Lecture 14: 9/11 and the Global War on Terror

Okay, let's go down memory lane. The topic today is an adversary that poses a threat, serious threat to security of the United States of America. This adversary is one of the world's last bastions of central planning, governs by dictating five-year plans, a single capital that attempts to impose its command across time zones, continents, oceans, and beyond. With brutal consistency, it stifles free thought and crushes new ideas. Perhaps this adversary sounds like the former Soviet Union, but that enemy's gone. The adversary is closer to home. It's the Pentagon bureaucracy. We must transform the way the department works and what it works on. Our challenge is to transform not just the way we deter and defend, but the way we conduct our daily business.

好的，让我们回忆往事。今天的话题是对美国安全构成严重威胁的一个对手。这个对手是世界上最后几个中央计划堡垒之一，通过制定五年计划来治理，一个首都试图在时区、洲际、海洋及更远的地方施加其命令。通过残酷的一贯性，它扼杀自由思想和创新。也许这个对手听起来像是前苏联，但那个敌人已经不复存在。实际上，这个对手离我们更近。它就是五角大楼的官僚机构。我们必须改变国防部的运作方式以及工作的重点。我们的挑战不仅在于改变威慑和防卫的方式，还包括改革日常事务的处理方式。

We know the adversary, we know the threat, and with the same firmness of purpose that any effort against a determined adversary demands, we must get at it and stay at it. Some might ask, how in the world could the Secretary of Defense attack the Pentagon in front of its people? To them, I reply, I have no desire to attack the Pentagon. I want to liberate it. We need to save it from itself. And that means we must recognize another transformation. The revolution in management, technology, and business practices. Successful modern businesses are leaner and less hierarchical than ever before. They reward innovation and they share information. They have to be nimble in the face of rapid change or they die.

我们了解对手，也了解威胁。面对顽强的对手，我们必须以坚定不移的决心来应对，并坚持下去。有些人可能会问，国防部长怎么能在五角大楼员工面前攻击五角大楼呢？对此，我的回答是，我无意攻击五角大楼。我要解放它。我们需要让它从自身的问题中解脱出来。这意味着我们必须认知另一次变革——管理、技术和商业实践的革命。成功的现代企业比以往更精简，等级制度更少。它们鼓励创新，并共享信息。面对快速变化，它们必须灵活，否则就会消亡。

Business enterprises die if they fail to adapt. And the fact that they can fail and die is what provides the incentive to survive. But governments can't die. So we need to find other incentives for bureaucracy to adapt and improve. Already we've made some progress. We've eliminated some 31 of the 72 acquisition related advisory boards. We now budget based on realistic estimates. We're improving the acquisition process. We're investing $400 million in public-private partnerships for military housing. Many utility services to military installations will be privatized. We have committed $100 million for financial modernization and we're establishing a defense business board to tap outside expertise as we move to improve the department's business practices.

如果企业未能适应变化，就会面临倒闭。而正是这种可能性为企业提供了生存的动力。然而，政府机构不会倒闭，因此我们需要找到其他激励措施来促使官僚机构适应和改进。目前我们已经取得了一些进展。我们已经裁减了72个与采购相关的咨询委员会中的31个。现在的预算是基于切合实际的估算来制定的。我们正在改进采购流程，并投资4亿美元于军用住房的公私合作项目。许多军用设施的公用服务将被私有化。此外，我们已承诺拨款1亿美元用于金融现代化，并建立了一个国防业务委员会，以借助外部专家的经验来改进国防部门的业务运作。

To transform the department we must look outside this building as well. Consequently the senior executive council will scour the department for functions that could be performed better and more cheaply through commercial outsourcing. Like the private sector's best in class companies, DOD should aim for excellence in functions that are either directly related to war fighting or must be performed by the department. But in all other cases we should seek suppliers who can provide these non-core activities efficiently and effectively. We have brought people on board who have driven similar change in the private sector. We intend to do so here.

要转型这个部门，我们必须不仅仅局限于这栋大楼内部。因此，高级执行委员会将仔细审视部门内部，寻找那些可以通过商业外包实现得更好且更便宜的职能。就像私营部门的顶级公司一样，国防部应该在那些直接与战斗相关或必须由部门执行的职能上追求卓越。但在其他情况下，我们应该寻找能够高效、有效地提供这些非核心活动的供应商。我们已经聘请了曾在私营部门推动类似变革的人才，并计划在这里同样实施这样的改革。

The old adage that you get what you inspect, not what you expect or put differently, that what you measure improves is true. It is powerful and we will be measuring. So that was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in a speech at the Pentagon as it turned out on the 10th of September 2001. And as you can tell he is elaborating on the agenda that we've already discussed at length in this course about privatization of military functions without any idea about what's about to hit the country. And so he's not only talking about outsourcing and privatizing but he really came into the Pentagon with a mandate to completely reorganize it along management principles that were deployed in the private sector. And he was busily setting about that agenda in the first month and first year of the administration. But of course 10 days later America was very differently preoccupied.

这句古话说得好：你得到的是你检视的，而不是你期望的，或者换句话说，你所衡量的东西会得到改善。这非常有道理，所以我们会进行测量。这是国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德在2001年9月10日于五角大楼的一次演讲中的发言。如你所见，他正在详细说明我们课程中已经深入讨论过的议程，即军事职能的私有化，而他完全没有预料到国家即将面临的事件。因此，他不仅仅谈论外包和私有化，他实际上带着一个全面按照私营部门管理原则重组五角大楼的使命入驻。在政府执政的第一个月和第一年，他正积极推进这一议程。但当然，十天后，美国的关注点完全改变了。

Their enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us because we stand in their way. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism, and they will follow that path all the way to where it ends in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.

他们的敌人是一个由恐怖分子组成的极端网络以及支持这些恐怖分子的政府。我们反恐战争的起点是基地组织，但绝不会止步于此。我们的目标是找到、阻止并消灭每一个具备全球威胁的恐怖组织，并且只有在实现这个目标后才算结束。这些恐怖分子不仅仅是为了杀戮生命，他们还意图破坏和终结一种生活方式。每次他们犯下暴行时，都希望美国因此恐惧，退缩隐居，舍弃我们的朋友。因为我们阻碍了他们，所以他们与我们为敌。我们以前见过这类人，他们是那些20世纪各种残暴意识形态的继承者。为了他们极端的理想，他们牺牲生命，抛弃一切价值观，只追求权力，他们的行径如同法西斯主义、纳粹主义和极权主义，并将沿着这种道路一直走向历史中无人标记的谎言墓地。

Americans are asking how we fight and win this war. We will direct every resource at our command. Every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war, to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network. This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago with the decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.

美国人正在询问我们如何打赢这场战争。我们将动用所有可以支配的资源。我们将运用所有的外交手段、情报工具、执法手段、金融影响力，以及所有必要的战争武器，来打击和摧毁国际恐怖网络。这场战争不同于十年前的伊拉克战争中那种明确解放领土并迅速结束的方式，也不会像两年前在科索沃上空的空战那样，不使用地面部队且没有一名美国士兵在战斗中牺牲。

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists to funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.

我们的回应不仅仅是立即反击和单独的打击。美国人民不应期待只打一场战斗，而是要准备一场与以往不同的长久战役。这场战役可能包括电视上能看到的激烈打击和秘密的成功行动。我们将切断恐怖分子的资金供应，让他们互相对抗，迫使他们无处藏身、无处安宁。我们还将追究那些为恐怖主义提供援助或避难所的国家。现在，每个地区、每个国家都必须做出选择：要么站在我们这一边，要么站在恐怖分子那一边。

So that was President Bush's statement to the nation, the 20th of September, nine days after the 9-11 attacks. And it announced the advent of what we have come since to refer to as the global war on terrorism or the GWAT. And today, the agenda is going to be to explore that. We are going to talk about what was the GWAT and what is it, what does it become. We are going to ask how radical an innovation was it and what did it mean for the emerging post-Cold War international order that we talked about in the very first lecture of the course.

以下是对上述内容的翻译: 这就是2001年9月20日布什总统向全国发表的声明，距9-11袭击事件九天之后。他宣布了一场我们后来称之为全球反恐战争（GWOT）的开始。今天，我们将探讨这一主题。我们要讨论GWOT曾经是什么以及现在是什么，它已经发展成了什么。我们会思考这场战争是多么激进的创新，以及它对我们在第一节课中讨论的后冷战国际秩序的影响。

And finally, I want us to also think about as we go through this material, what were the paths not taken? What might have been done differently that might leave us in a different position than we are today? So let's think back to the 1991 Gulf War that I lectured about at the beginning of the course. And particularly George Herbert Walker Bush, Bush 41 as some like to call him. What strategy he pursued when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in December of 1990. And the strategy he pursued had a number of elements.

最后，我希望我们在学习这些材料时也能思考一下，那些未曾选择的道路是什么？如果采取不同的行动，我们今天可能会处于什么位置？让我们回想一下我在课程开始时讲述的1991年的海湾战争，特别是关于乔治·赫伯特·沃克·布什，有些人喜欢称他为布什41。他当时在萨达姆·侯赛因于1990年12月入侵科威特时采取了什么战略。他的战略包含了多个要素。

One was that it was fully authorized through the UN Security Council. Resolutions were passed admonishing Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait, which he ignored in eventually Stonewald, but refused to comply with. Secondly, the Bush 41 administration put together a very large and diverse coalition, which included participants with many different geostrategic interests, including every Arab nation except Jordan, participated in that coalition. They stuck to the limited authorized goal of spelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and made no effort at regime change in Iraq. This is something for which Bush was heavily criticized by neoconservatives in the U.S. We'll hear more about neoconservatism next week. And many people thought he was being too much of a wimp and that once you had half of me in troops there, they should have gone all the way to Baghdad. And interestingly, Dick Janie, who was in that administration, came out as a strong defender of not doing that, partly on the grounds that we wouldn't be able to manage the situation thereafter, the sort of philosophy. If you break it, you own it, which again, we will attend to more next week.

有一个原因是这次行动得到了联合国安理会的完全授权。安理会通过了决议，警告萨达姆·侯赛因撤出科威特，但他拒绝遵从。这引发了布什41届政府组织了一个庞大且多元的联盟，包括了除约旦外的所有阿拉伯国家，他们的地缘战略利益各不相同。联盟坚定地执行了把萨达姆·侯赛因赶出科威特的有限目标，并没有尝试在伊拉克进行政权更迭。布什因此受到美国新保守主义者的强烈批评。很多人认为布什过于软弱，他们认为既然军队已经进驻，应该直接攻入巴格达。有趣的是，当时政府中的迪克·切尼强烈支持不进军巴格达，部分理由是认为我们无法管理之后的局势，这就是所谓的“打破就要负责”的哲学。下周我们会对新保守主义进行更深入的探讨。

But it was this basic idea that Bush was operating on, that I like to call stop the bully without becoming a bully. So then the notion was that if people engage in aggression across borders, the international community will stop them. But it was consistent with the U.N. Charter's commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security, which is a line in the U.N. Charter, which we saw has come to be questioned subsequently in with the implementation of responsibility to protect, for example. But at the time, it was seen as a sacrosanct commitment of the U.N., essentially to protect the status quo of the division of the world in tenations.

布什当时就是在推行这样一个基本理念，我称之为“制止欺凌者而不变成欺凌者”。也就是说，如果有人在跨国界进行侵略行为，国际社会就有责任制止他们。这一理念与《联合国宪章》中维护国际和平与安全的承诺是一致的。这个承诺在当时被认为是神圣不可侵犯的，是《联合国宪章》的重要原则，尽管后来在“保护的责任”（Responsibility to Protect）的实施中受到了质疑。但在那时，这一承诺被视为联合国基本立场，主要是为了保护世界各国之间的现有分界。

And so you stop aggression, but you don't engage in regime change and you don't arrange the global geography. So over this and the next two lectures, I want people to think about one counterfactual, not the only one, but what if that had become the template for facing down international aggression in the post-Cold War world? And that was clearly part of Bush-41's agenda. He wanted to etch these norms into accepted common law practice, if you like, of international conduct and also the notion that they should all be mediated through the United Nations.

因此，你制止侵略，但不进行政权更迭，也不重新划分全球地理。在这一讲和接下来的两次讲座中，我希望大家思考一个反事实的问题，这不是唯一的，但如果这成为冷战后世界应对国际侵略的模板会怎样？这显然是布什总统（老布什）的一部分议程。他希望将这些规范融入国际行为的公认惯例中，同时认为这些问题都应通过联合国进行协调。

Another way of putting it is that he had a kind of containment sensibility, George Herbert Walker Bush. The idea was to contain aggression, not to solve the world's problems, not to end bad regimes, but to contain aggression, to stop aggression. And of course, the word containment has a long history. It goes back to the Cold War. And I want to take us back through that history because it's really only by having some sense of that history that we can evaluate the extent of the departure that comes with the global war on terror a decade after Bush Sr. was doing this.

另一种表达方式是，乔治·赫伯特·沃克·布什具有一种“遏制”的敏感性。他的想法是遏制侵略，而不是解决世界问题或终结恶劣的政权，而是要遏制和阻止侵略。当然，“遏制”这个词有着悠久的历史，可以追溯到冷战时期。我想带大家回顾一下这段历史，因为只有了解了这段历史，我们才能评估与十年后布什父亲推行的全球反恐战争之间的差异程度。

So if we think back, the idea of containment, of course, was articulated by George Kennan in 1946 in something which was called the long telegram. Germany was in Moscow at the time as part of the Truman administration. And it was published subsequently, anonymously, with the authorship X as a document in Foreign Affairs the next year called the Sources of Soviet Conduct. And this is the sort of classic statement of the original idea of containment. And it had a number of elements to it. The original doctrine of containment as conceived by Kennan. Kennan first and foremost, he was a staunchly anti-communist, very conservative and indeed held views about race and other matters which would not endear him to many people in this room. Be that as it may, this was his view of the Soviet Union. He thought it was, first of all, fundamentally antithetical to Western democracy. And he thought the enterprise of getting involved in public debates with the Soviets about capitalism versus communism and the desirability of different systems was a total waste of time. There was no possibility of dialogue and he didn't advocate. He thought it was just pointless. And indeed might give propaganda victories to the Soviets in the developing world during the Cold War.

因此，如果我们回想一下，遏制政策的概念是由乔治·凯南在1946年提出的，他通过一份被称为“长电报”的文件阐述了这个想法。当时凯南在莫斯科，作为杜鲁门政府的一部分。随后，这份文件以匿名作者X的身份发表在《外交事务》杂志上，题为《苏联行为的根源》。这是遏制政策最初理念的经典表述，包含了多个要素。凯南制定的最初遏制理论中，他首先是一个坚定的反共主义者，非常保守，并且在种族和其他问题上持有许多看法，这可能不会让在座的很多人喜欢。不管怎样，这就是他对苏联的看法。他认为苏联本质上与西方民主格格不入。他认为与苏联展开关于资本主义与共产主义及不同制度优劣性的公共辩论完全是浪费时间。不可能进行这样的对话，他也不支持这样做。他认为这毫无意义，并且可能在冷战期间为苏联在发展中国家赢得宣传上的胜利。

But secondly, he was absolutely unequivocally convinced that the Soviet Union was unsustainable. That it was a flawed economic system for the reasons that we know well, that command economies don't really work. And that eventually it would develop the kinds of problems that it eventually did. But then secondly, and actually in this he was stating something that has since become conventional wisdom among political economists who study international relations, he was convinced that the Soviet Union's hegemonic ambitions would bankrupt them. That as they sought to become a hegemonic power, they would be spending more and more sustaining that hegemony and eventually it would drive them to ruin. And as I say, the conventional wisdom now in the international relations field made famous by people like Stephen Krasner, Robert Kohane and others that hegemonic powers become overextended and eventually find it very difficult to sustain the financing of their hegemony.

其次，他坚信苏联是无法持续的。他认为这是一个有缺陷的经济系统，这一点我们都很清楚，因为计划经济并不真正有效。最终，它会出现各种问题，而这些问题也确实如他所预料的一样发生了。此外，他还指出了一点，这现在已经成为研究国际关系的政治经济学家的常识，即苏联的霸权野心会让他们破产。为了成为霸权国家，他们会不断增加支出来维持这种霸权，最终这会让他们走向衰败。正如我所说的，国际关系领域如今的普遍观点，由像斯蒂芬·克拉斯纳、罗伯特·科亨等人所阐述，认为霸权国家会过度扩张，最终发现很难维持其霸权的财政支出。

So Kenan was contemptuous of all political science and social science. He would have put it in those terms. But his seat of the pen's judgment was that this was a system that was just going to drive itself off a cliff. So then what should the US do? And here Kenan's view was, well the US should forget about the governments in the Soviet Union and really focus its attention on the populations behind the Iron Curtain, essentially to win the battle for hearts and minds. The thought was that as these systems became more and more dysfunctional, people would be more and more dissatisfied and then it would be important first of all for them to see successful models elsewhere. And so he thought it was hugely important to rebuild the American domestic economy at home and to invest in rebuilding Western Europe and Japan.

所以，凯南对所有政治科学和社会科学都持轻蔑态度。他会用那样的说法来表达他的看法。但根据他的判断，这套系统最终会自取灭亡。那么，美国应该怎么做呢？在这一点上，凯南的观点是，美国应该不再关注苏联的政府，而是把注意力放在铁幕背后的人民身上，努力赢得他们的心灵和思想。他认为，随着这些系统越来越失灵，人们的不满会越来越多，因此，重要的是首先让他们看到其他地方成功的模式。因此，他认为重建美国国内经济以及投资重建西欧和日本是极为重要的。

So a huge supporter of the Marshall Plan. Not partly because of commitment to the West European countries, but from the point of view of his containment doctrine, the idea was that as the populations behind the Iron Curtain experienced increasing levels of poverty and disaffection from their regimes, they would see on television and learn about in other ways the thriving democratic systems in the West. The other side of that coin was he very much wanted to admonish first and foremost the Truman administration but subsequent American administrations in Western governments not to start to become like the Soviet Union. We needed to not behave in ways that would make us seem to be their moral equal. We should therefore maintain civil liberties at home and in our international conduct we shouldn't engage in adventurism. Essentially our goal should be about containing Soviet aggression.

所以他非常支持马歇尔计划。不仅仅是因为对西欧国家的承诺，而是因为他的遏制政策。这个想法是，当铁幕后的国家因为贫困和对政权的不满日益加剧时，他们通过电视或其他方式了解到西方繁荣的民主制度。另一方面，他非常希望警告杜鲁门政府和之后的美国政府，以及西方政府，不要变得像苏联那样。我们不能采取行为让我们看起来与他们在道德上相等。因此，我们应该在国内维护公民自由，在国际上不进行冒险活动。我们的目标主要是遏制苏联的侵略。

And he thought the principle means of doing that would be economic and diplomatic. So he was opposed to the formation of NATO. For example, he thought creating NATO would just militarize the confrontation between us and the Warsaw Pact. And if we created NATO, the Soviets would do something comparable on the other side which they did. He opposed the Vietnam War. This is much later of course. But again on the theory that this is about something more aggressive than containment. The Vietnam War was motivated by a domino theory that if Vietnam was allowed to fall then the whole of the rest of Southeast Asia would go communist, none of which turned out to be true.

他认为实现这一目标的主要手段应该是经济和外交方式。因此，他反对北约的成立。例如，他认为成立北约只会使我们与华沙条约组织之间的对抗军事化。而如果我们创建了北约，苏联就会在另一边做出类似的反应，事实上他们也确实这么做了。他还反对越南战争。当然，这发生在相对较晚的时期。同样，基于这样的理论：越南战争超出了遏制政策的范围。越南战争受到多米诺理论的驱动，即如果越南沦陷，那么整个东南亚都会变成共产主义，但这些都没有成真。

And part of the reason that he was opposed to the Vietnam War was quite prescient which is that if in his mind if you were fighting a war of choice against an enemy for whom it's an existential war. Unless you can have a very quick, cheap, easy victory as you know when Ronald Reagan invaded the Grenada or something of that order. Basically the cards are stacked against you because you're not going to be able to sustain support at home for a war of choice whereas your adversary isn't fighting for their very existence and so they will be able to sustain support. So he was very skeptical of conflicts like the Vietnam War which he thought was a giant mistake.

他反对越南战争的部分原因相当具有前瞻性。因为在他看来，如果你发起了一场选择性的战争，而对手却将其视为生存之战，除非你能快速、廉价且轻松地获胜，例如罗纳德·里根入侵格林纳达或类似的情况。否则，基本上你的处境是不利的，因为你难以在国内持续获得支持，而你的对手是在为生存而战，因此他们能够持续获得支持。因此，他对像越南战争这样的冲突感到非常怀疑，他认为这是一个巨大的错误。

So that was classical containment doctrine as articulated by Kenan and it didn't get very far. Indeed he rapidly got into conflict with the Truman administration and the Truman doctrine as I've already intimated was revolved around militarizing the standoff with the Soviets in ways that Kenan didn't like. And this was laid out in a document called the NSC68 published in 1950. Many scholars call it the most important US strategic statement of US principles during the Cold War. It was essentially laid out what's come to be known as the Truman Doctrine and it supported the creation of NATO and it supported a much more aggressive stance. Now some scholars still call it containment so John Lewis-Gaddis in his excellent book Strategies of Containment calls this a different kind of containment and I don't have anything invested in the terminology but it's a much more militarized version of containment than Kenan originally envisaged.

这就是由凯南提出的经典遏制学说，但它并没有走得很远。实际上，他很快就与杜鲁门政府产生了冲突。我之前已经提到，杜鲁门主义围绕着以凯南不喜欢的方式军事化与苏联的对峙。这种战略在1950年发布的一份名为NSC68的文件中得到了阐述。许多学者称其为冷战期间美国战略原则最重要的声明。该文件基本上奠定了后来被称为杜鲁门主义的基础，并支持创建北约，同时采取了更为激进的立场。一些学者仍然称之为遏制政策，比如约翰·刘易斯·加迪斯在他那本优秀的书《遏制战略》中称之为一种不同类型的遏制。我对术语本身并无执着，但这确实是比凯南最初设想的更为军事化的遏制版本。

For Kenan military force should always be a strategy of lost resort, not a strategy of first resort. You try everything else first and you only use it sparingly to stop aggression when you have to. So even during the Truman administration Kenan had all this conflict and eventually he stormed off in a half to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton where he spent the next several decades occasionally throwing spitballs at one administration after another. So he became a grumpy old man of sorts. But of course the Truman administration was just the beginning of the Cold War and then we had the Eisenhower administration and the Eisenhower administration took a more militaristic view of US foreign policy than the even the militarized version of containment that was embedded in the Truman Doctrine.

对于肯南来说，军事力量应该永远是一种不得已而为之的策略，而不是首选的策略。你应该先尝试一切其他方法，只有在不得已的情况下才有限地使用武力来阻止侵略。因此，即使在杜鲁门政府时期，肯南也经历了种种冲突，最终愤然离开，前往普林斯顿高等研究院，在那里度过了接下来的数十年，并不时对一届又一届政府进行批评。因此，他成为了某种意义上的“脾气暴躁的老头”。然而，杜鲁门政府仅仅是冷战的开端，随后是艾森豪威尔政府，而艾森豪威尔政府对美国的外交政策采取了更为军事化的立场，甚至超过了嵌入杜鲁门主义中的军事化遏制策略。

And so the Eisenhower comes to power in 1952, the Cold War is ramping up, McCarthyism is ramping up and proponents of containment get accused of being proponents of appeasement. That this is all about appeasement. Of course appeasement is actually giving in to foreign aggression in the way that the British and French did when Hitler was beginning his expansionist policies and then accepting them. Containment is not that. Containment says you do respond to actual attempts at aggression. But short of that you don't involve yourself in trying to rewrite global political geography.

1952年，艾森豪威尔上台，冷战逐渐升级，麦卡锡主义也不断增强。这时，支持“遏制政策”的人被指责为支持“绥靖政策”，认为这一切都是在进行绥靖。其实，绥靖是指在面对外国侵略时妥协退让，就像当初英国和法国对希特勒的扩张政策所采取的态度。而“遏制政策”并不是这样。“遏制”主张的是在面对实际侵略时要进行回应，但在没有实际侵略的情况下，不要介入去试图重塑全球政治版图。

And so John Foster-Dallis who was the John Bolton of his era you might say, he was the proponent of rollback. And rollback was to not accept the disposition, particularly of Europe after the Iron Curtain came down and that he thought we really needed to push back against the Soviet Union much more aggressively than any notion of containment would suggest. And indeed Eisenhower ran on rollback in the 1952 election saying that they would take a much more aggressive anti-communist stance than the Truman administration had done. Interestingly enough of course at that time the Truman administration was bogged down in the Korean War which Eisenhower promptly negotiated his settlement to after not very long in office.

约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯，你可以说他是那个时代的约翰·博尔顿，他是“遏制政策”的倡导者。遏制政策的目的就是不接受铁幕降下后的欧洲局势，他认为我们需要比单纯的“遏制”更积极地对抗苏联。事实上，艾森豪威尔在1952年的大选中就以“遏制政策”为竞选口号，声称他们会采取比杜鲁门政府更激进的反共立场。有趣的是，当时杜鲁门政府深陷朝鲜战争，而艾森豪威尔上任不久就成功促成了战争的解决。

But in any event they ran on rollback. And of course something like rollback became a much more dominant theme if we think about the Johnson administration during Vietnam and Nixon's strategy became more complicated than just straightforward rollback because he wanted to actually in true kennonesque fashion he wanted to exploit divisions among communist regimes that's part of what the opening to China was about. But nonetheless in prosecuting the Vietnam War at least as he did and in the era before Daitan he was something of a hawk with respect to the Soviet Union. And so that was rollback and interestingly when we think about we look back on the Cold War despite what Eisenhower ran in in 1952 and what Dallas came into the State Department attempting to do he found a lot of pushback against rollback in the State Department and found that many people were actually more convinced if not of a kennonesque version of containment at least they were convinced of the Truman Doctrine's version of it.

翻译如下： 但无论如何，他们执行了“回滚”政策。当然，如果我们考虑约翰逊政府在越战期间的表现，“回滚”变成了一个更为主导的主题。而尼克松的策略变得比单纯的“回滚”更为复杂，因为他想要以一种真正体现乔治·凯南风格的方式，利用共产主义政权之间的分歧，这也是打开中国关系的部分原因。然而，在执行越南战争的过程中，至少从他的角度来看，以及在与苏联对抗的时代，他对苏联的立场是相对强硬的。所以，那是“回滚”。有趣的是，当我们回顾冷战时期，尽管艾森豪威尔在1952年的竞选活动中支持“回滚”，以及达拉斯尝试在国务院推行这个政策时，他遇到了很多反对。有很多人更加认同如果不是乔治·凯南版的“遏制政策”，至少是杜鲁门主义版本的“遏制”。

And so in Europe the US largely did stick to containment as its policy they didn't really try to roll back the frontiers of the Soviet Empire and if you look at where they did try to roll back the frontiers of the Soviet Empire such as in Iran where there was an election in 1953 and a pro-Soviet government was elected we went in and toppled that government and basically implanted the Shah did and turn out that well we engaged in rollback in Vietnam did and turn out that well. So by the end of the Cold War containment and indeed cannon was given a lot of credit as a policy that had actually worked of course whether containment would have worked in the absence of NATO is a question to which we'll never have an answer. So whether it was the cannon asked version of it or the Truman Doctrine version of it nonetheless it was given great credit partly because the early predictions had turned out to be right the economy was unsustainable and the Soviet Union did indeed become bankrupt partly because of Reagan's Star Wars which spent them created in not just an arms race of space-based weapons but a dollar's race and then of course very relevant to today's discussion they got embroiled in an unwinnable war in Afghanistan which turned out to be the Soviets Vietnam.

在欧洲地区，美国大体上坚持了遏制策略，而没有真正试图推翻苏联帝国的边界。如果看看他们确实尝试推翻苏联帝国边界的地方，比如在伊朗，1953年进行了一次选举，选出了一个亲苏政府，我们介入并推翻了那个政府，然后基本上扶植了国王，这并没有取得好的结果。我们在越南实施的推翻行动也并不奏效。因此到冷战结束时，遏制政策，尤其是作为这一政策代表的凯南，获得了很大的赞誉。当然，我们永远无法知道如果没有北约，遏制是否会成功。所以无论是凯南版本的遏制政策还是杜鲁门主义版本，它们都备受赞誉，部分原因是早期的预测证明是正确的，经济在现实中不可持续，苏联的确因为经济困难而走向破产，这部分归因于里根的“星球大战”计划，不仅引发了太空武器的军备竞赛，还产生了金钱竞赛。当然，与今天的讨论非常相关的是，他们卷入了一场在阿富汗无法取胜的战争，这场战争成为了苏联的“越南战争”。

Interestingly also motivated by domino theory the Soviet belief was that if the Mujahideen succeeded in Afghanistan this would allow Islamic fundamentalism to start working its way through the Asiatic Republics of the Soviet Union and it had to be stopped of course when the domino's finally started falling it was in Western Europe and it had nothing to do with Afghanistan. So George Herbert Walker Bush's policy in 1990 the First Gulf War is really a version of containment as mediated through international institutions. Cannon was a hard-boiled realist and so had no time for the UN and part of the reason he had no time for NATO by the way was again his hard-boiled realism he said no nation is going to bind itself by an alliance if it's not in their interest to do it so it's either going to be irrelevant when it's needed or window dressing when it's not but he also thought no nation was comparing attention to the UN so that aspect of Cannon's thinking is not part of the post-Cold War containment idea that Bush was working to entrench in the way that he responded to the First Gulf War in 1991.

有趣的是，出于多米诺理论的影响，苏联认为如果穆罕默德抵抗者在阿富汗取得成功，这将使伊斯兰原教旨主义得以在苏联的亚洲共和国中逐渐扩散，因此必须加以制止。当然，当“多米诺骨牌”最终开始倒下时，却发生在西欧，与阿富汗毫无关系。因此，乔治·赫伯特·沃克·布什在1990年第一次海湾战争中的政策实际上是一种通过国际机构进行的遏制政策。乔治·凯南是一个老练的现实主义者，他对联合国不感兴趣，部分原因也是他对北约持保留态度。他认为，如果一个联盟不符合国家利益，就没有国家会参与，因此联盟要么在需要时无关紧要，要么在不需要时只是装饰。他还认为，没有哪个国家会认真对待联合国。因此，凯南的这种观点并没有体现在布什在1991年响应第一次海湾战争时所努力巩固的后冷战遏制思想中。

So now let's come to Bush 43's Global War on Terror and what came to be called the Bush Doctrine very rapidly, and we can see what we think about how it contrasts with what had gone before. So the first feature of the Bush Doctrine is that he envisages it as being worldwide in scope. He says we will strike anywhere and we reserve the right to strike anywhere if there is a threat to our national security. Now, of course, America's assertion of unilateral rights to strike perceived threats that were not to the American mainland has a long history.

那么现在让我们来看看布什43号的全球反恐战争以及很快被称为布什主义的政策，我们可以思考一下它与之前的政策有何不同。布什主义的第一个特征是，他将其设想为全球范围的。他表示，我们将在任何地方进行打击，并且如果有威胁到我们国家安全的情况，我们保留在任何地方进行打击的权利。当然，美国对认为存在威胁但并不直接位于美国本土的目标进行单方面打击的做法已经有悠久的历史。

In fact, goes back to 1823 when John Quincy Adams articulated what came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine although didn't actually get named in the Monroe Doctrine until some decades later in 1850 but it was the Monroe administration asserted that any European influence, any European interference anywhere in Latin America would be conceived of and responded to as a threat to the national security of the United States. And so essentially during the Monroe Doctrine said that we control the hemisphere and anybody who interferes in the hemisphere is interfering with America's national interest and we will respond with force.

实际上，这一概念可以追溯到1823年，当时约翰·昆西·亚当斯阐述了后来的“门罗主义”。虽然直到几十年后的1850年才正式被称为“门罗主义”，但在门罗总统任内，该政策表明，任何欧洲在拉丁美洲的影响或干涉都会被视为对美国国家安全的威胁。因此，门罗主义的核心思想是美国要控制整个西半球，任何在这个区域的干涉将被视作对美国国家利益的侵害，我们将会以武力回应。

So that was aimed at the Europeans in the 19th century but it is the precedent if you like to extend there is a precedent for George W. Bush asserting we will act militarily anywhere in the world if our national security is threatened. And indeed interestingly he talked about the axis of evil, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. And of course in those days Iraq was not an Islamic administration. It was a secular Ba'athist regime run by Saddam Hussein. Iran was an Islamic state and North Korea was a communist state and so he was by putting those three together as the axis of evil he was doing two things.

因此，虽然最初是针对19世纪的欧洲人的，但如果你愿意的话，这为乔治·W·布什声称：一旦我们的国家安全受到威胁，我们将在世界任何地方采取军事行动，提供了先例。值得注意的是，他提到“邪恶轴心”，包括伊朗、伊拉克和朝鲜。当然，那时的伊拉克并不是一个伊斯兰政权，而是由萨达姆·侯赛因掌控的世俗巴士党政权。伊朗是一个伊斯兰国家，而朝鲜是一个共产主义国家。因此，将这三个国家并列为“邪恶轴心”，布什实际上在做两件事情。

One was he was saying this was the Bush administration's position until 2006 that this is not about Islamic fundamentalism. The terrorism was very careful not to attack the idea of Islamic fundamentalism. The war on terror was not just about Islamic changes that rhetoric after 2006 but also that we would act anywhere in the world. And if you think about non-paying it is 12 time zones away from the East Coast of the United States so the only way you could get further away would be by blasting off into space.

他说的一个观点是，直到2006年，布什政府的立场是恐怖主义并不是单纯关于伊斯兰原教旨主义的问题。在反恐战争中，非常小心地避免攻击伊斯兰原教旨主义的理念。2006年后，这种说法发生了变化，战争不仅涉及伊斯兰事务，还包括我们在世界任何地方都会采取行动。如果考虑到距离问题，它距离美国东海岸有12个时区之遥，因此如果要更远，那就只有飞入太空了。

So now we have taken the Monroe Doctrine worldwide. Secondly, we asserted the right to act unilaterally. Unconstrained by any existing alliances and unconstrained by what international institutions might or might not authorize. And indeed this is where he coined the phrase coalitions of the willing. We will put together coalitions on an opportunistic basis if necessary to fight our adversaries. And indeed as I mentioned to you in an earlier lecture one of the reasons so many East European countries were added to NATO in the 2004 and 2005 was the quid pro quo for their promise to participate in the Iraq invasion that I will be talking about next week.

现在我们已经把门罗主义推广到了全球。其次，我们主张有权单方面行动，而不受任何现有联盟的约束，也不受国际组织可能授权与否的限制。实际上，这就是他提出“志愿者联盟”这个说法的由来。我们会根据实际需要灵活组建联盟来对抗我们的敌人。正如我在之前的讲座中提到的，2004年和2005年，许多东欧国家加入北约的原因之一是他们承诺参与我将在下周讨论的伊拉克入侵行动，这是一个交换条件。

So we can act unilaterally with allies that are willing to form coalitions with us. And we are not constrained either by alliances or by international institutions. Third, he asserted a right to engage in preemptive war. So the traditional justification of war was the existence of an imminent threat. Word imminent has a long history. It's partly connected to just war theory which says that an imminent threat is necessary for war to count as a just war.

因此，我们可以与愿意与我们结盟的盟友单方面采取行动。而且，我们不受联盟或国际机构的限制。第三，他主张有权发动先发制人的战争。传统上，战争的理由是存在迫在眉睫的威胁。"迫在眉睫"这一词有悠久的历史，部分与正义战争理论有关，该理论认为只有在面临迫在眉睫的威胁时战争才能被视为正义的。

And if you go back and actually read the NSC68, the statement of the Truman Doctrine in 1950, it asserts there that the US will never engage in preemptive war, that it's only going to act defensively. So very quickly the Bush administration said no, we are not going to be constrained by the doctrine of imminent threats. And they started talking about things like emerging threats, gathering threats would be sufficient to justify American military action. And of course, if you think about that doctrine, a doctrine of emerging threats, you then are almost inevitably also going to get away from the idea that we are only going to be involved in wars of existential survival.

如果你回过头来阅读1950年的NSC68文档，以及杜鲁门主义的声明，你会发现其中主张美国绝不会发动先发制人的战争，而只会采取防御行动。然而，布什政府很快表示，他们不会受到“即将威胁”原则的限制。他们开始谈论一些比如“新兴威胁”和“潜在威胁”等概念，认为这些威胁足以为美国军事行动提供理由。当然，如果你思考这种“新兴威胁”的原则，你几乎不可避免地会偏离仅参与生存存亡战争的理念。

We are going to be back in the world of optional wars because there's no clear sense in which emerging or gathering can be neatly calibrated or that you can convince your citizenry of the importance of an emerging or a gathering threat. That's part of what we have with global warming. It's a gathering threat. It's an emerging threat. It can't much harder to mobilize people for a chronic problem if you like than a crisis. So imminent war was thrown out of the window in favor of these notions of gathering, gathering threats, emerging threats, and so on.

我们即将回到可以选择参与的战争时代，因为对于新兴或逐渐逼近的威胁，没有明确的标准来进行有效评估，更不用说去说服公众这类威胁的重要性了。这方面的一个例子就是全球变暖，它是一个逐渐逼近的威胁，是个新兴的威胁。相比于爆发性的危机，为长期存在的问题动员大家要困难得多。因此，迫在眉睫的战争被抛到了一边，取而代之的是这些“逐渐逼近的威胁”和“新兴威胁”的概念。

Again, so we can engage in preemptive wars against emerging or gathering threats. In that Bush doctrine, as he articulated it first at West Point commencement address in June of 2002 and then reiterated it in the two national security statement doctrines that the Bush administration published for one later that year and then reaffirmed in 2006, they said a legitimate war aim was now regime change. A legitimate war aim was to get rid of an oppressive dictatorship. So completely out of the window the UN notion that international action is legitimate if its goal is to restore the status quo anti of international borders. But simply if a regime is sufficiently oppressive vis-a-vis its own population, this will be a justification for military action. And the reason they articulated this so early was they already had their eye on Iraq. It was very clear for reasons we'll get to next week that from the beginning the administration was committed to removing Saddam Hussein from power even before we had started the battle in Afghanistan.

为了进行预防性战争，以应对新出现或正在形成的威胁。在布什主义的框架下，他首先在2002年6月于西点军校的毕业典礼上阐释了这一点，然后在布什政府在同年和2006年发布的两份国家安全声明中重申，他们表示，推翻政权现在是一个合法的战争目标。合法的战争目标包括消除压迫性的独裁政权。这完全推翻了联合国关于国际行动只有在旨在恢复国际边界现状时才是合法的观念。他们认为，只要一个政权对其自身人民的压迫程度足够严重，这就可以成为军事行动的理由。他们如此早地阐明这一点的原因是他们已经将注意力集中在了伊拉克。很明显，出于下周将要讨论的原因，从一开始，政府就致力于在我们甚至还未开始阿富汗战争之前就要将萨达姆·侯赛因赶下台。

A fifth element of the Bush doctrine was again a very radical departure which was that there's no possibility of neutrality. As he put it at the end of the clip I showed you, if you're not with us, you're with the terrorists. And of course there had been a long tradition of neutrality in international relations. If you go back to the US in the 19th century we had often asserted neutrality. And if you come even in the 20th century if you look at the run up to World War II Congress was passing neutrality legislation hand over fist to keep FDR out of the war with Germany in the late 1930s. There was a long tradition of the US asserting the right to be neutral in international conflicts and during the Cold War the non-aligned nations had declared themselves to be neutral in the conflict between the US and the Soviets. And once we get to the Bush doctrine all of that also goes out of the window. So essentially we're now declaring to the world that if you do not support us we will feel free to interpret that as support for our adversaries and we will act accordingly.

布什主义的第五个元素是一个非常激进的转变，即不再可能保持中立。正如他在剪辑结尾所说的那样："如果你不支持我们，你就是和恐怖分子站在一起。" 当然，在国际关系中，中立一直以来都是一个长期的传统。如果追溯到19世纪的美国，我们常常宣称中立。即使在20世纪，看看二战前夕，国会也不断通过中立法案，以阻止罗斯福总统在上世纪30年代晚期卷入与德国的战争。美国在国际冲突中坚持中立权利有着悠久的传统，而且在冷战期间，不结盟国家也曾表示在美苏冲突中保持中立。但是，布什主义出现后，这一切都不复存在。 基本上，我们现在向全世界声明：如果你不支持我们，我们就会认为你支持我们的对手，并据此采取行动。

Finally the Bush doctrine as he indicated in that clip envisages if not permanent war a war that we can never really say has finally been won. We're declaring war on terror. Well there's been terrorism in the world since the beginning of time. And so the idea that you're now going to be on a war footing so long as there is terrorism in the world you're essentially saying the US economy is going to be on a permanent war footing. We're going to be engaging in what have since come to be called endless wars into the indefinite future. So some have said that the Bush doctrine was not that radical of an innovation but clearly it was. It was much more radical than anything that had gone before. Of course what it did was as it has played out and we'll see this in the next two lectures it completely rubbish his father's attempt to re-embed some notion of containment for a post-cold war era into international politics and it's one reason his father was very critical of him and of Cheney and of Rumsfeld if you like scuttling his legacy and this came out in a subsequent biography.

布什主义在他的视频中提到，即使不是永久战争，至少也是一场我们无法真正宣告胜利的战争。我们正在对恐怖主义宣战。然而，自古以来世界上就存在恐怖主义。因此，当你说只要世界上还有恐怖主义就要保持在战争状态，实际上意味着美国经济将处于永久战争状态。我们将参与所谓的无休止战争，未来无定期地进行下去。因此，有人说布什主义并不是那么激进的创新，但显然并非如此。它比以往的任何政策都更加激进。事实上，这项政策在实施过程中完全否定了他父亲在后冷战时代试图将某种遏制理念重新融入国际政治的努力。这也是为什么他的父亲对他以及切尼和拉姆斯菲尔德非常批评，认为他们毁掉了他的政治遗产，这一点在随后的一本传记中有所体现。

So in effect the Bush doctrine if you wanted a bumper sticker for it is roll back of all possible adversaries at any time and in any place. The US now asserts the right to do that. So it was about as radical an innovation as one could have come up with and certainly the most radical innovation in US national security policy in the history of the republic.

布什主义的实质可以简单概括为：随时随地打击所有潜在对手。美国现在声称有权这样做。这可以说是一个极具创新性的构想，也是美国历史上国家安全政策中最为激进的创新之一。

So now let's turn to the Afghan conflict. So one question is well why was al-Qaeda based in Afghanistan in the first place? Anybody know? Why were they there? We just they just popped up. So Osama bin Laden had a long and antagonistic history of not very good relations with his Saudi government. He was a Saudi Arabian citizen and he had become radicalized and had in the 1980s worked with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan helping them battle the Soviets and when the Soviet Union finally collapsed he had tried to mediate an end to the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan among the militias not with much success. He had then bounced around the Middle East and eventually wound up in Sudan and during the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in that I was talking about some minutes ago he was strongly of the opinion that the Saudis first of all in that war part of the reason there was so much anxiety about the Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was people thought Saudi Arabia will be next and Saudi Arabia is a huge supply of oil to the west.

好的，现在让我们谈谈阿富汗冲突。有一个问题是，为什么基地组织一开始会在阿富汗呢？有人知道吗？他们为什么在那里？他们好像突然就出现了。奥萨马·本·拉登与他的祖国沙特阿拉伯政府有着长期且敌对的关系。他是沙特阿拉伯公民，并且已经被激进化。在20世纪80年代，他与阿富汗的圣战者合作，帮助他们对抗苏联。苏联解体后，他曾试图调解阿富汗各派民兵的内战，但没有取得多大成功。随后，他在中东各地辗转，最终到了苏丹。在萨达姆·侯赛因入侵科威特期间，他坚决认为沙特在那场战争中处境艰难，部分原因是人们担心沙特阿拉伯会成为下一个目标，而沙特阿拉伯对西方来说是一个巨大的石油供应国。

So both the Saudis themselves and others as part of the reason there was Arab participation in the coalition to get Saddam out of Kuwait. bin Laden said that on no account should the Saudis accept western participation in expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and if they did they would be inviting the infidel into the heart of the Middle East and they ignored him and then he kept up a steady stream of attacks on the Saudi regime in print and verbally and was increasingly suspected also of even financing terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia from his bases in Sudan and elsewhere that he moved around to and so the Saudis finally they first banished him from the country and then stripped up his Saudi citizenship and I think that was in 1994 they had stripped him of his citizenship and eventually they started putting pressure on Sudan to kick him out of Sudan because they thought he was and as did the Americans think he was using this as a base for mounting terrorist attacks which were ramping up over the 1990s and so finally the Saudis agreed and everybody agreed that they would leave him alone if he would go to Afghanistan and there was a sort of tacit acknowledgement that he would not forment terrorism within Saudi Arabia from that base but as al-Qaeda became increasingly radicalized we should remember that the two primary war aims were first to overthrow the Saudi regime and secondly to get the west out of the Middle East it was what they at that time called a defensive jihad rather than an offensive jihad which they have subsequently embraced so that's why it was in Afghanistan and that's why the the 9-11 attacks were plotted from Afghanistan he had good relations with the Taliban regime of Mullah Omar they had worked together there in the 1980s

沙特人自己和其他一些人参与到将萨达姆赶出科威特的联盟中。 本·拉登曾明确表示，沙特绝不能接受西方国家参与驱逐萨达姆·侯赛因，因为这样做相当于将“异教徒”引入中东腹地。然而，沙特无视他的警告，本·拉登随后在公开和私下多次抨击沙特政权，并被越来越多的人怀疑他在从苏丹和其他地方资助在沙特的恐怖袭击。最后，沙特首先将他驱逐出国，然后在1994年剥夺了他的沙特国籍。接着，他们开始向苏丹施加压力，要求苏丹将他驱逐出境，因为他们和美国都认为他利用那里的基地策划不断升级的恐怖袭击。最终，大家达成一致，只要他去阿富汗就不再追究他，并在默许的情况下认为他不会从那里对沙特发起恐怖袭击。然而，随着基地组织急剧激进化，我们应该记住，他们的两个主要目标一直是推翻沙特政权和将西方赶出中东。当时他们称这为“防御性圣战”，而不是后来采取的“进攻性圣战”。因此，本·拉登在那里和塔利班的奥马尔关系良好，他们在1980年代就曾合作过，这也是为什么9·11袭击是从阿富汗策划的原因。

an important thing to say about the Afghan war is we very early on made a decision to pursue regime change basically what happened was we went to the UN we said we got resolutions passed saying the Taliban must turn over Osama bin Laden and closed down the training camps they refused and we essentially said we're going to wipe you out we're going to take we're going to take over your regime but and here this is part of the reason I showed you the Rumsfeld clip at the beginning of the lecture it turns out that when Rumsfeld said we'll contract out everything except core military capacities that was not an accurate statement because the Bush administration was certainly not interested in growing the military indeed Rumsfeld was shrinking the military and they had no intention of changing that so they wanted to they wanted to attack Afghanistan and they wanted to do

关于阿富汗战争，一个重要的观点是，我们在战争初期就决定进行政权更迭。具体来说，我们向联合国提出了决议，要求塔利班交出奥萨马·本·拉登并关闭训练营。当塔利班拒绝时，我们基本上宣称要消灭他们并接管他们的政权。然而，这里要提到的一个关键点是，我之前在讲座开始时播放的拉姆斯菲尔德（美国前国防部长）的片段。这表明当拉姆斯菲尔德说我们将把核心军事能力以外的所有事情外包出去时，这并不是一个准确的陈述。因为布什政府显然并不打算扩充军队，实际上拉姆斯菲尔德还在缩减军队规模，并无改变这种情况的意图。所以，他们一方面想要攻击阿富汗，另一方面又想要保持这种军事政策。

it largely by contracting out not to military contractors as we talked about in the private organization lecture like that would come later but they thought the way to do this since Afghanistan was in the midst of a civil war the way to do this was to get behind one of the belligerents in the civil war and let them take over the country and then they will be a friendly regime and so the belligerent in question was a group called the Northern Alliance and the Northern Alliance was losing the war they they had been pushed into a small corner of the country and but for us involvement with them and support for them they would they would almost certainly have been defeated in relatively short order and so what we did was we got behind the Northern Alliance and supported them in the Afghan civil war which led then to the destruction of the regime which was in two important respects a set up for failure for two reasons one is a theoretical expectation maybe it's dressing it up too much to call it theoretical but at least one should have skeptical priors if you get behind the losing side in a civil war the odds are it's going to be very difficult for them to govern if you put them in power because one of the reasons they're losing side in a war is they probably don't have much grassroots support. on the ground and we will see this play out again in Libya and elsewhere in upcoming lectures

这段话的意思是，他们没有选择与军方承包商合作，而是决定在阿富汗内战期间支持其中一个交战方。当时的想法是通过支持一个交战方来让其控制整个国家，从而建立一个友好的政权。他们选择支持的是一个名为“北方联盟”的组织。当时北方联盟在战争中处于劣势，被迫退守到国家的一个小角落。如果没有外部势力的介入和支持，他们几乎可以肯定会很快被击败。因此，他们选择支持北方联盟，并帮助其在阿富汗内战中战胜对手，这最终导致原政权的垮台。 然而，这种策略在两方面注定会失败。首先，从理论上来说（也许称其为理论期望有些夸张，但至少应持怀疑态度），当你支持内战中失败的一方，并试图让他们接管政府时，他们统治国家的难度会很大，因为他们之所以失败，可能是不具备广泛的基层支持。这种情况再次在利比亚等地重现，我们将在后续课程中对此进行讨论。

So there were good reasons for skepticism of the idea that this was a good way to put in a puppet government that would be friendly to the U.S. and be able to govern the country without massive infusions of support and of course nobody suspected nobody anticipated for a second that we would make sort of martial plan type of investments in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 so that the notion we were going to sustain the rebuilding of this country was not on anybody's scanner and indeed as we have subsequently tried to do it that has been a dramatic failure there was no post-war planning of any kind people were this was in the you know in the heat of the weeks off to 9-11 and the notion was that this horrific evil has been perpetrated against the United States and we are going to go there and take care of business I mean that was the dominant rhetoric behind this invasion

因此，对这个想法持怀疑态度是有充分理由的，即这种方法能否有效地建立一个亲美的傀儡政府，并能在没有大量支持的情况下治理该国。当然，没有人预料到我们会在2001年和2002年对阿富汗进行类似马歇尔计划的投资，所以持续重建这个国家的想法根本不在任何人的考虑范围内。实际上，随后的重建尝试被证明是一次显著的失败，因为当时根本没有任何战后的规划。这正是在9-11事件后的几周内所发生的事。因为对美国犯下了如此可怕的罪行，所以当时的主流言论是我们必须去那里处理问题——这也是这次入侵背后的主要理由。

so one question to ask is well might there might we have done any of this differently was there a path not taken here clearly we you know as I said in the chapters I had you read today the idea of responding to 9-11 through the lens of the criminal justice system was a complete non-starter given the scale and scope the attacks and there was going to be a military response and it was also clearly the case that once the Taliban regime refused to be cooperative there was going to be military action well there was a path not taken advocated by some at the time and this is summarized by Lawrence Wilkinson who was Colin Powell's chief of staff in an interview in the Cairo review in in five years ago

所以一个值得问的问题是，我们是否本可以以不同的方式去处理这些事情？是否有其他的路径我们没有选择？显然，正如我在今天让你们阅读的章节中所说的，考虑到袭击的规模和范围，通过刑事司法系统来应对“9·11”事件是完全行不通的，军事应对是在所难免的。而且，一旦塔利班政权拒绝合作，军事行动就必然会发生。不过，当时也有一些人提倡另一种路径，五年前在《开罗评论》的一次采访中，科林·鲍威尔的幕僚长劳伦斯·威尔金森对此进行了总结。

he said the smart strategy and there were those who advocated at this at the time and he's correct about that you can find it in the archival evidence the the was to go in pound the hell out of al-Qaeda try to get bin Laden and his leadership if you didn't so be it you'd keep hunting you'd do it mostly with special ops forces and the CIA you would pound the Taliban a little bit and as you left you'd tell them do it again and we'll do it again this was a very formidable persuasive strategic brief and the president rejected it then he says in a rather mean aside well really the vice president rejected it because it was common knowledge that Cheney was really the brains behind and certainly the the energy behind the war as it was being fought so what would have been the advantages of such an approach essentially you would say to you would ignore the Taliban you would say we're we've been attacked by these people and we're going to go after them and we are going to destroy them and if you interfere with us good luck with that because well we will beat you up too and they need not have engaged in regime change particularly if you thinking about a world in which you're going to be acting with a light footprint and wanting to keep your forces available for deployment anywhere seems like it might be a way to go obviously first of all much cheaper vastly cheaper than replacing a regime you find you finance your operation and then when you leave your you leave with your operation

他说，当时有些人支持这样一个聪明的策略，而他对此是正确的，从档案证据中可以找到支持。他们的策略就是猛烈打击基地组织，尽量抓住本·拉登及其领导层，如果没成功，那就继续追捕，主要通过特种部队和中央情报局来执行。你还可以稍微打击一下塔利班，然后离开，并警告他们：如果再这样做，我们也会再来。这是一个非常强有力且有说服力的战略方案，但总统拒绝了。然后他略带讥讽地补充说，其实是副总统拒绝了它，因为大家都知道切尼才是真正的智囊，也是战争背后的动力。 那么这种策略的优点是什么呢？基本上，你可以忽略塔利班，专注于说“我们被这些人攻击了，我们会去追击他们，并彻底消灭他们”。如果他们妨碍我们，那就祝他们好运，因为我们会打击他们。他们不必进行政权更迭，特别是如果你想着在一个轻装上阵、保持部队随时可部署的世界中行动，这似乎是一个可行的方法。而且显然，这种方式首先要便宜得多，比更换政权便宜得多。你的行动结束之后，你对运营的投入也随之结束。

secondly it avoids the you break it you own it problem if you create a failed state you are then saddled with a failed state and you've got to administer a failed state or at least support some side that's trying to administer a failed state so we by by toppling the regime we took on a much bigger set of problems now some might say well but what about the costs in terms of deterrence that you want other players around the world to know that if they support terrorists or allow terrorists in their country they're going to be wiped out too and so that might have been some of the thinking but I suspect the real reasons it were not done first of all the rage after 9-11 the idea that in the weeks and months following that attack the notion that that mula armor's omar's regime was thumbing his their nose at the u.s was just too much to bear and too much politically to tolerate as well as hubris about what could be achieved in afghanistan and here you know we we we tend to repeat the mistakes of history you didn't have to go back to the 19th century and britains failed attempts to subdue afghanistan americans had watched in real time for a decade as the as the soviets had been ground down in the afghan mountains it's about the worst possible to reign in the world for military campaigns so it's not really surprising perhaps that we didn't pursue that path but it certainly there were people on the ground advocating it and it's something that we didn't do so what did we do apart from toppling the regime what did we do in going after bin Laden and what we did came to ahead in december in north east in syria in what uh you know in our north east afghanistan in the very high up in the mountains in a remote area called torobora

其次，通过避免“你打破了它，你就拥有它”的问题，我们可以避免承担因造成一个失败国家而带来的责任。如果你创建了一个失败的国家，你就不得不管理这个国家，或者至少支持某一方尝试去管理这个国家。因此，当我们推翻了一个政权时，其实也接下了一大堆更复杂的问题。有人可能会说，那国际威慑成本呢？我们希望让全世界其他国家知道，如果他们支持恐怖分子或允许恐怖分子在他们国家活动，他们也将面临被消灭的风险。这可能是当时的考虑之一，但我怀疑这并不是不采取行动的真实原因。 首先，9·11事件后全民的愤怒情绪，就在那几周和几个月里，塔利班政权无视美国的行为是难以忍受的，在政治上也是无法容忍的。同时，对在阿富汗能达成什么的自大，是历史上反复犯下的错误。你不需要追溯到19世纪英国在阿富汗失败的尝试，美国人曾在十年内目睹苏联在阿富汗山地中失败，那里是世界上最不利于军事行动的地形之一。所以我们没有选择这条路并不令人意外，但地面上确实有人在倡导这样做。 那么我们到底做了什么呢？除了推翻政权以外，我们如何展开对本·拉登的追捕？我们所做的一切在阿富汗东北部，塔拉波拉山区的一个偏远高地于12月迎来了高潮。

The battle of torobora which was conducted over the middle of december of 2001 and here's some commentary from a key player in that the battle of torobora following the strategy of keeping an afghan face on the war furies delta team joined the cia and afghan fighters and piled into pickup trucks they videotaped their journey to a place called torobora fury told us his orders were to kill bin laden and leave the body with the afghans right here you're looking at basically the battlefield from the last location that we had firm on a somber laws location this ridge line is at about 14,000 feet and back this way toward me is pakistan that's right on a scale of say one to ten 10 being the toughest how tough a position is this to attack in my experience it's a 10 delta developed an audacious plan to come at bin laden from the one direction he would never expect we want to come on the back door you were going to come up over the tops of the peaks that's right the original plan that we sent up to a higher headquarters delta force wants to come in over the mountain with oxygen coming from the pakistan side over the mountains and come in and get a drop on it bin laden from behind why didn't you do that disapproved at some level above us whether that was a central command or all the way up to the president of states i'm not sure

2001年12月中旬爆发的托拉博拉战役中，我们可以看到一些关键参与者的评论。在这场战役中，为了保持战争的阿富汗特征，三角洲特种部队与中情局以及阿富汗战士们一起行动，乘坐皮卡车前往名为托拉博拉的地方，并录像记录了他们的旅程。弗瑞告诉我们，他的命令是击毙本·拉登，并把尸体留给阿富汗人。这里你看到的基本上就是我们最后确认本·拉登位置的战场，这片山脊海拔大约14,000英尺，向我所在的方向延伸的是巴基斯坦。这场攻坚战在难度等级中是10分，10分为最难。在我经验中，这个难度为10分。三角洲部队制定了一项大胆的计划，从本·拉登意想不到的方向进攻。我们希望从后门进入，即从山顶上方进攻。原计划是从巴基斯坦一侧带着氧气越过山脉，形成对本·拉登的包围。然而，这个计划没有得到批准。我不确定是被中央司令部还是总统亲自否决了。

the next option delta wanted to employ was to drop hundreds of land mines in the mountain passes that led to pakistan bin laden's escape route first guy blows his leg off airway stops that allows aircraft overhead to find them they see all these heat sources out there okay there's a big large group of all kind of moving south they can engage that why didn't you do that disapproved why was it not approved i have no idea how often does delta come up with a tactical plan that's disapproved by higher headquarters in my experience in my five years of delta never before the military wouldn't tell us who rejected the plans or why fury wasn't happy about it but he pressed on with the only option he had left a frontal assault on bin laden's dug-in al-qaeda fighters the delta team had only about 50 men so the mission would depend on the afghan militia as guides and muscle their leader was a warlord a self-styled general named ali ali second from the left met with this cia officer and accepted millions of dollars in cash from the agency dressed like afghans the americans maneuvered up the mountains calling in airstrikes on al-qaeda by day they would advance but at night they soon discovered that their afghan allies went home well i have to assume that if you started up the hills of torbora and and the mojo hadeen took territory they didn't abandon that at night oh yes they did they gave it up to the enemy absolutely mojo dean would go up get into a skirmish firefight lose a guy or two maybe kill an al-qaeda or two and then they leave it was almost like it was an agreement and understanding between the two forces fighting each other almost put on a good show and then leave in the morning bin laden was on the radio the cia delta and their afghan allies were listening how did the afghans react when they heard from ossama bin laden on the radio as some bin laden is many a muslims hero these guys in my opinion were more in awe of a son bin laden than they were willing to kill him when they heard him talking on the radio they would gather around the individual to hell that handheld transistor he would hold it up in the air almost as if he didn't want

下一个三角洲部队想采用的计划是，在通往巴基斯坦的山口投下数百个地雷，这些是本·拉登的逃跑路线。第一批人踩到会被炸断腿，空中飞机就能发现他们的位置，看到那里有大量热源，就能判断有一大伙人正在向南移动，然后可以进行攻击。为什么没有这样做？计划未获批准。为什么没有获批？我不知道。在我五年的三角洲部队经验中，从未遇到过这种情况：总部否决了我们的战术计划。军方没有告诉我们是谁拒绝了计划或者为什么。Fury对此非常不满，但他仍然继续执行仅存的选择：对本·拉登和他的基地组织战士进行正面攻击。三角洲部队只有大约50人，因此任务需要依靠阿富汗民兵作为向导和打手，他们的领导是一位自封的将军，名叫阿里。阿里与一名CIA官员会面，并接受了来自该机构的数百万美元现金。 美国人装扮成阿富汗人的样子，在山上进行机动，白天呼叫空袭攻击基地组织。然而，他们很快发现，一到晚上，他们的阿富汗盟友就回家了。我只能假设，如果你开始攀登托拉-波拉山，而圣战者占领了领地，他们晚上不会放弃。哦，不，他们确实放弃了，绝对的。圣战者会上去，发生小规模冲突和交火，可能会伤亡一两人，也可能击毙一两个基地组织成员，但第二天就会离开。就像是双方达成了一种协议，只是做个样子而已。基地电台里传来本·拉登的声音，CIA、三角洲部队和他们的阿富汗盟友都在监听。 当这些阿富汗人听到奥萨马·本·拉登通过电台讲话时，他们是什么反应？奥萨马·本·拉登是许多穆斯林心目中的英雄。在我看来，他们对奥萨马·本·拉登更多的是敬畏，而不是想要杀死他。当他们听到他的声音时，会围拢在持有收音机的人周围，几乎像是他不想让人离开的样子。

the connection to break almost like they could see the ries line with some laden happen to be talking from like they could almost see him and feel his presence and they just stood there with wide eyes and somebody in awe that here is a leader of the jahad the leader of al-qaeda and they're actually hearing his voice over the radio and these were the men who were supposed to help you capture or killing some allies and then something extraordinary happened furies afghan allies announced that they had negotiated a ceasefire with al-qaeda something the americans had no interest in when furies team advanced anyway his afghan partners drew their weapons on delta it took 12 hours to end the bogus ceasefire precious time for al-qaeda to move you got to figure he's heading for the valley and the past in depacistan or assumption as he's going for the valley at that time bin laden had changed direction and the tone of his radio calls clearly under dress clearly hurting clearly caring for his men inside this building the american team listened to bin laden on the radio fury wrote down the translation in a notebook quote our prayers were not answered times are dire and bad we did not get support from the apostates who are brothers i'm sorry for bringing you here it is okay to surrender in quote when you heard that what did you think i thought it's almost over so dalton fury is the pen name uh he is book he is a book i said several books called to kill done laden he was the major in charge of the delta forces uh in in the afghan operation um and you can read his book if you want the the detailed account but but basically what happened at torah bora has been much in dispute um an important document which gives a lot of the blow by blow is this uh senate report uh foreign relations senate report published in 2009 um which which documents a lot of uh what fury uh said in in that clip and that basically um you know that the u.s it's not the only thing by the way there's a some might be skeptical of this if you see who is chairman of the committee at that time and he had failed in his 2004 bid to unseat george w bush no he was not involved in writing this report but uh another around the same time an academic um an academic uh you can read this abstract uh at your leisure when i post the slides basically they said there there was an alternative path not taken uh not just the two strategies that um fury was suggesting of feeding up the the command that didn't want to hear him but that there were um even within the sailing of ten thousand troops um even within that ceiling there were battle plans to to go into the mountains and at least seal off the um seal off the escape to pakistan um and they didn't do it uh instead there was a lot of hand ringing about whether first of all they were there were claims that we didn't know he was there for sure which turned out to be false the cia didn't know that he was there for sure um and then they thought that maybe he had been killed and they spent some time digging up for bodies but uh he hadn't been killed um and so the the the strategy had essentially been to rely upon these um militias who uh whose loyalty was very much in question and of course we shouldn't be surprised by that not only for the reasons dalton fury gave in that video that they might have had much stronger allegiance many of those people to bin Laden uh then to the prospect of killing him um but also because um we know from the literature on civil wars uh here the the state of the artist status calibis's work uh used to be at Yale now at oxford but um civil wars are never just about ethnic conflicts they're all kinds of other local uh interests served and as we saw in the host nation trucking case we talked about some time ago people are being paid and and making money in these kinds of settings and so it's it's very unlikely that you're going to be able in a setting like this to um outsource the fighting against somebody like bin Laden um so what explains the american strategy well one is that we wanted to keep the troops to a minimum um as i said there were there have been subsequent studies done um both by the senate uh foreign relations committee

这段文字描述了一些关于美国在阿富汗塔拉波拉战役中的策略和决策细节。翻译如下： “几乎就像他们能看到那条线一样，连接被中断，仿佛有人在谈论他们几乎可以看到他，感觉他的存在，站在那里目瞪口呆，惊讶于这是圣战的领袖，基地组织的领导者，他们实际上通过无线电听到了他的声音。这些本应帮助你抓捕或杀死一些盟友的人，发生了一件不同寻常的事情：‘Fury’的阿富汗盟友宣布，他们已经与基地组织谈判达成停火协议，而美国人对此毫无兴趣。当‘Fury’的团队继续前进时，他的阿富汗伙伴反而对三角洲部队掏出了武器。结束这场虚假的停火花费了12个小时，给基地组织留下了宝贵的时间进行转移。你得想象他正朝着山谷和向巴基斯坦的山口行进，或者我们假设他那时正朝着山谷行进。本·拉登改变了方向，他的无线电通话听起来显得十分疲惫和痛苦，显然很关心他藏在建筑物里的人。美国团队通过无线电监听本·拉登，‘Fury’在笔记本上记录下翻译：‘我们的祈祷未被回应，时局艰难，我们没有得到变节者兄弟的支持，我很抱歉把你们带到这里，可以投降。’听到这些你有什么想法？我想事情几乎结束了。” Dalton Fury是一个笔名，他的书详细记述了阿富汗行动中的很多事件。可以通过阅读他的书来了解塔拉波拉战役的详细情况。对于这一战役有很多争议。2009年发布了一份外国关系参议院报告，其中记录了许多‘Fury’在录像中提到的内容。报告指出，美国没有采取另一种可能的行动路径，不仅在‘Fury’提议的战术方面有不同策略的存在，还有十万部队限制下的计划，原本可以封锁通往巴基斯坦的逃生路线，但未被执行。相反，有许多关于我们是否确知他在那里和是否已经被杀死的争议，比如挖掘尸体的时间浪费等等，这些无疑延误了抓捕行动。美国的策略是依赖一些忠诚度存疑的民兵组织，考虑到内战中的复杂利益和人们在这种局势下的经济动机，这种选择弊大于利。在这种情况下，靠外包民兵来打击本·拉登是不太可能成功的。 美国策略受到许多因素影响，其中之一是想保持最小规模的部队部署。参议院和其他组织事后对这些策略的分析研究表明，应对策略原本有更好的选择。

and uh academic studies which should make it believable uh at least obviously there's always risk in any military operation but there certainly could there was a colorable case that the u.s could have gone in uh with troops that were in the region and prevented bin Laden's escape um it seems like a principal reason was that uh the the what has become uh so important in american uh wars abroad they wanted to keep uh the number of u.s. casualties to a minimum so as you saw there were only some 50 delta force people up there in the mountains working with the afghans they did not want american uh to start hearing about uh dead soldiers in afghanistan but then secondly it is it is also clear from that report that that they were already in december of 2001 president bush was asking um rumsfeld for a battle plan to go into iraq uh and remove sadam who's saying from power and they did not want to get a lot of american troops embroiled in any kind of conflict in afghanistan um so the thought was they were going to be redeploying whatever assets they had in afghanistan as soon as possible to iraq

翻译如下： 学术研究表明，这看起来是可信的，至少在理论上是这样。显然，任何军事行动都有风险，但美国确实有充足的理由可以派驻当时在该地区的部队，防止本·拉登的逃脱。一个主要原因似乎是，在如今的美国海外战争中，他们希望将美军的伤亡降到最低。因此，如你所见，当时只有大约50名三角洲部队的人在山上与阿富汗人合作，他们不想让美国民众听到在阿富汗有士兵去世的消息。 其次，从那份报告中也可以看出，早在2001年12月，布什总统就已经要求拉姆斯菲尔德制定一个进入伊拉克并移除萨达姆·侯赛因的战斗计划。他们不想让大量美国军队卷入阿富汗的任何冲突中，因此他们的想法是尽快将阿富汗的武力资源重新部署到伊拉克。

now you might think about well what were the costs of this strategy um one was the obvious you know immediate costs that bin Laden and al-qaeda escaped through the mountains to pakistan which gave them a huge propaganda victory against the u.s that the most powerful nation on earth in fact couldn't chase down this terrorist group in the mountains afghansan um but secondly also because we had such a weak footprint actually mula umar himself escaped on a motor bicycle motorcycle uh from uh uh from afghanistan uh into uh pakistan and would come to lead the taliban insurgency uh to retake the country uh from the the new uh regime in konda haw so much so that within a year uh american generals on the ground were saying up the chain of command uh you should negotiate a deal with the taliban because um the new regime's not going to be able to survive and here we are uh 18 years later and I believe we're on the verge of doing that but they're what i was saying is as early as 2002 um and finally I think that what the afghan operation did do uh though it's going to was going to take some time for this to become clearer it it made it obvious that the gap between the aspirations for and the capacities behind the bush doctrine were becoming that should say doctrine on that slide the bush doctrine were coming clearly into view because if you think about the massive expansion of breach that we proclaim you know we're white we're which preemptive wars against gathering threats anywhere on the world at any time uh with with uh any allies uh at the same time as with shrinking our military capacities extremely unwilling to get american soldiers killed uh and wanting to work through pro proxies that this is not going to end well it didn't end well in afghanistan and uh next tuesday we'll see how it ended in iraq. see you then thank you

现在你可能会思考，嗯，这个策略的代价是什么呢？首先，最明显的就是本·拉登和基地组织通过阿富汗山区逃到了巴基斯坦，这给了他们一个巨大的宣传胜利，让他们能够声称，即使是世界上最强大的国家美国，也无法在阿富汗山区追捕到这个恐怖组织。其次，由于我们在当地的存在感非常弱，甚至塔利班的领导人穆拉·奥马尔都能骑着摩托车从阿富汗逃到巴基斯坦，后来又领导塔利班反叛斗争，试图从新政权手中夺回国家。以至于在一年之内，驻阿美军司令们已经开始向上级建议，与塔利班谈判达成协议，因为新的政权将无法独自生存。而18年后的今天，我相信我们正处在这样一个边缘，但我想说的是，这种局势早在2002年就已经显现出来了。 最后，我认为阿富汗行动虽然当时还需要一些时间来体现，但显而易见的一点是，它揭示了布什主义的理想与其实力之间的差距。我们曾宣布要进行预防性战争，应对全球任何地方随时出现的威胁，同时却缩减了军事力量，不愿意让美军士兵牺牲，只想通过代理人来行动，这注定不会有好的结果。在阿富汗没有好结果，下周二我们将看到在伊拉克的结局。再见，谢谢。