Stan Druckenmiller | Podcast | In Good Company | Norges Bank Investment Management

Hi everybody, I'm Nicola Tangen, the CEO of the Norwegian Sawan Wealth Fund and today I'm here with Stan Druckenmiller, a proper legend in the investment world. Stan, what a pleasure to be here. I'm happy to see you in that cloud. Now, what are the most important data you're looking at these days? Currently. Yeah. Interestingly enough, I'm known as a macro investor but I do a macro from the bottom up so we're listening primarily to companies and we're not seeing any material signs of weakness other than maybe in the housing market but that's from a very elevated price level. So we're not seeing bottom up information indicating to us that there's an economic problem anytime in the next three to six months. I would also say I'm revealing now that I'm more on the market animal than an economist that we look at financial conditions. They've been very, very loose. I mean, they're looser looser than they were when the Fed actually started tightening. They've tightened considerably in the last four or five weeks ever since, ironically, ever since the Fed cut because the dollar has rallied and obviously interest rates have gone up but they're still quite above normal. So that's pretty much the data we're looking at.

大家好，我是挪威主权财富基金的首席执行官尼古拉·唐根。今天我很高兴能和投资界的传奇人物斯坦·德鲁肯米勒在一起。斯坦，真是很高兴见到你。现在，你最近在关注哪些重要的数据呢？ 斯坦回应道：“有趣的是，虽然我以宏观投资闻名，但实际上我是从自下而上的角度进行宏观分析的，所以我们主要听取公司的情况。除了房地产市场可能从非常高的价格水平有所减弱外，我们并没有看到其他实质性的疲软迹象。因此，按照我们从具体公司获得的信息来看，在未来三到六个月内，似乎没有经济问题的迹象。 此外，我要承认我是一个更倾向于市场的投资者而不是经济学家，我们也在观察金融状况。金融状况一直非常宽松，甚至比美联储开始收紧时还要宽松。虽然在过去四五个星期，从美联储减息后，反而由于美元走强和利率上升，金融状况开始明显收紧，但仍然比正常水平宽松。所以这就是我们正在关注的数据。”

I'd say the other thing I'm focused on, I've been obsessed with whether we were in the 70s really since 2021 when this whole inflationary episode started. And I'd say two years ago or a year and a half ago, I was very confident that inflation was going to come down, which I was right on, but I was worried about the economy which I was completely wrong on. More recently, and you can take this for the grain of salt since I had one right and one wrong there, I've switched to being more worried about inflation going forward than the economy itself. Why do I say that? If we go back to the 70s, there was an episode with OPEC that set off an inflation, you had a recession and inflation came down, I think, from about eight to three. And then went back up again. Yes. And what bothered me and what I have wanted to see, your exact right and went back up again, it went back up again and the number of months would correlate to the bottom being right about now. So my confidence a year, a year and a half ago was we're going to have that period where we came down again and then we'd see. And I'm a little worried that the Fed has declared victory too early. I don't have conviction like I had in 2021 that inflation was going to go up. That's when the money supply was growing 40% and all sorts of things were happening. But I also don't have conviction that they've snuffed this thing out and won the battle and to cut 50 basis points with credit spreads tight, gold at new highs, equities roaring, no sign of weakness, material weakness in the economy. Of course, there are some spots. That just makes me nervous that this thing could turn up again.

这段文字大意如下： 我一直专注于是否经历了类似70年代的情况，自从2021年的通胀开始以来，我对此非常着迷。大约两年或一年半之前，我很肯定通胀会下降，这点我判断对了，但我对经济感到担忧，这一点我判断错了。最近，你可以认为我的看法有保留，因为我之前有一个判断对了，一个错了，我开始对未来的通胀比经济本身更担心。为什么这么说呢？回到70年代，当时OPEC引发了一次通胀，随后出现了衰退，通胀从大约8%降到了3%，然后又回升。这让我困扰，因为我想看到这种变化，而实际上再次回升。这次回升的时间几乎与现阶段相符。因此，我过去一两年前的信心是，我们会看到通胀再次下降的一段时期，然后再观察。而这次我有点担心美联储可能太早宣布胜利。我没有像2021年时那么坚定地认为通胀会上升，当时货币供应增长了40%，各种情况纷纷出现。但我也不认为他们已经完全解决了问题并赢得了这场战斗。考虑到信贷利差紧缩、黄金创新高、股票市场活跃，经济未显现出实质性的疲软（当然，某些领域例外），这让我担心通胀可能再次回升。

What would make you turn up again? What would be the factors? I think what I just said, easing into financial conditions, let's say Trump wins. If Trump wins, you could have animal spirits from the business community who are dying for deregulation. You could have tariffs which are on the margin, inflationary. Immigration has been a great boon to this country. Maybe not the way it was done, but it certainly enabled us to have growth without inflation in labor materially the last two or three years. The combination of animal spirits or recovery doing better than it is. I'm just open-minded to it. Why is it so urgent for them, central bank to cut, given this? Honestly, I don't take the nefarious view that Powell is doing it for quote unquote political reasons. I do think he's obsessed with the soft landing and I think he's obsessed with his legacy and having made the mistake he made in 21. And he's being egged on by other economists in the press. To me, the Fed's job is to avoid the big, big mistakes. Like the 70s, like the great financial crisis, like the big inflation we just had. But all this fine-tuning and worrying about a soft landing, that is not the job of the Fed in my opinion. It's to maximize employment for the long term, not for the next three months to the next four months. But I think the Fed's obsession with nailing this so-called soft landing, I would remind everybody that the reason we're having a landing is because they let inflation go from 2 to 9%. So there was no need for landing for 20 years. But I think that's what they're obsessed with. I don't really, I don't know.

为了让你重返舞台，什么因素会起作用呢？我认为刚才提到的，放松金融条件，比如说特朗普赢了。如果特朗普获胜，可能会激发商业界盼望已久的放松监管的“动物精神”。关税可能会在一定程度上导致通货膨胀。移民对这个国家有很大的益处，尽管可能方式不当，但它确实帮助我们在过去两三年实现了经济增长而不引发严重的劳动通胀。结合“动物精神”或经济复苏的表现好于预期，我对此持开放态度。 为什么中央银行在这种情况下如此急于降息呢？老实说，我不认为鲍威尔是出于所谓的政治原因这么做。我认为他对实现“软着陆”极为关注，同时他对自己在2021年犯下的错误以及自己的遗产问题也非常在意。他也被其他经济学家和媒体推波助澜。在我看来，美联储的职责是避免重大的失误，比如上世纪70年代的经济危机、重大金融危机以及我们刚刚经历的大通胀等。这种对软着陆的精细调整并不是美联储的职责。美联储应该以长期最大化就业为目标，而不是关注未来三到四个月的短期变化。但我认为，美联储对实现所谓“软着陆”的执着应该提醒大家，我们之所以面对“着陆”问题，是因为他们让通胀从2%上升到了9%。过去20年没有这种“着陆”的必要。但我觉得这也是他们念念不忘的问题。对此，我不太确定。

How much of a problem is the forward guidance? It's a huge problem. My friend, Jim Grant says they're forward guidance dependent, not data dependent. It's a problem because once you do forward guidance, you eliminate your optionality. And I think, Nikolai, you and I being in this business, we know we have to change our mind when we're wrong. This Fed has shown over and over again that they think if they change their mind, they're losing credibility. So it makes them have their hands tied behind their back. I'm wrong all the time. I think my record is mainly because when I'm wrong, I change my mind, not that I'm always right. I'm certainly not. Forward guidance seems to tie them into positions where an eliminate flexibility they need. How big a problem is the budget deficit? As a practitioner, it's something I can't be obsessed with on a three to six month basis. As an American, it's something I'm really obsessed with because that's a GDP can't go up forever. And to me, we have a reckoning, but I don't know how to time when that's going to take place.

前瞻指引的问题有多大？这是个大问题。我的朋友Jim Grant说，他们依赖的是前瞻指引，而不是数据。这是个问题，因为一旦你采用前瞻指引，就失去了操作的灵活性。我认为，尼古拉，你我身处这个行业，我们知道在我们错的时候必须改变想法。而这个美联储一再表明他们认为若改变主意就会失去信誉，因此使得他们有种束手束脚的感觉。我经常犯错，我的业绩主要来源于当我错了的时候我会改变主意，而不是我总是对的。这显然不是。而前瞻指引似乎把他们固定在一个位置上，失去了需要的灵活性。 预算赤字的问题有多大？对从业者来说，我无法在三到六个月内对此过于痴迷。作为一个美国人，我对此深感忧虑，因为GDP不可能永远增长。在我看来，我们终将迎来清算，只是不知道什么时候会发生。

I will say that because the reserve currency, we've been permitted to engage in behavior that say the Brits couldn't have behaved in. There's a new term I have getting Liz Trust. We haven't been Liz Trust because we are the reserve currency. Even though if you look at everything we're doing, it's much more radical than the Brits we're doing. What's that old saying? How do you go bankrupt slowly and then suddenly running deficits with full employment? Basically, it's 7% of GDP is a recipe that can't last forever. One of the reasons we haven't paid for it is in COVID. The entire private sector, 80% of individuals refinance their mortgages. So the average mortgage rate is still under 4%, even though at the margin, and you've got to 8% corporations turned out their debt. That stuff rolls over in 25 and 26. If we're going to have a problem, it's probably more like late 25, early 26, but you just don't know. What is it that can create this kind of trust moment where people suddenly change their mind in terms of the price they want to have to lend money to you? It could be a failed auction. It could be if the Fed is wrong about inflation and it turns back up again because they're easing financial conditions into a melt up. If they were to have to start increasing interest rates again, which is why I think they should be so cautious about their optionality.

由于我们是储备货币的拥有者，我们可以进行一些其他国家无法做到的行为，比如英国人。如果你看看我们正在做的一切，其实比英国人做的更为激进。我常说的一句话是：“你是如何破产的？先是慢慢地，然后突然间。”这是指在充分就业的情况下持续赤字的现象。基本上，国内生产总值（GDP）的7%的赤字是一个无法永远持续的配方。我们之所以还没有为此付出代价，部分原因是由于新冠疫情。那时，整个私营部门中有80%的人重新融资了他们的房贷，所以即使现在利率已经涨到8%，但平均抵押贷款利率仍低于4%，公司也延长了债务期限。这些债务将在2025年和2026年到期。如果我们面临问题，可能会发生在2025年晚些时候或2026年初，但谁也无法确定。是什么能引发这样的信任危机，让人们突然改变他们愿意贷款给我们的价格？这可能是因为一次失败的拍卖，也可能是美联储对通货膨胀的预判错误，导致通胀再次上升，因为他们放松金融状况进入了一种膨胀的局面。如果他们不得不开始再次提高利率，这就是为什么我认为他们在选择上要非常谨慎的原因。

Now that they've forward guided to a series of cuts, that could cause it. My best guess would be a failed auction, but honestly, it could be six months. It could be six years. I just don't know. So if rates start to go up, how high can they go? Well, that's a great question because right now, the 10-year, I guess it's around 4.5, it can go to normal GDP. So let's say inflation went to 4, 4.5 and real growth was 2.5 or 3, 10-year, it could go to 6 or 7. I'm not predicting that, but that would be consistent if inflation did turn back up again and the economy wasn't weakening. I think you could get there. Interesting. That's what happened in the 70. The bond market didn't really respond until we went back up from like 3 to 12 and then it responded in spades. Again, I'm not predicting this, but as a practitioner, I'm very open-minded to it and I've got to cycle on my radar.

既然他们已经前瞻性地指导了一系列的削减，这可能会引发相关后果。我的最佳猜测是可能会出现一次失败的拍卖，但说实话，这可能需要六个月，也可能需要六年。我真的不确定。所以如果利率开始上升，它们能涨多高呢？这是个好问题，因为目前10年期国债的利率大概在4.5%左右，可能会上升到与正常GDP相符的水平。假设通货膨胀达到4%或4.5%，实际增长是2.5%或3%，那么10年期国债利率可能会上升到6%或7%。我并不是在预测这会发生，但如果通胀再次上升且经济并没有疲软下去，这种情况是符合趋势的。很有意思，在70年代就发生过类似情况。当时债券市场的反应相对滞后，直到利率从3%激增到12%，才出现了积极的市场响应。同样地，我不是在预测这种情况一定会重演，但作为一个从业者，我对这种可能性持开放态度，并已将其纳入我的观察范围。

Well, you say you make the most money from Fed mistakes, so is this the way you are positioned now? I'm short pawns. I'm not like mega-short. I actually had good timing for one, so I shorted them literally the day the Fed cut. It's been kind of an easy ride. Since then, I should have been much bigger. They've moved so much, I'm more worried about if anything being too big, but that's the way I'm positioned. If I thought what we are talking about was happening and I don't see a sign of it yet, I'm just open-minded to it, I would be much bigger. I'm like 25% NAV short 10-year equivalent. Moving on to the stock market. The leadership is very narrow, it's led by not so many stocks. How do you read this narrow leadership?

好吧，你说你从美联储的失误中赚到最多的钱，那么你现在是这样布局的吗？我做空一些小型股票，但并不是大量做空。我实际上一次时机把握得不错，所以就在美联储降息当日做空了。自那以后，交易相对顺利。不过，我应该进行更大规模的操作。市场波动这么大，我更担心的是仓位过大，但这就是我的当前布局。如果我看到我们讨论的情况正在发生，而我目前还没看到迹象，我会更加大胆一些。我约有25%的净资产价值在10年期等价的空头。接下来谈谈股市。现在的市场领涨股很少，只有少数股票在引领市场。你怎么看这种狭窄的领涨现象？

It's never been great, but the leadership is not as narrow as it was last April. So you're starting to get some broadening out, the financials are doing better. It's not great. We've never had a bear market start without the leadership narrowing, and it's narrowing enough that you're starting to get toward a necessary condition being satisfied, but it's early, but it's a yellow light, it's not a red light. That's how I read it. So how do you think the tech sector will develop? What kind of science are you seeing there? The AI boom is going unabated, I think the private sector just sees it as an existential threat to their business if they don't spend money on it, because if they don't spend money on it and their competitors doing their competitors are right, they're going to have a big, big competitive problem. And of course, the hyperscalers, they're all in and they're the man is just continuing.

它从来没有太好过，但领导力不像上个四月那样狭隘了。所以你会看到一些扩展，金融板块表现得更好。不过，还不算太好。以往在进入熊市前，领导板块都会变窄，而现在的收窄已经达到触发必要条件的边缘;不过，事情还处于早期阶段，现在只是一盏黄灯，还不是红灯。这就是我的看法。那么你认为科技行业会如何发展呢？你在这方面看到了什么动态？AI热潮势头不减，我认为私营部门视其为一种生存威胁，如果它们不投资于AI，而竞争对手投入了，那么它们将面临巨大的竞争问题。当然，大型云服务商都已经全力投入，市场需求依然强劲。

So look, you've got very rich prices in the tech sector, stuff like Apple selling 25 or 30 times earnings. It's certainly not growing at 25 or 30%, but we don't have that much exposure to the tech sector. It's not that short, it's so I'm not really involved. But you were very early into it. How do you spot these early trends? What is it that you look at? Honestly, I've got young, really good analysts here. Yeah, a lot of people have a lot of young analysts who are on top of things and they started, we noticed about three or four years ago that the kids that go to Stanford and MIT, the engineers were shifting from crypto to AI. That was the first sign. Then my young partners started talking more and more about AI. I asked them how to play it. They mentioned the company called NVIDIA, which I thought was a gaming company I hadn't done work on in a long time. I bought a pretty good chunk of it and then like a month later, CHETCHUPT happened. It was just total luck. I had no idea CHETCHUPT, but the AI drum around here was big enough and the stock was down from 400 to 150 or something.

所以你看，现在科技行业的股价非常高，比如苹果的市盈率是25到30倍。苹果的增长确实没有达到25%或30%，但我们在科技行业的投资不多。并不是看空这个行业，只是我并没有深度参与。不过你很早就观察到这一趋势了。你是如何发现这些早期趋势的呢？说实话，我这儿有些很优秀的年轻分析师。很多公司都有一群优秀的年轻分析师，他们总是紧跟潮流。大约三四年前，我们注意到斯坦福和麻省理工学院的那些学生、工程师们开始从加密货币转向人工智能。这就是第一个信号。然后，我的年轻合伙人开始越来越多地谈论人工智能。我问他们该如何投资，他们提到了一个叫NVIDIA的公司，我之前以为它只是个游戏公司，很久没关注了。我买入了它不少股票，然后大概一个月后，CHETCHUPT事件发生了。这完全是个运气，我对CHETCHUPT一无所知，但这里关于人工智能的讨论够热烈，而且该股票从400美元跌到了大约150美元。

That's how I got started in it. Once we invested in something like that, then we really started to dig deeper and then there was a whole chain of things. We knew it would affect power or we knew it would affect uranium. We just went through the whole chain and it was a pretty easy trend to spot. Not unlike the cloud was, these things come in waves. The question with AI now that I'm wrestling with and the reason our exposure is really neither long nor short is how to play it because we started with PIX and CHOVALS, which is NVIDIA and to some extent Microsoft. Now we're seeing just massive amounts of capital being spent by these modelers. If AI is for real and I think they're all going to give you the same answer, so we're going to have four or five companies who have spent massive amounts of capital, but I don't see it as a winner and take all model. On the other hand, I think there are applications that I haven't even thought of and nobody's thought of. They're going to spring up.

这就是我如何开始涉足这个领域的。我们一旦投资于这样的事情，就深入挖掘，发现还有一连串的事情。我们知道这会影响到能源或者说铀市场。我们只是顺着这条链条继续下去，很容易就发现这是一个明显的趋势。这和云计算很像，这类事情通常以浪潮的形式出现。现在我在思考人工智能的问题，我们在这方面的投资既不算长远也不算短期，因为我们开始时关注PIX和CHOVALS，也就是英伟达和在一定程度上微软。现在我们看到这些模型开发者投入了大量资本。如果人工智能确实会有影响，我认为他们都会给你同样的答案，所以将会有四五家公司投入巨资，但我不认为这是一个"赢家通吃"的模式。另一方面，我相信会有一些应用程序出现，是我们甚至没有想到或者还没有人想到的。

I mean, who would have thought of Uber or Facebook when the Internet started? We're very bullish on AI, but we're not bullish currently on exactly where we're supposed to be and how to play it aggressively. Not unlike the Internet in 2000, 2001, you could have believed in the Internet, not been exposed and then got your exposure on a more timely basis, or I could just be wrong, which wouldn't be that unusual. But you were also early into the anti-obesity drug producers. Oh, that was what you see. I mean, I don't know what it's like in Norway, but in America, if you've got a Disney world or anything, and if you know the American psyche, if you tell an American, they've got a way to lose weight without doing any work. I knew the drug worked early on just because we were exposed to it. And then when I heard if you get off the drug, you gain the weight back, then I knew it was sort of a razor blade business because people would have to say on the drug.

谁能想到在互联网刚开始时会有Uber或Facebook这样的公司出现呢？我们对人工智能非常看好，但目前在明确我们该处于哪个位置以及如何积极参与上还没有十足的把握。这有点像二十多年前的互联网，你可以相信互联网的潜力，却不一定在当时完全投入，后来择机进入，或者我可能完全错了，这种情况也不少见。不过，你当初也很早就关注了抗肥胖药物的生产商。哦，那你看到了什么。我不知道挪威是什么情况，但在美国，无论是迪士尼还是其他地方，如果你了解美国人的心理，只要告诉他们有不用运动就能减肥的方法，我早就知道那个药有效，因为我们接触到它了。后来听说如果停药，体重会反弹，这让我意识到这是一种类似剃须刀片的生意模式，因为人们需要继续服药才能保持效果。

Yeah, but you say it's easy to say, but I mean, hey, it's not like you're the only one who is walking around in Disneyland and looking at these kinds of things, right? So but you actually act on your intuition or your or the data that's in front of you. I do. It's not all brilliance. I bought NVIDIA very well, but I sold it at eight or nine hundred right when the party was really getting going. And I sold my Lily in the high seven hundreds. Granite had a nice profit. But yeah, I look for big trends. I'm not a buffet guy that holds for 20 years, but I look for two to four year stuff and both fit into that category. And frankly, we're looking now for AI applications that might not have been recognized yet. I think I'm on the board.

是的，但你说这很简单，不过我意思是，嘿，这又不是只有你一个人在迪士尼逛，看这些东西，对吧？但你实际上是根据你的直觉或摆在你面前的数据采取行动。我也是这样做的。这并不是完全依靠聪明才智。比如，我买入了英伟达（NVIDIA）时机很好，但在价格涨到八九百时卖掉了，那其实是趴踢刚刚开始的时候。我在礼来（Lily）股价达到七百多时也卖掉了。确实有不错的利润。但我关注大趋势，我不是那种持有股票20年的巴菲特式投资者，我追求的是两到四年的机会，这两家公司都符合我的这种策略。而且坦白说，我们现在在寻找那些还未被认可的人工智能应用。我觉得我走在前沿。

And most long catering have been for almost 30 years in the applications and cancer are unreal. And just FYI, the more long catering is the leading cancer hospital in the world. Yes. And they have a lot of money in the endowment, partly because you are on the board or the investment. Well, they have a lot of money in their endowment. I wouldn't say partly because I'm on the board, but thank you. Now, when we last met...

大多数长期从事情感支持服务的机构已经在相关领域运作了近30年，而癌症方面的情况却不那么理想。顺便提一下，这些长期提供情感支持的机构中的一个是全球领先的癌症医院。是的，他们的基金有很多钱，部分原因是你在董事会或参与投资。不过，他们确实基金非常雄厚。我不敢说这部分是因为我在董事会，但谢谢你。上次我们见面的时候……

you mentioned the concept of buy first analyze later. Tell me about that. Yeah, Soros used to call it invest and then investigate. I think I just gave a classic example. I didn't know that much about Nvidia. I just knew that AI and I had some people here tell me how to play it. So we bought Nvidia and then we were in the process of doing a lot more work and then Chachie BT happened. But I've always had the view that markets are smart, they're fast and they're getting much more so with all the communication and the technology we have today. And then if I hear a concept and I like it, if I wait and spend two or three months analyzing it, I may miss big part of the move...

你提到“先买入后分析”的概念，能告诉我这是什么吗？是的，索罗斯曾称之为“先投资再调查”。我想我刚刚给出了一个经典例子。我对英伟达并不是特别了解，只是知道人工智能很有前景，并且这里的一些人告诉我可以怎样投资，所以我们买入了英伟达股票，然后我们在进行更多分析的过程中，ChatGPT事件发生了。但我一直认为市场是聪明且快速的，特别是在今天这个通讯和科技发达的时代。如果我听到一个概念并喜欢它，但如果花两三个月时间去分析，可能会错过较大的一部分涨幅。

and then psychologically be paralyzed. It's hard to buy a stock. You're looking out of the 100. It's 160 even if it's going to 400. Somehow your head is screwed up and you're waiting for the pullback. So we will buy something, a meaningful position, but not earth shaking and then really do the work. And if I think we made a mistake, I'll sell it. And if I don't think we made a mistake, we'll add to it if we have to. No, I happen to have worked exactly the same way in my life.

心理上会感到麻痹。买股票很难。你看到的价格是100，但它已经涨到160，即使它可能会涨到400。无论如何，你的思维会变得混乱，总在等待价格回调。我们会买一些有意义的仓位，但不会是决定性的，然后认真研究。如果我认为我们错了，我会卖掉它。如果我不认为我们错了，我们会在需要的时候加仓。事实上，我一生都是这么做事情的。

It really focuses in your work and your efforts and your thinking. But have you always believed in your own pattern recognition? Yes. When I started in the business, I got promoted to early. So before I had really learned the nuts and bolts of the analysis to the extent that I should have, I was promoted to a leadership position and I had to rely a lot on charts and I had to rely a lot on intuition. But I found it's not that hard. If you're dealing with a cyclical company and they're losing money or they're not profitable and everybody in their industry is shutting capacity down, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to try and envision 18 to 24 months out.

这段话强调了你的工作、努力和思考。你一直相信自己的模式识别能力吗？是的。当我刚进入这个行业时，我很早就得到了晋升。所以在我还没有充分掌握分析的细节之前，我就被提升到了一个领导职位，我不得不大量依赖图表和直觉。但我发现这并不难。如果你面对一家周期性公司，而他们正在亏损或没有盈利，并且他们行业中的每个人都在减少产能，那么预测18到24个月后的情况并不需要火箭科学家的水平。

If nobody's adding capacity, they may not be losing money anymore. They might be making a lot of money. I have found it's very important never to invest in the present. Always try and envision the situation as you see it in 18 to 24 months and then see if you feel things will be differently than they are now with security prices reflect that. I think that's probably the biggest mistake investors make is they invest in the present rather than looking where the puck is going instead of where the puck is. Now, a few people believe in other people's gut field...

如果没有人增加产能，可能就不再亏钱了，他们甚至可能赚很多钱。我发现，永远不要只根据当前情况进行投资是非常重要的。要试着设想18到24个月后的情况，然后判断当时的情况是否与你现在看到的不同，证券价格是否会反映这一点。我认为，投资者犯的最大错误之一就是只关注当前，而不是预见未来的趋势。现在，只有少数人会相信别人的直觉……

Did Soros believe in your gut field or did you have to show him analysis? Soros and I had a rocky start. I went there. I had some significant success running public funds at Dreyfus. He told me I was his successor, but I don't really think his mind was completely made up when I got there. The first six months were quite rocky because it wasn't clear who was in charge. Frankly, we're both trading badly. I was flying to Pittsburg...

索罗斯是相信你的直觉，还是需要你给他看分析？我和索罗斯的合作一开始并不顺利。我之前在德雷富斯基金公司管理公共基金取得了一些显著的成功，他告诉我我是他的接班人，但我觉得当我到那里的时候，他的想法并没有完全确定。最初的六个月相当动荡，因为不清楚谁在掌控局面。坦率地说，我们都交易得不太好，我还要飞到匹兹堡……

because I still had to do cane. I was running both. When I got off the airplane, I think we had pay phones back then. We didn't have cell phones. The head trader there told me he had sold out my bond position. I probably had a higher opinion of myself at the time that I showed up. I was young and I had always been in charge. I was quite upset and basically expressed extreme displeasure. He said we'll talk about it when you come back to New York. Implied that I wanted to quit. He said that maybe...

因为我还需要处理甘蔗的事情，所以我两件事都在忙。当我下飞机的时候，我记得那时候我们用的是付费电话，还没有手机。那里的首席交易员告诉我，他已经卖掉了我持有的债券。我当时可能对自己有更高的评价，因为年纪轻，习惯了掌权，所以特别生气，表达了强烈的不满。他跟我说等我回到纽约再谈。他暗示我可能想辞职。他说那也许……

there were too many cooks in the kitchen and he was going to Eastern Europe for four or five years to be out of touch. Then he'd find out whether he had been in my hair or if I really was incompetent. That's the way he talks the way we think except he actually says it. Luckily for me, while he was gone, the Berlin Wall came down. I am best in the Deutschmark. I think it was lucky for both of us. I went on the best run I've had before or since for four years. He kept seeing the results. I think he trusted my intuition only because the record started that way. Do you trust the injection of Yoko Dix now? I trust their analysis. They're so much deeper and better at analysis than I was.

厨师太多了，他要去东欧待四五年，这段时间不会与我们联系。然后他会发现他是在干扰我，还是我真的能力不足。这就是他的说话方式，和我们思考的方式一样，只不过他直接说出来而已。幸运的是，在他离开的期间，柏林墙倒塌了，我最擅长的是使用德国马克。我认为这对我们俩都是好运。我在那四年里达到了前所未有的最佳表现。他持续看到这些成绩。我想他信任我的直觉只是因为良好的业绩从那时开始。你现在信任Yoko Dix的注入分析吗？我信任他们的分析能力。他们的分析比我当时要深入得多、出色得多。

I can see the intuition developing. I'm probably as bullish on the equity talent in my firm as I've been in 45 years. I guess that's an answer to it, yes, but partly brain, partly analytics, and then partly intuition. They're not as intuitive as I am because it'll have to be. I was forced to be intuitive because I never acquired their analytical skills. Do you mention some examples where you had sold a bit early? Do you generally sell early? No, I mean, embarrassingly, I did an interview on NVIDIA. I think it was like 370 or something.

我能感受到直觉在逐渐形成。在过去的45年里，我对我公司里的股票人才感到比以往任何时候都更加乐观。也许这算是一种回答，但这部分依靠大脑，部分依靠分析能力，还有部分靠的是直觉。他们没有我这么有直觉，因为这也是必然的。我被迫变得直觉化，因为我从未掌握他们的分析技能。你能举一些例子说明你是否曾经卖得有点早吗？你一般会早卖吗？不是，我的意思是，有点不好意思，我曾在一次采访中谈到过英伟达，当时它的股价大概是370左右。

I said, this is one we're probably going to own for a few years. I didn't think it was going to go to 900 in a year and to over a $2 trillion market cap. I think it had started like $100 billion or $150 billion. It was something crazy. No, I don't necessarily sell early. I'm a technician, so I usually wait for tops. NVIDIA had no top. I just thought, what does that mean? What does it mean to have a top? A top is something, the rate of change of its going up changes and it tends to flatten out for quite some time. The trick is, in the technical world, that could end up being a bull flag where it's just consolidated for a bit and then it's hit a new leg or it could be a top where that was it. How do you know where she's rich? You don't. You have an opinion and you express it and sometimes you're right and sometimes you're wrong.

我说过，这只股票我们可能会持有几年。我没想到它会在一年内涨到900，并且市值超过2万亿美元。我记得它最初的市值大概是1000亿或1500亿美元，这真是太疯狂了。我通常不会过早卖出。我是一个技术分析师，所以一般会等到股价触顶再考虑出售。然而，NVIDIA 并没有明显的顶部。我只是想，这到底是什么意思？所谓的顶部，就是股价的增长速度开始变化，渐渐平缓，并保持一段时间。技术分析的难点在于，这种现象可能意味着牛旗形态，股价仅仅在整固，然后再启动新一轮上涨；也可能是已经到了顶部。怎么知道什么时候卖出才是好时机？其实你不知道。你会有一个判断，并付诸行动，有时候是对的，有时候是错的。

Within NVIDIA, there was no top, but I've analyzed the semiconductors industry not particularly wild, but since the 1970s. It's a cyclical industry. I knew NVIDIA had same power and they had 4,000 software engineers, so it wasn't just hardware. They have a CUDA, this thing called CUDA software that they do to make their GPUs. But I just thought once it went through $2 trillion, this is just too much. Worst case, it'll have a big correction. I'll get another chance. Of course, I didn't get another chance. Oh, you may. Yes, I may. You think you will? I don't know from this price. I assume I will or I would have bought it back.

在英伟达内部，并没有固定的顶点。我从上世纪70年代开始分析半导体行业，这个行业是有周期性的。我知道英伟达有很强的实力，他们有4,000名软件工程师，所以他们不仅仅依赖硬件。他们有一个叫做CUDA的软件，用来优化他们的GPU。但当公司市值超过2万亿美元时，我觉得这已经过高了。最坏的情况是，这会有一次大幅回调，我可以再有一次机会。当然，我没能等到这样的机会。哦，你也许会有。是的，我也许会有。你认为你会有吗？我不知道从这个价位来讲。我假设我会有，不然我就会买回来。

I don't mind buying something back higher than I would. I don't like it, but I'm perfectly willing to buy something back higher than I sold it. Some people can't get themselves to it. Oh, I can. The one thing I'm strong on is I'm not emotional. But you never had a down ear. No. Stupid question. Why is that important? No good reason. I think it's important because other people talk about it. My investors loved it when I had investors because they have this stuff in our industry. It's called risk-weighted return. I'm not big on that, but I will say it's a stressful job and there's less stress if you don't have big drawdowns. I have had significant drawdowns in her years.

我不介意以比我想的更高的价格买回某样东西。我不喜欢这样，但我完全愿意以比卖出时更高的价格买回来。有些人无法做到这一点。但我可以。我最大的优点是不会感情用事。你从没经历过业绩下滑吗？没有。这是个愚蠢的问题。为什么这很重要？没有什么特别好的理由。我觉得它之所以重要，是因为其他人会谈论到这一点。以前我有投资者时，他们很喜欢，因为我们行业里有一种东西，叫风险加权回报。虽然我不是很看重这个，但我会说这是个压力很大的工作，如果没有大幅回撤，压力会小一些。我确实在某些年份经历过大幅回撤。

So part of the down year is just luck. What does a drawdown do to you? I get anxious, upset. Do you get upset even though it's only your money? Yes. Yeah, I'm just a very competitive person even if it's just my own money. I wish I wasn't, but I am. It's probably one of the reasons my results are as good as they are, but I prefer myself not to be. It's a bit of a sickness, but it works for me. Who do you compete against? I compete against what I would call the opportunity set. If there was a great opportunity set that year and I missed it, I'm disappointed in myself.

所以这一年的表现不佳，部分原因只是运气问题。资金回撤对你有什么影响？我会感到焦虑和沮丧。即便只是你自己的钱你也会这样吗？是的。我就是个很有竞争心的人，即使这只是我自己的钱。我希望我不是这样的，但我确实如此。这可能也是我能取得好成绩的原因之一，但我宁愿自己不是这样。这有点像是一种病，但对我来说有效。你与谁竞争呢？我会与我称之为机会集合的东西竞争。如果那一年有很好的机会集合，而我错过了，那我会对自己感到失望。

If I'm up 20 and I think I should have been up 50, I'm disappointed in myself. If the opportunity set was basically to be up 10 or 15 and on up 20, I'm thrilled. The good thing about being an investor is always a good reason to hit yourself in a head, right? I don't know if that's a good thing about it. It's probably the bad thing about our business and for some reason I like to hit myself in the head. I don't just measure it from the top. But you are quick at selling your losers. What's the key to that? If the reason I bought a stock is no longer the case, I don't care what I paid for it.

如果我赚了20，而我觉得自己本该赚50，我会对自己感到失望。但如果情况是只能赚10或15，而我却赚了20，我会很高兴。做投资者的好处就是，总有理由让自己感到懊恼，对吧？不过我不确定这是不是我们的行业的好处，也许这反而是坏处。但不知为何，我就是有点喜欢反省。我的评价标准不仅仅是从最高点算起。不过你倒是很快就卖掉亏损股。做到这一点的关键是什么呢？如果我买入一只股票的理由已经不再成立，那么我就不在乎我买它时花了多少钱。

If I bought it at 60 and it's 50 because the markets discovered the problem before me, I have no emotion whatsoever. Soros was the same way. I didn't really learn it from him, but it was certainly reinforced. After a while in the next slide, you also develop enough confidence that you're not afraid to clean the slate and start over because you have the confidence that you'll be successful again and you're not going to sit there in a lazy position that you're not that sure about anymore. Use clean house and if you've been doing it for decades and it's worked, you kind of have the confidence to take a loss and not worry about it too much.

如果我以60买入，而因为市场在我之前发现了问题，现在价格变成50，我是没有情绪波动的。索罗斯也是这种态度。我并不是从他那里学习到的，但这个观念得到了强化。经过一段时间后，你也会建立足够的信心，敢于清零重新开始，因为你相信自己会再次成功，不会停留在一个不太确定的懒散状态。清理阵地，如果你已经这样做了几十年并且成功了，你就会有信心去接受损失而不过分担心。

Once I'm out, I'm out. You said you don't have feelings. What do you mean by that? Did I say I don't have feelings? I have a lot of feelings. You mean about taking losses? Yeah, just what I mean by that is I think one of the reasons charts work. We have the reason there's support and there's resistance. It's a resistance is a bunch of people that bought it at 60 and it went down and they've been waiting for three or four years for it to get back to 60 while they could have been in something else.

一旦我退出了，就真的是退出了。你说你没有感觉。你这是什么意思？我有说过我没有感觉吗？我有很多感觉。你是指关于承受损失吗？对，我的意思是，我认为图表奏效的原因之一是，我们看到为什么有支撑和阻力。阻力是因为有一群人在60买入，它下跌了，他们等了三四年才等它回到60，而他们本可以在其他地方投资。

It was going up the whole time. I just don't care what I paid for a stock. It's absolutely irrelevant in terms of my investment process going forward. Now this combination of being on the one hand stubborn but the donor hand being able to change your mind, it's pretty rare. I'm told it is. Yeah. I'm told why my friends and other investors said I'm entirely unemotional and like yes, I am told it's rare. Is that the key to your success you think? One of them, I think it's a big part of it. I think again, being open minded and having humility, the only reason you can change your mind is if you're not arrogant about a position has mattered.

一直在上涨。我真的不在乎我为一只股票支付了多少钱。在我未来的投资过程中，这完全不相关。这种一方面固执但另一方面又能改变主意的组合，挺罕见的。我一直被告知是这样的。是的，我被朋友和其他投资者告知，说我完全不带感情，是的，我被告知这种情况很少见。你认为这是你成功的关键吗？其中之一。我认为这是很重要的一部分。我认为，开放的心态和谦逊是让我能够改变主意的唯一原因，这在于不对自己的立场自以为是。

I think I had some great mentors, the one in Pittsburgh and then Soros in terms of sizing. I think I learned some lessons very early on concentration, not to be afraid of concentration. That's a big reason for my success and probably the other big reason was sort of self-taught is being willing to go into other asset categories. If you're going to concentrate, it's better to have five buckets to plan than to plan one. I was brought up in the equity market, but sometimes the risk of order in the equity market is not that clear when it actually is clear in the bond market or the currency markets. It's a coincidence.

我认为我有一些很棒的导师，一个是在匹兹堡，另一个是在规模方面的索罗斯。我很早就学到了一些关于集中投资的教训，不要害怕集中投资。这是我成功的重要原因之一，另一个重要原因是我自学了愿意进入其他资产类别。如果你要集中投资，最好有五个不同类型的投资篮子，而不是只计划一个。我是在股票市场中成长起来的，但有时候股票市场的风险顺序并不清晰，而在债券市场或货币市场中却是清晰的。这只是一个巧合。

You asked about never having a down year. Part of it is the most action in bonds and currencies tends to happen in bear markets and equity markets. You can put the equities in the drawer for a while and just concentrate in those markets. I think that's been a huge part of my successes is it gives you the discipline not to play in areas that you don't have a lot of conviction in because if you've got credit to play in, if you've got commodities to play in, currencies or bonds, you can usually find something that you think there's a great risk of order. It's also they tend to be more liquid than equity markets. To our earlier conversation, you can change your mind when you're wrong. What do you learn about sizing from Soros? I don't know whether you know about baseball at all or what your listeners are about baseball. When I went to Soros, I thought I would learn what would make Deutschmar go up in the end go up. And modestly, I found I was better at that than him. In baseball terms, I had a very high batting average. He had a much higher slugging percentage.

你问过关于从未有过亏损的一年。部分原因是在熊市和股票市场中，债券和货币市场最活跃。这时候，你可以先把股票放在一边，专注于这些市场。我认为这是我成功的一个重要因素，因为它教会了我不在没有很大信心的领域里投资的纪律性。因为如果你有信用债券、商品、货币或债券可以投资，你通常可以找到一些你认为有较大风险机会的方面。此外，这些市场通常比股市更具流动性。回到我们之前的话题，当你判断失误时，你可以及时改变策略。关于规模管理，你从索罗斯那里学到了什么？我不知道你是否了解棒球，或者你的听众是否了解。当我加入索罗斯的团队时，我原本以为会学习如何让德意志马克上升或者下降。然而，我发现自己在这方面比他做得稍微好一些。用棒球术语来说，我的击球率很高，而他的长打率更高。

What I learned from Soros is when you have conviction, you should bet really big. I know your listeners have probably heard it before, but probably the best illustration is the pound. Yeah. What happens? Let's go back. You are in the office. What's happening in the UK? I'm in the office in New York. Scott Besant, who was a partner of mine in the European area, he's in London. And he tells me the London housing market is a big trouble. And the British economy is in trouble because, like most Anglo-Saxon economies at the time, it's very much driven by housing and so forth. Just peep it out a bit.

我从索罗斯那里学到，当你有坚定信念时，就应该大下赌注。我知道你的听众可能之前听过这个观点，但最好的例子可能就是英镑。发生了什么呢？让我们回顾一下。你在办公室里，英国发生了什么？我在纽约的办公室，而我的合伙人斯科特·贝桑特则在伦敦。他告诉我伦敦的房地产市场陷入了大麻烦。与当时大多数盎格鲁-撒克逊经济体一样，英国经济非常依赖房地产，因此整个英国经济也遇到了麻烦。稍微解释一下这个情况。

So your office, are you overlooking Central Park? I'm not overlooking Central Park, but I'm near it. I'm in the Soros office on 32nd floor, but it's not a corner off. It's not the fancy. And the UK economy is going down the toilet. We think the U.A. economy is going down, but I need to take you back about three years. When the Berlin Wall Kim comes down, it probably saved me my job because I probably would have been fired at Soros six months after he went to Eastern Europe, had the Berlin Wall not come down. But the Deutschmark went down for two days dramatically because the theory in the market was the Osmark, which was the East German currency was going to pollute the Deutschmark. I knew German history and knew they were obsessed with inflation because the Weimar Republic and then that led to Hitler and so forth and so on.

所以，你的办公室能看到中央公园吗？我的办公室不能看到中央公园，但很靠近。我在32楼的索罗斯办公室，但不是角落的那种豪华办公室。而且，英国经济现在一塌糊涂。我们认为美国经济正在下滑，但我需要带你回到大约三年前。当柏林墙倒下的时候，这可能拯救了我的工作，因为如果柏林墙没有倒塌的话，我很可能在索罗斯工作六个月后就被解雇了。因为当时市场的理论是东德马克（Osmark）会污染德国马克（Deutschmark），所以德国马克剧烈下跌了两天。但我了解德国历史，知道他们对通货膨胀极度敏感，这都源自于魏玛共和国时期的经济问题，最终导致了希特勒上台等等。

So I knew the Germans were absolutely obsessed with inflation. I knew that all bringing all these East Germans into the labor supply was going to cause a boom in the economy. So we were very bullish on the overall German economy and we were very convinced that there is no way the Bundesbank would let inflation so we were very convinced it would be accompanied by type monetary policy. So we had shorted the Italian liaris successfully during that period. So when Scott called me, we were already sort of on this Deutschmark journey we've been for a few years and the British economy is going down and the currencies are linked. It was a peg, right? It was a peg.

所以，我知道德国人对通货膨胀极为敏感。我也知道，把这些东德人加入劳动力市场会引发经济繁荣。因此，我们对德国经济整体非常看好，并坚信 Bundesbank（德国央行）不会允许通货膨胀，因此我们相信它会采取紧缩的货币政策。所以，在那个时期，我们成功做空了意大利里拉。当时，Scott 打电话给我时，我们已经在德国马克的这条路上走了好几年，而英国经济在下滑，和其他货币之间是挂钩的，对吧？是挂钩的。

So I called and asked how much it would cost me to short the pound versus the Deutschmark for six months. It was a half a percent. I think the fund was around seven and a half billion at the time, quantum fund. I decided to do an invest and then investigate position. So I did a billion and a half or like 20, 25 percent of the fund short the pound long the Deutschmark figuring I'd probably lose a half percent because the peg in it won't break within six months. But I wanted the position on fast forward probably about five or six weeks. The day I believe was September 15th not that I would remember. I read the financial times and the head of the bonus bank. Now I'm sure I made, but I'm pretty sure what Stietmaier has written an editorial in the financial times basically in more proper language, but he's basically saying that the Deutschmark and the pound should no longer be linked. So I decided to take Duquesne and the quantum fund to 100 percent long the Deutschmark short the pound because it's still a half percent unbelievably.

所以，我打电话询问，卖空英镑对德国马克6个月需要花多少钱。答案是半个百分点。当时，量子基金的规模大约是七十五亿美元。我决定先投资再调查。所以我投入了十五亿美元，或者说大约20%到25%的基金，用于做空英镑、做多德国马克。因为我认为固定汇率机制在六个月内可能不会破裂，所以预计可能会损失半个百分点。但我想快速建立这个头寸。 大约五六周后，时间是9月15日，虽然我不太记得。我读了《金融时报》，看到一篇由某位不记得名字但我很确定的作者写的社论，大致意思是用更委婉的语言表达，德马克和英镑不应该继续挂钩。所以我决定将Duquesne基金和量子基金的头寸全部转为做多德国马克、做空英镑，因为成本仍然是极低的半个百分点，简直令人难以置信。

Now you're going to hear vintage Soros. So he happens to be in New York at the time, which he wasn't always. I go into his office and I explained to him why I'm going to 100 percent and he had a rather large personal account. That's how we kept each other out of each other's hair. He traded that and it was 90, 95 percent overlap. Told him why I was doing this. And he had this unpleasant puzzled look on his face when I'm telling him my thesis that this one economy is booming and they need higher rates. This other economy is falling apart. They need lower rates. That these two currencies shouldn't be linked. And I'm thinking what does he not understand about this because this guy pretty much understood everything. And he says, look, this is a one way bet. They come along very, very rarely. It's ridiculous doing 100 percent. We should put 200 percent of the fund in this trade. So there you have it. So that means that you borrow money in the bank and double up. Yeah, on a seven and a half billion dollar fund, he thought we should have $15 billion short to pound long to doish mark. It turns out we never got there, but it shows the way the man thinks I saw it over and over again. Because once you've been trading, the thing happened. Yeah, unfortunately we had a pretty strong reputation. When I started selling at that night, I noticed a lot of other hedge funds started selling at the gossip community and the currency marks.

现在你要听到的是经典的索罗斯风格。当时，他正好在纽约，而他并不总是在那里。我走进他的办公室，向他解释我要投入100%的原因。他有一个相当大的个人账户，这使我们能不互相干扰。他进行交易，而这个账户与我们的重合率为90%到95%。我告诉他我为何这样做，而当我阐述我的理论时，他脸上露出一种不悦和困惑的表情。我认为，一个经济体正在蓬勃发展，需要提高利率；而另一个经济体在崩溃，需要降低利率。这两种货币不应该捆绑在一起。我想不通他没理解什么，因为他基本上对一切都了如指掌。然后他告诉我，这是一个非常难得的单向押注，投入100%是可笑的，我们应该将200%的资金投入这笔交易。你看，他的意思是，我们应该借银行的钱来加倍押注。在一个75亿美元的基金上，他认为我们应该有150亿美元来做空英镑、做多德国马克。虽然我们最终没达到，但这反映了他的思维方式，我曾一次又一次地见证。当我们开始进行交易时，不幸的是，我们因为声誉而引起了注意。当我那晚开始抛售时，我注意到很多其他的对冲基金也在传闻圈和货币市场开始抛售。

And by midnight to one o'clock, the fords had blown out. They'd started a day and a half percent. They were like six or seven percent. And it basically wasn't trading after one in the morning. Then the British raised rates, I think from six to nine to try and stop the bleeding. And then they went to 12. I knew it was over. The fords were out so much didn't matter. It was done by noon the next day. And you were sitting at your desk looking at the Reuters screen? Yes, or whatever the screen at the time was. We only got seven and a half billion done ironically. Well, I have to ask you to do that. Had it not been for Soros, I probably would have not got to the seven and a half because you know, intending to do 15, I was in a bigger hurry. So what did you feel when he broke? There was a lot of adrenaline. It was exciting. I didn't feel bad because I thought the British economy needed it. I was gratified years later when they changed it from black Wednesday to white Wednesday.

到午夜到一点钟的时候，福特的股价已经大跌。他们从一天半的涨幅到跌幅达到了六、七个百分点左右。基本上一点之后就没有交易了。然后英国为了阻止局势恶化，利率从六提高到九，我记得后来升到十二。当时我就知道结束了。福特的股价下跌得太厉害，无济于事。一切在第二天中午之前就尘埃落定。你是不是坐在桌前看路透社的屏幕？是的，或者当时的任何屏幕。我们讽刺地说，最后也只完成了七十五亿的交易。如果不是因为索罗斯，我可能都达不到这一水平，因为我本来打算完成十五亿，所以急于行动。那么当他突破时，你是什么感觉？肾上腺素飙升，非常刺激。我没有觉得不好，因为我认为英国经济需要这样。几年后，他们从“黑色星期三”改称为“白色星期三”，我感到欣慰。

Then I went into action after it broke because the gilts were down two points, which I thought was ridiculous. British need lower rates. There's some theory in the academia that if you have a weak currency, your interest rates have to go up. So I bought gilts. I bought British stocks. There was a whole. Because what happened was that the currency depreciated and it was good for exports, right? So the stocks went up up. Yes, the stocks went up. The gilts went up because they needed lower rates and they'd been held artificially high. So there was all kinds of other stuff I did around it, which is kind of the way I trade. You get a theme and then you look at the concentric circles or the dominoes that fall because of a theme.

然后，在事件发生后，我立即采取了行动。当时英国国债下跌了两个点，我认为这是荒谬的，因为我觉得英国需要更低的利率。在学术界有一种理论认为，如果货币疲软，利率就得上升。于是我买入了英国国债和英国股票。当时的情况是货币贬值，这对出口有利，因此股票大涨。是的，股票上涨了，而且由于利率需要降低且此前被人为保持在高位，国债也上涨了。我在这过程中还进行了其他各种操作，这基本上就是我的交易方式。你先有一个主题，然后观察因为这个主题引发的相关连锁反应。

But the point was, with Soros, if he really believed something, the position could be never be big enough, particularly if it's in a liquid market. And I learned from him, I like to play the turn, maybe my ego, in a big turn in something. He was perfectly happy to play from the third to the sixth inning if we go back to baseball terms. If it's a nine inning game, he was perfectly happy to play the third to sixth inning when there was more certainty on much greater leverage. He had more courage than I did in terms of sizing positions. I don't think it totally rubbed off on me, but it certainly helped in it. It was a huge learning experience. I think the major thing I learned with him is it's not whether you're right or wrong, it's how much you make when you're right and how much you lose when you're wrong. And that's what he was probably as good as anybody who's ever been at.

翻译：但重点是，对于索罗斯来说，如果他真正相信某件事情，那么在一个流动性良好的市场中，仓位永远都不够大。我从他那里学到，我喜欢去抓住转折，也许是因为我的自尊心，在大的市场转折中下注。他非常乐意在情况更明朗时，加大杠杆，类似于棒球比赛中的第三局到第六局。一场九局的比赛中，他乐意在第三到第六局时出手，因为此时确定性更高。他在决定仓位大小方面比我更有勇气。我虽然没有完全学会这一点，但确实从中得到了很大的启发。这是一个巨大的学习经历。我想我从他那里学到的主要东西是，不在于你对或错，而在于你对时赚多少，错时亏多少。这方面他可能是历史上最厉害的人之一。

Stan, many people have heard about the pound, but not many people know that. You also did the Swedish Grana? Yes. My memory's a little less clear on that one as to the reasoning, but it was just another victim of the Deutschmark. I assume there was some kind of divergence between the two economies and there was a peg that I thought was inappropriate and it turned out. Yeah, so you took that back too. You took an auto peg too, because I thought you were also involved with the tie-bought. The tie-bought was easy. But nobody knows about this, right? No, I think Sebastian Malaby wrote a book called More Money Than God. There's a whole chapter on the tie-bought. But not on the Swedish Grana? No, the Swedish Grana. I prefer nobody knew any of this stuff. Well, we need to get it right to the history. I'm happy to talk about it 25 years later.

史丹，很多人都听说过英镑，但很少有人知道这一点。你还处理过瑞典克朗？是的。关于那次的理由我记得不太清楚，但它也成了德国马克的又一个牺牲品。我想是因为两国经济之间有某种差异，并且有一个我认为不合适的汇率固定，结果我没看错。是的，所以你也放弃了那个固定。你还放弃了一个自动汇率机制，因为我记得你也参与了泰铢。泰铢处理起来很简单。但是没人知道这些，对吗？不，我想赛巴斯蒂安·马拉比写了一本书叫《比上帝有钱》，里面有一整章讲泰铢。但没有关于瑞典克朗的？没有，瑞典克朗。我希望没人知道这些事情。不过，我们需要正确记录历史。25年后我很乐意谈论这个。

How many trades you regret not making? Oh, there's trades I regret not making constantly. I'd say one of the biggest mistakes I made was having predicted the inflation really early and feeling so strongly about it. I wrote a piece in the Wall Street Journal with my partner Christian Broda in the spring of 21. I had a massive short for me in two years. Like we just talked about with the pound, it was a one-way bet. They were 15 basis points. I was so mesmerized by where they'd been. I took most of it off at 150 basis points. It seemed like a great win from 15 to a basis point to 150. As you know, they went to 500. I regret deeply not holding that position. There's probably 30 others, but I prefer to forget my mistakes.

你后悔错过了多少交易机会？哦，我经常后悔错过交易。我想我犯的最大错误之一，就是很早就预测到了通货膨胀，并且对此很有信心。2021年春天，我和我的伙伴Christian Broda在《华尔街日报》上写过一篇文章。那时，我好不容易积累了一笔巨大的两年期空头交易。就像我们刚才谈到的英镑交易一样，这是一场单向的赌注。当时利率是15个基点，我被它曾处于的水平深深吸引。当涨到150个基点时，我就把大部分头寸撤出了。看起来这次从15个基点到150个基点的涨幅是个很不错的胜利。但你知道的，后来涨到了500个基点。我非常后悔没有坚持持有那个仓位。还有大概其他30个类似的交易，但我更喜欢忘记我的错误。

Do you think machines can take the place of humans when it comes to investing? No, I don't. But I think they can work as a co-pilot and the combination can beat anything a mere human could be. I'm lucky enough to have known Gary Kasparov for a long time. I'm co-founder of the Kasparov Chess Foundation for no good reason. I can hardly play chess. My nine-year-old daughter was beating me. That's how I started with Gary. But he was probably one of the first guys to use machines to train himself and work with them. I could see the same thing happening with money management. I don't think the pure machines, they'll make money because they have a discipline process and there's math. I think if you could find an intuitive investor who's using AI and other things to supplement, I think that would probably be the top investor in the world, not a machine.

你认为机器可以取代人类进行投资吗？我不这么认为。但我认为它们可以作为副手，与人类合作，联合起来可以超越任何仅靠人类的表现。我很幸运认识加里·卡斯帕罗夫很长时间。我是卡斯帕罗夫国际象棋基金会的联合创始人，理由不充分，因为我几乎不会下棋，我九岁的女儿都能打败我。这就是我和加里开始合作的原因。但他可能是最早使用机器来训练并与之合作的人之一。我觉得这在资金管理方面也会发生。我不认为纯粹依靠机器能赚钱，尽管它们有纪律的流程和数学支持。我认为如果能找到一个直觉敏锐的投资者，他能使用人工智能和其他工具来辅助自己，那他可能会成为世界上最顶尖的投资者，而不是一台机器。

Now, you took a sabbatical in 2000. Yeah. What was the reason behind that? It's a painful but really fun story. It really starts in 1998. Well, no, it starts in the spring of 1999. I think it was 11 or 12 internet stocks, not the leaders like AOI or Yahoo but the also rounds. I believe the position was like $200 million and in like four weeks, I had lost like $600 million. So, it was the first time I'd ever had a big drawdown. I was down like 16 or 7% in the spring of 99. I then pivoted and realized that Greenspan easing because of the age and financial crisis, while our economy was strong and we had the internet and all this behind it. I went out and hired a couple of young managers to buy tech stocks that I didn't know how to spell. They had their own little accounts and like I would plow in on top of their positions. We ended up the year, I think something like 42 net or something after being in this deep pole because I rode this crazy, nasty, quick wave in 99.

现在，您在2000年休了一段假。是的。那是什么原因呢？这是一个痛苦但又有趣的故事。一切始于1998年，不，应该说始于1999年的春天。当时我投资了大概11或12个互联网股票，不是那些领导者如AOI或雅虎，而是其它的一些股票。我相信投入的金额大约是2亿美元，但在大约四周内，我亏损了大约6亿美元。这是我第一次经历如此巨大的回撤。在1999年春天，我的资产缩水了大约16%到7%。然后我改变了策略，意识到由于亚洲金融危机，美联储主席格林斯潘正在采取宽松政策，而我们的经济很强劲，再加上互联网的发展。我于是找了一些年轻的经理人来买我甚至拼不出名字的科技股。他们有自己的小账户，我会在他们的持仓上追加投资。最终那一年结束时，我想我们净赚了大约42个点左右，尽管经历了一波疯狂、艰难又迅速的震荡，这就是1999年的故事。

So then in January, I just said, this is ridiculous. I sold out all my tech holdings. I can't remember. It was like they had grown to like $6 billion or so. It was enormous for that period of time. I actually went and told Soros why I had sold them out. Next thing that happens, the two little satellites inside, they don't sell out. They're gamblers. I don't really care because quantum's huge and they're this little thing. They're not going to affect the performance that much. But Nikolai, they're making like 4% to 5% a day. I mean, the market is still roaring going into March. I'm watching this and I'm getting really annoyed with myself that I'm not still in this trade.

所以在一月份，我就决定这样下去太荒唐了。我抛售了我所有的科技股。我记不太清了，当时好像这些投资已经涨到大约60亿美元左右。对于那个时期来说，这已经是个巨大的数目。我确实去告诉了索罗斯我为什么卖掉这些股票。接下来发生的事情是，那两个小团队没有卖掉，他们就像赌徒一样。我并不在乎，因为量子基金很大，而他们只是很小的一部分，不会对整体表现产生太大影响。但尼古拉，他们每天的收益率居然有4%到5%。我意思是，市场在三月份仍然在上涨。我看着这一切，对自己没继续持有这些股票感到非常懊恼。

And then around early March, I can't take it anymore. I told you earlier, I'm not emotional. This was a real emotional, really dumb move. I buy everything back. I think I missed the top by about an hour. So I buy back all these tech stocks and within a week I know I'm dead. And quantum goes from up 14% to up 1% in a week. And I've already been through the trauma of the spring before. I recovered from it, but it had a big effect on me. The stress, I had young kids and it's like a repeat of the year before.

然后大约在三月初，我实在受不了了。之前告诉过你，我不太情绪化。但这次我真的情绪化了，做了个很愚蠢的决定。我把所有东西都买了回来。我想我买入的时间只比最高点晚了一个小时。所以我把这些科技股全都买回来了，结果没过一周我就知道自己完蛋了。量子基金从上涨14%到只涨1%，仅用了一周时间。我以前经历过春季的波动，虽然从中恢复了，但对我影响很大。压力很大，我还有年幼的孩子，就像去年重演一样。

So I go into Soros and I tell them two things. A, I'm getting out of all this stuff. B, I'm quitting. We can't tell anybody because I got to liquidate this portfolio. But the NASDAQ is in the beginning wave of a down 90% move and you can't get out. So by the time I get out, it takes a few weeks. The fund is down like 17% and Duquesne is down 17%. And I'm just exhausted. I've been running this high profile fund for 12 years. So I sell everything out, everything. Duquesne send my investors a letter and say, I'm going on a sabbatical. I don't know whether I'm coming back or not. You can take all your money out. But if you take your money out, if I decide to come back, I can't care until I let you back in.

所以我去找索罗斯，告诉他们两件事。第一，我要退出这些投资。第二，我要辞职。我们不能告诉任何人，因为我必须先清算这个投资组合。但是，纳斯达克正在经历90%的下跌浪潮的初期阶段，你没法完全退出。因此，当我退出时，大约用了几周的时间，基金下跌了约17%，Duquesne也下跌了17%。我感到筋疲力尽，我已经管理这个知名基金12年了。所以，我卖掉了所有投资。Duquesne给我的投资者发了一封信，说我要去休假。我不确定是否会回来。你可以把你的钱全拿走，但如果你拿走了资金，而我决定回来时，我不会保证能让你重新投资。

I think I had like 200 clients, one of them pulled their money. I remember who it was, but they'll remain anonymous for now. So I shut everything down. I go to Africa with my wife and kids. And the best thing I did is during the summer, I refused to expose myself in any way to something that would tell me where the markets were. So I'm not allowed to watch TV. I'm not allowed to see the Wall Street Journal prices. Nothing. In Labor Day, I think my wife couldn't have handled me being around once the kids go back to school, sort of humor, maybe not. So I come back and it's remarkable because the S&P has rallied back almost to the high. The NASDAQ retraced about 85% of the decline. But the dollar is up, interest rates are up, and oil is up, three death knells for markets if you look at history.

我想我大概有200位客户，其中有一位提款。我记得那个人是谁，但暂时不会透露他的身份。于是我关闭了一切业务，和我的妻子和孩子们一起去了非洲。在夏天期间，我做的最棒的一件事就是完全避免接触任何能告诉我市场行情的东西。我不允许自己看电视，也不允许看《华尔街日报》的价格变化，什么都不看。到劳工节的时候，我想我妻子可能无法忍受我继续在家了，特别是孩子们开学以后，这有点幽默感，也可能不太幽默。于是我回来，令人惊讶的是，标普指数几乎回升到了之前的高点，纳斯达克指数恢复了大约85%的跌幅。但是，美元升值了，利率上升了，石油价格也上升了，根据历史，这三者都是市场的警讯。

So I then start calling all my clients who are basically small businessmen. They're not fancy institutions. And all their businesses are terrible. So then I call Ed Hyman. And I say, he's an equity strategist, micro-college. Yeah, he probably was the number one institutional guy, whatever that rating in a social investor economist. And I say, this is very odd. And I've been out of touch, dollars up, blah, blah, blah, blah. And two days later in his daily missive, he has regression analysis. And it says it's 50% I think currency, 25% oil, and 25% interest rates. And it looks one year forward and it predicts earnings. And it's predicting that earnings are going to decline 36% the next year. And the Wall Street consensus is they're going to go up 18%.

所以，我开始联系我所有的客户，他们基本上都是小企业主，不是什么大型机构。而且他们的生意都很糟糕。于是我打电话给Ed Hyman。他是一位股权策略师，也是个微观经济学家。他可能是某评价机构的头号专家。在电话中我说，这情况很奇怪，我跟不上形势了，美元上涨等等。两天后，他的每日通讯中进行了回归分析，显示分析结果是：预测的因素50%来自货币波动，25%来自石油，25%来自利率。并且它预测未来一年企业收益将下降36%。而华尔街普遍认为收益会增长18%。

So combination of that, listen to my clients, the fact that Greenspan's got a tightening directive on, which I think is inappropriate, I start buying all these treasuries. And the market doesn't go my way, but all the information keeps coming. So I keep buying more and more and more and more. So now I have a 350% tenure equivalent in the fund. And then I get lucky with the Gore Bush fiasco, economy falls apart. I end up making 40% in the fourth quarter. So I had written a year off. When I came back, I'm down 18, I assume, okay, at least I don't have to worry about this anymore. I'm finally going to have a down year. And it's like the best quarter I ever had. And to this day, if I had stayed managing money, I think I'd have been tied to knots and there's no way I would make that trade. It was the fact that I was arrayed for four months, had a clean slate, had a clear head, and just looked at the new evidence. So it was a very, very horrible beginning and a very lucky ending.

所以结合这一切，我倾听客户的意见，再加上格林斯潘的紧缩政策（我觉得这不合适），我开始大量购买国债。然而，市场走势并不如我所愿，但信息源源不断，所以我不断加码投入。现在基金中持有的十年期国债相当于350%的仓位。然后，我在戈尔布什闹剧中走运，经济崩溃，我在第四季度赚了40%。本来我以为这一年已经没希望了，当我回来时，我亏损了18%，想着至少不用再担心了，终于要迎来一个亏损的年份。结果那一季度是我经历过的最好季度。至今仍想，如果我继续管理资金，我可能已经被束缚住并且不可能做出那种交易。正是因为我曾离开了四个月，才有了一张白纸和清晰的头脑，去看待新的证据。这是一个非常糟糕的开始，但有个非常幸运的结局。

Now you don't take four months off, and you work very hard. When do you wake up in the morning? Four. Four in the morning. Yeah. What do you do? Ah, I have it. You have an office at home, right? Yeah, yeah. I immediately go to Bloomberg. And four o'clock, you do make a cup of coffee before you go to Bloomberg or straight in your eyes? Yes, no, yes. I make a cup of coffee. I go up. I don't shower yet. Check all the markets. Read the journal. Skim the financial times. Can the New York Times check like all the emails overnight? When I say check, I mean skim them for the important ones. Then it's probably a 5.15 or 5.30. Take a shower. Go to work. Start all over again. When do you go to bed? Ah, usually around 8.30, quarter or nine. As soon as I see Japan, what's happening? You basically live according to the financial markets. Yes. My mother-in-law said a long time ago on the day that it's a bond. She thought she was joking, but she's correct. It's the only thing I'm really good at. I really enjoy it. Keeps me young. I'm dealing with really young people here as analysts, but also I force to read the newspaper and force to learn about these waves. And keeps me stimulated. I love it. You're 71, right? Yes. And you will continue until you die, you think? Yes. Hopefully won't be tonight. What are you doing? I think probably not. I do. It's the last thing. We've got 10,000 of young people here.

现在你不休四个月假，而且工作非常努力。你早上几点起床？四点。早上四点。你做什么？我知道了。你家里有办公室，对吧？是的，是的。我立刻查看彭博社。那四点钟的时候，你是先冲一杯咖啡再看彭博社，还是直接盯着屏幕看？是的，先冲咖啡。我起来，不洗澡。查看所有市场，读《华尔街日报》，略读《金融时报》，查看《纽约时报》，浏览所有过夜收到的邮件。我所说的查看是指浏览重要的邮件。大概5:15或5:30，洗澡，然后去上班，重新开始新的一天。你什么时候睡觉？啊，通常在8:30或9点左右。我看到日本市场情况后就睡。你基本上是按照金融市场的节奏生活。是的。我岳母很久以前开玩笑说某天会成为一债券。她以为她在开玩笑，但她说对了。这是我真正擅长的事情。我真的很享受。它让我保持年轻。我和这里的分析师都是年轻人打交道，而且我也被迫阅读报纸，学习这些趋势。这让我充满活力。我爱这份工作。你71岁了，对吗？是的。你会继续做这份工作直到去世吗？会的。希望不会是今晚。你在做什么？我想大概不会。我在做最后一件事。这里有一万名年轻人。

Now, they want to be like you, make a lot of money, be successful in the financial markets. What should they be doing? How should they enter? What should they think about? First of all, if they're going in it for the money, they should go elsewhere. There's too many people in the business like me that just love the game and the passion for reasons I just articulated. And they're not going to be able to outwork the people that are passionate in the game. And it's not a fun game if you're losing. It's horrible. I just told you how I respond to drawdowns. But if they have a passion for it. If I was a young person, I would not get an MBA. I go find a mentor. And if they didn't want me, I would just relentlessly bug the hell out of them, which a couple have done with me until they finally accepted me to go and work for them, learn what I could from them.

现在，他们想要像你一样，赚很多钱，在金融市场取得成功。他们该怎么做？该如何进入这一领域？该考虑些什么？首先，如果他们只是为了钱而去的，就该去别的地方。这行里有太多像我这样，纯粹因为热爱和激情而参与的人。如果没有对这个行业的激情，他们是无法超越那些热爱这个行业的人。而且，如果在这个行业里一直亏损，就一点也不好玩，反而会很糟糕。我刚才已经告诉你，我是如何应对亏损的。但如果他们真的对此充满热情。假如我是一个年轻人，我不会去读MBA。我会去找一个导师。如果他们不愿意接纳我，我就会不停地去打扰他们，直到他们最终接受我，让我为他们工作，并向他们学习。

If they still like the business, just keep trying to grow your knowledge base. I would say an analyst skill set in our business is completely different than a portfolio manager skill set. Once in a while, you'll get an overlap. But I would be careful if they really love the analyst part, which is where we all start, of thinking they have to become a portfolio manager. I've seen it ruin people's lives who weren't built for trigger pulling, so they should be open-minded. I got in the business because I wanted intellectual stimulation and you're going to get plenty in either one. But that would be my advice to them and be open-minded. Stan, there's been an epic conversation. Thanks, Nick. I probably said more than I should. I'm going to do that exactly right. I'm going to be getting too much trouble. Thank you.

如果他们仍然喜欢这个行业，只需继续努力扩展你的知识。可以说，我们这个行业中，分析师的技能与投资组合经理的技能是完全不同的。有时会有重叠，但是如果他们真的热爱分析师的工作——这是我们所有人的起点——需要小心以为自己必须成为投资组合经理。我见过一些人因为不适合做决策而生活变得很糟糕，所以他们应该保持开放的心态。我进入这个行业是因为我想要智力上的刺激，而无论哪个角色都会让你得到很多这样的机会。但这就是我给他们的建议：保持开放的心态。斯坦，这次谈话非常精彩。谢谢你，尼克。我可能说得太多了，但我会按自己的想法来做。我可能会遇到很多麻烦。谢谢你。