冲突建模专家罗伯特·佩普（Robert Pape）声称，与最近的冲突开始前相比，现在的伊朗强大得多，这是他二十年来一直预言的“噩梦情景”。他警告称，一场迫在眉睫的全球经济危机即将到来，这主要是由石油供应日益枯竭以及美伊对抗迅速升级所驱动的。 佩普解释说，美国最初针对领导层的空袭战略未能推翻伊朗政权。尽管最高领袖和一百多名高级官员被击毙，该政权仍得以幸存，这表明仅凭空中力量不足以实现政权更迭。伊朗迅速利用权力真空，在3月初控制了霍尔木兹海峡，这成为了核心困境。 由副总统万斯（Vance）提出的旨在结束战争的谅解备忘录（MOU）之所以失败，是因为它从根本上误解了冲突的性质。万斯将其视为一笔商业交易，提供经济诱因以开放海峡。然而，佩普认为这关乎区域“力量平衡”的转变。伊朗，这个此前影响力不断下降的国家，将控制霍尔木兹海峡视为成为区域霸主的机会。伊朗签署了谅解备忘录，因为它有效巩固了其对海峡的控制，并为在该地区建立更广泛的“安全抵抗带”提供了路线图，使其能够通过也门的胡塞武装和黎巴嫩的真主党等盟友，影响霍尔木兹海峡以外的石油运输路线。然而，特朗普总统几乎立即违反了谅解备忘录的关键条款，导致敌对行动再度升级。 当前美国的军事行动，尽管声称已严重损害伊朗的能力，但在遏制伊朗威胁航运和袭击美国基地的能力方面收效甚微。佩普指出，伊朗在开战时拥有数千架无人机和导弹，其中一小部分就足以发动压倒防御的“饱和攻击”。他阐述了消除这些威胁的困难，因为它们体积小，藏匿于山区，且仍在持续生产。 经济影响是严重的： 1. **石油供应：** 霍尔木兹海峡的关闭，以及至关重要的是，胡塞武装最近关闭红海石油运输路线（延布输油管道），已严重扰乱全球石油流动。 2. **战略储备：** 美国及其盟友的战略石油储备已降至40年来的最低点，消除了应对油价上涨的任何缓冲。 3. **炼油能力：** 全球很大一部分炼油能力位于波斯湾，这意味着该地区的关闭，加上对俄罗斯炼油厂的袭击，已使全球燃料生产面临压力。 佩普将当前局势比作置身“泰坦尼克号”，正驶向经济危机的“冰山”。特朗普总统尽管承认即将到来的“混乱”，并签署谅解备忘录以避免，但他选择破坏协议，而不是“承担让伊朗获得权力的损失”。这与林登·约翰逊（Lyndon Johnson）在越南面临的困境如出一辙，当时政治生存的重要性盖过了战略军事判断。 佩普预测，美国在未来一个月内在伊朗进行地面行动的可能性很高（接近70%），目标是伊朗东南海岸具有象征意义的一小块领土（例如，恰巴哈尔或贾斯克）。这将是特朗普在11月美国中期选举前展示行动的绝望尝试，届时高油价可能会损害他所在的政党。然而，此类地面行动蕴藏着巨大风险，主要是可能引发大规模伤亡的自杀式恐怖袭击，这是佩普广泛研究过的一种现象。军事存在于恐怖分子珍视的领土上，是此类袭击的最强预测指标，这些袭击可能针对全球范围内的美军或平民。 佩普认为，美国在不显得遭受战略失败的情况下，没有简单的“退出途径”。他建议，摆脱“永久战争”情景的唯一潜在出路是，如果民主党在中期选举中赢得国会控制权并削减战争资金，就像在越南发生的那样。然而，这可能导致宪法危机，因为总统可能援引行政权力继续军事行动。 最终，佩普预测，日益加剧的经济危机和潜在的大规模伤亡袭击将迫使特朗普在伊朗发动地面行动，以寻求短期的象征性胜利。他强调，伊朗人民将付出毁灭性的人道代价，他们被卷入日益升级的冲突中，在可预见的未来看不到和平的希望。

Robert Pape, an expert in conflict modeling, asserts that Iran is significantly stronger today than before the recent conflict began, a "nightmare scenario" he has predicted for two decades. He warns of an imminent global economic crisis, primarily driven by dwindling oil supplies, and a rapidly escalating US-Iran confrontation. Pape explains that the initial US strategy of leadership-targeting airstrikes failed to topple the Iranian regime. Despite killing the Supreme Leader and over a hundred top officials, the regime endured, demonstrating that air power alone is insufficient for regime change. Iran swiftly capitalized on the power vacuum, seizing control of the Strait of Hormuz by early March, which became the central dilemma. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) proposed by Vice President Vance, intended to end the war, failed because it fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the conflict. Vance viewed it as a business deal, offering financial incentives for opening the Strait. However, Pape argues it was about a shift in the regional "balance of power." Iran, previously a declining power, saw controlling Hormuz as an opportunity to become a regional hegemon. Iran signed the MOU because it effectively solidified its control over the Strait and offered a roadmap to a broader "security resistance belt" across the region, allowing it to influence oil routes beyond Hormuz via allies like the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon. President Trump, however, almost immediately violated key clauses of the MOU, leading to renewed hostilities. The current US military actions, despite claims of significantly damaging Iran's capabilities, have been ineffective in curbing Iran's ability to threaten shipping and attack US bases. Pape notes that Iran entered the war with thousands of drones and missiles, and a small fraction is sufficient for "saturation attacks" that overwhelm defenses. He illustrates the difficulty of eliminating these threats due to their small size, hiding locations in mountainous terrain, and continuous production. The economic implications are severe: 1. **Oil Supply:** The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and, critically, the Houthis' recent shutdown of the Red Sea oil route (Yanbu pipeline) have severely disrupted global oil flows. 2. **Strategic Reserves:** The US and its allies have depleted their Strategic Petroleum Reserves to a 40-year low, removing any cushion against price hikes. 3. **Refining Capacity:** A significant portion of global refining capacity is in the Persian Gulf, meaning closures there, combined with attacks on Russian refineries, have strained global fuel production. Pape likens the situation to being on the "Titanic," heading for an "iceberg" of economic crisis. President Trump, despite acknowledging the impending "bedlam" and signing the MOU to avert it, chose to undermine the agreement rather than "own the loss" of letting Iran gain power. This mirrors Lyndon Johnson's dilemma in Vietnam, where political survival outweighed strategic military judgment. Pape predicts a high likelihood (bordering on 70%) of US ground operations in Iran within the next month, targeting a symbolic piece of territory on Iran's southeastern coast (e.g., Chabahar or Jask). This would be a desperate attempt by Trump to demonstrate action before the US midterm elections in November, where high gas prices could damage his party. However, such ground operations carry immense risks, primarily triggering mass-casualty suicide terrorist attacks, a phenomenon Pape has extensively researched. Military presence on territory prized by terrorists is the strongest predictor of such attacks, which could be launched against US troops or civilians globally. Pape sees no easy "off-ramp" for the US without appearing to suffer a strategic defeat. The only potential way out of a "forever war" scenario, he suggests, is if the Democrats win Congress in the midterms and cut war funding, as happened in Vietnam. However, this could lead to a constitutional crisis as a president might invoke executive powers to continue military actions. Ultimately, Pape's prediction is that the growing economic crisis and potential mass-casualty attacks will pressure Trump to launch ground operations in Iran, seeking a short-term symbolic victory. He emphasizes the devastating human cost for the Iranian people, who are caught in the escalating conflict, with no hope for peace in the foreseeable future.