前。而且我认为我学会了如何做一个独立的投资者。所以我们去见了这家公司的CEO，实际上我派了我的两个团队成员去见他，他们回来时对所展示的可怜的技术演示感到难以置信。有趣的是，有一个潜在的催化剂，那就是关于他们财务报告的报道。最后，他们只是说那是胡扯。

And then the stock went up a lot. And so actually, I tried to take, become an activist in this position. I filed a formal criminal complaint for fraud in the at the Munich Prosecutors Office because they said if I didn't wasn't public about it, it would be viewed as market manipulation. So we're transparent about it. And that created chaos, but it forced some action. Yeah. You know, when it forced, eventually an investigation. And so because I didn't want to be like Bronte Capital, he just ran and ran.

然后股票上涨了很多。所以实际上，我试图在这个职位上采取激进行动。我在慕尼黑检察官办公室提交了一份正式的欺诈刑事投诉，因为他们说如果我不公开这件事，就会被视为市场操纵。所以我们对此保持透明。这引发了一些混乱，但也促使了一些行动。最终这促成了一次调查。我这样做是不想像Bronte Capital那样，一直置之不理。

And so at some point, it really became obvious. And it became a confidence game. I think that people trust authority too much. Okay. That sounds a strange thing. But they trusted the German establishment. Yeah. That you had a board with the great and the good. And they weren't willing to believe the journalist. But we had a very good team at the MBM, which was on the same side of that. So yeah, so really good. Talking about trusting authority and so on. And moving on to corporate culture at TCI. What is a corporate culture like in TCI? How many people are you? You know, in the investment team, it's, you know, seven, eight people. We have a large back office. How do you work together? We want so small, very small and it's collegiate. Yeah, we've known each other a long time. And there's something that we have built, which is an intangible trust.

翻译如下：所以有一段时间，这一切变得非常明显。这变成了一种信任游戏。我认为人们对权威太过信任。这听起来有点奇怪，但他们确实信任德国的体制。你会看到一个由各界精英组成的董事会，但他们却不愿意相信记者。不过，我们在MBM有一个非常优秀的团队，和他们立场一致。所以，是的，真的很不错。说到信任权威，接下来谈谈TCI的企业文化。在TCI，企业文化是什么样的？你们团队有多少人？在投资团队里，大约有七八个人。我们的后台团队很大。你们如何协作？我们团队很小，非常小，但团队氛围是合作性的。我们彼此相识已久，建立了一种无形的信任。

Why don't you have a hundred fund managers? Good question. Firstly, my best people, you know, they would never stay. They just, they don't want to, it would be too impersonal. There's a human aspect to work. Yeah. People don't come to work. You know, the best people for money. They come to because they enjoy the environment. And so it's really important how we treat people, how everyone treats each other. And I'll never hire someone without the blessing of my senior team. And because we could destroy the culture. And so I mean, Isoke teams are five and football teams are 11. Is there something magic with seven?

为什么我们不雇佣一百位基金经理呢？这是个好问题。首先，我手下最优秀的人才，不会留在那样的环境中。他们不愿意，那样会显得太不近人情。工作的背后有人情味的因素。是的，顶尖人才工作并不是单纯为了赚钱。他们来工作是因为他们喜欢这个环境。因此，我们如何对待员工，以及员工之间如何相处，非常重要。我雇佣新员工时，绝不会不经过我高管团队的同意，因为那样可能会破坏公司的文化。我是说，冰球队有5人，足球队有11人，那7人是不是有什么特别之处呢？

No, you're bad. It's small enough. Yeah, it would above 10. It would be too, too big. What do you look for when you hire? So now I'm applying for job. Everybody, everybody, everybody, everybody, everybody, everybody, applying for a job at TCI. I mean, you're the philosophy. You share the philosophy. What kind of questions you ask? Yeah, what makes a good business or the things you talked about, it becomes, yeah, we ask for a case study, right? Or two. And it becomes immediately obvious whether you know what you're doing. Yeah, whether you share the philosophy. But also, it's not enough just to be a good investor. You have to want to work in a team.

不，你理解错了（意思为：你误解了）。这已经足够小了。是的，如果超过10就太大了。你在招聘时看重什么？所以现在我在申请工作。每个人，每个人，每个人，每个人，每个人，每个人都在申请TCI的职位。我的意思是，认同这个理念很重要。你会问什么样的问题？是的，什么造就了一个好的企业或你提到的那些事情，这就变得很明显了，对吧？我们要求一个或两个案例分析，通过这种方式很快就能看出你是否知道自己在做什么，以及你是否认同这个理念。但仅仅成为一个好投资者是不够的，你还需要愿意在团队中工作。

Yeah, not everybody wants that. And you have to be able to get on with people in a way where you have to be open-minded to being wrong. You can't be too dogmatic because so the personality does matter a lot. Now, you have a big share of the profit over the firm goes to the charitable foundation. Yes. How well, actually, I give it to charities. A lot of labs would be I do it directly. Often I give it to the foundation or co-invest with them. So yeah, one way or another, it goes to charity. Do you think it's important for your colleagues that you guys fund all these?

是的，并不是每个人都想要那样。你必须能够以一种开放的态度与人相处，接受自己可能会错的可能性。你不能太教条，因为个性确实非常重要。现在，你有相当大的一部分利润是捐给慈善基金会的。没错。实际上，我直接把钱捐给慈善机构。很多情况下，我会直接捐给基金会，也有时会和他们一起投资。所以无论哪种方式，最终都是用于慈善事业。你觉得为你们的同事提供这些资助重要吗？

Well, charitable. I think they make a lot of money too. What do you think is irritating that you give away all the money? They also earn good money. It's probably a positive thing. I don't know definitively. I don't really care about money because other than its value in helping people when did you learn about philanthropy? Who taught you? When I was in York working for a hedge fund, a one point after about three or four years, I don't know, two or three million dollars and they had done well and they said you're going to get a ten million dollar bonus.

嗯，慈善。我觉得他们也赚很多钱。你觉得把所有钱捐出去有什么烦人的？他们也赚了不少钱。这可能是件好事。我不太确定。我对钱其实不太关心，因为除了在帮助别人时它的价值之外，你是什么时候了解到慈善的？是谁教你的？当我在约克的一个对冲基金工作的时候，大概过了三四年吧，我记不得确切时间，也许两三百万美元，他们表现得不错，他们说你将获得一千万美元的奖金。

And I just, this is in intuition, said I don't want it. I want to just give it to charity and I created a US foundation and gave it to it. And I didn't really understand it. What was driving me for 50 years? I would meet with Bill Gates. A lot of charitable work with him over the years and he would ask me, I couldn't answer the question. And eventually I did understand it and better like the never as a soul urge. But there's essence who we really are.

我凭直觉决定，我不想要它。我想把它捐给慈善机构，于是我创建了一个美国基金会，并把它捐了出去。我当时并不完全理解是什么驱动了我50年的选择。我曾多次与比尔·盖茨见面，和他一起做了很多慈善工作，他也问过我这个问题，但我无法回答。最终，我明白了这个驱动力是什么，尽管迟来总比没有好，这是一种灵魂的冲动。这就是我们真正的本质所在。

What we really are isn't the personality or the physical body, but soul or consciousness and that that someone would call it life. That's something that gives us life. And that and will gave you in the same way you Niklai had a desire or will to do something more with your life. And then just make money and that fundamental nature of that, that the soul is service, desire help, to help ultimately humanity. And where did that come from? It's innate within everyone. But yeah, for sure, everyone is innate with everyone.

我们真正的本质并不是个性或身体，而是灵魂或意识，有的人会称之为生命。正是这种东西赋予了我们生命。正如你尼可莱想要在生活中做更多事情，不只是赚钱一样，这种本质是灵魂的服务、愿望和帮助，最终是为人类服务。这种特性是天生就存在于每个人体内的。是的，没错，这种特性确实存在于每个人体内。

Why don't more people do it? Because they're, they identify with their personality and less with consider that like a user, use the interface of the soul. And the personality is basic urges desire, possessions, glamour like power and money and other things like that. And and soon or a later people realize that that doesn't really give, you know, some would say happiness, but actually there's more important things in the world in life than happiness, purpose and meaning.

为什么没有更多人这样做呢？因为他们过于认同自己的个性，而很少将其视为灵魂的用户界面。个性通常包含基本的欲望，如占有、权力、金钱以及其他类似的东西。而人们迟早会意识到，这些东西实际上并不能带来真正的快乐。有人可能会说快乐是重要的，但实际上，在生活中，比快乐更重要的是目标和意义。

But you say that sooner or later people, but I mean people don't. I'm not saying in one life. They may need here many lives and that may be a strange thing for you to hear, to to realize. Yeah, I don't believe this is the only time we, we, we, we're, we hear and eventually we'll learn that they, the what we are and can be as a result of some crisis in your life. Yeah. And death disease or or or in my case, the third D divorce. And the and it's then that they look inward and and ask, well, what is their life about? What is their purpose? Is there a meaning? And for me, I could never find any purpose or meaning in my life except service. And and that is clearly, you know, something you could say it comes from within.

但你说迟早人们会做到这一点，但我指的是人们并不总是这样。我并不是说在一个生命中实现这个目标。他们可能需要经历许多生命，这可能对你来说有点奇怪，也难以理解。是的，我不相信这是我们唯一的一次最终认识到自己是谁、可以成为什么的机会，而这是由于生活中发生的一些危机，比如死亡、疾病，或者在我这种情况中是离婚。正是在那时，人们开始向内审视，问自己人生的意义是什么，人生的目标是什么。对我来说，我找不到任何人生的目标或意义，除了服务。而这显然是一种你可以说是发自内心的东西。

Yep. And and so that's my origins of my philanthropy. Do you think, I mean, you came from my working class family, right? And you're following us an immigrant. Do you, how do you think that shaped you? It made me an independent thinker. You always grew up as an outsider. And and you, you felt different. And and it gave me a work ethic, a work ethic. And and and desire to achieve something here. And so I think that that was an important piece of my history here.

好的。这是我从事慈善事业的起源。你觉得，嗯，你是来自工人阶级家庭，对吗？而且你还是移民的后代。你认为这对你有什么影响吗？它让我成为一个独立思考者。你总是作为一个外来者成长，并且时常感觉与众不同。同时，这种背景给了我一种工作伦理和在这里取得成就的愿望。所以我认为这对我的成长历史来说是一个重要的部分。

Tell me about the foundation. What are the main priorities of the foundation now? First, he was a said, so he did now one of the largest foundations in the world, right? We have about six and a half billion dollars. And in the foundation. And I also do philanthropy outside of that. And so between us, we're giving away over 500 million dollars a year. Two main areas, climate change and children's health in Africa and India. On the health side, we focus on foundational issues. Contraception is one. We can't get development or lifting people out of poverty if the women are having which are far more children than they want. You know, Africa fatalities nearly seven. And in many cases, that's not a problem.

这段话翻译成中文如下：请告诉我关于这个基金会的信息。基金会现在的主要优先事项是什么？首先，他曾经被称为，所以他现在是世界上最大的基金会之一，对吗？我们大约有六十五亿美元。在基金会里，我也在基金会外从事慈善活动。因此，我们每年在这两个方面捐赠超过五亿美元：气候变化和非洲及印度的儿童健康。在健康方面，我们专注于基础性问题。其中之一是避孕。如果女性生育的孩子远远多于她们想要的数量，我们就不能实现发展或让人们摆脱贫困。比如，在非洲，女性的生育率接近七个。在许多情况下，这并不是问题。

They don't have access and agency. Women don't have access or agency to to contraception. And so for $10 cost for avoided pregnancy, you can help a poor woman have one less pregnancy if she wants. Yeah. And that's a remarkably low return on investment. High return on investments. Yeah, there's almost nothing. Another area is severe acute malnutrition where I funded the creation of a company. And I buy product for $40 a case you can of therapeutic food. Think of it as a fortified power bar or you can save a child's life. There's 100 million children with severe or acute malnutrition nearly half of all child deaths under five. Neglected tropical diseases like trocoma. I fund to coma surgeries where just a stint. It's not a for $50 you can do fund a surgery which stops someone going blind irreversibly. And there's millions of people with this.

他们没有渠道和自主权。女性没有避孕的渠道或自主权。因此，仅花费10美元就可以帮助一个贫困女性避免一次不想要的怀孕，这真的是一种高投资回报的方式。另一个领域是严重急性营养不良问题，我资助了一家公司的成立，并购买价值40美元的治疗食品，这类似于强化能量棒，可以挽救孩子的生命。全世界有1亿儿童面临严重或急性营养不良，几乎占五岁以下儿童死亡人数的一半。对于被忽视的热带疾病，如砂眼，我资助了砂眼手术。仅需50美元就可以资助一次手术，防止患者不可逆的失明，而全球有数百万人正面临这样的疾病。

So with so little money, yeah, $10, $40, $50, you can save a life. Yeah. Or stop something going blind. It's remarkably you know, you know, what what you know, when you go to Gouds for dinner, you might pay $40 for a bottle of wine. You wouldn't think, oh, I could save someone's life with this. But that's the reality. And so the HIV AIDS, we're very involved in as well.

所以，仅仅用很少的钱，比如 $10、$40、$50，你就可以拯救一条生命，或者阻止失明。这真是令人惊讶。想想看，当你去餐馆吃晚餐时，可能花 $40 买一瓶酒，你不会想到用这笔钱可以拯救一个人的生命，但这就是现实。另外，我们也非常参与抗击艾滋病工作。

So and on the climate side, what are the main areas there? We've been trying to create infrastructure for the climate movement and regulation advocacy because nothing's going to be fixed if there isn't regulation. We fund. And that's across the board and also technical assistance to governments who want to change but don't know how. We're very active in Asia. Where if you don't operate in India and China, that's where and you know, Vietnam and all these countries, that's where all the emissions are growing. Tax is another thing because if we're not advancing through tax, new technologies and subsidizing fossil fuels, which is what happens, we'll never change. And methane is another one. We're fund of the methane hub and methane satellites and just many things, litigation, environmental litigation. We fund that. So in a sense, there's activism there.

在气候方面，主要有哪些领域呢？我们一直在努力为气候运动和法规倡导创建基础设施，因为如果没有法规，就无法解决问题。我们提供资金支持。这包括广泛的方面，还为那些想改变却不知如何下手的政府提供技术援助。我们在亚洲非常活跃。如果你不在印度和中国开展业务，你就错过了重大的排放增长地区，还有越南和其他国家也是如此。税收也是一个重要方面，因为如果我们不通过税收推动新技术，并继续补贴化石燃料——这就是现状——我们永远不会实现改变。甲烷也是一个关注点。我们为甲烷中心和甲烷卫星提供资金，还有很多事情，比如诉讼、环境诉讼。可以说，这就是一种积极行动。

And so given all this, how do you read the backlash against ESG in financial markets? Well, I never really got involved in the S and the G, just the E. And so here, I think it's a very dark thing that's going on where people are saying, some people are saying, in effect, burn down the planet as long as we can make money today. And we don't care about future generations. We don't care about poor people in poor countries, dying off. We only care about our country. Yep. And making money as much money as we can today to hell with the consequences. And it's really back to what I was talking about, this distinction between soul and personality, that if it's a consciousness problem, and actually we'll never solve any of these problems, whether it's climate or poverty or war, if there isn't a change in the level of consciousness.

鉴于所有这些，你如何看待金融市场对ESG（环境、社会和公司治理）反弹？嗯，其实我从未真正参与社会和公司治理这两个方面，只关注环境。因此，我认为目前的情况非常不妙。有些人实际上在说，只要我们今天能赚钱，就算毁了地球也无所谓。他们不关心后代的未来，也不关心贫穷国家的穷人会因此死去。他们只在乎自己的国家，以及能赚多少就赚多少，不顾后果。这让我想起之前说过的灵魂和个性的区别问题。如果意识层面没有变化，我们就永远无法解决任何这些问题，无论是气候、贫困还是战争。

So given that, and in order to finish off on a slightly more uplifting note, what is your advice to young people on a kind of spiritual path? Go on a study and I would say the spiritual world is real. Soul is, when I first mentioned this to my son, he was 20, he said, Dad, the soul is a mess. He doesn't think that now. Is it not? He doesn't think that now. It's definitely not.

鉴于此，为了以较为积极的方式结束这个话题，您对那些走在精神道路上的年轻人有什么建议吗？继续学习，我会说，精神世界是真实存在的。灵魂是存在的。当我第一次和儿子提到这个话题时，他20岁，他说：“爸爸，灵魂一团糟。” 但他现在不这么认为了。他现在绝对不认为是这样的。

And there are many paths to connect to it and you can connect consciously to it. The long way, the short way, the easy way, the hard way through suffering, you eventually come to learn that the spiritual world is not just real, but it's the whole thing.

有很多途径可以与之连接，你可以有意识地进行连接。无论是漫长的路径，还是捷径，简单的方法，还是通过艰难的磨难，你最终会认识到，精神世界不仅仅是真实存在的，它其实就是一切。

And so, and that's the only source of real purpose and meaning and joy, which the world needs. And I think that if you crack that, then everything else is easy. Very good. Chris Orn, we've talked a lot about purpose, meaning and joy, and what really matters in life. Big thank you. Thank you, Nick. Thank you.

因此，这就是世界所需要的真正目的、意义和快乐的唯一来源。我认为，如果你能理解这一点，那么其他一切都会变得简单。非常好。克里斯·奥恩，我们讨论了很多关于生活中真正重要的目的、意义和快乐的话题。非常感谢你。谢谢你，尼克。谢谢。