Stephanie Flanders的播客节目《特朗普经济学》（Trumponomics）邀请了彭博社亚洲区的Dan Tang-Kate和彭博经济（前美国国务院/国家安全委员会）的Chris Kennedy，深入探讨唐纳德·特朗普总统任期内塑造的复杂地缘政治格局。核心问题是：在全球对特朗普治下的美国“热情消退”的背景下，这在多大程度上促使各国转向中国，以及“中间国家”（middle powers）对此作何反应。 讨论伊始，便引用了皮尤研究中心一项引人注目的调查：在20个主要经济体中，中国目前的受欢迎程度已超过美国，这与三年前相比是一个巨大的转变。在加拿大和一些欧洲国家等地区，习近平甚至被视为比美国总统更可靠的伙伴。再加上中国在人工智能和电动汽车领域的进步，这似乎表明中国正在赢得迈向超级大国地位的竞争。 然而，嘉宾们认为，这远非一个非此即彼的“美国退出，中国进入”的二元局面。Dan Tang-Kate解释说，尽管特朗普“几乎做了所有能惹怒所有人的事”——他列举了H-1B签证限制、对俄罗斯石油征收关税，以及对印度等国的“外交羞辱”——但许多国家将特朗普的影响视为一种“反常现象”（aberration），而非永久性转变。印度、日本和以色列等国，特别是那些地理位置靠近中国的国家，出于冷酷的战略考量，仍然倾向于美国而非中国。 各国不完全接受中国的一个关键原因是其显著的信任赤字和缺乏透明度。与美国不同，特朗普的思想是公开可查的，而中国不透明的体系使得人们难以理解其战略方向。中国共产党的最终目标和习近平的长期执政，意味着其他国家的利益可能被“牺牲”或“被抛弃”。例如，印度认为与中国做生意风险很高，一位官员指出，“他们会榨干你，让你一无所有，而你甚至不知道发生了什么。”相比之下，美国尽管目前一团糟，但仍提供和平的权力移交和独立的法院，从而提供了一个更可预测的环境。 Chris Kennedy强调，尽管欧洲和中间国家确实正在使其关系多样化，但这并非是完全脱离美国的结构性转变。美国仍然是一个至关重要的市场，是G20中14个经济体的第一或第二大出口市场。例如，印度寻求与除中国以外的所有国家实现贸易伙伴多元化，旨在建立一个非中国的供应链，并吸引美国技术和投资以实现其发展目标。 在国防方面，欧洲正在增加投资，但取代美国的战略价值以及北约密不可分的作用将是一个“代际挑战”。同样，在印太地区，摆脱美国的军事存在也极为困难。 人工智能竞赛也呈现出微妙的局面。尽管美国在先进芯片硬件方面掌握着优势，但中国的开源权重AI模型既有效又具成本效益，使其能够在不完全依赖美国尖端技术的情况下进行部署。印度和许多国家一样，担心中国可能“武器化”因其AI广泛应用而产生的依赖性。 Flanders所说的“房间里的大象”（elephant in the room），是中国大规模的出口攻势。这种激增，尤其是在廉价电动汽车和其他产品方面，正日益被视为对 struggling economies 和制造业部门的威胁，这与通胀较低时期中国进口被视为积极因素的情况大相径庭。Chris Kennedy指出，中国并非通过将中间生产过程让给新兴经济体来提升价值链；相反，它正牢牢掌控着整个价值链，从而对中间国家造成压力。例如，德国和法国现在都认为中国的经济模式是一个主要问题。 Dan Tang-Kate总结说，习近平的国内当务之急使他无法限制中国的生产，因此，国际社会的集体行动是迫使中国改变的唯一途径。具有讽刺意味的是，特朗普的贸易战和言论，通过迫使各国质疑其对美国的依赖，可能无意中推迟了对中国具有挑战性的经济模式形成统一战线。

Stephanie Flanders' "Trumponomics" podcast, featuring Dan Tang-Kate (Bloomberg Asia) and Chris Kennedy (Bloomberg Economics, formerly State Department/NSC), delves into the complex geopolitical landscape shaped by Donald Trump's presidency. The central question explored is how much the world's perceived "falling out of love" with the U.S. under Trump translates into a rush toward China, and how "middle powers" are responding. The discussion begins by highlighting a striking Pew Research survey showing China now viewed more favorably than the U.S. in 20 leading economies – a massive swing from three years prior. Xi Jinping is even considered a more reliable partner than the U.S. president in some places, like Canada and several European countries. This, coupled with China's advances in AI and electric vehicles, might suggest China is winning the race to superpower status. However, the guests argue that this is far from a binary "US out, China in" scenario. Dan Tang-Kate explains that while Trump has "done nearly everything you could do to upset everyone"—citing H-1B visa restrictions, tariffs on Russian oil, and diplomatic "humiliation" for countries like India—many nations view Trump's impact as an "aberration" rather than a permanent shift. Countries like India, Japan, and Israel still favor the U.S. over China due to cold, hard strategic calculus, especially those geographically close to China. A key reason countries aren't fully embracing China is a significant trust deficit and lack of transparency. Unlike the U.S., where Trump's thoughts are publicly accessible, China's opaque system makes it difficult to understand its strategic direction. The ultimate goal of the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping's longevity means other countries' interests could be "thrown under the bus." India, for example, views doing business with China as risky, with an official noting, "they'll take you to the cleaners and wipe you out, and you won't even know what happened." In contrast, the U.S., despite its current messiness, still offers peaceful transfers of power and independent courts, providing a more predictable environment. Chris Kennedy emphasizes that while Europe and middle powers are indeed diversifying their relationships, it's not a complete structural shift away from the U.S. The U.S. remains a crucial market, being the top or second-highest export market for 14 of the G20 economies. India, for instance, seeks to diversify its trade partners with every country *except* China, aiming to build a non-Chinese supply chain and attracting American tech and investment for its development goals. In terms of defense, Europe is increasing its investment, but replacing the U.S.'s strategic value and NATO's intertwined role will take a "generational challenge." Similarly, in the Indo-Pacific, moving away from the U.S. military presence is extremely difficult. The AI race also presents a nuanced picture. While the U.S. holds leverage over advanced chip hardware, China's open-weight AI models are effective and cost-effective, allowing deployment without solely relying on cutting-edge U.S. tech. India, like many nations, worries about the potential for China to "weaponize" dependencies created by widespread adoption of its AI. The "elephant in the room," as Flanders terms it, is China's massive export onslaught. This surge, particularly in cheap electric vehicles and other products, is increasingly seen as a threat to struggling economies and manufacturing sectors, a far cry from when Chinese imports were viewed positively during periods of low inflation. Chris Kennedy notes that China is not moving up the value chain by surrendering intermediate production processes to emerging economies; instead, it's maintaining a grip on entire value chains, creating pressure on middle powers. Germany and France, for example, are now aligned in seeing China's economic model as a major problem. Dan Tang-Kate concludes that Xi Jinping's domestic imperatives prevent him from restraining Chinese production, making a collective international action the only way to force change. Ironically, Trump's trade wars and rhetoric, by forcing countries to question their reliance on the U.S., might have inadvertently delayed a unified front against China's challenging economic model.