Trump Is Facing a Losing Tariff War With China

It's official Donald Trump has been elected president of the United States. Donald Trump's first presidency gave Washington a playbook of hard-line tactics for preventing China from overtaking the US as the world's dominant economic and technological power. Trump introduced punitive tariffs on China as well as trying to rebalance the trade deficit, to try and contain China's economic rise, as well as trying to contain its military might. To me, the most beautiful word in the dictionary is tariff. Trump has focused on raising tariffs to prevent China from shipping many of their goods into the United States that perhaps are subsidized by the government.

正式消息：唐纳德·特朗普当选为美国总统。在特朗普第一次任期内，他为华盛顿提供了一套强硬的策略，以防止中国在经济和技术上超过美国成为全球主导力量。特朗普对中国实施了惩罚性关税，并试图重新平衡贸易逆差，目的是遏制中国的经济崛起，同时也试图遏制其军事实力。对我来说，字典中最美的词就是“关税”。特朗普专注于提高关税，以防止中国可能由政府补贴的许多商品进入美国市场。

In his campaign for reelection, left no doubt that his ambition for American supremacy was still his North Star. We will hire American, buy American, build American, grow American and show the whole world that the American dream is back. But after four years out of the Oval Office, Trump is returning to face an emboldened, savvier China, and one of the US may already be losing its battle to contain. Tackling that is likely to be one of Trump's primary plot lines in the sequel to his first four-year showdown with China.

在他的连任竞选中，他毫无疑问地表明，美国至上的雄心仍然是他的指引方向。我们将雇用美国人、购买美国货、建设美国、发展美国，并向全世界展示美国梦的回归。但在离开白宫四年后，特朗普回归时将面对一个更加强大且聪明的中国，美国可能已经在遏制这个大国的斗争中处于劣势。对付这个问题可能会成为特朗普在他与中国的第一场四年对抗的续集中主要的任务之一。

Let's rewind for a second. When China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, it marked a new era in global economics. Lower trade barriers allowed China to ship cheap toys, t-shirts, and TVs around the globe, and an export bonanza that helped lift hundreds of millions of Chinese into the middle class. Then around here, two pivotal events occurred.

让我们回顾一下。当中国在2001年加入世界贸易组织时，全球经济进入了一个新时代。降低的贸易壁垒使中国能够向全球运输廉价的玩具、T恤和电视，出口的繁荣帮助数亿中国人进入了中产阶级。然后，在这里发生了两个关键事件。

I am officially running for president of the United States. In that same year, China officially revealed a 10-year plan to upgrade its thriving export economy with cutting-edge innovations. Made in China 2025 is essentially President Xi Jinping's vision to secure China's place in the world as a preeminent global technological leader. At its heart, it's really about ensuring that China's national security goals are at the heart of its policymaking. It's the kind of grand ambition that would galvanize successive US presidents into taking action.

我正式宣布竞选美国总统。同年，中国正式发布了一项十年计划，旨在通过尖端创新提升其蓬勃发展的出口经济。“中国制造2025”实际上是习近平主席希望确保中国在全球确立自己作为技术领军者的地位的愿景。其实质在于将国家安全目标作为政策制定的核心。这种宏伟的目标会激励历任美国总统采取行动。

The US efforts to contain China's growth began with tariffs and some of the trade policies in the Trump administration. Basically, they sought to make it more expensive for Chinese companies to sell to the US and consequently redress a massive trade deficit. The imbalance that occurs when a nation imports more from a country than it exports to it. President Biden is holding back on a decision to scrap any Trump era tariffs on China imports. You could see this has had an impact.

美国试图遏制中国发展的努力始于特朗普政府实施的关税和一些贸易政策。他们基本上是想通过提高中国公司向美国出售商品的成本，来减少巨大的贸易逆差。这个逆差是指一个国家从另一个国家进口的商品多于出口的商品。在是否取消特朗普时期对中国进口商品的关税问题上，总统拜登一直犹豫不决。可以看到，这些措施已经产生了一定影响。

In 2023, the deficit shrank to the smallest total since 2010, reflecting a decline in imports shipped from China. But globally, China's productive prowess is at historic heights. Its manufactured goods trade surplus is the largest relative to global GDP of any country since the US right after World War II. Trump also introduced policies to control high-tech exports from US manufacturers as well as those of some allied economies which were tightened by the Biden administration.

2023年，赤字缩减至2010年以来的最低水平，这反映了从中国进口的下降。但从全球范围来看，中国的生产能力达到了历史高峰。中国制造商品的贸易顺差相对于全球GDP来说是自二战后美国以来最大的。特朗普还推出了政策来控制美国制造商以及一些盟国经济体的高科技出口，这些政策在拜登政府时期得到了加强。

So that essentially makes it impossible or much harder to transfer US goods or US technologies into China. The US government stopped Huawei from being able to sell much of its telecom equipment into the United States and then it went even a step further. It went to many of its allies around the world and tried to persuade them also to not let Huawei sell its equipment into their countries. That caused all sorts of problems for them.

这实质上使得将美国商品或技术转移到中国变得不可能或困难得多。美国政府阻止华为在美国销售其大部分电信设备，并且更进一步，游说世界各地的许多盟友也不要让华为在他们国家销售其设备。这给他们带来了各种各样的问题。

In 2022, they constrained China's ability to get the most advanced semiconductors out there including AI chips that would be used to train models like chat GPT. They also constrained the country's ability to get chip-making equipment including the machines that make the most advanced chips that drive smartphones and also AI and quantum computing. Massive appliances like these extreme ultraviolet lithography machines developed by Dutch company ASML. The constraints are also intended to hinder China's tech giants from anything that could threaten America's military superiority. A concern long intertwined with Washington's economic strategy.

在2022年，他们限制了中国获取最先进半导体的能力，包括用于训练类似ChatGPT模型的AI芯片。他们也限制了中国获取芯片制造设备的能力，这些设备包括制造推动智能手机、AI和量子计算发展的最先进芯片的机器。像荷兰ASML公司开发的极紫外光刻机等大型设备也在限制之列。这些限制措施还旨在阻碍中国的科技巨头从事任何可能威胁美国军事优势的活动。这是华盛顿长期以来与经济战略紧密相连的一个关切。

In terms of semiconductors and these really sensitive technologies, China is still lagging behind the US so we have seen some efficacy there. But the data shows US-led export controls had an unintended side effect. They forced China to become more self-reliant and invest in its own scientists and researchers. They've been very aggressive and applying for patents that they think are going to help them develop domestic industries that are critical to their future.

关于半导体和这些非常敏感的技术，中国仍然落后于美国，所以我们看到了一些有效性。不过，数据显示，美国主导的出口管制产生了一个意想不到的副作用：它们迫使中国更加自立，投入到本国的科学家和研究人员的培养中。中国一直非常积极地申请专利，他们认为这些专利将帮助他们发展对未来至关重要的国内产业。

When President Xi Jinping makes something a priority in China, he can point to banks to provide cheap financing. He can point to state-owned enterprises to throw their full weight behind backing that certain sector or industry. For instance, backers of companies like Shanghai Microelectronics, considered China's best bet for competing with ASML's advanced lithography machines. At this point, I think everybody believes that they're many years away from being able to match ASML at the pinnacle of the industry. But they're pouring billions and millions of dollars into this effort and they're very determined to be able to close the gap as much as they possibly can.

当习近平主席在中国确定某个优先事项时，他可以要求银行提供廉价融资，也可以让国有企业全力支持特定行业。例如，像上海微电子这样的公司被视为中国与ASML先进光刻机竞争的最佳希望。目前，我认为大家都认为，他们在追赶ASML行业巅峰方面还有很多年的路要走。但是，他们正在投入数十亿和数百万美元到这个努力中，他们非常坚定地希望尽可能缩小差距。

Evidence that China's semiconductor ecosystem was expanding emerged in 2023 when Huawei released the May 60, or more precisely when Bloomberg News commissioned a research firm to take one apart. Inside that phone was a semiconductor that was much more powerful than anybody thought China could make on its own. It's suggested instead of being eight or 10 years behind the US. Actually, China was four to five years behind the US. But the cross application is what really worries DC. If we can do this with a consumer product like a phone, it's just as easy to do this with much more sensitive technology that's used for military applications.

2023年，华为发布Mate 60，引发了外界对中国半导体生态系统扩张的关注。更确切地说，这种情况的引发是由于彭博新闻委托一家研究机构对其进行拆解。在这部手机中发现的半导体比外界普遍认为的中国自行制造能力要强得多。这表明中国的技术水平与美国的差距并不是八到十年，而是实际上只有四到五年。然而，最让华盛顿担忧的是这种技术的交叉应用。如果我们能在手机这样的消费产品中实现这一技术，那么在军事应用中使用更为敏感的技术也同样容易。

In other areas, China really has charged ahead to take a lead. Take a look at this chart. You can see China's market share of many high-tech exports growing, particularly EVs, despite US tariffs and restrictions on access to technology. Ultimately, there is this idea that trade always gets through. And that's sort of what we see when we think about the EV industry in China. So, for example, a big EV automaker like BYD is already getting around some of these potential restrictions by building factories in places like Thailand, in Hungary, and in Brazil.

在其他领域，中国确实已经迎头赶上并取得了领先地位。看看这张图表，你可以看到中国在许多高科技产品出口中的市场份额正在增长，特别是电动车（EV）领域，尽管存在美国的关税和技术限制。最终，人们认为贸易总是能够突破障碍。这种现象在我们考虑中国的电动车行业时尤为明显。例如，一家大型电动车制造商，比如比亚迪，已经通过在泰国、匈牙利和巴西等地建厂，来规避一些潜在的限制。

Trump wants to further limit imports of Chinese EVs and batteries. And in his second term, may try to fulfill a popular campaign pledge to protect US car makers. I will impose whatever tariffs are required 100%, 200%, 1000%. They're not going to sell one car into the United States. The concern in Washington is that the electric vehicles and some of the software behind them would be able to collect personal information and perhaps share it with the Chinese government or at least with the companies that are involved in making those vehicles. It's the kind of rhetoric Beijing has vehemently rejected.

特朗普希望进一步限制中国电动汽车和电池的进口。在他的第二任期中，他可能会努力实现一个颇受欢迎的竞选承诺，即保护美国汽车制造商。他表示，无论需要多高的关税，他都会征收，100%、200%、甚至1000%，让他们一辆车都卖不进美国。华盛顿担心，这些电动汽车及其背后的一些软件可能会收集个人信息，并可能与中国政府或至少与参与制造这些车辆的公司共享。这种言论遭到了北京的强烈反对。

So, have two US administrations hindered China in ways Trump initially intended? It doesn't appear so. The vast majority of made it in China 2025 targets that Bloomberg tracks actually have been achieved or are on track to be achieved. Tariffs have helped cut America's trade deficit with its rival. But as we saw earlier, they haven't prevented China from boosting exports elsewhere. And while the US may have slowed Beijing's progress in some areas like advanced chip making, overall Xi Jinping's industrial policies are successfully advancing China's technological capabilities.

那么，是否有两个美国政府以特朗普最初的意图阻碍了中国？看起来并不是这样。彭博社追踪的《中国制造2025》目标，大部分实际上已经实现或正在实现的轨道上。关税确实帮助减少了美国与中国的贸易逆差。但正如我们之前看到的，它们并没有阻止中国在其他地方增加出口。虽然美国可能在一些领域，比如先进芯片制造方面放缓了北京的进展，但总体而言，习近平的产业政策正在成功推动中国的技术能力提升。

But even if the US hasn't managed to trip China yet, nobody expects a second Trump administration to stop trying. If you look at the geopolitic landscape, I think it's clear that the United States will continue to apply pressure on their life or more restriction. How this sequel to Trump's first confrontation with China will play out is yet to be written. But if you listen to Trump, it's clear that keeping America on top is his ultimate goal. We can do things that nobody else can do. China doesn't have what we have. Nobody has what we have.

即便美国目前还没有成功阻止中国崛起，但谁也不认为接下来的特朗普政府会放弃尝试。看看地缘政治的格局，我认为很明显的是，美国将继续施加压力，甚至采取更多的限制措施。特朗普与中国的首次对抗后续发展尚未定论。但如果你听特朗普的话，他的最终目标明确是保持美国的领先地位。他常说，我们能做一些其他国家做不到的事情。中国没有我们拥有的东西，没有哪个国家拥有我们拥有的东西。