External mandates – making billions on local expertise

Oh boy, how have we been lucky. So the oil was found in one of the last drills in 1969. And forward thinking politicians, they acted such that the Norwegian people were the ones that benefited, and not only over generations, but the generations to come. And in 1990, only six years prior to the first inflow, the Norwegian Parliament adopted an act that established the Norwegian government petroleum, which was called at that time. It was only six years prior to the first inflow. So the timing was quite excellent.

天哪，我们真是太幸运了。1969年，在最后几次钻探中发现了石油。具有前瞻性的政治家们采取了措施，使得挪威人民不仅在当时受益，而且还确保了未来的世世代代都能受益。1990年，在第一次资金流入的六年前，挪威议会通过了一项法案，建立了当时称为挪威政府石油基金的机构。时机非常理想。

So when the money started to flow in, the organization was just set up, ready to invest. And since then, our goal has been to maximize or give the highest possible return for the moderate risk so that the fund can endure. Just five billion corona has been added in the fund since the beginning. That is the flow of money that has been saved from the revenues from the wheat and sale of oil and gas reduction. But most of the fund is returned. Since the first inflow in 1996, the fund has had a return of 14,000 billion corona, including the currency effect of 3,000 billion. So the return accounts for 75% of the value of the fund, including the currency. That is fascinating.

因此，当资金开始流入时，该组织已经成立并准备投资。从那时起，我们的目标就是在适度风险下实现最大化或最高可能的收益，以确保基金的持久性。自成立以来，基金仅增加了五十亿克朗，这些是从小麦收入和石油天然气销售减少中节省下来的资金流。然而，大部分基金已经产生了回报。自1996年首次资金流入以来，基金已经产生了1.4万亿克朗的收益，其中包括3000亿克朗的汇率效应。因此，收益占基金总价值的75%，包括汇率因素。这实在是令人惊叹。

And to protect the Norwegian mainland economy, the fund is only invested outside Norway. So the investments are divided between North America, Europe and Asia, or say, primarily. 72% of the fund is invested in equities. 26% in fixed income and 2% in real estate. We have an automatic rule that makes us sell down or reduce equities after a stock market increase and buy equities after a decline to keep the equity pollution at around 70%. Most of the fixed income assets are made in developed markets with a large percentage in treasury bonds issued in euros, dollars, pounds and yen.

为了保护挪威本土经济，基金仅投资在挪威以外的地区。因此，投资主要分布在北美、欧洲和亚洲。基金的72%用于股票投资，26%用于固定收益投资，2%用于房地产投资。我们有一条自动化规则：在股市上涨后，我们会出售或减少股票持有量，而在股市下跌后，我们会购买股票，以保持股票投资比例在大约70%左右。大部分的固定收益资产投资于发达市场，其中很大比例是以欧元、美元、英镑和日元发行的国债。

The fund also invests in close to 900 properties in several global cities. So we invest in offices, retail and logistics sectors in London, Paris, Berlin, New York, Boston, San Francisco and Tokyo. And the fund is also invested in almost 9,000 companies in, I think it's 71 countries. All listed equities. So on average, the fund owns 1.5% of all listed companies. That makes the fund one of the world's largest single owners of companies, which is also quite fascinating. The equity management is based on two main strategies, a market exposure and securities selection based on fundamental research. And these strategies enable us to sort of achieve the exposure to the broad equity market expressed in the equity benchmark, while at the same time increased return based on company analysis.

该基金还投资于全球多个城市的近900处物业。我们在伦敦、巴黎、柏林、纽约、波士顿、旧金山和东京的办公、零售和物流行业进行投资。此外，该基金还持有约9000家公司的股票，分布在大约71个国家。所有这些都是上市公司股票。平均而言，该基金拥有所有上市公司1.5%的股份，使其成为全球最大单一公司股东之一，这也相当引人注目。股票管理基于两大主要策略：市场敞口和基于基本面研究的证券选择。这些策略使我们能够按照股票基准获取广泛股票市场的敞口，同时通过公司分析来提高收益。

The security and the selection is done both by internal managers and extal managers. The internal managers that are based in Oslo, London, New York and Singapore and organized in global sector teams, focuses in developed markets, primarily large caps. And then we arrive at the fund park, investing with extal managers. So we use extal managers in segments and markets where we believe they will generate excess return. In emerging markets and small caps in Asia, all of them are in country focused with, and they're based in the country where they're managing money. And we have managers in Jakarta focusing on Indonesia, in Mumbai focusing on India, in Sao Paulo focusing on Brazil, in Tokyo and so focusing on Japan's small cap and Korea's small cap, etc.

安全性和选择由内部管理人员和外部管理人员共同负责。内部管理人员位于奥斯陆、伦敦、纽约和新加坡，以全球行业团队的形式组织，主要关注发达市场，尤其是大型股票。接下来我们谈到基金部分，投资于外部管理人员。我们在认为外部管理人员能够产生超额收益的领域和市场中使用他们。在新兴市场和亚洲的小型股方面，所有的外部管理人员都集中在某个国家，并且他们驻扎在管理资金的国家。我们在雅加达有专注于印尼的管理人员，在孟买有专注于印度的管理人员，在圣保罗有专注于巴西的管理人员，在东京和首尔则有专注于日本和韩国小型股的管理人员等。

In Europe and in Europe it's a bit more mixed with both locally based country focused small cap managers and also some regional managers and sector managers. The thing is that we look for specialists that know a few areas very well. So we have today 110 managers in 50 different cities across the world. So we strongly believe in the information advantage of being on the ground. Because the managers we seek to find, they build portfolios grounded in their extensive local knowledge and research. They maintain regular communication with the companies in the portfolios by frequently visiting them on sites and not in conferences. So our aim is to generate excess return. As I've been there last year, we have generated 1.8% annualized excess return off the fees since beginning, that is 90 billion corona off the fees. And over time, we have only paid 0.3% in fees. So that is 80% of excess return is kept by end-bin. We also believe that the external managers will reduce the risk of over investments by avoiding certain companies with problematic business models and weak corporate governance in these markets. And these markets or these managers, they operate in markets with higher exposure to ease G-risk.

在欧洲，情况更为多样化，有些是专注于本地市场的小盘股经理，也有一些是区域和板块经理。我们的策略是寻找在某些领域非常专业的人才。目前我们在全球50个城市有110位经理。我们坚信，身处当地带来的信息优势。这些经理通过丰富的本地知识和深入的研究来构建投资组合。他们通过频繁的实地访问，而非仅仅参加会议，来保持与组合中的公司进行定期沟通。我们的目标是实现超额回报。去年下半年，我们已经实现了每年1.8%的超额回报，这在扣除费用后相当于900亿瑞典克朗。长期以来，我们仅支付了0.3%的费用，这意味着最终用户保留了80%的超额回报。我们还相信，外部经理能够通过避免商业模式有问题和公司治理较弱的企业，来降低过度投资的风险。这些经理所运营的市场通常面临较高的ESG风险暴露。

So our focus on these issues is integrated in the selection and monitoring. For example, before they are selected, and once a year after that, we send and bin expectations to the managers and discuss the issues with them. To ensure that the managers invest with their focus on ease G-risk, they understand what is important to us and that they have that in mind when they are investing on behalf of us. So the local managers, they have actually avoided 75% of the companies in their local benchmarks. Ours strategy has evolved over time with both the expansion of the fence universe, the fence size, the changes in the market environment. But our approach has always been dynamic. And the statements we have chosen to focus on, they have changed while all focus areas have been phased out. From regional managers in the United States, sector managers in 2000, small kept with focus in 2001, emerging markets in 2005. Regional managers and sector managers have phased out in 2010. But are entering again these days in a somewhat different shape and form.

所以，我们在这些问题上的关注已被整合到选择和监控过程中。举例来说，在他们被选中之前，以及之后每年一次，我们会向管理者发送并制定预期，然后与他们讨论这些问题。为了确保管理者在投资时关注降低G风险，他们必须理解我们认为重要的东西，并在代表我们投资时牢记这些要点。因此，本地管理者实际上避免投资了他们本地基准中75%的公司。我们的策略随着时间推移进行了调整，伴随了投资范围的扩大、基金规模的变化以及市场环境的变化。然而，我们的方法始终是动态的。我们选择关注的声明已经改变，所有的关注领域已经逐渐被淘汰。从2000年的美国地区管理者和行业管理者，到2001年专注于小市值公司，2005年关注新兴市场。地区管理者和行业管理者在2010年被逐步淘汰，但这些日子又以稍微不同的方式和形式重新进入。

So in general, we perform mandates in market segments where gathering information is difficult. And there's a great deal of uncertainty that may be better assessed through additional research. So we expect changes to continue going forward as we know there will be changes in opportunities. What does not change the law is that all our mandates are equity only. They are based on deep fundamental research. And they are all on segregated accounts. That is, they are trading on our book in our name. And there's several reasons for why we do that. First, we see at all times what they buy and sell. So we know the risk of each of the portfolios, the holdings in each of the portfolios changes over each of them and the combination. The second is that we can terminate the account at any time. First, it's just to cut the trading authorization that they've given them. When we do that, we do the same thing notice to safeguard the assets. The third is that the investment universe is defined by us. And since this is an account in our name, if something happens to the manager, anything, there is absolutely no doubt who owns the assets because they are trading on our book.

所以，总的来说，我们在信息难以获取的市场细分领域执行任务。这些领域存在很大的不确定性，需要通过额外的研究来更好地评估。因此，我们预计未来会有变化，因为我们知道机会会有所变化。但我们的法律要求始终不会改变：所有任务仅限于股票领域。它们基于深入的基本面研究，并且都是独立账户操作。也就是说，它们是以我们的名义在我们的账簿上交易。这样做有几个原因。第一，我们能随时看到他们的买卖情况，所以我们清楚每个投资组合的风险以及各投资组合及其组合的持有变化。第二，我们可以在任何时候终止账户。只需撤销他们的交易授权即可。这样做时，我们会采取相应的措施来保护资产。第三，投资范围由我们定义，由于账户在我们名下，如果经理发生任何情况，资产归属没有疑问，因为它们是在我们的账簿上交易。

You may have seen the movie or read the book, Monoball. Movie with Brad Pitt as Bill Bean, who is building a team of babes, both players for O'Killney. They can't compete on salary. So they must do the selection process differently. So they are constructing a team of baseball players and we are constructing a portfolio of managers. And like Bill Bean, we seek to have different selection process. For example, we don't ask for a minute to look at historic performance, but on the actual portfolio. So we hire managers because we believe they expected research or expected performance would be good, not that they have good performance in the future, in the history. And historic performance may hide certain factors. For example, when a good performance was driven by certain analysts who used to work in the team. And furthermore, we need a long history to figure out whether all performance is driven by skilled O'K. And very frequently, we don't have such history. And second, there's not an investment committee in BIM that decides which man should be awarded a mandate. But an individual performance manager. And BIM, or we have said that employing external managers is an investment decision. And investment decisions should not be made in groups settings. So we are eight people in the team selecting managers. And each of us in the team are for the full managers who are responsible for selection and termination within each over area and is measured on the performance generated. So we have huge debates in the team.

你可能看过电影或读过书《Monoball》。电影中布拉德·皮特饰演比尔·比恩，他正在为O'Killney组建一支由“宝贝们”组成的球队。由于无法在薪资方面竞争，他们必须采用不同的选拔方式。因此，他们在组建一支棒球队，我们则在组建一支管理团队。就像比尔·比恩一样，我们也希望采用不同的选拔方式。例如，我们不会花时间查看过去的业绩表现，而是关注实际的投资组合。我们雇佣经理是因为我们相信他们预计的研究或表现会很好，而不是因为他们过去有良好的业绩表现。历史表现可能会掩盖某些因素，比如过去好的业绩可能是由某些曾在团队工作的分析师推动的。此外，我们需要很长一段历史记录来判断表现是由技能驱动的还是偶然因素驱动的，而我们经常没有这样的历史数据。 其次，在BIM中，并没有一个投资委员会决定哪些人可以被授予委托，而是由个人绩效经理来负责。BIM或我们认为，雇佣外部经理是一项投资决策，投资决策不应该在群体设置中做出。所以我们团队有八个人来挑选经理。我们团队中的每一个人都全权负责各自领域内的经理选择和解雇，并根据所产生的绩效进行衡量。因此，团队内常常会有激烈的讨论。

We have one dedicated decision maker for each mandate. And third is that we don't use consultants to assist us. Several of them have in-depth knowledge of several managers, but we are in a different position than many of the other clients. So we have decided to dig deep of ourselves to know every aspect of the manager's portfolio, philosophy and the interaction in the team. So because we are striving to create a portfolio of different portfolio managers that fit well together with different focus and different investment universities. So what do we do? We follow quite a structured selection process. It starts with a short question there to potential managers with questions on the organization, the team, the assets and the full portfolio with actual weights back through time for different quarters. We also include a question on who they see as the main competitors. This information is used to get a better insight into additional managers. So based on that, we have a huge dataset with potential managers and can do different analysis on the actual portfolios, the changes, when and what they've been buying, and the differences between each one. This leads to a short list of managers, often around 10, that you can meet on site.

我们为每个任务安排一位专门的决策者。第三点是我们不使用顾问来协助我们。虽然有些顾问对多个管理者有深入的了解，但我们的情况与许多其他客户不同。因此，我们决定深入了解每位管理者的投资组合、理念以及团队中的互动。因为我们努力创建一个由不同投资组合经理组成的投资组合，这些经理各有不同的侧重点和投资领域。那么我们该怎么做呢？我们遵循一个相当结构化的选择流程。首先是给潜在管理者一个简短的问卷，其中包含关于机构、团队、资产以及完整投资组合的过去各个季度的实际权重问题。我们还包括一个关于他们认为的主要竞争对手的问题。利用这些信息，我们可以更好地了解其他管理者。因此，基于此，我们拥有一个包含潜在管理者的大型数据集，可以对实际投资组合、变动情况、买入时间和内容以及每个投资组合之间的差异进行不同的分析。这样我们就能筛选出一个包含大约10个管理者的候选名单，并可以实地考察他们。

And those selected for the second and third round, they get a more extensive question there with the questions on operation and compliance, etc. But we often meet the team three to four times before selection. And several of them are screened out during these meetings, while new managers are found and included in the search. Between each time of these meetings, doing a lot more analysis on the changes in the portfolio, potential changes in the team, this is repeated continuously to make sure that you have at all times invested with a potential or with a right potential managers. We usually meet the managers three to four times before selection and one per quarter after they are selected. In this meeting, we discussed the portfolio, individual companies, when they met the management of the companies, where they missed it, what they talked about, which ESG issues they discussed, what is priced into the company, why they have a different view from the risk of the market on both companies that they are invested in and the companies they have decided to stay out of.

被选中进入第二轮和第三轮的人将会面临更深入的问题，比如运营和合规等。但我们通常会在选择之前与团队见三到四次，其中有些会被淘汰，而一些新的经理会被发现并加入到甄选中。在每次见面之间，我们会对投资组合的变化、团队的潜在变化进行更多分析，这种过程不断重复，以确保随时投资在有潜力的或者合适的经理人身上。通常在选择之前，我们会与经理人见三到四次，选择后则每季度见一次。在这些会议中，我们讨论投资组合、个别公司、他们何时会晤公司的管理层、错失了哪些机会、谈了什么内容、涉及了哪些ESG（环境、社会和治理）问题、哪些因素已在公司中反映出来、以及他们为何对所投资和决绝投资的公司持有与市场风险不同的看法。

All the meetings with these managers are conducted on site. We never meet any managers in our offices. And there are several reasons for that. First is that sort of we prefer the manager to focus on the investments and the portfolio, not traveling around the world to meet us. The second is that by seeing them on site, we can meet the whole team, which of course is impossible if you drive them to Norway. And the third is that when meeting the managers in the country, we don't only meet the ones that we have, but we meet all the existing and also the potential managers. So we can compare their view on markets and companies. So that gives us a very good understanding of the managers' different views, who thinks differently than the rest, who are early or late to investment ideas, who are engaged in hurting, etc.

所有与这些经理人的会议都是在现场进行的。我们从不在自己的办公室与经理人会面。这样做有几个原因。首先，我们希望经理人专注于投资和投资组合，而不是到处旅行来见我们。其次，在现场会面时，我们可以见到整个团队，而把他们带到挪威是做不到的。第三，当在他们所在的国家见到经理人时，我们不仅能见到已合作的经理人，还能见到所有现有的和潜在的经理人。这样一来，我们可以比较他们对市场和公司的观点。这让我们更好地理解不同经理人的看法，谁的想法与众不同，谁对投资理念反应早或晚，谁在追随潮流等。

When looking for managers in a certain market, we look for a good investment company and a good portfolio manager within the company. So our experience is that excess return is tied to individuals, and they need an organization they can thrive. So we have found that the smaller, privately owned organizations more often have a higher excess return than the larger ones. And the larger ones are owned by financial institutions. I think there are several reasons for that. More often, they have better alignment of interest between the portfolio managers, the analysts and the sales customers. And they have a compensation structure that sort of reflects and strengthens this alignment. We have heard of it more seen that the privately owned organizations, they are better at attracting, retaining and growing talent, so the teams are more stable. And we find more frequently focused on asset gathering rather than excess return in some of the larger organizations with different departments linked to different parts of the financial industry. Our experience is that personal responsibility and personal accountability leads to more diligent analysis of the PMs. And they have an ownership to the final investment decision. So we avoid investment teams with rigid investment committees and look for organizations where we can find clear and individual-based decision-making process.

在寻找特定市场的经理时，我们会寻找一家优秀的投资公司和公司内优秀的组合经理。我们的经验表明，超额收益与个人有关，他们需要一个可以茁壮成长的组织。我们发现较小的私人公司往往比大型公司有更高的超额收益。大型公司往往由金融机构拥有。我认为这是有几个原因的。通常情况下，私人公司在投资组合经理、分析师和销售客户之间有更好的利益一致性。他们的薪酬结构也反映和加强了这种一致性。我们了解到，私人公司在吸引、留住和培养人才方面表现得更好，所以团队更稳定。而我们发现，一些大型组织更关注资产收集，而不是超额收益，因为它们的不同部门与金融业的不同部分有关联。我们的经验是，个人责任感和问责制可以促使投资组合经理进行更详尽的分析，并对最终的投资决策负有责任。因此，我们会避开那些有严格投资委员会的投资团队，寻找那些决策过程清晰且以个人为基础的组织。

The overconfidence in group settings with lack of quality and seeking anonymity that should be avoided in investment decisions. It is very important that the portfolio manager has a strong team around him or her to give input on the stocks to buy and the stocks that he or she should have sold. In general, just give them a hard time. Such that they can help him or her to avoid anchoring bias, loss aversion bias and other behavioral traps. For example, one of our managers in Japan, they have a war room where views from the team are flushed out and opinions are expressed independently of seniority. Which of course is very different from the Japanese culture.

在投资决策中，应避免在群体环境中的过度自信、缺乏质量和寻求匿名。非常重要的是，投资组合经理需要有一个强有力的团队来为他们提供股票买卖的建议。总的来说，要对他们提出严厉的问题，以帮助他们避免锚定偏见、损失厌恶偏见和其他行为陷阱。例如，我们在日本的一位经理设有“作战室”，在这个空间里，团队成员能畅所欲言，而意见的表达与资历无关。这当然与日本的文化大相径庭。

In general, we seek to identify that the investment culture is supported at all levels through sitting down with each analyst, preferably at their desk. And we prefer being an early investor. So we are searching for boutiques. And given that we don't look at track record, we can look for good teams and good portfolio managers elsewhere than many of the other allocators out there. And we often find hungry teams focused on showing the world or a large potential client that they will succeed. Given the long-term commitment with the managers that we select, we have time to grow with them.

总体来说，我们会通过与每位分析师面谈，最好是在他们的办公桌旁，来确认投资文化在各个层面都得到支持。此外，我们更倾向于做早期投资者，因此我们一直在寻找精品公司。因为我们不看重过往业绩，我们有机会在其他许多资金配置者没有涉足的地方寻找优秀团队和优秀的投资组合经理。我们经常能找到那些渴望向世界或潜在大客户展示自己能取得成功的团队。鉴于我们与所选经理的长期合作，我们有足够的时间与他们共同成长。

At first, it requires quite deep diligence into why they have started the business. And their passion for investing compared to the work building and organization. And the team, let's give them a right input and tough discussions. The types of decision-makers or portfolio managers we have chosen to invest with, they are quite diverse. There are some common characteristics among RPMs. They need to have a creative and distinct view of the world where they seek different data, different interpretations and can put the numbers into context.

首先，需要深入了解他们为何创办这项业务的原因，以及他们对投资的热情与建立和管理工作的比较。同时，团队需要给予正确的指导和进行严肃的讨论。我们选择投资的决策者或投资组合经理类型非常多样化。但他们都有一些共同特点：他们需要对世界有创造性和独特的视角，能够寻找不同的数据、不同的解读，并能将数字置于背景中进行分析。

It's essential to be curious, challenge, conventional wisdom, inquisitive and humble. And they need to be willing to always look for new information and willing to change one's mind. So one of our peers was sitting on the road counting cars for a week before investing in a tall road. Another one was sitting in a wheelchair traveling around the world to make up its own view. So in general, they need to find information through their own analysis of market and companies. And at the same time, accept that changing market and dynamics may lead to disruption.

关键在于保持好奇心，挑战传统观念，保持求知欲和谦逊。他们需要愿意不断寻找新信息，并愿意改变自己的看法。因此，我们的一个同行曾在投资公路之前，花了一周时间坐在路边数车流。另一个同行则曾坐在轮椅上环游世界，形成自己的见解。总之，他们需要通过自己对市场和公司的分析来获取信息。同时，他们也要接受市场变化和动态可能带来的颠覆。

The only information which I away from is inside information. I once met a PM with the Gold Clubs in the office claiming that the best information that he got was the one on one's with the CEOs on Goldscotch. That is one of the shortest meetings I ever had. The external managers apply huge analytical capacity on a limited number of equities. They seek to identify companies with attractive valuation and sort of positive ESG progress. And these convictions should be reflected in the portfolio. So we seek for concentrated portfolios.

我只有一类信息是不会接触的，那就是内幕信息。我曾经遇到一位基金经理在办公室里炫耀他通过与CEO私人会面的"金球"葡萄酒俱乐部获得了最好的信息。那是我参加过的最短的会议之一。外聘经理通常对有限数量的股票进行深入分析，寻找具有吸引力的估值和积极的ESG（环境、社会和治理）进展的公司。这些信念应该体现在投资组合中，因此我们追求集中的投资组合。

We believe we have selected the best portfolio manager in that specific field. And we expect them to take high market risk to outperform. Although the group that ILEED is responsible for the selection, termination and ongoing return and risk, there are many more of us in aiming that are involved in monitoring. So we have governance, compliance, internal legal advisors, risk management and measurement operations, the internal and external auditors who regularly go through all of routines. But focusing more on what we do, given that all over mandates are on a segregated account, we have access to all holdings and changes in the portfolio daily through our database.

我们相信在这个特定领域，我们已经选定了最优秀的投资组合经理，并期望他们通过承担高市场风险来实现超额回报。虽然由ILEED负责选择、结束以及持续的收益和风险管理，但我们的很多同事也参与了监督工作。我们有治理、合规、内部法律顾问、风险管理和测量操作，还有定期审核所有流程的内部和外部审计员。更专注于我们的工作，由于所有的委托账户都是独立管理的，我们每天都可以通过数据库查看投资组合中的所有持仓和变动。

So we have built several monitoring tools on this data that is crucial in monitoring each of the managers. Tools and performance, risk, trading, holding. For example, in this tool, it's just the trading analyzer. We follow the managers buying and selling a specific stock in combination with performance and broke estimates. This is put into context or over discussions with the managers to evaluate whether they are executing the strategies and strategies. Is the PM a follower? When is he or she increasing the position? Are they utilizing market volatility to trade the position?

因此，我们基于这些数据构建了几种监测工具，这在监控每位经理时至关重要。这些工具涵盖了绩效、风险、交易和持仓等方面。例如，其中一个工具就是交易分析器。我们跟踪经理人在某只特定股票上的买卖操作，并结合其业绩和市场预估进行分析。通过与经理人的讨论，我们评估他们是否在执行策略。基金经理是跟随者吗？他们何时增加仓位？他们是否在利用市场波动进行交易？

Are they willing to be able to revisit the investment thesis and change the portfolio? Staled portfolios are red flag and something that we would investigate further. Because market demand must change quite drastically and we expect all managers to adjust their portfolios. Furthermore, this database is stretching back to 1998, which gives us a huge data set on when and how they end the perform or outperform. How we should think about combining managers, increase funding, terminate the mandates, etc. Our focus is to optimize a portfolio of managers based on knowledge of the portfolio, the regular meetings with the managers and the analysis of the portfolios.

他们是否愿意重新审视投资理念并调整投资组合？停滞不前的投资组合是一个危险信号，需要我们进一步调查。因为市场需求会发生相当大的变化，我们希望所有的经理都能相应调整他们的投资组合。此外，这个数据库的历史可以追溯到1998年，使我们能够掌握一个庞大的数据集，了解他们何时以及如何表现不佳或超常发挥。我们应该如何考虑组合经理、增加资金、终止委托等问题。我们的重点是基于对投资组合的了解、与经理的定期会议及对投资组合的分析，优化经理的投资组合。

The aim is to maximize expect return per dollar fee. An additional manager may bring excess performance but also may bring us closer to index portfolio, which is just an expensive way of doing it. We manage the portfolio quite actively. On average, we have 14 new and 10 terminations every year. 40% of the terminations are due to significant changes around the portfolio manager, that he or she is leaving, expanding the coverage, etc. 40% is due to the wrong selection from us or that we are less convinced about their excess performance going forward for some reason. 20% is due to a shifting strategy, getting out of the sector managers, all the regional managers, etc.

目标是最大化每一美元费用的预期回报。增加一个经理可能带来额外的收益，但也可能让我们更接近于指数组合，这其实是一种更昂贵的做法。我们对投资组合的管理非常积极。平均每年有14个新的加入和10个终止。40%的终止是因为投资组合经理的重大变动，比如他们离职或扩大覆盖范围等。40%是因为我们错误的选择，或者出于某种原因对他们未来的超额表现不再有信心。20%是因为策略的变动，比如退出某个行业或所有地区的经理等。

The shortest we have had is two weeks. That was the performance that left right after we had signed the agreement. The longest is a UK small gap mandate that we had since 2001. On average, we hold the mandate for a bit of four years. Average holding of today's mandate is about between 6 and 7. We use experts in selected market segments, utilizing deep, fundamental research. We prefer small and privately owned organizations. We prefer single PMs versus team-run portfolios or investment committees. We meet the whole organization on site.

我们曾经持有最短的委托期限是两周。那是在我们刚签完协议后就结束的项目。最长的是一个自2001年就开始的英国小缺口委托项目。平均来说，我们持有委托的时间是四年多。目前委托的平均持有时间大约是6到7年。我们在特定的市场领域使用专家，进行深入的基础研究。我们更倾向于选择小型和私人拥有的组织。相比团队管理的投资组合或投资委员会，我们更喜欢单一的基金经理。我们会亲自到现场了解整个组织。

We look for some specific characteristics with the portfolio manager and the team. And they have quite a thorough monitoring process.

我们寻找投资组合经理和团队的一些特定特点。而且他们有一个相当全面的监控流程。

We have a lot of information about the market. We have a lot of information about the market. We have a lot of information about the market. We have a lot of information about the market. We have a lot of information about the market.

我们掌握了很多关于市场的信息。

We have a lot of information about the market. We have a lot of information about the market. We have a lot of information about the market.

我们掌握了很多关于市场的信息。我们掌握了很多关于市场的信息。我们掌握了很多关于市场的信息。